People ex rel. Glasgow v. Carlson, 2016 IL 120544 (December). Episode 382 (Duration 10:20)

Mandamus awarded to force trial court to sentence defendant as a class X offender.

Sentencing Dispute

Petitioner, James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney of Will County, seeks mandamus pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 381 against respondent, the Honorable David M. Carlson, judge of the circuit court of Will County.

Defendant had some priors in his background: Defendant’s record included a 1989 Class 2 felony conviction, a 1981 Class X felony conviction, and a 1980 Class 2 felony conviction.

What is Mandamus?

Under the Illinois Constitution, this court has discretionary original jurisdiction to hear mandamus cases. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(a), Illinois Supreme Court Rule 381.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to compel a public official to perform a purely ministerial duty where no exercise of discretion is involved.

This court awards mandamus relief only when “the petitioner establishes a clear right to the relief requested, a clear duty of the public official to act, and clear authority in the public official to comply. Only matters of law are ever appropriate in a mandamus.

Judge’s Benchbook

Apparently, the judge had some bench book memo saying this section was inconsistent and some lenity should be applied.

The judge ignored the cases that were cited to him.

What They Want

Petitioner asks this court to compel respondent to

(1) vacate its sentencing order,

(2) classify as a Class 2 felony a third violation of Illinois’s driving while under the influence (DUI) statute of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501 et seq.), and

(3) resentence defendant as a Class X offender pursuant to section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b)).

Class 4 or Class 2

Defendant was charged by indictment with Class 2 felony aggravated DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2)).

The indictment alleged he had 2 prior DUI convictions. The State acknowledged that a separate provision, subsection (d)(2)(A), generally classified aggravated DUI as a Class 4 felony.

Nonetheless, the State argued that because defendant was charged under subsection (d)(2)(B), that provision’s express classification of the offense as a Class 2 felony must control.

For support, the State cited to the appellate court’s decision in People v. Mischke, 2014 IL App (2d) 130318, that reached the same conclusion. In turn, the State argued that defendant was subject to a mandatory Class X sentence on his third DUI conviction based on his prior criminal record.

What Trial Court Did

The circuit court, however, continued to express doubt that defendant’s third DUI conviction should be classified as a Class 2 felony.

The court repeatedly asked the State to explain when a third DUI conviction would ever be classified as a Class 4 felony.

The court also suggested that the State was asking the court to ignore subsection (d)(2)(A), that generally defined aggravated DUI as a Class 4 felony.

The court then sentenced defendant as a Class 4 offender to 24 months of probation.

(d)(2)(A) v. (d)(2)(B)

First of all, subsection (d)(1)(A) provides that a person is guilty of aggravated DUI if that person commits a DUI o...

People v. O’Donnell, 2015 IL App (4th) 130358 (March). Episode 381 (Duration 12:56)

Officer says she could tell defendant was not telling the truth when he told her his story.

Single Car Accident

Beckett testified he responded to a car accident at approximately 12:46 a.m. and no driver was found at the scene. At 1:12 a.m., he was notified by the local fire department an individual had been located walking approximately one mile away.

Defendant Located

Beckett proceeded to that location, where he found defendant.  

Beckett testified defendant told him a friend had been driving his car, he had been a passenger, and after the crash, he exited the car to go to a business district to find a way home. Beckett stated, at the time he located defendant, defendant was not near a business district, but was walking deeper into a residential area.

Crash Scene

Arresting officer Rebecca Bragg of the Mahomet police department testified next for the State.

She stated she observed skid marks across the road and a crashed vehicle in a bean field. She identified the vehicle as a white Grand Prix and testified the outside of the vehicle was damaged–the hood was crushed, the mirrors were broken, the front windshield was shattered, and the passenger’s side window was “busted out.”

Bragg testified she observed both the driver’s side and passenger’s side air bags had been deployed. She stated the driver’s side air bag looked like it had been tampered with and pushed in between the handles of the steering wheel. Bragg also observed a cushion and cell phone on the driver’s seat and miscellaneous items on the passenger’s seat.

She explained the passenger’s side air bag appeared not to have been tampered with and there was a path from the car through the bean field, leading away from the road, where it appeared someone had walked and broken the beans.

Admissible Opinion

In Bragg’s opinion, the accident occurred when “the driver was going entirely too fast, couldn’t make the curve, went off the roadway, tried to overcorrect the steering, and causing [sic] them to skid, and it collided with a fire hydrant, which caused the car to flip and roll.”

