So Ordered

By So Ordered

AI-narrated readings of U.S. Supreme Court majority opinions. Each episode pairs the Court's syllabus with a reading of the majority opinion, lightly adapted for listening and voiced by a synthesized ... more

· Government

Download on the App Store

Download on the App Store

Get it on Google Play

FAQs about So Ordered:

How many episodes does So Ordered have?

The podcast currently has 45 episodes available.

So Ordered episodes:

August 28, 2026 Watson v. Republican National Committee
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1260_g3cn.pdf
Case background
Three federal election-day statutes set the day for the “election” of
Representatives, Senators, and the President on a Tuesday in November. See
3 U. S. C. § 1; 2 U. S. C. §§ 1, 7. Mississippi permits certain residents,
such as college students away from home and senior citizens, to vote in
federal elections by absentee ballot, Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-713, and it is
one of roughly 30 States that count at least some absentee ballots mailed by
election day but received afterward. Absentee voters in Mississippi may
dispatch their ballots by mail or common carrier, and every absentee ballot
must be “postmarked on or before the date of the election and received by
the registrar no more than five (5) business days after the election.”
§§ 23-15-637(1)(a), (3). In 2024, the Republican National Committee, the
Mississippi Republican Party, and various individuals sued the Mississippi
secretary of state and several election officials, contending that federal
law prevents Mississippi from counting absentee ballots received after
election day. On their reading, the election-day statutes use the word
“election” to refer to two acts, ballot casting and ballot receipt, so
setting the day for the “election” sets the deadline for both. The
Libertarian Party of Mississippi filed a similar suit, the District Court
consolidated the cases and granted summary judgment to Mississippi, and the
Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Mississippi’s statute is preempted
because the federal election-day statutes require ballots to be received by
election day.
Questions Presented
(1) Whether the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after that day.
Holding
The federal election-day statutes do not prevent Mississippi from counting
absentee ballots postmarked by election day but received up to five days
thereafter; nothing in those statutes requires ballots to be received by
election day. The defining element of an “election” has always been the
electorate’s choice of candidate, and that choice is made when voting is
complete, not when ballots are received. A related statute, the Uniformed
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, reinforces the point: it
repeatedly presupposes that ballot receipt is a matter of state law, and its
cross-references to state ballot-receipt deadlines would make little sense
if the election-day statutes already set a nationwide one. The reading is
also consistent with the Constitution, which requires the day on which
Presidential electors give their votes to be the same throughout the United
States but says nothing about the day for receipt. Plaintiffs’ contrary
arguments from 19th-century historical practice, from Foster v. Love, and
from election integrity and voter confidence are unavailing: the practice
they identify cannot be tied to the statutory text, Foster is not about
ballot receipt and nowhere mentions it, and policy arguments are properly
directed to legislatures rather than courts. 120 F. 4th 200, reversed and
remanded.
The Court
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Alito
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined, and
in which Justice Kavanaugh joined as to all but Parts II-C-2 and III.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Watson v. Republican National Committee, written by Justice Barrett.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Barrett. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
35min
August 21, 2026 Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us1r08_f2q3.pdf
Case background
Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, entered bankruptcy in 2014 and initiated
adversarial proceedings against Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc., to
collect $50,000 in allegedly unpaid invoices. Vista-Pro attempted to serve
process on Coney Island by mail but purportedly failed to comply with the
mail-service requirements of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
7004(b)(3). Coney Island did not file an answer, and the Bankruptcy Court
entered a default judgment in 2015. Over the next six years, Vista-Pro’s
bankruptcy trustee attempted to enforce the judgment, sending a demand
letter to Coney Island’s CEO in April 2016; those efforts bore fruit in 2021
when a marshal seized funds from Coney Island’s bank account in satisfaction
of the judgment. Coney Island then filed a motion to vacate the judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, arguing that Vista-Pro’s failure
to make proper service rendered the judgment void. The Bankruptcy Court
denied relief, holding that Coney Island had failed to abide by Rule 60’s
requirement that parties make motions for relief within a “reasonable time.”
The District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Questions Presented
(1) Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Holding
Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable-time limit applies to a motion alleging that a
judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4). The plain text of Rule 60(c)(1)
provides that a “motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable
time,” and a motion for relief from an allegedly void judgment is such a
motion. The structure of the Rule confirms that reading: Rule 60 modifies
the default reasonable-time limit expressly when it means to — imposing a
1-year limit on motions alleging mistakes, new evidence, or fraud — yet it
includes no analogous unlimited-time principle for motions alleging
voidness. That a void judgment is a legal nullity does not change the
analysis, because the passage of time cures few legal errors and statutes
and rules routinely limit the time for seeking relief from an erroneous
judgment. A party would need to identify some principle of law, such as the
Due Process Clause, conferring a right to allege voidness at any time, and
Coney Island disclaimed any such argument. Neither historical practice nor
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee supports an
