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Bear markets are funny things. They tend to start small, and isolated, and then suddenly they become a big problem. Almost all the talk now is about whether the AI “bubble” is bursting. From the numbers being reported out of Google last night, maybe you could argue this is as good as it gets, but bursting seems a stretch at the moment. The backlog number and token usage numbers look great to me.
My working theory on markets was that growth would be good (see Google numbers above), but the cost of capital would rise. And this rising cost of capital would be the problem for markets. This has already been a problem for parts of the market. Private equity and private credit equities have traded poorly. Invesco Private Equity ETF is pretty indicative.
But for broader markets, things have been okay. Generally speaking the S&P 500 tends to follow HYG US - the high yield ETF. When this is falling - equities don’t do so great.
First of all, the 200MDA on this is now inflecting lower, like it did back in 2022. Secondly, HYG is falling even though credit spreads are tight. To restate what HYG says, when credit spreads widen, equities don’t do so great. Currently we are near life time lows on spreads.
Another measure of credit is the leverage loan index. This is pretty heavily tied to private equity, and again when this is going lower, bad things tend to happen. This tends to match up well with movement in the Invesco Private Equity ETF. It was weak at the beginning of the year, stabilised, but not able to get back to old highs as it has done before.
What all of this credit metrics do not need would be a treasury sell off. As pointed out, credit spreads are probably TOO tight. The US 5 year is really having a good look at breaking higher.
What I am saying is that conditions for a bond market led sell off in equities are starting to look ideal. The best example is more like 2022, which was a repricing of assets, rather than collapsing revenue or earnings. How bad could it get? Its a tough question. The relationship between rising government bond yields and US equity valuations has been unstable of late. In 2022 it seemed to matter, but since then, not so much.
The big issue is that the US government would be forced to raise more revenue. Stealing a graph from Grizzle on Substack shows the problem.
Looking at US interest payments highlights the problem.
What I am trying to say is that AI trade will someday come to an end, as all trades do. But bear markets tend to come from areas that people know are problem, but are no longer invested in. People know that private credit is bad, they know that private equity is bad, they know the government is bankrupt, so they have already minimised their exposure there. The problem is that it is very hard for markets to ignore higher sovereign yields. I think the next sell off in sovereigns will be particularly problematic as it will likely send a number of hedge funds doing the treasury basis trade bankrupt overnight. I live in hope.
I have been talking about GLD/TLT for so long, even I was getting bored of it. Since starting to talk about it in 2022, it has been on absolute tear.
But from a high in February, it has had a chunky 26% fall. And for the first time since 2022, went through the 200 MDA, and completed a dark cross. For technical only investors (CTAs etc) this is very bad. It has had a rally recently - but should this be sold?
I have been pretty sure that yields on JGBs were going to go much higher, and this has been right.
I did have an expectation that this would drive yields much higher elsewhere. This has not been so true. US yields are higher, but still within a level that we have seen before within living memory.
And the biggest surprise have been the collapse in Chinese bond yields, to close to all time lows.
What disturbs me about this, is that my view on bond yields was driven by a view that the world is becoming more “populist” or pro-labour. Generally speaking, this would also include China - and yet its bond yields remain at low levels. If I just look at Japan, I could speculate that loan demand is what drives bond yields. Japanese loan data inflected in 2013, and have not looked back.
FDIC data for US banks show aggressive loan growth has become in recent years, and in particular in contrast to slower loan growth in the 1990s.
The problem is that Chinese loan growth also seems pretty good.
One thing that is different between China and Japan, is that foreign investment is dropping in China, and rising in Japan. The best was to see rising FDI in China is in the increase in it NIIP. Falling FDI into China, and rising FDI out of China should drive a higher NIIP.
While from Japanese NIIP data, we can see that foreign investment into Japan is rising from a low base.
The problem with FDI as a driver of bond yields is that the US has FDI into the US even through the period of low yields.
