
Sign up to save your podcasts
Or


This commentary responds to Matthew Valasik and Shannon E. Reid’s article “The Alt-Right Movement and US National Security” published in the Autumn 2021 issue of Parameters (vol. 51, no. 3).
Keywords: US National Security, Alt-Right Movement, white-power/far-right, Criminal Justice and Criminology
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss1/16/
Episode Transcript:
Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.
The guests in speaking order on this episode are:
(Guest 1 Dr. Shannon Reid)
(Host)
Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Shannon Reid, coauthor of “The Alt-Right Movement and National Security” by Dr. Reid and Dr. Matthew Valasik, featured in Parameters’ Autumn (Fall) 2021 issue. Retired US Air Force Major General Charles J. Dunlop replied, disagreeing with Reid and Valasik’s articles. His thoughts as well as Reid and Valasik’s reply are in the Parameters Spring 2022 issue.
Reid is an associate professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. She is the lead author of Alt-Right Gangs: A Hazy Shade of White. Valasik is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at Louisiana State University. He’s the coauthor of Alt-Right Gangs: A Hazy Shade of White. Dunlap retired from the Air Force in 2010, after more than 34 years of service. He currently teaches at Duke Law School and is the executive director of its Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security. His 1992 essay “The Origins of the Military Coup of 2012” was selected for Parameters’ 40th Anniversary Edition. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
Shannon, thanks for joining us. I’m glad you’re here. Your article talks about the white-power movement and its history with the military from the Civil War to today. What was the overarching goal of your original article?
(Reid)
So the overarching goal of the main article is to really bring attention to the fact that we have a white-power/far-right issue in the military, and it’s not a new problem. As you mentioned, we go back all the way to the Civil War. But it is an area of focus that needs attention and cannot continue to be pushed out of the way as something we don’t want to focus on.
(Host)
Military-affiliated citizens supporting DVEs (that’s domestic violent extremists)—how bad is it?
(Reid)
Part of the problem is we really don’t have any idea. The issue with not studying something is that we only have anecdotes and guesses. While Major General Dunlap said we’re overestimating, the truth of the matter is we really don’t know if it’s an overestimation or underestimation because all we’re seeing is when somebody either commits a violent crime or gets in trouble for supporting white-power messaging and is removed from the military. So all we are seeing is a very tail end of what the problem is. But if we continue to say either (a) we don’t want to look at this because we feel like it does a disservice to the image of the troops or (b) assuming that we’re overestimating, because it’s only a proportion of the individuals who are part of these groups really does not allow us to tackle the actual problem, but rather allows it to continue fairly unfettered. Because they know that no one is really interested in looking into it in a more in-depth way.
(Host)
Dunlap, in his reply to you, gave an example illustrating how, he says, the numbers are small. And he also notes that exaggerating the problem beyond what data shows dangerously erodes public confidence in the armed forces. It diminishes the propensity of minorities to join, and it gives succor to America’s enemies around the world. You say your position is concentrated on the need for the US military to finally confront this problem head on. What would that look like?
(Reid)
It’s sort of a multistage process. As you look at people who have talked about their involvement, either in the white-power movement generally or in the intersection of the military and the white-power movement, a lot of it has to do with personal, individual, and group vulnerability. The same way we talk a lot about gang membership or mental health risk, (posttraumatic stress disorder or) PTSD, and suicide—just because it’s potentially a small portion of the population doesn’t mean that there are people who are not at risk for long-term consequences from this action. So when we think about “OK, what would studying this really look like,” a lot of people are bringing these ideologies or beliefs in with them, and it continues once they’re there. Or are they sort of becoming—and I use the word “indoctrinated” very loosely—but, you know, sort of becoming wrapped up in this movement while in the military because of either what they’re seeing or what they’re being exposed to? Because that really impacts how we intervene and how we move to prevent further polarization or further extremism.
But the bottom line is we don’t know. So if we can get surveys or research done as people are coming in or coming back from deployment—so, figuring out those points of inflection where risk is the highest—then we are able to develop prevention programs the same way we do for others. Again, probably small numbers, but large impacts.
So we don’t dismiss suicide risk amongst the military because it’s only going to be a small proportion, right? We take that seriously, or we hope people take that seriously. We tried to take PTSD seriously. We take veteran homelessness seriously. And, so, dismissing something simply because it’s a small number, potentially, is to give the people who are at risk for this behavior no support and put them on a path that leads to a lot of risky behavior and can really change their lives in a negative way.
(Host)
There was some commonality in your views, and Dunlap does agree. In fact, I’ll quote here. He says, “Let’s be clear about something. The military, like American society in general, needs to stamp out racism and white supremacy. In this respect, I believe, Valasik and Reid have some ideas worth pondering.”
Do you have any final thoughts?
(Reid)
Because they are the military—similar to the police, where we’ve seen this issue in law enforcement generally—we are giving them extra skills and assets and a belief system that the far right is trying to exploit. They bring something to the table that potentially an average citizen doesn’t. And, so, it becomes more imperative to really root out this problem. Because it’s more than just racism. It’s beyond, you know, “I don’t like so-and-so.” And I know he talks about, you know, “We don’t want to cause distrust in the military.” But the problem is that distrust exists because these people are showing up on the news and are being seen at things like the Capitol riot or Unite the Right or Portland protests. I think it erodes trust more not to be doing anything about it than it does to try to expose a problem and say, “We’re going to move forward to deal with this in an efficient and effective manner.”
(Host)
Thanks for joining me today, Shannon, and for sharing your thoughts on this topic.
