Black Hat Briefings, USA 2007 [Audio] Presentations from the security conference.

RDS-TMC is a standard based on RDS (Radio Data System) for communicating over FM radio Traffic Information for Satellite Navigation Systems.

All modern in-car Satellite Navigation systems sold in Europe use RDS-TMC to receive broadcasts containing up to date information about traffic conditions such as queues and accidents and provide detours in case they affect the plotted course. The system is increasingly being used around Europe and North America.

The audience will be introduced to RDS/RDS-TMC concepts and protocols and we'll show how to decode/encode such messages using a standard PC and cheap home-made electronics, with the intent of injecting information in the broadcast RDS-TMC stream manipulating the information displayed by the satellite navigator.

We'll discover the obscure (but scary!) messages that can be broadcast (and that are not usually seen over legitimate RDS-TMC traffic), the limits of standard SatNav systems when flooded with unusual messages and the role that RDS-TMC injection / jamming can play in social engineering attempts (hitmen in the audience will love this!).

In order to maximize the presentation we'll also demo the injection...hopefully at low power so that we won't piss off local radio broadcasts.

Tracing a malicious insider is hard; proving their guilt even harder. In this talk, we will discuss the challenges faced by digital investigators in solving electronic crime committed by knowledgeable insiders. These challenges will be presented in light of three real world investigations conducted by the presenters. The focus of this talk will on the technicalities of the attacks, the motivation of the attackers, and the response techniques used by the investigators to solve the respective crimes.

The first case is the high-profile U.S. v Duronio trial, in which Keith Jones testified as the DoJ?s computer forensics expert. Mr. Jones testified for over five days about how Mr. Duronio, a disgruntled employee, planted a logic bomb within UBS?s network to render critical trading servers unusable. His testimony was key in the prosecution of the accused on charges of securities fraud and electronic crime. Mr. Jones will present the information as he did to the jury during this trial.

The second incident involved a recently fired employee at a large retail organization. The irked employee made his way from a store wireless network into the company's core credit card processing systems. The purpose of the attack was to malign the company?s image by releasing the stolen data on the Internet. We will discuss the anatomy of the "hack", the vulnerabilities exploited along the way, and our sleepless nights in Miami honing in on the attacker.

The final case presented will focus on the technicalities of web browser forensics and how it facilitated the uncovering of critical electronic evidence that incriminated a wrong-doer, and more importantly freed an innocent systems administrator at a law firm from being terminated and facing legal music.

The common thread in all these cases - a malicious insider!

During 2006 vulnerabilities in wireless LAN drivers gained an increasing attention in security community. One can explain this by the fact that any hacker can take control over every vulnerable laptop of entire enterprise without any "visible" connection with those laptops and execute a malicious code in kernel.

This work describes the process behind hunting remote and local vulnerabilities in wireless LAN drivers as well as in other types of network drivers. The first part of the work describes simple and much more advanced examples of remote execution vulnerabilities in wireless device drivers that should be considered during quest for vulnerabilities. We demonstrate an example design of kernel-mode payload on Windows and construct a simple wireless frames fuzzer. The second part of the work explains local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in I/O Control device driver interface on Windows, introduces a technique to uncover them and IOCTLBO fuzzer implementing this technique. Third part of the work describes specific examples of local vulnerabilities in network drivers that can be exploited remotely and introduces an exploitation technique. In the last part of the work we present case studies of remote and local vulnerabilities mitigated in Intel Centrino wireless LAN drivers. The work concludes discussing vulnerabilities in other types of network drivers.

We present Sphinx, a new fully anomaly-based Web Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDS). Sphinx has been implemented as an Apache module (like ModSecurity, the most deployed Web Application Firewall), therefore can deal with SSL and POST data. Our system uses different techniques at the same time to improve detection and false positive rates. Being anomaly-based, Sphinx needs a training phase before the real detection could start: during the training, Sphinx ?learns? automatically the type of each parameter inside user requests and applies the most suitable model to detect attacks. We define 3 basic types: numerical, short and long texts. The idea behind this is that, e.g., if we observe only integer values and later some text, that is likely to be an attack (e.g. SQL Injection or XSS).

For numerical parameters, a type checker is applied. For short texts (text with fixed length or slight variations), Sphinx uses a grammar checker: grammars are built observing the parameter content (during the training phase) and then used to check the similarity of new content during detection. Long texts are typically e-mail/forum messages, which change often their length and would produce infeasible grammars. For this kind of content we use a modified version of our NIDS POSEIDON, using n-gram analysis.

Furthermore, Sphinx can actively support the deployment of WAFs like ModSecurity: e.g. if we are deploying an ad hoc web application, most probably we need to spend a lot of time on writing signatures (or when 3rd parties? software is used). Once Sphinx accomplishes the training phase, it can automatically generates ModSecurity-style signatures for numerical and (some) short-text parameters, making the deployment much easier.

Malicious software authors use code injection techniques to avoid detection, bypass host-level security controls, thwart the efforts of human analysts, and make traditional memory forensics ineffective. Often a forensic examiner or incident response analyst may not know the weaknesses of the tools they are using or the advantage the attacker has over those tools by hiding in certain locations.

This session provides a detailed exploration of code injection attacks and novel countermeasures, including:

1. The technical details of code injection starting with basic user land techniques and continuing through to the most advanced kernel injection techniques faced today.