Defendant’s Statements At The Scene

Bragg testified she spoke with defendant, the registered owner of the car, after her assisting officer brought him back to the scene.

Defendant explained he went to Uncle Buck’s Sports Bar and Grill (the bar), where he played five or six games of pool with three or four different individuals. Bragg stated defendant could not describe or name any of the people he played pool with, except for one, “John.”

Bragg testified she asked defendant about his alcohol consumption, and defendant admitted he drank “approximately five, twelve-ounce Busch can beers” and was too drunk to drive.

Defendant told Bragg he was ready to leave the bar and talked to the man he had just met playing pool, John, who told defendant he would drive defendant’s car to an address on Prairie View Road. Defendant told Bragg he was not sure where that location was.

It was “John”

Bragg testified defendant told her John was driving too fast and he told him to slow down.

He then explained, once the car went off the roadway, he closed his eyes and did not open them until after the car landed. When he opened his eyes, John was not in the vehicle.

Defendant then told Bragg the car doors would not open, so he crawled out the passenger’s side window and started walking to try to find a business area so he could call a friend. Bragg testified defendant went in the opposite direction of a business area after the accident.

The only information defendant could give Bragg about John was he was a male,

People v. Martin, 2017 IL App (4th) 150021 (June). Episode 380 (Duration 9:58)

A little police opinion testimony was not a problem.

Single Car Accident

Defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI.

The Trooper discovered a black car in the ditch and two men standing outside the vehicle.

The Trooper asked if the men were all right, and they responded they were. The Trooper then asked who had been driving the vehicle, and defendant stated his wife had been driving.

Defendant explained his wife accepted a ride from someone on the interstate to get a tow truck.

The Trooper noted there were no footprints in the snow walking away from the vehicle or walking along the interstate. The Trooper Vandeventer also noted a strong smell of alcohol on defendant’s breath.

The other man eventually says defendant was driving.

Records check revealed he was revoked and at that point he is arrested.

It’s A DUI

Defendant, of course, appeared disoriented, his eyes were red and glassed-over, and his breath smelled of alcohol.

By this point a different the Trooper takes over and asks defendant how many alcoholic beverages he had consumed, and defendant responded he had consumed “four beers approximately.”

The Trooper administered a field sobriety test, but the test was inconclusive.

The Trooper then arrested defendant for driving with a revoked license.

The Trooper transported defendant to the jail and administered the “walk-and-turn” field sobriety test and the “one-legged stand” field sobriety test, both of which indicated defendant was impaired.

Defendant was then charged with DUI.

Wife & Buddy Testify

Defendant’s buddy testified that he was drinking beer with defendant. When they left defendant drove.

While defendant was driving, he slid off the road.

Defendant’s wife was never with them. The wife testifies she was driving, but admitted she did not say this to the the Trooper when she called defendant’s phone and the The Trooper answered.

At that point she was told he was being arrested for DUI and all she did was ask about her car being towed.

Opinion Testimony

It was harmless error when the prosecutor asked the The Trooper who the The Trooper thought was driving.

Defendant argues The Trooper testimony was unfairly prejudicial because the jury was likely to believe him due to his role as a state Trooper.

Defendant also makes much of the fact The Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony related to “the only issue for the jury to decide” and complains this testimony “usurped the province of the jury to judge the credibility of witnesses and decide the facts.”

Ultimate Fact Doctrine

But the court rejected this idea, noting that: Illinois courts have rejected the so-called “ultimate fact” doctrine, which held that a witness may not express his opinion as to the ultimate issue in a case.

Instead, it is now well settled that a witness, whether expert or lay, may provide an opinion on the ultimate issue in a case. This is so because the trier of fact is not required to accept the witness’ conclusion and, therefore, such testimony cannot be said to usurp the province of the jury. See also Ill. R. Evid. 704. (“Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”)

Illinois Rule Of Evidence 701

The Trooper’s testimony as technically an improper lay opinion.

Illinois Rule of Evidence 701 states:

People v. Bonilla, 2017 IL App (3d) 160457 (June). Episode 364 (Duration 15:16)

Constitutional violation did not depend on whether the common door to the apartment was locked.

Basic Facts

On a tip police bring a dog to an apartment complex in Moline, Illinois.