(Reid)
Thank you.
(Host)
If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platform.
Assessing threats to the air littoral, the airspace between ground forces and high-end fighters and bombers, requires a paradigm change in American military thinking about verticality. This article explores the consequences of domain convergence, specifically for the Army and Air Force’s different concepts of control. It will assist US military and policy practitioners in conceptualizing the air littoral and in thinking more vertically about the air and land domains and the challenges of domain convergence.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/7/
Keywords: air littoral, paradigm change, American military thinking, verticality, US military and policy practitioners
Episode Transcript:
Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production, featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.
Decisive Point welcomes Colonel Maximillian K. Bremer and Dr. Kelly A. Grieco, authors of “Air Littoral: Another Look.” Colonel Bremer is the director of the Special Programs Division at Air Mobility Command. He is a 1997 distinguished graduate of the US Air Force Academy, he has an MPP from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and an MAAS from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.
Dr. Grieco is an assistant professor of military and security studies in the Department of International Security at the Air Command and Staff College. She received her PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Max. Kelly. Thanks for joining me today. I’m really glad you’re here. Your research looks at air littoral, which is the space between ground forces and high-end fighters and bombers, and how the US military thinks about its verticality. What has changed in recent decades that makes this a priority?
Colonel Maximilian K. Bremer
Well, Stephanie, first, thanks for having us on. And thanks to Parameters for publishing this paper. It’s really a privilege. So you’re asking what’s changed? Well, in a nutshell, democratization and technological advancement have led to increased access and persistence in the space that we’re calling the air littoral. Basically, more users with more technology are driving innovation both in the military and civilian realms. Changing the way that we access and persist in any domain will alter the way we contest that domain–the way we seek dominance. The air littoral, until recently, was mostly a realm of transit to and from the blue skies. Persistent access within the air littoral was just not tenable. But it is now, and that drives a change in how we utilize the domain. Before, we could think about airspace as layered flat maps, and now we have to understand the interaction vertically and persistently from the ground all the way to the edge of space.
Dr. Kelly A. Grieco
As Colonel Bremer suggests, what has changed is increased access and persistence to the air littoral. Russia in eastern Ukraine, for example, has been able to access the airspace and deny it to the Ukrainian Air Force mainly using not manned aircraft but a combination of air defense and electronic warfare systems. And they have then been able to exploit this airspace using multiple drones flying simultaneously at different altitudes over target areas to spot for artillery rockets.
This example illustrates two important changes in my mind. First, manned aircraft are no longer essential for accessing or exploiting the airspace, or at least parts of the airspace. And second, increasingly, both nonstate actors and strategic competitors will use small unarmed systems–things like drones, low flying missiles, and loitering munitions to gain persistent access to the air littoral and then exploit it.
Host
What is the working definition of air superiority? And where does the United States fall on this topic? Do we still rule the skies?
Grieco
No. At least not the same way we did 10 or even five years ago. In joint doctrine, air control exists on a spectrum based on the degree to which an adversary can interfere with friendly military operations. On that spectrum, air superiority refers to a level of air control in which friendly forces are able to operate at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.
Air supremacy goes even further than that. It refers to a degree of dominance in which the opposing force is incapable of even effective interference. And that’s anywhere in the entire theater of operations. I would argue, and many others, that based on those definitions, for the last 30 years, the United States has had air superiority, if not air supremacy in all its major conflicts. Today, however, that’s no longer a given and in fairness, both the Air Force and the Army have increasingly recognized this in recent years. To emphasize that point, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Brown, has said on numerous occasions that air dominance is not an American birthright. But attempts to maintain or regain that air superiority have mainly centered on developing and acquiring sixth-generation fighters and bombers. So those aircraft that operate in the blue skies. As we point out in our article, this focus on the blue skies runs the risk of missing that adversaries are increasingly able to access the airspace between the ground and the blue skies, that is the air littoral.
Bremer
So to address this new reality, we have to recognize that air control exists in a volume rather than a flat bounded plane. In the past, control the air was won or lost in the blue skies. If you obtained air superiority over a theater of operations, it was generally imparted to control over all altitudes, but that assumption no longer holds. Control of the air littoral is rapidly decoupling from that of the blue skies, which means our concept of air control has to evolve. It must account for a third dimension—that of vertical space.
Critically, conceptualizing air control as a volume calls attention to key differences between the blue skies in the air littoral. Compared to blue skies, the air littoral is becoming much more highly dynamic, threat-intensive in a more important environment. In Iraq, as General Raymond Thomas noted, the adversary was able to operate, quote – right overhead and underneath our air superiority – unquote.
If the enemy is in the air above us, do we actually have air superiority?
Host
Here’s a quote from your article. Most worrying for the United States is the potential curtailing of the military’s ability to provide effective support to US, Allied, and partner ground forces from the skies above. Can you expand on US adversaries contesting control of the air littoral and your answer to it?
Bremer
In the US military, the services are aligned with the physical domains, the mediums through which they primarily operate. They’re charged with the duty to organize, train, and equip forces to be experts in and dominate those domains to the benefit of the joint force. Yet the fuzzy border between physical domains creates a seam. And this seam is where services contest with each other for authorities and funding. Our adversaries are watching, and they could potentially exploit that seam. What is the airspace? Who has responsibility for control of the airspace, and what does control mean? These are some fundamental challenges that the democratization of the air littoral creates. For example, you know, a bullet fired from an M-4 is traveling through the air. Is that in the airspace? What about a mortar that travels up to 1,500 feet and then comes back down? Or HIMARS? Or what about a small loitering drone that doesn’t go above 400 feet but sticks around for several hours?
