If you want to impress your children, tell them you listen to this South Korean boyband

Feb 26th 2026|6 min read

WHO MADE the second-highest-selling album in the world last year? (There are no prizes for correctly guessing who claimed the top spot—it was Taylor Swift.) You may be tempted to name a pop juggernaut such as Lady Gaga or Justin Bieber. Country-music fans might opt for Morgan Wallen. Lovers of Latin music might volunteer Bad Bunny, the star of the Super Bowl half-time show.

All those answers are wrong. The right one is Stray Kids, a South Korean boyband. You might find this perplexing, because Stray Kids sounds like a clothing line or an after-school club. Chances are you cannot name one of their hits, never mind hum one of their punchy dubstep- and electronic-inflected tunes.

But there are millions of people across the world who can. Stray Kids are** fully fledged** superstars. The band has more than 10.5bn views on YouTube and almost 2bn likes on TikTok. Fans have spent some 21m hours—roughly equivalent to 2,400 years—feasting on a track called “God’s Menu” on Spotify. In November “DO IT” became their eighth album or ep (extended play) to reach number one on the Billboard 200 chart. It is a feat not even BTS, another K-pop group with far superior name recognition, have accomplished.

Stray Kids’s recent stadium tour, “dominATE”, lived up to its name, with revenues of almost $200m. A concert film was released in cinemas at the beginning of February. For one weekend, it was the highest-grossing movie in the world.

The band is not an overnight success. The eight members had been working on their skills as singers, rappers and dancers in K-pop’s intensive training system long before they joined the band in 2017. That year a reality-television show chronicled Stray Kids’s transformation from a gaggle of novice, nervous youngsters—during shows members would drop their microphones and mess up the words—into a well-oiled entertainment machine. The show was a canny marketing technique; their debut single, “Hellevator”, was released to coincide with its broadcast.

But the group’s global breakout came later, in 2020, with the release of “God’s Menu”, a cacophony of sirens, thudding beats and aggressive vocals. (Throughout, the members mimic the sound of gunshots: “DU DU DU DU DU DU”.) The music video, displaying sharp dance moves and even sharper editing, went viral.

Stray Kids’s success is not the result of child’s play. They have prospered for two reasons. One is a defiantly original sound. From the start Stray Kids eschewed the effervescent tunes preferred by their K-pop rivals in favour of something much rowdier. (Some call it “noise music”, which does a disservice to the catchy hooks and tuneful bridges.) The frenetic trap-pop style made them outliers, but over time has won them admirers. Stray Kids’s followers—around 75% of whom are female, according to Chartmetric, a music-data firm—find it thrilling. “We made it on our own,” the band declares. “We do what we wanna do.”

This is all by design. In 2017 Bang Chan, the group’s leader, selected each member himself from the trainees at JYP Entertainment, a record label. Normally it is music executives who put bands together and it can result in groups that lack chemistry. But Bang Chan picked performers who suited his boisterous style. For instance, Felix, a rapper, has a deep, gravelly voice that lends a distinctive texture to songs.

And whereas other K-pop groups may be assigned tracks by their label, leading to variations in style across albums, Stray Kids write most of their music themselves. Three members, working as a group called 3RACHA, handle the music production. Their songwriting approach is guided by recurring “melodic symbols” within tracks, Changbin, one member, has said. Fans can repeat these leitmotifs even if there is a language barrier. Watch “dominATE” and you will see hordes of women screaming “LA-LA-LA-LA” or “MANIAC” on beat.

The other reason for their success is Stray Kids’s relationship with those fans. For though their music is gritty, their public image is anything but. The band members wear makeup and paint their nails. They sport designer clothes. (It is a miracle their concert outfits did not precipitate a global shortage of rhinestones and sequins.) Stray Kids demonstrate a more progressive kind of manhood, says Ray Seol of Berklee College of Music. “It’s the Korean way of masculinity…it’s very different from the Western way,” Mr Seol says. “Fans love to see this kind of stuff.”

The members also cultivate an air of authenticity. (K-pop fans are attuned to engagement they feel is “fake” or done at the behest of a record label.) The group regularly chats with fans online via livestreams, with special broadcasts for birthdays and other major events; Stray Kids also take fans behind the scenes, sharing songs-in-progress. This creates a sense of proximity and allows fans to feel that they have a direct relationship with their idols.

Stray Kids chat about their feelings, particularly feelings of anxiousness. In the “dominATE” film every single member talks to the camera about one insecurity or another. Hyunjin says it took him a long time to accept that being vulnerable was acceptable, to realise that “A wounded blade of grass smells sweeter.”

This sensitive side comes out in their music. Their lyrics express the concerns of young listeners starting to make their way in the world. (A large majority of the fanbase is aged 13-24.) “My Pace” talks about the perils of comparing yourself with others. “Grow Up” reassures listeners that they are “doing fine”: “Even adults make mistakes.” Nicole Ohiomah-Paul, a teenage fan from London, says that she “didn’t really like to show [her] emotions” for fear of seeming weak. But Stray Kids have taught her that it “is part of who we are. We’re human.”

**Stray Kids exemplify a generational divide **that has long existed in culture. Since the dawn of popular music, parents have been perplexed by what their offspring bop along to in their bedrooms. This has been heightened with the advent of streaming, as listeners can access tracks written by anyone, anywhere.

The scale of Stray Kids’s success demonstrates just how much the media landscape has changed in the 21st century. In decades past, television shows, radio stations and newspapers were music’s kingmakers: they decided which acts were worth exposure and listeners’ time. They could boost careers or throttle them.

That is no longer the case: “Consumers are the new broadcasters,” says Will Page, a former chief economist at Spotify. Stray Kids have had relatively little attention from traditional outlets, but they have still won fans from Seoul to Sydney and São Paulo. “We make the rules,” the band asserts on “MEGAVERSE”, and “our music echoes through the galaxy.” ■

你從未聽說過的全球最強天團

如果你想讓孩子對你刮目相看，告訴他們你也在聽這支韓國男團。

去年的全球專輯銷量亞軍是誰？（第一名毫無懸念由泰勒絲奪冠）。你可能會直覺想到女神卡卡（Lady Gaga）或小賈斯汀（Justin Bieber）等流行巨頭；鄉村音樂迷可能會選摩根·沃倫（Morgan Wallen）；拉丁音樂愛好者則可能推舉超級盃中場秀巨星 Bad Bunny。

這些答案都錯了。正確答案是 Stray Kids，一支韓國男團。你可能會感到困惑，因為「Stray Kids」聽起來像個服裝品牌或課後社團。你很可能連他們的一首熱門歌曲都叫不出來，更別提哼出那些富有打擊感、融合了迴響貝斯（dubstep）與電子樂元素的旋律。

然而，全球有數百萬人對他們瞭如指掌。Stray Kids 是名副其實的超級巨星：他們在 YouTube 上的觀看次數超過 105 億次，TikTok 上的按讚數近 20 億。粉絲們在 Spotify 上聆聽《神選菜單》（God’s Menu）這首歌的時間總計約 2,100 萬小時——相當於 2,400 年。去年 11 月，《DO IT》成為他們第八張登上 Billboard 200 榜首的專輯或迷你專輯（EP），這是一項連知名度更高的 K-pop 團體 BTS 都未曾達成的壯舉。

Stray Kids 最近的體育場巡迴演唱會「dominATE」人如其名，創造了近 2 億美元的營收。2 月初上映的演唱會電影，更曾蟬聯週末全球票房冠軍。

他們的成功並非一蹴而就。在 2017 年成軍前，八位成員就在 K-pop 嚴苛的練習生體系中磨練唱跳與饒舌技能。當年的實境節目記錄了他們從一群青澀緊張的青少年——當時他們還會在表演中掉麥克風或忘詞——蛻變為精準運作的娛樂機器的過程。該節目是一場精明的行銷，首支單曲《Hellevator》便配合節目播出同步發行。

但他們真正的全球突破是在 2020 年，憑藉《神選菜單》一曲成名。這首歌融合了警報聲、沉重的鼓點與侵略性的唱腔，成員們在副歌中模仿槍聲（DU DU DU DU DU DU）。其舞蹈動作俐落、剪輯銳利的音樂錄影帶隨即在網路瘋傳。

Stray Kids 的成功並非兒戲，主要歸功於兩大原因。首先是標新立異的音樂風格。他們從一開始就捨棄了 K-pop 對手偏好的輕快旋律，轉而追求更為狂放、喧鬧的曲風。雖然有人稱之為「噪音音樂」，但這顯然忽略了其中朗朗上口的記憶點與動聽的過渡段落。這種狂躁的 Trap-pop 風格讓他們成為異類，卻也隨著時間贏得大批擁護者。據數據公司 Chartmetric 統計，其粉絲約 75% 為女性，她們對此深感震撼。正如樂團所宣言：「我們靠自己成功，我們只做想做的事。」

這一切都在計畫之中。2017 年，隊長方燦從 JYP 娛樂的練習生中親自挑選成員。通常團體是由高層湊合而成，往往缺乏化學反應，但方燦挑選的是能契合他豪放風格的表演者。例如，饒舌擔當 Felix 那深沉渾厚的嗓音，為歌曲增添了獨特的質感。

此外，其他 K-pop 團體通常由經紀公司分配曲目，導致風格參差不齊；但 Stray Kids 大部分音樂皆為自創。由三位成員組成的「3RACHA」負責音樂製作。成員彰彬曾表示，他們的創作受歌曲中反覆出現的「旋律符號」引導。即便有語言隔閡，粉絲仍能跟著這些主導動機（leitmotifs）唱和。在「dominATE」現場，你會看到成千上萬的女性隨著節奏尖叫「LA-LA-LA-LA」或「MANIAC」。

第二個成功關鍵是他們與粉絲的關係。雖然音樂風格硬核，但他們的公眾形象卻極其細膩。成員們化妝、塗指甲油，身著設計師服飾（他們的表演服幾乎快造成全球水鑽與亮片的短缺）。伯克利音樂學院的 Ray Seol 指出，Stray Kids 展現了一種更進步的「男子氣概」——這是一種不同於西方、帶有韓國特色的陽剛之美，深受粉絲喜愛。

成員們也努力營造真實感。K-pop 粉絲對於「虛假」或應公司要求的互動非常敏銳。該團體定期透過直播與粉絲聊天，舉辦生日特輯，並分享創作過程的幕後花絮。這創造了一種親近感，讓粉絲覺得自己與偶像之間有著直接聯繫。

Stray Kids 也常談論心理感受，尤其是焦慮感。在「dominATE」紀錄片中，每位成員都對著鏡頭傾訴自己的不安全感。鉉辰提到，他花了很長時間才接受「展現脆弱」是沒問題的，並體悟到「受傷的青草聞起來更香」。這種感性也體現在音樂中。他們的歌詞觸及了年輕聽眾（13-24 歲的主力粉絲群）初入社會的煩憂。《My Pace》探討了與他人比較的危險，《Grow Up》則安撫聽眾：「即便大人也會犯錯，你已經做得很好了。」一位倫敦的青少年粉絲說，她以前因害怕顯得軟弱而不敢表達情感，但 Stray Kids 教會她：情感是人類的一部分。

Stray Kids 體現了文化中長期存在的世代鴻溝。自流行音樂誕生以來，父母總是對孩子在房間裡聽的音樂感到困惑。隨著串流媒體的興起，聽眾可以隨時隨地獲取任何人的作品，這種現象更加顯著。

Stray Kids 的巨大成功反映了 21 世紀媒體的巨變。在過去幾十年，電視、廣播和報紙是音樂界的「造王者」：他們決定誰值得曝光，進而左右歌手的興衰。

但現在情況已大不相同。Spotify 前首席經濟學家 Will Page 表示：「消費者就是新的廣播員。」Stray Kids 雖然相對較少受到傳統媒體關注，卻依然從首爾、雪梨一路紅到聖保羅。正如他們在《MEGAVERSE》中所言：「規矩由我們制定，我們的音樂迴盪在銀河之中。」

小分享:奧茲維新集中營的叛亂

The Great Sonderkommando Revolt of 1944

Article written by:Sky HISTORY

WW2

On 7 October 1944, the inhuman tyranny of Auschwitz was suddenly challenged in the most astounding way. A group of prisoners, known as the Sonderkommando, fought back against the SS, in an act of rebellion that shocked their complacent captors. So just what was the Sonderkommando, and how did they orchestrate their uprising?

The Sonderkommando

In a place that was as close to Hell as anything that has ever existed on Earth, the men of the Sonderkommando inhabited their own special circle of anguish. They weren't just prisoners – they were forced to assist in the mass killings of other prisoners. Largely made up of Jews, the Sonderkommando were men deemed fit and able enough to help the Nazis process new arrivals – shepherding them from the trains, giving them false reassurance, leading them to the gas chambers and disposing of the mountains of corpses in the crematoria. Some of these corpses were of their own friends and relatives.