unlimited window, and policy concerns, drafting history, and constitutional
avoidance carry weight only when a Rule’s language is ambiguous.
The Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson
joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
agreeing that Rule 60’s text and structure require the result but objecting
that the majority unnecessarily opined on the potential validity of a
Due Process Clause challenge to the reasonable-time limit — an argument
Coney Island did not raise below and expressly disclaimed in this Court.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, written by Justice Alito.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Alito. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
13min
August 11, 2026 National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Comm’n
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-621_h315.pdf
Case background
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) restricts a political party’s
spending on campaign activities undertaken in coordination with its
candidates. 52 U. S. C. §30116(d). Those coordinated-expenditure limits vary
by State and by office sought; a national party committee may spend from
$130,600 to $4,071,800 in coordination with a Senate candidate. In 2001, in
Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533
U. S. 431 (Colorado II), this Court upheld the limits as consistent with the
First Amendment. In 2022, a group of candidates and political party
committees sued the Federal Election Commission: the National Republican
Senatorial Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee,
then-candidate for Senate JD Vance, and then-Representative Steve Chabot.
They argued that Colorado II is no longer good law in light of the Court’s
more recent campaign finance decisions. A majority of the judges on the en banc
U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit questioned Colorado II but
considered themselves bound by it, and so rejected the challenge. This Court
granted certiorari. Because the United States declined to defend the limits,
the Court appointed Roman Martinez as amicus curiae to defend the judgment
below, and the Democratic national and congressional campaign committees
intervened.
Questions Presented
(1) Whether the limits on coordinated party expenditures in 52 U.S.C. § 30116 violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with “party coordinated communications” as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 109.37.
Holding
FECA’s political-party coordinated-expenditure limits violate the First
Amendment. The Court has jurisdiction under Article III: at least one
plaintiff had standing at the outset of the litigation, and Vice President
Vance still maintains an active “Statement of Candidacy” on file with the FEC
along with a campaign committee that has raised money for a Senate race. On
the merits, the Court’s precedents recognize only one permissible objective
for campaign finance restrictions: preventing quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance. The anti-circumvention rationale of Colorado II cannot carry
these limits under the rigorous review the closely drawn test now demands.
The base contribution limits, the earmarking rules, and the disclosure
requirements together already serve the Government’s anti-circumvention
interest without unduly restricting core political party speech, so the
coordinated-expenditure limits are “disproportionate” and are not “necessary”
and “narrowly tailored.” Colorado II’s reasoning has been rejected by the
Court’s more recent precedents, and to the extent it retained any vitality it
is now overruled. 117 F. 4th 389, reversed and remanded.
The Court
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice
Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson
joined.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Comm’n, written by Justice Kavanaugh.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Kavanaugh. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
50min
August 05, 2026 Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-171_new_3dq3.pdf
Case background
Cox Communications, Inc., is an Internet service provider serving
approximately six million subscribers, each associated with a unique Internet
Protocol address. Providers like Cox have limited knowledge of how their
services are used: they know which IP address corresponds to which subscriber
account, but cannot distinguish individual users or directly control how the
service is used. Cox contractually prohibits subscribers from using their
connection to post, copy, transmit, or disseminate infringing content.
Sony Music Entertainment and other major music copyright owners enlisted
MarkMonitor to track copyright infringement across the Internet. Over the
roughly two-year period at issue, MarkMonitor sent Cox 163,148 notices
identifying IP addresses of Cox subscribers associated with infringement.
Sony sued Cox in Federal District Court on two theories of secondary
liability: that Cox contributed to its users’ infringement by continuing to
serve subscribers it knew were associated with infringement, and that Cox was
vicariously liable for that infringement. The jury found for Sony on both
theories, found Cox’s infringement willful, and awarded $1 billion in
statutory damages. The Fourth Circuit affirmed as to contributory liability,
reasoning that supplying a product with knowledge that the recipient will use
it to infringe is exactly the sort of culpable conduct sufficient for
contributory infringement, and reversed as to vicarious liability. This Court
granted Cox’s petition for certiorari as to contributory liability.
Questions Presented
(1) Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that a service provider can be held liable for “materially contributing” to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access, without proof that the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote it?
(2) Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that mere knowledge of another’s direct infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)? (Review was granted limited to the first question.)
Holding
The provider of a service is contributorily liable for a user’s infringement
only if it intended that the provided service be used for infringement, and
that intent can be shown only if the provider induced the infringement or the
provided service is tailored to that infringement. Cox neither induced its
users’ infringement nor provided a service tailored to infringement:
it did not induce or encourage its subscribers to infringe, Sony offered no
evidence of express promotion or intent to promote infringement, Cox
