Presidential management style, foreign policy preferences, and domestic political interests all affect the national security agenda. International crises, however, are particularly likely to garner the attention of the National Security Council. This podcast analyzes a novel data set of all the issues raised at National Security Council meetings from 1947 to 1993 and finds that contemporaneous crises are very likely to be discussed, but that crisis management attenuates the Council’s attention to noncrisis national security matters. The results suggest presidents focus on crises at the expense of other strategic matters, and they do so when political conditions favor crisis management.

Keywords: national security, presidency, international crises, political science, strategic studies

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I’m in the studio with Colonel Neil Snyder, author of “Tyranny of the Inbox: Managing the US National Security Agenda,” which was published in the Spring 2025 issue of Parameters.

Snyder is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Strategy at the US Army War College.

Let’s just go ahead and get started. You describe in your article how international crises dominate presidential attention, often at the expense of broader strategic issues. What are the long-term risks of this crisis-driven focus for US national security planning?

Colonel Neil Snyder

 If I could, maybe I’ll back up and just kind of start with my intuition and my curiosity and why I was doing this research at all.

And, it’s something that my guess is that many of the Parameters readers and [Decisive Point] listeners will relate to, which is the simple intuition that crises can dominate your life. When you are attending to crises, it seems to crowd out all of your other priorities, and I think leaders have this natural intuition whereby when you’re stating priorities, you’re actually talking about the things that . . . It’s a choice. You’re stating which you’re not going to do, what you’re going to defer or just table completely. And, I had this abiding curiosity of whether or not that was happening to us in the national security and strategy realm, too.

It’s kind of like this tyranny of the inbox where, maybe how you and I might manage our e-mail, where if you just answer every e-mail that comes in, in the order in which it comes in, it’s not exactly a dominant strategy for managing your e-mail, right? You’re not choosing to spend your time on those important messages—the ones from family or the ones about your bank accounts or something that might matter the most. You’re just sort of managing the flow that comes in. That tyranny of the inbox can happen two ways—[by] attending to the things that are unimportant or, alternatively, focusing on only the most urgent thing that popped into your inbox at the expense of everything else that might matter to you.

Eisenhower had this concept of Eisenhower’s window [The Eisenhower Matrix]. I’m sure many of the readers have seen it, where it’s this matrix, a two by two of the urgent versus the important. And, I kind of had this intuition that, in the national security world, we focus almost exclusively on the things that are urgent and important to the expense of those things that are important but not urgent.

And, I wondered whether that was actually true or not. So, my curiosity started [not] with a question of whether or not [but] how the US relates to the world. And how we manage national security is affected by a kind of crisis myopia by which we are exclusively attentive to national security [issues] that are urgent. And so, it’s a matter of almost strategic discipline, which is a phrase, a term of art, that we hear a lot now, which is to say, do we have the discipline to attend to a broad range of topics, to have a breadth of our national security agenda, or do we sacrifice that breadth to attend to crises?

And it’s a dilemma—like, we can’t not deal with crises—that’s the nature of a crisis. It’s urgent. It’s a high stakes, [and includes] high risk of use of military force. How do you not deal with that? And that, I see, as a kind of persistent problem. And so, my research is on the presidency. I look at all the presidential national security meetings from 1947 to 1993, the entirety of the Cold War, using primary-source records. And I looked at the post–National Security Council (NSC) meeting accounts of what topics they looked at—so, issues or topics that actually got [a] president’s attention in formal meetings of the NSC. And I looked for patterns, and I used a kind of algorithmic, computational text analysis to figure out whether or not those topics dealt with contemporaneous crises—things that were happening at that time—or other national security issues.

And, I had a few expectations. One is, I thought style would matter, that presidents would vary. You know, Johnson did his Tuesday lunch clubs, whereas Eisenhower had large numbers of very formal NSC meetings. And Nixon was different. He chose to centralize things with Kissinger. And Reagan was certainly different. So, style matters. Every president would likely have different policy views and preferences and preference for either formal meetings or not, and that would determine whether or not they held meetings at all and whether or not they were attending to crises a lot when they did so.

The second expectation I had was that conditions kind of matter. So, I had previously written a piece, in an academic journal called Presidential Studies Quarterly, which basically showed that NSC meetings become more likely during crisis periods. And so, not only do crises drive attention to national security, generally, because of linked threats, [for example] a crisis in the East might have impacts on security interests elsewhere because of forced trade-offs and these kinds of things. You know, the conditions themselves could drive interest in national security, but the problem with it is that those conditions that cause presidents to pay attention to things can invoke the threat of opportunity costs that, just by taking on an issue, it may trigger public opposition, congressional opposition, Congress may have partisan differences or policy differences with the president over an issue, or perhaps, alternatively, may simply use the opportunity of a president taking on an issue to take the opposite position for horse trading.

And so, you know, when presidents are choosing whether to answer that e-mail in the inbox or not, what they’re actually doing is choosing whether to take resources on or to use resources to take on an issue and potentially overcome congressional opposition. And so, what are the risks, you ask, like, what are the long-term risks of a crisis-driven focus for US national security planning?

Well, if we come back to [a] president’s logic about why they would take things on, they have incentives to deal with crises because it’s a chance for policy gains or political gains, potentially, but also, it comes with a cost. And so, that calculus in my data seems to suggest that presidents are particularly likely to take on crises, and that when they do so, they pay less attention to all other topics.

The president is the most powerful person in the world [and] has a massive range of national security issues that presidents deal with. The challenge of that is that when you focus on one thing, the Ukraine today, the Taiwan today, the Gaza today, you’re not doing the other things. And so, the risk is agenda breadth. The long view tends to suffer.

We tend to get crisis myopia, and it’s a question of how this gets extrapolated over time. In an era when crises are particularly prevalent, what we likely see is that attention to all other things drops off, and that compounds over time as crises last longer and become more frequent, which really reduces our strategic breadth. That’s concerning. It’s concerning for me when I can’t manage my e-mail, and it should be concerning for everybody else who would want our national security system to have a really broad view—because Americans have lots of interests.

Host

How do domestic political dynamics shape the way presidents prioritize national security issues? How about an example for the audience?

Snyder

I’m a social scientist by training. My work isn’t commentary. It’s certainly not a commentary on partisan positions or polarization or anything like that in a contemporary environment. And I’m speaking to data from the Cold War. So, it’s largely retrospective. But what my take is, is that I focus on institutions and incentives. Kind of the way I was describing it earlier is that when presidents make a choice to chart an agenda, they’re taking on issues, and the simple choice of taking on issues is also the choice to take on opposition or to take on the resource costs necessary to either drum up public support for an issue or drum up elite support for an issue or overcome elite opposition to an issue.

You ask, like, what is the domestic political dimension that’s affecting this? Well, my view is that the domestic and the foreign are not separate [and] that [a] president’s decision making is conditional both on international conditions (like crises) and also on the array of partisan forces through our institutions—be that in Congress, in the House and Senate, or [in] the potential for bureaucratic opposition within the executive branch agencies, which has its own kind of bureaucratic domestic politics. The institutions, the separation of power system, the shared power system between Congress and the presidency for certain national security instruments, creates these incentives for political actors on different sides to force negotiations. And those negotiations affect [a] president’s calculus of whether to take on certain issues, and that’s absolutely what the data bears out, that we see attentiveness to crises varies with whether or not the president’s co-partisans are in control of Congress.

So, we can think about it in simple terms. If my friends are in charge over in Congress, they’re probably not going to vote against me, and they probably have policy preferences that are like mine.

So, if I’m considering whether to take on an issue that I have beliefs about, I’m going to feel safer doing it knowing that the costs are going to be less if my friends are in charge. Whereas, if it’s [a] divided government where the opposition owns or has control of all or part of Congress, then you’re going to see substantial difference where they may be less likely to do things.

Host

Do you have an example that you can give us?

Snyder

I like to draw back to good historical examples. The one I use in the paper is [President Harry S.] Truman. President Truman ends World War II. We think of him as a great president. He assumed office after [Franklin D. Roosevelt’s] death. You know, he’s the one and only person in human history to have employed nuclear weapons to end a war. [He was], like, this great president.

Well, by 1948, things were not going well for him. So, [in] the spring of ’48, he’s got his partisan opposition in control of Congress—the Republicans. He was a Democrat. The Republicans had control of Congress. His approval ratings in the spring of ’48 were super low. They were below 40 percent for the whole of the spring. His party was going to force him to a convention to get the party nomination for his reelection in the fall of ’48, so he knew that, come June, July of ’48, he was going to have to drum up party support to stay in office.

He was in this very precarious position at home, where his attention was, by some accounts, focused on his own political fortunes and not getting voted out of office as this great president who won World War II.

Then there’s the Soviets. The dawn of the Cold War. There was a conflict, [a] competition, over what would happen with Berlin. And, in June of ’48, the Soviets blockaded Berlin and, eventually, we had the Berlin Airlift and all of these things that everybody knows about [like] American pilots bravely dropping candy to kids over Berlin. Well, the question is, how did Truman deal with the situation? That crisis seized the government. I mean, we considered a forcible ground option to penetrate Soviet defenses and retake Berlin, like, essentially reopening World War II—the endgame of World War II.

We considered nuclear strikes in the period of the crisis. Truman ends up holding something like 25 different National Security Council meetings on the issue, 16 of which, I believe, were about Berlin itself or related to Berlin. The question is, did his domestic weakness cause him to be more (or less) attentive?

In the article, I don’t call the case.

I’m using this case to stimulate curiosity because there seems to be a real intuition from Truman’s case that it probably did. In fact, [the] chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time, the first chairman, Omar Bradley, in his retrospective memoir, essentially criticized the president for being too attentive to domestic politics instead of the crisis, which is a pretty damning indictment.

I’m interested in patterns like how did this play out over the entirety of the Cold War? And my intuition and the data [seem] to say that domestic politics really, really matters, which is striking. Like, you would think that we would attend to international crises because of the crisis and security stakes, not because of domestic politics. But that’s not what the data shows—that, in fact, presidents sometimes don’t take these things on simply because of the domestic political costs involved.

Host

Given the centrality of the National Security Council, what reforms or practices could help ensure the NSC maintains strategic breadth even during periods of intense crisis?

Snyder

I have more recent personal experience with the National Security Council in the last few years, but that’s not the topic of the research, and I’m certainly not commenting on current things, but I think there are some lessons.

Right?

So, what we see is that over the course of the Cold War, foreign policy and national security issues [became] increasingly centralized at the White House. And, in fact, this was by design. There was a debate after World War II about what presidents need to manage US security, now that the US was this leading global power. We equipped the president with the National Security Council, and that has multiple things that help the president maintain some breadth, thing one is the system itself. So, presidential meetings of the National Security Council are but one feature of what we call the Scowcroft [Model] for the NSC. So, you have presidential meetings, and you have principals’ meetings—which are the cabinet officials and the adviser—without the president present. You have deputy’s meetings. You have interagency policy coordinating committees and sub IPCs, and they’ve got different names, but all of those structures allow attention to national security matters, even with the president not in every meeting. Thing one—how do we get strategic depth is the system itself is fairly resilient.

Thing, two, is the NSC staff. Now, the staff size is varied—and it sometimes includes lots of professionals—sometimes lots of detailees from the departments and agencies. That system ensures that the president has access to experts who have topical focus areas and [that] they're maintaining the work on that portfolio throughout the administration.

And the third part is the WHSR, the White House Situation Room, the nerve center for the NSC with communications and access to intelligence and information to inform decision making and figure out what issues ought to surface.

These structural features have really evolved over time. And, you know, today what you see is that these structures allow the NSC to have a lot of breadth, bearing in mind that the limiting factor is that there’s only one president. If there are certain hard issues that [are] truly urgent and important that need to go to the president for direction or decision, there can only be one, so to speak. And so, that is a chokepoint. And that is a feature of the system by design. The president can only do so many things.

Host

You mention that inattention to non-crisis issues may contribute to strategic decline. Can you give us some examples where deferred issues later escalated into crises, and maybe how better agenda management might have changed outcomes?

Snyder

 In the paper, from a pure science perspective and in terms of methodology, I’m applying a method of looking at the topics that are raised over time. And so, it’s really, really difficult to draw the different continuities between different kinds of topics. And so, it’s difficult to know whether there’s a shadow cast forward or cast after crisis periods, which is to say, social scientists will struggle to know whether or not inattention or attention today—because the US is so powerful and has so many capabilities—might prompt crises later, or not.

So, in fact, there’s a problem of endogeneity and the rigorous way of saying it where, like, “what I do today might affect whether or not there’s a crisis that I have to attend to later, which might lead to crisis myopia later (or not),” and that’s difficult to untangle. And, I’m careful in the article to recognize the limits of what the data can tell us.

And so, I don’t want to extrapolate beyond my support, too much, but what I will comment on is that the NSC deals with a massive range of issues. For example, today, it might be about space policy or cyber biotechnology, quantum computing, general artificial intelligence, or all kinds of other issues that can get securitized or brought into the national security domain when any of the world's issues could be the president’s issues and could get on the table. Then certain crises—like an ongoing war, Arab-Israeli conflict in the ’60s and ’70s, [and the] ’50s, crises over the Taiwan Strait—when those things demand attention in the immediate, what happens, and what you see in the data, is that those topics take on a certain weight, a certain frequency of attention during the crisis, and then, after. There’s this lagged effect. And, in general, NSCs only deal with so many topics per meeting, they can only cover so much, and these are complex, thorny issues, and the NSC is a forum for deliberation. These are hard topics.

What we see is that when we attend to crises, there’s this current and then downstream effect. And, I’ve looked at this several different ways. I’ve looked at it through the lens of meetings themselves, which is what the paper is about. I’ve also looked at it through national security directives to see if the types of guidance that [come] out of the NSC to the government drops off about certain topics after a crisis, and the answer is there’s some evidence that it does.

Essentially, these crises cause a massive drop off across everything that's noncrisis. And so, you asked, “Can you give an example of a particular issue that's deferred?” My answer is actually that it’s not a particular issue. It’s all the issues that get deferred. That becomes the all-consuming challenge that we should be worried about. That, when all things that I should be paying attention to, I don’t, well, we have a problem. That’s the problem with strategic breadth that I’m talking about—I mean, agenda breadth, the scope of things that we could look at as the most prosperous, secure, powerful country in the world. We have a big agenda, and we should. And the question is, how do we manage that? And if we’re only managing today’s problems, are we living up to American’s expectations for what we should be doing to care for their security?

And, I have questions about that.

Host

In today’s environment of simultaneous crises—Ukraine, Gaza, Taiwan—how can the United States walk and chew gum strategically?

Snyder

Going into my research, I had this intuition, and maybe it’s because I was inspired by some great historians that I’ve been mentored by over the years, that if there was going to be a one period of American history when we could look back and say the US had great strategic breadth and vision, I would have thought early Cold War, you know, [for example] Eisenhower, [and] the birth of the NSC. He was known for having used it very effectively.

And even during that period of time, you see crisis myopia, where the presidents get drawn into these things and can’t escape the dilemma of paying attention to the urgent and important at the expense of everything else. Today, crises are perhaps more prevalent. And if you believe that we are in a kind of a new multipolar world where balance-of-power strategies are becoming more prevalent, then [the] contemporary environment, along with media attention and the ability for the information environment to hype or kind of inflate risk perceptions in crisis conditions, I think that the dilemma is probably getting worse.

Our current conditions may exacerbate the idea of crisis myopia. And so, if I were to predict, and I’m not really, in the paper, speaking off the cuff, I think that we may see NSC processes that become increasingly affected by crisis myopia. So, increasing centralization to the White House plus this information environment plus domestic discord plus media creates all kinds of incentives for continued crisis myopia. And what might that mean? Well, sadly, it may mean that we may be entering into a period of continued or persistent crisis myopia where we’re not really able to look long, and that is going to have potentially negative consequences.

Host

So, maybe extending that thought a little bit, we do need to wrap it up. Do you have any concluding thoughts or takeaways?

Snyder

I think the obvious question is, like, how do you get out of the dilemma? And so, woe be it from me as just a lowly professor at the [US Army] War College, to try to, like, offer advice to presidents about how to solve this.

But I think, as a leader in the Army, I think to myself to remind leaders that taking on issues is a choice you’re making a choice. It should be a thoughtful, reasoned choice. And you ought to be careful about what you’re choosing to defer and how you delegate [and] who you empower to do other things so that many things can happen simultaneously.

And, I guess the last thing I would say, [is that] maybe we should extend our national security leaders some grace [and] be cognizant of the huge burden that they bear and that they’re facing these dilemmas. The weight of their responsibility is massive, and it likely takes a toll on them as people across the organization. And, maybe we should just give them some grace and recognize that there are these strong forces that condition them and that lead them to focus on crises and limit their worldview.

Host

What a great point to end on. Thank you.

Listeners, you can read the genesis article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 55, issue 1. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

Dr. Shang-Su Wu and Dr. Collin Koh discuss the ties between the Philippines and Taiwan and how the Philippines would be affected in a conflict between Taiwan and China. Their discussion also delves into topics such as military modernization in the Philippines and US involvement in the Philippines.

Keywords: Philippines, Taiwan, China, Philippine-Taiwan relations, security, military modernization

Disclaimer: This transcript has been edited for clarity.

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Joining me virtually today are Dr. Shang-Su Wu and Dr. Collin Koh. Wu is the author of “The Philippines’ Security in the Face of China's Rising Threats,” which was published in the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters. He's an assistant professor and research coordinator in the Homeland Security Program at Rabdan Academy in Abu Dhabi.

Koh is [a] senior fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) based in Nanyang Technological University. He primarily researches maritime security and naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific region, focusing on Southeast Asia.

Welcome to Decisive Point.

Dr. Shang-Su Wu

Thank you

Dr. Collin Koh

Thank you

Host

Tell me about the security connection between the Philippines and Taiwan. What are the likely scenarios that might play out in Taiwan, and how would these different scenarios impact the Philippines?

Wu

Generally, if China wants to use force against Taiwan, there's probably two most likely scenarios. The one is a blockade, then another—of course, after a blockade or certain fire projection—[is to] try to eventually do the invasion. So, deployment of the US military near to Taiwan, no matter in Okinawa or in the Philippines, they [are a] dilemma [for] China because China, on the one hand, if they want to constrain the conflict [bilaterally], just go straight. Yes, they would not like to attack, but on the other hand, that means their flanks are opened for the intervention for the attack. On the other hand, if you want to extend the conflict, then, of course, the scale will be much bigger, the outcome will be much worse, or the risk much higher. In that case, they have to pay very [close] attention on military deployments.