They had no say in the matter – their choice was either to do as they were told, or face a swift execution themselves. It was a queasy, morally sickening position to be forced into – particularly as the men of the Sonderkommando were granted special privileges like better (or at least, less disgusting) living quarters, more food and "perks" like cigarettes and medicines. They were also less likely to be arbitrarily gunned down just because a Nazi officer felt like it.

The sense of being forced into being "collaborators" was too much for the men to bear. One Sonderkommando prisoner who would survive the genocide, Filip Muller, later recounted how he his crushing feeling of guilt led him to follow one group of prisoners right into the gas chamber. As he put it, one of the girls in the doomed group stopped him, saying "We must die, but you still have a chance to save your life. You have to return to the camp and tell everybody about our last hours… They ought to fight, that's better than dying here helplessly."

Of course, death for the Sonderkommando was still inevitable – it was simply postponed. Their slave labour meant they knew the truth of the camp and the industrialised slaughter taking place there. That in turn meant they had to be regularly slaughtered themselves, to make way for a new "generation" of Sonderkommando. It was the 12th generation who would rise up against their cruel masters.

The October revolt

The Sonderkommando uprising wasn't some spontaneous outburst of anger against the SS. It was a carefully thought-out plan that overcame incredible logistical odds. And some of the key players were female Jewish prisoners working in a munitions factory within the sprawling Auschwitz complex.

In the months leading up to October, these women had painstakingly smuggled gunpowder from the factory to the secret resistance movement within the Sonderkommando. They used ingenious techniques, like hiding the tiny packages of powder in the false bottoms of food trays, and even in the nooks of corpses being sent to the crematoria. All the while enduring the nerve-jangling possibility of being found out.

The gunpowder was used by the Sonderkommando to create makeshift bombs and grenades. This careful preparation came to a head on 7 October, when – during a roll call – one of the prisoners calmly walked up to a Nazi officer and with a triumphant "Hurrah!" struck him with a hammer.

What followed was chaos, as the SS found themselves attacked on all sides by prisoners brandishing hammers, knives and explosives. According to accounts, one SS guard noted for his extreme sadism was nonchalantly thrown into a crematorium oven alive. Some of the prisoners also cut their way through the barbed wire to flee into the woods, while the SS opened fire with machine guns.

It was a brief, delicious taste of vengeance for the Sonderkommando, killing three SS men and injuring around a dozen. But, inevitably, the Nazis crushed the revolt. The escaped prisoners were recaptured and executed. Hundreds of Sonderkommando prisoners were massacred, as were the brave women who helped them.

But, despite all of this, some knew that the tide would turn again some day, and this time for good. A month after the revolt, and weeks before his own death, a Sonderkommando prisoner called Chaim Herman wrote a message for his family, and closed it with these words:

"I am sending you my last farewell forever, these are my last greetings, I embrace you most heartily for the last time and I beg you once more, do believe me that I am going away calmly, knowing you are alive and our enemy is broken."

1944年10月7日：奧斯威辛特遣隊起義

1944 年 10 月 7 日，奧斯威辛那泯滅人性的暴政突然遭到了極其驚人的挑戰。一群被稱為「特遣隊」的囚犯向黨衛軍（SS）展開反擊，這場叛亂震驚了那些心滿意足的捕獵者。那麼，「特遣隊」究竟是什麼樣的組織？他們又是如何策劃這場起義的呢？

特遣隊（The Sonderkommando）

在一個與人間煉獄無異的地方，特遣隊的成員們處於一種特殊的痛苦深淵中。他們不僅僅是囚犯，更被迫協助對其他囚犯進行大規模屠殺。特遣隊主要由猶太人組成，納粹認為這些人體格健壯，足以協助處理新抵達的人員——包括將他們從火車上引導下來、給予虛假的安慰、帶領他們進入毒氣室，並在火葬場處置堆積如山的屍體。而這些屍體中，有些甚至是他們自己的親友。

他們對此毫無選擇——唯一的生路就是聽命行事，否則將面臨立即處決。這是一種令人作嘔、在道德上極其痛苦的處境。尤其諷刺的是，特遣隊成員被賦予了某些「特權」，例如較好（或至少沒那麼噁心）的居住環境、更多的食物，以及香菸和藥品等「福利」。此外，他們也比較不會僅僅因為納粹軍官的一時興起就遭到隨意槍殺。

這種被迫成為「共犯」的感覺讓這些人難以承受。其中一位大屠殺倖存者菲利普·穆勒（Filip Muller）後來回憶說，那種壓倒性的罪惡感曾讓他一度跟著一群囚犯直接走進毒氣室。然而，那群走向死亡的人中，有一位少女阻止了他，她說：「我們必須死，但你仍有機會保住性命。你必須回到營區，告訴所有人關於我們最後時刻的事……他們應該戰鬥，這總比在這裡無助地死去要好。」

當然，對特遣隊來說，死亡終究是不可避免的，只是被推遲了而已。由於他們的奴隸勞動意味著他們掌握了集中營與工業化屠殺的真相，這反過來意味著他們必須被定期處決，好讓位給新一梯次的「特遣隊」。而最終對殘酷主子發起反抗的，正是第 12 梯次的特遣隊。

十月反抗

特遣隊的起義並非針對黨衛軍的自發性怒火爆發，而是一個克服了重重物流困境、精心策劃的計畫。其中一些關鍵角色是在龐大的奧斯威辛建築群內，於軍火工廠工作的猶太女囚。

在 10 月之前的幾個月裡，這些婦女含辛茹苦地將火藥從工廠偷運到特遣隊內部的秘密抵抗組織中。她們使用了精巧的技術，例如將微小包裝的火藥藏在餐盤的假底層，甚至藏在送往火葬場的屍體縫隙中，同時還要承受隨時可能被發現的極度恐懼。

特遣隊利用這些火藥製作了簡易的炸彈和手榴彈。這份精心的準備在 10 月 7 日達到了頂點。當時在點名期間，一名囚犯平靜地走向一名納粹軍官，高喊著勝利的「萬歲！」（Hurrah!），並用鐵錘擊中了他。

隨之而來的是一片混亂，黨衛軍發現自己陷入了囚犯們用鐵錘、刀具和炸藥展開的四面圍攻。根據記述，一名以極度虐待狂著稱的黨衛軍守衛，被若無其事地活生生扔進了火葬場的焚化爐。部分囚犯還剪斷了刺鐵絲網逃往森林，而黨衛軍則以機關槍開火掃射。

對於特遣隊而言，這是一場短暫而甘甜的復仇，他們擊殺了三名黨衛軍並傷及十餘人。然而，納粹最終不可避免地鎮壓了這場叛亂。逃跑的囚犯被抓回並處決，數百名特遣隊成員遭到屠殺，那些提供幫助的英勇女性也未能倖免。

儘管如此，有些人知道局勢總有一天會扭轉，而且會是徹底的扭轉。起義一個月後，就在自己去世前幾週，一位名叫海姆·赫爾曼（Chaim Herman）的特遣隊囚犯給家人寫下了一段話，並以這段文字作結：

「我向你們送上永別。這是最後的問候，我最後一次由衷地擁抱你們。我再次請求你們，務必相信我是平靜地離去的，因為我知道你們還活著，而我們的敵人已經支離破碎。」

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China’s graduates face a whole new set of gruelling tests

They prefer certainty to good pay

Feb 5th 2026|4 min read

Around 2024 Mr Wang, a tutor for people taking** graduate-admissions tests**, saw the number of students in his classes plummet by more than half. At first he thought something had gone badly wrong with his teaching. But comparing notes with others in the industry, he found the problem was pervasive. Mr Wang had also casually posted an ad offering his services as a tutor for the national civil-service exam. He was shocked to receive hundreds of replies. His newly opened class was filled with top talent, including two students who had flown from Hong Kong after graduating there. “Holy shit,” Mr Wang thought. “The winds have changed.”

He is right. Young Chinese are rethinking the options they face when they complete undergraduate studies. Between 2023 and 2026 the number of people who registered to take exams for admission to master’s courses fell by a third, from 4.7m to 3.4m. Meanwhile, between 2021 and 2026, the number who applied (and passed checks) to take the national civil-service exam more than doubled to 3.7m, a record high. Interest in the latter now exceeds the former for the first time (see chart).

An attraction of a master’s degree is that it can upgrade one’s human capital (at least, in theory), while delaying entry into the job market. But the civil service offers a far more immediate reward: stable, if staid, employment. Stella Zhou, who is 24, attended a tutoring camp for the civil-service exam. For three months she started the day at 9am and slogged through thousands of practice questions, only retiring to her dormitory after 9pm. “My bum hurt from sitting all day,” she gripes.

Last year about 20% of those who took the exam for admission to a master’s course were accepted. The national civil-service exam is far more competitive. This year there are 38,000 positions available, meaning about 99% of those who took the written test in November (including many postgraduates) will be disappointed by the time the process, which also includes interviews, wraps up in the middle of the year. A 26-year-old woman, Ms Ma, is studying for a master’s degree in law. Some 80% of her class are planning to take the civil-service exam. It is a “battle royale”, she says (having a master’s degree confers little advantage for civil-service jobs, most of which do not require one). Because success is so unlikely, many are also sitting provincial- or city-level civil-service exams as a less prestigious back-up.

The reason is clear: a bleak job market. Ms Ma, who is from the eastern province of Shandong, had never thought she would be interested in the civil service. She changed her mind after working as an intern at a small company: her colleagues were often not paid on time. When China was booming, government jobs were thought dull (“If you become a civil servant, you can see the whole of your life,” as a common saying goes). Now, as the economy falters, they are highly sought-after. Ms Zhou, who is from the south-western region of Chongqing, received an offer of 300,000 yuan ($43,000) per year from JD.com, an e-commerce giant, to work in its procurement arm. But she turned it down to try her luck with the civil service. Young people increasingly prefer certainty to good pay.

Between 2020 and 2022, when China imposed a strict “zero-covid” policy, many students swarmed into postgraduate studies as a way of postponing the job hunt during economic turbulence (in China, a master’s often takes three years). Since then, the number sitting the master’s entrance exam has dropped. It has become clearer that staying in education produces diminishing returns. A survey in 2024 by Zhaopin, a hiring platform, found that by the spring recruitment round, 44.4% of postgraduates had received a job offer—one percentage point lower than those with bachelor’s degrees and 12 points below those with vocational training. It might be expected that many would apply for a master’s after failing the civil-service exam. But many graduates fear the job market could get worse. Better to take the plunge sooner rather than later, some reckon.

So the rise in applications for the civil service and fall in demand for graduate courses are two sides of the same coin: a weak economy. It could become a self-reinforcing trend: the more that talented youngsters **turn their backs on **the private sector and seek government jobs, the less vigorous China’s economy will become. ■

中國畢業生面臨全新嚴峻考驗：比起高薪，他們更求穩定

2026年2月5日 | 閱讀時間 4 分鐘

約莫在 2024 年，專門輔導研究生入學考試的王老師發現，他班上的學生人數驟減了一半以上。起初，他以為是自己的教學出了問題，但與同業交換意見後，他發現這是整個行業普遍面臨的困境。與此同時，王老師隨手發布了一則國家公務員考試（國考）的補習廣告，驚訝地收到數百則回覆。他新開設的班級擠滿了頂尖人才，其中甚至有兩名學生是從香港畢業後專程飛回來的。王老師心想：「天哪，風向變了。」

他是對的。中國年輕人正在重新思考大學畢業後的出路。2023 年至 2026 年間，報考碩士班入學考試的人數減少了三分之一，從 470 萬人降至 340 萬人。與此同時，2021 年至 2026 年間，通過審核報考國考的人數翻了一倍多，達到 370 萬人的歷史新高。對後者的興趣已首度超越前

。

碩士學位的吸引力在於理論上能提升「人力資本」，同時延緩進入職場的時間。然而，公務員職位提供了一個更直接的回報：穩定（儘管沉悶）的就業。24 歲的周小姐參加了國考衝刺班，三個月來，她每天早上 9 點開始埋頭苦讀數千道練習題，直到晚上 9 點後才回宿舍。「整天坐著，坐到我屁股都痛了，」她抱怨道。

去年，碩士入學考試的錄取率約為 20%，而國考的競爭更為激烈。今年僅提供 38,000 個職位，這意味著 11 月參加筆試的人（包括許多研究生）中，約有 99% 的人最終會失望而歸。26 歲的馬小姐正在攻讀法律碩士，她班上約 80% 的同學都計劃報考公務員。她形容這是一場「大逃殺」（儘管碩士學位對大多數不要求學歷的公務員職位並無顯著優勢）。由於成功機會微乎其微，許多人也報考了省級或市級公務員考試，作為退而求其次的備選。