Grieco
And currently, the focus is really on counter-system ideas–counter UAS, counter mortar, counter cruise missiles, counter aircraft. But these all operate in the same physical realm and only vary by propulsion, systems speed, persistence, and range. And those characteristics, especially speed, persistence, and range are converging. And our adversaries are very aware of this and responding to these developments. And as they innovate their capabilities and operational concepts, the Air Force is increasingly at risk of failing in his primary job—winning in the air to allow the army to occupy and win the ground.
Host
How does vertical reciprocity play into this?
Grieco
The air littoral, like the maritime littoral, is fundamentally a trans domain environment. This requires vertical reciprocity between air and ground forces. It also means more interactions and interdependencies between the air and ground. And the Army, for example, plans to exploit this vertical space with joint all-domain operations, emphasizing presenting the enemy with multiple dilemmas. The Army has an emerging vision of simultaneously, both horizontally and vertically, enveloping the enemy. Of course, US adversaries also seek the same advantages.
Bremer
Yes, but bringing the air war close to the ground will also lay bare the differences in the army in the Air Force’s concept of control. Control of the land domain has traditionally been a function of the persistent occupation of territory. Armies, as Clausewitz said, can stand fast, as it were, rooted to the ground. In contrast, the Air Force concept of control in the air domain centers on responsive presence, not persistent occupation. Air Forces may occupy airspace for a time but it’s ephemeral. What it offers instead is a rapid but not necessarily persistent presence, the ability to quickly mass and deliver fires. The growing mission overlap will cause a clash of ...
Critics of the Afghan war have claimed it was always unwinnable. This article argues the war was unwinnable the way it was fought and posits an alternative based on the Afghan way of war and the US approach to counterinsurgency in El Salvador during the final decade of the Cold War. Respecting the political and military dictates of strategy could have made America’s longest foreign war unnecessary and is a warning for the wars we will fight in the future.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/3/
Keywords: counterinsurgency, Cold War, El Salvador, Regional Command East, General Mark Milley, Afghanistan war
Episode Transcript:
Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.
Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Todd Greentree, a former US Foreign Service officer who served as a political military officer in five conflicts, including El Salvador and Afghanistan. He’s a member of the Changing Character of War Center at Oxford University and teaches in the Global and National Security Policy Institute at the University of New Mexico. Greentree is the author of “What Went Wrong in Afghanistan,” featured in Parameters Winter 2021-2022 issue.
Welcome, Todd. I’m so glad you’re here. Let’s talk about your article. Some people would argue the Afghan war was unwinnable. You assert it was unwinnable the way it was fought. What do you mean by that?
Dr. Todd Greentree
Thank you, Stephanie. Great to be here. The idea that it was unwinnable the way it was fought is really tied to the purpose, sort of the reason why I was writing it, which is not just about what went wrong in Afghanistan, what lessons can be derived about counterinsurgency. This is really an article about US strategic behavior. Afghanistan was my fifth war. And I like to write what I know. So really, the origin of the article is from my own story.
I got the idea that we were maybe not doing this right, sort of when I stepped off the helicopter at Bagram in 2008. My first war had been El Salvador in the early 1980s. And so everything I learned were all from guys who had been in Vietnam. There’s more about that in the article. For the next four years, though, I served with people who were…most of the people were from the 9/11 generation, and I was a political adviser to combat units out in the field and was super impressed with the astuteness that everybody was showing. So first, I was in Regional Command East, where General Mark Milley was the deputy commander for operations. But there was a problem with the entire effort in Afghanistan. We were on economy of force. But that economy of force was not being exercised for a strategic purpose, just to minimize the cost, because Iraq had sucked up all the attention and the bulk of the resources.
Then I moved to Regional Command South into Taliban home country, and they had been raging there since 2006. It took three years for the US to adapt. I came back to Kandahar in 2010, at the height of the surge, with the 10th Mountain Division. They were in command of Regional Command South. And this was the main effort at the height of the surge. It was a strong coalition team. They knew what to do, how to partner with the Afghan army. They took it seriously. They were serious about aligning political and military strategies, which was my part of this. The overall strategy of the US, by 2009, was coming into focus, we’d had Stan McChrystal’s math, the idea, here’s our most experienced Special Operations commander who had come to the realization, as had many of the SOF guys, that attrition generates more insurgents. This led to a shift in the understanding of focus on the population rather than exercising firepower.
General Petraeus, following McChrystal with Field Manual 3-24 and counterinsurgency doctrine and all of that. The problem was that when Obama announced the surge, he time-limited at the same time, which was a strategically incorrect thing to do because, for the Taliban, all they had to do was wait it out. And for them, jihad was forever.
But by 2011, when the surge was peaking and then over, that was 10 years into the war. It was just way too long to be fighting and to get it right.
My big point is that military operational excellence was essentially what we were exercising–a series of operations in a context of strategic incoherence. So, there was warfighting, but it was associated with this wildly ambitious nation-building that was very well-intentioned and made a lot of progress, but it was far too complex for the United States to sustain at that level. We certainly can’t blame the Afghans. In the end, I arrived at the same conclusion that Bob Komer did in 1973, when he, as the head of counterinsurgency in Vietnam, wrote this incredible paper called “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance in Vietnam.”
That conclusion was: if you find yourself doing Big COIN, it’s too late.
Host
Let’s talk about accidental guerrillas and accidental counterinsurgents. How did this happen in relation to Afghanistan?