So that leaves government spending. Going back to the US, government spending seems to drive yields. Government expenditure rose rapidly in 1970s and in 2020s.
And a similar dynamic is playing out in Japan. The increase in spending matches the inflection in JGB yields higher.
Chinese data is a bit hard to compare but there is definitely a slowdown in government spend in 2025 at least.
There is a way to check this hypothesis. In Europe, the UK has the higher government bond yields. Government expenditure looks like this.
Switzerland has the lowest bond yields in Europe. Its government expenditure looks like this.
This seems to prove what I always thought. Sovereign bond yields reflect markets belief in governments ability to control spending. And in the UK, with Reform on the right and Greens on the left - there is no belief.
I always think of this as one of my all time great notes, for two reasons. First, almost no one had looked at this before I did, and second, after I looked at it, I had research providers trying to sell me this as their own research.
In some ways, this is a timely note - as once again ETFs (this time leveraged single stock ETFs) are causing market havoc.
Japanese US REIT funds and the Buy Case for Yen (2015)
The last few years in Japan have seen the emergence of and selling of some innovative high yield funds. These asset management products are designed to pay out very high yields, while sadly almost guaranteeing the destruction of capital. There are numerous examples of this but this note shall deal with only US REIT Funds sold in Japan.
According to Goldman Sachs, the largest 20 Japanese US REIT funds have 50bn USD under management. The single largest is the Shinko US REIT fund (Bloomberg Ticker: 06311049 JP), which has an AUM of around 14bn USD. For comparison the Vanguard US REIT Index fund has 26bn USD of assets, total US REIT market capitalization is 720bn USD.
Japanese US REIT funds tend to offer a dividend yield in the high teens. The Shinko fund has a yield of 17% currently. For reference the US based Vanguard REIT Fund has a yield of 3.4%. The extra yield of 13.6% does not come from leverage. In fact the assets owned by the funds are very similar. Rather Japanese funds will sell down assets to ensure that a higher yield is paid out.
From 2005 to 2010, the Shinko fund and Vanguard fund had very similar performance, after 2010 a huge divergence opened up. In my view, Shinko noticed that assets under management at their fund grew aggressively when funds offered a high dividend yield. Talks with participants in Japanese financial markets indicate Japanese investors prefer funds that offer at least a 1% monthly dividend yield.
As can be seen from above, Shinko AUM exploded higher once it began to offer a yield in excess of 12%, and it continues to rise. The other major funds that I have looked at all offer similar yields and are presumably managed in a similar way.
With such high dividends, assets under management can fall as the fund needs to sell assets to pay dividends. To get an idea of when this can happen we can use the change in the share count of the fund multiplied by the fund price and then subtract the dividend payout to calculate net cashflow movements in the fund. We can see that there have been two times when assets raised have fallen below the cash needed to pay out.
This has a very clear effect on the shares outstanding for the Shinko fund, which fell in 2012, and again in recent months.
I suspect this new fund structure will have a big effect on the Yen. Typically, the flow of investment funds relative to currency movements is unknown. The reason for this is that sometimes investors will see the currency depreciation as a chance to buy an asset cheaper. Certainly US listed Japan equity funds tend to see rising share count (i.e. raising assets) when the yen is weakening. In other cases, weak currencies tend to correlate to weak returns and investors selling assets. The latter is what we have seen more recently with emerging markets funds
What I find most intriguing is that at constant values, ie US REITS remain constant, and the Yen exchange rate does not change, and Shinko does not raise any more assets, then this fund will be forced to sell 14% of its holdings in the US to repatriate to Japan to pay dividends each year. What is true for Shinko would be true for the industry as a whole.
The implications of this are intriguing for me. Firstly, assets in these funds are very unstable, as the high yields destroy assets under management very quickly. Secondly, if there was a shock that caused yen to appreciate or US REITS to fall in value, funds like Shinko would be forced to liquidate their assets very quickly to meet redemptions and dividend payments. Their liquidation could cause yen to appreciate further and possibly REIT to fall in value locking them into a vicious cycle. Even more disturbing, that this is only one of seemingly many assets classes that have this feature.
