So Ordered

By So Ordered

AI-narrated readings of U.S. Supreme Court majority opinions. Each episode pairs the Court's syllabus with a reading of the majority opinion, lightly adapted for listening and voiced by a synthesized ... more

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How many episodes does So Ordered have?

The podcast currently has 12 episodes available.

So Ordered episodes:

June 11, 2026Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us1r05_e2q3.pdf
Case background
Illinois law requires election officials to count mail-in ballots postmarked
or certified no later than election day and received within two weeks of
election day. Congressman Michael Bost and two other political candidates
filed a lawsuit claiming that counting ballots received after election day
violates federal law. They principally contended that doing so conflicts
with 2 U.S.C. § 7 and 3 U.S.C. § 1, which set election day as the Tuesday
following the first Monday in November. The district court dismissed the
case, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that petitioners
lacked standing.
Questions Presented
Whether Petitioners, as federal candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.
Holding
As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost has standing to challenge the
rules that govern the counting of votes in his election. Candidates have a
concrete and particularized interest in the rules that govern the counting
of votes in their elections, regardless whether those rules harm their
electoral prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns — their
interest extends to the integrity of the election and the democratic
process by which they earn or lose the support of the people they seek to
represent. Candidates need not show a substantial risk that a rule will
cause them to lose the election or prevent them from achieving a legally
significant vote threshold.
The Court
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice
Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections, written by Justice Roberts.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Roberts. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
17min
June 11, 2026Urias-Orellana v. Bondi
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us2r19_3e04.pdf
Case background
Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, his wife Sayra Iliana Gamez-Mejia, and
their minor child are natives of El Salvador who entered the United States
without authorization in 2021. After being placed in removal proceedings,
they applied for asylum, and Urias-Orellana testified that he was being
targeted by a hitman in El Salvador. The Immigration Judge found his
testimony credible but concluded that it did not establish past persecution
or a well-founded fear of future persecution under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, denied the asylum applications, and ordered the family’s
removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. On petition for review,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also affirmed, holding
that, under the substantial-evidence standard of review, the record did not
compel a contrary finding.
Questions Presented
Whether a federal court of appeals must defer to the BIA’s judgment that a given set of undisputed facts does not demonstrate mistreatment severe enough to constitute “persecution” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
Holding
The Immigration and Nationality Act requires application of the
substantial-evidence standard to the agency’s determination whether a given
set of undisputed facts rises to the level of “persecution” under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A). Section 1252(b)(4)(B) codified the standard of INS v.
Elias-Zacarias: the persecution determination — both the underlying factual
findings and the application of the INA to those findings — is conclusive
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary. The judgment of the First Circuit is affirmed.
The Court
Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, written by Justice Jackson.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Jackson. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
26min
June 09, 2026Fernandez v. United States
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-556_8m58.pdf
Case background
Joe Fernandez was indicted in 2013 for his role in the assassination of two
gang members. The Government’s theory was that a drug ring paid Fernandez to
serve as a backup shooter, and that when the primary shooter’s gun jammed,
Fernandez fired 14 rounds and killed both victims. Largely on the testimony
of his alleged co-conspirator Patrick Darge, a jury convicted Fernandez of
murder for hire and a firearms offense, and the District Court imposed two
consecutive life sentences. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting both a
Brady claim and an insufficiency-of-evidence argument. Fernandez then twice
moved for postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255; the first motion
was deemed “plainly meritless,” and the second succeeded only in vacating his
firearms conviction, leaving the murder-for-hire conviction in place. After
the District Judge pointedly observed that Fernandez would be released if his
remaining life sentence were commuted or held unlawful, Fernandez filed a
motion for compassionate release under 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing
that extraordinary and compelling reasons — above all, his asserted innocence
— warranted a sentence reduction. The District Court granted the motion,
citing unease about the truthfulness of Darge’s testimony and doubts about
the correctness of the verdict, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that
challenges to the validity of a conviction are not cognizable “extraordinary
and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Questions Presented
Whether a combination of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may warrant a discretionary sentence reduction under 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) can include reasons that may also be alleged as grounds for vacatur of a sentence under 28 U. S. C. § 2255.
Holding
A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must
proceed through 28 U. S. C. § 2255, not 18 U. S. C. § 3582; the supposed
invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” that justify compassionate release. Section 2255 governs collateral
attacks on federal convictions and imposes tight procedural constraints, and
the Court’s precedents require that claims close to the core of habeas corpus
be brought under the specific federal habeas statute, with other statutes
