In the spring of 2025, I became aware that law-enforcement in Las Vegas Nevada supported by private military security contractors had access to my gig work platform(s) such as DoorDash. They not only had access apparently to the data that I shared with the third-party app, but they could manipulate the app to control my deliveries to the point of being able to direct all my deliveries during what I recall to be a 30 to 60 day period off the top of my head to be made to law enforcement at their homes and to locations where they appeared to be conducting stake outs.
At a later date, I became aware that they had access to my personal delivery and ride share apps (Instacart, Amazon, DoorDash, UberEats, Uber and Lyft) as well. Once I became a victim of unlawful surveillance, monitoring of my electronic devices, tracking and covert harm, I could no longer even use the delivery apps without tampering or ride-share apps without being assigned a compromised driver participating in the harm.
My personal experience raises constitutional and civil rights questions.
Access/acquisition:
What data did federal law enforcement, law enforcement and or their contractors, specifically private military and security contractors, obtain from Instacart, Uber, Lyft, DoorDash, etc.? Are they legally entitled to access any data that a citizen provides to a third-party platform, or are there constitutional or civil rights protections that apply to that information? What determines which categories of information are protected, and what legal process is required to obtain them?
If information about an individual was obtained from a third-party gig platform, what records document that access, and what legal mechanism is available to the individual to determine whether such access occurred and obtain those records?
Tracking/monitoring:
After obtaining information from third-party gig platforms, did federal law enforcement, law enforcement, and/or their contractors, specifically private military and security contractors, use that information to reconstruct, track, surveil, or monitor an individual’s movements, associations, activities, and/or pattern of life? If so, what laws or constitutional protections govern that use, and what legal authority or process is required before information obtained from a third-party platform can be used in this manner?
Use of the information:
After obtaining information from third-party gig platforms, did federal law enforcement, law enforcement, and/or their contractors, specifically private military and security contractors, use that information for purposes beyond tracking or monitoring, including investigations, enforcement, profiling, or other activities directed at a particular individual, group, or community? If so, what laws or constitutional protections govern those uses, and what legal authority, oversight, or process is required?
Operational manipulation:
Federal law enforcement, law enforcement, and/or their contractors, specifically private military and security contractors, appear to have the ability to use a third-party gig platform as an operational capability by influencing or manipulating its dispatch, delivery routing, driver assignment, or other operational functions. What legal authority, if any, governs such a capability, and would such manipulation, if conducted without legal or platform authorization, constitute unauthorized manipulation, hacking, or unlawful interference with the platform’s operations? Did the third-party gig platform itself authorize or consent to this use of its operational functions, or was the platform being accessed or manipulated without the platform’s knowledge or authorization?
Private Contractor Authority
What legal authority, if any, permits private military and security contractors to independently obtain, access, use, or manipulate third-party gig-platform information or operational functions on behalf of, at the direction of, or in coordination with federal law enforcement and/or law enforcement? Does direction or coordination by law enforcement itself confer legal authority on a private contractor to perform functions that the contractor would otherwise have no legal authority to perform?
This is the first installment in a series. The same legal, constitutional, civil-rights, privacy, and data-protection questions raised in this article also extend to hotel and airline booking platforms and the information associated with those reservations. Those questions are not limited to the reservation itself, but also include whether the operational functions of a booking platform can be manipulated in ways that affect the choices and options presented to an individual when making a reservation.
The hotel and airline issues also raise additional questions because, in my experience, the use of booking information appeared to extend beyond the reservation process and into the physical environment, facilitating in-person harm after a victim arrived at a hotel or while traveling on a flight. This raises questions about who has access to that booking information, who had the authority or capability to use it in this manner to facilitate placing law enforcement, private security contractors, or local proxies around an individual, and whether hotel brands and airlines were aware of or authorized the use of their properties, personnel, platforms, and/or operational systems in connection with such activity.
I will address these additional questions in subsequent installments.
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