Greentree
Accidental Guerrillas was this great book that Dave Kilcullen wrote–one of his first books. And he had this idea that the Pashtuns, who make up most of the Taliban, were fighting us because we were in their space. My idea with accidental counterinsurgents is merely to hold up a mirror on that idea and say, “well, that’s right.”
And the only reason that we were fighting the Taliban was because they helped al-Qaeda, who got into our space by attacking us on 9/11. The strategic problem with this was that we confused the two. The Taliban were insurgents. They were not international terrorists. They didn’t like the Arabs in al-Qaeda very much, most of them. And they weren’t threatening the US in any way. So, in the end, we were hunting these extreme conservative Islamists, on their home ground, who were fighting jihad against us, the foreign troops who were in combat in the middle of their own people. So you had this incredible conflict, incredible clash, between two warrior cultures–one on their home ground and one on the sort of the “away team” that really didn’t understand this dynamic very well.
Host
Let’s circle back for a minute to your comment about if you’re doing big COIN, it’s already too late. Was there really any other option? What were they going to do? Small COIN?
Greentree
In El Salvador, small COIN was the model because the Vietnam War had ended less than a decade earlier. So early 1980s. Saigon was evacuated in 1975, so there was no way that the US military or the American public would support involvement in major counterinsurgency. So there was a political imperative that limited the presence of US forces on the ground. But there was more to it than that.
It was also part of the policy to balance political and military strategy. They were in sync with each other. To take that lesson away, keep foreign troops–keep ourselves–out of direct conflict, out of direct combat. Focus on training, assisting, and advising.
And one way to put it is to change one word in Article 15, of the famous article by Thomas Edward Lawrence, T. E. Lawrence of Arabia, the article was titled “27 Articles,” and it was about supporting and fighting with the Arabs in World War I in 1917. Article 15, with one word change (changing Arabs to Afghans) reads, “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Afghans do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them. Not to win it for them. Actually, also under the very odd conditions of Afghanistan, your practical work will not be as good as perhaps you think it is.”
I think that just applies 100% to what was going on in Afghanistan. To take that a step further, is, rather than taking the war over, we should have been doing all along what we were doing at the end, which was keeping the size of our forces small and focusing on training, assisting, and advising rather than combat itself.
The second part of this looking at options and alternatives, though, is equally if not more important. We should have listened to the Afghans. We often treated them and thought of them as our proxies, but we were fighting in their country. They weren’t proxies. They were really joint venture partners in which both sides, both participants, shared strengths and shared risks and shared costs. Just building on that, there’s a lot of blame to go around. That was a culminating point of victory. And we should have entered war termination with them, even while we continued counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda.
The reason I’m talking about this as an option, as an alternative, was because a new President Karzai, and his fellow Pashtuns and government, had a strategy that was in accord with the Afghan way of war. The Taliban were streaming in to recognize the new winner and swear fealty to President Karzai. The government side was ready to disperse them back to their communities in southern Afghanistan and separate out those leaders who led the Pakistan from the Taliban, but at the same time to bring Taliban representatives, who had sworn fealty and were willing to reconcile, and include them at the table at the Bonn conference, where the new government was being formed.
It was all thought out. The Afghans seemed to know what they were doing. They proposed this, and the Bush administration, principally Secretary defense, Rumsfeld said “no way, we’re not having anything to do with these Taliban people.”
And so we ended up taking over the war with our own set of Afghan warlords, conducting co...
A titan of modern strategic studies, Colin S. Gray distinguished himself from other scholars in the field with his belief that grand strategy is indispensable, complex, and inherently agential. This article identifies key themes, continuities, conceptual relationships, and potential discontinuities from his decades of grand strategic thought. Gray’s statement that “all strategy is grand strategy” remains highly relevant today, emphasizing the importance of agential context in military environments—a point often neglected in strategic practice.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/8/
Keywords: strategic studies, grand strategy, military environments, Colin S. Gray
Episode Transcript:
Stephanie Crider (Host)
Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Lukas Milevski, an assistant professor at the Institute of History at Leiden University. He’s published The West’s East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective (2018) and The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought (2016). He is the author of “The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray,” featured in Parameters Winter 2021-22 issue.
I’m glad you’re here, Lukas. Thanks for joining me today. Let’s talk about your article. “The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S Gray.”
Colin Gray, a Titan of modern Strategic Studies, often referred to grand strategy as equivalent to statecraft. War is more than a simple military contest, it inherently involves nonmilitary forms of power. Gray’s, conception of grand strategy contradicts the mainstream interpretation, particularly favored in the United States, in which grand strategy is identified as the Master of Policy. Walk us through Gray’s basic views on grand strategy.
Dr. Lukas Milevski
OK, well first of all, thank you for inviting me. Now there are four key features of Colin’s basic understanding of grand strategy which are worth emphasizing.
First grand strategy was in some ways a compromise, particularly between strategic studies characterized by the study of strategy, understood fairly strictly as military strategy, and security studies, which encompass security beyond military security— economic, environmental, human, etc.
So grand strategy, therefore, was a compromise between the necessity to focus on war in strategic studies and the recognition that war, and indeed security, is more than just warfare as waged by militaries.
Second, his personal definition of grand strategy is, and I’ll quote here. “The direction and use made of any or all among the total assets of a security community and support of its policy goals as decided by politics.”
Which he followed up by asserting that the theory and practice of grand strategy is the theory and practice of statecraft itself.
So, for Colin, grand strategy was clearly rather enormous concept in both theory and in practice, and one which did actually go beyond war itself. Given that he stated that grand strategy and statecraft are essentially synonymous.
