Fifty years ago, the US Army faced a strategic inflection point after a failed counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam. In response to lessons learned from the Yom Kippur War, the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command was created to reorient thinking and doctrine around the conventional Soviet threat. Today’s Army must embrace the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as an opportunity to reorient the force into one as forward-thinking and formidable as the Army that won Operation Desert Storm. This episode suggests changes the Army should make to enable success in multidomain large-scale combat operations at today’s strategic inflection point.

Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/10/

Read the episode transcript below.

Email [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.

Keywords: strategic inflection point, Ukraine, multidomain operations (MDO), mission command, large-scale combat operations (LSCO)

Episode Transcript

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You're listening to Decisive Point.

The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I'm talking with Lieutenant Colonel Katie Crombe and Dr. John A. Nagl today, authors of “A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force,” which was published in the autumn 2023 issue of Parameters. (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/10/)

Crombe is an Army strategist currently assigned to the joint staff. She was the chief of staff of an integrated research project commissioned by TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) during academic year 2023 at the US Army War College.

Nagl is a professor of war fighting studies at the US Army War College and was the director of an integrated research project commissioned by TRADOC during academic year 2023.

Welcome to Decisive Point, Katie and John.

John A. Nagl

Thanks, Stephanie, it's good to be here.

Katie Crombe

Thanks, Stephanie.

Host

Katie, please give our audience some background and tell us about the establishment of TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command).

Katie Crombe

During this study, we went back to the last strategic inflection point that we saw the Army go through. And we recognized that as 1973, following the Yom Kippur War. And so, we began digging a little bit deeper on why that was such an important point for the US Army.

What we realized was not only the Secretary of Defense, but the Chief of Staff of the Army at the time, Creighton Abrams, had a revolutionary and evolutionary leader in a guy named General William E. DePuy, who was a combat leader in World War II but also known for being a deep and thoughtful intellectual. They knew that the Army needed to change. They knew that the Army needed to rise to the occasion of the conventional Soviet threat, and they figured that the training and education that the Army had established was not going to get us there.

So, they had General DePuy stand up something called Training and Doctrine Command in 1973. And what he did right at the beginning was do a deep study on the 1973 Yom Kippur War through a couple of lenses, both his intellectual lens—you know, he was just deeply interested in that as a curious man— and also, his combat lens, as he lost 100 percent of his battalion in World War II. That deeply affected him, and he wanted to ensure that the US Army never faced this again. So, when he established Training and Doctrine Command, his concept was really to lead training and education and do this through a series of exercises, different ways to train, and also the development of new fighting manuals that the Army would read at echelon. Everyone from the lowest in the squad up to the division commander really could understand how and why people were fighting. And so, we really used that as the genesis.

Over the years, TRADOC—as we all know it by now—I think that it's a little bit of a culture thing, but we think of it as more the doctrine side rather than the training side. We don't think of it as a revolutionary kind of think tank–type of organization. And we know now what's going on with Russia and Ukraine and what will (or could, eventually) go on with China, that we need TRADOC to go back to its revolutionary roots and really start thinking about the future. And we think that they have infrastructure and the people and the leadership to do it. It's just that they need to be the drivers of change for the future.

Host

John, what else can you tell us about the study that this article is based on?

Nagl

So, this study began when General Funk (Paul E. Funk II), then the commander of Training and Doctrine Command, asked the Army War College, about a year ago, to look at this ongoing war between the Russians and the Ukrainians, the biggest war in Europe since 1945. And General Funk believed, as I do, that the lessons available to us from this rare, horrifying event were so important that we would be sadly remiss if we didn't learn from them. And I was privileged to be able to pull together a team of what ended up being 18 students from the Army War College class of 2023 (and) half a dozen faculty members. The leader of the students was Katie, and we looked across the Army's warfighting functions. But even more broadly, we looked at medical lessons we could learn from this war. We looked at airpower and seapower lessons we could derive, and we came up with a, I think, a pretty extraordinary list of ideas that the Army, we believe, can benefit from as it prepares to deter war with China and as it prepares for whatever other fights it may have to engage in in the years and decades to come.

