If a food is not edible for human beings but is suitable for animal consumption, does it have the status of Muktzeh on Shabbat? The Halacha regarding such food depends on whether animals for which this food is edible are prevalent in the given society. Today, many people own dogs and cats as pets, and therefore food suitable for consumption by these animals would not be considered Muktzeh, even for a person who does not own a dog or cat. Thus, chicken bones left on one's plate, which are suitable as food for dogs, may be moved on Shabbat even by those who do not own a dog. Since dogs are prevalent, and the bones could be fed to a dog, one may move them on Shabbat. If a person has food that is suitable for consumption only by an animal that people in society generally do not own, he may not move it on Shabbat unless he happens to own that animal. Remnants of food that are inedible for all animals, such as pistachio shells and olive pits (assuming no fruit of the olive is still attached to the pit), are of course considered Muktzeh on Shabbat and may not be moved.

If a food is not edible for human beings but is suitable for animal consumption, does it have the status of Muktzeh on Shabbat? The Halacha regarding such food depends on whether animals for which this food is edible are prevalent in the given society. Today, many people own dogs and cats as pets, and therefore food suitable for consumption by these animals would not be considered Muktzeh, even for a person who does not own a dog or cat. Thus, chicken bones left on one's plate, which are suitable as food for dogs, may be moved on Shabbat even by those who do not own a dog. Since dogs are prevalent, and the bones could be fed to a dog, one may move them on Shabbat. If a person has food that is suitable for consumption only by an animal that people in society generally do not own, he may not move it on Shabbat unless he happens to own that animal. Remnants of food that are inedible for all animals, such as pistachio shells and olive pits (assuming no fruit of the olive is still attached to the pit), are of course considered Muktzeh on Shabbat and may not be moved.

The Status of Food Suitable Only for Animal Consumption With Respect to Muktzeh

The Torah prohibits an animal owned by a Jew to do work on Shabbat, even if the animal is rented or loaned to a non-Jew. Therefore, a Jew is permitted only to rent an animal to a non-Jew if he stipulates that the non-Jew will return the animal before Shabbat. The Shulhan Aruch (246:2) discusses a case in which the non-Jew violated the agreement and did not return the animal before Shabbat. The animal is liable to work on Shabbat and cause its owner to violate the prohibition. Maran says that the solution to this problem is to make the animal hefker, i.e. to relinquish ownership. By doing so, the non-Jew now owns the animal, and any work done is in the domain of the non-Jew. Maran says you can even execute the hefker, relinquishing of ownership, privately, without the presence of additional observers. This is similar to the hefker made before Pesach to dispose of hametz. The commentaries point out an internal contradiction in Maran’s opinion. How can Maran say that it is sufficient to do hefker privately, when he himself holds like the opinion of the Rambam that hefker is only valid when performed in front of a least one person? The Mahasit Ha’shekel (246:9) answers that, in principle, Maran does hold like the Rambam, that hefker requires at least one outside person. The presence of an additional person serves to publicize the transaction. However, in this case, even the Rambam would agree that there is no need for additional people, since everybody knows that his animal is in the domain of the non-Jew. They will therefore assume that he relinquished ownership rather than violate the Shabbat. The Rama gives another answer. Hefker requires the presence of additional people only when the owner’s intent is that someone else will come and take ownership of the item. In this case, the owner is only interested in removing his connection from the animal; he does not want the non-Jew to actually become the owner. Such a hefker does not require additional people. The Ben Ish Hai in his Torah Lishma deals with a case in which the non-Jew actually does take possession of the animal and refuses to return it to the Jew after Shabbat. The Ben Ish Hai provided a solution to this scenario. The Jew can take the non-Jew to a Rabbonc Court and sue him for the monetary loss of the animal incurred by the fact that the non-Jew did not return the animal before Shabbat as stipulated in the rental agreement. The court will rule that because he indirectly caused a loss, the Jew has license to take back the animal on his own-even using force. SUMMARY If a non-Jew does not return a rented animal before Shabbat, the Jewish owner should relinquish ownership of the animal, and this will take effect, even if done without the presence of additional people.

The Torah prohibits an animal owned by a Jew to do work on Shabbat, even if the animal is rented or loaned to a non-Jew. Therefore, a Jew is permitted only to rent an animal to a non-Jew if he stipulates that the non-Jew will return the animal before Shabbat. The Shulhan Aruch (246:2) discusses a case in which the non-Jew violated the agreement and did not return the animal before Shabbat. The animal is liable to work on Shabbat and cause its owner to violate the prohibition. Maran says that the solution to this problem is to make the animal hefker, i.e. to relinquish ownership. By doing so, the non-Jew now owns the animal, and any work done is in the domain of the non-Jew. Maran says you can even execute the hefker, relinquishing of ownership, privately, without the presence of additional observers. This is similar to the hefker made before Pesach to dispose of hametz. The commentaries point out an internal contradiction in Maran’s opinion. How can Maran say that it is sufficient to do hefker privately, when he himself holds like the opinion of the Rambam that hefker is only valid when performed in front of a least one person? The Mahasit Ha’shekel (246:9) answers that, in principle, Maran does hold like the Rambam, that hefker requires at least one outside person. The presence of an additional person serves to publicize the transaction. However, in this case, even the Rambam would agree that there is no need for additional people, since everybody knows that his animal is in the domain of the non-Jew. They will therefore assume that he relinquished ownership rather than violate the Shabbat. The Rama gives another answer. Hefker requires the presence of additional people only when the owner’s intent is that someone else will come and take ownership of the item. In this case, the owner is only interested in removing his connection from the animal; he does not want the non-Jew to actually become the owner. Such a hefker does not require additional people. The Ben Ish Hai in his Torah Lishma deals with a case in which the non-Jew actually does take possession of the animal and refuses to return it to the Jew after Shabbat. The Ben Ish Hai provided a solution to this scenario. The Jew can take the non-Jew to a Rabbonc Court and sue him for the monetary loss of the animal incurred by the fact that the non-Jew did not return the animal before Shabbat as stipulated in the rental agreement. The court will rule that because he indirectly caused a loss, the Jew has license to take back the animal on his own-even using force. SUMMARY If a non-Jew does not return a rented animal before Shabbat, the Jewish owner should relinquish ownership of the animal, and this will take effect, even if done without the presence of additional people.

