ChinaEconTalk

Douglas Irwin is the John French Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College and the author of Clashing Over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy. On this episode, Irwin provides an overview to the history of U.S. trade policy from the 18th century to the modern day, highlighting significant legislation as well as the formation of important intergovernmental organizations that have sprung up along the way.

19:53: On the flawed logic behind the Tariff Act of 1930, and the parallels with similarly problematic thinking in the modern day: “There’s absolutely a parallel there because some Democrats in Congress said, ‘You know, we ought to really think about this carefully, and not just our domestic interest but also our export interests, and other countries might retaliate.’ And basically, the reaction of most members of Congress was, Republicans at the time, ‘No, we don’t have to worry about that. This is a domestic piece of legislation, it doesn’t really concern other countries. They’re not going to retaliate.’ And, of course, they did.”

39:40: Doug discusses the tips and tricks behind one example of “tariff engineering”: “The tariffs applied to motorcycles with piston displacements of 700cc and above. What Honda started doing is producing a 699cc version. Now the difference [between the two] is imperceptible, but just by changing that one cubic centimeter, it changed the whole tariff treatment and you avoided a 45 percent tariff and were assessed at a much, much lower rate.”

Jordan will be hosting his first-ever live recording of ChinaEconTalk at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, D.C., at 6:00 p.m. on Thursday, September 19. Be sure to drop by Mission Dupont afterward for dinner or drinks!

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Douglas Fuller is an associate professor in the Department of Asian and International Studies at the City University of Hong Kong and the author of Paper Tiger, Hidden Dragons: Firms and the Political Economy of China’s Technological Development. In his book, Fuller explores a question that has hounded heads of state around the world for decades: How can a developing country get ahead in the tech sector? Drawing on the results of 499 interviews from experts over the course of 15 years, Fuller discusses China’s answer to this question in the context of its attempts to dominate the global semiconductor industry. Fuller and Jordan also touch on the transformative impact of the trade war and the concept of technology transfer and their implications for the immediate future of the Chinese tech sector. 

Jordan’s newsletter is now available for sign-ups: chinaecontalk.substack.com. In the past few weeks, he’s translated articles on topics like the troubled future of VPNs in China, the role of “operations” in Chinese internet companies, and the rise of a cheese tea Starbucks slayer. 

What to listen for in this week’s ChinaEconTalk:

27:38: Chinese tech companies are often portrayed as monolithic, but in reality, the financial decisions that brought companies like ZTE and Huawei to the international stage are significantly different: “[Huawei CEO and founder] Ren Zhengfei — there was a method to his madness. He decided to forgo what were these rational incentive structures to just embrace state procurement and instead took a very high risk strategy of very early on looking abroad for contracts, for markets because he really wanted to hone Huawei’s capabilities by competing against the best… In contrast, a firm like ZTE was more than happy to be much more reliant on the Chinese marketplace when it went abroad. It sort of very much followed this [path of taking] China Development Bank subsidized loans to sell equipment in African countries where the leading foreign firms were not interested because the price points were so low.”

41:16: What should U.S. policy look like in regards to Chinese tech policy? In considering this question, Fuller notes: “Investment binges [by China] have wrecked certain markets… Now the United States is extrapolating forward. What if they do this in memory chips or other semiconductor products? Those two areas are of high concern, particularly when thinking about, ‘Well, are these natural outcomes, or not?’ And I would say the investment binges and the levels of subsidization of a lot of industrial investment in China, this obviously didn’t just happen because the market dictated it.”

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Danit Gal is a former Yenching Scholar and coauthor of a recent paper, “Perspectives and Approaches to AI Ethics: East Asia.” On this episode, Gal discusses how Japanese, South Korean, and Chinese experts are forging new paths in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), exploring societal applications — and the unexpected drawbacks of “female” virtual assistants. Gal also explains the tech connections between China and Israel, and the possible impact of the U.S.-China trade war on this relationship.

What to listen for on this week’s ChinaEconTalk:

15:56: Gal on her trip to Longquan Monastery in Beijing: “They basically have a Chinese robot monk, named Xian’er. I spoke to him and he gives you all these responses and talks to you about the deep meaning of Buddhist ceremonies… And then I asked him, ‘Who is your master?’ And then he answered to me very clearly, ‘The data is my master.’ And the monks freaked out — they [said] ‘No, no, no. We give him the data. We are the data. We feed him the ceremonies, and everything he has to say!’” 