Host

Katie, you argue that TRADOC “can lead the Army back to the basics of education, training, and doctrine development at the pace that was founded, a pace that drove ruthless prioritization and reassessment.” Please expand on this idea.

Crombe

What we were driving toward in that is when General DePuy created TRADOC, he was really trying to bring training out of these abstract and ambiguous threats and more into a real-time training that focused on imminent threats of the day. The Ukraine War is posing such a real-life experimentation lab for us that we can put into training now as we speak. We can put these young soldiers into learning how to move combat outposts, to be more ambiguous in, you know, hiding from the enemy. And we can take so many lessons right now. We do not need to wait for 10 years to compile these lessons, you know, in the back of a library, eventually put them in a SCIF (sensitive compartmented information facility) and then transfer them to some kind of training manual, eventually put them into doctrine, and then 10 years from now, we're actually exercising or rehearsing on these lessons learned.

Our priority is to make sure that we get these out there in the unclassified environment as the fight is evolving and let units train to the standard that they will need to hold against a similar enemy, whether it be Russia or China, in the future. Another thing that he was really, really focused on, he being General DePuy, was carefully selecting and training soldiers and leaders and them doing this training together. It's not just sending someone out to a national training center one month a year and grading them on a scenario that they know is coming and that they've rehearsed all year. It's putting them in something that is changing by the minute, by the hour, by the day, and putting these leaders and soldiers together to learn to trust each other at echelon; to know that the person above them and below them is going to make the right decision, regardless of how dispersed or distributed they may be; and really build this trust that they'll need to conduct the kind of large-scale combat operation that we see in our future.

Host

TRADOC was established to transform the Army into the best-trained, -equipped, -led, and -organized land power in the world. What possibilities do you see for this organization going forward?

Nagl

I think it still has all those same responsibilities, Stephanie, and what we are doing is calling the organization back to its roots. So, in 1973, the United States Army was coming off of 20 years of not completely successful counterinsurgency campaigns in Asia, and suddenly proxy force for the United States, using American equipment to American doctrine, found itself challenged by the Soviet Union. TRADOC was created in response to that wake-up call, and we think there's a similar wake-up call today in a very similar historic situation in which the United States is again ending, at least for now, 20 years of counterinsurgency efforts in greater Asia. Thinking anew about large scale combat operations, we think TRADOC has the responsibility to learn those lessons, but we have another organization that's being created in the Army, just in the past five years or so.

General (Mark A.) Milley, when he was Chief of Staff of the Army, created something called Futures Command. I'm actually just back from a session at Futures Command. General Jim Rainey (James E. Rainey) and his team are very interested in this study that we've been doing and in what it says about what the Army should look like in 2040. We've been sharing these lessons with him, with Futures Command, and thinking hard about how the Army adapts to this new era of what appears to be persistent surveillance, Katie talked about that a little bit, and increasingly, the artificial intelligence, robotics, human-machine pairing. Those are some of the t...

This podcast analyzes the US Army’s successive recruiting crises, identifying their consistent patterns and the efforts to resolve them, and makes three provocative arguments. First, there is a long-standing institutional tension between recruiting personnel for the combat arms and technical and administrative specialists. Second, many of today’s talent management problems were first identified in a 1907 General Staff report and reiterated in subsequent studies. Third, the Army has pursued innovative recruitment strategies, but much of their success depended on factors outside the service’s control. The podcast concludes with four history-based recruiting lessons and an affirmation that the 2019 Army People Strategy recognizes the need for the Army to revise its talent management approach.