And, in the past, of course, the Philippines remained less relevant because most invasion [scenarios] remain focused on Taipei, the northern part of Taiwan. So, Japan’s side will be important, but nowadays, if they are doing a blockade (of course, if they are surrounding the island), they would also [employ] the longer range of the weapon systems for the munitions.

So, even the northern part [of Taiwan] would be under the firepower [deployed from] the Philippines. That’s why the US military deployment in the Philippine would matter a lot. But, on the other hand, the Philippines have various weakness. The one weakness is their armed forces haven’t been modernized since, generally, between the 1980s to the 2000s or early 2010s. So nowadays, their capability is still weak, especially compared to China. And, you know, they have the maritime disputes over various islands, and China may use that to press the Philippines. Another issue is [that] the Philippines likes to export the labor force for their economy. And in Taiwan, they [have] at least 154,000 Filipino workers. China may use these people as a kind of hostage to threaten the Philippines. And in 2003, the Philippines quit Operation Iraqi Freedom [because] al-Qaeda threatened the Filipino workers overseas, and there could be a similar situation [in Taiwan someday]. So, that makes the US deployment in the Philippines, and overall, the security connection with Taiwan, significant.

Koh

Yes, thank you. I think, first of all, allow me to first comment [compliment], Shang-Su, on the new publication. Congratulations. And, it's a great honor to be here to share about what I feel to be the security connection between the Philippines and Taiwan.

This is a very timely discussion we are having because the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] Eastern Theater Command started a whole new series of [exercises], and one of the itineraries that was being exercised was the blockade [in] some parts of the waters around Taiwan.

As Shang-Su has rightly pointed out, in the past, it used to be that the invasion would have focused on the northern part of Taiwan—and particularly around Taipei. I do understand that there is still an emphasis on the defense around the Tan-shui River area, but now, given that the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) has been maneuvering more frequently around Taiwan, it's not [an] “around Taiwan” issue. So, the conception has all changed. The south of Taiwan, which is right close to the doorstep of the northern Philippines, has become increasingly more saliant. The Bashi Channel, which is the channel—the waterway—just in between southern Taiwan and northern Philippines, is a key waterway for the transit of various forces, not just for the PLA, but also for US and Allied forces. So, it will be a contested waterway in times of conflict, and the Philippines will find it rather difficult to stay out of it completely. So that's one.

Second is with the [Ferdinand] Marcos Jr. administration, in recent times, there has been a boost to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the two countries. Under this agreement [signed in 2014], which is, in fact, dated all the way back to the late [Benigno Aquino III] administration, there [have] been moves to reinvigorate the bases and other access arrangements centering around [the] northern Philippines. Those exercises that we see, for example, [in the] exercise Balikatan, they actually have a focus on the northern area of the Philippines in mind, and that actually has Taiwan right in the crosshairs without being them actually naming Taiwan as the area of focus.

But, clearly, the intent is to boost the forces—both the American forces and the Philippine forces—to deal with a Taiwan contingency. So, whether or not the Philippines like it or otherwise, being involved in some way or another in a Taiwan Strait conflict might be a higher possibility these days. I remember Marcos Jr. did mention that it will be inevitable for the Philippines to be involved in one way or another.

The question here is: If the US has to be involved in direct combat operations around Taiwan, and if the Philippines would opt to stay out of direct combat operations around Taiwan, then it would mean that the Philippine forces will have to take on the primary mantle of safeguarding its waters in the South China Sea. And that, in itself, is going to be a tall order for the Philippines, as Shang-Su rightly pointed out. The armed forces of the Philippines is still currently in the midst of modernization, and there is much to be done before they become a more credible deterrent force going forward.

Host

Regarding the balance of forces, what impact does America’s involvement in the Philippines and Taiwan have vis-à-vis China’s threat?

Wu

Because [of] the Philippines very limited capability—there’s just one squadron of fighter jets and, and maybe it will expand to four very soon, this year—[it] has a very limited capability to defend itself. So, if the armed conflict happened—and in the Philippines—then US detachments would have to shoulder most [of the] responsibility of the missions because the Philippines itself only can protect very key locations, very few—even [in] most of [its] territory.

Regarding this imbalance, of course, we have to mention [the] Philippines since 2012, because the Scarborough Shoal incident, they indeed put the effort into modernization, but unfortunately, they face China, the quickest expanding (or military increasing), the rising power. So, [the] Philippines’ effort compared to China is very limited. It’s very insufficient. So, if anything, the US will play a very key factor [in bringing] balance. But, on the other hand, it also means the US knows [it has] to handle different locations—so, how [many forces the US can provide to the] Philippine regarding defense—and that will be challenging.

Koh

If I could chime in quickly on that. Shang-Su, you rightly pointed out the current modernizational challenges faced by the AFP—the Armed Forces of the Philippines—and, I think one thing to also point out is that the Philippines, as an archipelagic state, has multiple maritime areas of interest. And, given that it doesn’t just have the West Philippine Sea, which is the area within the South China Sea that they claim under their sovereignty and jurisdiction, other than the West Philippine Sea, we have also the eastern seaboard of the Philippines, which, of course, [centers] around what they call the Philippine Rise, which is an underwater submerged feature that is considered resource rich. And not to mention that there are key waterways that run through the Philippine archipelago that actually allow access right into the open western Pacific Ocean. Now, one example would be that in recent times we have seen PLA Navy ships actually transiting some of those waterways, for example, the Basilan Strait, which is in the southern part of the Philippines. And, it also could mean that in wartime, those waterways could be contested, largely because the Philippine armed forces on its own might be unable to, in fact, police effectively those waterways, much less to even think about defending them in times of war.

So, it will really depend on the US, but what I do tend to see is that the war in Ukraine might actually offer some very important lessons. For example, Ukraine was derided as having no Navy to talk about. But Ukraine—with the help of Western, primarily US, intelligence and other [types] of support—was, in fact, able to deal a blow to the Russian Black Sea fleet with the sinking of the flagship Moskva soon after conflict broke out in Ukraine. I believe, using this model, the Philippines might be able to stand a chance in at least dealing a blow to Chinese forces in certain parts of its archipelago. But, it goes without saying that the armed forces of the Philippines remain pretty limited when it comes to capacity, especially when we are talking about a long-drawn sustained conflict over a period of time.

Host

What do our listeners need to know about the Philippines’ military modernization?

Wu

Before the 1960s, it took the lead in Southeast Asia because of the ties under the [US-Philippines Mutual] Defense Treaty with the US, and also the US military deployment, then also during the Cold War context. So, [the] Philippines received a certain kind of capability [to] build out the Navy and the Air Force, but during later 1960, when their insurgency happened, they [were mostly at] war. And in war, that means the external [issues like modernization for] the Navy [and] Air Force generally were [considered] secondary development. And, of course, [because of these circumstances, it] turned out their Navy, until [the]2010s, didn’t have any [missiles].  

So, the defense fell behind other countries, and especially after the [Ferdinand] Marcos Sr. regime collapsed in1986. More of the internal turmoil made the military modernization even worse. Then, following the US closing of [its] bases, they found their resources could not handle [the requirements of] modernization. So, overall, they lay behind—not just compared to China [but] compared to all the other Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, United Malaysia. They fell much behind [the] others.

So, from the Scarborough Shoal [incident of] 2012, because they proved then their overall capability, China is really too [much for the Philippines to] even maintain [a] forcing presence. So, they started to modernize [and] started to build back against the [Chinese] build up—build back the capability. But a build-back capability based on the Philippines financial capacity is limited. It is still at a slow pace. Then, of course, also, from 2012 until now, they have [had] three different administrations. And in the Philippines, every presidency will have a different approach [regarding defense spending]. So, the route—I can’t say it is very zigzag, but of course, it won’t [be the same as what] all the less strong efforts like Vietnam or other South Asian country will have done. So, this is relatively less than just, unfortunately, their territorial contest. And now, with the location with regarding Taiwan facing China, [it gives] them much more, much heavier pressure.

Host

Collin, do you have anything to add?

Koh

Yes, very interesting. Shang-Su rightly pointed out [that] this evolution of the Philippines’ security conception and threat perceptions over time, much of it, of course, has to do with the fact that right into the 1990s, all the way into the early 2000s, the priority has always been on internal security. I mean, look, there has been a militant threat in the post–9/11 environment. The militant threat actually magnified in the Philippines, especially around the southern Philippines, in particular. The Philippines was also facing a communist insurgency. So, much of the emphasis had been on internal security [rather] than on external security.

Those presidencies that existed back then, talking about the [Joseph] Estrada administration, before that was the [Fidel V.] Ramos administration. They have largely been looking more inwards than outwards, and that, thereby, means that over time, despite what happened in 1990s with the first flare-up on the South China Sea, with the Philippines centering around Mischief Reef, in fact, there was more of a conception that, you know, that wasn’t so much a big problem. But, dealing with internal threats from communist insurgents and militants will take precedence, and there has always often been a somewhat, I call, fatalistic defeatist type of thinking that there’s no point or very little meaning in trying to build up the armed forces with a credible deterrent capability because there’s no way the Philippines is able to fight a war with China anyway, so don’t waste time on that.

So, now it all changed last year because now, with Marcos Jr., he has adopted a more assertive stance on the South China Sea issue, together, backed up by a very supportive congress [of the Philippines], and we are going to look at what’s going to happen with the midterm election in the Philippines and, of course, a largely supportive population that backs up the administration’s South China Sea policy, its approach on China, as well as the modernization of the Philippines’ military. The problem here is funding is short. At the same time, the armed forces of Philippines is starting from a pretty low base—the low base that actually was frozen since the 1960s [and] ’70s ’til now. So, the base was so low that any modernization effort has to be not just sustained, but it does require a lot more effort in trying to, sort of, match up various aspects—air, naval, land, cyber, and other domains as well.

Host

Is there another really important factor as it relates to Taiwan, the Philippines, and China that you want to touch on?  

Wu

All I want to add [is] as previously mentioned about the Philippine overseas labor in Taiwan, that this issue, so far, is, I think, still very hard to solve. And [regarding] the military modernization for the Philippines—just as Collin mentioned—there is this huge gap, but on the other hand, it’s [about] the profits. There’s no shortcut. Of course, if [the] US [has a] large military deployment [to the area], they [might] show up very quickly [and fill] the gap. Another thing [is that] the Philippines may not politically accept [going] back to the Cold War era. So, what they do is still their modernization and, if possible, they [can] adjust their own overseas labor deployment or, overall, the labor distribution around the major market may help. And, either way, [it] won’t be fast.

But, on the other hand, there's probably no other solution, so they have to take this slow pattern. Then, the US and the other [allies or partners] for the Philippines probably only can just assist them because as long as the Philippines [builds itself] better [and prepares] better, it will lower the cost and then lower the burden on others and also [generate] a more confident or credible attitude to face the challenge.

Koh

Yeah, I will quickly chime in on what Shang-Su has shared, but I will focus more on what probably hasn’t been so much touched on, namely the security or, rather, informal security relationship between Taiwan and the Philippines.

The Philippines has officially embraced a One China policy, and there is no way of publicizing much of those interactions between the two militaries. But, first of all, we have to highlight that the answer of those arrangements that actually existed, for example, the two countries’ coast guards actually police the Balintang Channel—and, of course, that is part of the Bashi Channel in itself—over fishery operations. There have been instances of illegal fishing that took place across the waterways from time to time. Having the two coast guards coordinate and at least engage in some form of communications with each other is, in fact, a good thing to have. And, that might actually potentially form the basis of any potential wartime strategic coordination, if necessary. So that is one.

Second is that between the two navies—at least from an earlier Philippine report—there was an instance where the Taiwanese navy and the Philippine navy engaged in some form at-sea interaction, practicing the core unplanned encounters at sea, or queues, that came about more than 10 years ago with the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. Though these two navies practiced queues during their interaction, which, while it might be minor, I tend to see it as, again, one type of interaction that could serve as a basis for future operational cooperation between the two forces in terms of contingencies that concern both entities.

Host

Shang-Su, last word to you. Do you have any closing comments or a rebuttal to Collin?

Wu

Okay, the final spot probably is not about the Philippines [but] something with [Taiwan] because [for] Taiwan, the external focus has always been on the US and China. I mean Southeast Asia, yes, they mentioned the ostensible policy, but [it is] still quite limited, especially like the bilateral relations with the Philippines, especially after 2013 because there [was] a fishing incident. But I think further engagement [has] to improve—we can see [that relations between] Japan and Taiwan improved quite much in the last decades, but I think the  Philippines have a lot of potential in Taiwan—and Taiwan [in the Philippines] (both sides) regarding the coordination of certain kinds—at least the mutual understanding that could be improved.

Koh

I guess it is important to look at, from the standpoint of the Philippines, that engagement in any future conflict over Taiwan is going to be a very tricky calculation for Manila because, on the one hand, there is, of course, the obligation that the Philippines has to fulfill as a treaty ally to the US under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty [United States-Japan Security] . But on the other hand, clearly, you know, there are interests that Manila could not ignore, and that will be, of course, the South China Sea interest [and] concerns that if the Philippines is involved one way or another that it will be possibly embroiled in a conflict in the South China Sea with China. In other words, the Taiwan Strait conflict, right, may potentially expand into a larger conflict that involves the South China Sea that the Philippines will have to be involved [in] directly.

So, therefore, I think there is quite a bit of soul searching on the part of Manila when it comes to future planning. But with the military exercises from the PRC [People’s Republic of China] around Taiwan, now the armed forces of the Philippines has instructed the Northern Luzon Command, which is [all] the command that is, in fact, you know, centering on the northern part of the, of the archipelago itself, telling the command to start to prepare for any future Taiwan contingency. So, right now, as we see, there is now serious talk about what the contingency is like. Very possibly, we won’t see that plan that will transpire, but what I tend to see is the Philippines slightly calibrating its involvement in any future Taiwan conflict going forward.

Host

It’s been a real pleasure talking with you both. Thank you so much for making time to speak with me today.

Koh

Thank you, Stephanie. Thank you, Shang-Su.

Wu

Thank you, Collin. Thank you, Stephanie.

Host

Listeners, you can read the genesis article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 4. There will also be a link to the article in the show notes. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

In this episode, authors Dr. Michael Fitzpatrick and Dr. Hugo Harvey-Valdés compare the transatlantic partnerships between the United States and West Germany in the 1970s, the US and South Korea in the 1970s and 80s, and the US and Chilean armies’ relations in the 1960s. They discuss the successes and struggles of those partnerships and the strengths and limits of American influence during these time periods.

Keywords: history, partnerships, Cold War, Post-Cold War, Federal Republic of Germany, South Korea, Chile, foreign policy, defense industry, political indoctrination

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m speaking remotely today with Hugo Harvey-Valdés and Michael Fitzpatrick. Both were authors of articles featured in the Historical Studies forum in the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters.

Dr. Hugo Harvey-Valdés, full professor and researcher at the University of Los Americas Santiago, held a variety of field and academic positions during 27 years of active military service before retiring in December 2020. He is the author of “Allies, Partners, or Puppets: American and Chilean Armies, 1961–69.”

Dr. Michael Fitzpatrick is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and supports the Defense POW-MIA Accounting Agency. Fitzpatrick wrote “Korea, Germany, and the Arsenal of Democracy.”

Welcome to Decisive Point. Thank you for joining me.

Michael Fitzpatrick

Thank you for having me.

Hugo Harvey-Valdés

I appreciate the invitation. Thanks a lot for having me.

Host

What drew you to study these particular aspects of US foreign military policy?

Fitzpatrick

I was drawn to this subject because I think the relationship between the US and its allies is so important to the crafting of contemporary foreign policy. I think, in the last several presidential administrations, Americans have really tried to reconsider their alliance relationships. And, I think that the actual mechanics of these relationships are often understudied in the historiography.

And, I think that this is such an important subject and an interesting subject because I see a lot of overlap between the West German situation in the 1970s and the South Korean situation. The strategic outlook in both of those regions is very similar. And yet, American policy and American actions in those countries—and the result of American policy and action in those countries—is often radically different. And so, this creates an interesting opportunity for study and an interesting opportunity for comparison.

Host

Hugo, what was your inspiration?

Harvey-Valdés

When I was working on my doctoral dissertation that was about President [Eduardo Frei Montalva’s] foreign policy between 1964 and 1970, I analyzed many declassified documents from the United States and Chile, which showed that Chile was not above its state—I mean that Chile didn’t follow the US guidelines in foreign or domestic policy. Despite the millions of dollars that Frei Montalva received from economic aid plans and that supported his presidential campaign in his first years in office.

Then, I asked myself, “If the politicians developed independently, why would the military have faithfully followed US demands?”   

Furthermore, in my own exchanges and training with the US Army, I never felt any intention to influence or ideologize my military thought.

Therefore, I realized that there was a need to reassess prevailing narratives that have depicted the relations between American and Chilean armies during the Cold War, especially during [the] Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

Host

Michael, give us an overview of US military involvement in Korea and Germany. What were the strategic priorities in each case, and what time frame are we talking about here?

Fitzpatrick

So, the time frame of the article is actually quite broad. I started looking at the immediate post-war and the onset of the Cold War through to the current day. But particularly, I like to focus on the period of the 1960s, ’70s, and ’80s, which I think is a very dynamic period in the three-party alliance. The strategic priorities, generally, are very similar, I think, between South Korea and West Germany. Both countries were divided. East and West in the case of Germany [and] North and South in the case of Korea. The American allies in each country, their allied nations, were confronted by kind of aggressive neighbor states on the border, who looked to, at some point in the ambiguous far future, to try and end this artificial division and bring Marxist Leninism to these divided situations.

So, for the United States, deterrence is an incredibly important component of their strategic outlook in these regions. Third, in the case of both divided situations, both sides of the division were backed by outside superpowers. The United States backed West Germany and South Korea, China backed North Korea, and the Soviet Union backed East Germany. And so, there was a tremendous amount of outside military aid, economic aid—support that flowed into these divided situations—which only exacerbated inflamed tensions. So ultimately, I would argue in both cases that the US pursues a policy of deterrence, and they focus on maintaining the status quo in each country—that they prefer the status quo situation rather than some kind of very violent attempts to realize it.