原因很明顯：就業市場低迷。來自山東省的馬小姐從未想過自己會對公務員感興趣，但在一家小公司實習後，她改變了主意——因為她的同事經常無法準時領到薪水。在中國經濟蓬勃發展的時期，政府工作被認為是枯燥的（當時流行一句話：「當了公務員，一眼就能望穿一生」）。

現在，隨著經濟步履蹣跚，這些職位變得炙手可熱。來自重慶的周小姐曾獲得電商巨頭京東（JD.com）提供的採購部職位，年薪高達 30 萬人民幣（約 43,000 美元），但她拒絕了，決定轉向公務員試試運氣。年輕人越來越傾向於選擇「確定性」而非「高薪」。

2020 年至 2022 年中國實施嚴格的「動態清零」政策期間，許多學生湧入研究所，將其視為經濟動盪期推遲求職的一種方式（在中國，碩士學位通常需要三年）。從那時起，報考研究所的人數開始下降，人們愈發意識到，留在教育體系中的邊際收益正在遞減。招聘平台「智聯招聘」2024 年的一項調查顯示，在春季招聘中，僅有 44.4% 的研究生獲得錄取通知（Offer），這比大學畢業生低 1 個百分點，比技職生低了 12 個百分點。原以為許多人在國考失利後會轉而考研，但不少畢業生擔心就業市場會進一步惡化，因此有人認為，與其等待，不如儘早投入職場放手一搏。

因此，公務員報考熱與研究所需求降溫，實為經濟疲軟的一體兩面。這可能演變成一種自我強化的趨勢：越多優秀人才背離私營部門轉向政府職位，中國經濟的活力就越發衰微。

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If it turns inward, the country and continent will lose out

May 22nd 2025|5 min read

TWICE IT** VANISHED** from the map, swallowed up by its rapacious neighbours. After it emerged from the second world war as a Soviet satellite, it endured decades of oppression. Today, Poland has transformed itself into Europe’s most overlooked military and economic power—with a bigger army than Britain, France or Germany and living standards, adjusted for purchasing power, that are about to eclipse Japan’s. Yet, just when Poland should stand proud and tall once more, is it about to throw away its influence?

That is the question Poles face in the decisive run-off vote to elect their president on June 1st. One vision, from the candidate of the Law and Justice (PiS) party, is a brand of right-wing nationalism that feeds off conflict with Poland’s neighbours and the European Union. The other, from the centre, is that, in a dangerous world, Poland needs Europe to magnify its strengths, just as Europe needs Poland as a source of security and economic dynamism. Unfortunately, at the moment the right may have the upper hand.

For the past three decades, Poland has shown how much a country can achieve by European integration and good economic policy. Since 1995 income per person has more than trebled. Since it joined the EU in 2004 Poland has never known recession apart from briefly at the height of the covid-19 shutdown. During those two decades, its average annual growth has been almost 4%.

The fruits of that growth are on display across the country. Warsaw, the capital, boasts Europe’s tallest building outside Russia, the Varso tower; and below it bustles with designer shops and cafés, IT startups and fashion houses. Out in the once-neglected countryside fine roads, often built with EU money, criss-cross vistas of well-tended fields, farms and new houses.

Poles used to flock abroad to find work, but for some years now home has been a stronger draw. Manufacturing is booming, thanks to Poland’s proximity to Germany, continuing to do well even as its western neighbour, like much of Europe, has stagnated. When Germany, under its new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, starts a planned new burst of infrastructure and defence spending, Poland is likely to be a beneficiary.

Long attuned to the threat from Russia, Poland has used its wealth to enhance its security. It now musters the largest army in Europe after Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, and the third-largest in NATO. It spends well over 4% of its GDP each year on defence, far above the 2% that has been the NATO target since 2014, and plans to raise that to over 5% next year.

This has translated into influence. These days the group that counts in European security is sometimes dubbed the four musketeers: the young addition to Britain, France and Germany is Poland, like the superlative swordsman d’Artagnan. Tellingly, its prime minister, Donald Tusk, travelled to Kyiv earlier this month with his three counterparts to stress that Europe is ready to stand by Ukraine even as America’s commitment has weakened. Poland’s stance is in sharp distinction to the rest of the “Visegrad Four”. Hungary under Viktor Orban and Slovakia under Robert Fico have both taken the side of Russia rather than Ukraine; and the Czech Republic is expected to tilt in that direction after elections in October.

Given Poland’s record, much of it achieved during the total of ten years in which PiS has been in power, you might conclude that it could continue its renaissance with either candidate in June’s run-off election—especially as the role of president in Poland is less powerful than that of prime minister. However, that would be a mistake.

Under the constitution, the president’s veto can be overridden only by a three-fifths majority in the Sejm, the lower house, which Mr Tusk does not command. The current president, Andrzej Duda, is a former PiS politician who has blocked or delayed many of the new government’s reforms and is now termed out. PiS wants his successor to be Karol Nawrocki, a fierce ideologue who would be even less accommodating than Mr Duda. Mr Nawrocki is almost certain to use his powers to block Mr Tusk’s agenda, so as to pave the way for a PiS victory in the next parliamentary elections. To win the presidency, he would depend on support from far-right parties that exploit growing anti-Ukrainian feelings; one is openly antisemitic.

This matters because Mr Tusk is trying to unravel PiS’s capture of the state while it was most recently in office, from 2015 to 2023. In that time, while pursuing mostly sensible economic and security policies, PiS systematically took over independent institutions, including the judiciary, the media, the civil service, the central bank and the banking system. PiS’s fights with Brussels over the rule of law caused Poland to be temporarily shut out of some of the EU’s aid programmes.

By contrast, Mr Tusk is a committed European—he previously served as the president of the European Council in Brussels. Under him Poland has co-operated with other European countries on security, diplomacy and defence to the benefit of all. Were Poles to use the presidential election to vote in Rafal Trzaskowski, a Tusk ally who is Warsaw’s mayor, EU co-operation would be easier and Poland’s influence would grow further.

The world has changed since Mr Tusk took over. With another Donald back in the White House, the task of building up Europe’s strategic autonomy is not just a luxury but an urgent necessity. Poland could not only set an example in security, but also serve as a powerful voice for supporting Ukraine and deterring Russia. Economically, Poland is an example to central and eastern European countries; and Mr Tusk could be a proponent of the economic reforms the EU desperately needs.

Don’t throw it away

Next week’s election is finely balanced. In the first round the candidates of the hard right took around 52% of the vote. Were Mr Nawrocki to win the second round, both Poland and Europe would suffer. Europe would lose a source of dynamism, and Poland would risk losing the place at the heart of Europe it has worked so hard to claim.

波蘭如何守住其歐洲核心地位

若轉向內化，該國與歐洲大陸都將面臨損失

2025年5月22日 | 閱讀時間 5 分鐘

波蘭曾兩度從地圖上消失，被貪婪的鄰國吞併。在第二次世界大戰後成為蘇聯衛星國，經歷了數十年的壓迫。如今，波蘭已轉型為歐洲最被忽視的軍事與經濟強權——其軍隊規模大於英國、法國或德國，且經購買力平價調整後的生活水平即將超越日本。然而，正當波蘭應該再次昂首挺胸之際，它是否即將拋棄自己的影響力？

這正是波蘭人在 6 月 1 日舉行的關鍵總統選舉第二輪投票中所面臨的問題。一種願景來自法律與公正黨（PiS）的候選人，這是一種以與鄰國及歐盟衝突為養分的右翼民族主義；另一種則來自中間派，認為在危險的世界中，波蘭需要歐洲來放大其實力，正如歐洲需要波蘭作為安全與經濟活力的來源。不幸的是，目前右翼可能佔據上風。

在過去的三十年裡，波蘭展示了一個國家透過歐洲整合和良好的經濟政策能取得多少成就。自 1995 年以來，人均收入增長了三倍多。自 2004 年加入歐盟以來，除了在新冠肺炎停擺的高峰期短暫出現過衰退外，波蘭從未經歷過經濟衰退。在這二十年間，其年均增長率幾乎達到 4%。

經濟增長的成果在全國各地隨處可見。首都華沙擁有俄羅斯以外歐洲最高的建築物——華沙塔（Varso tower）；塔下則是熙熙攘攘的設計師商店、咖啡館、資訊科技新創公司和時裝店。在曾經被忽視的農村，通常由歐盟資金修建的優質公路縱橫交錯，映襯著整齊的田野、農場和新房屋。

波蘭人曾成群結隊地出國找工作，但幾年來，家鄉的吸引力已變得更強。製造業蓬勃發展，這得益於波蘭鄰近德國的優勢，即使其西方鄰國（與歐洲大部分地區一樣）處於停滯狀態，波蘭仍能持續表現良好。當德國在其新任總理弗里德里希·梅爾茨（Friedrich Merz）的領導下，開始計劃中的新一輪基礎設施和國防開支衝刺時，波蘭很可能成為受益者。

波蘭長期以來一直對俄羅斯的威脅保持警惕，並利用其財富來增強安全。它現在擁有的軍隊規模在歐洲僅次於俄羅斯、烏克蘭和土耳其，在北約中排名第三。波蘭每年將超過 GDP 的 4% 用於國防，遠高於北約自 2014 年以來設定的 2% 目標，並計劃明年將這一比例提高到 5% 以上。

這轉化成了影響力。如今，在歐洲安全領域發揮作用的集團有時被稱為「四個火槍手」：繼英國、法國和德國之後的年輕新成員就是波蘭，就像那位卓越的劍客達太安（d’Artagnan）。值得注意的是，波蘭總理唐納德·圖斯克（Donald Tusk）本月早些時候與其他三位同行一起前往基輔，強調即使美國的承諾有所減弱，歐洲也準備好支持烏克蘭。波蘭的立場與「維謝格拉德集團」（Visegrad Four）的其他成員形成了鮮明對比：維克多·奧班領導下的匈牙利和羅伯特·費科領導下的斯洛伐克都站在俄羅斯而非烏克蘭一邊；而捷克共和國預計在 10 月選舉後也會轉向該方向。

鑑於波蘭的紀錄（其中大部分是在 PiS 執政的累計十年中取得的），你可能會得出結論：無論 6 月份的第二輪選舉中哪位候選人勝出，波蘭都能繼續其復興——特別是波蘭總統的角色權力不如總理。然而，那將是一個錯誤。

根據憲法，總統的否決權只能由下議院（Sejm）五分之三的多數票推翻，而圖斯克先生並不具備這種優勢。現任總統安傑伊·杜達（Andrzej Duda）曾是 PiS 的政治人物，他阻撓或延遲了許多新政府的改革，現在即將卸任。PiS 希望他的繼任者是卡羅爾·納夫羅茨基（Karol Nawrocki），他是一位激進的意識形態家，會比杜達先生更不配合。納夫羅茨基幾乎肯定會利用他的權力來阻止圖斯克先生的議程，以便為 PiS 在下一次議會選舉中獲勝鋪路。為了贏得總統職位，他將依賴極右翼政黨的支持，這些政黨利用日益增長的反烏克蘭情緒，其中一個政黨甚至是公開的反猶太主義。

這之所以重要，是因為圖斯克先生正試圖清理 PiS 在 2015 年至 2023 年執政期間對國家的掌控。在那段時間裡，PiS 在奉行大多合理的經濟和安全政策的同時，系統性地接管了獨立機構，包括司法機構、媒體、公務員體系、中央銀行和銀行系統。PiS 與布魯塞爾在法治問題上的爭鬥，曾導致波蘭暫時被排除在歐盟的一些援助計劃之外。

相比之下，圖斯克先生是一位堅定的親歐人士——他此前曾擔任布魯塞爾歐洲理事會主席。在他領導下，波蘭在安全、外交和國防方面與其他歐洲國家合作，惠及所有人。如果波蘭人利用這次總統選舉投票給拉法烏·特扎斯科夫斯基（Rafal Trzaskowski，圖斯克的盟友，現任華沙市長），歐盟合作將變得更加容易，波蘭的影響力也將進一步增長。

自圖斯克先生接任以來，世界已經發生了變化。隨著另一位「唐納德」（指川普）回到白宮，建立歐洲戰略自主的任務不再是奢侈品，而是迫在眉睫的必然。波蘭不僅可以在安全方面樹立榜樣，還可以成為支持烏克蘭和威懾俄羅斯的強大聲音。在經濟上，波蘭是中東歐國家的典範；圖斯克先生可以成為歐盟迫切需要的經濟改革支持者。

不要拋棄它

下週的選舉勢均力敵。在第一輪投票中，硬右派候選人獲得了約 52% 的選票。如果納夫羅茨基先生在第二輪獲勝，波蘭和歐洲都將受苦。歐洲將失去一個活力的源泉，而波蘭將面臨失去它努力爭取到的歐洲核心地位的風險。

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A remarkable election victory that will reshape Japanese politics for years to come

Feb 8th 2026|TOKYO|4 min read

TAKAICHI SANAE gambled her position as Japan’s prime minister by calling a snap election. Her bet has paid off. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) triumphed on February 8th. The LDP won a commanding two-thirds supermajority in parliament’s powerful lower house, even without the support of its coalition partner. The result gives Ms Takaichi, who is both a fiscal dove and a security hawk, a massive mandate, while marking the LDP’s return to unquestioned dominance in Japanese politics.