repeatedly discouraged infringement through warnings and suspensions, and
Internet access is plainly capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
Accordingly, Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s
copyrights. The Fourth Circuit’s contrary rule went beyond the two forms of
liability recognized in Grokster and Sony and conflicted with this Court’s
repeated admonition that contributory liability cannot rest only on a
provider’s knowledge of infringement and insufficient action to prevent it.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s safe harbor does not change the
analysis: it creates new defenses from liability rather than imposing
liability on providers who serve known infringers.
The Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.
Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
Justice Jackson joined.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, written by Justice Thomas.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Thomas. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
23min
August 04, 2026 Barrett v. United States
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us1r07_7647.pdf
Case background
This case concerns the relationship between two provisions of 18 U. S. C.
§ 924: subsection (c)(1)(A)(i), which criminalizes using, carrying, or
possessing a firearm in connection with a federal crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime, and subsection (j), which prescribes different penalties,
including, in certain circumstances, capital punishment, when “a violation of
subsection (c)” causes death. Dwayne Barrett committed a series of robberies
between August 2011 and January 2012; during one, his confederate shot and
killed Gamar Dafalla. Barrett was convicted on seven counts, three of them
relevant here: Hobbs Act robbery of Dafalla, which served as the predicate for
a § 924(c) count and a § 924(j) count arising from the same killing. The
District Court declined to sentence Barrett separately on the two firearm
counts, merging the subsection (c) conviction into the subsection (j)
conviction.
On appeal after resentencing, the Second Circuit held that one act may yield
two convictions and instructed the District Court to impose separate
convictions and sentences on both counts. That court acknowledged that
subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j) qualify as the same offense under the test
in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, but believed that, as construed
in Lora v. United States, 599 U. S. 453, the two provisions are separate
offenses for which Congress has clearly authorized cumulative punishments.
Because that decision deepened a split among the Courts of Appeals, this Court
granted certiorari. Because the Government agreed with Barrett, the Court
appointed an amicus curiae to defend the judgment below.
Questions Presented
(1) Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree.
The petition presented two questions, but the Court granted certiorari limited
to the first. The second question, whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a
crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), was not taken up.
Holding
Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i)
and (j) for a single act that violates both provisions. One act that violates
both provisions therefore may spawn only one conviction. The part of the Second
Circuit’s judgment that held otherwise is reversed.
All agree that the two subsections define the same offense under Blockburger,
which triggers the presumption that Congress does not intend to punish the same
offense under two different statutes. That presumption yields only to a plainly
expressed contrary intent, and nothing in the text, structure, or legislative
history of § 924 supplies one. Congress twice wrote “in addition to” language
into subsection (c) itself, language this Court has called “crystal clear”
evidence of an intent to overcome Blockburger, but used no similar language
for the interplay between subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j). Subsection
(c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate speaks only to how sentences are arranged
once two convictions are permissible; it does not answer whether two
convictions may be imposed at all. And because subsection (j) supplies its own
comprehensive penalty scheme that operates independently of subsection (c)’s,
Congress is best read to have placed in front of prosecutors a menu, not a
buffet.
The Court
Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II,
III, IV-A, and IV-B, and an opinion with respect to Part IV-C, in which Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Gorsuch filed
an opinion concurring in part.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Barrett v. United States, written by Justice Jackson.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Jackson. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
36min
August 03, 2026 West Virginia v. B. P. J.
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-43_2b35.pdf
Case background
In 2021, West Virginia enacted the Save Women’s Sports Act, which prohibits
male students from playing on female teams and provides that sex is
determined by biology. Respondent B. P. J., a biological male who identifies
as female and has taken puberty blockers and hormones, sought to compete on
the girls’ cross-country and track-and-field teams. B. P. J. sued West
Virginia and relevant officials, alleging violations of Title IX and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U. S. District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment for the
State on both claims, but the Fourth Circuit reversed on the Title IX issue
and remanded for further fact-finding on the equal protection claim. In a
companion case, Lindsay Hecox — a biological male who identifies as female
and competes in college sports — challenged Idaho’s similar Fairness in
Women’s Sports Act on equal protection grounds; the District Court enjoined
that law and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Court granted certiorari in both
cases and decided them together.
Questions Presented
(1) Whether Title IX prevents a state from consistently designating girls’ and boys’ sports teams based on biological sex determined at birth.
(2) Whether the Equal Protection Clause prevents a state from offering separate boys’ and girls’ sports teams based on biological sex determined at birth.
Holding
Title IX allows schools to provide separate women’s and men’s sports teams
defined by biological sex, and West Virginia has permissibly maintained