The exterior doors leading into the apartment building’s common-area hallways were not locked, and there was no lock, pass card, entry system, or anything whatsoever on the closed exterior doors of the apartment building that would prevent any person off the street from entering into the common-area hallways of the apartment building.

Once inside the apartment building, the canine officer walked his drug-detection dog down some of the common-area hallways.

As the dog came to apartment 304, however, the dog moved back and forth in the doorway, sniffing at the bottom of the door, and signaled a positive alert for the presence of illegal drugs.

The police officers obtained a search warrant for apartment 304 based upon the drug-detection dog’s alert.

After obtaining the search warrant, the officers searched the apartment and found a quantity of cannabis and certain other items. Defendant, who lived in apartment 304, was later arrested and charged with unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver.

Issue

The specific issue before us in this appeal is whether the police officer violated defendant’s fourth amendment rights when he entered the common-area hallway of the unlocked apartment building and conducted a dog sniff of the front door of defendant’s apartment.

More specifically, we must determine whether the police officer’s actions constituted a search for purposes of the fourth amendment.

A Short Review

There are two different approaches that a court may be called upon to apply when determining whether a police officer’s actions constitute a search under the fourth amendment— a property-based approach and a privacy-based approach.

Property-Based Approach

If applicable, the property-based approach should be applied first.

First of all, there is no need to apply the privacy-based approach if a violation of the fourth amendment has been found under the property-based approach.

The property-based approach recognizes a simple baseline of protection that is provided by the fourth amendment as it relates to the property interests specified: that when the government obtains information by physically intruding (trespassing) on a person’s house, papers, or effects, a search within the original meaning of the fourth amendment has undoubtedly occurred.

The question a court must ask when applying the property-based approach is whether the police officers intruded (trespassed) upon a constitutionally protected area (one of the protected properties specified in the text of the fourth amendment) to obtain the information in question.

Privacy-Based Approach

The privacy-based approach recognizes that property rights are not the sole measurement of the fourth amendment’s protections and that fourth amendment protections also extend to areas in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Under the privacy-based approach, a fourth amendment search occurs when police officers intrude into an area in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The question a court must ask when applying the privacy based approach is whether the complaining person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area invaded (the location or object of the alleged search) by the police.

Again, there is no need to apply the privacy-based approach if a fourth amendment search has already been found under the property-based approach (if the situation before the court is such ...

People v. Martin, 2017 IL App (1st) 143255 (June). Episode 363 (Duration 17:41)

Constitutional violation depended on whether the 2 story flat was more like a single family home or an apartment building.

A Drug Deal?

Police searched a home without a warrant.

Police say they observed a man approach defendant and raise his right index finger, whereupon defendant acknowledged the gesture and entered the main door frame of a two story flat.

The door to was slightly ajar.

Defendant stood on the immediate threshold and reached into the door inside of the doorframe.

Defendant retrieved a blue plastic bag, manipulated it, and then retrieved a smaller unknown item from the bag. Police could not tell what the item was that defendant took from the bag.

Defendant then placed the bag on top of the door and returned to the man, where he received money from and tendered the small unknown item to the man. Defendant tendered the money to another male who was standing outside of the house.

The man was arrested and he said he just purchased heroin.

Police then arrested defendant.

The Search

An officer then reached above the door frame on the inside of the door and recovered the blue bag.

The items inside the blue bag matched the suspect narcotics that were recovered from the man. The baggies were branded with a bomb logo and said “stay high imagine”.

The police said the door was open, he observed that the front door opened into a vestibule or common area that had another door, leading into the residence.

The parties stipulated that the officers did not have a warrant.

Trial Court Findings

The court acquitted defendant of the hand to hand delivery and of possession with intent to deliver but found him guilty of possession of a controlled substance.

Issue

On appeal defendant challenges the warranty seizure of the drugs.

The Case Law

Turning to defendant’s contentions, defendant relies on Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409, and the expectation of privacy test from Katz, 389 U.S. 347. See also the Illinois search & seizure resource guide.

We briefly summarize each framework.

Katz

Under Katz, to claim the protection of the fourth amendment, a person must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy in the place searched or thing seized, and this expectation must be one that society is willing to recognize as “reasonable. ”

Of note, Illinois courts have found that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment buildings that are accessible to others.