read in harmony with that framework. Allowing a compassionate-release motion
to serve as a vehicle for attacking a conviction would let prisoners
circumvent § 2255’s exacting requirements, and the text, structure, and
regulatory history of § 3582 — which centers on a defendant’s personal
circumstances such as age, illness, and rehabilitation — confirm that the
invalidity of a conviction is not an extraordinary and compelling reason for
release.
The Court
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice
Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Kagan
joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Fernandez v. United States, written by Justice Barrett.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Barrett. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
32min
June 09, 2026Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1287_new_3135.pdf
Case background
Shortly after taking office, President Trump invoked the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to address what he identified as two
foreign threats: the influx of illegal drugs from Canada, Mexico, and China,
and “large and persistent” trade deficits. Declaring a national emergency as
to each and deeming the threats “unusual and extraordinary,” the President
imposed two sets of tariffs — “drug trafficking” tariffs of 25% on most
Canadian and Mexican imports and 10% on most Chinese imports, and
“reciprocal” tariffs of at least 10% on imports from all trading partners,
with dozens of nations facing higher rates. He then issued numerous further
increases, reductions, and modifications.
Two groups of plaintiffs sued, alleging that IEEPA does not authorize either
set of tariffs. The Learning Resources plaintiffs — two small businesses —
sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, which denied
the Government’s motion to transfer the case to the Court of International
Trade (CIT) and preliminarily enjoined the tariffs. The V.O.S. Selections
plaintiffs — five small businesses and 12 States — sued in the CIT, which
granted them summary judgment. The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed
in relevant part, holding that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate . . .
importation” did not authorize the challenged tariffs, which “are unbounded
in scope, amount, and duration.” The Court granted certiorari — including
before judgment in Learning Resources — and consolidated the cases.
Questions Presented
Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs.
Holding
IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution gives Congress alone the power to “lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises,” and the power to impose tariffs is a branch of
that taxing power; the Government concedes the President has no inherent
peacetime authority to impose them. The President must therefore point to
clear congressional authorization, and IEEPA’s authority to “regulate . . .
importation” does not supply it: the statute never mentions tariffs or
duties, the ordinary power to “regulate” does not include the distinct power
to tax, and no President had invoked IEEPA to impose tariffs in the statute’s
nearly half-century of existence. The judgment in No. 24-1287 is vacated and
remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the
judgment in No. 25-250 is affirmed.
The Court
Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court, except as to Parts II–A–2 and III, which were joined
only by Justice Gorsuch and Justice Barrett. The Court divided 6–3 on the
result. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Barrett filed
a concurring opinion. Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson,
agreeing that IEEPA does not authorize the tariffs but concluding that
ordinary tools of statutory interpretation — rather than the major questions
doctrine — sufficed to decide the case. Justice Jackson also filed a separate
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, adding that she
would consult legislative history. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting
opinion, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito. Justice Thomas filed a
separate dissenting opinion.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
*Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump *, written by Justice Roberts.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Roberts. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
38min
June 05, 2026Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-466_5i26.pdf
Case background
Ongkaruck Sripetch engaged in numerous fraudulent schemes involving at least
20 penny-stock companies. After discovering the schemes, the Securities and
Exchange Commission brought a civil enforcement action against him, charging
six counts of securities fraud and one count of selling unregistered
securities. Sripetch consented to the entry of judgment against him and
agreed that the court could order disgorgement. When the SEC then sought over
$4.1 million in disgorgement, Sripetch objected, arguing that the request
violated Liu v. SEC, 591 U. S. 71, because the SEC lacked evidence that his
schemes caused investors to suffer any financial losses and so left no
victims for whom disgorgement could be awarded. The district court found that
the SEC had shown pecuniary loss, but on appeal the Ninth Circuit took a
different path, holding that a finding of pecuniary harm is not required at
all before a court may order disgorgement. That ruling deepened a split among
the Courts of Appeals.
Questions Presented
Whether the SEC may seek equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing investors suffered pecuniary harm.
Holding
A showing of pecuniary loss to investors is not required before the SEC may
obtain a disgorgement award. Even assuming that disgorgement under
Section 78u(d)(7) remains an equitable remedy that must comply with
traditional equitable rules — including the rule that disgorgement be awarded
for victims — those principles do not demand proof of pecuniary loss. Courts
sitting in equity have long deprived wrongdoers of the net profits of their
unlawful activity, and a person whose legally protected interests have been
invaded may recover the defendant’s wrongful gain even when he has suffered
no measurable loss whatsoever. Because traditional equitable principles do
not require a showing of pecuniary loss, and nothing in Liu teaches
otherwise, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is affirmed.
The Court
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas
filed a concurring opinion.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission, written by Justice Gorsuch.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Gorsuch. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