42:15: In a recent piece, Gal wrote that trade and technology tensions between the U.S. and China present both challenges and opportunities for Israel: “One clear way is that it’s really disrupting supply chains in that you would have to choose your alliances in order to get certain components at a good price and time. We’re getting to the point where a lot of companies are not allowed to trade directly and that significantly adds costs and uncertainty… An upside to that is actually that because American companies are not allowed to directly trade with China, they go through technical middlemen.” 

Jordan will be in New York and Washington, D.C., this September and October, so reach out if you want to meet up! Email him at [email protected] or connect on WeChat using his WeChat ID, jordanschneider.

Oh, and don’t forget to subscribe to chinaecontalk.substack.com!

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On this episode of ChinaEconTalk, Jordan interviews Lauren Teixeira, a freelance reporter based in Chengdu, Sichuan Province. After what has been a jam-packed few months of China news, Lauren discusses a wide range of topics, from engaging with mainlanders about the anti-Extradition Bill protests in Hong Kong to the downsides of Chinese superblock urban planning. Lauren finishes the interview with a wide-ranging introduction to contemporary pop culture artists in China whose innovation and creativity are helping people to stay inspired at a challenging time. 

What to listen for on this week’s ChinaEconTalk:

6:59: Lauren recalls Ian Johnson’s comments to her during their conversation on engaging in political discussions in China: “He said to me, ‘There’s a ceiling for your rhetoric because at some point you can’t tell someone to “look it up” because they can’t look it up.’ Epistemologically you’re not on even ground. And so, if you want to really get into a real discussion with someone,  you basically have to redpill them.”

14:41: On K-pop and geopolitics, as China tries to develop its own pop music industry: “It’s half import substitution and half, I think, just a concerted effort to build your own idol industry that you can better control. For example, there would be all these geopolitical conflicts. If something happened in the South China Sea, the Chinese idols would have to go on Korean television and be like, ‘F*** this, I’m a patriot.’ There was once a Taiwanese idol who waved a Taiwanese flag on a Korean reality show and she had to absolutely bend the knee to get back into the good graces of China, which was putting pressure on her agency.” 

Jordan will be in New York and Washington, D.C. this September and October so reach out if you want to meet up! Email him at [email protected] or connect on WeChat using his WeChat ID, jordanschneider.

Oh, and don’t forget to subscribe to chinaecontalk.substack.com! You've all signed up already, haven't you?

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Jordan interviews Chris Miller, associate professor of international history at Tufts University and a specialist on Russian politics, economics, and foreign policy.

This week on ChinaEconTalk, Jordan interviews Chris Miller, associate professor of international history at Tufts University and a specialist on Russian politics, economics, and foreign policy. Drawing on some of his recent publications, Miller discusses topics ranging from Sino-Soviet collaboration and competition to their respective economic and political reform programs in the 1970s and 80s. Miller concludes by exploring the significance of the collapse of the USSR in terms of the impression it made on Chinese officials, including Xi Jinping, and what this may suggest about the future of Chinese politics and the ongoing Sino-Russian relationship. As Xi himself is reported to have said during a closed-door meeting in 2012: “Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the Soviet Communist Party collapse? … Finally, all it took was one quiet word from Gorbachev to declare the dissolution of the Soviet Communist Party, and a great party was gone. In the end nobody was a real man, nobody came out to resist.”

What to listen for on this week’s ChinaEconTalk: 

34:17: On the Soviet origins of Deng’s Reform and Opening strategy: “There was a period of learning [by China] from the Soviet Union in the 1950s right after the revolution...Deng picked that back up to a certain extent in the late 1970s...the goal was to give space to private enterprises in the countryside and to give space to farmers to operate without central Party control...Deng saw this and said, ‘I wonder if we can try something like this at home in China, and we can use Lenin to justify it.’”

52:15: “The CCP interpretation, which is also the interpretation of many in Russia today, is that it’s plausible to have had a strong man reform the economy but keep the party and the state as they were, and in my research that just seems extraordinarily implausible…in some ways the Xi Jinping view is the ‘have your cake and eat it too’ version, and the reality is the history doesn’t support that counterfactual.”

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This week on ChinaEconTalk, Jordan speaks with Dongwoo Kim, a postgraduate research fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada who specializes in AI. Dongwoo discusses his research on the progress of AI development in Japan, Korea, and China, including the challenges faced by Chinese AI researchers overseas, and the need for greater tech literacy in general.