The issue for American foreign policy, and I would love to talk about this more, is that in Germany the status quo for most of the period that we’re talking about is a pretty positive one. Germany remains democratic. It remains committed to the kind of government that’s created in the aftermath of World War II and is committed to a very specific interpretation of the aftermath of World War II. But in South Korea, particularly once you get into the 1960s and ’70s, the situation is undemocratic. There are significant problems in South Korea. And so, American commitment to the status quo in South Korea actually becomes very problematic to South Korean politics.

Host

How was US military assistance to Chile in the 1960s different from Korea and Germany?

Harvey-Valdés

US military assistance to Chile, during the 1960s, contrasted a lot with its relationships with Korea and Germany. While the US involvement in Korea and Germany included three kinds of relations—extensive long-term military alliances, operational developments, and joint technological developments—US and Chilean interactions remained just educational and professional. Military exchanges with Chile involved mainly training and limited equipment transfers.

In fact, when the United States sold weapons to Chile within the Mutual Assistance Pact, in order to give stabilization within the region, similar equipment was transferred to neighboring countries [such] as Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. Furthermore, US policy toward Chile was a joint effort complementing civilian-driven economic initiatives like the Alliance for Progress.

Host

What determined whether the United States treated a country as an ally, partner, or puppet?

Harvey-Valdés

The distinction between what was considered an ally, partner, or puppet rested on the degree of autonomy first and then, the mutual benefits perceived by both countries. In Chile’s case, the relationship reflected mutual professional interests rather than a mere subordination. My research shows that Chile maintained significant autonomy in decisions regarding military cooperation, and these were always made by civilian authorities [and], thus, aligned with Chilean foreign policy.

Chile’s refusal to fully support US policies during the Cuban Missile Crisis and then, during the Dominican Republic intervention in 1965, reinforced this position as a sovereign partner, rather than being a recipient or a puppet state. The nature of the relationship was based on the willingness and then capacity of recipient nations to exercise independent decision making.

Host

Was military aid meant to build independence or was it a tool for American influence in Korea and Germany?

Fitzpatrick

The historian’s answer is that both, I think, are true at different times as we look through the timeline. Ultimately, for the US, I think, military aid is a tool for independence, generally, and it’s a tool to secure deterrence. I think that, especially for Army planners in the Pentagon itself, military aid was necessary in order to produce the strategic outcomes that they were looking for. And, American influence was secondary to that—or a vehicle—in order to get the situation that they were looking for. Like I said, I think in both cases, but especially in South Korea, there was a desire to maintain the status quo. Using American influence to achieve that strategic outlook was something that was sometimes palatable, but I think that there’s significant variation from period to period.

For example, in Germany in the 1950s, US aid was an important tool to the remilitarizing German Bundeswehr, which began to rearm in 1954. After that, American arms sales were important because they could keep Germany in the Western sphere. They could rapidly militarize, remilitarize, especially the German land army. Of course, weapon sales to the West German army were profitable for American companies, using that as a tool to try and support the US’s own deterrence and production posture. But ultimately, I think, also, in the 1950s, there’s still a concern about democratic backsliding in West Germany and the fear that a revived army could, in fact, follow some of the mischief, we’ll call it, of the German armies of the previous decades. I think in that case, it’s definitely a tool for American influence and American influence towards the promotion of democracy.

That only goes away in the ’60s and ’70s when it becomes clear that backsliding is not going to occur and when the German military begins to establish more independence. Interestingly, though, I think in the 1960s and ’70s in South Korea, you see almost the exact opposite trend where, in South Korea, American arms initially, after the Korean War, especially, ends in 1953, are used to kind of maintain that position of American influence and maintain the American commitment to South Korea. By the 1970s, American planners are far more interested in preserving Korean independence—preserving Korean autonomy.

There’s a period of strong democratic backsliding in South Korea. In [1963], the democratic government is replaced by the dictatorship of Park Chung-Hee. And in 1972, his dictatorship transforms from, kind of a, we’ll call it a light authoritarianism to a pretty hardcore authoritarian regime.

American pressures for democracy and some of those, you know, kind of core national values, seemed like they would be apt and fitting for the difficulties of the Korean context. 

Host

Is there anything else that you want to tell us about how US support influenced democratization efforts?

Fitzpatrick

I think that in Germany, in particular, American military support was one tool used to prevent the resurgence of Prussianism and militarism and Nazism. Even before rearmament in 1954, American connections to German officers, the former officers of the Wehrmacht, were critical, I think, in trying to secure a democratic future and in offering a lot of these officers the possibility of a democratic future and suggesting to them that if they were to abandon some of the old ideologies that there would still be a viable place for them in the future of Germany. And so, I think that this military relationship with the Germans played such an important role in democratization and sustaining it through the period of remilitarization.

And yet, I think it’s the opposite story in South Korea, where the US presence in South Korea not only rejects the value of democratization, sometimes even at the same time it’s being pushed in other countries, it’s being pushed in Western Europe, it is being rejected in South Korea. And instead, the US presence often either supports or legitimizes or enables the dictatorial and often brutal regimes of the South Korean government.

And in that case, the US is more interested in deterrence and is less worried about the dangers of the Korean government or the possibility of rampant Korean militarism, which has not historically been an issue for East Asia in same way that German militarism is for Western Europe. And so, Americans are, I think, a lot more willing to sit by and watch the South Koreans repress their people, for example, with the implementation of the Yushin Constitution in South Korea in 1972, which I would argue is a direct consequence of the Nixon Doctrine and Nixon’s strategic revision in 1969, or the Gwangju Massacre in 1980 in the city of Gwangju, as dictator Chun Doo-Hwan kind of establishes his regime. And, a little bit more than tacit American support for the execution of the suppression of the Gwangju democracy movement leads to almost another decade of dictatorship in South Korea.

Host

The impact of US military training in Chile, did it strengthen democracy or push Chile toward authoritarianism?

Harvey-Valdés

The evidence shows that US military training did not push Chile to any kind of [regime]. Rather, it made it mainly reflected professional military objectives aligned, again, with Chilean foreign policy. In fact, during the ’60s, there were many political events unfolding in Chile, an intervention by the United States—or [to] a lesser extent, the Soviet Union—did not change their course. There are many critics that argued that programs and institutions, such as the [The School of the Americas,] had politically indoctrinated Chilean officers, leading to the 1973 coup. But, Chile sent two or three officers to this school for training each year—until the first large group that was sent in 1968. However, this large group, [consisted of] just 50 second lieutenants that took part in a tailored course that lasted one month and that was very different from other countries or armies that came from the Caribbean area.

All these officers were just lieutenants by 1973. So, they didn’t have any power or much influence in any decision-making processes. Probably the only place where a military officer could be idealized would be in war colleges. But Chilean government voted against the creation of the Inter American Defense College because Chile had a war college since 1896.

So, the first officer that was sent to the Inter American Defense College was in 1967. My research offers another perspective that says that a small fraction of the officers that were sent to the United States for training were sent to attend controversial courses, I mean, counterinsurgency, internal security training, [and] counterintelligence. And it was just 2.5 percent of the whole personnel. So, that shows that this ideological influence is more like rhetoric, or some is historiography, made with some second intentions.

Fitzpatrick

I really liked your point about the War College and the role of institutions, especially multinational institutions, in developing new cultures and outlooks and being a place where democratization or values changes might be able to happen.

I think it’s so interesting in the South Korean context, you also have, it would be my guess, more South Korean officers traveled, to American war colleges. South Korea, in 1946, with their own remilitarization, establishes their own domestic defense institutions. And South Korea, through the Cold War, very much preferred rather than rely on American defense institutions to rely on their own domestically located alternatives.

And now, most of these institutions were just totally created in the mold of their American counterparts. So, they have an army war college, which almost totally resembles the American war college. They develop, in 1980, Korean Army TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command), which totally reflects the US Army TRADOC. And in fact, many of these organizations even use American teaching materials.

But importantly, to your point about the role of multinationalism and democratization. A lot of these are [set up so that] Korean nationals, only, attend these institutions. And so, they provide an insulating effect for officer corps as they are promoted and trained up. It’s no surprise in South Korea that the two later dictators come out of the army.

The dictators themselves, Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo-Hwan, come out of the army. They’re supported by members in the army and other people who retire and become politicians but are almost totally isolated as they come up through the ranks of the Army, I think, from exposure to some of these, American institutions.

Harvey-Valdés

Probably the Chilean experience [demonstrates] that Latin America is not a homogeneous whole. Therefore, US foreign policy in a system probably should consider each country’s political dynamics and particular historical context to ensure long-term cooperation. Historical examples from Chile underline the technical military training alone—that’s not assurance, political alignment, nor redeeming evidence. Instead, effective partnerships could require understanding national identities, domestic politics, and institutional cultures. Probably for contemporary US policymakers, this historical case has underscored the importance of flexible, respectful, and mutually beneficial relationships rather than overly prescriptive or paternalistic approaches, thus preventing strategic misunderstandings or resistance to cooperation.

Host

What lessons do Korea, Germany, and Chile offer about the limits of US military influence?

Harvey-Valdés

It’s difficult to make recommendations of this kind, especially when we are facing an international order change. But in general, there are geopolitical conditions that no political context can overlook or change. For example, in Chile, policymakers understand that no matter how many trade relations we have with China or how much we want to look like Europe, the United States will always be to the north, and Chile will always be within its [sphere of] influence.

In that sense, I think that the United States probably should consider to have a more sustained interest in Latin American countries because usually when the US realizes that something is going on or happening in its backyard, it’s already too late, and its policies tend to be somewhat aggressive.

Fitzpatrick

I think that the US has a lot of influence that its military can wield, in [some] cases, more influence than we often give credit for in terms of the political situation. As I argued before, I think the US really helped to build democracy in important ways in the early period in German history, in the early part of the Cold War and abdicated that power in South Korea for most of the Cold War. And so, I think for policymakers, an important lesson from these two situations, I think, is the role that American military officers can play in the development of countries’ domestic politics and domestic social relationships.

This can be an affirmative role if Americans want it be, for example, in the case of Germany—trying to rebuild that nation’s politics. But even if American officers don’t want to take a role, as they didn’t in South Korea, they wanted to try and maintain the status quo and focus only on the military and strategic concerns. The forces deployed there nevertheless have an influence, and the focus on the military relationship does not necessarily get American officers out of influencing domestic politics and domestic issues. And so I think policymakers, even when the goal is not to try and change politics and change the regime and change the nature of society in a country, need to be cognizant of the fact that their very presence in a place may have that effect no matter what and how that presence can be used and channeled to reinforce American values, rather than perpetuate anti-American circumstances.

Host

Going forward, should the United States take a different approach when building alliances, and what might that look like?  

Harvey-Valdés

Well, I consider it essential to approach these kinds of issues from a multidisciplinary perspective, integrating approaches from history and from international relations. I think that the study of these topics [demonstrates]demonstrates the value of primary sources and declassified documents, allowing scholars to reinterpret the specific episodes of the Cold War, which have always been oversimplified, misunderstood, or ideologically framed, especially within Latin American historiography.

I think that such [an] empirical basis would provide a solid foundation to critically challenge and debate existing theories in international relations, then enabling the scholars to test and reassess theories against historical realities.

Fitzpatrick

I see [a] lot of similarities between the 1970s and today. I think one of the big underpinnings of my work, both this article and some of my larger work, is that I think that we can draw a lot of lessons from the 1970s and bring them into our current era. And in terms of alliance building, I definitely see that for Europe, the 1970s was a period where, especially, West Germany sought to assert a stronger independence from the United States and looked to develop a coequal relationship with the United States within the context of the NATO alliance and Western security. And ultimately, Americans were forced to accept that and to nurture that and, actually, this has developed into a very positive military relationship by the 1980s in the late Cold War.

And, now I see very similar dynamics in the European Union, more broadly. And American policymakers have the opportunity to either try to fight this trend and hold back the tsunami or re-channel it into something that is productive for both partners. And so, I think trying to figure out what Americans want from Europe, what are our strategic interests, what can be our overlapping military interests, and then using that to develop new technologies and doctrines which are going to help both sides could lead to a very productive outcome in the future.

And, in very similar ways, I also see the 1970s threatening to repeat themselves in South Korea with their own constitutional crisis and political turmoil in Seoul. And, if you look at some of the protests and some of the demonstrations, you see the symbols of the American alliance displayed quite openly. I think that for South Korea, the American relationship is still very important.

South Koreans still feel they need the alliance with the United States and that they desire an alliance with the United States. We’re two very close allied partners. And so I think developments that happen in the United States are not going to stay in the United States, and there is a strong possibility that our alliance is going to work both ways. There’s a strong possibility that what happens in the United States is going to flow back into South Korea and vice versa.

And so I think, in that case, officers traveling to Korea and working with Korean counterparts should again think about what American values are important to assert and important to demonstrate to our allies—with the understanding that whether they want to or not, South Korean partners will look to Americans for inspiration or support or camaraderie and will look to maintain that very close relationship.

Host

Hugo, Mike, thank you so much.

Harvey-Valdés

Thank you. And thanks to the US Army War College, and it was a pleasure to have this moment.

Fitzpatrick

Thank you.

Host

Listeners, you can read the genesis articles at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 4. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.  

The threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a neglected and under-prioritized problem across the US government, requiring a dramatic change of approach. Most proposals for Goldwater-Nichols reform focus on geography, either increasing or decreasing the number of geographic commands. Based on our personal experience as Joint military planners at strategic-level headquarters, we argue that the change needs to go further, focusing on global national security problems instead of geography. This article’s analysis and conclusions will provoke conversation across the national security enterprise about how the United States competes with multiple global threats.

Keywords: North Korea, South Korea, Goldwater-Nichols reform, National Defense Strategy, force structure

Disclaimer: This podcast was recorded March 28, 2025, prior to the election of South Korea’s current president, Lee Jae Myung, in June of 2025.

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I’m talking remotely today with Justin Malzac, coauthor with Rene A. Mahomed of “Korea: The Enduring [Policy] Blindspot,” which you can find in the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters. Malzac is a senior information planner and policy adviser for the Department of Defense in Korea. He’s also a historian with a focus on East Asia. His history work on Korea has been published in the International Journal of Korean Studies and other venues. Welcome to Decisive Point, Justin.

Justin Malzac

Thanks for having me, Stephanie. Unfortunately, my coauthor, Rene, could not be here today due to scheduling issues, but I’m going to try to make sure that I bring up some of the points that he wanted to mention here.

Host

Set the stage for our listeners, please, and give us a brief overview of the article.

Malzac

So, our article looked at Korea—North Korea, in particular—as a policy problem, and argued that it is a under-prioritized issue. We did a comparison of North Korea and the issues and the threats emanating from North Korea and also Russia and the degradation of Russia in Ukraine, making an argument that strategic prioritization needs to be shifted and that North Korea needs to be elevated as a more severe threat. We also provided one recommendation on how you might do that through restructuring the combatant commands. For today, I wanted to really focus on the problem-framing piece of it—understanding the North Korea problem and understanding how we got here.

Host

Let’s start with the impeachment issue. Can you put the current South Korean impeachment issue into context for us?

Malzac

Yes. So, obviously one of the biggest news events coming out of South Korea recently is the impeachment of President Yoon [Suk-Yeol]. It’s hard to talk about South Korea as an ally or the Korean Peninsula as a strategic battle space without addressing that elephant in the room. There’s a lot that has been published on the impeachment issue in a variety of media with a lot of very, I don’t want to say inflammatory, but headlines that are there to draw attention. So, for example, in January an article was released in Foreign Affairs entitled “Can South Korea’s Democracy Survive?”—very provocative title. But if you actually open up the article, the author says [that] South Korean democracies—the institutions—are healthy and sound. And the author actually goes into showing that South Korea faces a lot of the same problems that most modern democracies are facing today, things like polarization, extremism, misinformation, and those types of problems. So, the problems faced by South Korea’s democracy are not exactly unique to it.

However, to understand the impeachment issue, you really have to jump back in time and you kind of need a little bit of a historical framework. South Korea is a very young democracy. The current system, where popular elections that have been legitimate, really only goes back about 30 years. You go back to the end of the Korean War [and] the first South Korean president, Syngman Rhee, was really forced upon South Korea. He was, you know, the one that the United States side had chosen to lead. He survives as president until around 1960–1961, and then, there are scandals, corruption, and vote-rigging scandals; and protests—large protests—[and] public pressure. He’s removed from office. There’s a power struggle, and then in 1961, General Park Chung-Hee launches a coup and initiates a military junta at the end of 1961. And that’s actually what I wrote about in my historical article. Park Chung-Hee rules for about 20 years. In 1979, he is assassinated in another period of turmoil and another coup d’etat, and General Chun Doo-Hwan comes into power. Particularly in the ’70s and the ’80s, South Korea is really an authoritarian police state. Protests are brutally suppressed, student protesters are disappeared, the intelligence services are watching everybody. It’s a very rough time. And then, towards the end of the ’80s, South Korea starts to come out of it. And, after Chun Doo-Hwan (he’s replaced by the election of Roh Tae-Woo in 1987), it was a transition period—you really weren’t at democracy yet.

Then in 1992, with the election of Kim Young-Sam, that’s the first civilian elected to the ROK (Republic of Korea) presidency. So that’s the period where the modern South Korean democracy really takes off is 1992. From then, it’s been relatively stable. And you wouldn’t know by watching on TV because you see things like ROK lawmakers in the parliament building setting off tear gas grenades and things like that—really flashy politics. But the systems and the institutions have been very stable. The first Korean president [impeached was] in 2016. That was Park Guen-Hye, and it was a significant vote—234 out of 300 lawmakers voted to impeach, and then they went to the Constitutional Court and [the vote] was upheld. So, it’s only ever happened one time before. She was removed from power. There was another election. There was a transfer of power. The system was working.

I think, really, when you look at South Korea today, the signs that democracy is healthy is the reaction to President Yoon’s martial law declaration. The reaction was immediate. The public came out in droves to the streets to protect the parliament building and to protect the lawmakers. Senior level—not the top generals who were initiating the military activities, but people right under them—were refusing orders to arrest lawmakers and do other things. So, Koreans have seen this movie before. They know what martial law means, and they weren’t going to take it. And across the layers of society, they resisted it. And then the institutions took over, and the Parliament voted to impeach. It got referred to the Constitutional Court.

