"Lately there seems to be an explosion of press hype around the possibility of hackers exploiting Voice-over-IP networks and services (Skype, Vonage, etc.). VoIP Spam, Caller ID Spoofing, Toll Fraud, VoIP Phishing, Eavesdropping, and Call Hijacking are just some of the terms being thrown around that seem to cause a fair share of fear and uncertainty in the market.

We set out to write "Hacking Exposed VoIP" in part to combat this FUD, and also in order to help admins prioritize and defend against the most prevalent threats to VoIP today through real exploitation examples. This presentation is the byproduct of our research for the book. In it, we describe and demonstrate many real-world VoIP exploitation scenarios against SIP-based systems (Cisco, Avaya, Asterisk, etc.), while providing a sense of realism on which attacks are likely to emerge into the public domain. Also, we will unveil several VoIP security tools we wrote to facilitate the exploiting and scanning of VoIP devices, along with a few 0-days we discovered along the way.

As VoIP is rolled out rapidly to enterprise networks this year, the accessibility and sexiness of attacking VoIP technology will increase. The amount of security research and bug hunting around VoIP products has only reached the tip of the iceberg and we predict many more vulnerabilities will begin to emerge.

David Endler is the director of security research for 3Com's security division, TippingPoint. In this role, he oversees 3Com's internal product security testing, VoIP security center, and TippingPoint’s vulnerability research teams. Endler is also the chairman and founder of the industry group Voice over IP Security Alliance (VOIPSA). VOIPSA's mission is to drive adoption of VoIP by promoting the current state of VoIP security research, testing methodologies, best practices, and tools. Prior to TippingPoint, Endler led the security research teams at iDEFENSE. In previous lives, he has performed security research working for Xerox Corporation, the National Security Agency, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Endler is the author of numerous articles and papers on computer security and holds a Masters degree in Computer Science from Tulane University.

Mark Collier, CTO for SecureLogix Corporation, is responsible for research and related intellectual property. Previously, Mr. Collier was with the Southwest Research Institute for 14 years, where he contributed to and managed software research and development projects in a wide variety of fields, including information warfare. Mr. Collier has been working in the industry for 20 years, and has spent the past decade working in security, telecommunications, and networking. He is a frequent author and presenter on the topic of voice and VoIP security and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Computer Science from St. Mary’s University."

"Trusted computing is considered a dirty word by many due to its use for Digital Rights Management (DRM). There is a different side of trusted computing, however, that can solve problems information security professionals have been attempting to solve for more than three decades. Large scale deployment of trusted computing will fundamentally change the threat model we have been using for years when building operating systems, applications, and networks. This talk will examine the history of trusted computing and the current mindset of information security. From there, we will attempt to demystify the trusted computing architecture and give examples of where trusted computing is being used today. Then, we'll discuss how security constructs that we know an love today (such as firewalls and SSL transactions) fundamentally change when a trusted hardware component is added. Finally, new tools will be released to allow users to examine trusted components in their system.

Bruce Potter is the founder of the Shmoo Group of security professionals, a group dedicated to working with the community on security, privacy, and crypto issues. His areas of expertise include wireless security, software assurance, pirate songs, and restoring hopeless vehicles. Mr. Potter has co-authored several books including "802.11 Security" and "Mastering FreeBSD and OpenBSD Security" published by O'Reilly and "Mac OS X Security" by New Riders. Mr. Potter was trained in computer science at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks. Bruce Potter is a Senior Associate with Booz Allen Hamilton."

"The known topics for this year include:

1. The Worldwide SSL Analysis-There's a major flaw in the way many, many SSL devices operate. I'll discuss how widespread this flaw is, as well as announce results from this worldwide SSL scan.

2. Syntax Highlighting...on Hexdumps. Reverse Engineering efforts often require looking at hex dumps-without much context for whats being looked at. I will discuss a "bridge" position between AI and manual operation in which compression code is used to automatically visualize patterns in analyzed data.

3. Everything else "

"Reverse Engineering has come a long way-what used to be practiced behind closed doors is now a mainstream occupation practiced throughout the security industry. Compilers and languages are changing, and the reverse engineer has to adapt: Nowadays, understanding C and the target platform assembly language is not sufficient any more. Too many reverse engineers shy away from analyzing C++ code and run into trouble dealing with heavily optimized executables. This talk will list common challenges that the reverse engineer faces in the process of disassembling nowadays, and suggest some solutions. Furthermore, a list of unsolved problems will be discussed.