28min
June 04, 2026Rutherford v. United States
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-820_97be.pdf
Case background
Petitioner Daniel Rutherford was convicted of two counts of using and
carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c), and petitioner Johnnie Carter was convicted of three § 924(c)
violations. At the time each was sentenced, a defendant convicted of two
§ 924(c) counts faced a mandatory 25-year sentence for the second offense
that was “stacked” upon — run consecutively to — the penalty for the first.
That scheme produced a 32-year minimum sentence for Rutherford and a 57-year
minimum for Carter. Years later, Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018,
which eliminated the 25-year stacking requirement for first-time offenders.
But that amendment does not apply to defendants sentenced before the Act, so
neither Rutherford nor Carter qualifies for the reduced penalties. Each
instead invoked the nonretroactive change as a basis for a sentence reduction
under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the “compassionate release” provision, which allows
a court to reduce a term of imprisonment if it finds, after considering the
§ 3553(a) factors, that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction” and that the reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. The courts below held that
the nonretroactive change to § 924(c) cannot be an “extraordinary and
compelling” reason; the Third Circuit added that the Commission’s 2023 policy
statement — which lists an “unusually long sentence” among such reasons —
conflicts with the will of Congress. The Court granted certiorari in these
consolidated cases to resolve a split among the Circuits.
Questions Presented
Whether the Sentencing Commission acted within its expressly delegated authority by permitting district courts to consider, in narrowly cabined circumstances, a nonretroactive change in law in determining whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a sentence reduction.
Holding
When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive — as with
the change to § 924(c) — the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as
an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that warrants a sentence reduction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Under the ordinary meaning of the words,
“extraordinary and compelling” reasons are those that are especially unusual
and convincing. A disparity created by Congress’s deliberate choice to extend
reduced penalties to some offenders but not others is neither: nonretroactive
amendments to criminal penalties are the norm, so the disparity is an
unexceptional feature of a system in which nonretroactivity is the default,
and treating it as a compelling reason for release would undermine Congress’s
choice to leave the existing sentence intact. Eligibility for compassionate
release is a distinct gatekeeping step that turns on whether a prisoner can
offer “extraordinary and compelling” reasons, not on the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors. Because the statutory text and structure foreclose treating the
§ 924(c) change — considered by itself or in combination with other factors —
as a basis for eligibility, the Sentencing Commission’s contrary 2023 policy
statement is invalid to that extent. 120 F. 4th 360, affirmed.
The Court
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice
Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson
joined.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Rutherford v. United States, written by Justice Barrett.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Barrett. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
32min
June 01, 2026Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-983_c07d.pdf
Case background
In 1928, the United States-based Havana Docks Corporation acquired from the
Cuban Government a time-limited property interest, a usufructuary
concession, in the development and operation of docks at the Port of Havana,
set to expire in 2004. After Fidel Castro seized power in 1959, the new
Cuban Government decreed that it would forcibly take American-owned
properties in Cuba and specifically identified Havana Docks; in 1960 it
seized the docks without compensation. The Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission later certified about $9 million in losses, plus six percent
annual interest, but Havana Docks had no means to obtain compensation. In
1996, Congress enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 22
U.S.C. § 6021 et seq., which creates a private right of action for U.S.
nationals who own claims to property confiscated by the Cuban Government on
or after January 1, 1959. Title III of the Act imposes liability on those
who knowingly and intentionally traffic in such confiscated property.
Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama continuously suspended the Title III
right of action; President Trump allowed the suspension to expire in May
2019. From 2016 to 2019, four commercial cruise lines — Royal Caribbean,
Norwegian, Carnival, and MSC — transported nearly a million paid passengers
to Cuba, using the docks Havana Docks had built to embark and disembark
them. Havana Docks sued the cruise lines under Title III in the Southern
District of Florida. The District Court rejected the cruise lines’ argument
that they were not liable because Havana Docks’s interest would have
expired in 2004 absent confiscation, and entered summary judgment, awarding
Havana Docks more than $100 million from each. A divided panel of the
Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that a defendant is liable for trafficking
only if its conduct would have interfered with the plaintiff’s property
interest had there been no confiscation.
Questions Presented
Whether a plaintiff suing under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act must prove that the defendant trafficked in property confiscated by the Cuban Government as to which the plaintiff owns a claim, or instead that the defendant trafficked in property that the plaintiff would have continued to own at the time of trafficking in a counterfactual world “as if there had been no expropriation.”
Holding
The cruise lines’ use of the docks is sufficient to establish that they
used “property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government”; Havana Docks
is not required to establish that the cruise lines trafficked in Havana
Docks’s own property interest. Under the plain text of Title III, “property
which was confiscated” can refer to the physical property in which the
plaintiff had an interest, and not just the interest itself. Confiscated
property is, as it were, tainted — off limits — such that anyone who uses