[An] interesting nuance about impeachment in South Korea is that extra layer of the court review, the judicial review, that we don’t actually have in the United States. So, really, in the United States, there isn’t something that can prevent, you know, a political party who has a super majority in both houses of Congress from just wielding impeachment as a political weapon and just impeaching and impeaching and impeaching. There’s no check on that. In South Korea, all the impeachments have to go to the court and get validated. And we saw that working out with, most recently, the vice president’s impeachment, Vice President Han Duck-Soo. His impeachment was overruled. The Constitutional Court said it wasn’t valid. Yoon was impeached, removed from power, Han took over as the interim president, and the opposition party in the legislature wanted him to do very specific things. And, when he didn’t do those things, the court said that’s not valid. That was a political move.

All in all, the country is in a period of transition because they don’t have an elected president. But soon the court is going to very likely rule that the Yoon impeachment is valid, which is going to trigger a new election which is going to trigger a transfer of power and all the systems are gonna come back into balance, I highly suspect. There’s gonna be some protests, probably, but I highly suspect anything that’d be disruptive. So, our ally is here. Our ally is still engaging with US whole-of-government agencies that are here.

Host

In your article you suggest deterrence has failed. Why?

Malzac

In the article, this is actually Rene, my coauthor’s, major part of the paper. So, I’m going to do my best to respond for him here. I’m going to start very quickly with a quote from the US Northern Commander’s recent posture statement to Congress where he said, “Regime rhetoric surrounding the new ICBM suggests Kim [Jong Un] is eager to transition his strategic weapons programs from research and development to serial production and fielding, a process that could rapidly expand North Korea’s inventory and narrow my confidence in NORTHCOM’s existing ballistic missile defense capacity in the coming years.”

So NORTHCOM is basically saying, “This problem is getting out of hand, and we can’t handle it anymore.” How has that come about? Well, North Korea has not been a strategic priority for a very long time. The DoD [Department of Defense] official media announcement of the 2022 National Security Strategy didn’t even mention Korea. It’s been something that we have, for a long time, kind of neglected and ignored. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons [and] ICBMs [and] continues to engage in other gray-zone activities.

Really, the core of the problem, in my opinion, is that the US policy towards North Korea is a requirement for complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization, or CVID, and this has been a long-held precondition that the United States imposes on North Korea to even enter in negotiations. Denuclearization has to be on the table for the United States even to approach that level of negotiations. Of course, those nuclear weapons are what guarantee Kim Jong-Un his regime survival, so he’s not going to give them up. And we’ve seen that a lot of writers and pundits have agreed that that is not a valid starting point that’s going to get you into negotiations. Writing in Foreign Policy in 2024, Stephen Walt called it a neurotic fixation of the US Defense and policy enterprise to think that he’s ever going to give up those weapons.

We can look back in history and we can see examples, such as South Africa. I think South Africa only had five or six weapons, and they were safe. They had alliances and they had no, you know, existential threats. So, it was very easy for South Africa to give up their nuclear weapons. North Korea sees the United States as an existential threat. They truly believe that the United States may, given the chance, launch a preemptive strike to remove the regime as they have seen happen across the world throughout many decades of history.

So, understanding what the right starting point is for negotiations is the important thing, and then, understanding that those nuclear weapons that North Korea has now can reach anywhere in the continental United States. So those ICBMs can reach Washington, DC, and they’re just getting more of them as time goes by. And then, North Korea is also engaged in a variety of other gray-zone activities such as cyber, hacking, cyber crime, crypto theft, providing arms to a lot of regimes that we don’t like, such as Iran and, I believe, Sudan and other places in Africa—and then, of course, support to Russia. You know, [it] started as logistical support and weapons, and now there are North Korean soldiers in Ukraine. Our paper was written before the current relationship really manifested, and we were making an argument that Russia was effectively degraded and had lost too many troops and equipment. And now there’s this influx of troops and equipment, and Russia is taking back the Kursk region that Ukraine had occupied. So, all in all, a very significant problem on the deterrence side.

It’s an equal problem on the assurance side. The South Korean public now strongly supports a domestic nuclear weapons program. A June 2024 poll showed around 70 percent public support for a South Korean nuclear weapons program, and that support has only grown due to a variety of changing strategic circumstances. If that happens, it puts the United States in a very untenable political position because the United States is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and is obligated not to support the development of nuclear weapons in other nuclear-weapon states. Israel has nuclear weapons, and we still engaged with Israel, but South Korea is different because we have troops here in South Korea that engage with the South Korean military day-to-day. We have a combined bilateral command and combined forces command—all that comes at risk if the South Koreans get a nuclear weapon because of NPT requirements for the United States.

And then lastly, really the ultimate risk is not nuclear weapons being used, it is the outbreak of another conventional conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and nuclear weapons give Kim Jong-Un the security he needs to be more provocative and aggressive than he normally would be. And then, also, we see, potentially, the lack of assurance, but also the risk calculus on the South Korean side also leading to escalation. So, in 2010, the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong was shelled by North Korea, killing ROK marines and civilians, and the ROK government was planning to send fighter aircraft into North Korea to attack the artillery that had fired on them. And they were, luckily, talked down by the US side, but that tit-for-tat escalation, really, a lot of folks see that as the immediate risk in the region. And then those conflicts—a conflict on the Korean Peninsula—could easily spiral into a regional conflict or could trigger a sympathetic conflict such as [a] Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Host

So, what’s the answer then? How can the United States and its partners increase deterrence?

Malzac

Well, Rene had a good point he would have made here, and that is that deterrence begins with the coalition. Deterrence is a team effort. It’s not something that the US can do on their own. In particular, one of North Korea’s strategic goals is to break the ROK-US alliance or to fracture the US coalition in Korea. And one way that they try to do this is [that] they advocate for one-on-one talks with the US—so, between North Korea and [the] US having one-on-one diplomatic talks—and they want to do this because if they can get the United States to commit to something that the ROK cannot commit to, then you immediately have a structural break in the alliance.

So, it is important that any negotiations with North Korea be multilateral, such as the Six Party Talks or some other framework and that it incorporates other allies: Japan, potentially; or United Nations command elements; or other elements such as that. It’s also important to bolster the legitimacy of those institutions. North Korea will often attack the legitimacy and the legality of United Nations Command (UNC) and Combined Forces Command. [For] Combined Forces Command, that is a prerogative of the United States and South Korea as sovereign states that want to work together and have a multinational command. United Nations Command was established by the United Nations has a valid mandate. The United Nations has taken up the vote to deactivate UNC, or at least some have tried to inject the vote into the UN to deactivate UNC, and it has never held up.

So, the UN continues to maintain the validity of the United Nations Command, and recently it actually grew. So, Germany just—I think it was last year—Germany joined United Nations Command. So, it continues to grow, and it continues to be seen outside of North Korea as a legitimate entity. And then, of course, we need to, you know, apply pressure to those core supporters that support North Korea: China and Russia. Right? Obviously, Russia provides direct support. They are giving fuel and supplies and weapons and technology directly to North Korea now, and China has been a player that just refuses to enforce sanctions, casts a blind eye on things, you know, sanctioned materials that transit through their territory, engages in sanctioned coal transfers in the waters of the Yellow Sea. So, China is the core enabler of that behavior as well.

And then lastly, we need to impose costs on North Korea and [its] strategic interests globally—that includes the hacking, the revenue-generation activities such as crypto theft, the procurement activities to get materials for the nuclear program that North Korea cannot generate domestically [and] those alliances with Africa, Iran, and other areas that give them safe haven and support. This is really the hardest piece of the problem because 1) North Korea is not a US national priority, so [there are] not a lot of resources placed to what is a global problem. They are all over the world. They have these connections, and they have these activities going on all over the world. And those US interagency and DoD elements that are going after the problem really are going after the problem in isolation. So, the [US Department of the] Treasury might sanction a specific company that’s doing dual-use stuff, or the FBI might indict some North Korean hackers. It’s all really kind of ad hoc and in isolation, and none of it’s really being synchronized because there isn’t the prioritization that creates a broader strategy on how to approach the global problem.

Host

What is South Korea’s security role in the region—and also globally?

Malzac

Yeah, so I think one thing that we alluded to in our paper but that we didn’t really have a lot of space to examine was the increasing global security role that South Korea is trying to take on. In 2022, they published their first Indo-Pacific Strategy where they referred to themselves as a “global pivotal state.” They want to be a global pivotal state that actively defends the international rules-based order. In recent years, South Korea has not only expanded its own defense, its own funding across the board, it’s developed a strategic command; a cyber command; drone and counter-drone activities [and] capabilities; long-range fire capabilities. But they’ve also increased their partnerships across the world. A primary focus for the US strategic decisionmakers is the ROK and Japan relationship. It’s actually been very surprising to see how well South Korea and Japan have been cooperating on the military side in recent years because they’ve always, kind of, had this political tension amongst themselves. If you look back at history, you’ll know why. But the ROK also has expanding strategic partnerships with a variety of other countries in the region, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, India, Australia, [and] Taiwan. Australia is very interesting because Australia is facing a lot of increased pressure from China right now, who’s actually doing military exercises in their backyard. Making sure that the ROK continues all those relationships is very important.

And then, the other piece of it, too, is that the ROK ranks among the top 10 in global arms suppliers. They provide a large supply of weapons and, really, platforms like artillery, tanks, [and] aircraft to a lot of important US allies, including NATO. The ROK just recently completed a brand new missile frigate for the Philippines. They’re providing K-9 artillery to Estonia. They previously provided it to Poland, which allowed Poland to provide weapons to Ukraine. They’re providing FA-50 fighter aircraft to Egypt. So, they’re all over the place as [an] arms provider to folks that we traditionally try to help stabilize and see as our core partners.

In deterrence, not only of DPRK, regionally, but PRC, globally, it’s important that our allies and partners have enough strengths—obvious strengths—to push back on coercion, and the ROK is really filling in that gap to make sure that a lot of those partners—particularly the Philippines, who historically has not really had a robust navy—[are] now getting ships from the ROK that they now can use to defend their waters against PRC incursions. So, I think that’s a really important way that South Korea supports global deterrence in support of our interests—the United States’ interests.

Host

I would like to end with the hypothetical here. What if North Korea is honestly signaling? What if it is no longer an aggressive threat? What would that circumstance mean for US strategy and force presence in the region?

Malzac

Yeah, so I think a lot of folks who don’t pay a lot of attention to the region might not understand that there are a lot of things that North Korea is doing and saying that suggest they are trying to close off their borders and really just be left alone. In my opinion, I think Kim Jong-Un is likely telling the truth. He has taken many very clear actions, such as destroying roads and transportation nodes between the north and the south, installing obstacles along the border that just make no sense for anyone who has any intention of launching a ground invasion. He’s putting things in his own way. He is making it much harder for him to attack, which doesn’t make a whole lot of sense. And then, North Korea recently changed their official policy that confirms the two-state solution. They have recognized South Korea as a separate state. They call South Korea “the primary enemy.” The problem really is on the other side, it’s on the South Korean, it’s on the ROK side, because the South Korean constitution lays claim to the entire peninsula. It makes it very difficult for the ROK to politically or legally engage in any sort of discussion of recognizing North Korea as a separate, sovereign state.

And you see this tension playing out, at least, I think I see this tension playing out. So, for example, in October 2024, the North Koreans blew up a major road and bridgeway that connected the North and South, and it was all on the North Korean side, but the South Koreans fired warning shots they said they were in self-defense. I think that was really the ROK side kind of acting out in desperation because there’s nothing legally they can do to stop North Korea from crawling back into its borders and fortifying its borders and just saying, “I want to be left alone, and I want to be a sovereign state.” And if North Korea wants to live on Russian handouts and just be left alone, obviously, they’ve got to stop being provocative, and they’ve got to stop, you know, launching missiles over Japan and doing other things and doing illegal cybercrime activities. But if they do all that, if they stop doing all that and they just say, “leave me alone,” there really isn’t much you can do about that. I mean, that’s their sovereign right.

So, what happens to the US forces in Korea if that happens? If there’s no longer an actual threat that you need those forces in South Korea to handle, that you need Combined Forces Command to prepare defense plans against, I think it could be likely that those forces get pulled out of South Korea. Japan’s a little bit of a different animal because Japan really is more aligned against China and Russia and not really shy about picking those fights. South Korea really wants to stay out of the China-US fight in that rivalry because China’s their number one trading partner, but Japan is not afraid to poke China or Russia. So, those troops remaining in Japan or some troops remaining in Japan or having a US command in Japan, makes a lot of sense. But if the North Korean threat goes away because North Korea says, “I don’t want to play anymore. I’m just going to stay in my house,” then the justification for troops on South Korea becomes much less tenable.

Host

Listeners, you can read the genesis article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 4. There will also be a link to the article in the show notes.

For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

Justin, thank you for making time to speak with me today.

Malzac

No, thank you for the opportunity.

As a key battleground in the global struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, Africa offers US policymakers insights to navigate competing interests and power dynamics. For a comprehensive view of this competition, this article analyzes American, Chinese, French, and Russian geopolitical strategies; employs a geopolitical analysis of current events, diplomatic maneuvers, and historical lessons; and uses policy documents, expert opinions, and case studies of geopolitical engagements. It then provides actionable policy recommendations for fostering stable, long-term US relations in Africa and offers strategic perspectives on managing the global power competition applicable to broader national security and diplomatic contexts.

Keywords: US policy in Africa, global order and power dynamics, strategic insights for policymakers, Russia-China relations in Africa, proxy conflicts and diplomatic maneuvers

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

My guests today are Hamid Lellou and Dr. Amin Tarzi. Lellou is the author of “US Relations with Africa and the New Cold War,” which was published in the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters. Lellou is an independent analyst specializing in conflict resolution and regional dynamics in the Middle East and Africa. Tarzi is the professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps War College. His teaching and research include the Middle East, hybrid actors, major power competition in the region, and evolving competition and contestation in the Red Sea, Black Sea, and Mediterranean regions.

Welcome to Decisive Point.

Dr. Amin Tarzi

Thank you for having us.

Hamid Lellou

Thank you.

Host

Hamid, give us a brief overview of your article.

Lellou

My article discusses evolving dynamics between the United States and the African nations in a very particular area and time. We have [the] United States, and in the title, as you saw, I added “and the new Cold War,” referring to other [superpowers] including Russia and China. When you invited me to this podcast, and I looked back to my article, I thought if I had to change or add something, I would do it in the title. And rather [than] saying, “US-Africa relations,” I would say “US-Africa Win-Win Relations.”

In the paper, I talk about the approaches [to Africa], mainly the Chinese approach and the Russian approach. On the one hand, I described the Chinese approach as development/infrastructure diplomacy and, on the other hand, we have [Russian] security diplomacy. As the US, what should be our approach, knowing that the interests are different, approaches are different, values are different, which [puts] the United States in a very unfair situation. And, whatever things we’ll be talking [about] on Africa, in the back of my mind, I look at two different Africas. I look at the Africa from the academic and official point of view, the formal Africa, but there is also the informal Africa.

Host

Hamid, please outline how African nations are addressing their security issues.

Lellou

That’s a great question. Again, [regarding] African nations, if I said that they are doing it in a very specific way, it means I will imply that they’re doing it together. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. So, I would frame it in two dimensions: the global, international, continental dimension, and the local dimension.

I will start with the local [dimension] because it has also some implications [for] the regional aspect of it. Internally, they are working on developing their military infrastructure capabilities, trying to develop some economies, and so forth. The problem that I see in Africa is that when it comes to, for instance, developing the military there, we see a lot of arms [races] rather than developing their capabilities in ways that will lead to a better development and protection of their countries. And, I’m saying this because, as I said before, I look at the informal side of Africa-Africa [relationships]—and, unfortunately, African countries don’t necessarily have great [relationships] between them. So, even if you look at it from the internal standpoints, it has an effect on the trans-border relationship.

For that, I can give you examples. There are many countries where [the] United States has interest in working with different countries and yet, these same countries, they don’t necessarily have great [relationships]. Take the case of Algeria and Morocco. [They are] great partners, already having [a] great relationship with Morocco, developing [a] great relationship with Algeria—and yet, these countries, don’t have [a] diplomatic relationship. How can we work with countries like this? [It is the] same thing when you look at Central Africa [and] what’s going on between DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] and Rwanda—and even with Uganda, and you name it. There are many examples. This is one. The problem that I see, though, with many of these countries—and this is the caveat in the official Africa when I talk about “official” and “nonofficial”—is that using, for instance, the fight against terrorism for regimes means instead of state security.

And, I will leave it there because I’m sure Dr. Tarzi will have to add [to my thoughts].

Host

Dr. Tarzi?

Tarzi

First of all, thank you for having me on Decisive Point.

You know what, I’ll respond [to] your question, first and foremost, by challenging a prevalent assumption that we, specifically the United States, have regarding African states, and namely that is that we assume—and I think my colleague said that—that they act collectively, in tandem. You never hear us saying “How are the Asian states?” It’s just never happened. We specifically refer to either a specific country, whether it’s India or Pakistan or China—or even the smaller ones—or at least the region, [such as] the Middle East [and] South Asia. Somehow, we do that with Africa as if the 55 countries work together. We use the word “Africa” as if it’s one place. It is not. There are 55 countries there, or 56 if you count some countries that are not official, or [it] could be 57, you know. We could go on, but [there are] at least 55 officially, according to the African Union.

I think this homogeneity applied to Africa makes our decision making also based on this idea that they all work together. They don’t, and it’s not because there’s something wrong with them, it’s just that they [have] different issues. You heard about Algeria and Morocco. They have their problems. That is totally apart from their [relationships] with [the] United States.

Also, I deal with countries such as Egypt. Egypt and Madagascar, what [do] they have in common? They are very different. And, in [the] case of the United States’s [relationships], Egypt actually happens to be not even dealt with [by] AFRICOM. It’s still sitting in Central Command for various reasons because Egypt’s trajectory, security, [and] relationship [are] much more connected to its Middle Eastern neighbors than it is with their African neighbors. They still have a lot of [relationships]. They are in Africa. Most people think Egypt is not in Africa.

