Abstract: Why do states decide to criticize come countries, but not others, over domestic human rights abuses? States often criticize rights violations abroad to improve human rights or bolster their own legitimacy, while refraining from criticizing allies. States can also be deterred from criticism by countercriticism coercion, or economic sanctions in response to criticism. I theorize that states are more likely to be deterred from criticizing countries with a reputation for countercriticism coercion, notably China. States learn from other countries’ past responses to criticism, rather than their economic power, stated positions on human rights, or domestic policies. UN member states are less likely to criticize rights violations in countries with reputations for countercriticism coercion. Elite interviews demonstrate how China’s reputation for countercriticism coercion deterred Indonesia and Malaysia from criticizing China over human rights in Xinjiang. This study has implications for the effectiveness of sanctions and resilience of international human rights norms.

"Chinese Encounters With America," published by Columbia University Press, tells the stories of twelve women and men whose experiences with the United States not only transformed their own lives but also influenced China’s quest to become a modern global nation. Their professions range from diplomacy, business, and science to music, sports, and civil society. Their lives show how Chinese citizens have interpreted and engaged with America, especially since the opening of relations in the 1970s. At a time when Chinese and American relations are dominated by competition and conflict, this book speaks to the value of shared interests and values.

Abstract: In the months since Donald Trump won the U.S. presidential election in November, policymakers in Beijing have been looking to the next four years of U.S.-Chinese relations with trepidation. Beijing has been expecting the Trump administration to pursue tough policies toward China, potentially escalating the two countries’ trade war, tech war, and confrontation over Taiwan. The prevailing wisdom is that China must prepare for storms ahead in its dealings with the United States. As we approach the symbolic measure of the first 100 days of the second Trump administration, what Trump disruptions are Beijing taking advantage of to advance their own aims? Does the escalating tariff war change that calculus?

 

Bio: Yun Sun is a Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. Her expertise is in Chinese foreign policy, U.S.-China relations and China’s relations with neighboring countries and authoritarian regimes. From 2011 to early 2014, she was a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, jointly appointed by the Foreign Policy Program and the Global Development Program, where she focused on Chinese national security decision-making processes and China-Africa relations. From 2008 to 2011, Yun was the China Analyst for the International Crisis Group based in Beijing, specializing on China’s foreign policy towards conflict countries and the developing world. Prior to ICG, she worked on U.S.-Asia relations in Washington, DC for five years. Yun earned her master’s degree in international policy and practice from George Washington University, as well as an MA in Asia Pacific studies and a BA in international relations from Foreign Affairs College in Beijing.

Abstract: Why do nations actively publicize previously overlooked disputes, and why does domestic mobilization sometimes fail to lead to aggressive policy? The Art of State Persuasion explores China’s strategic use of state propaganda during crises, revealing why certain disputes are amplified while others are downplayed. This variation depends on the alignment, or lack thereof, between Chinese state policy and public opinion. When public sentiment is more moderate than the government’s foreign policy objectives, a “mobilization campaign” is initiated. Conversely, when public opinion is more hawkish, a “pacification campaign” is deployed to mollify public sentiment.

Bio: Frances Yaping Wang is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Colgate University. She was previously an Assistant Professor at the Singapore Management University, a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Notre Dame’s International Security Center, a Minerva-United State Institute of Peace Scholar, a predoctoral fellow at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies of the George Washington University, and a senior editor at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She received her PhD from the University of Virginia.

Peter Dutton will discuss recent political, legal, and operational dynamics in the South China Sea and around the island of Taiwan. Issues discussed will include, what is the nature of the South China Sea disputes? How is China pursuing its interests? What are some of China’s motivations? What kind of maritime order does China want? And why? What roles do politics and law play in the different narratives about Taiwan? What are some of the possible resolutions to these serious and challenging disputes?

Abstract--In July 1930, the Kuomintang party school, the Central Political Institute (zhongyang zhengzhi xuexiao), established a new Diplomacy Department and welcomed its first cohort of ten students into a program designed to train young party members for careers in the Nationalist government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Over the course of the next decade, more than 130 young men and women were admitted to this highly selective department where they studied a curriculum that had been specifically designed to produce a new generation of Chinese foreign policy experts, combining rigorous language training with novel theories of international politics. This talk argues that the 130 graduates from this program were at the heart of a movement to transform Chinese foreign policymaking that began in the 1930s but continued throughout World War II and the Cold War, profoundly shaping how both Beijing and Taipei pursue their global agendas to the present day. Nearly half of the Diplomacy Department alumni stayed in Mainland China after 1949, working for the new communist state’s foreign policy apparatus, and this network of Kuomintang-trained diplomats exercised considerable influence on both sides of the Taiwan Strait throughout the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s. In this presentation, Anatol Klass will introduce this cohort: their education, their careers, and the manner in which they helped bring about a strategic reorientation and a structural transformation in Chinese diplomacy during the middle decades of the twentieth century.