Read here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/9/

Download the full episode transcript here: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/15/2003341318/-1/-1/0/DP-4-18-podcast-transcript-Linn_HistoricalPerspectiveRecruitingCrisis.PDF

Keywords: recruitment, US Army history, personnel policy, talent management, Army People Strategy

This podcast offers a preview of the latest Parameters demi-issue and full issue. Read the issue here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/7/

Download the full episode transcript here: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/15/2003341251/-1/-1/0/DP-4-17-PODCAST-TRANSCRIPT-CRANE_2023-AUTUMNPREVIEW.PDF

Keywords: recruiting, Ukraine, Taiwan, Antarctica, Russia, Chechen Kadyrovtsy

This episode showcases the understudied institutional Army, the generating force, as a critical prerequisite for overall strategic success. Competition, crisis, and conflict require more than the manned, trained, and equipped units that deploy. This podcast analyzes six case studies of institutional Army reforms over 160 years to examine adaptation in peace and war. The conclusions provide historical insights to inform current practices and fulfill the Army’s articulated 2022 Institutional Strategy.

Read the source article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/14/

Download the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/10/2003316777/-1/-1/0/DP-PODCAST-TRANSCRIPT-BONIN-SCUDIERI-FINAL.PDF

Keywords: institutional Army, generating force, Department of the Army staff, Army Futures Command, adaptation, innovation

Crider

You’re listening to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/mod/67423/details/582).

The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Today, I'm talking with Dr. John A. Bonin and Dr. James D. Scudieri, authors of “Change and Innovation in the Institutional Army from 1860–2020,” (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/13/) which was published in the summer of 2023, issued of Parameters.

Bonin is a consultant and distinguished fellow at the US Army War College, and Scudieri is the senior research historian at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

Welcome to Decisive Point.

Bonin

Thank you.

Scudieri

Thank you for hosting us today, Stephanie.

Crider

Let's jump right in. Your article offers 6 case studies examining the institutional army from 1860 to 2020. Your examples review the keys to successful institutional reform and the pitfalls and setbacks that impede progress. Let's walk briefly through the case studies. What do we need to know about the Cavalry Bureau in the American Civil War?

Bonin

I'm the one that picked that one, and it's an interesting case study, for me, because it's one of the earliest we can point to that the Army was trying to actually innovate. They even used that word. Secretary of War (Edwin McMasters) Stanton was very concerned with the abuse of cavalry and the lack of Union success. The Confederates had gained calvary superiority early in the war with a better structural focus of their cavalry units. The Union was behind, so Stanton, Secretary of War, tried to take some bureaucratic innovations to solve the problem. He came up with the idea of the Cavalry Bureau, which combined pieces of the Quartermaster Bureau and the Ordnance Bureau in order to create a synergistic effect. This is very similar to our cross-functional teams today, which is what resonated with me as a useful case study.

After several false starts, Stanton appointed James H. Wilson, a brigadier general, to head the Bureau in January of ‘64. Within about four months, Wilson was able to reform the procurement of horses, acquire seven-shot repeating carbines for all cavalry forces, and reform the institutional training for calvary troops before they joined their horses. And in short order, the Union armies were able to gain cavalry superiority over the Confederates and ultimately led to success. Unfortunately, shortly after 1865, Calvary Bureau was disestablished, which is one of the lessons we've learned in our case studies.

Crider

What impact did the US Army circa 1898 to 1920 have on institutional reform?

Scudieri

I found that a fascinating case study. First, it covers almost a quarter century, so those years are trying to learn post-war lessons after the Spanish-American War. It's trying to identify what changes are necessary in peacetime based on all of the changes going on in terms of the characteristics of warfare, through western warfare. The Europeans are trying to figure this out, as well. And then specifically for the US Army, there's major wartime adaptation as America becomes involved in the First World War.

There are lots of personalities involved here, but there's also a lot of personnel turmoil because there are several chiefs of staff who go through the leadership of the Army during this particular period, and also on the civilian leadership, two secretaries of war. Especially well-known would be Elihu Root, and then less well-known is Newton Baker, who wound up becoming a wartime secretary, which I don't think was originally his plan.