Halvar Flake is SABRE Labs' founder and Black Hat's resident reverse engineer. Originating in the fields of copy protection and digital rights management, he gravitated more and more towards network securityover time as he realized that constructive copy protection is more or less fighting windmills. After writing his first few exploits he was hooked and realized that reverse engineering experience is a very handy asset when dealing with COTS software. With extensive experience in reverse engineering, network security, penetration testing and exploit development he recently joined Black Hat as their main reverse engineer."

"PL/SQL is the flagship language used inside the Oracle database for many years and through many versions to allow customers to implement their business rules and logic. Oracle has recognized that it is necessary for customers to protect their intellectual property coded in PL/SQL and has provided the wrap program. The wrapping mechanism has been cracked some years ago and there are unwrapping tools in the black hat community. Oracle has beefed up the wrapping mechanism in Oracle 10g to in part counter this.

What is not common knowledge amongst the user community is that PL/SQL code installed in the database is not secure and can be read if you are in possession of an unwrapper. What is not common knowledge even in the security community is that Oracle always knew that PL/SQL can be unwrapped due to the methods chosen to wrap it in the first place, what is more surprising is that there are features and programs actually shipped with the database software that show how it is possible to unwrap PL/SQL without using reverse engineering techniques-if you know where to look!

Pete Finnigan is well known in the Oracle community for hosting his Oracle security website, www.petefinnigan.com, which includes a whole raft of Oracle security information from blogs, forums, tools, papers and links. He is also the author of the "SANS Oracle Security Step-By-Step" guide book, he is also the author of the SANS GIAC Oracle security course. Pete currently works for Siemens Insight Consulting as head of their database security team performing security audits, training, design and architecture reviews. He has also written many useful Oracle security scripts and password lists available from his website and has also written many papers on the subject published by many different sites including Security Focus and iDefence. Pete is also a member of the OakTable a group of the world’s leading Oracle researchers."

"VoIP applications went mainstream, although the underlying protocols are still undergoing constant development. The SIP protocol being the main driver behind this has been analyzed, fuzzed and put to the test before, but interoperability weaknesses still yield a large field for attacks. This presentation gives a short introduction to the SIP protocol and the threats it exposes; enough to understand the issues described. A SIP stack fingerprinting tool will be released during the talk which allows different stacks to be identified and classified for further attacks. The main part focuses on practical attacks targeting features from caller ID spoofing to Lawful Interception. Various attack vectors are pointed out to allow further exploit development.

Hendrik Scholz is a lead VoIP developer and Systems Engineer at Freenet Cityline GmbH in Kiel, Germany. His daily jobs consist of developing server side systems and features as well as tracking down bugs in SIP stacks. He earned his Bachelor in Computer Science from the German University of Applied Sciences Kiel in 2003. While studying abroad in Melbourne, Australia and working as Unix developer in Atlanta, GA and Orlando, FL, he contributed to FreeBSD and specialized in networking security issues. He released Operating System level as well as Application Layer fingerprinting tools.

Having access to present and upcoming VoIP devices, hacking on these has become a spare time passion."

"Historically, only file systems were considered as locations where evidence could be found. But what about the volatile memory which contains a huge amount of useful information such as the content of clipboards or the SAM database? How long can volatile data stay in the main memory? What about anti-forensic methods of defeating disk forensic and incident response tools? Why is the content of the memory not dumped during the process of data collection from a suspicious computer? What is the best way to analyze the physical memory from Windows® and Linux® machines? Is it possible? I will answer these questions during my Black Hat presentation which is focused on methods of finding digital evidence in the physical memory of Windows and Linux machines.

During the presentation, methods of investigations of the physical memory from a compromised machine will be discussed. Through these methods, it is possible to extract useful information from the memory such as the full content of .dll and .exe files, various caches like clipboards, detailed information about each process (e.g. owner, MAC times, content) and information about processes that were being executed and were terminated in the past. Also, methods of correlating page frames even from swap areas will be discussed. The techniques covered during the presentation will lead you through the process of analyzing important structures and recovering the content of files from the physical memory. As an integral part of the presentation, new ways of detecting hidden objects and methods of detecting kernel modification will be presented. These methods can be used to identify compromised machines and to detect malicious code such memory-resident rootkits or worms.