I would challenge that before we even start talking about outlining how African nations address their security, [let us] underline the idea that there is no such thing as African nations because of a continent—they are different countries, groupings, [and] historical realities. And, I think if we start dealing with them in that way, we might get a lot more traction than [by] looking at it holistically as a homogeneous continent.

Thank you.

Lellou

It’s a perceived homogeneity. It’s also part of my policy recommendations, if you go back to my paper. Instead of looking at Africa as a whole continent holistically, look at it as blocks. This is what I recommended. [Look at it] in blocks that naturally exist right now. But, we will discover later that, actually, there are some missing legs, which means we need to have maybe more blocks in Africa to make them much more homogeneous. That will ease any relationship with [the] outside—and between them, to start—and with outsiders, including the United States.

Host

In your view, how could NATO learn from the African model, particularly in terms of respecting sovereignty and empowering local leadership?

Lellou

Sovereignty. That’s the keyword here. Sovereignty. And I will add another word—antagonism—which we were talking about—the different interests and approaches due to competing interests. But, when it comes to the United States, it doesn’t stop there. You have Russia and China, who have their competing interests, including economy, politics, and resources. But, when it comes to [the] United States, we cannot stop there. We have values, and that is a huge disadvantage. When you compare [the] United States’s engagement with Africa [or] you compare it to [Russian] and Chinese engagement with Africa, there are some existing institutions. We’re not saying this to describe Africa as everything is black and bleak, and everything is bad. No, there are some strong foundations like [the] AU [African Union], which originally existed since 1963 as [the] African Organization Union, which turned to AU, I think, in 2002. We have, for instance, a regional block, [the] ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States]. ECOWAS is the most successful, despite some hiccups with the Sahel.

We should take this AES, which is the Alliance [des] États du Sahel [Alliance of Sahel States]. People may look at it as a bad idea [saying,] “It is a bad idea because military coups led to this because of what’s going on in the Sahel.” But let’s take it from the other side. Instead of fighting against the current, let’s swim a little bit with the current. And, this is a great opportunity to actually create another regional block (and I called it Economic Community of Sahel States) and take those countries that are in ECOWAS and instead of leaving them in ECOWAS, where there is no homogeneity with Western Africa, [which] already [has] access to the Atlantic, but the Sahel [doesn’t, and move them to the Economic Community of Sahel States]. All the issues we have seen in the region are due to what is believed in the Sahel region. So, let’s go and encourage this block of Sahel, and to Niger, Mali, [and] Burkina Faso [that] they could add Chad, Mauritania, and Sudan, and that will become a very homogeneous and natural group.

This is one of the approaches. We can also leverage IGAD [Intergovernmental Authority on Development]. IGAD is a good body of influence in Eastern Africa. We have also the Southern African block, which is already pretty homogeneous. If you take them as blocks, they are much more homogeneous [than] if you look at them as one continent.

Tarzi

The African model, in my view, is based on expecting the unique approaches by individual states or [groups] of states to [address] their collective security. However, this model, while [it] greatly enhances, [as] my colleague just said, with operationalization of the Peace and Security Council within the AU—and I think that happened in 2004 as well, about two years after AU was rebranded—it lacks mechanisms and abilities, in my view, to confront major threats to its members. What you have is a mechanism. That’s a positive. So, there is a mechanism, and it has worked in some places. But still, confronting a major power from outside, whether it be China or Russia, [the capability is not there]. Secondly, within their own union, the big, more powerful states cannot be confronted.

Your question had a NATO component. That’s where I swim a lot. I think I would add that all decisions in NATO are made by consensus, which at its very core is respecting member states’ sovereignty. So, I think if you want to look at your question, if you want to take NATO, it is a model that is based on consensus. The question is whether this model is applicable [to] the current situation within Africa. I go back to the question. In certain areas—again, you heard my colleague talk about a regionalization—yes. Within the 55 countries, I don’t think this is applicable. Even in NATO, we have had issues with it, but at least [in] NATO, they are much closer. Geographically, they’re all in the same place except two members that are not on this side of the Atlantic. And, NATO has a very specific mandate that is not security as such—it is security of the member states. It was created for a very specific threat, actually. So, I think there [are] things to learn, but there [are] also inherent differences between a collective security agreement, such as NATO, which is consensus-based, to what we have in Africa right now.

I leave it at that. Thank you.

Host

Hamid?

Lellou

Regarding NATO, I agree. If we are talking about NATO, if we are talking about the relationship that NATO could have with Africa as two entities, in this case, I’m not trying to recreate other international-national bodies, but what is NATO? NATO is a north [Atlantic] alliance; it is security for Western Europe and [the] United States. But what are the issues they are facing? And, actually, NATO has evolved beyond that. People, they know NATO. Maybe other people, they don’t know what NATO does. Do they know about the Mediterranean Dialogue? Do they know about the Istanbul [Cooperation] Initiative? These are sort of [ramifications] of NATO ensuring that safety and stability goes beyond its borders and [its] prevention approach.

Where is Africa in that? Africa is closer to NATO countries, given globalization. And, even with this Mediterranean Initiative, we have North African countries, but we don’t have the rest of Africa. With even the nonmajor NATO allies, there is one country, if I recall, Kenya, and maybe Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, but these countries are North African. Again, they go in that very specific regional block. But are there any other African countries that are considered as very strategic allies to NATO?

No.

Correct me if I’m wrong, Dr. Tarzi.

Tarzi

It’s five countries in Africa. There are more outside of Africa. So, it’s Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. So, it’s pretty much aligned in the north, with the addition of Mauritania. For NATO, again, because the mandate of NATO is safeguarding Northern Europe and North America, that is the line that, for them, holds [the] security of Mediterranean basin. Every country north of there is a NATO member, and the island.

So, what happens is, you’re right, NATO’s vision is to make sure that it safeguards its own borders, and these five countries are part of it—and that includes also Israel because it is also in the Mediterranean. It literally is a band of discussions. It’s very successful. It actually brings those countries, including two that we heard do not even have a diplomatic relationship, [to] the same table. That is where you see Algeria and Morocco actually working, at least, in the same room [and at the] same table on a specific topic, which is based on a dialogue. It’s called a dialogue for a reason—because there is no operational aspect to it.

And, to be very, very frank right now, the biggest challenge for NATO is refugees. Terrorism, wars, and refugees; those are the biggest challenges they look at. But, [it is difficult to know] how to mitigate that and how to work together. In my view, any dialogue, whether it’s a dialogue with a kinetic component or it’s a dialogue for understanding, it’s a positive step. Now, yes, anything south of Mauritania is not there. But, at this point, at least, that is there. NATO’s mission is in the name: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It’s not meant to be beyond that.

Thank you.

Lellou

If I may quickly follow up on this one, dialogue is the first step. And, thank you for mentioning those cases where countries, [if] you take them individually, they wouldn’t talk, but if you have a powerful block or entity, like NATO or [the] United States, [they will]. And, this is one of my recommendations. That’s why I insist [in my] recommendation [on] having [the] United States as that vehicle to boost [relationships] between the countries.

As Dr. Tarzi was mentioning, when you have these big entities such as NATO, or even the United States by itself, it has that leverage to help other countries to come together and work together. As I mentioned in the beginning, Morocco and Algeria, they cannot work together. And yet, because we have this NATO initiative, it’s a dialogue, but we have to start somewhere, and they are dialoguing. They’re sitting around the same table and they’re talking.

Host

What can the United States learn about multilateral partnerships and, as you were just saying, regional collaborations and dialogues, when it comes to African security and really even Mediterranean security, like you were talking about Dr. Tarzi?

Lellou

The most important thing right now for [the] United States, when it comes to Africa is, unfortunately, security, security, security. But [at] the same time, your listeners may wonder, “Why should we care? There is a huge body of [water] between us. Why should we care? We have no connection to Africa.”

Well, we should care because of many reasons. In this era of globalization, which means those distances, they mean nothing, and borders have become obsolete. You need to protect yourself, and security is very important. But [what we] also need to know is [that] because of that globalization, whatever happens in the United States, whatever we do in [the] United States, it affects—directly or indirectly—Africa, and vice versa. Whatever happens or whatever is done in Africa, it affects us here in the US. So, those are very important reasons why we should care.

Now, the best approach. What can we do about it? I like to use some descriptive analogies and, to me, the relationship I see between [the] United States and Africa is presented this way: Look at a coffee table. The coffee table has three legs, okay? And, for me, the table is the stability of Africa. It’s Africa tomorrow. It is the future of Africa. One leg should be security. The second leg should be development and economy. And the third leg should be good governance. These three legs, like the coffee table, if you take away one of them, what happens to the table? [It] flips around. It’s exactly the same thing. The US approach to Africa should bear in mind these three legs and work hand in hand with them and give equal importance, equal emphasis on these three legs.

Tarzi

I would add, if I may, to my colleague’s three leg [example]. I’ll add a fourth leg of understanding. Having been, throughout my life, mostly in the Middle East, I would say we have the economic component, but yet, still, we lack understanding—it’s both ways. I’m not saying it’s just from our side to theirs. I think enhancing that is crucial, especially now that you have powers such as China that pretend to understand and come in there or Russia, [which] is very nefarious and comes in and provides the security to [an] individual group, usually undemocratic, to contain democracy or take over or protect a coup or something. Here, I think understanding in the broader sense would be a fourth leg if, I may.

In talking about the United States security architecture, I would go back [to the] end of the Second World War. Our security has been based, and I say successfully so, on multilateral partnerships and regional collaborations. [The] African model can be a good example of how 50 countries with different cultures, cultural norms, challenges, languages, religions, and overlapping historical narratives can come together towards at least safeguarding the continent’s collective security; [it is] not always successful, but at least they have a model.

The Peace and Security Protocol Council is the most solid thing they [the African Union] have put together in 2004. Now, how can we, the United States, looking at our own examples from [the] Second World War, whether it’s NATO or other [global] partnerships, look at that and not just “Africanize” it but make sure that it applies to different parts of Africa together to ensure our [interests], but at the same time, I think Hamid said something very important—we bring value in there.

I think what is lost, is lost in the conversation. That value is not explained well. Explain that value and I believe the African continent as a whole will be in a much better position. Let us not forget that Africa will produce the majority of humans, so we have to be aware of that. They [have] the highest child [birthrate] anywhere. Europe is actually declining. Even now, China is slowing down. We are not going forward. Even Latin America is not. So, you’re looking at a place that has [the] potential of becoming the center of activity and democratization and good production, good governance, or [becoming] China’s place for their minerals of rare earths. Because of that, [they could] become dependent and subjected to something that is not good for anybody.

Host

Hamid, did you want to add to that?

Lellou

I agree completely with understanding. And mutual understanding and culture [are] a big part of it, right? You cannot do business with your partners if you don’t understand, if you don’t know what the common interests [are]. That’s why in the beginning, remember, I told you if I had to change something to my paper [it] is the title, and [I would] add the win-win [relationship]. That win-win [relationship] cannot happen without common understanding. It has to go both ways.

Host

We just talked about what the United States can learn from Africa and the African-led approach to security. What about NATO? What can NATO learn?

Lellou

[For] NATO, it’s the same thing. The approach both for [the] United States—and NATO [is that] it has to be support [and] advise [rather] than leading, than doing. Sometimes, I can understand [that] we want things to be done correctly but let them fail if they have to. Sometimes, we need to fail to do better later. What we can do, as we have mentioned, is strengthen these AU institutions—whether through the economic groups like ECOWAS and IGAD—and there are other institutions like the African Standby Force. With, for instance, direct intervention [and] what we have seen in some places, we have to be careful with this capacity building.

And, we’re doing these recommendations, but some of them, they’re already in place: ACOTA [African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance]. Listeners are aware of ACOTA, security cooperation. There is training and education, and Dr. Tarzi can speak [to] that, with international students coming to [the United States Army Command and General] Staff College. Maybe, what I would add to this is [to] maybe develop curricula within military institutions, since we’re talking about security, where African affairs would be taught in terms of what they are doing. How do they approach their own security? Do they have doctrines? What are their doctrines? I’m talking about the African doctrines.

Let’s sit and learn [and] understand. If they have doctrines, how are their doctrines developed? As I said, we mentioned the example of this dialogue. We can continue with this but also make sure that all approaches are adapted to Africa. And, going back to understanding, meaning flexibility and context-driven because Africa—I don’t know if all listeners know about it—it’s a huge continent, but it is so dynamic. It changes every single day, and you need to keep up with that.

Tarzi

NATO is a consensus-based decision-making organization that is very unique, and it has an inherent limitation in acting as a unit in global peacekeeping and security, unless Article 5 is involved, which has only been involved once in the history of this amazing organization, and that happened in support of our country, [the] United States of America, after 9/11 [in the] case of Afghanistan. I say that because this uniqueness, while it is very important in safeguarding the North Atlantic security—inclusive of the attack against [one] is [an] attack against all—it is very difficult to, in my view, duplicate in any other area, whether [it] is even a regional post or, especially, with holistically looking at Africa, the 55 countries or so. Can we learn from it? Yes.

Now, as I say, there is a learning process from Africa by NATO, and that’s specifically the Mediterranean Dialogue. I have had the good fortune to have been involved in that in some capacity, and this is a very important part where learning happens. Where, again, that fourth leg that I’m glad that Hamid accepted—that accepting each other’s issues, not always saying, “Okay, well, it doesn’t make sense to me. Let us understand that.” That said, also, Africa, unlike Europe and, thankfully, North America, has become, we all have said it, a specific point for what we call the major power competition. And then here, I think, whether it’s a long-term investment, predatory investments of China, or [in] the short term, I would say destructive, disruptive activities by the Russian Federation, [is] how we’ll bring in a component of stability through some security arrangement. And, this is where the NATO part comes in, as a model, to make sure to safeguard Africa against becoming, as I’ve said before, basically China’s [plaything].

I don’t think Africa is just sitting there and accepting it, but it’s overwhelming how much has happened. I was just in Sub-Saharan Africa—and I was just being [an] observer. I was going from [the] airport to the downtown—and almost everything was built by the Chinese. The taxi drivers told me this. And I saw the cranes—they all had Mandarin on them, and you don’t see us there. We can pretend that we are the good guys and we are there, but if you’re not there and the other side comes in and it keeps on investing, at the end of the day, with the dynamic youth, very, very high rate of birth, the one who’s there and investing will win, and that is a detriment not only [to] the United States, but [to] the Africans as well, in my view. I think this is what we need to learn from NATO. NATO should learn from Africa, and they [will] learn from there that security as a whole is no longer. You cannot pretend to protect the Mediterranean Coast and think everything else is okay, to be very blunt, you know what I’m trying to say?

Thank you.

Lellou

It is a great point, and this is what I mentioned in the beginning with the Chinese approach [to] development, infrastructure, [and] diplomacy. I will nuance one point: It is rather an approach than [an] investment because China is not investing. China knows Africa has the resources. China doesn’t put cash into that. They built all those infrastructures, but African countries, they have already paid for it. There are some talks and writings about another issue that is facing Africa, [which] is the debt trap. Some people, they say this is not true, but we say in French, “n’y a pas de fumée sans feu,” no smoke without fire, right?

So, if people are talking about it, probably, there is something there, and we have to be very careful with this so Africa doesn’t become [a] hostage of China, economically speaking, which takes us back to their sovereignty. And, this is the unfair side of the United States having [a] relationship in Africa—you come with those values you cannot put on the table: human rights, democracy, power sharing, while other partners like China and Russia, they overlook that. Maybe it will answer how America should approach its relationship to Africa.

Host

Before we go, concluding thoughts?

Lellou

The United States, the government, the business, they are big [fans] of [the whole-of-government] approach. I would take that model and translate it to [a] relationship to Africa, which means we should think of [our] relationship with Africa as a [whole-of-government approach] from both sides—meaning not only Americans doing their business the right way, where civilians [are] concerted with the military, with businesses, with civil society, [but] the other side should be the same. Rather than having [a] US-Africa summit where you have guest speakers speaking, the [whole-of-government] approach is to have participative and engaging [participants], where they bring in not only their military folks but their civilian diplomats, also the economic players and civil society. And, they will work with their American counterparts. But, if you’re doing it in a very bilateral [way] and [are] reduced to officials—military talking only to military and civilian diplomats talking only to civilian diplomats—you are assuming that they’re doing business the way you do it in-house.

Tarzi

I’ll just end it with a quotation from Sir Winston Churchill, who said, and I quote, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, that is fighting without them.” Let’s remember the wise words of that great stateman.

I leave it at that.

Host

Thank you both so much for joining me today.

Tarzi

Thank you, ma’am.

Lellou

My pleasure.

Host

Listeners, you can read the genesis article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 4.

For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

Academic military historians, government institutions, and defense practitioners have unique purposes for advancing the study of war that influence the way they consume and produce history. Although there is substantial scholarship covering how the discipline of military history has changed since the late nineteenth century, the literature surrounding why it changes and how it is used is less plentiful. Using primary and secondary sources to contextualize debates between historians, this study traces major developments in military historiography, considers the US Army’s relationship with its history, and explores potential connections between a history’s purpose and its use for military professionals.

E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.

Keywords: Whig history, New History, American Historical Association, US military history, Society for Military History

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I’m talking with US Army Major Michael P. Ferguson and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Professor Richard Kohn about military history.

Ferguson is a PhD student and advanced civil schooling participant in the Department of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He’s coauthor of The Military Legacy of Alexander the Great: Lessons for the Information Age, published in 2024. He’s also the author of “The American Way of Studying War: What Is It Good For?” and that’s what we’re here to talk about today.

Kohn has focused on military history generally, emphasizing national security and military policy strategy and the American experience with war making and the connections between war, the military, and American society. In recent years, his concentration has been on current civil-military relations, particularly civilian control of the military.

Thank you for joining me remotely from North Carolina today.

Major Michael P. Ferguson

Thanks for having us.

Richard Kohn

Special pleasure.

Host

We’re here to talk about why military history remains relevant, and we’re going to talk about its values for individuals, institutions, and society.

Why has military history been so controversial?