female sports for biological females consistent with Title IX. The term “sex”
in Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the implementing regulations refers to
biological sex, and nothing in those texts requires schools to allow
biological males who identify as female to play on girls’ and women’s teams.
West Virginia and Idaho also did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment by limiting female teams to biological females: that
sex-based classification is substantially related to the important
governmental interests of safety and competitive fairness, and the States
need not make individualized, athlete-by-athlete exceptions to satisfy
intermediate scrutiny.
The Court
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice
Thomas and Justice Gorsuch each filed concurring opinions. Justice Sotomayor
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part,
in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
West Virginia v. B. P. J., written by Justice Kavanaugh.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Kavanaugh. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
51min
July 20, 2026 Chatrie v. United States
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-112_0am4.pdf
Case background
In 2019, a man robbed a credit union in Midlothian, Virginia. Local police
could not identify a suspect, so they obtained a geofence warrant directed to
Google, requiring the company to hand over data about the cell phones located
within a 150-meter radius of the credit union near the time of the crime.
That data came from Location History, a Google service that records a user’s
cell-phone location every two minutes or so. The warrant set out a three-step
process: Google first produced anonymized location data for all phones inside
the geofence in the half hour before and after the robbery; officers then
narrowed the list and Google supplied additional anonymized data covering a
two-hour window; and finally officers narrowed the list again and Google
turned over identifying information, including names and phone numbers. That
process identified three users, including petitioner Okello Chatrie, whose
data showed him entering the geofence about ten minutes before the robbery.
Chatrie, charged with robbery and related firearms offenses, moved to suppress
the location data as the fruit of an invalid Fourth Amendment search. The
District Court found the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment but denied
suppression under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, and after
a divided panel and an evenly divided en banc court, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari solely on whether the police
violated the Fourth Amendment in obtaining Chatrie’s location data.
Questions Presented
(1) Whether the execution of the geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.
Holding
Police officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired
Chatrie’s location data from Google, because an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information. Everything the
Court relied on in Carpenter v. United States to hold that accessing cell-site
location information is a search applies as well or better to Location History,
which is even more precise and revealing. Neither the limited two-hour period
of data obtained nor its storage by a third-party company defeats that
expectation of privacy, and the third-party doctrine does not apply. Because
the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches, the Court does not
decide whether this search was reasonable, leaving to the Court of Appeals
whether, at each step of the search process, the warrant satisfied the Fourth
Amendment’s requirements of probable cause and particularity.
The Court
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson
filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined. Justice Gorsuch
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined as to Part I, and in which Justice
Barrett joined as to Parts II–B, II–C–1, and II–C–2. Justice Barrett filed a
dissenting opinion.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Chatrie v. United States, written by Justice Kagan.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Kagan. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
58min
July 10, 2026 Trump v. Slaughter
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-332_qn12.pdf
Case background
The Federal Trade Commission is a regulatory agency with vast rulemaking,
enforcement, and adjudicatory powers under more than eighty federal statutes.
Its five Commissioners serve seven-year terms and may be removed by the
President only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”
Shortly after beginning his second term in January 2025, President Trump fired
the FTC’s two remaining Democratic Commissioners, Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro
Bedoya, without citing any statutory cause. He told them their continued
service was “inconsistent with his Administration’s priorities” and that they
were removed pursuant to his authority under Article II of the Constitution.
Slaughter filed suit seeking reinstatement, arguing her removal was ultra
vires, violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and violated the
Constitution. The District Court for the District of Columbia granted
Slaughter’s motion for summary judgment, declaring the removal unlawful and
issuing a permanent injunction. A divided Court of Appeals denied the
Government’s motion for a stay pending appeal. The Supreme Court stayed the
District Court’s order and granted certiorari before judgment.
Questions Presented
(1) Whether the statutory removal protections for members of the Federal Trade Commission violate the separation of powers and, if so, whether Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), should be overruled.
(2) Whether a federal court may prevent a person’s removal from public office, either through relief at equity or at law.
Holding
The FTC’s for-cause removal provision is contrary to the separation of powers
enshrined in the Constitution. The Constitution vests the executive power in
the President and requires that he be able to remove officers who exercise
executive power on his behalf. The FTC unquestionably exercises executive
power — through substantive rulemaking, in-house enforcement adjudications,
and civil suits in federal court — and must therefore be subject to the
President’s control. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, to the extent it
stands for anything beyond the proposition that an agency exercising no
executive power may be structured independently of the President, is overruled.