Third, grand strategy will still be strategy despite its enormity, means that it could be, had to be, and was understandable via the general theory of strategy, which he, throughout his career, sought to clarify ever further.
This means, among other things, that as much as military strategy needs to be conducted, performed, or whatever word you prefer. So too does grand strategy. So there’s performance and economic or financial sanctions. For example, just as much as , if quite different from, that found in military strategy.
That said, Colin didn’t really ever actually delve into how and nonmilitary power performed in application.
Fourth, and finally, grand strategy is indispensable. Any military strategic judgment is inherently a grand strategic judgment. And often judgments needs to be made which are grand strategic rather than narrowly military strategic. You know, not every threat or every policy problem is necessarily solvable with armed force. Or even if it is, that task may be more easily done in combination with other instruments.
Host
Gray noted grand strategy undoubtedly is so close to policy that the two can seem indistinguishable. Can you clarify? What is the difference between the two?
Milevski
I’ll try, certainly.
So the first thing to note about the distinction between grand strategy and policy, or even more broadly between strategy and policy, is that conceptual distinctions are rarely born out in organizational structure.
And this in turn means that organizational structure should not and cannot be used as an argument for or against particular conceptual distinctions. Otherwise, we can’t share concepts with other analogous organizations like within that the DoD or with other European ministries of defense, or even with our own past or our probable future and our organizations in those time periods.
So there is value in conceptual clarity, even if we also acknowledge that practice is liable to be messier. Because then we can develop theory, which both maintains clarity and is still useful in messy situations.
So, for example we can develop theory which embraces the ideal. That strategy should serve policy while acknowledging and incorporating the fact that often strategy can shape policy, and that this is, to some degree inevitable and not even necessarily bad. Or even that some might attempt to practice strategy in a policy vacuum and why those attempts are a bad idea.
So real-world might messiness can actually be very useful in developing and annunciating theoretical clarity.
So then coming back to the distinction between grand strategy and policy, Clausewitz observed that at higher levels, strategy slowly transforms into policy. Quoting from the Howard and Paret translation, “. . . the conduct of war in its great outlines is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen.’
And he noted elsewhere that there’s no such thing as purely military advice, even though that sort of notion is quite attractive to military professionals.
Then we might add in the context of grand strategy, there’s similarly no such thing as purely economic, financial, diplomatic, or whatever, advice either.
This means that in considering and employing the instrumental value of these forms of power, policy is always present because these instruments are used to achieve policy.
So, policy may arguably be felt less in tactics than strategy, and even that’s not necessarily true, but fundamentally still present in one way or another. So the question is then, what does this mean for the distinction between grand strategy or even strategy in general, and policy, if policy permeates the whole conduct of war?
So the difference in conception, I would say between grand strategy and policy, is that the former does not set political goals to be achieved, whereas in the latter does.
Moreover, it is through policy that politicians demonstrate a political preference for particular instruments to be used, but it is up to grand strategy to determine first the details of that use in as much as that use is tactically viable and politically acceptable.
And second, ultimately, determining whether it is possible to fulfill the desired political goals using the instruments preferred by policy–or not–as the case may be.
Ultimately, theory needs to recognize that there is a dialogue, even if it is unequal, between grand strategy and policy.
The difference in practice, of course, is that organizations are not necessarily structured in ways which reflect these sorts of conceptual distinctions.
So when you look at practice, I would suggest that the main difference is really based on degrees of engagement with the particular responsibilities of grand strategy or policy. That is, the more one engages in deciding political direction and political preferences concerning the conduct of war, the more one is engaging with policy.
Conversely, the more one engages with reconciling tactical details in whatever field whether that’s military, economic, financial, whatever, with given political limitations, with imagining the political meaning of actions and in providing feedback from real practice back to policy as necessary, then one is doing grand strategy. And, of course, a single individual or single set of individuals can be doing all of this together.
But that’s not really a problem, because they can still be conceptually distinct.
So sort of to sum it up, grand strategy is still a relational. It’s still relates tactical actions and the details of the many forms of power to policy and political consequence.
Policy, on the other hand, is the director and to say it quite inelegantly, the “related to,” as it were.
Host
Let’s end with this quote from your article Grays's interpretation of grand strategy contains much potential conceptual depth yet to be explored, but which may further develop grand strategy as an idea. Can you give us an example?
Milevski
Sure. So one example is the orchestration and combination of military and nonmilitary forms of power together into a single grand strategic effort.
What does it look like?
How do we do it?
Here in the West, we don’t really have that many good ideas on this issue. Now, this is something Colin didn’t explore in his writings, as I mentioned my article. And in fairness, it’s partly because it’s incredibly difficult to do so effectively. It requires understanding, even if not necessarily mastering, all the various forms of power–military, economic, financial, diplomatic, disinformation, etc. And then on top of...
This article explores the current debate about service and Joint operating concepts, starting with the Army’s multi-domain operations concept. It argues for adaptations to an old operational design technique—defeat mechanisms; updates to Joint and service planning doctrine; and discipline regarding emerging concepts. Rather than debate over attrition versus maneuver, combinations of a suite of defeat mechanisms should be applied to gain victory in the future.
Keywords: multi-domain operations, operational design technique, Mechanisms in Modern Warfare, vulnerabilities of cyber-enabled systems
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/6/
Episode Transcript:
Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.
Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Frank Hoffman, author of “Defeat Mechanisms in Modern Warfare,” featured in Parameters 2021 – 22 Winter issue. Dr. Hoffman is a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. His latest book, Mars Adapting: Military Change under Fire, was published this year.