Ferguson

It’s probably something that’s not as well known outside the halls of history departments on universities. Military history in general has a pretty turbulent background, and the way I open up the article, which I thought was kind of a fitting alpha, or beginning, to the story of military history is looking at the turn of the century in 1900 and Edward Eggleston, who was the president of the American Historical Association at the time. And, in 190Z, he drafted a speech to be given at the annual conference. Unfortunately, he was never able to deliver it because he fell ill and passed away the following year in 1902. But, his speech touches on this concept of new history and a lot of [lines ] from the speech really reflect this movement of new history—of looking at the smaller things and moving away from classical history, which was essentially “Ivory Tower” history looking at big policies and wars and politics. But, it also reflects this turn-of-century way of thinking at the time, where we’re on the back end of the Enlightenment. Mankind had supposedly liberated themselves from the shackles of predestination. And, you had Darwin’s theories taking traction, and it came out in 1859 on the origin of species. And then, you also had this massive progress in terms of art and science and industry, where it seemed like the sky was the limit at the time.

And, one of the outgrowths of this period in the history that Eggleston touches on in his speech is this belief that militarism, in general, and war, specifically, could be something that humankind would essentially evolve out of. It was this anachronistic relic of a past form of human life; this barbaric form that they could educate civilization away from it.

That leads into a lot of the themes of why do military historians do history? What’s the purpose of history? And, I want to read one line real quick from his speech because like in any written work, a lot of it ends up on the chopping room floor. But, this is according to Edward Eggleston. This was his purpose, the object of history:

Man is such a savage that until the lifetime of the present generation, he has insisted on settling everything by the gauge of battle. But the brute age and age of heroism in the contest with the brute must pass. We cannot always cover our pages with gore. It is the object of history to cultivate this out of man, to teach him the wisdom of diplomacy, the wisdom of avoidance. In short, the fine wisdom of arbitration that last fruit of the human experience,

End Quote.

The object of history to Eggleston and many other of his contemporaries was, essentially, to weed these remnants of militarism out of human beings.

Kohn

I would say that the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a time when war was being praised as the highest form of human behavior. Heroism changes history. It makes contributions to society. And, it wasn’t really until after World War I, with the horrible killing and no real decision for most of the war that there was a change, I think, in public opinion and among scholars—that war was to be avoided, that it was a mistake. And, it’s controversial because often there are many mistakes made in war. British generals came in for huge criticisms for just wasting human lives by the hundreds of thousands. There was really a turn, I think, in Western society after World War I, that experience that made and still makes war a controversial human endeavor, even though it might illustrate some positive human characteristics.

Mike, why don’t you talk about new history because you’ve [covered the] subject so much in your very, I hope, influential article in Army circles.

Ferguson

Absolutely. New history is kind of a misnomer because it’s not really new at all, but it’s still referred to as “new history.” And, as I mentioned, in Eggleston’s draft of his speech that he was going to give in 1901, he started using this term “new history.” And, he cited, going back to the sixteenth century, a couple examples of other historians who had looked at what he called “the little things in life.” So, social interaction, the everyday life of Americans—from what their bedrooms look like on to the ornate details in their kitchen and their everyday patterns of life. And, part of that concept of new history was that focusing on these things would help create a better citizen. And, that was another thing he mentioned in his speech was that the purpose, the object, of history, was to create good citizens (good men and women) who could contribute to society. And, obviously, the conduct of war and study of war didn’t really fall within that bailiwick of good, kind, productive citizens, especially at a time when a lot of intellectuals were of the mind that they could use reason and logic to essentially extinguish war from the human existence.

Kohn

I think, [at] this time, military history was equated with war history and with battle. And so, it was being studied, really, once wars began. Perhaps [there was] some study on the causes of war amongst states. And, it was almost considered to be war among states. And that, of course, just touches the most prominent part of military history.

It’s as though you can understand elections—we just had one in this country—by only studying the elections. What are the results? Why did someone do this? Why did someone do that? I mean, you can’t understand an election unless you know who’s running, what the issues are, what the background is, what the strategies were, what’s the electorate, what’s at stake. “War is an extension of politics” said the great nineteenth-century student of Carl von Clausewitz. If you don’t understand what’s at stake in a war, if you don’t understand why the sides are fighting each other, how they’re using military institutions, and so on, you really won’t understand war.

So, [I think] there was a sense of the need that developed over time in the twentieth century, and what became known as the new military history after World War II, is that if you don’t study it, as Sir Michael Howard said, in length, breadth, and depth, you really won’t understand it. It’s just military institutions clashing and trying to eradicate each other, or at least wound some so that the one side can win and the other side would lose, or there’d be a compromise. Win what? I mean, if you don’t understand, Clausewitz said, the kind of war you are in then you are really lost as military officers and as political leaders, which, in most Western societies now, are the ones that determine the making of war and peace.

Ferguson

And, I would add to that as the concept of new military history grew in the mid-twentieth century, particularly after 1973 and the institution of the all-volunteer force, a lot of educational institutions and scholars started looking at the question of why serve? Why serve, not only in a peace time when there’s no war being fought? Why serve in an all-volunteer military when there’s no forcing function to get you to put on the uniform?

That led to military historians wrestling with a lot of new concepts that really forced them to ask some new questions. And, what it did was broaden the aperture into other disciplines, whether or not internal to the field of history or external to history and political science and communications and other fields, where they started looking more at subjects that were adjacent to military history, not necessarily war or the battlefield or the conduct of war, as Dick was commenting on, kind of, the run up to war or what basically led to the declaration of war, to a conflict in some of those underlying conditions that supported either prolonging the war or bringing it, ultimately, to a close.

Host

This leads right into my next question. Why should we record military history?

Kohn

One of the great American philosophers, George Santayana, once said, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to relive it.” One [of the] other aphorisms which always struck me [is] an exchange between an Israeli general and a military historian. The general accosted the historian and said, “You know, why do you waste your time studying the past? It’s just not relevant in this new high-tech, fast warfare we’re engaged in or would engage in.” And, the historian looked at general and said, “What makes you think you’re so smart that you can win in the next war on the basis of your own experience alone?”

I mean, it is human experience in a critically important subject to every society, every state, to millions of individuals because wars often decide things. And, they make history as well as destroy things and lives. It’s always been understood as an important human endeavor, even if it’s to be avoided.

Ferguson

I think that ties into how we define history. How we define it correlates with its value, and Alan Evans said that, basically, history is the best possible version of the truth. One of the most common misunderstandings of what history is is its clarity. History is one of the muckiest, murkiest disciplines we have, and that’s what historians are charged to do is historical inquiry. If you were to throw a bunch of historians into a room and tell them to come to a unanimous consensus on why the Allies won World War II or when the Cold War started and why, if they all emerged out of the room unscathed, I can guarantee you they wouldn’t reach a consensus.

These things—that’s 100 years later, almost, and how many conferences and books and papers have been written about these issues? And, we’re still finding new ways of interpreting whether it’s new evidence or new ways of looking at the evidence. That provides a value. And, the reason why it’s so necessary is because practitioners have to use history in order to formulate doctrine, plans, and strategy. It’s all they have in order to anticipate future requirements. And, they have to go with what is, in their estimation, the best version of history. [In] the study of history, the careful, rigorous study of history, using primary source documents is so important because we’re constantly realizing that we really didn’t have quite as good of a grasp on an event or the causality, especially behind an event or events, as we thought we did. And, those assumptions are what feed into plans, strategy, and tactics in the practitioner world.

Kohn

One of the common misunderstandings, I think, of war and of military history is, and I think this is true, particularly in the Armed Services, is the feeling that history is like a fact. It’s there, we know it all, and all we have to do is to ask it the right questions and plumb it. And, I was walking in the hall of the Pentagon one day and one of my boss’s bosses, a four-star general said, “Your job is to give us the lessons of the past.” I said to him, “General, if there were lessons in the past—like you’re thinking—your forever, absolute kinds of things—they’d be so classified, I couldn’t share them with you.”

And, he looked at me like, wait a second, I know you, you’re not a wise guy. Why did you say that? I said that because it doesn’t have lessons, per se, that will be applied to any present problem. It’s only accumulated human experience around a certain phenomenon [or] incident, a question.

You, as a decisionmaker, a senior officer, or even a junior officer or even enlisted people and noncommissioned officers, have to try to understand the past so that you can be wiser and more informed about how to deal with your present problems. When I worked as the chief of Air Force history for the USAF, the first question I would ask someone who wanted something from me or from our program was, “Why do you want this? What’s the problem you’re facing?” So that we could isolate the history that might be valuable for this decisionmaker, and that’s really it. The lessons of the past is a concept that can be highly misleading.

Host

Are there any specific insights that military history offers compared to other kinds of history?

Kohn

It’s just the selection of, I think, the subject matter. It can be plumbed, if you will, by various people for various reasons. I’ve long thought that you can ransack the past, and to prove anything you want, because there’s so much there. Depending on what your problem is, it’s really the question of what are you asking about what that will determine its value if there is some historical experience that can be useful to a person trying to gain an understanding or to make a decision about something.

Ferguson

The values that military history specifically provides in comparison to, maybe, some of the other disciplines, is that it provides a window into phenomena that most will never experience. And, the only way you’re going to get any kind of window into how human beings act in those moments and why they potentially react the way they do, act the way they do—why do they charge forward instead of turning around? Why do they follow orders instead of disobeying them? These are the kind of things that you need military history to convey because history on the margins of that isn’t going to explain that to you. One of the services that John Keegan provided when he wrote The Face of Battle was to try and get in the boots of the soldier on the ground and understand not just, okay, they were doing a maneuver here. You know, now it’s a flanking here. This unit was here. That unit was here. X amount of troops died here. X amount of troops died there. Really trying to get into the mind of [the] individual soldier and understand the mind state of war, which is something that is an outgrowth of new history because you’re looking much more at that micro level of why individual human beings are acting the way they do as opposed to this broad 30,000-foot view of the battlefield like a Napoleonic war and view of history, essentially. And, you need military history to do that.

Unfortunately, that is one of the casualties of the move away from the drum and trumpet histories—which are focusing on the battlefield and on tactics—to focus more on the social and cultural [aspects] and the political origins of war, is you’re going to end up getting perhaps fewer people looking at the battlefield under the assumption that maybe everything has been learned about that battlefield that we need to learn. And, as we’ve already touched on a little bit, those [kinds] of assumptions are constantly being revisited and questioned and, in some cases, overturned.

Kohn

I think also it's valuable for senior leaders at the various levels to get inside the minds of decisionmakers in the past to try to understand why they made the decisions they made, what they studied, what they thought, and what affected their decision making. A lot of military history is often critical in hindsight of the decisions of senior officers—or even mid-level officers—in operational situations. Because, as we know, there’s often not a lot of time to make investigations when you’re in battle, but you have to be prepared. The military as a profession is one of the few in which people who are trained early in their lives, in their graduate-level studies, to practice a profession, and then once they get the degree, once they take jobs, they practice their profession. Surgeons, lawyers, clergy, teachers [get to], but soldiers of the various Armed Services are always facing new situations as they rise in rank. As a result, they are constantly, in a sense, having to learn their profession again at a different level, with different responsibilities, different problems. Of course, the environment changes also. So, history can really be critically important for preparing officers for higher responsibility.

Host

Looking through the lens of the Iraq war and maybe reflecting on Ukraine, what are your thoughts on whether the military is prone to misusing history to conform biases?

Ferguson

That kind of touches a bit on the Whig history aspect of the essay in Parameters. And, just for a quick wave-top overview, Whig history essentially refers to the Whig authors back in England, who wrote from a certain angle to try and, essentially, promote the British Crown’s values within their history. A lot of people refer to military history as the last stand of Whig history because it’s writing, you know, representing government entities and government agencies.

I think some of the challenges that the DoD encounters, whether it’s writing its own history or uniformed historians like myself trying to be objective and open to being as critical as possible, not only of your own service, but of the decisions made by your country as well, recognizing wholeheartedly that we still maintain a loyalty to our nation and to our service. When writing history, you have to be willing to be very critical of those things, as well, which has not, obviously, been very popular over time, and that’s one of the things I kind of touch on.

Dick can probably touch on this after I do because there’s a lot of civ-mil dynamics as far as interservice rivalry and loyalty at the service level that would prevent you from either creating or, basically, consuming a history objectively about some things you feel very passionate about. Whether it’s conflict you actually participated in, or a system or a weapons system or a platform that you have experience with, you see a lot of this going on right now, and I don’t want to go too far into the presentist weeds here talking about Ukraine and Iraq, of course. But, I mean, Ukraine’s essentially turned into a petri dish of confirmation bias. And, the people with experience with armor are coming away from Ukraine saying, “These are the lessons of Ukraine, right? We got to double down on armor.” People with experience with drones and unmanned aircraft are coming away, saying, “It’s drones and unmanned aircraft. We got to double down.”

You see a lot of that, and it’s to be expected, but I think that’s one of the challenges with the way the DoD approaches history is all the services are going to fight for their own interests. They’re gonna do that. That’s natural. I think it’s a matter of coming to what we talked about: What’s the closest version of the truth as far as historical patterns? Are there historical patterns that we can lean on to make decisions that will please all of the services going forward? And, that carries over into some of the ways that we write history. And, I touch on one example of that in the article.

Kohn

I think one of the greatest mistakes that the Armed Services makes, and has historically, about the use of history is that it’s an instrument [to] which they fight their battles in the Pentagon over budgets, over roles, over missions, and the rest. Or, it’s just an academic exercise to teach people to use their minds critically. So, it’s a sign to the professional military institutions, war colleges, and staff colleges. Or, it’s used [instrumentally] as a type of public relations to serve an institution. And, that’s just wrong. I mean, I had to fight off people who would say, “Well, you’re just academic. You ought to be . . .” or, “Why aren’t you stationed at the War College? Why don’t you do that kind of thing?” and, “Why aren’t you in the public relations business in the Pentagon because that’s what you’re most useful for?” And, I had to fight that off.

And, you have to [prove], as historians both in professional military education and in staff work, as to what you’re useful for. And, that’s why I would have to ask people, “Why are you asking me that question? What are you going to use this for?” and have an interactive relationship with the client. Our clients were uniformed military first and foremost and then other services and the public.

Interestingly enough, the Army and the Air Force use historians and history instrumentally to help them make strategy, do plans, do doctrine, and do it in a sophisticated and professionally valid way, and not misleading themselves. And, I would say to you, when asked why do we do this, 1) we don’t want to reinvent the wheel if we already know how to use this. And second of all, we don’t want to lie to ourselves on the basis of what we would like to know or what we would like to think happened and why. We need to get at, as Mike put it, the truth, the best we can—and the past, and then to use it wisely and carefully for the present and the future.

Ferguson

I think, too, another one of the risks of the abuse of history, which is a topic that’s been touched on by other historians in the past, is the military it takes them years to write doctrine. And, the military is also obviously downstream from its elected leaders in politics and strategy. The realities of the operational environment of the world are going to influence the priorities of the military, either in drafting doctrine or what it’s looking at in history as far as lessons it wants to use as instructive in crafting their doctrine, plans, and strategy.

One of the challenges with that is not only how long it takes to craft doctrine, and things might change, or our perception of history might change in that period, but, also, the political environment’s very mercurial. We saw in 2017 and 2018 with the new National Security Strategy, and the new National Defense Strategy. We completely turned almost 20 years of focus on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism on its head to refocus on interstate competition with a pacing challenge there.

And so, that’s what reorients a lot of the priorities and, obviously, the funds within the DoD, as far as what it’s looking at and how it’s using history. I think if you were to go to a lot of people in the United States right now and ask them what the number one lesson learned from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were, they might just tell you, “don’t do it” because we don’t really want to talk about it anymore. We’ve moved on. And, that’s one of the unfortunate realities that you do have to get on board with that and have to try and keep up with that political aspect of where the focus is strategically.

Kohn

[The] 2017, 2018 redo of the national strategy and of doctrine was headed in the Army by a lieutenant general named H. R. McMaster, a very sophisticated historian who’s written now three books and who had the breadth and depth of understanding to be able to assess what was going on then and what needed to be done for Department of Defense and Army strategy. It’s also Interesting, and I think we ought to bring this out, that when the Army’s modern military history program was set up at the end of World War II and into the ’40s and ’50s by Dwight Eisenhower, he wanted to make certain that it was kept out of the hands of the participants in the war who might have an ax to grind as to what they did and how they did it and why they did it and to put it in the hands of scholars working for the Army, trying to make history useful. The only way it can be useful, though, is to find out what happened—accurately and without fear or favor, as we used to say—even though it might reflect badly on some senior leaders who made decisions. There are many stories about that. But the point is, that Eisenhower knew, and the Army has, I think, for the most part, kept faith with the idea that it would be, first and foremost, accurate and not warped, for a certain outside purpose.

Host

I do have one more question: What takeaways can you leave us with today about military history?

Ferguson

I’ll just comment, maybe, on some of the things I’ve learned in my time here at UNC under two phenomenal advisers. Read the classics. Far more people discuss the classics than actually read them, and even fewer actually study them and discuss them. A lot of them are assigned in professional military education, but there’s just not enough time to really dive into them. So, that’s something that a lot of practitioners will need to do on their own time.

When reading the classics, I would say supplement them and try and find experts out there who speak the language and have read the original documents. This is especially true for things like [the works of] Sun Tzu and Machiavelli. Every time someone comes to me, or I read someone quoting about winning without fighting or something of that nature, I tell them to go read John Sullivan’s papers he’s [written] for Strategy Bridge, which are a phenomenal supplement to the readings of Sun Tzu.

Also, read history to understand the intersection of culture and human needs, not necessarily for dates and facts. And, I guess that is a nice little cherry on top to our conversation about new history. That’s something I think new history has done really well. It’s helped us to understand some of the causal factors behind war beyond, obviously Thucydides’ Fear, Honor, and Interest, which is still, though, relevant today. I think really reading history for an eye towards why certain social and cultural conditions existed and how those conditions either led to war or prevented war, is a really important way to look at history from a strategic perspective. But, from the tactical and operational perspective, I think, still, reading the classics is a phenomenal way to get that foundational understanding, and then can branch out from there.

Kohn

Well, that’s absolutely right. But [what] I always tell people who ask that question of “What should I be reading?” is try those things. Read the most important things that have been written on the subject but read as far as you can and as much as it holds your interest. Just because you start reading a book doesn’t mean you have to finish it. Just because you start a book doesn’t mean it’s the right book to continue. The point is, you’ve got to develop your mind around the subject you’re studying. You don’t do that by throwing away books. You have a responsibility to yourself to find out which are the most important books and select those which you are most interested in and can come to grips with.