How does China influence international order and when are China’s efforts successful? China develops a new strategy, international discourse power, focused on the use of narratives. Using international discourse power, China seeks to gain global influence by crafting compelling messages. Through interviews with China’s foreign policy experts, I describe the concept of international discourse power and explain how the Chinese Communist Party uses it to mobilize support and gain followers for China’s global leadership. Central to the strategy are narratives about international order. To observe the impact of China’s strategy, I focus on the development of order in cyberspace, an inchoate space where global rules are under development. Central to China’s discourse power in cyberspace is the message of cyber sovereignty. By employing a mixed methods approach to analyze the development of order in cyberspace, I find support for the argument that discourse is a source of power that allows China to mobilize support for changes in the status quo. This research flips the analytical lens from describing whether China will be motivated to shape international order to tracing the impact China has in a space where it is highly motivated to impact global governance. The focus on China’s use of rhetoric demonstrates the power of narratives in building and shaping international order.

Abstract: In recent years, China has deepened its involvement in the Latin America and Caribbean region, moving beyond its traditional commercial relationship to foster political, cultural, and even military ties, replacing in a stepwise process the region’s conventional North American and European partners. In parallel, Latin America and the Caribbean's trade relationship with China has been increasingly focused on exporting low-value-added primary products and importing high-tech goods, which has accelerated the process of deindustrialization in the area. This study outlines the historical regional and international context that frames both the Chinese movements into Latin America and the Caribbean and the investments, projects, and partnerships the regions have established to date. Mexico’s relationship with the PRC and what it means for the region and the US market is also explored. Through an in-depth analysis of Chinese activity in the area, this study will highlight the opportunities and risks this calculated and strategic rapprochement presents.

Bio:

Jackson Schneider has more than 30 years of high-level experience at transnational companies, working closely with domestic and international government bodies through his leadership roles in strategic industry associations and boards of public institutions. In his decade-long role as President and CEO of one of the most critical emerging-nation defense companies, Jackson interacted with government officials in several countries through trade negotiations or as a Brazilian representative in international forums such as CEBRICS and the B20.  He was visiting senior fellow(non-resident) at King's College, Dept of War Studies, London, from August 2020 to August 2022.

While most attention has focused on Putin’s aggression in Ukraine, the big story of the past decade has been the reorientation of Russia from Europe to Asia. Centered on China but not limited to it, this abrupt shift made possible Putin’s anti-West behavior. In this book, Rozman, Christofferson, and several contributors present a comprehensive analysis of the turn “east.” Having penetrated the web of censorship in Russia (and China also) to grasp what is said about the actual state of Sino-Russian relations, the authors explain the duality of Russia’s ties to China: together against the US-led order but at odds over reconfiguring Asian regionalism. 

The overall message combines two contrasting conclusions: Russia has increasingly joined with China in challenging the existing order in Asia, working to forge what Moscow calls a Greater Eurasian Partnership; and Russia and China have played a cat-and-mouse game of rival strategies that, on all fronts, have been difficult to reconcile. Without grasping this story, it would be difficult to understand why Putin has invaded Ukraine and is threatening the West.

What makes this book exceptional?  First, it thoroughly covers four stages in Russian policy and seven directions ranging from Central Asia to the Sino-Russian border to the Korean Peninsula, Japan, India, Southeast Asia, and Mongolia. Second, this is a cohesive, cumulative account of what transpired, not a disparate, edited collection. Third, this book draws heavily on a record of more than 1000 Russian articles over a decade as well as familiarity with the publications from China, Japan, South Korea, and Mongolia. It tells a unique story of how both Sino-Russian relations and Russian thinking toward Asia have evolved, year-by-year through 2022.

This book tells of Russian plans to forge a new architecture across Asia, from North Korea to India, in constant tension with China’s Sinocentric agenda.

Abstract: Many studies of China's relations with and influence on Southeast Asia tend to focus on how Beijing has used its power asymmetry to achieve regional influence. Yet, scholars and pundits often fail to appreciate the complexity of the contemporary Chinese state and society, and just how fragmented, decentralized, and internationalized China is today.  This talk points out that a focus on the Chinese state alone is not sufficient for a comprehensive understanding of China's influence in Southeast Asia. Instead, we must look beyond the Chinese state, to non-state actors from China, such as private businesses and Chinese migrants. These actors affect people's perception of China in a variety of ways, and they often have wide-ranging as well as long-lasting effects on bilateral relations. Looking beyond the Chinese state's intentional influence reveals many situations that result in unanticipated changes in Southeast Asia. This talk proposes that to understand this increasingly globalized China, we need more conceptual flexibility regarding which Chinese actors are important to China's relations, and how they wield this influence, whether intentional or not.

Bio: Dr. Enze Han is Associate Professor at the Department of Politics and Public Administration, The University of Hong Kong. His recent publications include The Ripple Effect: China’s Complex Presence in Southeast Asia (Oxford University Press, 2024), Asymmetrical Neighbors: Borderland State Building between China and Southeast Asia (Oxford University Press, 2019), Contestation and Adaptation: The Politics of National Identity in China (Oxford University Press, 2013), and various articles appearing in The Journal of Politics, International Affairs, World Development, The China Quarterly, Security Studies, Conflict Management and Peace Science, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies among many others. During 2015-2016, he was a Friends Founders' Circle Member of the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, United States. His research has been supported by the Leverhulme Research Fellowship and British Council/Newton Fund. He has been awarded the Distinguished Fellow on Contemporary Southeast Asia by the Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Initiative on Southeast Asia in 2021. Dr. Han received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the George Washington University, and he was also a postdoctoral research fellow in the China and the World Program at Princeton University.