it can be liable to those who had any interest in that property. The
Eleventh Circuit’s counterfactual approach conflicts with the statutory
text, and the cruise lines’ argument that the Cuban Government confiscated
only the concession and not the docks themselves fails: when armed agents
physically occupied the dock facilities in 1960, they seized control of the
docks within the meaning of the Act.
The Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and
Jackson joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which
Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., written by Justice Thomas.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Thomas. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
31min
May 31, 2026Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-935_k53m.pdf
Case background
Flowers Foods, Inc., is one of the Nation’s largest producers of packaged
baked goods, with bakeries in 19 States. To get its products to market,
Flowers depends in part on franchisees who buy the rights to distribute
Flowers’s products in specific geographic territories. Angelo Brock is one
such franchisee serving the Denver area; he picks up Flowers’s products from
a warehouse in Colorado and delivers them to local stores, all without
leaving the State. In 2022, Brock sued Flowers in federal district court,
alleging that the company had underpaid him and other distributors in
violation of federal and state law. Flowers moved to compel arbitration
under the Federal Arbitration Act, but the district court denied the motion
and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that Brock belonged to a class of
workers engaged in interstate commerce and so fell within the Act’s § 1
exemption from arbitration.
Questions Presented
Are workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce — but who do not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders — “transportation workers” “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” for purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act’s § 1 exemption?
Holding
A worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey
can qualify for § 1’s exemption from the Federal Arbitration Act without
crossing state lines or interacting with vehicles that do. The statutory
phrase “engaged in . . . interstate commerce” does not require either
border-crossing or vehicle-touching; longstanding cases interpreting that
language describe individuals who, like Brock, play a direct, necessary, and
active role in moving goods between States while operating entirely within
one of them.
The Court
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, written by Justice Gorsuch.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Gorsuch. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
18min
May 28, 2026Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1238_1b7d.pdf
Case background
Shawn Montgomery sustained severe and permanent injuries when his tractor-trailer
was struck on the side of an Illinois highway by a truck driven by Yosniel
Varela-Mojena, who was hauling a shipment for motor carrier Caribe Transport II,
LLC. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., a transportation broker, had coordinated
that shipment. Montgomery sued, alleging that C.H. Robinson was liable for his
injuries because it negligently hired Varela-Mojena and Caribe Transport despite
a “conditional” safety rating from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration. The district court held the negligent-hiring claim was expressly
preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act and did not
fall within the Act’s safety exception, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Questions Presented
Does § 14501(c) preempt a state common-law claim against a broker for negligently selecting a motor carrier or driver?
Holding
A claim that one company negligently hired another to transport goods is not
preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, because
States retain authority to regulate safety with respect to motor vehicles under
the Act. Requiring a broker to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier
“concerns” motor vehicles — most obviously the trucks that will transport the
goods — and so falls within the Act’s safety exception, which saves it from
preemption.
The Court
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Kavanaugh
filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Alito joined.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, written by Justice Barrett.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Barrett. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
15min
May 27, 2026First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Davenport
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-781_pok0.pdf
Case background
First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc., is a religious nonprofit that has
provided counseling and resources to pregnant women in New Jersey since 1985,
and does not provide or refer clients for abortions. In 2022, New Jersey’s
Attorney General established a “Reproductive Rights Strike Force” and served
First Choice with an investigatory subpoena demanding twenty-eight categories of
documents, including the names, addresses, and other personal information of most
of its donors. First Choice challenged the subpoena in federal court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as a violation of its First Amendment rights, while the Attorney
General sued to enforce the subpoena in state court. The federal district court
held the constitutional claims were not ripe, and a divided Third Circuit panel
affirmed per curiam, reasoning that First Choice could raise those claims in
state court.
Questions Presented
Where the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, is a federal court in a first-filed action deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court?
Holding
First Choice has established a present injury to its First Amendment associational
rights sufficient to confer Article III standing. The Attorney General’s subpoena,
which demands disclosure of First Choice’s donors, has caused an ongoing,
concrete injury to the group’s associational rights — an injury that is present
now and does not depend on the outcome of the state enforcement proceeding.
The Court
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
First Choice Women’s Resource Centers v. Davenport, written by Justice Gorsuch.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Gorsuch. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
45min

FAQs about So Ordered:

How many episodes does So Ordered have?

The podcast currently has 12 episodes available.