And, always remember that you’ve got to be a critical thinker. You’ve got to think for yourself, and you’ve got to integrate what you’re reading and what you’re learning with what you know and what you know is right because there is no perfect answer to that question of what you should read, when you should read it, how you should read it, and how it should develop your own understanding of your profession. But if you’re not reading, if you’re not developing in your profession, you’re throwing away your experience and the potential of your contribution to American national defense, and that’s really, really important. Know your profession.

Host

Wise words to end with. Mike, Dick, thank you so much. I really enjoyed our chat today.

Ferguson

Thank you, Stephanie.

Kohn

Thank you. I, too. Thanks Stephanie.

Host

Listeners, you can read the genesis article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 4. There will also be a link to the article in the show notes (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss4/3). For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

The Indications and Warnings subfield of intelligence has traditionally divided warnings into a dichotomy of “ambiguous” and “unambiguous” that gives policymakers a false sense of security. In this episode, Regan Copple examines why unambiguous warning has become an inadequate planning tool that can lead to dire consequences in the quest for certainty.

E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.

Podcast record date: November 20, 2024

Keywords: intelligence, military planning, warning, decision making, strategic planning

Episode Transcript

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I am talking with Regan Copple today, author of “The Fallacy of Unambiguous Warning,” which you can find in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters. Copple is a research associate at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia, where her work focuses on strategy development and war gaming. She is also a doctoral student at George Mason University.

Welcome to Decisive Point, Regan.

Regan Copple

Thank you. Thanks for having me.

Host

What are the working definitions of ambiguous warnings and unambiguous warnings in the context of your article?

Copple

For ambiguous warning, the easy way to break it down is the idea of you know something’s coming, but you’re not quite sure what or when. In practice, this would look like seeing some sort of mass mobilization but not knowing where those forces were mobilizing to or where the first attack might occur. Whereas unambiguous warning, you know something’s going to happen. You know what’s going to happen, when is it going to happen, and how is it going to happen. It sounds super simple, but in reality, this is a really high bar to be able to pin down the exact when and how. A good example of unambiguous warning is the ideal conceptualization of tactical warning about two to three days or a week before an attack would happen.

Host

How has the traditional distinction between ambiguous and unambiguous warnings contributed to a false sense of security in military planning, and how might this thinking be revised?

Copple

This distinction isn’t so much of what’s creating the false sense of security, it’s the expectation that you’re going to receive unambiguous warning, which both very recent events like Ukraine and the Hamas attack on Israel, and modern history more broadly—like Pearl Harbor, the Korean War and [the Yom Kippur War] show—is that what’s creating the false sense of security is the idea of we will know when this is going to happen. And, we will know exactly what is coming and when, which hasn’t been true.

In terms of how can we reverse this thinking, I’d say we need to start thinking about writing. When we write about unambiguous warning in plans and in our day jobs, rather than think about it as a necessary condition, [we should] start treating it as a “nice to have” rather than a “must have” to further confirm our existing assumptions. Because if we’re waiting for the confirmation that we’re right, that confirmation normally comes in the form of being attacked, which, needless to say, is not a preferred outcome.

Host

Your article discusses the failure of Israeli intelligence during the Yom Kippur War due to their expectation of unambiguous warnings. What lessons can modern military strategists learn from these kinds of historical intelligence failures?

Copple

The biggest reason Egypt succeeded in obfuscating their warnings was because they employed an especially well-thought-out deception plan. I think the biggest lesson from this conflict is that adversaries understand the victim state might be watching, so they have an incentive to obscure what they’re actually doing and misrepresent what they’re doing, which means planners and strategists have to factor in responses to deception or contingency plans and think about what happens if the opponent would try and execute some sort of deception. What might this look like? How might we be able to counter that? Basically, the bottom line is don’t expect the enemy to make it easy for you because they have a vested interest in not doing so.

Host

How can military planners better utilize ambiguous warnings in their intelligence collection and analysis process to avoid surprises like Pearl Harbor or the Yom Kippur War?

Copple

The biggest take away from Pearl Harbor wasn’t that we didn’t have most of the information we needed to make a decision. We did. The bigger issue was that the right people didn’t have the right information at the right time, in no small part due to security classification issues. Now in 2024, a lot of this has been fixed by technology because now we don’t need to burn letters flown halfway across the world minutes after they’re read. But, the underlying message that remains for today is that information sharing is hard. We shouldn’t assume that everyone gets every piece of information they need the second they need it—and plan around that—and basically understand that institutional bureaucratic stove pipes can get in the way of information sharing and those things are difficult to break down over time.–

Host

The article suggests that the Intelligence Community’s process is not designed to predict specific events but to assess probabilities. How can decision makers ensure they act on high-probability intelligence without over-relying on the elusive certainty of unambiguous warnings?

Copple

Much like how lots of the solution rests with changing the way that planners and strategists think about warning, this requires educating decisionmakers inside—but also, mostly outside—the Department of Defense on what do we mean when we say “warning?” Because the DOD has its own very specific language where things that we may say in our day-to-day jobs may mean something very, very different to a person with no previous defense experience or very little defense experience.

We also need to talk about what a given probability means. What does a low-confidence assessment mean? What does a high-confidence assessment mean? What are some of the implications of that? And also, educate that just because we don’t have unambiguous warning, that doesn’t mean something isn’t going to happen. That just means that we don’t have a crystal-clear picture on what we think is going to happen next.

Both the beauty and the curse of this problem is primarily that it’s a solution that’s driven by a mindset change. It’s a beauty in that it doesn’t cost us any money or people to make this change, which is nice. But, at the same time, it’s a curse in that entrenched beliefs within the DOD and the national security establishment are incredibly hard to dislodge once those beliefs have been established.

Host

We have a few extra minutes if you’re willing to entertain another question or two.

I’d love to know what inspired you to write this article.

Copple

A few years ago, I was sitting in some planning discussions out in INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific Command], and some of the planners at the table looked around and they said, “Hey, you know, maybe we should define unambiguous warning in the document so that way everybody in the future knows and it’s clear, that they understand what we meant when we wrote this.” Everybody at the time thought that was a great idea. So, then everyone started to share what to them looked like unambiguous warning. And, what started off as a very civil, casual discussion very quickly turned into a very acrimonious argument, and by the very end, everyone was further apart in understanding what unambiguous warning meant, not closer together. That sort of prompted me to think if there are so many different views on what unambiguous warning is, is it really unambiguous? And, that’s what really sparked my research—and looking at case studies and realizing that there’s a trend here. What I experienced wasn’t just a one-off conversation.

Host

Once you started researching it, did you find any surprises or unexpected information?

Copple

I think the underlying thread that I found the most was that a lot of the most successful surprise attacks have a very big deception component where it’s not just that the victim state misses something altogether. That’s normally not what happens. There’s normally some sort of active deception and obfuscation going on on the part of the attacking state.

Host

Do you have any concluding thoughts you’d like to share?

Copple

Bottom line: warning is hard, and I think we forget that sometimes. We tend to think as long as we check off every box on a list of things we observe, that means we have a certain level of warning, and we know what’s going to happen based off of that list. It doesn’t. We not only have to think about what we’re seeing, but why are we seeing what we’re seeing? What other explanations or adversary motivations could be out there that’s driving the adversary to make those decisions, or those maneuvers, and figure out are we falling into some sort of mental trap? Are they doing what we expect them to do? And, if they’re not, maybe why not? And, think through all of this because once we do, we’re going to get a little bit closer to understanding the true picture of what’s going on.

Host

Thank you for making time to speak with me today. I really enjoyed it.

Copple

Thank you. Pleasure to be here.

Host

Listeners, you can read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 3.

For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

In this episode, Richard D. Hooker argues that the historical assessment of Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in World War II lacks objectivity and balance. While we will never know if other generals would have outperformed Eisenhower, several leaders were available—all senior to Eisenhower at the outbreak of the war and with superior professional résumés.

E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.

Podcast record date: November 7, 2024

Keywords: Dwight D. Eisenhower, World War II, strategy, command, Joint campaign

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I'm talking with Richard D. Hooker today, the author of “Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander: A Reappraisal,” which you can find in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters. Hooker is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council and senior associate at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. He is the former National Security Council senior director for Europe and Russia and authored The High Ground: Leading in Peace and War, which was published by Casemate in 2023.

Welcome to Decisive Point, Richard.

Richard D. Hooker

Thank you. It's great to be here.

Host

How did Eisenhower’s lack of prior combat command experience affect his performance as Supreme Allied Commander?

Hooker

Well, I think first of all, it is important to give some credit where credit is due. Eisenhower began the war as a lieutenant colonel and rose in some 23 months to four stars. As the Supreme Commander he superintended, really, the largest Joint campaign in probably military history up to that point, which was ultimately successful in a little over 10 months. So, that’s a major achievement.

I think what we’re wrestling with here [is] was he the best qualified person, and how did his background help him or hinder him in the performance of those remarkable duties? And, I think it’s fair to say that although he was clearly a highly intelligent and experienced middle-grade officer, the lack of professional experience in command of larger formations—and probably a lack of combat experience, as well—didn’t serve him as well as it otherwise might have done. There were other officers, in my opinion, who were far more experienced and senior who possibly could have done a little bit better job, and we can talk about that as we go forward in this discussion.

Host

Sure, I’m looking forward to hearing about that. Tell me, what were some of the key strategic errors that are attributed to Eisenhower, and how did they affect the course of the war?

Hooker

I think there are a number of those that are discussed in the article in Parameters and most of them have to do, in my opinion, with seizing or not seizing opportunities.

So, the first major error that I see in the European campaign in 1944 is a missed opportunity to trap two German field armies at Falaise during the breakout from the Normandy beachhead. At this time, Eisenhower is still in the UK [United Kingdom], and the overall ground commander is [British General Bernard Montgomery, commander of 21st Army Group]. So, I think it's fair to say that Eisenhower did not exert, really, a firm grasp of the operations that were going on at that time. There was a golden opportunity to close the gap at Falaise and trap a large number of German soldiers who, unfortunately, were able to escape and then form the basis for reconstituted units later on, which of course prolonged the war, and were directly responsible for many, many more Allied casualties.

The second opportunity, I think, had to do with the failure to open the port of Antwerp, which was essential for the logistical support of the campaign after the breakout from the Normandy beachhead in the bocage. Although the British actually captured Antwerp early in September of 1944, the long estuary leading out to the North Sea, some 54 miles, was not cleared of German troops as Montgomery attempted to press forward. This resulted in an inability to open up Antwerp—really, one of the major ports in all of Europe at the time. And it caused the campaign to stall for logistical reasons at a time when even the German commanders in their post-war memoirs felt that it would have been fairly easy to rupture the entire front and drive deep into Germany. So, I think that was the second major strategic misstep.

The third, in my opinion, was Market Garden, which was the audacious attempt to seize the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem, which for a number of reasons was unsuccessful. Eisenhower himself described himself as an ardent supporter. He said he didn’t have to be convinced to approve the operation. But, for a number of reasons, it failed, and the Germans remained in control of that sector and of that bridge, really, all the way through April of 1945. As a number of historians have pointed out, [it was] a real strategic disappointment.

Perhaps the fourth major strategic misstep was the terrible, painful, and very costly battle fought in the Hürtgen Forest through the fall and early winter of 1944. [It was] really one of the longest ground battles ever fought by the US Army in Europe [and] resulted in very, very high casualties for very limited gain. I think the official historians have pointed out [that it] was really a battle that didn’t need to be fought and ended up having very, very high costs on American soldiers.

Little known to many is an opportunity for Eisenhower’s forces to cross the Rhine in, uh, late November, early December of 1944. So, if you’ll recall, [General Jacob L. Devers] 6th Army Group coming up from southern France following Operation Dragoon actually reaches the Rhine in mid-November of 1944 and makes preparations to cross the river and enter into Germany, which, in all probability, would have disrupted the Ardennes counteroffensive, the Battle of the Bulge, which happened shortly thereafter. He pleaded with Eisenhower for permission to cross the Rhine with his army group, but that permission was denied, and that opportunity was, in my opinion, squandered. And so, a month later, we find ourselves in the middle of the Battle of the Bulge, again with very, very heavy US casualties—and arguably a needless battle that could have been avoided or prevented.

That takes us to what I saw as this sixth strategic misstep, which was the Bulge itself. It has to be accounted a major intelligence failure for the Germans to mass almost 30 divisions without the knowledge of the Allies doesn’t speak well to our intelligence apparatus. There’s reason to believe that intelligence officers were always cautious about predicting the chances of German counterattacks because of the wave of euphoria that had sort of swept Eisenhower’s headquarters at that time. At any rate, the Battle of the Bulge does happen. The Ardennes, counteroffensive, again, inflicting very, very heavy casualties on US troops, in particular—really not on Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, which suffers very, very few, almost 20,000 US fatalities in the Battle of the Bulge, which is a very high number.

But, the Bulge represented an opportunity as well. It was a very large, very deep penetration, which, if it had been countered aggressively, as Patton argued, by strong attacks on the northern and the southern flanks of the penetration, again, another opportunity to cut off and bag several hundred thousand German soldiers. That’s not what happens. Eisenhower finds himself unable to get Montgomery to attack aggressively from the north, and the Germans are essentially pushed back from west to east. They fall back in something like good order, and the campaign continues for another five or six months.

So very briefly, those are the six major missteps that I saw in the campaign that I think can be fairly attributed to Eisenhower’s generalship, as he himself pointed out in his memoirs and in his letters to General [George C.] Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, he assumed the supreme authority for all the decisions that were made in the campaign, and I argue, therefore, bears responsibility for these decisions as well.

Host

So, you mentioned earlier about Montgomery and I’m curious about how Eisenhower’s relationship with British commanders like Montgomery might have influenced Allied operations and campaign outcomes.

Hooker

Eisenhower, of course, is often lauded as being, sort of, a very accomplished military diplomat, but actually, his relations with Montgomery, in particular, were very strained and problematic. Although only three years older than Eisenhower, Montgomery, of course, was vastly more experienced and senior than Eisenhower at the outbreak of the war. [He was] badly wounded in World War I, commanded at the division and the corps in the Army and, ultimately, Army group level. And, as some stories have pointed out, Eisenhower was painfully aware of his lack of credentials when compared to others like Montgomery.

So, through the course of the campaign, he finds it very difficult to impose his will on the field marshal. I’ve cited some of the examples of that at Falaise and the opening of the port of Antwerp and during the Battle of the Bulge. During the war, Montgomery never attended any of the staff conferences that Eisenhower held for the Army and Army group commanders, always sending his chief of staff instead. So, I think this was really problematic for the campaign because in a number of instances there were real opportunities to inflict decisive defeats on the German army that would have hastened the end of the war and saved tens of thousands of lives. And, Eisenhower is just unable to, as I said, impose his will on Montgomery in that way. And so, I do think it was problematic.

A different, more senior, more experienced commander, perhaps someone like General Walter Krueger, who spoke fluent French and German and was a corps commander in 1941 when Eisenhower is a newly promoted colonel, would have been able, in my opinion, to contend on a much more equal and more firm footing with strong world commanders like Montgomery.

Host

Can we build on that a little bit? You hinted earlier about maybe an alternative commander would have had better outcomes with the Allies in Europe. What kind of qualities would this person possess?

Hooker

First of all, you would want someone who had standing with the British. Let’s remember that the British had been in the war for a number of years before the Americans really entered the scene in force. So, that would have been one.

A commander who had had previous experience at high levels of command would have enjoyed a greater prestige and, I would say, position power with the British. There’s no question about that. An example is Pershing in the First World War, he had been a general officer for many years by the time the war broke out, and he was able to interact with his Allied counterparts on more or less an equal footing. And, we know from the memoirs of senior British officers following the war that they always looked at Eisenhower with this in mind, and I think that was an important factor in many of the problems that he had dealing with Montgomery, but also with others.

Host

This has been a very interesting overview of your article, but before we go, do you have any concluding thoughts that you would like to share?

Hooker

You know, it’s hard to find another example of an officer [that] was so junior at the outbreak of the war, who rose to Supreme Command. Certainly, the British didn’t operate that way. The Germans did not operate that way. They had some very talented officers who were, sort of, regimental commanders at the outbreak of the war. [General Georg Otto Hermann Balck] is one who comes to mind. He begins the wars of lieutenant colonel, and he ends the war as an army group commander, but he never rises above three stars. This was really an unprecedented decision that Marshall took to put a relatively untried officer in such an exalted position, and I think there probably were good reasons for that.

Now I don’t want to in any way denigrate Eisenhower’s service. At the end of the day, he’s ultimately responsible for a successful campaign in—up to that point—the largest war in human history. Let’s give him the credit which is due. The real question is, was he the best choice for the job, and could the war have been concluded more quickly with fewer casualties? I think that’s the real question for us to think about here some 80 years on.

Host

Listeners, you can download the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 3. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

Richard, I enjoyed this very much. Thank you for making time to speak with me today.

Hooker

Thank you. [It was] a great pleasure.

In this episode, Colin D. Robinson discusses American and Western liberal ideas (ideological views) and politics in relation to the obstacles faced in rebuilding the Afghan and Iraqi armies. This podcast reviews the differences between Western liberal democracies and partner states, the politics of counterinsurgency, and army accounts.

E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.

Podcast record date: September 26, 2024

Keywords: liberal peace, Afghan National Army, Iraqi Army, security sector reform, security force assistance

Episode transcript

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You're listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Joining me virtually today is Colin D. Robinson, author of “Why the Afghan and Iraqi Armies Collapsed: An Allied Perspective,” which you can find in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters. Robinson lectures on defense leadership and management at Cranfield Defense and Security at Cranfield University, Shrivenham, United Kingdom. He began his tracking of Operation Enduring Freedom while at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, DC, in 2002.

Welcome to Decisive Point, Colin.

Colin D. Robinson

Thank you so much.

Host

In your view, what were the most critical structural weaknesses that led to the collapse of the Afghan and Iraqi armies? How could these have been addressed more effectively by their respective governments or allied forces?