For investors nervous about the state of global markets, a long yen position seems to offer a good hedge in my view.
Japanese US REIT Fund – an Update 2016
In 2015, we released two market views about Japanese investors being short Yen via fund products. One was long Turkish lira (TRY) and short Yen (JPY), while the other was long US Reits (Real Estate Investment Trusts) unhedged. Both of these assets classes are relatively concentrated, the two largest TRY funds account for 80% of assets, while the two largest US Reit funds make up 50% of assets. This year we have seen Yen rally significantly. While the size of the Turkish lira funds (Amundi European High Yield – TRY Course and Nikko Pimco High Income Soverign Fund – TRY Course) have shrunk dramatically, the US Reit funds (Shinko US Reit and Fidelity US Reit Fund) have increased.
The contrasting fortunes of Turkish lira funds and US Reit funds in Japan are undoubtedly connected to the divergent performance of these assets. The Turkish lira has been very poor, while US Reits have performed well.
While the US Reit funds and the Turkish lira funds are very different assets, they both offer Japanese investors very high dividend yields as the main selling point for Japanese yield hungry retail investors. The largest Turkish lira fund, the Amundi Europe High Yield fund Turkish Lira Course, still offers a 25% indicated yield. The largest US REIT fund in Japan, Shinko, also offers an indicated yield of 25%. This level of dividend yield is typical of the funds in this space.
US Reits do not offer 25% dividend yields, and the Japanese US Reit funds are not leveraged. Instead, they commit to maintaining these dividend yields from capital. Fortunately, for these funds they have been able to raise enough funds and realise enough capital appreciation to grow their funds’ assets significantly. The problem is that with increasing share count, and large yields the two largest funds are paying out 64bn JPY (640m USD) a month. Since 2015, a period of significant capital raising, they have on average raised 80bn JPY a month. If Japanese investors just cease adding capital to these funds as they did in 2012 and 2014, it would precipitate significant selling of US Reit holdings to pay dividends.
It is also interesting that US Reits, in contrast to the trend for most US corporates, have generally been issuers of shares, some quite dramatically. In general terms, Japan based US Reit Fund use the FTSE North America Reit Index as a benchmark. According to the index provider, the top five stocks in this index is Simon Property Group, American Tower Corp, Public Storage, Crown Castle Intl and Prologis.
Reits have various tax advantages, as long as they pay out the majority of their income as dividends. This means that to grow assets, they need to issue shares to buy assets. The Reits above are typical in that share count has a tendency to rise over time. It seems to me that for the Reits to grow, they need to be able to find buyers of new shares at ever higher prices, while Japanese based US Reit funds need to find new investors to not become sellers of Reits to meet dividend commitments. This strikes me as particularly unstable.
Republican and in particular Trump energy policy can be summed up as “Drill, Baby Drill”. It has become de rigueur in Substack and elsewhere to praise US policy, and the criticise European energy policy. The UK has come in for particular abuse. The main nature of this abuse is that high energy costs in the Europe and a pursuit of net zero has led to business stagnation. This Economist article is pretty much standard. The key graphic is below.
The political view on this is that the UK has been “too woke” and heavy taxation on oil and gas production, as well as trying to upgrade an electricity grid has made UK and Europe uncompetitive. Data from one my favourite publications, the Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy 75th edition provides compelling evidence. North American natural gas production has surged, while European gas production has collapsed.
But as I read through the rest of the publication, I was struck by how much it made the US policy of increasing fossil fuel production looks like a short term win, but long term loss. This review starts strong by highlighting how renewable energy became the biggest source of new energy in 2025 - the first time outside of a recession. Now you may have, like President Trump, a natural born hatred of renewable energy. But last year it proved it can add capacity at a fast enough rate to not slow GDP growth.