Such a resounding victory was hardly guaranteed. Although Ms Takaichi herself has been unusually popular since taking office last October, her party remained far less so. The result shows that Ms Takaichi’s personal appeal is a potent force. Together with its partner, the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin), and several allied independents, the LDP’s ruling coalition entered the election with 233 seats in the 465-seat chamber, for a majority of just one. They have secured 352. The LDP also benefited from the collapse of the mainstream left-of-centre opposition: the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), formed by the merger of two long-standing parties, lost more than half of the total seats they had held heading into the election. While several smaller upstart parties secured footholds in the Diet, none is strong enough to challenge the LDP.

The LDP has lost power only twice since its foundation in 1955. **Following a turbulent period **of opposition rule in 2009-12, the party reclaimed its dominance under Ms Takaichi’s mentor, Abe Shinzo, the prime minister until 2020. But in recent years, it has stumbled from scandal to scandal; in the two most recent elections, an upper-house contest last summer and a lower-house vote in October 2024, the party lost its majorities, leaving it leading a minority government. The LDP turned to Ms Takaichi as party leader in October. She brought in Ishin as a new partner, producing a slender majority.

Ms Takaichi has appealed to voters eager for change, or at least the appearance of it. The country’s first female prime minister, she has cut a welcome contrast to previous ones, thanks to her middle-class upbringing and plain-spoken style. A former heavy-metal drummer, she has performed confidently on the world stage, including with Donald Trump, the leader of Japan’s most important ally. (Mr Trump endorsed Ms Takaichi ahead of the election.) A diplomatic spat with China helped her to consolidate support at home. Her big-spending pledges have at times caused bond markets to shudder, but tend to appeal to voters.

On the campaign trail, Ms Takaichi electrified audiences. She lived up to her pledge to “work, work, work, work, work”: during the 12-day election period, she covered more ground than any other party leader, racking up 12,480km, according to a tally by Yomiuri, a newspaper. She also dragged her fusty party into the digital era, becoming a force on social media. The hastily-assembled CRA, meanwhile, failed to inspire. Combining the Constitutional Democratic Party (the successor to the country’s historic main centre-left outfit, the Democratic Party of Japan), and the LDP’s former coalition partner, Komeito, produced a muddle rather than synergy. Online, the party acquired the unflattering nickname “5G”, a play on the Japanese word for “old man”, oji-san, in reference to the fact that its top leaders were all older male political dinosaurs.

The remarkable election result will reshape Japanese politics for years to come. The leaders of the CRA will probably resign; whether the alliance itself survives remains unclear. Smaller leftist parties also suffered big losses, suggesting that voters see their ideological pacifism as out of step with today’s turbulent world. Upstart parties have proven more dynamic than the traditional opposition. The far-right Do It Yourself party (Sanseito) picked up a handful of seats, albeit fewer than they had targeted. Team Future (Mirai), a techno-optimist party founded in May, was a surprise breakout, emerging as an alternative for many independent voters, and winning 11 seats.

With its imposing new majority, the LDP will be able to ignore opposition sniping. Ms Takaichi will emerge from the election stronger and bolder. Potential challengers inside the party will fall silent, leaving her to rule for the foreseeable future. With a supermajority in the lower house, the ruling coalition will be able to control the legislative process, as it can override the more fractious upper house (where it lacks a majority).

Ms Takaichi can also pursue her preferred policies. She has pledged a “responsible and proactive fiscal policy”, including a temporary two-year cut to the consumption tax for food and big investments in industrial policy to support critical industries. She also wants to spearhead more reforms to strengthen Japan’s armed forces and security apparatus. She has called for lifting restrictions on arms exports to help boost Japan’s defence industry; she favours the creation of a new national intelligence agency. The fly in the ointment? Though Ms Takaichi has made quick work of her domestic political foes, other adversaries, from bond market vigilantes to her counterparts in Beijing, will not prove so easy to overcome. ■

日本首相將如何運用她的龐大民意授權：一場將重塑未來數年日本政壇的重大選舉勝利

2026年2月8日 | 東京 | 閱讀時間約4分鐘

高市早苗以解散國會提前改選，賭上了她的日本首相寶座。事實證明，她賭贏了。執政的自由民主黨（LDP）於 2 月 8 日贏得大勝。自民黨在權力核心的眾議院中，即便不依賴聯盟夥伴的支持，也單獨拿下了具備主導權的三分之二「超級多數」席位。此結果賦予了兼具「財政鴿派」與「國安鷹派」色彩的高市女士極大的民意授權，同時標誌著自民黨重返在日本政壇無可置疑的霸權地位。

如此輝煌的勝利絕非預料中的必然。儘管高市女士自去年 10 月就任以來展現了罕見的高人氣，但她所屬的政黨卻沒那麼受歡迎。選舉結果顯示，高市女士的個人魅力是一股強大的政治力量。自民黨與其夥伴「日本維新會」（Ishin）以及幾位盟軍獨立人士組成的執政聯盟，在選前於 465 席的眾議院中僅佔 233 席，僅比過半數多出一席；而選後，他們成功奪下 352 席。

自民黨的獲勝也受惠於主流中間偏左反對陣營的潰敗：由兩大長期在野黨合併組成的「中間改革聯盟」（CRA），失去了選前持有席位的一半以上。雖然幾支新興小黨在國會取得立足點，但目前尚無足夠力量挑戰自民黨。

自 1955 年成立以來，自民黨僅失去過兩次政權。在 2009 年至 2012 年動盪的在野時期後，該黨在高市女士的導師安倍晉三帶領下奪回統治地位。然而近年來，自民黨深陷各類醜聞；在去年夏天的參議院選舉及 2024 年 10 月的眾議院投票中，該黨皆失去多數優勢，只能領導少數政府。去年 10 月，自民黨轉向推舉高市女士為黨魁，她引入維新會作為新夥伴，勉力維持微弱的多數。

高市女士成功吸引了渴望改變（或至少是改變的表象）的選民。作為日本首位女性首相，她憑藉中產階級的出身與直爽的言論風格，與過往的首相形成鮮明對比。這位前重金屬鼓手在國際舞台上表現自信，包括與日本最重要的盟友領導人唐納德·川普（Donald Trump）的互動（川普在選前曾公開支持高市）。此外，與中國的外交糾紛也有助於她在國內鞏固支持。雖然她擴大支出的承諾一度令債券市場感到不安，但這對選民極具吸引力。

在競選期間，高市女士令觀眾熱血沸騰。她實踐了自己「工作、工作、工作、工作、工作」的諾言：根據《讀賣新聞》統計，在為期 12 天的競選期內，她奔波的路程超過任何其他黨魁，總計達 12,480 公里。她還將保守陳腐的自民黨帶入數位時代，成為社群媒體上的重要勢力。相比之下，倉促組成的「中間改革聯盟」則未能激發選民熱情。由立憲民主黨（其前身為日本史上主要的中間偏左勢力民主黨）與自民黨前盟友公明黨合併，產生的只有混亂而非綜效。在網路上，該聯盟獲得了「5G」這個帶有貶義的綽號，這是對日語「大叔」（Oji-san）的戲稱，諷刺該聯盟的高層領袖全都是年長的男性政治恐龍。

這場卓越的選舉結果將重塑未來數年的日本政治。「中間改革聯盟」的領袖們可能會辭職，該聯盟能否維持仍是未知數。其他小型左翼政黨也遭受重創，顯示選民認為其意識形態上的和平主義與當今動盪的世界脫節。新興政黨展現出比傳統在野黨更強的活力。極右翼的「參政黨」（Sanseito）獲得了少數席位，儘管少於其預期目標。於去年 5 月成立、主張科技樂觀主義的「未來隊」（Mirai）則成為異軍突出的黑馬，成為許多獨立選民的替代選擇，並贏得了 11 個席位。

憑藉龐大的新多數優勢，自民黨將能忽視反對黨的抨擊。高市女士將在選後變得更強大、更果敢。黨內潛在的挑戰者將會噤聲，讓她在可預見的未來掌握統治權。擁有眾議院的超級多數後，執政聯盟將能掌控立法進程，因為它有權推翻意見紛歧的參議院（執政聯盟在參議院尚無多數）。

高市女士也可以推行她偏好的政策。她已承諾實施「負責且積極的財政政策」，包括為期兩年的糧食消費稅減免，以及對關鍵產業的大規模工業投資。她還希望帶頭進行更多改革，以加強日本的武裝部隊與安全機構。她呼籲放寬武器出口限制以提振日本國防工業，並贊成建立新的國家情報機構。唯一的隱憂在於：雖然高市女士迅速擊敗了國內的政敵，但其他對手——從債券市場的「糾察隊」到北京的領導層——可能不會那麼容易被克服。■

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Cheng Li-wun tells The Economist she hopes to meet China’s president early this year

Jan 29th 2026|TAIPEI|5 min read

RISK COMES naturally to Cheng Li-wun, Taiwan’s opposition leader. She began her career as a student activist in the 1990s, seeking independence for her homeland and castigating the Kuomintang (KMT), the ruling party at the time. Then she stunned colleagues by joining the KMT. Now, as that party’s new leader, she is making her biggest gamble yet. As China steps up military drills around Taiwan, which it sees as its territory, she is blocking efforts to boost defence spending. She thinks Taiwan’s people should accept that they are Chinese. And she hopes to bring her party back to power by pursuing reconciliation with China’s leader, Xi Jinping.

**“The most important task of my tenure is to advance peace across the Taiwan Strait,” **she told The Economist in an interview on January 27th. To that end, she revealed that after a nine-year hiatus, the KMT will resume dialogue with China’s Communist Party in early February, starting with exchanges between their think-tanks. She says she hopes to visit China in the first half of 2026 to meet Mr Xi (who sent her a congratulatory telegram after her election in October, expressing hope that they could work together towards unification). “We must stop deliberately vilifying everything related to China,” she says.

It is a controversial strategy, even for some within her party. The KMT lost the past three presidential elections to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which views Taiwan as a separate country. Opinion polls show that a majority of Taiwan’s people distrust China’s government, have little appetite for unification and consider themselves Taiwanese rather than Chinese. Ms Cheng’s platform is also troubling for America, which is committed to helping the island defend itself but insists Taiwan must spend much more on its own armed forces. American officials believe Mr Xi has ordered his generals to be capable of taking Taiwan by 2027.

Yet Ms Cheng, 56, believes that she can help avert an attack—and win round voters by the time of the next presidential election, in 2028. She admits that her views on national identity are out of step with public opinion but blames the DPP’s efforts to “de-Sinicise” Taiwan. Besides, she believes that national identity will not be the defining political issue of the next few years. “What matters more is cross-strait relations,” she says. “That’s what I believe will truly determine how people vote.”

Her message plays on two main fears. One is that if the DPP wins again in 2028 China’s leadership could lose hope of peacefully unifying Taiwan with the mainland.** “Once it holds no expectations for Taiwan, the only way it can resolve or address the Taiwan issue would be through means none of us wish to see,**” she says. The other fear is that American support for Taiwan is wavering. She cites President Donald Trump’s demands that Taiwan increase defence spending to 10% of GDP and shift to America 40% of its semiconductor industry, which produces most of the world’s top-end chips. *“For many Taiwanese, piecing together this information makes them feel that America is abandoning Taiwan,”* she says.

Critics view such talk as scaremongering. Although China has developed formidable capabilities to invade or blockade Taiwan (and often practises doing so), it is far from clear that it could succeed without suffering huge losses and devastating the global economy. Mr Xi has also just purged his military leadership. DPP leaders accuse Ms Cheng of echoing Chinese propaganda and endangering Taiwan’s security by blocking defence spending. Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, has pledged to increase military spending to 5% of GDP by 2030. He has also proposed a $40bn supplementary defence budget this year, mainly for American weapons. Yet both plans are being blocked in parliament by the KMT and its allies, which together hold a majority.

In Ms Cheng’s telling Mr Lai is to blame for not providing more details of his military spending plans. The figure he has proposed “crowds out all other needs”, she says. She declines to specify how much Taiwan should spend on defence, but says it can never match China’s firepower. Instead, she argues Taiwan’s security should be achieved through “reasonable” military spending combined with negotiations with Mr Xi. And she faults Mr Lai for refusing to accept the consensus agreed with China in 1992, when the KMT was in power. That stipulated that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are part of “one China”, while allowing for different interpretations. Because the DPP rejects that formula as legally invalid (and a trap), China has suspended official talks since it came to power in 2016. Embracing the 1992 consensus today “would significantly reduce the likelihood of military confrontation”, Ms Cheng says.