Frank, I’m glad you’re here. Thank you for joining me. We’re here to talk about your article that was published in Parameters Winter 2021 – 22, “Defeat Mechanisms in Modern Warfare.” Your article assesses several conceptual efforts to better posture US military for success and future wars. Specifically, you explore the debate between service and joint operating concepts and the opportunities and vulnerabilities of cyber-enabled systems to produce decisive effects at the operational level of war. Please set the stage for our listeners and explain the current debate.
Dr. Frank Hoffman
Sure, thank you. Great to be here today.
It’s just interesting that, you know, in the literature right now, we’re going back to fundamentals about how we in the military conceive of, plan for, and conceptualize obtaining victory. And there seems to be quite a fervent debate going on both in the military literature and in the academic literature. In the current issue of “Survival,” published by double I double S in London, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Franz-Stefan Gady challenges American concepts and thinking about maneuver versus attrition, which is an age-old debate that goes back in the Army and the Marine Corps back to the 1980s. And Gady suggests that we need to reemphasize attrition, since maneuver, both in the sense of movement and mobility across the battlespace, is going to be much harder because of persistent surveillance, attacks from drones, drones as a source of ISR. His reading of future technology suggests that maneuver is going to be very hard and that we need to focus on buying capabilities to attrit the adversary.
And this is also taken up by Michael Kofman from the Center for Naval Analysis, who argues that the Army and the joint world need to let loose their embrace of strategic or operational paralysis, you know, attempting to confuse commanders. And we need to reembrace attrition and firepower to destroy enemy capabilities, not by combinations and not by the way we currently think about it.
And this is also then taken up by Dr. Heather Venable, who’s a professor at the Air University. And she also argues that most of our thinking in the Army and the Marine Corps is based upon some rather thin historical cases drawn largely from either 1916’s infiltration tactics or the theories of John Boyd and the OODA loop and this notion of cognitive paralysis and outmaneuvering the enemy in the broader sense through combinations of forces in modern combine arms.
Those are the critics. In the service literature, in the joint world, and in the United States, we do seem to have this emphasis now on what in the Army is described as creating multiple dilemmas for the opponent as a theory of victory. I found in the Air Force’s doctrine the same kind of theory of victory. And I’ve also found it in the latest British integrated operating concept that we’re predicating our ability to win and to defeat the adversary by somehow generating multiple dilemmas. And that there’s this perception that if we come from different directions with different cross-domain capabilities, our opponents will be cognitively constipated or somehow operationally paralyzed and unable to defend themselves. Or they’ll just make a lot of mistakes.
And I do have some problems with this notion of cognitive paralysis. So I’m glad that the critics have pointed up this particular debate, but I’m not sure that attrition, particularly against peers, is really the way to go about it. So I’ve been exploring some old concepts that I learned from General Wass de Czege in the 1990s, that I think need to be reintroduced. They need to be updated to account for the cyber and information strike capabilities we have now. We just don’t rely upon physical strikes. We have offensive capabilities in cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum capability as well. As do our adversaries. So I think a refreshing look at defeat mechanisms, a terminology that I learned from the Army a long time ago, more than two decades ago, just needs to be refurbished and made more contemporary. And that’s what the essence of the article is about.
Host
Your article says the real issue is the construction of concepts or operational plans that have a historically demonstrated or testable theory of victory. What are some possible defeat mechanisms that might contribute to a solution?
Hoffman
Well, I do have to say that the critics are right, that attrition, or the phrase I use that I think is more preferable is destruction–the use of firepower to destroy either capabilities or the capacities of the size of the enemy forces–is a component. But I think in the cyber realm, we also need to think about disorientation or disruption through both deception through information operations and through cyber capabilities. There is certainly this physical and nonphysical means that we have of both destroying and disorienting the adversary to gain an operational advantage. That is where I think the future lies.
I do believe that maneuver in its tactical sense, you know, the movement of forces, can create the options of dislocation, and again, this is where seizing a positional advantage or making an opponent’s defense irrelevant by moving around them or over them or coming from a sudden direction, still has some utility–even in a period of massive surveillance capability. We can still blind somebody, disorient them first, and then conduct the maneuver and dislocate them.
So disruption disorientation, dislocation, and destruction are the for defeat mechanisms that in different contexts against different adversaries, can be combined and sequenced and orchestrated in time and place to gain an operational advantage and achieve a degree of systems disruption over the adversaries operating system that makes them far less capable relative to us. I think that’s where the future lies in creating overmatch or creating a competitive advantage in the battlespace in the future.
I don’t believe that we can paralyze an enemy commander, I don’t believe that we can stupefy them. But I do believe that their system disruption, through the combination of disorientation, dislocation, and disruption, is still feasible in the twenty-first century. And I think our concepts, our military planning, should define some of these terms. And I’m only offering my definitions to begin the debate. Let the joint doctrine world find the best terms.
But this isn’t a big lift for us intellectually, but it does put us on, I think, more solid ground both in terms of what has worked in the past, what worked in World War II, what has worked in contemporary conflict, and what will work in the future in a world in which command systems are operating at great ranges–in which everybody has some space parity and some operational aviation capability. We’re dealing with a much more contested space; I think we need to reconceptualize victory and defeat mechanisms to deal with this twenty-first century.
Host
Can you give us any final thoughts or any concluding thoughts on this topic?