And I find it stunning that Pakistan gets 20% of its energy from solar panels. This does hold out the possibility of decarbonised future. If developing markets can adopt renewable energy early, then the outlook for fossil fuels looks negative to me. For places like Pakistan, building out a decentralised system seems like a good option.
We can see that the relationship between GDP and fossil fuel supply is already breaking. This is probably the most negative chart you could possible produce on fossil fuel in my view.
China, where EV usage is higher, is already slowing oil consumption at a much lower per capita level. This is almost a reverse of the emerging market investing model. When I started, it was assumed emerging markets would converge on western consumption levels. Not it looks like Western consumption levels will converge to Chinese levels. Potentially you could see western demand for road fuel drop by half.
The world is moving towards an electrified future, with renewables meeting much of the demand growth.
It follows it up with this very arresting graph of US exceptionalism. When I look at this, I start to see a potential problem for the US. A decarbonised world does seem inevitable to me - despite the protestations of corporates and older voters. Eventually the Greta Thumbergs of the world will be politicians and not activists. North America is alone in making its energy supply more carbon intensive.
Here is where the politics gets interesting. European carbon prices have remained at a high level for a few years already. Which comes back to the original argument that European electricity costs too much. But does it really cost too much, when it incentivising the growth of renewable energy and true energy independence? Does it make sense to switch reliance on Russian energy exports to US energy exports?
Which is a much higher level than markets elsewhere. California Carbon Allowance is one third of European levels.
But this has had the effect of leading to a much more thoroughly decarbonised electricity generation system than either the US or China. Europe is much closer to fossil fuel independence than either China or the US.
In this pro-labour world we live in, with tariffs and industrial policy. It would be very easy to see Europe seeing US renewable energy policy as “carbon dumping”, or race to the bottom deregulation. Why not tariff US exports to price the externality of the carbon heavy energy production? What I am saying is that the data already shows that fossil fuel consumption has already broken away from GDP growth, something that markets have already shown when Russia turned off the energy supply in 2022, and again this year with the closing of the Straits of Hormuz. In fact, sometime the best way to think about US foreign policy changes, is going from a free trade era to ensure maximum oil supply, to a competitive era, where it is looking to reduce competition for its exports. But long term, do you want to be investing in an industry that looks to be heading for decline? North America already lags badly behind China and Europe in Wind capacity.
Likewise in solar capacity.
For the first time, I wonder if we could see US LNG exports actually decline at some point? While the Straits of Hormuz are closed, this should be fine. But in my mind, the pieces for globally falling fossil fuel consumption are coming together.
I do wonder if US shale producers see this same world as me. Permian drillers have been running down their stock of wells now for a few years. Even with the supply disruptions in Russia and the Middle East.
If there is one thing I have learnt in my life, is not to bet against technological change. And it is hard to not see technology making fossil fuel yesterdays energy. The interesting part for me, is that we are already beginning to see signs of the benefits of European investment into renewables. Negative pricing is becoming more common.
And this negative pricing in driving a build out in battery storage.
Putting it all together, it looks more and more like fossil fuels are a dead industry.
From a peak in June, SK Hynix, a DRAM and NAND manufacturer has seen its share price fall 37%. Given the huge run up over the last year, this still leaves it well above its 100MDA.
Generally speaking, SK Hynix follows the DRAM price. So it is odd that it has been weak as DRAM prices have hit new highs.
You could perhaps argue that we have hit the end of the AI trade - and capex is going to be cut, as we saw all the way back in 2000. This is of course possible, but the JGB market gave a pretty good heads up that we were heading to a deflationary environment back in 2000. These days it keeps sending an inflationary signal
Much more likely is the announcement that SK Hynix will double capex to help reduce memory short fall has been the negative priced into markets.