As to the desired outcome of such negotiations, Ms Cheng chooses her words carefully. In meeting Mr Xi, she says her main goal is to secure an explicit public commitment that both sides should work to maintain peace, acknowledging that war would bring “unimaginably catastrophic consequences”. Can he be trusted? To avoid damaging its international image, China must “be true to its word”, she says. “Credibility is paramount.”

For the longer term, she declines to say whether the ultimate goal should be peaceful unification (as a former KMT president has suggested). Within her four-year term, she says it would already be a big achievement to set up a framework for maintaining peace. “As for whether the status quo might change thereafter, I only hope it occurs under circumstances acceptable to people on both sides,” she adds.

Her talk of reconciliation is all the more striking, given her past. Though her father was a soldier in the Nationalist army that fled to Taiwan from the mainland in 1949, she became a student protester who was drawn to the DPP. She left it in 2002, disillusioned by what she saw as corruption and intolerance of dissent within its ranks. Joining the KMT three years later, she quickly earned a reputation as a combative public speaker. But she only recently became more outspoken about her own sense of Chinese identity.

Whether she will be the KMT’s presidential candidate in 2028 is unclear: she says she is focusing on her current job. But as the party’s chairwoman, she will shape its platform for local elections this November, as well as the presidential vote.** Already, she is shaking up Taiwan’s politics in ways that could alter the precarious balance of relations between Taiwan, China and America. The stakes have never been higher. And Ms Cheng is all in. ■**

台灣新任反對黨領袖欲與習近平對話

鄭麗文接受《經濟學人》訪問時表示，希望能於今年初會晤中國國家主席

2026年1月29日 | 台北

對台灣反對黨領袖鄭麗文而言，「風險」似乎是與生俱來的本能。她的職業生涯始於 1990 年代的學生運動，當時她追求台灣獨立並強烈抨擊當時的執政黨——國民黨（KMT）。隨後，她加入國民黨的舉動震驚了昔日戰友。如今，作為該黨的新任領導人，她正進行一場人生中最大的豪賭。在中國不斷加強對台軍事演習之際，她正阻撓增加國防開支的計畫；她認為台灣人民應該接受自己是中國人，並希望透過與中國領導人習近平尋求和解，帶領國民黨重返執政。

「我任期內最重要的任務就是推進台海和平，」她在 1月27日接受《經濟學人》專訪時表示。為此，她透露國民黨將在 2月初恢復中斷九年的國共對話，首波將從智庫交流開始。她表示，希望在 2026年上半年訪問中國並會晤習近平（習近平在去年 10月她當選黨主席後曾致電賀電，表達共同推動統一的期望）。她說：「我們必須停止刻意醜化與中國相關的一切。」

這是一項充滿爭議的策略，即使在國民黨內部亦然。國民黨已連續三屆總統大選敗給主張台灣是主權獨立國家的民進黨（DPP）。民意調查顯示，大多數台灣民眾不信任中國政府，對統一興趣缺缺，且認同自己是台灣人而非中國人。鄭麗文的政綱也讓美國感到不安；美國雖致力於協助台灣自我防衛，但堅持台灣必須大幅增加軍事支出。美國官員相信，習近平已下令要求解放軍具備在 2027年前奪取台灣的能力。

然而，現年 56歲的鄭麗文相信，她能幫助化解攻擊，並在 2028年下屆總統大選前贏回選民支持。她坦言自己的國家認同觀點與主流民意脫節，但她將此歸咎於民進黨推行「去中國化」的結果。此外，她認為國家認同不會是未來幾年的核心政治議題。她強調：「更重要的是兩岸關係，這才是真正決定民眾投票取向的關鍵。」

她的論點觸及了民間兩大恐懼。首先，若民進黨在 2028年再次勝選，中國領導層可能會對和平統一失去希望。她表示：「一旦中方對台灣不再抱有期待，解決台灣問題的方式將會是我們所有人都不願見到的。」另一個恐懼則是美國對台支持正在動搖。她舉例，美國總統川普要求台灣將國防開支提高至 GDP 的 10%，並要求將全球領先的半導體產業 40% 移至美國。她說：「對許多台灣人來說，這些訊息拼湊起來讓他們感到美國正準備遺棄台灣。」

批評者認為這種說法是危言聳聽。儘管中國已具備強大的侵略或封鎖能力，但在不承受巨大損失及摧毀全球經濟的情況下，中國能否成功仍是未知數。且習近平近期才剛清洗了軍方高層。民進黨領袖指責鄭麗文附和中國宣傳，並透過阻撓國防預算危害台灣安全。台灣總統賴清德已承諾在 2030年前將軍事支出提高至 GDP 的 5%，今年更提出 400億美元的國防追加預算，主要用於採購美製武器。然而，這兩項計畫目前在國民黨及其盟友佔多數的國會中遭到攔阻。

在鄭麗文看來，賴清德應為未提供軍費細節負起責任。她認為提議的金額將「擠壓到其他所有需求」。她拒絕具體說明台灣應投入多少國防預算，但表示台灣的火力永遠無法與中國匹敵。相對地，她主張台灣的安全應透過「合理」的軍費支出結合與習近平的談判來實現。她批評賴清德拒絕接受 1992年國民黨執政時達成的共識（即「九二共識」），該共識規定海峽兩岸同屬「一個中國」，但允許各自表述。由於民進黨認為該公式缺乏法律效力且是陷阱而拒絕接受，中國自 2016年民進黨上台後便中斷了官方對話。鄭麗文表示，現在擁護九二共識「將顯著降低軍事對抗的可能性」。

至於談判的預期結果，鄭麗文用詞謹慎。她表示，會晤習近平的主要目標是獲得一項明確的公開承諾，即雙方應致力於維持和平，並承認戰爭將帶來「難以想像的災難性後果」。習近平值得信任嗎？她說，為了避免損害國際形象，中國必須「言而有信」，「誠信至關重要」。

至於長遠目標是否為「和平統一」（如某位國民黨前總統所言），她不願定論。她表示，在她的四年任期內，若能建立維持和平的框架已是大功一件。她補充道：「至於現狀此後是否會改變，我只希望這是在兩岸人民都能接受的情況下發生。」

考慮到她的背景，這番求和言論更顯得引人注目。她的父親是 1949年隨軍來台的國民黨老兵，但她曾是投身民進黨的學運人士。2002年，她因不滿黨內腐敗與不容異己而離開。三年後加入國民黨，她很快以辭鋒犀利的政治評論員聞名。但直到近期，她才更公開地表達自己的中國認同感。

目前尚不清楚她是否會成為國民黨 2028年的總統候選人，她表示正專注於當前職務。但身為黨主席，她將主導今年 11月地方選舉及未來大選的政綱。她已經在撼動台灣政局，其方式可能徹底改變台、中、美之間脆弱的平衡關係。這場賭局的代價前所未有地高，而鄭麗文已傾力孤注一擲。

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1) Donald Trump again defended the actions of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Minneapolis. The president said that ICE agents’ killings of Alex Pretti and Renee Good were caused by “Democrat ensued chaos”. Braving freezing temperatures, protesters took to the streets across America. Tim Walz, Minnesota’s governor, urged Mr Trump to withdraw federal agents from the state “before they kill another American in the street”.

2) The price of an ounce of gold broke the $5,000 barrier for the first time. Demand for the metal—which cost $2,770 an ounce a year ago—shows no sign of slowing as investors dump bonds and currencies in the face of Mr Trump’s erratic attitude towards international trade. A weakening dollar has also made gold more affordable for those outside America.

3) Taiwan said it was monitoring “abnormal” changes to China’s top military brass. On Saturday Zhang Youxia, China’s top general, was put under investigation, reportedly for leaking nuclear secrets to America. General Liu Zhenli, the army’s chief of staff, is also being investigated. President Xi Jinping has set a deadline of next year for the People’s Liberation Army to** be capable of** taking Taiwan.

4) Alex Honnold successfully scaled Taipei 101, one of Asia’s tallest skyscrapers, without ropes or a safety net. The American’s 508-metre ascent was broadcast on Netflix, sensibly with a ten-second delay, and took an hour and a half. Standing atop the building’s spire, Mr Honnold** proclaimed** his achievement to be “sick”.

5) Israel said it would partially reopen Gaza’s Rafah border crossing with Egypt, a vital entry point for aid, after the body of the final Israeli hostage in the enclave is located. Israel’s army has launched a “large-scale operation” to retrieve the remains of Ran Gvili. The crossing was supposed to have reopened during the first phase of a ceasefire that was agreed in October.

6) Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that American security guarantees for post-war Ukraine were “100% ready”, with documents waiting to be signed and sent to American and Ukrainian lawmakers for ratification. The Ukrainian president’s comments suggest that tri-lateral talks between America, Russia and Ukraine in Abu Dhabi over the weekend had not been entirely fruitless. Talks are expected to continue this weekend.

7) Britain’s ruling Labour Party barred Andy Burnham, the mayor of Greater Manchester, from standing as its candidate in a forthcoming by-election, saying it would be too costly to run a mayoral campaign to replace him. Figures on the party’s left strongly criticised the decision. Mr Burnham is widely seen as a contender to challenge Sir Keir Starmer, the unpopular prime minister, for the party’s leadership.

8) In Melbourne anti-immigration demonstrators clashed with marchers protesting against Australia Day, which marks the landing of the First Fleet of British convicts in Sydney Cove in 1788. Riot police were reportedly deployed. Every year Australians get tangled in an argument over the event, which is seen by many indigenous Australians as celebrating colonisation.

1) **唐納·川普（Donald Trump）再次為移民暨海關執法局（ICE）**在明尼阿波利斯的行動辯護。總統表示，ICE 探員殺害艾力克斯·普雷蒂（Alex Pretti）與芮妮·古德（Renee Good）事件是由「民主黨導致的混亂」所引起的。抗議者冒著嚴寒走上全美街頭。明尼蘇達州州長提姆·華茲（Tim Walz）敦促川普先生在聯邦探員「於街頭殺害另一名美國人之前」，將其撤出該州。

2) 黃金價格首次突破每盎司 5,000 美元的關卡。黃金在一年前的價格為每盎司 2,770 美元，由於投資者面對川普先生對國際貿易的反覆態度而拋售債券與貨幣，目前對黃金的需求毫無放緩跡象。美元走弱也使得美國境外的投資者更容易負擔黃金。

3) 台灣表示正在監控中國軍方高層的「異常」變動。週六，中國最高將領張又俠遭到調查，據報導是因為向美國洩露核機密。陸軍參謀長劉振立大將也正在接受調查。習近平主席已為中國人民解放軍設定了明年必須具備奪取台灣能力的期限。

4) 艾力克斯·霍諾德（Alex Honnold）在沒有繩索或安全網的情況下，成功攀登了亞洲最高摩天大樓之一的台北 101。這位美國人的 508 公尺攀爬過程在 Netflix 上直播（基於安全考量設有 10 秒延遲），耗時一個半小時。霍諾德先生站在建築物的尖塔頂端，宣稱他的成就「酷斃了」。

5) 以色列表示，在尋獲位於加薩境內最後一名以色列人質的遺體後，將部分重新開放加薩與埃及之間的重要援助入境點——拉法跨境口岸（Rafah crossing）。以色列軍隊已發起一項「大規模行動」以追回藍·格維里（Ran Gvili）的遺體。該口岸原定於去年 10 月達成的停火協議第一階段期間重新開放。

6) 弗拉迪米爾·澤倫斯基（Volodymyr Zelensky）聲稱，美國對戰後烏克蘭的安全保障已「100% 準備就緒」，文件正等待簽署並送交美烏兩國立法機關批准。這位烏克蘭總統的言論顯示，週末在阿布達比舉行的美、俄、烏三方會談並非完全沒有成果。預計會談將於本週末繼續進行。

7) 英國執政黨工黨禁止大曼徹斯特市長安迪·博納姆（Andy Burnham）參加即將舉行的補選，理由是為替換他而進行的市長選舉競選活動成本過高。黨內左翼人士對此決定表示強烈批評。博納姆先生被廣泛認為是挑戰民調低迷的首相**施凱爾爵士（Sir Keir Starmer）**黨魁地位的有力競爭者。

8) 在墨爾本，反移民示威者與抗議**澳洲日（Australia Day）**的遊行者發生衝突；澳洲日是為了紀念 1788 年英國第一艦隊囚犯抵達雪梨灣。據報導現場已部署防暴警察。每年澳洲人都會捲入對該紀念日的爭議，因為許多澳洲原住民將此日視為對殖民統治的慶祝。

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Yes—but it is not what populist politicians say it is

Jan 8th 2026|4 min read

JAPAN is consumed by talk of a “foreigner problem”. The story goes that the country has been overrun by ill-mannered migrant workers, misbehaving tourists and opportunistic foreign investors. But Japan’s real problem is not that it hosts too many foreigners. It is that it has too few.