Hoffman
I think this is very, very critical. It’s particularly critical for our concepts. It’s particularly critical for us to imagine and understand what it is to be in a competitive environment with a peer–someone whose space capabilities and aviation capabilities, and their C-2/AI-enabled capabilities may approach our own in some senses. We’ll have edges and some areas and not. I think it’s very important for us to rethink our operational art and refocus. After 15 or 20 years of focusing on the lower half of the conflict spectrum, the scale, the pace, the role of destruction, also, but the role of deception and disorientation and dislocation is still relevant, I think, in the 21st century. I think we need to rejuvenate our thinking about this.
Host
Thank you for joining me. I had a blast and learned a lot.
Hoffman
I’m really pleased to work with the Army War College Press.
Deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan without recklessly threatening a great-power war is both possible and necessary through a tailored deterrence package that goes beyond either fighting over Taiwan or abandoning it. This article joins cutting-edge understandings of deterrence with empirical evidence of Chinese strategic thinking and culture to build such a strategy.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/4/
Keywords: People’s Republic of China, INDOPACOM, Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Indo-Pacific Affairs
Episode Transcript:
Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.
Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Jared M. McKinney, co-author of “Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan,” written with Dr. Peter Harris and featured in Parameters’ 2021 – 22 Winter issue.
Dr. McKinney is the chair of the Department of Strategy and Security Studies at the eSchool of Graduate Professional Military Education, Air University, and reviews editor of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.
Dr. Peter Harris is associate professor of political science at Colorado State University and Indo-Pacific Perspectives editor of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.
Jared, I’m so glad you’re here. Thanks for joining me today. Let’s talk about your article, “The Broken Nest.” Would the People’s Republic of China invade Taiwan even if it meant risking war with the United States and its allies? Your article says there’s no doubt that the United States has a strong interest in deterring a Chinese takeover of Taiwan but relying on the latent threat of a great power war is the wrong approach.
Please elaborate on this.
Dr. Jared M. McKinney
Yeah, it would be my pleasure to walk you through the argument. Just as I get going, I’ll note that my opinions, conclusions, and recommendations are solely my own and that of Peter Harris, my coauthor, and we don’t represent the views of the Air Force or the Department of Defense.
The Taiwan issue is really hot right now not just because of provocations or perceived provocation, but also because the strategic environment has changed.
The historical position of the United States has been that the Navy could deter a Chinese invasion by denying it the possibility to succeed.
This is how the 7th Fleet responded in the 1950s to various Taiwan Straits crises. And as recently as 1996, the US Navy again was deployed to the region around Taiwan in an act of deterrence against perceived Chinese aggression at the time.
In 2021, the question really is, is this possible anymore? And pretty much everyone agrees that the status quo is inadequate.
One camp says that we need to double down on deterrence by denial, and we need to do more much more quickly.
This is in a response to the recognition that China’s capabilities have developed very quickly. The PRC of this decade is radically more powerful than (the) PRC of previous eras.
And so, in this environment a posture of deterrence by denial seems much less credible because it’s quite possible that the United States would not have the ability to effectively deny a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The question therefore becomes, does this create an opportunity for a Chinese invasion, and what would the United States do?
In our article, we argue that simply doubling down on deterrence by denial is foolish and not sufficient in the long run. Because even if deterrence by denial could be reinvigorated for this year or next year, it’s not going to be possible to do so in the long run due to imbalances in valuing Taiwan, and in geography. The United States is located on the other side of the world.
In this environment. There is an increase in risk because if the United States policy is to deter such an invasion, but it no longer has the capability to do so, there’s the potential for a real crisis.
We develop an argument that deterrence is still possible, but we need to rethink how we go about it. Because deterrence by denial has succeeded for so long. It’s our default approach today.
But we need to start thinking of the situation in new terms, and so we suggest a deterrence by denial [should be deterrence by punishment as corrected by author post-taping] approach. The bottom line is that because of shifts in the balance of power, and because of Taiwan’s trajectory further away from China, mainland China is becoming increasingly aggressive in a way to signal its dissatisfaction with the status quo.
Deterrence by denial [should be deterrence by punishment as corrected by author post-taping] seeks not to stop an invasion from occurring, but to inflict such costs after an invasion has occurred that the costs of invasion outweigh the benefits.
The U.S. has, to some extent, a de facto policy of deterrence by punishment such that automatically US sanctions would probably be inflicted on China in response to an invasion, regardless of any other military decision. However, we can actually think ahead about the economic response, and we can design a strategy that makes the economic costs of an invasion very, very high. And that is what we have called the “Broken Nest” approach.
Host
If Taiwan fell to China, a successful democracy would be snuffed out, and Beijing’s geopolitical position in East Asia would be enhanced at the expense of the United States and its allies. What are the costs and the risks attached to abandoning Taipei to China?
McKinney
The most basic cost is that 23.5 million people who live in Taiwan would no longer live under a free and democratic government. And that’s a real and significant cost. To some extent, we need to be aware that U.S. policy has at least partially accepted this cost in the sense that from 1954 to 1979 the United States had a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, including sometimes tens of thousands of soldiers deployed to Taiwan.
We severed this mutual defense treaty in 1979, despite knowing the risks that China would successfully invade Taiwan.
We have lived with the ambiguity of the “one China” policy and taking no stance on the sovereignty of Taiwan since 1979 and the earlier years when the agreements were negotiated.
That being said, there are also geopolitical costs in that China’s position would be marginally improved in terms of power projection.
There’s also image costs in that a successful Chinese invasion would send a great victory to China’s communist regime, and it would certainly come at the expense of American credibility.
So, the costs are real, and for that reason, just a blanket “abandon Taiwan” position is not prudent, and that’s why it has not been US policy.