Finally, toolkits will be presented to help an investigator to extract information from an image of the physical memory or from the memory object on a live system.

Mariusz Burdach is a security researcher specializing in forensics, reverse engineering, intrusion detection, advanced intrusion protection and security management. He has published several articles on these topics in online and in hardcover magazines. Mariusz is currently working on methods of forensic analysis of physical memory and methods of detecting kernel mode rootkits. In addition, he is also an expert witness and a SANS Local Mentor. As an independent instructor, he has been teaching incident response and forensic analysis and hardening of Unix/Linux systems for over 4 years. Mariusz has served as a consultant, auditor and incident handler to many government and financial institutions in Poland. He lives in Warsaw, Poland."

"This presentation prepares attackers and defenders to perform automated testing of some popular Windows® interprocess communication mechanisms. The testing will focus on binary win32 applications, and will not require source code or symbols for the applications being tested. Attendees will be briefly introduced to several types of named securable Windows communication objects, including Named Pipes and Shared Sections (named Mutexes, Semaphores and Events and will also be included but to a lesser degree). Audience members will learn techniques for identifying when and where these communication objects are being used by applications as well as how to programmatically intercept their creation to assist in fuzzing. iSEC will share tools used for interception and fuzzing including tools for hooking arbitrary executable's creation of IPC primitives. Working examples of fuzzers with source code written in Python and C++ will demonstrate altering of data flowing through these IPC channels to turn simple application functionality tests into powerful security-focused penetration tests.

Attendees should be familiar with programming in C++ or Python, and have a security research interest in win32. Developers, QA testers, penetration testers, architects and researchers are the primary target audience for this somewhat technical talk.

Jesse Burns is a Principal Partner at iSEC Partners, where he works as a penetration tester. Previous to founding iSEC Partners, Jesse was a Managing Security Architect with @Stake and a software developer who focused on security-related projects on Windows® and various flavors of Unix®. Jesse presented in December of 2004 at the SyScan conference in Singapore on exploiting weakness in the NTLM authentication protocol. He has also presented at OWASP, Directory Management World and for his many security consulting clients on issues ranging from cryptographic attacks to emerging web application threats. He is currently working on a book with Scott Stender and Alex Stamos on attacking modern web applications for publication with Addison Wesley."

"During this presentation SensePost will discuss and demonstrate two pieces of new technology - the Suru WebProxy and the SP_LR Generic network proxy.

The Suru web proxy is an inline web proxy (the likes of Paros, @stake webproxy and Webscarab) and offers the analyst unparalleled functionality. Are the days of the web proxy counted? Is there really room for another web proxy? Come to their presentation and see what happened when the guys at SensePost decided to develop a proxy with punch.

SP_LR is a generic proxy framework that can be used for malware analysis, fuzzing or just the terminally curious. Its a tiny, generic proxy built on open-source tools with extensibility in mind at a low low price (GPL - Free as in beer).

Both proxies serve distinct masters and will be valuable tools in any analysts arsenal.."

"Thomas Ptacek and Dave Goldsmith present the results of Matasano Security's research into the resilience of Enterprise Agents: the most dangerous programs you've never heard of, responsible for over $2B a year in product revenue, running on the most critical enterprise servers from app servers to mainframes.

WHY THIS TALK?

1. Enterprise Agents are their own worms, preinstalled for the convenience of attackers. We found critical, show-stopping vulnerabilities in every system we looked at.

2. It's a whirlwind tour of the landscape of internal security. We reversed proprietary binaries, deciphered custom protocols, and cracked encryption algorithms.

3. It's a call to arms. Applications running behind the firewall aren't getting audited. While vulnerability research talent fights over the scraps of Windows OS security, hundreds of thousands of machines remain vulnerable to attacks most people thought were eliminated in the early '90s

For the past 12 months, Matasano Security has conducted a research project into the security of internal applications. Our theory? That any code which doesn't run in front of a firewall, exposed to Internet hackers, is unaudited, wide open-fertile ground for ever-adapting attackers. Our findings? Tens of applications reversed, proprietary protocols deciphered, "state-of-the-art" XOR encryption algorithms cracked, and it's worse than we thought. Perhaps more than any other software, save the operating system itself, insecure systems management applications pose a grave threat to enterprise security. They're the Agobot that your administrators installed for you.

Internal security is a nightmare, and things are going to get worse before they get horrible. "