We also have the same issue as John talked about, wartime reform after the Spanish-American War, peacetime changes, which affect in many ways the front-office access on how many different entities in the Army could walk directly in to see the chief, and then wartime adaptation to get through the First World War. And get through the First World War, in this case, means not just forming the divisions that go to France under Pershing but the Army that's back home, this institutional army, especially the general staff. Unfortunately, one of those areas that did not resolve itself too well was the contest between Pershing and his headquarters in France and the institutional army, especially the general staff back home. And then, after the war, there's this major demobilization followed by, again, as John pointed out, some of the lessons are not learned permanently.

Crider

Your subsequent case study is General Marshall and an army headquarters for World War II. What is most important from this study?

Scudieri

Well, one could look at this case study almost as a sequel to the one I just discussed in the sense that in both cases, especially the end of the first one and now pretty much for most of this one, the Army has to adapt institutionally to what we would now call large-scale combat operations.

And World War II will be even bigger than America's involvement in the First World War, but this is also an analysis of the institution. That Marshall, before the war starts, he's got too many hats to wear, too many people that he has to help, assist, monitor, manage. And so, part of that reorganization is what I

call the triple hat of he can now delegate and deal directly with Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, and the Army Air Forces instead of the multitude he had before. These are the entities that will wind up providing the 89 divisions the Army has in the Second World War.

Crider

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and U.S. Army Combat developments. What are the takeaways from this example?

Bonin

Following on what we were just discussing, these other reforms, the Army had reverted back to essentially a Bureau and a technical service system that had been existent since 1860. McNamara comes in as Secretary of Defense and wants to reform DoD, so he's the really first activist Secretary of Defense. We hadn't had that before. So, he does a couple of things. He creates defense entities: Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, but he looks inside the Army and doesn't like what he sees. And so, he wants to see more focus on combat developments, is the term, and so he forces the Army to create a Combat Developments Command and an Army Material Command.

[He] takes the power away from these bureaus that had been contested in 1860, puts it under Army material command. And it keeps a combat developments command to focus on developing new techniques, new procedures, new doctrine, new concepts rather than leaving those back under the individual branches and uncoordinated. That immediately leads to the Army's focus on Army aviation, which I did my dissertation on, so I think this is a very interesting case of which the external SecDef (Secretary of Defense) had to force the Army to embrace Army aviation.

It did not come necessarily from within without his forcing function. So, he creates a test division, resources it, that test division then becomes the First Cav Division which is then deployed almost immediately to Vietnam. McNamara believed Army aviation was the key to success in Vietnam. I'm not so sure he was right, but he did force the Army to embrace aviation. And that's one of the lessons of this is that sometimes it takes an external civilian leader to force the changing function inside the US military.

Crider

Tell me about General Creighton William Abrams Jr's 1973 reorganization.

Bonin

Well, this comes at the end of the Vietnam War, so this is not a war-time adaptation and, as I mentioned, McNamara is prewar, but he was anticipating a war. So now we're through the Vietnam War and now we have a new strategic environment. The draft is over, the volunteer Army is in place, the army is shrinking by over 50 percent, and Creighton Abrams is concerned that we entered the Vietnam War poorly trained. So, he's got a training concept and he's aided by General Depuy. Depuy was an advocate for training. So Depuy is the key subordinate that helps him guide this reorganization, and he's going to take the Continental Army Command, which had become huge—too many missions, too many focuses—and he wants to split it into the Forces Command that handles forces and the Training and Doctrine Command, which handles training and doctrine.