Foreigners moved to the centre of political debate after the upstart Do It Yourself (Sanseito) party rode a “Japanese first” platform to big gains in last year’s upper-house election. In October the panicked ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) chose as its new leader Takaichi Sanae, who launched her campaign for the job bylambasting foreign tourists who, she said without evidence, had been “kicking” sacred deer in Nara, an ancient capital. In Japan’s polite political culture, this was nearly as provocative as Donald Trump’s false claim that Haitian immigrants were eating American pets.

Since becoming prime minister, Ms Takaichi has proposed tightening the screws on foreigners in the hope of winning voters back to the LDP. Her administration has talked of crackdowns on people who overstay visas, taxes on tourists, restrictions on property purchases and caps on foreign labour. A package of measures may be put forward later this month.

Vilifying outsiders may make for good politics. But in the long run it is misguided. The true causes of voters’ frustrations are economic struggles. Cracking down on foreigners will not heal the underlying malaise. If anything, it will make it worse.

The backdrop is demographic change. Japan’s population is expected to decrease by 30% to 87m in 2070. Ms Takaichi’s mentor, the late Abe Shinzo, recognised that Japan needed to open up if it was to keep thriving. When he served as prime minister he let in more migrant workers and encouraged tourism. The number of foreign residents in Japan has doubled since 2010 to 3.7m. The number of foreign visitors has quadrupled over the same period, reaching some 40m last year.

Many foreigners live in Japan on temporary work visas. Such programmes are better than no immigration at all. But in Japan, where migrants are often treated as expendable cogs, not people who might settle and have families, such schemes hold back integration, which in turn causes tension. And as the foreign population in Japan has risen, mainstream politicians have often been reluctant to talk about it. That has helped populists paint the arrivals as a “silent invasion”.

Some popular worries reflect real problems that can be fixed. Stricter oversight of foreign investors who buy land next to sensitive sites such as military bases is wise. Imposing Japanese-language requirements for permanent residence is reasonable, too. Over-tourism has turned Kyoto’s best-known temples into mosh pits during cherry-blossom season.

But broader fears about social breakdown and loss of traditions are overstated. Japan is an island country with strong borders. It faces no surge of refugees from war or poverty. Its neighbours are either prosperous or North Korea, which locks its people in. Foreigners are only about 3% of Japan’s population; the average across the OECD, a club of mostly rich countries, is 15%. And there is plenty of room for tourism to grow.

Japan already relies on foreigners in industries including hospitality, farming and nursing. Migrants help sustain many of the traditions that nativists fear losing: they catch and harvest the raw ingredients for Japanese cuisine; in some ageing rural communities they help carry portable shrines during festivals. Japan will need far more workers in the coming decades to maintain even modest growth. That is why business leaders and governors tend to favour admitting more foreigners, not fewer. As for curbing tourism, that would mean stifling Japan’s second-largest export, after cars.

Instead of discouraging tourists, Japan could** lure **more of them to the many beautiful places that are currently off the beaten track. (Even Kyoto has plenty of spectacular yet barely visited sites.) Instead of cracking down on foreign workers, it should design an immigration system that attracts and selects newcomers with useful skills, integrates them into society and ensures that they pay their fair share of health-care and welfare costs. The real problem is not foreigners. It is the failure to take advantage of one of Japan’s greatest strengths—that it is a wonderful place to live and work. ■

日本真的有所謂的「外國人問題」嗎？

有——但並非民粹政治人物所宣稱的那種

2026 年 1 月 8 日｜閱讀時間 4 分鐘

日本正被有關「外國人問題」的討論所籠罩。流行的說法是，日本已被不守規矩的移工、行為失當的觀光客，以及投機取巧的外國投資者所「淹沒」。然而，日本真正的問題並非外國人太多，而是外國人太少。

外國人議題之所以成為政治焦點，是因為新興的「自己動手黨」（Sanseito）在去年的參議院選舉中，憑藉「日本優先」的政綱取得顯著進展。10 月，驚慌失措的執政黨自民黨（LDP）選擇高市早苗為新任黨魁。她在競選期間，毫無證據地抨擊外國觀光客，指稱他們在古都奈良「踢踹」神聖的鹿群。在日本一向溫和的政治文化中，這樣的言論幾乎可與唐納．川普聲稱海地移民吃美國人寵物的虛假指控相提並論。

高市上任首相後，為了重新贏回選民支持，提出多項針對外國人的強硬政策，包括打擊逾期居留者、對觀光客課稅、限制外國人購置不動產，以及對外籍勞工設置上限。一套完整的措施可能將於本月稍晚提出。

妖魔化外來者或許有助於短期政治操作，但長期而言卻是誤入歧途。選民不滿的真正根源在於經濟困境，而非外國人。打壓外國人無法治癒結構性問題，反而可能使情況惡化。

其背景是人口結構的劇烈變化。日本人口預計將在 2070 年減少 30%，降至 8,700 萬人。高市的政治導師、已故前首相安倍晉三早已意識到，日本若要持續繁榮，必須對外開放。在他任內，日本引進更多移工並鼓勵觀光發展。自 2010 年以來，外國居民人數已倍增至 370 萬；外國旅客數量更在同期間成長四倍，去年達約 4,000 萬人次。

許多外國人在日本持短期工作簽證居留。這類制度固然勝過完全不接受移民，但在日本，移民往往被視為可替換的勞動齒輪，而非能夠定居並建立家庭的成員，這種作法阻礙了社會融合，也因此引發緊張。隨著外國人口增加，主流政治人物卻長期避而不談，反倒讓民粹勢力將移民描繪成一場「無聲入侵」。

部分民眾的擔憂確實反映了可解決的問題。加強對購買軍事基地等敏感地點附近土地的外國投資者之監管是明智的；對申請永久居留者設立日語能力要求亦屬合理。過度觀光確實讓京都的知名寺院在櫻花季期間人滿為患。

然而，對於社會崩解與文化流失的恐懼被嚴重誇大。日本是島國，邊境管控嚴密，並未面臨戰爭或貧困所引發的難民潮。其鄰國不是富裕國家，就是將人民封鎖在國內的北韓。外國人僅占日本人口約 3%；而經合組織（OECD）成員國的平均比例為 15%。日本的觀光成長空間仍然相當大。

日本早已在旅宿、農業與護理等產業仰賴外國勞工。移民實際上也在維繫那些排外者所擔憂失去的傳統：他們捕撈與收成日本料理所需的原料；在一些高齡化的鄉村社區中，他們協助在祭典時抬神轎。未來數十年，日本若要維持即便是溫和的經濟成長，也將需要更多勞動力。正因如此，企業領袖與地方首長多半支持增加而非減少外國人。至於抑制觀光，等同於扼殺日本僅次於汽車的第二大出口產業。

與其打擊觀光，日本更應將旅客引導至仍未被充分探索的美麗地區（即便是京都，也仍有眾多壯麗卻鮮少造訪的景點）。與其限制外籍勞工，不如設計一套能吸引具實用技能的新移民、促進其社會融合，並確保其公平負擔醫療與福利成本的移民制度。真正的問題不在於外國人，而在於日本未能善用自身最重要的優勢之一——它是一個極適合生活與工作的國家。■

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It won’t change China’s calculus but is a case study for “decapitation” strikes

Jan 8th 2026|Taipei|4 min read

China’s public is used to seeing flashy footage of its armed forces parading new weaponry through Beijing, conducting peacekeeping patrols in Africa or staging elaborate drills around disputed territory, especially Taiwan. But nobody under 45 can claim to have lived through an actual Chinese military strike on another country. And among older generations who did, most would rather forget the war of 1979 in which Vietnam repelled a Chinese invasion. No wonder, then, that many Chinese people were transfixed by reports of America’s dramatic night-time extraction of Nicolás Maduro from Venezuela.

China’s government swiftly denounced the raid, but details and discussion of it circulated widely online. Among the more nationalist comments, there was also a common refrain: could this be a template for a Chinese attack on Taiwan? Similar thoughts have been raised in Taiwan itself and in America, with prominent figures arguing that the raid could set a precedent for China’s leader, Xi Jinping, to conduct—and legitimise—an assault on the island.

**In truth, Mr Maduro’s capture will probably have little direct impact on China’s approach to Taiwan. **Rhetorically, Chinese officials have already started to use the operation to bolster their long-standing portrayal of America as a global bully and serial violator of international law. But the Trump administration’s legal justifications are of little interest to China. More pertinently, China has refrained from attacking thus far, not because it fears foreign reprimand, but owing to its own military limitations and concerns that America would intervene.

Even so, there are lessons to be drawn for both China and Taiwan. Chinese special forces have been planning “decapitation” strikes on Taiwan’s leadership for years. In 2015 China’s state television revealed that the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, had built a mock-up of Taiwan’s presidential palace in the desert in northern China to practise an assault. The training site has tripled in size since 2020. Models of other Taiwanese ministries have been built, according to satellite images obtained by a Japanese think-tank in October. China’s focus on decapitation seemingly intensified after the success of Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, in rallying resistance to Russia’s invasion.

Decapitation drills have been included in China’s recent military exercises around Taiwan, too. The latest, on December 29th and 30th, involved dozens of warships and military aircraft as well as long-range rocket fire. They simulated a blockade and operations to prevent foreign forces intervening. They also rehearsed strikes on pro-independence figures, according to Senior Colonel Zhang Chi of China’s National Defence University.

China would need to do more than kill or capture Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, as that would leave intact the rest of the government, which has a clear line of succession. The PLA is thus likely to use decapitation strikes as part of a bigger operation, potentially a full-scale invasion.

Still, the PLA’s own elite units have yet to conduct any operations of note at home, let alone abroad. Nor has China yet established the high-level integration of space, air, ground and other forces that is needed for such operations, despite reforms that Mr Xi introduced more than a decade ago to achieve that. So China is likely to scrutinise America’s raid on Caracas, just as it has studied other significant foreign operations with potential relevance to Taiwan, including the D-Day landings and the Falklands war.

Taiwan will likewise be hungry for insight into the American raid. Its armed forces are better equipped and trained than Venezuela’s. But they have long worried about Chinese decapitation strikes, potentially involving sleeper agents already in Taiwan. Hsu Szu-chien, the island’s deputy defence minister, told reporters on January 5th that Taiwan’s armed forces had protocols to respond to various types of Chinese aggression. Those included the so-called Wan Chun plan to protect the president, details of which are secret. The Venezuela raid showed the importance of strengthening preparedness and ensuring weapons are upgraded and maintained, he said, linking the episode to his government’s recent efforts to boost defence spending—blocked by the opposition.

One detail of particular interest to Taiwan is the apparent failure of Venezuela’s Chinese-made JY-27 air-surveillance radars. Their manufacturer describes them as jam-resistant, and Chinese state media have claimed they can detect incoming missiles and advanced stealthy aircraft, including America’s F-22 fighter jets. Though the radar’s failure in Venezuela may have been due to poor maintenance, operator error or even sabotage, any suggestion that America exploited a weakness could affect China’s perception of its own vulnerability in a Taiwan conflict. Versions of the same radars also protect the mainland.

