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Bowe v. United States
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us1r04_n7ip.pdf
Case background
Petitioner Michael S. Bowe is serving a 24-year federal sentence after
pleading guilty in 2008 to three offenses: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act
robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and using a firearm in relation to a
“crime of violence” under Section 924(c). The firearm conviction carried a
mandatory 10-year sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence for the
robbery offenses, and that conviction was valid only if at least one predicate
offense qualified as a “crime of violence” under Section 924(c)’s elements
clause or residual clause. Years after Bowe was sentenced, this Court held in
United States v. Davis that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague,
and in United States v. Taylor that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime
of violence under the elements clause — decisions that call his Section 924(c)
conviction into question.
A comprehensive statutory scheme governs when prisoners may seek
postconviction relief, and under AEDPA a second or successive effort first
requires a prisoner to obtain authorization from a court of appeals. Bowe
repeatedly asked the Eleventh Circuit for permission to file a second or
successive motion under Section 2255, but his requests were denied; among
other things, a panel applied Section 2244(b)(1)’s “old-claim” bar to dismiss
the portion of his request that had been raised in a prior application. Bowe
sought certiorari, noting a Circuit split — six Circuits apply the old-claim
bar to federal prisoners while three do not — and the Court granted review.
Questions Presented
(1) Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
(2) Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Holding
First, the Court has jurisdiction. Section 2244(b)(3)(E) — which bars
certiorari review of the denial of an authorization to file a second or
successive “application” — does not apply to federal prisoners. It is housed
within Section 2244, which imposes requirements that apply only to state
prisoners, and it speaks only to “applications,” whereas federal prisoners
file “motions.” Nor does Section 2255(h)’s narrow cross-reference to Section
2244 supply the clear indication needed to strip the Court of its broad
certiorari jurisdiction; that cross-reference incorporates only the procedures
for how a panel certifies a filing, not the certiorari bar.
Second, Section 2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar does not apply to second or
successive motions filed by federal prisoners under Section 2255(h). By its
plain terms it governs claims “presented in a second or successive habeas
corpus application under section 2254,” and state prisoners alone file Section
2254 applications. Section 2255(h)’s cross-reference incorporates Section
2244’s procedures only as they relate to how a panel certifies a filing, not
the old-claim content bar. The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is vacated and
the case remanded for it to determine in the first instance whether Bowe
should receive authorization under the correct standard.
The Court
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson
filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Justices Thomas and Alito joined, and in which Justice Barrett joined as
to Part I.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Bowe v. United States, written by Justice Sotomayor.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Sotomayor. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
View all episodes
By So OrderedOpinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us1r04_n7ip.pdf
Case background
Petitioner Michael S. Bowe is serving a 24-year federal sentence after
pleading guilty in 2008 to three offenses: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act
robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and using a firearm in relation to a
“crime of violence” under Section 924(c). The firearm conviction carried a
mandatory 10-year sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence for the
robbery offenses, and that conviction was valid only if at least one predicate
offense qualified as a “crime of violence” under Section 924(c)’s elements
clause or residual clause. Years after Bowe was sentenced, this Court held in
United States v. Davis that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague,
and in United States v. Taylor that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime
of violence under the elements clause — decisions that call his Section 924(c)
conviction into question.
A comprehensive statutory scheme governs when prisoners may seek
postconviction relief, and under AEDPA a second or successive effort first
requires a prisoner to obtain authorization from a court of appeals. Bowe
repeatedly asked the Eleventh Circuit for permission to file a second or
successive motion under Section 2255, but his requests were denied; among
other things, a panel applied Section 2244(b)(1)’s “old-claim” bar to dismiss
the portion of his request that had been raised in a prior application. Bowe
sought certiorari, noting a Circuit split — six Circuits apply the old-claim
bar to federal prisoners while three do not — and the Court granted review.
Questions Presented
(1) Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
(2) Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Holding
First, the Court has jurisdiction. Section 2244(b)(3)(E) — which bars
certiorari review of the denial of an authorization to file a second or
successive “application” — does not apply to federal prisoners. It is housed
within Section 2244, which imposes requirements that apply only to state
prisoners, and it speaks only to “applications,” whereas federal prisoners
file “motions.” Nor does Section 2255(h)’s narrow cross-reference to Section
2244 supply the clear indication needed to strip the Court of its broad
certiorari jurisdiction; that cross-reference incorporates only the procedures
for how a panel certifies a filing, not the certiorari bar.
Second, Section 2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar does not apply to second or
successive motions filed by federal prisoners under Section 2255(h). By its
plain terms it governs claims “presented in a second or successive habeas
corpus application under section 2254,” and state prisoners alone file Section
2254 applications. Section 2255(h)’s cross-reference incorporates Section
2244’s procedures only as they relate to how a panel certifies a filing, not
the old-claim content bar. The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is vacated and
the case remanded for it to determine in the first instance whether Bowe
should receive authorization under the correct standard.
The Court
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson
filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Justices Thomas and Alito joined, and in which Justice Barrett joined as
to Part I.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Bowe v. United States, written by Justice Sotomayor.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Sotomayor. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.