But a casualty of this reorganization was the combat developments command that had previously been created by the Secretary McNamara, Combat Development Command then gets subsumed under TRADOC, and ultimately, we’ll find that the future focused mission of the Combat Developments

In 1944, Third US Army created a cohesive and flexible system for managing information and denying it to the enemy that aligned operational concepts with technological capabilities. The organization’s success in the European Theater highlights its effective combined arms integration. An examination of the historical record shows the creative design of the Signal Intelligence and Army Information Services enabled Third Army to deliver information effects consistently and provides a useful model for considering the dynamics at play in fielding new and experimental multidomain effects formations.

Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/14/

Keywords: World War II, Third United States Army, military effectiveness, force design, information advantage

About the author: Major Spencer L. French, US Army, is a military intelligence officer currently assigned as the operations officer for the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade at Fort Meade, Maryland. His research interests focus on historical military innovation and force design.

This podcast presents four factors to consider in evaluating Taiwan’s strategic importance to the United States and its allies and answers a question often raised at forums concerning the Indo-Pacific: “Why should the United States care” about this small island in the Pacific? The response often given is simply US credibility, and while this is an important factor, this podcast reviews a wider array of possible factors to consider when answering that question. The study of these factors should assist US military and policy practitioners in accurately evaluating the related strategic environment. Through a survey of official US policy statements and strategy documents across administrations, part two of this article (to be featured in a future issue) will examine the evolving US perception of Taiwan throughout the aggressive strengthening of China and during Taiwan’s domestic political development into a full-fledged democracy.

Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/11/

Keywords: Taiwan, geopolitical, credibility, democracy, authoritarian

About the author:Luke P. Bellocchi, JD, LLM, MSSI, MBA, served in senior and senior executive positions throughout his government career and is now an associate professor of practice at National Defense University, where he teaches strategy and a China elective at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School. His recent work, “The U.S. One China Policy: A Primer for Professional Military Education,” can be found at https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Media/Campaigning-Journals/.

National security practitioners need to understand the motives, mindsets, and intentions of adversaries to anticipate and respond to their actions effectively. Although some authors have argued empathy helps build an understanding of the adversary, research points to its cognitive component of perspective taking as the more appropriate skill for national security practitioners to have. In this podcast, Dr. Allison Abbe synthesizes previous research on the development and application of perspective taking in analysis and decision making and recommends four ways strategists and practitioners can enhance their ability to gain insight into adversaries.

Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/9/

Keywords: perspective taking, strategic empathy, political psychology, military education, cognitive bias

Episode Transcript: Understanding the Adversary: Strategic Empathy and Perspective Taking in National Security

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I’m talking with Dr. Allison Abbe today, author of “Understanding the Adversary: Strategic Empathy and Perspective Taking in National Security,” which was published in the Summer 2023 issue of Parameters. Abbe is a professor of organizational studies at the US Army War College. Her research focuses on the development of leadership and intercultural skills in national security personnel.

Welcome to Decisive Point, Dr. Abbe.

Dr. Allison Abbe

Thanks for having me.

Host

Your article synthesizes research on perspective taking in analysis and decision making and recommends four ways strategists and practitioners can enhance their ability to gain insight into adversaries. Will you please explain perspective taking in the context of strategic empathy?

Abbe

Sure. So, strategic empathy has been talked about in terms of understanding adversaries and competitors and being able to better anticipate their actions. And in psychology, the topic of empathy has been more in the context of helping relationships between clinicians and patients, or clinicians and clients in the context of mental health. And so, there’s a rich literature on empathy but in a slightly different context than in the national security arena.

In psychology, empathy is talked about in terms of empathic concern for the other person or party, motivation to engage in empathy, and then perspective taking. So those three components are not as equally applicable in the national security arena as they might be in a one-on-one relationship—an interpersonal relationship like in a romantic relationship or a patient-practitioner medical kind of context. So, focusing on perspective taking allows us to pull just the really relevant skills about empathy that can be applied in the national security context and focus more on how it is people can go about understanding the cognitive perspective of someone else without taking on the emotions of another party or really wanting to help the other party. You can maintain your own interests while understanding the perspective of the adversary, or even a partner.