The market does not like capex. An increase in capex makes it more likely it becomes cashflow negative in the future. This is both as natural consequence of spending more, and the second order effect of increasing supply leading to lower prices.
A similar logic has been holding back the hyperscalers, who have been lagging the market for a year now.
Even more intriguing has been the break out in that decidedly non-capex spending company, Apple.
Apple, has not raised capex in years, despite surging cashflow.
This is where this market gets very interesting to me. You have Warren Buffett style capital discipline in Apple, up against Elon Musk style capex heavy investing. Both have become rich with very different investing styles. Steve Jobs probably would have Apple investing as well, as he would no doubt fear that Apple could become obsolete, while the money managers are happy to see capital returned. And this I think goes to the heart of the problem for the markets. Not investing keeps cashflow high, but exposes you to competitors, something that is being priced into other software companies. My view, which remains unchanged, is that with SpaceX entering the AI race, everyone has to invest. If you see capex spend as negative - then being bearish is correct. But if you bearish think that capex is going to suddenly stop, and prices are going to collapse, then I think that is far less likely. And this seems to be what sovereign bonds are saying too.
I have been thinking about markets in a political way for a few years. I have this theory that we were moving to a “pro-labour” era, which would be good for wages, but higher interest rates would be bad for asset markets. In some ways we have seen this, with market doing very well while 2 year yields were falling, and now we are getting all sorts of market weirdness now that 2 year yields are rising.
What has been most interesting is that rising yields HAVE been hugely negative for SPECULATIVE assets. Silver, which does have central bank supporting it, has gotten smacked this year, down 55% from its peak.
Crypto has been given the same treatment - with Ethereum at 2020 prices.
I have mentioned private credit and private equity have also been at the mercy of this speculative asset smackdown. But the trillion dollar question is whether AI is a speculative asset or not? Lets take a closer look at Korea. The Kospi, which has broken out of a long term ranges, has become a memory/AI trade.
But weirdly, the Kosdaq, another speculative Korean index has been very poor this year. What I am trying to say here is that generally speaking Korean stocks have been difficult, but the memory/AI plays have been good.
Now here is the rub. I think many people think AI is entirely speculative. I think this is not correct. But I do think speculative structures have been erected around AI trades. Why is AI not speculative? Well memory prices have moved, and remain at highs.
If the AI boom is done, then why does TSMC remain at all time highs?
If you are bearish, then you could point at Korean memory stocks or Micron, and say, look these stocks are down 30% - its the beginning of the end.
But the thing is, the memory stocks sit at the intersection of AI and speculative trading. When I look at MUU - the 2x levered Micron ETF - and see shares outstanding up 8 times from a year ago (market cap USD 4bn), I see speculation has run wild.
What I am saying is that it is right to be bearish on speculation, but I am not sure it is right to be bearish on AI. I am also going to follow that up with a view that perhaps we are near the end of the “speculation” bear trade. As pointed out, memory prices and TSMC local shares remain strong. But demand for TSMC ADRS (the US listed stock) has historically been so strong, it has traded at a premium to locals for many years. As of today, the premium has fallen to 6%, down form 25% not so long ago.
Typically the collapse in premium happens at lows. That is speculative unwind may have run its course.
VKOSPI, which is VIX for the Kospi200, is running at about 80. This is a level I normally associate with a washout in markets, and potential buying opportunity.
So what am I try to say? The pro-labour trade should be good for growth, but higher yields should be and has been bad for speculative assets. From where I sit, AI trade does not look speculative, but the market has built up a range of “speculative” assets around AI. For my money, I think the chat about AI crash or not is missing the bigger picture. If short term rates are bad for speculative assets, their remains one speculative asset that really moves markets - the US 30 year treasury. Very quietly, yields have passed through 5% again.
As my substack colleagues over at Grizzle Research and Quant point out, the US government really does not have any money anymore. Everything that comes in the door goes out in interest payments and entitlements.
