Recording of a debate at the Battle of Ideas festival 2025 on Saturday 18 October at Church House, London.

ORIGINAL INTRODUCTION

Despite the name, rare earths are not particularly rare. For example, cerium is more abundant in the earth’s crust than copper. But they are spread thinly as trace impurities, so to obtain usable rare earths requires processing enormous amounts of raw ore at great expense – and with considerable environmental impacts. China has been willing to massively subsidise this process to support its own industries while keeping the price low, making the processing of ore uneconomic elsewhere in the world.

The potential geopolitical consequences are obvious: China’s rivals are currently utterly dependent on it. Years ago, China secured a significant proportion – almost a monopoly – of excavated rare earths in Venezuela, Brazil and other parts of South America and has now imposed export controls on many rare earth elements in response to Trump’s tariffs. China is responsible for 60 per cent of all rare earths mined but, more importantly, it controls the processing of 90 per cent of all global refined rare earth output.

Given that US is reliant on production plants in in China/Taiwan for its computer chips, it was slow to respond to the geopolitical power shift. China has already flexed its muscles in this regard, having banned exports of rare earths to Japan in 2010 over a fishing dispute (subsequently overturned by the World Trade Organisation) and has imposed export restrictions on the US since 2023. In May, Ford had to stop production at a car plant in Chicago because of the shortage of magnets made with rare earths. China has also placed an export ban on the technologies used to extract and separate rare earths.

A desire to open up access to these metals was said to be a major feature of Trump’s negotiations around Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. After Zelensky’s painful ambush in the White House, Trump quickly concluded a deal allowing the US access to Ukraine’s natural resources, especially the coveted rare earths. Some have also suggested that claiming these metals is one of the aims of Russia’s war.

What should the rest of the world do about China’s monopoly? Is it feasible to create alternative sources of supply – and what would it cost? Can innovation reduce the need for rare earths – or can recycling save the day? What does it all mean for the direction of geopolitics?

SPEAKERS

Animesh Jha

Henry Sanderson

CHAIR