Host

How can leaders and strategists develop perspective taking as a skill?

Abbe

So, perspective taking as a basic ability develops in childhood. We know from the developmental psychology literature that we’re capable of it as small children. But it’s a very cognitively demanding skill, and so people don’t automatically engage in it. Your default is to use your own perspective, and then you only take on someone else’s perspective with additional cognitive effort. And so, even though people have the capability to do it, they aren’t necessarily applying it in day-to-day life. And so, it takes a lot of intention to use perspective taking and to get better at understanding other people’s perspectives.

You can really only take on someone else’s perspective if you understand their context and you understand the person. And so, it’s important to have the background knowledge that would enable you to really understand their perspective. You have to have that information available to be able to do that effectively. So, study of another party’s decision-making patterns, the influences—cultural or regional influences—on their decision making would be important, as well as having the time and energy to engage in that perspective-taking skill.

Host

What unique challenges and opportunities are there in the national security context of perspective taking?

Abbe

One of the unique challenges is the distance often from the other party. And so, you’re trying to take on the perspective of somebody that you don’t have an opportunity to interact directly with. And so, you could watch their speeches, you can read what they’ve published, what they’ve written (or at least what their speech writers have written for them). But in the national security context, you don’t necessarily have the opportunity to ask them questions so you can better understand their perspective the way that you would if you were a doctor interviewing a patient (or in an interpersonal relationship) to try to better understand the other’s perspective. And so, that distance and the lack of opportunity to interact directly is certainly one limitation or challenge. So, then you have to use other sources of information to try to gain that perspective.

I think one of the unique opportunities that we haven’t always engaged in this context is that perspective taking can really help make better decisions and choose among courses of action. So, if you understand the other party, whether it’s an individual foreign leader or it’s a local population in a village, and you’re trying to help them counter terrorism influences in their community, you have to understand what they care about, what they’re motivated by, what their interests are . . . in order to make better decisions about how to interact with them and how to advance US interests.

Host

Are there any research gaps or challenges that we need to consider regarding this topic?

Abbe

One of the research gaps is we’ve had difficulty in psychology, at least, in developing measures of perspective-taking ability. So, that’s one limitation. The typical way to go about measuring it is to use a self-report questionnaire, which is really good for assessing people’s motivation to engage in perspective taking. But it’s not as good at measuring their accuracy and doing it as a skill. As a really important cognitive skill, we should have better tools to go about measuring how well people are engaging in perspective taking (and) how accurate they are in engaging perspective taking. And so, that’s one research gap that could be addressed in the behavioral sciences.

Another one is just on the development and application of perspective taking. How is it that we can encourage practitioners to engage these skills as they’re acquiring other skills at the same time? I’ve talked about it in the article in terms of its relationship to systems thinking, which is another important cognitive skill set.

Cross-cultural competence is another area where there’s intersection. And so, then, how do we develop this skill in practitioners at the same time that they’re developing these other important skills that are applicable to their work?

Host

I think we have a few extra minutes if you have any concluding thoughts that you’d like to share before we wrap it up.

Abbe

One of the interesting areas for further research is looking at various tools to develop perspective-taking skill. There’s some interesting research, in college students, at least, that shows that reading literary fiction is one way to develop perspective taking. Literary fiction helps you take on the perspective of the characters in the novel and can help people develop perspective taking. And it doesn’t develop from just watching movies or reading popular fiction. There’s something about the challenging nature of literary fiction and requiring cognitive effort and really diving into characters that seems to help. There’s limited research on that, but that’s really one interesting avenue.

Studying history, of course, is one way to develop better perspective-taking skills. So, there might be some interesting research avenues for that as well.

Those are two good ways of potentially developing that people can use in their own free time, as reading is, you know, one common hobby. So, directing people to the kinds of sources that might help them develop the skill set and understanding how that develops would be an interesting area for further research.