What to listen for on this week's ChinaEconTalk:

4:49: Misconceptions abound when it comes to AI, as do references to "Skynet" from the Terminator movies. "Strictly speaking, that's not what we're talking about," Dongwoo says. "People have such a misunderstanding about this, and also the way in which we're using AI now, it's kind of subtle, right? It's used by Google, it's used by Facebook. If you don't have the tech literacy, you're not always going to be aware of it. So I think there's a potential that if we don't educate people about what AI really is and why this matters, we might get to a situation where people don't really have a clear conception of what this AI thing is when it will be affecting so many aspects of their lives."

32:36: On Chinese AI researchers in Canada: "[Problems are] not as overt as in the U.S. I think, if anything, the concerns that have materialized are if there's funding within a Canadian postsecondary institution that is tied to an American partner, that may compromise their ability to continue working on that research project for a researcher of Chinese ethnicity. But there has been no concrete move to do that in Canada."

This week, Jordan speaks with Graham Webster, a China digital economy fellow and coordinating editor of the DigiChina project at New America. He was previously a senior fellow and lecturer at Yale Law School's Paul Tsai China Center. The two talked about Graham's work at DigiChina, artificial intelligence in China and its complex legal infrastructure, the facts (and fiction) behind China's controversial social credit system, and the potential for a new cold war between the U.S. and China.

What to listen for on this week's ChinaEconTalk:

10:23: "If the Chinese government wants to step on Huawei or somebody to get access to data, they're not going to need this particular provision of law to do it. I think it's a similar case with VPNs and these cross-border data rules. The pretty clear intent behind these rules is to expand on an increasingly detailed regime for protecting Chinese peoples' data from abuse by companies or cyber criminals or just breaches due to bad security practices. It could be read in a way that would make VPNs problematic, but there are already other sets of regulations that make VPNs kind of problematic under Chinese law… From my perspective, this would be a very strange way for the Chinese government to try to cut down on VPNs, when they could just go at it directly and say it's a violation of the principle of cybersovereignty."

32:59: "In the end, we're having this global discussion and people around the world are realizing how unaccountable various institutions and businesses are when they use automation. And there's both real things going on in China, especially in Xinjiang, and a bunch of maybe slightly exaggerated or imagined things going on that capture people's imaginations about what could go wrong… I really would like it for people to be better informed about the realities of, for example, social credit because — my [former] colleague Jeremy Daum likes to say sometimes: 'There are plenty of actual Chinese government offenses against human rights and against the dignity and well-being of Chinese citizens; we don't need to invent other ones. We should focus on what's actually happening.'"

This week, in part 2 of a special two-part edition of ChinaEconTalk, Jordan interviews Professor Julia Lovell, author of the recently published book on Mao's international legacy entitled Maoism: A Global History. In this episode, Lovell recounts the ways in which Maoism truly started going global in the 1950s and 1960s. With some prompting courtesy of the Chinese government's propaganda machine, self-described Maoist groups sprang up in Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Western Europe, and even the U.S. Lovell explains how groups around the world interpreted the works and words of Mao in various ways and with varying results — from Black Panthers hosting study sessions of Mao's Little Red Book in the U.S. to members of the Shining Path who espoused a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology as they committed acts of guerilla warfare in Peru.

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Quotes to listen for on this week's episode:

21:19: Lovell describes the "counterculture craze" of the 1960s in Western Europe and the U.S., and the appeal of Maoism to such groups. "Student protestors, for example, who were dissatisfied with their universities and with their governments identified — or misidentified — Mao's Cultural Revolution as a youth protest, and adopted its slogans such as 'To rebel is justified' (造反有理 zàofǎn yǒulǐ) or 'Bombard the headquarters' (炮打司令部 pàodǎ sīlìngbù) in their own revolts and demonstrations… Many Western radicals felt solidarity with Mao's China, which was America's number one detractor through this time. And this really followed the logic of 'My enemy's enemy is my friend.'"

34:13: Lovell tells the story of one of Mao Zedong's generals, operating under the pseudonym of Mafaxian, who was sent to Zambia in an effort to recruit and indoctrinate lieutenants loyal to the political and militaristic precepts of Maoism. His mission was ultimately a failure, with Mafaxian feeling "embittered" toward the end of his years-long tenure. Lovell explains how this oral history is a "perfect grassroots example of how limited the possibilities of China's ability to export its model were, despite the huge amounts of generosity and largesse."

This week, in part 2 of a special two-part edition of ChinaEconTalk, Jordan interviews Professor Julia Lovell, author of the recently published book on Mao’s international legacy entitled Maoism: A Global History. In this episode, Lovell recounts the ways in which Maoism truly started going global in the 1950s and 1960s. With some prompting courtesy of the Chinese government’s propaganda machine, self-described Maoist groups sprang up in Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Western Europe,