* See People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 245 (1992) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation that occurred in an apartment building’s unlocked common area that was shared by other tenants, the landlord, their social guests, and other invitees);

* People v. Carodine, 374 Ill. App. 3d 16, 23 (2007) (the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the dryer vent of his three-unit apartment building where dryer vent was in a common area that was accessible to the landlord and other members of the general public);

* People v. Lyles, 332 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (2002) (stating that a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of an apartment building that are accessible to other tenants and their invitees).

Jardines

In Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1413, the Court considered whether using a drug sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch to investigate the contents of a home was a “...

People v. Ringland, 2017 IL 119484 (June). Episode 360 (Duration 13:06)

Prosecutors cannot designated officials with general policing power.

Basic Facts

5 defendants were each stopped by Jeffrey Gaither, a special investigator for the La Salle County State’s Attorney.

Each traffic stop occurred on Interstate 80 in La Salle County and resulted in the discovery of a controlled substance.

At issue in this case is the Counties Code section 55 ILCS 5/3-9005(b). Did Gaither have the authority to make these traffic stops?

State’s Attorney Testifies

In the litigation, defendant called the elected SA, Brian Towne, as a witness.

Brian said he created the State’s Attorney’s Felony Enforcement (SAFE) unit specifically to conduct drug interdiction traffic stops on route 80, so he could get his hands on some of that drug money flowing through his county.

Gaither was ex ISP and was hired for this task.

He was paid by La Salle County and was an employee of the State’s Attorney of Lasalle County.

He had a Ford Explorer equipped with lights and a video camera.

The Counties Code

55 ILCS 5/3-9005(b) of the Counties Code provides in relevant part:

“The State’s Attorney of each county shall have authority to appoint one or more special investigators to (1) serve subpoenas, (2) make return of process and (3) conduct investigations which assist the State’s Attorney in the performance of his duties.”

55 ILCS 5/3-9005(b).

Section 3-9005(b) expressly limits its investigation authorization to those investigations that assist a State’s Attorney in the performance of his or her duties.

Thus, to be valid, the instant traffic stops, must constitute investigations that assist a State’s Attorney in the performance of his or her duties.

Additionally, Section 3-9005(a) prescribes certain powers and duties of the State’s Attorney. These duties of each State’s attorney shall be:

* to commence and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments, and prosecutions, civil and criminal, in the circuit court for his or her county, in which the people of the State or county may be concerned;

* all actions and proceedings brought by any county officer in his or her official capacity;

* to prosecute charges of felony or misdemeanor, for which the offender is required to be recognized to appear before the circuit court (55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(6);

* to prosecute all forfeited bonds and recognizances and all actions and proceedings for the recovery of debts, revenues, moneys, fines, penalties, and forfeitures accruing to the State or his or her county or to any school district or road district in the county;

* to prosecute all suits in the county against railroad or transportation companies, which may be prosecuted in the name of the People of the State of Illinois (55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(2));

* to defend all actions and proceedings brought against his or her county, or against any county or State officer, in an official capacity, within the county (55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(4);

* to attend the examination of all persons brought before any judge on habeas corpus, when the prosecution is in his or her county (55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(5);

* to give his or her opinion, without fee or reward, to any county officer in the county, upon any question or law relating to any criminal or other matter, in which the people or the county may be concerned (55 ILCS 5/3-9...

People v. Petty, 2017 IL App (1st) 150641 (May). Episode 356 (Duration 7:33)

Defendant was under investigation for a theft so police were within their rights to confiscate the UPC labels they saw on the floorboard of defendant’s car.

Facts

Defendant Ronald Petty was convicted by a jury of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16A-3(b)) and sentenced to two years’ incarceration.

Best Buy

Best Buy had issued a storewide alert for an individual placing UPC labels for $42 Sony DVD players on $400 BluRay players and purchasing the more expensive players at the lower price.

They gave police the name on the receipts as well as video of the man making the purchases.

Man Is Back

Two hours after the report the man came back and the police were called. The police responded and waited in the parking lot. Defendant left the store and drove away without buying anything.

The officers ran the plates, which identified the car as belonging to Ronald Petty, whose license had been suspended.

The Stop

The officers stopped him and arrested him for driving on a suspended license.

As Petty was being taken out of his car, an officer saw some UPC labels on a clipboard on the front passenger-side floorboard. When searched, Petty had a credit card in his name that ended with the same four numbers on the Best Buy receipt.

Issue

Petty argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to quash arrest and suppress uniform product code (UPC) labels seized from his car.  