I do think it is right to be bearish speculative assets here - but I am not sure AI is speculative. On the contrary, the “safe asset” that underpins all finance looks to be more problematic to me.
Memory stocks, namely Micron, SK Hynix, Samsung and Sandisk have been wild of late. These stocks have been whipsawed by the increasing use of leveraged ETFs, and the capital raisings from SK Hynix and (potentially) Samsung. A good example would be KORU US, which is a 3 times leveraged South Korean bullish ETF. South Korean markets is dominated by SK Hynix and Samsung. KORU US has been volatile.
The volatility of KORU US does not match up with the still soaring DRAM prices.
Same can be said of leverage Micron ETF - MUU US.
The presence of such leverage makes the memory stocks tough holds here. Wafer stocks on the other hand still seem to lack the leverage ETF presence.
Below is a note from 2013 - In Italics, with added thoughts after
Gold buying as a leading indicator of financial distress
I wrote a note on gold late last year, pointing out that the gold price and the Indian rupee seemed to be correlated to me. With that view I suspected that if the Indian rupee fell, gold would then also fall. However market action has been the reverse, with gold falling before the Indian rupee fell, and the fall in gold was greeted with a record surge in gold buying in India. These Indian gold buyers have been rewarded with gold once again moving to new all time highs in rupee terms as India has entered a period of currency and possible financial crisis.
This led me to thinking about whether it was common to see elevated gold buying prior to financial crises. Certainly, the most motivated buyers of gold will be those depositors who take a view that their banks could go bust, either through their own reckless behaviour or government’s reckless behaviour. I went to the World Gold Council website (www.gold.org) to collect data on consumer (not official) buying of gold. Alas there was no single spreadsheet which I could consult, so the data had to be complied from a number of news releases. Below I present gold buying over time with what I believe is the best visual representation of financial distress in each market.
Thailand
We can see an increase in Thai gold buying before its major devaluation 1997.
Indonesia
Likewise Indonesian gold buying spiked and peaked before its currency devaluation.
Japan
Japan has never faced a meaningful currency crisis, but an ongoing financial crisis. Japanese gold buying peaked as Japanese banks started to underperform the markets. That is Japanese investors perceived the weakness of their own financial system and started buying gold.
USA
Much like Japan US gold buying seems to peak at the same time as banks peaked versus the market, and seem to reflect depositor’s views on US banks that they were undertaking reckless lending behaviour.
Conclusion
We have recently seen big increases in gold buying by emerging market countries with the World Gold Council reporting a 71% increase in Indian buying, Chinese buying was up by 87%, Turkish buying was up by 73% and Russian buying up by 184% in volume terms in the second quarter of this year. For gold bulls they take this as a sign of ever increasing emerging market demand for gold potential driving gold prices higher. For me I take it as a sign of domestic emerging market investors voting with their feet against their own currencies and financial systems. Investors should be aware of the rising financial risks in emerging markets.
In a recent note, I showed how Chinese consumers had gone all in on gold.
And since this buying orgy, GLD/TLT has fallen back below its 200MDA.
Looking at this note from 2013 (which I reposted because the data is chore to find, and putting on Substack means I will be access it for ever), the implication would be that China is about to enter a financial crisis of some sort. China devaluing would be very negative for GLD/TLT - so it stuck me as a good note to repost. All the crises above were in part property/financial crisis. China has already seen a slow down in construction.
And the Asian High Yield Market was very poor in 2022, mainly driven by Chinese debt problems.
The HSCEI Index has been very poor since 2007, reflecting these problems.
But the Chinese Yuan has been strong this year in contrast to Japanese Yen or Korean Won. Could Chinese buying be signalling a potential devaluation?