Operation nations

But perhaps more significant for both sides is what the Venezuela operation says about the Trump administration’s willingness to use force and its new focus on the western hemisphere. Taiwanese officials suggested that it could deter China by demonstrating America’s willingness to deploy military might against autocracies. On the other hand, mainland officials may be quietly encouraged by Mr Trump’s suggestion that his next targets could be Mexico, Colombia—or even Greenland. That does not necessarily mean giving Mr Xi carte blanche on Taiwan. But if America is bogged down in its own backyard, China could reap the benefits all the same. ■

中美兩國皆從美國突襲委內瑞拉中汲取教訓

這不會改變中國的盤算，但卻是「斬首」行動的案例研究

2026年1月8日 | 台北 | 閱讀時間 4 分鐘

中國大眾已經習慣看到其武裝部隊展示新式武器、在非洲進行維和巡邏，或在爭議領土（特別是台灣）周邊進行精密的演習。但 45 歲以下的人，幾乎沒人親歷過中國對另一國採取真正的軍事行動；而經歷過 1979 年中越戰爭的長輩  (1979年中國因邊境衝突及不滿越南入侵柬埔寨，發動「對越自衛反擊戰」。解放軍攻入越南北部，雙方死傷慘重；中方宣稱達到目標後撤軍，此後兩國在邊境對峙多年。)，多數也寧願遺忘那場被越南擊退的往事。因此，當美國戲劇性地在夜間將尼古拉斯·馬杜洛（Nicolás Maduro）從委內瑞拉帶走時，許多中國人感到震驚且目不轉睛。

中國政府迅速譴責了這次突襲，但相關細節與討論在網路上廣泛流傳。在民族主義色彩濃厚的評論中，也出現了一個共同的疑問：這是否能成為中國攻擊台灣的範本？ 同樣的想法在台灣和美國也被提出，一些知名人士主張，這次突襲可能為中國領導人習近平發動——並合法化——對台攻擊開創先例。

事實上，馬杜洛的被捕可能對中國應對台灣的方式影響甚微。在說法上，中國官員已開始利用這次行動，強化其長期以來將美國形塑為「全球霸權」及「國際法慣犯破壞者」的形象。然而，川普政府的法律依據對中國來說並不重要。更貼切地說，中國至今未發動攻擊，並非擔心國際譴責，而是出於自身軍事限制以及對美國可能介入的擔憂。

即便如此，中台雙方仍能從中汲取教訓。中國特種部隊多年來一直在籌劃對台灣領導層進行「斬首」行動。2015 年，中國中央電視台揭露解放軍（PLA）在內蒙古沙漠建造了台灣總統府的模擬建築以練習進攻。根據日本智庫去年 10 月取得的衛星影像，該訓練場自 2020 年以來已擴大三倍，並增建了台灣其他部會的模型。自烏克蘭總統澤倫斯基成功號召抵抗俄羅斯入侵後，中國對斬首行動的關注顯然有所加強。

近期中國在台灣周邊的軍事演習也納入了斬首演練。最近一次在 12 月 29 日至 30 日的演習中，涉及數十艘軍艦、軍機及遠程火箭，模擬了封鎖及防止外國勢力干預的行動。根據中國國防大學張弛大校的說法，他們還演練了針對「台獨分子」的打擊。

然而，中國僅僅殺害或抓捕台灣總統賴清德是不夠的，因為這會留下擁有明確繼任順序的政府運作體系。因此，解放軍很可能將斬首行動視為更大規模行動（可能是全面入侵）的一部分。

儘管如此，解放軍的精銳部隊尚未在國內執行過任何顯著行動，更不用說在海外。儘管習近平十多年前就推動改革以實現軍事轉型，但中國尚未建立起執行此類操作所需的高度太空、空域、地面及其他力量的整合。因此，中國很可能會仔細研究美國對卡拉卡斯的突襲，就像他們研究其他與台灣衝突相關的國外行動一樣（如諾曼第登陸和福克蘭戰爭）。

台灣同樣渴望從這次美國突襲中獲得洞察。台灣武裝部隊的裝備與訓練雖優於委內瑞拉，但長期以來一直擔憂中國的斬首攻擊，且可能涉及已潛伏在台灣的臥底特務。台灣國防部副部長徐斯儉於 1 月 5 日告訴記者，軍方已有應對各類侵略的預案，其中包括保護總統的「萬鈞計畫」（細節屬機密）。他表示，委內瑞拉突襲事件顯示了加強戒備及確保武器更新維護的重要性，並藉此聯繫政府近期提升國防預算的努力——儘管目前仍遭到在野黨阻撓。

台灣特別感興趣的一個細節是：委內瑞拉所使用的中國製 JY-27 防空雷達顯然失效了。製造商宣稱該雷達具備抗干擾能力，中國官媒曾吹噓其能偵測導彈及先進隱形戰機（包括美國的 F-22）。儘管在委內瑞拉的失敗可能是由於維護不良、人為疏失甚至內部破壞，但任何關於美國利用漏洞的暗示，都可能影響中國對自身在台灣衝突中脆弱性的評估。同款型號的雷達也負責保衛中國大陸。

行動國家

但對雙方而言，更具深遠意義的或許是：這次委內瑞拉行動展現了川普政府使用武力的意願，以及對西半球的新焦點。台灣官員暗示，這可能透過展示美國對獨裁政權部署軍事力量的決心，進而威懾中國。

另一方面，中國官員則可能因川普暗示下一個目標可能是墨西哥、哥倫比亞甚至格陵蘭而暗自感到鼓舞。這並不代表習近平在台灣問題上得到了「空白支票」，但如果美國被拖入自家後院的泥淖，中國仍可能從中獲利。

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How AI is rewiring childhood

The technology presents (3 meanings) dazzling opportunities—and ominous risks

Dec 4th 2025|5 min read

CHRISTMAS STOCKINGS may contain more surprises than usual this year, as children open presents that can talk back. Toymakers in China have declared 2025 the year of artificial intelligence (AI) and are producing robots and teddies that can teach, play and tell stories. Older children, meanwhile, are glued to viral AI videos and AI-enhanced games. At school, many are being taught with materials created with tools like ChatGPT. Some are even learning alongside chatbot-tutors.

In work and play, AI is rewiring childhood. It promises every child the kind of upbringing previously available only to the rich, with private tutors, personalised syllabuses and bespoke entertainment. Children can listen to songs composed about them, read stories in which they star, play video games that adapt to their skill level and have an entourage of chatbot friends cheering them on. A childhood fit for a king could become universal.

It is a future filled with opportunities—and hidden traps. As real kings often discover, a bespoke upbringing can also be a lonely and atomised one. What’s more, as their subjects often find out, it can create adults who are ill-equipped for real life. As AI changes childhood for better and for worse, society must rethink the business of growing up.

Being reared by robots has advantages. Tech firms are already showing how AI can enhance learning, especially where teachers and materials are scarce. Literacy and language-learning have been boosted in early trials. The dream is that, with an AI tutor, children can be saved from classes pitched to the median, in which bright pupils are bored and dim ones are lost. If you want a version of this leader for an eight-year-oldHindi-speaker, AI can rewrite it; if they would prefer it as a cartoon strip or a song, no problem.

Technology is creating new forms of fun, too. Hollywood may dismiss AI videos as “slop”, but young people are devouring them and making their own. Old toys are being upgraded: an AI-powered edition of “Trivial Pursuit” can pose questions on any topic. Video games are creating novel experiences, such as chatting to Darth Vader in “Fortnite”. Any child can meet their heroes (and shoot them).

There are well-publicised risks in letting children loose on an evolving technology. AI tutors may hallucinate wrong answers. Toys can go off the rails: parents should check stockings for the AI teddy that was recently found to have spiced up its chat with talk of kinky sex. Children can easily misuse AI, to cheat at homework or harass each other with “deepfake” videos. Chatbots can coax vulnerable adolescents into harming themselves. Tech firms insist these stumbling blocks can be fixed; ChatGPT is only three years old.

Yet childhood may be disrupted most radically by things that AI does when it is behaving as intended. The technology quickly learns what its master likes—and shows more of it. **Social-media feeds have already created echo chambers where people see only views they agree with (or love to hate). AI threatens to strengthen these echo chambers and lock children into them at an early age. **The child who likes football may be told football stories by his teddy and given footballing examples by his AI tutor. Not only does this stamp out serendipity. A favourites-only diet means a child need never learn to tolerate something unfamiliar.

One-sided relationships with chatbots present a similar risk. AI companions that never criticise, nor share feelings of their own, are a poor preparation for dealing with imperfect humans. A third of American teenagers say they find chatting to an AI companion at least as satisfying as talking to a friend, and easier than talking to their parents. Yes-bots threaten to create children not used to taking turns, who grow up into colleagues unable to compromise and partners unfamiliar with the give-and-take required in a relationship.

Other trends are pushing in the same direction. As birth rates crash, fewer children are growing up with siblings to smooth their sharp edges. Rising numbers of young adults are deciding that long-term romantic relationships are not worth the hassle. Remote work means that people who grow up in a personalised, asocial world can slip into jobs where they interact with colleagues only through screens—a chore they may soon delegate to an AI agent.

Some basic counter-measures are urgent. Parents should think twice before entrusting their child to a word-regurgitation machine, whether it is sewn into a bear or not. Chatbots should have age restrictions that are properly enforced; governments should not give ai firms the leeway they gave social networks, which are only now being cajoled into age-gating. Teachers are kidding themselves if they think essays written at home can any longer be trusted. In the age of AI, more in-school assessment is essential.

The longer-term challenge is to think deeply about how to preserve the socialisation that AI could rub out of children’s lives. Schools, where much of childhood plays out, are the best place to do this. They should take advantage of personalised tuition where it is proven to work. But they must also redouble efforts to teach things that a robot can’t: to debate, to disagree and to get along with—perhaps even to appreciate—people who are not as sycophantic as a chatbot.

Happy princes, hollow kingdoms

Schools should also enhance their role as centres of discovery. If AI is giving children more of what they want, it is more important that schools provide chances to meet people and encounter ideas that lie outside their experience. **Algorithmic personalisation **threatens to be a powerful barrier to social mobility if it nudges people to stay in the lane in which they start out. Inequality could widen if poor schools merely embrace chatbots as cheap substitutes for human teachers.

AI shows undeniable potential to improve education and enrich entertainment. It may one day let every child live like royalty. But the truly privileged may be those whose parents and teachers know when to turn it off. ■

領袖觀點｜AI 世代

人工智慧如何重塑童年

這項科技帶來耀眼的機會——也潛藏不祥的風險

2025 年 12 月 4 日｜5 分鐘閱讀

今年的聖誕襪裡，或許會出現比以往更多驚喜——孩子們打開的禮物，可能會「回話」。中國玩具製造商已將 2025 年稱為「人工智慧元年」，推出能教學、陪玩、講故事的機器人與泰迪熊。年紀稍大的孩子，則沉迷於爆紅的 AI 影片與 AI 強化遊戲。在學校裡，許多學生使用 ChatGPT 等工具製作的教材，甚至與聊天機器人導師一同學習。

無論在學習或娛樂上，AI 正在重新改寫童年。它承諾讓每個孩子都能擁有過去只有富裕家庭才能提供的成長環境：私人家教、個人化課綱、量身打造的娛樂內容。孩子可以聽到為自己創作的歌曲、閱讀以自己為主角的故事、玩會依能力調整難度的遊戲，甚至擁有一群為他加油打氣的聊天機器人。過去如王室般的童年，或將成為普遍現象。

然而，這樣的未來既充滿機會，也暗藏陷阱。正如歷史上的君王所發現的，過度量身訂製的成長過程，往往孤立而碎片化；而他們的臣民也知道，這樣的教育可能培養出不適應現實生活的大人。當 AI 同時以好與壞的方式改變童年，社會勢必得重新思考「成長」這件事。

由機器陪伴成長並非毫無優點。科技公司已展示 AI 在師資與教材匱乏地區，能有效提升學習成果，尤其在識字與語言學習方面，初步試驗成效顯著。理想情況下，AI 導師可讓孩子免於「為中位數設計」的課堂——資優生不再無聊，學習較慢者也不致迷失。若你想把這篇社論改寫成適合八歲、講印地語的版本，AI 也能做到；要變成漫畫或歌曲，同樣不成問題。

科技也創造了新的娛樂形式。好萊塢或許將 AI 影片貶為「垃圾內容」，但年輕人卻看得津津有味，甚至自行創作。老玩具也獲得升級：AI 版《Trivial Pursuit》可針對任何主題出題；電玩遊戲則提供全新體驗，例如在《要塞英雄》中與達斯．維達對話。任何孩子都能見到自己的英雄——甚至對他們開槍。

讓孩子接觸快速演進的科技，風險早已廣為人知。AI 導師可能會「幻覺」出錯誤答案；玩具也可能失控——近期就有一隻 AI 泰迪熊被發現在聊天中加入露骨的性暗示。孩子也容易濫用 AI，作弊寫作業或用「深偽」影片騷擾同學。聊天機器人甚至可能誘導脆弱的青少年自殘。科技公司強調這些問題都能修正，畢竟 ChatGPT 也才三歲。

然而，對童年影響最深的，或許是 AI 在「正常運作」時所帶來的後果。這項技術會迅速學會使用者的偏好，並不斷提供更多相同內容。社群媒體早已打造出回音室，讓人只看到自己認同（或厭惡）的觀點。AI 可能進一步強化這些回音室，讓孩子從小就被困其中。喜歡足球的孩子，泰迪熊會講足球故事，AI 導師會用足球舉例。這不僅扼殺了偶然發現新事物的可能，也讓孩子無需學習容忍陌生與不喜歡的事物。

與聊天機器人建立單向關係，也存在類似風險。永不批評、也不表達自身情緒的 AI 夥伴，無法讓孩子學會如何與不完美的人相處。三分之一的美國青少年表示，與 AI 夥伴聊天至少和與朋友聊天一樣令人滿足，甚至比與父母交談更輕鬆。「是的機器人」可能培養出不習慣輪流、不懂妥協的孩子，最終成為難以合作的同事，或不熟悉關係中互相付出的伴侶。