Petty maintains that the search of his car and seizure of the UPC labels was not justified as a search incident to an arrest as (i) the labels were unrelated to the traffic stop for driving on a suspended license, his only offense, and (ii) he was not within reach of his car at the time of the search. Defendant says he was not within reach of his car. 

He says a warrantless search of an arrestee’s car may be conducted only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reach of the passenger compartment or there is a likelihood of discovering offense-related evidence. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).

Petty asserts that the State cannot prevail on the latter basis

Trial Court

While noting that without the recovery of the UPC labels Petty would have been charged only with driving on a suspended license (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a)) and not retail theft, the trial court held that the active investigation for retail theft involving UPC labels justified the seizure.

Plain View

The plain view doctrine allows the police to seize property without a warrant.

The doctrine requires that

(i) the officer was lawfully in a position from which he observed the property,

(ii) the incriminating character of the property was immediately apparent, and

(iii) the officer had a lawful right of access to the property.

The seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.

Immediately Apparent Criminal Nature

Petty argues that the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement does not justify the seizure of the UPC labels, as the incriminating nature of the UPC labels was not immediately apparent.

However, in Brown, 460 U.S. at 741, where the United States Supreme Court discussed the concept of an object’s “immediately apparent” criminality, calling the phrase “very likely an unhappy choice of words.”

Rather, “probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution ...

People v. Richardson, 2017 IL App (1st) 130203-B (May). Episode 355 (Duration 6:52)

This pat down was justified after Defendant was fidgeting with his waistband and reaching for something after he was told to show them his hands.

Facts

Officers stop a car matching the general description of a stolen car.

Officer Akinbusuyi approached the vehicle from the passenger’s side while Officer Johnson approached the driver’s side.

Officer Johnson requested that the driver exit the vehicle after the driver was unable to produce a driver’s license or insurance information. As the driver exited the vehicle, Officer Akinbusuyi observed the defendant mumbling and reaching “into the center console with his right hand but with his left hand it was stuffing something in his waistband.”

Kind of Fishy

Officer Akinbusuyi testified that he found the defendant’s actions unusual, because “he had no reason to be doing that after I verbally told him let me see your hands.”

Officer Akinbusuyi testified that his “best judgment was that he was hiding something in his waistband.”

Based on his experience, he believed that “[i]t was mostly likely a weapon, drugs or something he didn’t want me to find.”

Defendant Ordered Out

Officer Akinbusuyi asked the defendant to exit the vehicle, and the defendant complied.

Officer Akinbusuyi handcuffed the defendant, “patted down the area” and discovered a handgun in the defendant’s waistband.

The officers subsequently searched the vehicle and found the victim’s culinary tools confirming it was the stolen car.

Issue

Defendant contends that his motion to suppress evidence and quash arrest should have been granted because the arresting officer’s pat-down search was unconstitutional.

He argues that the pat-down search was not justified pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because Officer Akinbusuyi lacked a reasonable belief that the defendant was armed and dangerous.

Law

Both the fourth amendment and the Illinois Constitution of 1970 guarantee the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art I., section 6. Courts have divided police-citizen encounters into three tiers:

(1) arrests which must be supported by probable cause;

(2) brief investigative detentions, or ‘Terry stops,’ which must be supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and

(3) encounters that involve no coercion or detention and thus do not implicate fourth amendment interests.

Terry Stop Pat Down

In Terry, the United States Supreme Court held “that a brief investigatory stop, even in the absence of probable cause, is reasonable and lawful under the fourth amendment when a totality of the circumstances reasonably lead the officer to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot and the subject is armed and dangerous.”

Terry further specifies when a pat-down search for weapons during an investigative stop is permissible if:

“…nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel [the officer’s] reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.

“The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warrant...

People v. Veal, 2017 IL App (1st) 150500 (May). Episode 350 (Duration 4:30)

When a driver is arrested does that then mean that the passengers are free to leave and go on their way?

Charges

Veal was charged with four counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and one count of armed habitual criminal after an officer recovered a gun on Veal’s seat during a traffic stop.

Facts

Police pulled up next to a Honda Civic at a red light, at which time officers observed that the rear two passengers of the car were not wearing seatbelts.

Defendant was the rear seat passenger and was seen making movements toward his waist, as though he was trying to cover something.

Specifically, the officer testified that Veal moved his hands towards his waist on the right side of his body and pushed his waist down.

Driver Arrested

The driver was ordered out and arrested.

