Geneva, Switzerland

The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies stands as a pivotal, though often misunderstood, multilateral export control regime formed to maintain international peace and stability amid rapidly evolving military and technological landscapes. To appreciate its contemporary significance and its notable limitations, it is essential to trace its historical underpinnings, its structural design, and the shifting global security context that both necessitated and constrained its architecture.

Origins in the Cold War and the Legacy of COCOM

Wassenaar’s genesis is inseparable from its predecessor, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), established in 1949 amidst the geopolitical tensions marking the nascent Cold War. COCOM’s founding mission was clear: to prevent technologically advanced Western nations from exporting military or dual-use technologies to the Soviet Union and its allies that could destabilize the strategic balance. It wielded significant powers, including veto rights whereby member states could strictly block exports to targeted nations. Headquartered in Paris and initially composed of a tight-knit group of NATO and aligned states, COCOM represented a binding, ideologically charged export control bloc with enforcement teeth tailored to its era.

However, the post–Cold War period rendered the East-West dichotomy obsolete. The Soviet Union and Eastern bloc disintegrated, Europe’s political map changed dramatically, and technology diffusion accelerated in complexity and diversity. Recognizing these realities, COCOM’s member states convened to dissolve the regime, culminating in a November 1993 High-Level Meeting that agreed to replace COCOM with a more inclusive and geopolitically neutral framework: the “New Forum.” This precursor rapidly evolved, and in December 1995, the arrangement was formalized in Wassenaar, Netherlands, with operational commencement in 1996.

Wassenaar departed significantly from COCOM’s foundational assumptions. It embodied a voluntary, consensus arrangement among a far broader group of roughly 40 states, transcending rigid ideological blocks. Rather than exclusionary export bans, members committed to transparency through information exchange about their dual-use exports and harmonized licensing practices. Notably, Wassenaar abandoned veto powers and binding enforcement, preferring cooperative dialogue and collective restraint to unilateral coercion. This transformation reflected both the multipolar political landscape and a strategic desire to balance trade interests with security objectives.

The Architecture of Scope: State-Centric and Physical Goods Focus

At its core, the Arrangement regulates the export of “dual-use” goods, products, and technologies with both civilian and military applications to prevent their misuse or diversion, particularly in destabilizing or repressive contexts. Early Wassenaar controls focused heavily on tangible goods: conventional weapons, missile technology, cryptography hardware, and related software with well-defined military utility. Member nations adopt control lists specifying these items, which inform national export licensing systems. The Arrangement’s emphasis has been on tangible assets crossing borders, aligning with regulatory frameworks predicated on physical inspection and customs enforcement.

Wassenaar’s governance is characterized by plenary meetings, working groups, and a consensus decision-making process, a mechanism that encourages collaboration yet precludes legally binding resolutions. Such an approach has facilitated broad membership and operational continuity, yet embeds an inherent trade-off between inclusivity and decisive regulatory action.

In today’s context, dual-use technology extends beyond traditional weapons to include high-precision drones, advanced sensors, cryptographic systems, and microprocessors that can serve both civilian and military applications. Intangible exports increasingly dominate the risk landscape, encompassing technical training for sophisticated surveillance systems, operational consulting for cybersecurity or law enforcement platforms, and cloud-based data analytics that can enable predictive policing or signal intelligence across borders.

Technological and Geopolitical Transformations Challenge Scope

While suitable for late-20th-century conventional arms control, the regime confronts profound challenges in a 21st-century security landscape dominated by digital surveillance, software-defined weaponry, and privatized intelligence networks. The proliferation of cyber-surveillance tools, biometric tracking systems, artificial intelligence-powered predictive algorithms, and cloud-based operational platforms, often developed and marketed by private contractors, complicates traditional control paradigms.

Modern “exports” frequently involve intangible deliveries: software licenses, technical training, operational consulting, remote monitoring capabilities, and data-processing services. These cross borders invisibly, sidestepping customs and physical inspections and thus eluding established control mechanisms. Wassenaar’s control lists and protocols, primarily designed to govern tangible goods, inadequately address these intangible vectors, causing significant regulatory blind spots.

Moreover, geopolitical shifts have introduced varied member state perspectives and priorities, complicating consensus on sensitive categories warranting control. The balance between trade liberalization, national security, and human rights considerations fuels ongoing policy tensions and stalls critical updates to the regime’s scope.

Toward a Broader and More Adaptive Definition of Export Controls

In light of these shifts, experts advocate expanding Wassenaar’s regulatory ambit to explicitly include services, training, and operational knowledge, which are components critical to the deployment and misuse potential of dual-use surveillance and repression technologies. This would mandate licensing not just of physical devices but also of intangible technical know-how and strategic guidance that enable complex surveillance architectures to be implemented across jurisdictions.

Such an expansion requires not only definitional clarifications but also mechanisms for effective review, monitoring, and enforcement adapted to the digital age’s opacity and speed. Without this evolution, Wassenaar risks obsolescence in governing the very capabilities that define modern intelligence and security economies.

Preview

Having laid out the foundational scope and historical terrain shaping the Wassenaar Arrangement, the ensuing section will analyze the regime’s structural weaknesses, including its voluntary, consensus-driven model, fragmented national implementations, and sluggish adaptation, which are factors critically responsible for its diminished effectiveness in contemporary export control governance.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit drtamaradixon.substack.com