If a Non-Jew Did Not Return a Rented Animal Before Shabbat

The Shulhan Aruch (Siman 247) discusses the delivery of mail by non-Jews on Shabbat. Is it permissible to drop a letter in a mailbox on Erev Shabbat, which will be delivered on Shabbat? The Shulhan Aruch establishes a clear rule: It is permitted, as long as the non-Jew is paid a fixed price and he was not instructed to deliver it specifically on Shabbat. If these conditions are met, it is considered that the non-Jew is working for himself, and it was his choice to deliver the letter on Shabbat. This principle can be applied to modern-day mail. The postage stamp is the fixed payment. When one puts the letter in a mailbox before Shabbat, he is not telling the non-Jew when to deliver it. Even though there is a sign on the mailbox that says it will be emptied on Shabbat, it is not a problem, since the Jew did not ask the non- Jew to deliver it on Shabbat. It does not make a difference to the Jew whether the mail carrier comes on Shabbat or Mosei Shabbat. Moreover, there are additional factors to be lenient. First, the non-Jew is coming not only for the letter of the Jew; he is coming because of the other letters in the mailbox as well. Also, he is not directly in the employ of the Jew; he has a salaried position working for the government. Therefore, it is clearly permissible to drop a letter in the mailbox before Shabbat. This is the opinion of the Shevut Yaakov in his responsa (2:42) and it is accepted by Hacham Ovadia and Hacham Ben Sion. This leniency applies also to leaving letters in the personal mailboxes of private homes, and not just public mailboxes. There is no issue of Marit Ayin, i.e. that an outside observer would think that the Jew gave the letter to the mail carrier on Shabbat. Everybody knows that postal workers walk onto the porch every single day of the week. However, it is prohibited to personally hand the mail carrier the letter on Shabbat. The Shulhan Aruch clearly rules (252:2) that a Jew cannot engage a non-Jew to do work on Shabbat, even for a fixed fee. It would also be a problem to raise the indicator flag of the mailbox on Friday. Actively calling the mail carrier’s attention to the letter is tantamount to asking him to pick up the letter on Shabbat. It would also be a problem to raise the flag on Shabbat in advance of placing letters after Shabbat. This would constitute Hachana-preparing for after Shabbat. SUMMARY It is permitted to place a letter in a mailbox that will be emptied on Shabbat. It is prohibited to hand a letter to a non-Jewish mail carrier on Shabbat.

The Shulhan Aruch (Siman 247) discusses the delivery of mail by non-Jews on Shabbat. Is it permissible to drop a letter in a mailbox on Erev Shabbat, which will be delivered on Shabbat? The Shulhan Aruch establishes a clear rule: It is permitted, as long as the non-Jew is paid a fixed price and he was not instructed to deliver it specifically on Shabbat. If these conditions are met, it is considered that the non-Jew is working for himself, and it was his choice to deliver the letter on Shabbat. This principle can be applied to modern-day mail. The postage stamp is the fixed payment. When one puts the letter in a mailbox before Shabbat, he is not telling the non-Jew when to deliver it. Even though there is a sign on the mailbox that says it will be emptied on Shabbat, it is not a problem, since the Jew did not ask the non- Jew to deliver it on Shabbat. It does not make a difference to the Jew whether the mail carrier comes on Shabbat or Mosei Shabbat. Moreover, there are additional factors to be lenient. First, the non-Jew is coming not only for the letter of the Jew; he is coming because of the other letters in the mailbox as well. Also, he is not directly in the employ of the Jew; he has a salaried position working for the government. Therefore, it is clearly permissible to drop a letter in the mailbox before Shabbat. This is the opinion of the Shevut Yaakov in his responsa (2:42) and it is accepted by Hacham Ovadia and Hacham Ben Sion. This leniency applies also to leaving letters in the personal mailboxes of private homes, and not just public mailboxes. There is no issue of Marit Ayin, i.e. that an outside observer would think that the Jew gave the letter to the mail carrier on Shabbat. Everybody knows that postal workers walk onto the porch every single day of the week. However, it is prohibited to personally hand the mail carrier the letter on Shabbat. The Shulhan Aruch clearly rules (252:2) that a Jew cannot engage a non-Jew to do work on Shabbat, even for a fixed fee. It would also be a problem to raise the indicator flag of the mailbox on Friday. Actively calling the mail carrier’s attention to the letter is tantamount to asking him to pick up the letter on Shabbat. It would also be a problem to raise the flag on Shabbat in advance of placing letters after Shabbat. This would constitute Hachana-preparing for after Shabbat. SUMMARY It is permitted to place a letter in a mailbox that will be emptied on Shabbat. It is prohibited to hand a letter to a non-Jewish mail carrier on Shabbat.

Mailing Letters That Will be Handled on Shabbat

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Daily Halacha by Rabbi Eli J. Mansour according the Sephardic laws and customs of Aram Soba.

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