Here is where I reflect on how much the world has changed from when I first wrote this gold note. Back then I would be convinced that Chinese gold buying was a sign of trouble. But now, in the modern world we live in, I think it reflects the political world we live in. In the 1990s and 2000s, central banks were sellers of gold, and the lack of tariffs and industrial policy make devaluation a popular policy choice. But today, what would a Chinese devaluation solve? Nothing, as almost certainly tariffs would follow. And with trust in the US ebbing, central bank act at buyers of last resort for gold - just as they used to do with treasuries. A changed world indeed.
Peak Oil Price
From $10 per barrel in 1999, crude oil has been in bull market with the brief exception of the financial crisis in 2008/9. So much so, that the recent rise in Brent oil to $119 per barrel barely generates a mention in the financial press. However, the reality is that the current spend on energy is similar to the level of spending seen during the second oil shock in the late 70s (see chart below). At that time, in a decade, oil went from $2 per barrel in 1970 to $35 in 1980 before falling gradually back to $10 over the next twenty years.
To try and adjust for the emergence of China, I have looked at its energy spend as percentage of GDP and then compared it to both Japan and South Korea. As can be seen in the chart below, China is currently tremendously inefficient in its usage of energy. Japan has always been far more efficient in its use of energy to produce GDP than either of its neighbours. While China has spent more energy as percentage of GDP, this was in the 1970s when the Chinese economy was imploding.
Of course one of the big differences is that China has huge domestic resources of coal which allows it to be inefficient with its energy. However, even then it still compares badly with the US. Recent US numbers are also overstated as I use the Brent price rather than WTI, and ignore lower cost of natural gas in the US.
China already consumes more energy that the US, even though its GDP is half that of the US. I like to look at energy usage in terms of per capita and also in terms of how much energy is needed to produce a dollar of GDP. As seen below, China is around half the per capita level of Japan, UK and Germany. Given that Chinese energy consumption has more than doubled over the last ten years, this implies a slowdown in consumption growth going forward in my mind. Or in other terms, the base level of consumption has increased so much that the Chinese growth rate must begin to slow. Regarding GDP produced per unit of energy, China is around 25% less efficient as Germany, UK, and Japan, and half as efficient as the US. Again, efficiency gains should reduce the growth rate of Chinese energy consumption going forward.
One of the reasons I scrutinise Chinese energy demand, is that oil demand has become increasingly dependent on China. If you look at the chart below, you can see that in the five years to 2007, oil demand grew in most regions. However, since 2007 China has continued to grow while the US, Europe and developed Asia have reduced consumption. Furthermore, other areas that are growing demand for oil also tend to be oil exporters, hence their demand for oil tends to move with the oil price rather than increase at lower oil prices. Hence the drivers for oil are becoming increasingly narrow.
While demand growth is increasingly reliant on Chinese demand, supply is also beginning to respond to higher prices. As can be seen below US oil production is surging.
We are seeing signs that increasing oil production and slower demand growth from the western world is starting to cause spare capacity at OPEC producing nations to rise. Historically this has occasionally preceded a fall in the oil price.
What is also surprising about the oil market is that speculative investors no longer seem willing to bet on lower oil prices. In the late 90s speculative investors were often willing to take a net short position in the oil market – but particularly since 2007 the market seems to have become structurally long. This may reflect the rise of passive investors in the commodity market via ETFs, or possibly the effect of zero interest rates making speculation cost free. I suspect a combination of these two reasons explains the long bias of investors in oil.
The sustained rise in oil prices has also led to a huge surge in government spending in oil producing nations, with Russia in particular needing $100 per barrel to balance its budgets. Some analysts take this to imply that oil now has a floor at 100 USD a barrel. I think this is unlikely. Far more likely is that if and when oil prices begin to fall, either through slower Chinese growth or higher interest rates, we are likely to see large currency devaluations from oil producing nations in order to balance their budgets. The most recent example of this is Venezuela, which just devalued by 47% in a single day. When I see record inflows in to emerging market bonds funds, which in my view, are the most exposed assets to this type of devaluation, I feel compelled to be short areas that I believe will fall in value when the oil price begins to fall.
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