Robinson

The structural weakness was politics. Iraq was split between Sunni, Shia, and Kurd. And, the parties interested in the Afghan army were split between the Tajiks and the Uzbeks and less-than minorities and networks of political party affiliation in the armed forces, which led to different political parties having the loyalty and patronage and financial links to different sets of generals within what was the Afghan National Army.

One of the other critical points was the disbandment of the Iraqi army under Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA] Order No. 2, which has historically now been seen as an enormous, enormous mistake. There were plans in place to use the existing remnants of the Iraqi army that still existed by the time Baghdad had fallen, and US Army senior leaders were liaising with their generals. The most recent research I have seen attributes the origins of CPA Order 2, potentially, to Ahmed Chalabi, clearly through Ambassador Paul D. Bremer.

The question is, did the United States try to set up a mirror-image state army along the lines of Western armies or try to build forces that took more account of the political realities? In thinking about this, one has to remember that the Kurdish forces, now, in what is the Kurdish zone of Iraq, are still split down the middle between two separate factions.

Host

Some have attributed the failure of these armies to issues of leadership, issues of corruption.

How much responsibility do you think should be placed on these internal factors compared to the external military pressures?

Robinson

General Colin Powell, later Secretary of State, had something he called a “Pottery Barn rule.” You break it, you own it. So, at least equal responsibility can be divided between the United States and its allies, including the United Kingdom, and on the other side, Iraqi and Afghan actors because the United States firstly created the whole Iraqi mess in 2002 and 2003 for no real justifiable reason, as we now know, in my view. And secondly, as [State Department representative Carter] Malkasian and [David] Kilcullen and Mills have noted, the United States and its allies did not bring one of the most important actors, the Taliban, to the key Bonn Afghan peace conference of 2002. If the Taliban had been at that conference, the result might have been very, very different. Now, that’s the external military factors or external political factors.

In terms of internal factors, leadership and corruption issues had been endemic in Afghanistan and Iraq since they were established. They were very much patrimonial states. They work along the lines of a father ruling his family with, to some degree, an iron hand. They’re low-trust societies. Less than 10 years of very bloody US-led presence in Iraq, or 20 years in Afghanistan, had very little hope of changing that. To sum up again, basically, at least equal responsibility between the interveners, the United States and its allies, and Iraq and [Afghanistan], different feuding political actors.

Host

Taking into consideration the lessons from the collapse of the Afghan and Iraqi armies, what changes in strategy should be implemented in current—or future—US military interventions to avoid similar outcomes?

Robinson

Since about the 1960s, large-scale Western democratic states have tried to do counterinsurgency in several states after they gained independence. After independence in places like South Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, it does not seem to work. There are too many political compromises. The selected local leader, client leader, does not want to do what the United States wants. It does not seem to be successful. Perhaps the most recent clearest example of this is Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan.

The thing is, this was not well understood or potentially well understood because during the colonial period, this is something that Richard Holbrook pointed out, it could and sometimes did work. The usual standard example of the British in Malaya, the British in Kenya, to some extent, the suppression and eventual resolution of the [Hukbalahap] insurgency in the Philippines immediately after the Second World War, assisted by the United States.

So, what changed in strategy? Firstly, do not try large-scale expeditionary Western counterinsurgency in client states, in partner states. It just doesn’t seem to work. For smaller-scale efforts, the State Department should be much more in the political driver’s seat. They should be building the political roads, supervising the political activities for overseeing things for the competent commands and involving, yes, the Department of Defense and the implementation, more the State Department overseeing, and potentially, even the Agency for International Development, which did wonders in Yugoslavia after the Second World War, supporting Yugoslavs when the US was allied with them.

The Bosnia train and equip program is a good working example of how the State Department implemented the program properly. I have to say with some sorrow that the Department of the Army is really not particularly well placed to plan and run assistance programs. [It has] too much focus on technical specifications and not enough on politics, which made and broke the Afghan and Iraqi armies. The temptation to put together a program plan and then push it together, push it through, virtually at all costs, should be resisted firmly.

Host

So where do we go from here? How do the failures of these armies reflect the broader challenges of nation building in conflict zones? Is there a way for external forces like the United States to foster sustainable military institutions in these kinds of environments?

Robinson

State building, what you could call fixing failed states, unquote, has proven very, very difficult in these very, very deeply split conflict zones. Literally, the book called Fixing Failed States: [A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World] was cowritten by Ashraf Ghani, who became president of Afghanistan and then lost to the Taliban. Analysts are moving beyond this kind of, “liberal peace,” paradigm. There needs to be a little bit more of an ability and a willingness to accept and work with other actors, non-state actors, the political forces that don’t necessarily fit in the state or Western Europe or North America’s view of the state.

To try and generate some kind of peace and prosperity, but potentially, case by case, to leave state structures out of it. So, no. External forces like the United States cannot necessarily at all foster sustainable military institutions in countries ripped apart by decades of war and oppression. Afghanistan and Iraq are a good example. Another potentially similar example is the decades of effort by France to support former colonies in Africa, which has just had somewhat of a similar backlash in the three countries in Niger and Burkina Faso [and] Mali, where their efforts have just led to yet another military coup. We have a whole lot more stable countries, [where it is] much easier to help because we have much more to work with, but if we’re wanting to work in places like Somalia, which appear to be strategically critical, be prepared to work with non-state actors or militia.

Host

Unfortunately, we’re out of time here. I do have time for one more question, though, if you have any concluding thoughts you’d like to share with us.

Robinson

I said before, do less interventions. Often, do not go. Focus on more stable countries where there are strong forces to work with. The United States actually doesn’t have to run the entire world. Climate change will create more problems and pressure for deployments. So, aspirations, as far as I can tell, will have to be scaled back over time as climate disasters increase in number and forces are needed more closer to home.

Host

Thank you for making time to speak with me today, Colin.

Robinson

Thank you so much for listening.

Host

Listeners, you can read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 3. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

In this episode of Decisive Point, authors Michael T. Hackett and John A. Nagl delve into insights from the article “A Long, Hard Year: Russia-Ukraine War Lessons Learned 2023.” They analyze the evolution of warfare tactics between the first and second year of the Russia-Ukraine War, highlighting the shift from rapid maneuvers to trench warfare characterized by saturation and attrition. The discussion emphasizes the significance of adaptability for military strategists in the United States and NATO, particularly in response to Russia’s strategic use of mercenaries like the Wagner Group. Hackett and Nagl explore the implications of a transparent battlefield shaped by modern technologies and the contrasting command structures of Ukraine and Russia, showcasing the effectiveness of decentralized command. Additionally, the critical role of airpower and the future of Ukraine in the context of Western support are key themes, underscoring the vital lessons for contemporary military strategists.

E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.

Podcast record date: September 5, 2024

Keywords: culture, human domain, cross-cultural competence, military education

You’re listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I’m in the studio with Dr. John A. Nagl today and joining us virtually is Michael T. Hackett. Nagl and Hackett are the authors of “A Long, Hard Year, Russia-Ukraine War Lessons Learned 2023,” which was published in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters.

Nagl, the director of the Russia-Ukraine War integrated research project, is a retired Army officer and a professor of war-fighting studies at the US Army War College.

Hackett is a foreign service officer at the US Department of State and served as the chief of staff for the integrated research project that studied the second year of the Russia-Ukraine War. He is a distinguished graduate of the US Army War College class of 2024.

Welcome to Decisive Point, John and Mike.

Dr. John A. Nagl

Thank you, Stephanie. It’s good to be with you.

Michael T. Hackett

Great to be here.

Host

Let’s just jump right in and get started here. How has the approach to war and its tactics changed from the first-year study of the war to the second-year study?

Nagl

I’ll take that if I can. I was asked by General [Paul E.] Funk and the Training and Doctrine Command during the first summer of the Russo-Ukrainian War [Russia-Ukraine War] to try to examine that war for lessons learned for the Training and Doctrine Command of the US Army, which General Funk then led, and started the academic year that graduated in 2023 by looking then at the first year of the Russo-Ukrainian War [Russia-Ukraine War] over the course of 2022.

And, Mike and I have now authored a study that is a capstone to a broader study of the second year of the war. And, I think I’d characterize the first year of the war as a war of maneuver. It was the year that Russia invaded and then that Ukraine counterattacked, broadly speaking, erasing the majority of Russia’s gains from the first month of the war. And so, the first year studied a war of movement.

The second year of the war, the year 2023, covered in the article that Mike and I have published, was much more a static war. It was a war of trenches. It was a war of a failed Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of 2023. And so, the lessons we learned from the first year of the war were very different than a lot of the lessons—not all, but a lot of the lessons—we learned during the second year of the war.

And ironically, we are now in academic year 2025, studying the war as it happens in 2024. And, with the Kursk incursion by Ukraine, we’re again seeing a war of movement. And so, the war keeps changing, the Russians and the Ukrainians keep learning and adapting, and our hope is that the American Army and the US military [will] learn and adapt as well from these changing lessons of a changing war.

Host

Thanks, John. Mike, how has Russia’s approach to utilizing mercenaries impacted its broader military strategy in the conflict? And what lessons can be drawn from this for future conflicts involving state and non-state actors?

Michael T. Hackett

One of the most significant aspects of the second year of the war was Russia’s increased use of mercenaries—of private military companies, or PMC—particularly the Wagner Group, culminating in the failed mutiny last June by [Wagner founder Yevgeny] Prigozhin and his death two months later. So, our Norwegian international fellow on the team focused exclusively on this topic and looked not only at the history of Wagner, but also the tactics and the degree to which their approach has altered Russian force structure in the long term.

In his review, he looked at two components of the Wagner PMC, zeki, which is short for zaklyuchënnyi, or prisoners, and osvovy, which are the foundational elements of that unit. And, the zeki’s are prisoners who were brought in through a service agreement, and the osvovy were trained professional fighters with experience in Syria and Africa. Now, on the battlefield, this meant that Wagner used the zeki as assault units, the so-called “Storm Z” units, which are sheer mass of numbers just to throw at the enemy, while the osvovy, the trained soldiers, were left to consolidate the gains. And, in doing so, despite the heavy casualties among the zeki, Wagner was able to maintain his long-term capabilities, leaving command elements and experienced soldiers protected and able to continue to fight.

So, the Russians used this approach to counter an increasingly transparent battlefield—one with drones and space and electronic warfare—made massing and concentrating attacks very difficult. Wagner used these assault tactics with bursts of massive expendable forces followed by a consolidation of gains with trained soldiers to successfully grind down the Ukrainians in that second year in battles like the one in Bakhmut and Avdiivka. And, even with the death of Prigozhin and the folding in of Wagner into regular Russian units, we’re seeing the Russian army adopt this approach into the tactics of its regular armed forces and even using it to alter the military’s force structure.

So obviously, in TRADOC, Training and Doctrine and Command, we need to look carefully at ways to approach an adversary that’s willing to take these heavy losses with these assault tactics and one that may not feel encumbered by [the] law of armed conflict. Both are really a significant shift and one that we need to be ready for.

Host

The article highlights the impact of persistent surveillance on the battlefield. How has this transparency affected traditional combat doctrines, and what innovations are necessary to counteract these changes?

Nagl

So, Mike talked a little bit about the transparent battlefield, and this is the idea that there’s an unblinking eye—largely drones, but also satellites and various electromagnetic systems that produce an unblinking eye—that make it essentially impossible to mask the forces that are necessary to conduct breakthrough-level attacks. And, the idea of that chapter was that a lot of the work we did during the second year of the war’s study was [documenting] that this technology changed the character of war. That was one of the reasons we attributed to the failures of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of ’23 [2023], and that was one of the conclusions we drew.

And then, just as we published the article, the Kursk invasion happens and, all of a sudden, Ukraine has found ways to adapt, to conceal movement, to use surprise, to somehow manage to mass the forces that allowed a breakthrough of Russian lines in a place where, admittedly, Russian lines were weak and seize a fairly extraordinary amount of Russian territory in fairly short order. And, we’re still trying to figure out—this is one of the things we’re going to examine in this year’s study—why and how it was that Ukraine was able to succeed. One of the early explanations appears to be that although Russia saw the massing of forces, they couldn’t understand why Ukraine would attack in that direction. There were no immediately apparent strategic goals in the direction of Kursk. They couldn’t imagine Ukraine, which was under enormous pressure defensively further south, would use its forces in an offensive manner.

This is one of the questions I’m most interested in. It’s one of the questions that I’m looking forward to digging into this year, but it’s another example, to me, of the way that armies learn and adapt at a very rapid pace on the battlefield. They make mistakes, but under the pressure of combat, and, for Ukraine, under the pressure of national survival. And arguably for Russia, at least for Putin, this is also a war of survival at this point.

We saw the Wagner mutiny spooking Putin. Both armies are working hard to gain an advantage over their adversary, and I’m reminded, really, of some of the innovations during World War I that led to, for instance, ultimately, the invention of the tank, the harnessing of the internal combustion engine to machine guns or to cannons and to armor that restored mobility to the battlefield. And, one of the interesting things for me is that the tank has been declared dead a number of times in the Ukraine war [Russia-Ukraine War], and, what the Kursk incursion clearly shows is that its demise has been sadly over-reported to date.

Host

The article suggests the need to foster a culture of mission command. How can military organizations effectively cultivate this culture, especially in a high-intensity conflict like Ukraine?

Hackett

To John’s point, talking about the Kursk incursion, certainly innovation adaptation has been important to the Ukrainian success on that front. Mission command has also been very important. The degree to which the Ukrainians have been able to delegate authority onto subordinate units, [and] frankly, the Russian failure to do so, this is something that we saw very much in the first year of the war, where subordinate Russian forces were unable to respond to changing factors on the ground without direct command from higher echelons. Communication did not only cause a time delay in responding on the ground, but also created a real vulnerability that the Ukrainians effectively exploited to strike at command centers. I suspect that something similar to that probably happened in Kursk as well.

In the second year of the war, when we were looking at mission command, we looked at Russia’s enforced conscription, opening its prisons to recruit new soldiers for the front line. And, those new soldiers were given very little training. This, in turn, led to very little agency given to those units, as there was really no opportunity to build the trust needed to allow for high command to feel comfortable to delegate decision-making autonomy. This wasn’t the case on the Ukrainian side, which benefited from extensive training and a [significantly] different culture, allowing subordinate units more autonomy.

While we have an entire section, an entire chapter dedicated to mission command, I think this idea of distributed operations is a common thread that was woven into almost every chapter that we looked at in the second year. Whether it’s the decentralization of fire’s direction or creating a culture of innovation and adaptation or even in the information space, our information expert discussed how Ukraine was brilliant in its ability to delegate authority and autonomy to its government officials and military spokespeople to speak directly to the public audience—not only in Ukraine, but to the Western partners as well—in a way that is deeply authentic and convincing. It’s been crucial to building shared resolve, both in the US and with our NATO partners. And, I think we could learn from that. We could look for ways ourselves to build in this advocacy into our military and broader US government messaging.

Host

Given the assertion that air superiority is a prerequisite for successful ground offensive, what challenges have emerged in achieving this in the Russia-Ukraine War? And, how might these lessons influence future air-ground integration strategies?

Nagl

We had two different Air Force officers examine the role of airpower during the second year of the Ukrainian war, and the American pilot, call sign “Boss,” unsurprisingly, I think, said that airpower is the key to victory, as airpower has been the key to victory since airpower was invented roughly a century ago. The non-American airpower advocate made a somewhat different argument. He said that Ukraine’s use of air defense systems, of air denial, was enabling, if not victory, at least Ukrainian survival, and he wondered whether there’s a less expensive way to negate the use of airpower on the battlefield. My own sense, in particular, for the American audience to whom we’re mostly writing, is that the former argument is more correct, that in order to gain ground, in order to seize ground on the battlefield, air superiority remains immensely valuable. Although again, during the Kursk incursion, Ukraine didn’t yet have its F-16s up in the air, but nonetheless managed to seize ground using elements of surprise [and] using artillery systems in some ways to achieve some of the effects of airpower.

And so, while the American military certainly hopes that it will always have air superiority, that we’ll be able to use multiple domains interacting together to place the adversary in as uncomfortable and difficult a position as possible, the Ukraine [Russia-Ukraine] War  continues to be a case that has different lessons, depending on where you look and what part of the war you examine. I’m reminded of the blind men feeling the elephant and thinking it’s a fan and a tree trunk and a rope. And the Ukraine [Russia-Ukraine] War is all of those different things all at once.

I do think that America should continue to try to achieve air superiority whenever possible, but when it can’t, it should study the lessons of what Ukraine has been able to do in air denial and achieve great things with limited resources, which is a challenge the United States military hasn’t had to struggle with for many years, but it’s a great reminder that ingenuity and national will, national resilience, which was another thing we studied in the second year of the war, have enormous and lasting benefits for an army, for a defense department, and for a nation.

Host

Unfortunately, we have to wrap it up. I’d love to hear—did we leave anything out? Do you have any concluding thoughts you’d like to share?

Hackett

The biggest question left unanswered here is what comes next? Not only in year three with Russia’s slow advance into eastern Ukraine and Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk and Belgorod regions, but what are the prospects for war termination? What is the future for Ukraine post-conflict?

And, I think a lot of that really depends upon maintaining resolve in Ukraine, as well as its Western partners. And fixing Ukraine as a partner in transatlantic institutions like the European Union and NATO, and supporting and strengthening Ukraine as a liberal democracy, strengthening its institutions, helping to build a vibrant economy, a robust civil society. And, I think that the team assembling at the [US Army] War College right now to look at year three will have their hands full grappling with those very questions. But overall, I’m very proud of what our team was able to accomplish over the past year.

And, I’m so honored and humbled to have been part of the project. It’s really rare for us at the State Department to see how all the pieces of our military support puzzle come together. And, the incredible team that we brought together at the [US] Army War College pulled expertise from across the Joint Force, as John mentioned, from active duty, reserve, National Guard, and crucially included international fellows from Ukraine and from our NATO partners who really are on the front line of this conflict. I really think and hope that the insights that this team of professionals has shared will help not only Ukraine but, really, our own Joint Force and unified command more broadly in the fight of the future. And I’ve really been grateful to have been a part of it.

Host

What a great note to end on. Listeners, you can download the article at https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/. Look for volume 54, issue 3.

For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

John, Mike, it was a pleasure. Thank you for making time for this today.

Nagl

It was fun, Stephanie. Thank you.

Hackett

Thank you so much.