Because the FTC’s activities fall well within the heartland of executive power,
the President was entitled to remove Commissioner Slaughter at will. Reversed
and remanded.
The Court
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices
Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, and joined by Justice Thomas as to all
but Part III-B. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor
filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Trump v. Slaughter, written by Justice Roberts.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Roberts. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
1h 1min
June 30, 2026 Trump v. Barbara
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-365_4hdj.pdf
Case background
On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 14160,
titled Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship. The Order
provides that children born in the United States to parents who are
unlawfully or temporarily present here are not “subject to the jurisdiction”
of the United States, and thus do not qualify for citizenship under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause or the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), which uses the same language. Several parents filed suit, some in
the name of their children, arguing that the Executive Order violates both
the Fourteenth Amendment and the INA. The District Court agreed,
provisionally certified a nationwide class of children who would be denied
citizenship by the Order, and preliminarily enjoined the Order’s enforcement.
This Court granted certiorari before judgment.
Questions Presented
(1) The question presented is whether the Executive Order complies on its face with the Citizenship Clause and with 8 U.S.C. 1401(a), which codifies that Clause.
Holding
Children born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily
present are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States and are
citizens at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause. The
Clause mirrors the common law’s criteria for citizenship: a child born on
American soil and subject to American law is a citizen, subject only to the
narrow exceptions recognized at common law — such as the children of foreign
ministers and members of Indian tribes — none of which applies to the
children of parents unlawfully or temporarily present. The Court’s precedent
in United States v. Wong Kim Ark confirms this rule, and arguments for
limiting birthright citizenship to the children of those domiciled in the
United States find scant support in the text or history of the Clause. The
judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
The Court
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a
concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to the introduction
and Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito and Justice Gorsuch each filed
dissenting opinions.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Trump v. Barbara, written by Justice Roberts.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Roberts. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
44min
June 30, 2026 Trump v. Cook
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25a312_5468.pdf
Case background
In August 2025, President Trump purported to fire Lisa Cook, a member of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System — the first Governor ever
removed in the central bank’s 111-year history. The move followed a
social-media letter from the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency
accusing Cook of mortgage fraud in connection with loans she had obtained
before joining the Board. In his removal letter, the President stated that he
had “reason to believe” Cook “may have made false statements on one or more
mortgage agreements” and that he lacked “confidence in [her] integrity.” Cook
promptly sued, alleging that the removal was not “for cause” as required by
the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U. S. C. § 242, and that the President had in any
event failed to provide the pretermination notice and opportunity to respond
demanded by the statute and the Constitution. The District Court issued a
preliminary injunction preventing her removal, the Court of Appeals declined
to stay the injunction, and the Government applied to the Supreme Court for a
stay.
Questions Presented
(1) This case came to the Court on the Government’s emergency application to stay the District Court’s injunction, not on a petition for certiorari, so no question was formally presented. The application asked whether the Government was entitled to a stay — in particular, whether it was likely to succeed in showing that the President could remove Cook and that she should not remain in office while the litigation continued.
Holding
The Government’s application for a stay is denied. The Government has not
shown that it is likely to prevail on the legal arguments advanced in its
stay application — arguments that, taken together, would transform the
Federal Reserve’s for-cause protection into at-will employment. The Court
resolves the case on the narrow ground that the President failed to afford
Cook the procedural protections she was entitled to by statute: before a
Governor may be removed for cause, she must receive notice and some
opportunity to respond, and Cook received neither. The Court further explains
that the Federal Reserve’s for-cause protection is consistent with the
Constitution, reflecting a long tradition of independent central banking that
traces back to the First and Second Banks of the United States. Because Cook
did not receive the process she was due, the injunction keeping her in office
remains in effect pending the litigation.
The Court
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices
Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justices Kavanaugh and Jackson each
filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice
Alito filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Gorsuch. Justice Barrett
filed a dissenting opinion.
What this episode contains
This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in
Trump v. Cook, written by Justice Roberts.
AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine
learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone,
inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be
attributed to Justice Roberts. The text being read is the Court’s published
majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.
...more
44min

FAQs about So Ordered:

How many episodes does So Ordered have?

The podcast currently has 45 episodes available.