Host
Are there options to the Taiwan-China issue that don’t involve a great power war?
McKinney
So this is the problem: deterrence by denial, if it can’t succeed, the tendency would be to escalate it. Because if you can’t succeed in the Taiwan Straits or over Taiwan, then there’s concepts of AirSea battle, which call for strikes on the Chinese mainland and the horizontal escalation of the war.
Very quickly a local war could become a global war, and the costs are essentially incalculable.
So, that’s actually part of the problem, because incalculable costs indicate that America’s current posture may not be credible.
A Chinese proverb asks, “Beneath a broken nest, how can there be any whole eggs?” and we work with this metaphor to suggest that Taiwan, so long as the status quo is maintained, should be an unbroken nest in that it is mutually beneficial in its ties with China and with the United States and the region.
However, were China to invade Taiwan, it’s possible that a strategy could be set up beforehand that would inflict very high costs on a Chinese invasion.
And these costs would be from the United States economically. But from Taiwan, they would have to be worked domestically. At the center of Taiwan’s economy, and actually the region’s economy and the global economy, is the semiconductor industry.
Were Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing to be destroyed as a result of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the costs would be very significant.
Beyond that, were this strategy to be joined to a wider economic sanctions and interdiction campaign against advanced semiconductor trade with China and Taiwanese attacks on Chinese manufacturing capability in Shanghai, it’s possible that a Chinese invasion would trigger a semiconductor and economic crisis in China, which would have no resolution for the short term.
The costs would be very high. There would also be costs the global economy, but the costs would be distributed principally to China.
Now this isn’t in itself likely to deter a Chinese invasion. However, a “broken nest” approach, which could combine serious harm to the semiconductor industry with a well-planned resistance to a Chinese occupation to a significant defensive effort before the invasion succeeded and to a regional coordinated regional response which takes the Taiwan issue as an assessment of China’s relative belligerency could create a package of tailored deterrence by punishment that would make the invasion of Taiwan very costly.
The Chinese Communist Party is not going to abandon its long-term ambitions. However, we can approach the issue not from the possibility of definitive resolution, of which there may be none, but from the possibility of maintaining stability in the short term, by which we think of the short term being app...
PROLOGUE: In the wake of the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3-4, 1993, in which 19 American servicemembers were killed and 73 injured, I was tasked to lead an effort to discern the strategic lessons to be learned from the ill-fated US intervention. The study highlighted several shortfalls: the absence of a clear US strategy and whole-of-government plan for the operation, the onset of mission creep as the operation evolved from a humanitarian mission into a manhunt for a notorious Somali warlord, the lack of coordination across the US government agencies and other coalition partners involved, and the failure to maintain proper oversight of execution as one presidential administration transitioned to the next. The study’s recommendations, which were briefed to the secretary of defense, the national security adviser, and other key participants, ultimately led to a more integrated US approach to planning for US operations in Haiti in 1994 as well as a new Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), Managing Complex Contingency Operations.
In this context, Len Hawley, a retired Army colonel, who as a civilian served as the director of multilateral affairs, became the National Security Council’s (NSC) point person to lead the implementation of PDD-56. Throughout his tenure in the Clinton administration, Len oversaw the drafting of more than 40 political-military plans for contingencies ranging from East Timor to Kosovo. These plans sought to incorporate
the costly lessons of Somalia in an effort to improve the outcomes and reduce the risks associated with US contingency operations overseas. After 25 years in the Army, Len continued to serve his country as a civilian leader in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the NSC staff, and the 9/11 Commission staff. This article is the last piece Len wrote before he died of complications from leukemia in 2020. It is full of the insights and wisdom of an unsung hero who was an extraordinary public servant, strategic thinker, and beloved mentor and colleague to many.
Keywords: Somalia, Haiti, Mogadishu, Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), whole-of-government plan, Managing Complex Contingency Operations
Click here to read the article.
Michèle Flournoy
Cofounder and Managing Partner of WestExec Advisors
Chair, Center for a New American Security Board of Directors
Statistical evidence suggests that Army battalion commanders are significant determinants of the retention of their lieutenants—especially high-potential lieutenants. Further, this so-called Battalion Commander Effect should be included in brigadier general promotion board assessments and used to inform officer professional military education curricula.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/10/
Keywords: force retention, Army battalion commanders, Battalion Commander Effect, promotion board assessments, officer professional military, education
The reemergence of great power competition, conflict with near-peer competitor states below the level of armed conflict, and persisting threats from nonstate actors with transnational ambitions and global reach pose challenges for strategists planning, executing, and assessing military operations and strategy. Building on current visualization tools, two proposed models—the National Strategic Risk Abacus and the National Strategic Risk Radar Chart—address these challenges and better depict how the US military may inadvertently contribute to risk at the national strategic level.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/5/
Keywords: National Strategic Risk Abacus, National Strategic Risk Radar Chart, near-peer competitor, below the level of armed conflict
Global health engagement, an underutilized strategy rooted in the strengths of soft power persuasion, can lead to more military-to-military cooperation training, help establish relationships that can be relied on when crises develop, stabilize fragile states, and deny violent extremist organizations space for recruiting and operations. Examining Chinese efforts worldwide to curry favor and influence and the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, this article shows health as a medium is a very compelling and advantageous whole-of-government approach to national security policy concerns.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/7/
Keywords: pandemic, whole-of-government, Global health, national security policy, COVID-19
From the publisher's feed

7,590 Listeners

153,131 Listeners

400 Listeners