He then ordered Veal out of the car and opened the door for him.

As Veal exited the car, Officer Kanski saw a handgun underneath where Veal had been sitting, and he immediately secured Veal and took possession of the weapon.

Issue

The issue on appeal is whether or not the traffic stop had ended once the driver was arrested.

Specifically, the parties dispute whether Officer Kanski’s command for Veal to exit the car occurred while the stop was in progress. Veal contends that following the arrest of the driver, the stop had concluded and he was free to leave. 

Illinois courts have not squarely confronted the issue presented in this case, which is whether a traffic stop ends when, instead of returning papers to the driver, the officers arrest or restrain him.

Law

There are several exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the circumstance where a police officer briefly stops a person for questioning when the officer reasonably believes that person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime—colloquially known as a Terry stop.

To lean more about Illinois search and seizure issues check out this resource page.

A motor vehicle stop is akin to a Terry stop (Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998)), and as such, we analyze the reasonableness of such stops under Terry principles (Jones, 215 Ill. 2d at 270).

And both parties agree that following a lawful traffic stop police may, as a matter of course, order the driver and any passengers out of the vehicle pending completion of the stop.

Traffic Stop & No Seat Belts

A traffic stop is reasonable when the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.

Here, Veal does not challenge the legality of the stop based on the fact that both Veal and his fellow rear-seat passenger were not wearing seatbelts. See 625 ILCS 5/12-603.1(a) (generally requiring rear-seat passengers to wear safety belts).

Analysis

According to Veal, the order to step out of the car constituted a new police-citizen encounter requiring separate justification under the fourth amendment.

The reviewing court disagreed.

We have considered the question of when a traffic stop “ends” for purposes of determining the legality of a later search of the automobile or the defendant. As a general matter, we have held that the return of paperwork—e.g., a driver’s license, vehicle registration, or proof of insurance—signifies the conclusion of the stop as it conveys to the driver that he is free to leave, and any ensuing search must be supported on grounds independent of t...

People v. Way, 2017 IL 120023 (April). Episode 349 (Duration 7:44)

Proximate cause defense in aggravated DUI cases remains alive and well after the cannabis reform law.

This was a cannabis related aggravated DUI. To learn more about Illinois DUI law visit this resource page.

Facts

Defendant drove over the centerline of a two-lane road in and struck head-on a truck driven by a pregnant lady.

Both the pregnant lady and defendant’s 14-year-old son, who was a passenger in defendant’s vehicle, suffered from great bodily harm.

Defendant consented to blood and urine samples on the day of the accident. The urine test revealed the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) metabolite, which results from cannabis use.

The Charge

Section 11-501(a)(6) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) makes it a misdemeanor offense to drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle in this state while there is any amount of a drug, substance, or compound in the person’s breath, blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of cannabis. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6).

Section 11-501(d)(1)(C) of the Vehicle Code elevates the misdemeanor offense to felony aggravated DUI if the person, in committing the violation of subsection (a), was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another, when the violation was a proximate cause of the injuries. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C).

Section 11-501 of the Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this State while: * * * (6) there is any amount of a drug, substance, or compound in the person’s breath, blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of cannabis listed in the Cannabis Control Act *** . * * * (d) Aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds, or any combination thereof. (1) Every person convicted of committing a violation of this Section shall be guilty of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds, or any combination thereof if: * * * (C) the person in committing a violation of subsection (a) was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another, when the violation was a proximate cause of the injuries[.]” 625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2010).

Note: This provision of the Vehicle Code was recently amended and no longer imposes a zero-tolerance ban on driving with cannabis in the driver’s system. Pub. Act 99-697 (eff. July 29, 2016).

Issue

Defendant was not allowed to call her doctor who would have testified that defendant “has low blood pressure and it is possible that the loss of consciousness right before the accident was caused by this condition and not caused by any particular drug.

At issue is whether defendant should have been allowed to present evidence from her physician that a medical condition, rather than drug impairment, led her to lose consciousness and was the sole cause of the resulting collision with Wood’s vehicle.

Doctor Would Have Said

Of course, the doctor could not say that was the cause, simply that it was a possibility.”

Defense counsel also stated that defendant would have testified “that she was not impaired and had not done any illegal drugs that particular day” and would have called three lay witnesses “who saw her shortly before the accident to testify that she was not impaired.”

Law Changed

The Act now prohibits driving with either 5 nanograms or more of...