其他趨勢也正朝相同方向推進。隨著出生率下滑，越來越多孩子沒有手足來磨平稜角；愈來愈多青年認為長期親密關係不值得付出心力。遠距工作則讓在個人化、非社交環境中成長的人，進入幾乎只需透過螢幕互動的職場——而這項互動，未來也可能交給 AI 代理完成。

一些基本的對策刻不容緩。家長在把孩子交給「文字拼湊機器」之前，應三思而後行，不論那台機器是否縫在泰迪熊裡。聊天機器人應設有並確實執行年齡限制；政府不該再給 AI 公司如同當年社群平台般的寬鬆待遇。教師若仍相信在家完成的作文可信，無疑是自欺欺人；在 AI 時代，更多校內評量勢在必行。

更長遠的挑戰，是如何保留 AI 可能從童年生活中抹去的社會化過程，而學校正是最佳場域。學校應在證實有效的情況下，善用個人化教學；同時，也必須加倍努力教授機器無法取代的能力：辯論、分歧、合作，甚至欣賞那些不像聊天機器人般阿諛奉承的人。

快樂的王子，空洞的王國

學校也應強化作為探索中心的角色。若 AI 不斷給孩子他們想要的內容，那麼學校更應提供機會，讓他們接觸經驗之外的人與思想。演算法式個人化，若引導人們始終停留在起點所在的「車道」，將成為社會流動的強大障礙；若貧困學校僅以聊天機器人作為廉價的人類教師替代品，不平等恐將擴大。

AI 無疑具備改善教育、豐富娛樂的潛力，或許終有一天，能讓每個孩子都過上如王室般的生活。但真正的特權，可能屬於那些知道何時該把它關掉的家長與教師。 ■

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Women in America are having as many babies over their lifetimes as they did two decades ago

A set of public signs showing women, pregnancy, baby care, strollers, and children playing

Dec 18th 2025 | 5 min read

**A colony of **sentient lizards, living on a distant planet. It comprises 100 females and 100 males. Each lives for 100 years. There is only one male and one female of any age (eg, one 15-year-old female, one 74-year-old male). The planet is safe and peaceful: no lizards die from disease or violence.

But every year the two 100-year-olds pass away. And every year two babies are born, the fruits of an unusual reproductive cycle. At age 24 every female produces a male baby; at 26, a female. She will never have any more. The population of Planet Lizard is thus fixed at 200. Now imagine an asteroid hits Planet Lizard, altering its atmosphere and climate. At first little seems to have changed. All the lizards miraculously survive, and they rejoice at their good fortune.

But it soon becomes clear something is wrong: the two females, aged 24 and 26, who are due to produce baby lizards do not. The population shrinks to 198. The next year, the same thing happens. The colony dwindles to 196. Concern turns to panic. Prophecies of extinction are splashed across the front pages of lizard newspapers. Councils of senior lizards are convened to devise plans to revive fertility. Nothing works.

Ten years after the asteroid struck, the remaining 180 lizards are resigned to their fate: ageing, death and extinction, two by two. And then: a miracle. The two females who failed to have babies at 24 and 26 are suddenly fertile, at 34 and 36. Soon, two infants are born, to general ecstasy. The next year, the miracle is repeated. And so on. The population stabilises and (a century later) climbs back to 200. Ultimately, the asteroid changed the timing of lizard births but not their number. This fable may seem silly, but it contains a lesson. For decades, across the West, the commonest measure of how many children women have, on average—the total fertility rate (tfr)—has been dropping. It has fallen well below the “replacement rate” (needed to keep a population constant) of 2.1. Between 2007 and 2022 America’s tfr dropped from 2.1 to just 1.6. Warnings of probable population decline, including from this newspaper, abound. Pronatalists are casting around frantically for solutions. A shrinking (human) population could be cause for concern. It means fewer working-age people to support the old. Fiscal crisis could loom. Fewer minds would yield fewer innovative ideas. Less scope for division of labour would mean a less efficient economy.

But tfr has flaws. It measures the number of children a hypothetical woman might have in her life, based on current birth rates for women of different ages. To calculate it, you start by dividing the total number of births to a given group of women (aged, say 15-19 or 35-39) by the number of women in that group. Those group birth rates are then added up and multiplied by the number of years in each group (ie, five).

The result is the number of children a woman will have if, aged 15-19, she has the same number of babies as the average woman of 15-19 is having today, then the same number at 20-24 as the average woman of 20-24 is having today, and so on. It is almost sure to be wrong. That does not make TFR useless. It captures what demographers call “tempo”—the timing of an event, like a birth.

But as a measure of “quantum”—the total number of births—it is likely to mislead. In effect it assumes that a young woman will have babies not only at the same rate as her contemporaries, but also at the same rate as women five or ten years older. That is not necessarily so. A different measure, the completed fertility rate (CFR), captures the average number of births a woman has by the end of her child-bearing years (put at 44).

America’s CFR has not fallen at all over the past two decades. In fact, according to an analysis of census data by Mike Konczal, a former Biden administration economist, it has risen slightly, from 1.91 in 2000 to 1.97 in 2024. Chart: The Economist Back on Planet Lizard, the TFR dropped to zero overnight. After ten years, when females started having babies again, it jumped back to 2. The CFR never budged. The timing of births simply shifted, and eventually the tfr caught up with the cfr. In a doomsday scenario, in which the asteroid did render the lizards infertile, the cfr would have dropped to meet tfr. Which scenario is playing out in the West? Many demographers, including Lyman Stone, of the Institute for Family Studies, a think-tank, point out that tfr is typically a strong predictor of cfr. But there is evidence that women are deferring, not forgoing, childbirth.

In 2000 by age 26 the average American woman had produced one child; the average 32-year-old, 1.6 children; the average 40-year-old, 1.9. In 2024 the average 26-year-old had 0.6 children and the average 32-year-old 1.2. But the average 40-year-old has still had 1.9, having delayed in her 20s and caught up in her 30s. Economies of scales Does this mean, as with the lizards, that tfr will rise to meet cfr? Historical examples are suggestive. As women delayed childbearing in Sweden the tfr dropped sharply in the 1980s, before recovering in the 1990s (though it has fallen since). The cfr, at around 2, barely budged. In America the question is pertinent. The commonest ages are 33 and 34, because of a baby boom in 1990 and 1991. Women aged 34 have had, on average, 1.46 children each. As this group approaches their 40s, many more births may be on the way. As for younger women, those born in 2000 have had fewer children than those born in 1990 had had by 2015.

Perhaps they will catch up—but that won’t be known for at least a decade. To be sure, an average of just under two births per woman is still not “replacement level”. But if that truly is the long-term average, panic is scarcely justified. It would mean a gradual population decline: tricky, but much more manageable than implied by TFR. It is easy to fear the end times. But the problem may be one that humans, like our faraway lizards, never face.

美國女性一生中生育的孩子數量，與二十年前其實一樣多

2025 年 12 月 18 日｜閱讀時間 5 分鐘

想像一下，在一顆遙遠的星球上，有一個由具備感知能力的蜥蜴所組成。這個社會共有 100 隻雌性與 100 隻雄性蜥蜴。每一隻蜥蜴都能活到 100 歲，而且每個年齡層都恰好只有一隻雄性與一隻雌性（例如：只有一隻 15 歲的雌蜥蜴，一隻 74 歲的雄蜥蜴）。這顆星球安全又和平，沒有任何蜥蜴死於疾病或暴力。然而，每年都會有兩隻 100 歲的蜥蜴自然死亡；同時，也會誕生兩隻新生蜥蜴，這來自一種特殊的繁殖週期。每隻雌蜥蜴在 24 歲時會生下一隻雄性幼蜥；在 26 歲時，會生下一隻雌性幼蜥。此後，她將不再生育。於是，「蜥蜴星球」的人口始終固定在 200。

接著，想像一顆小行星撞擊了蜥蜴星球，改變了它的大氣與氣候。一開始，看似毫無異狀。所有蜥蜴奇蹟似地存活下來，並為自己的幸運而歡欣鼓舞。但很快地，問題浮現了：原本應該在 24 與 26 歲生育的兩隻雌蜥蜴，沒有生下幼蜥。人口減少到 198。隔年，同樣的事情再度發生，人口降至 196。憂慮迅速轉為恐慌，關於滅絕的預言登上蜥蜴報紙的頭版。長老議會召開，試圖找出恢復生育力的方法，但一切都徒勞無功。

十年後，剩下的 180 隻蜥蜴只能接受他們的命運：逐漸老去、死亡，然後滅絕——每年少兩隻。

然後，奇蹟出現了。

那兩隻在 24 與 26 歲未能生育的雌蜥蜴，竟然在 34 與 36 歲時重新恢復生育能力。不久後，兩隻幼蜥誕生，整個星球陷入狂喜。隔年，奇蹟再次發生。接著年復一年。人口穩定下來，並在一個世紀後回升至 200。

最終，小行星改變的只是蜥蜴生育的「時間點」，而非「總數」。

這個寓言或許看來荒謬，但其中蘊含了一個重要教訓。數十年來，西方國家最常用來衡量女性平均生育子女數的指標——總和生育率（Total Fertility Rate，簡稱 TFR）——持續下降，且已遠低於維持人口穩定所需的「更替水準」2.1。2007 年至 2022 年，美國的 TFR 從 2.1 降至僅 1.6。各種關於人口即將衰退的警告不絕於耳，其中也包括本刊。鼓吹提高生育率的人士正四處尋找解方。

人口萎縮確實值得憂慮。這意味著勞動年齡人口減少，難以支撐高齡人口；財政危機可能浮現；創新思維的數量下降；分工的空間縮小，經濟效率隨之降低。

然而，TFR 本身存在缺陷。它是根據不同年齡層女性「當前」的生育率，推算出一名假想女性一生可能生育的子女數。計算方式如下：先將某一年齡組（例如 15–19 歲或 35–39 歲）的出生總數，除以該年齡組女性人數，得出該組的生育率；再將各年齡組的生育率加總，並乘以每組的年數（通常為五年）。結果是一個假設：一名女性在 15–19 歲時的生育行為，會與當今該年齡層女性相同；在 20–24 歲時，也會與當今該年齡層女性相同，依此類推。這種假設幾乎必然與現實不符。

這並不代表 TFR 毫無用處。它確實能反映人口學家所稱的「節奏」（tempo）——事件（如生育）發生的時間點；但作為衡量「總量」（quantum，即一生生育數）的指標，它往往具有誤導性。它實際上假設年輕女性不僅會以同齡人的生育率生育，未來也會以年長女性目前的生育率生育，而這並非必然。

另一個指標——完成生育率（Completed Fertility Rate，CFR）——則計算女性在生育年齡結束（通常定為 44 歲）時，平均實際生育的子女數。根據前拜登政府經濟學家 Mike Konczal 對美國人口普查資料的分析，美國的 CFR 在過去二十年間並未下降，反而略有上升，從 2000 年的 1.91 提高至 2024 年的 1.97。

回到蜥蜴星球：TFR 曾在一夜之間降為零；十年後，當雌蜥蜴重新開始生育時，TFR 又回升至 2。但 CFR 始終未曾改變。生育的時間只是延後，最終 TFR 追上了 CFR。若小行星真的使蜥蜴永久不孕，那麼 CFR 才會下滑，與 TFR 接軌。

那麼，西方世界正在經歷的是哪一種情況？

許多人口學家（包括家庭研究所的 Lyman Stone）指出，TFR 通常是 CFR 的良好預測指標。然而，越來越多證據顯示，女性是在延後生育，而非放棄生育。

2000 年時，26 歲的美國女性平均已有 1 名孩子；32 歲者為 1.6；40 歲者為 1.9。到了 2024 年，26 歲女性平均只有 0.6 名孩子，32 歲為 1.2；但 40 歲女性仍是 1.9——她們只是把原本 20 多歲的生育延到 30 多歲完成。

規模經濟

這是否意味著，美國的 TFR 會像蜥蜴一樣，最終回升以追上 CFR？歷史案例提供了一些線索。瑞典在 1980 年代女性延後生育時，TFR 曾急劇下降，並於 1990 年代回升（儘管之後再度下滑）；但 CFR 始終穩定在約 2。

在美國，這個問題尤為關鍵。由於 1990 與 1991 年的嬰兒潮，當前人數最多的女性年齡層為 33 與 34 歲。34 歲女性目前平均已有 1.46 名孩子。隨著她們邁入 40 多歲，更多出生可能仍在路上。至於年輕世代，2000 年出生的女性，到目前為止生育數少於 1990 年出生者在 2015 年時的水準。她們是否會「追上來」，仍需至少十年才能確認。

誠然，每名女性平均不到兩個孩子，仍低於更替水準。但若這真是長期趨勢，恐慌其實並不必要。這代表的是一個緩慢、可控的人口下降，而非 TFR 所暗示的危機規模。人類很容易想像末日降臨。但這個問題，或許終究不會真正發生——正如那些遙遠星球上的蜥蜴一般。 ■

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