2. Case study of captured malware that reveals how these techniques are used in real world situations.

3. Discussion of current memory forensic strengths and weaknesses.

4. New memory forensic analysis techniques for determining if a potential victim machine has been infected via code injection.

5. Post acquisition analysis.

Cross Site Scripting has received much attention over the last several years, although some of its more ominous implications have not received much attention. Anti-DNS pinning is a relatively new threat that, while not well understood by most security professionals, is far from theoretical. This presentation will focus on a live demonstration of anti-DNS pinning techniques. A victim web browser will be used to execute arbitrary, interactive HTTP requests to any server, completely bypassing perimeter firewalls.

This is NOT a Jickto knockoff. Jickto relies on using a proxy or caching site like Google to place both sites in the same domain. This does not allow for full interaction with dynamic pages, or any interaction with internal web sites. This demonstration allows full interaction with arbitrary web servers in the intranet environment. No browser bugs or plug-ins are required to accomplish this, only JavaScript.

The presenter will demonstrate an automated attack process that provides an HTTP proxy service for the attacker?s browser after scanning the internal network for web servers. New requests are retrieved from the attack server by using the width and height of truncated images (only 66 bytes) as a covert channel.*** This bypasses the browser DOM normal behavior of allowing data to be requested only from the server that provided the HTML.

Before demonstrating the tool, anti-DNS pinning will be explained in a way that anyone familiar with the basics of DNS and HTTP will understand. The presenter will describe the presentation environment and attack components, then walk through the steps in an attack. Once the foundation concepts have been established, the live demonstration will be performed.

Towards the end, the presentation will also briefly cover suggested defenses, including changing pinning behavior in browsers, better intranet security, gateway behavioral scanners, increased granularity for IE security zones, and introduction of security zones into Mozilla and other browsers.

In 2007 black hat Europe a talk was given titled: "Heap Feng Shui in JavaScript"

That presentation introduced a new technique for precise manipulation of the browser heap layout using specific sequences of JavaScript allocations.

This allowed an attacker to set up the heap in any desired state and exploit difficult heap corruption vulnerabilities with more reliability and precision.

Our talk is a defensive response to this new technique. We will begin with an overview of "in the wild" heap spray exploits and how we can catch them, as well other zero day exploits using our exploit-detection module.

We will give an overview of the analysis engine we have built that utilizes this module and we will demonstrate scanning and detection of a "live" website hosting a heap corruption vulnerability.

The talk will focus on Internet Explorer exploitation, but the general technique presented is applicable to other browsers as well.

Get ready for the code to fly as two masters compete to discover as many security vulnerabilities in a single application as possible. In the spirit of the Food Network?s cult favorite show, Iron Chef, our Chairman will reveal the surprise ingredient (the code), and then let the challenger and the ?Iron Hacker? face off in a frenetic security battle. The guest panel will judge the tools created and used to determine which who's hack-fu will be victorious and who will be vanquished.

Remember, our testers have only one hour to complete their challenge and will only be able to use tools they themselves have created. Watch as the masters wield their own weapons. What will they concoct? Who will come out victorious? Which techniques will prove most effective in a high-pressure every-minute-counts environment? Come and see for yourself!

Visit ?Vulnerability Stadium? and watch a fierce battle. Our contestants will have upwards of five minutes to discuss their strategy before the battle begins. The show will be taped live with a studio audience and our co-hosts will provide running commentary, encourage the competitors and judge the results with the audience, based on originality of created tool, presentation of the number of bugs, and creativity of using the tool when searching for vulnerabilities. So Black Hat attendees... with an open application and an empty exploit list, I say unto you in the words of my uncle: Hack This!

Discussion of the power of Digital Forensics today and the real-world challenges. Also discuss the Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) and the triad of organizations that comprise DC3; The Defense Computer Forensics Lab, the Defense Cyber Crime Institute, and the Defense Cyber Investigations Training Academy. The evolving discipline of cyber crime investigations and the critical role law enforcement plays in a Network Centric Warfare environment. The accreditation process for a cyber forensics lab, the forensic processes, and capabilities.

This year, there will be two separate panels:

IA Panel: Information assurance, CERTS, first responders organizations

from agencies including DC3, DHS, SOCOM, NSA, OSD, NDU, and GAO

LE Panel: Law enforcement, counterintelligence agencies including DC3, FBI,

IRS, NCIS, NASA, DoJ, NWC3, US Postal IG, FLETC, and RCMP

Jim Christy is a recently (1 Dec 2006) retired special agent that specialized in cyber crime investigations and digital evidence for over 20 years and 35 years of federal service. Jim is currently the Director of Futures Exploration for the Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) and was profiled in Wired Magazine in January 2007.

* Dir of Futures Exploration

* Dir the Defense Cyber Crime Institute

* R&D of digital forensic tools and processes

* T&Validation of tools both Hardware & software used in an accredited

digital forensics lab

* Dir of Ops for Defense Computer Forensics Lab

* LE/CI Liaison to OSD IA

* DoD Rep to Presidents Infrastructure Protection Task Force

* US Senate Investigator Perm Sub of Invest

* 11 years Dir of AF OSI Computer Crime Investigations

2007 held numerous watershed events for the security industry. Innovation is needed and the money is there. Come to this session and meet the VCs actively investing in security, web, and mobile applications. Learn how VCs see the future, what they are looking for, and how best to utilize them to further your innovations. This session will conclude with a announcement about the Black Hat/DEFCON Open, a business plan competition focused on innovations in security; winners will be announced at Black Hat 2008 and DEFCON 16.