Host

You can read more about perspective taking and empathy at press.armywarcollege.edu. Look for volume 53, issue 2.

Dr. Abbe, thank you so much for making time for me today. This was really interesting.

Abbe

Thank you so much.

Host

If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform.

About the author: Allison Abbe, PhD, is a professor of organizational studies at the US Army War College. Her research focuses on the development of leadership and intercultural skills in national security personnel. She previously worked as a research psychologist and program manager in defense and intelligence organizations and holds a PhD in social and personality psychology from the University of California, Riverside. H...

Scholars have been using the wrong card games to analyze Carl von Clausewitz’s analogies in On War, which has led to errors in understanding his ideas. This podcast identifies the games Clausewitz discusses, allowing for a more accurate interpretation of his original meaning for the study of war. Since Clausewitz’s ideas underpin strategy development within service education systems, it is critical his ideas are fully understood in context.

Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/12/

Episode Transcript: Geniuses Dare to Ride Their Luck: Clausewitz’s Card Game Analogies

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I’m talking today with Dr. Nicholas Murray. Murray designs and runs war games for the Secretary of Defense Strategic Thinkers Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Professional Military Education. He also translates the works of Carl von Clausewitz and other theorists. He’s the author of “Geniuses Dare to Ride Their Luck: Clausewitz’s Card Game Analogies,” which was published in the Summer 2023 issue of Parameters.

Welcome to Decisive Point, Nick.

Nicholas A. A. Murray

Thank you very much for having me. It’s a pleasure.

Host

Your article asserts that scholars have been using the wrong card games to analyze Clausewitz’s analogies on war, which has led to errors in understanding his ideas. Please expand on that.

Murray

The reason I got into this . . . I think a bit of background might help . . . is the card games we use, which are typically blackjack, poker, or games like chess and bridge and things, didn’t seem to line up with what else I was reading and finding in his histories in terms of how he understood luck. And so, as I dug into it, the question struck me, which was what games would he have actually been familiar with, and what would he have played?

And except for chess, the other games weren’t popular or even invented at the time of his life or writing. So, I started to look into that. What I found was that the games that he had in mind and actually discussed often—sometimes explicitly—were different stochastically in terms of luck. And they were different in terms of player interaction. And they were different in terms of things like cheating, which was an inherent part of almost all the games with which he was familiar. Taking that into account, it meant that contemporary analogies, using, say, blackjack, where one can card count, you can change the strategy of playing against the casino in your favor, for example. That simply didn’t exist. And so, he wasn’t thinking about something like that. He was thinking about something far more chance ridden than we have in mind.

Host

Which card games was Clausewitz likely talking about?

Murray

The three I’ve been able to identify, along with something called würfel, which is a version of a variety of different dice games, which is simply you roll a dice and bet on it. Sort of like craps, I suppose.

But the three main ones are games called faro, skat, and ombre. And these were games that were familiar to Clausewitz. He explicitly references two and implicitly references skat via phrases that occur within that game.

These card games are much different from the ones we would think about in terms of blackjack or poker. I think it’s worth the reader just having a quick understanding, if that would be helpful, I think, of what these entail. Faro is often described as little better than playing dice. It’s a banking game based on an older game called basset. Multiple players can play. The banker turns over a card, and you bet on a number. And if your number is matched by the card that turns up, you can win. And then the bets, depending on how you play, typically, you can win 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 times your stake, depending on the way the bank is set up. So, it’s enormously risky. It’s inherently wonderful for the banker. It’s typically known as one of the most fraudulent games . . . across cultures I found, as well, which is quite interesting. It’s all on the turn of a card. It’s essentially all about luck. There’s really no skill involved. And there’s no player interaction, either, which is one of the things that current scholars often, when they talk about card games, talk about the interaction between players. So, one of the main games that Clausewitz explicitly references has virtually no interaction with players and is almost exclusively luck based. It’s fundamentally different from often how we look at and interpret what he’s saying.

Skat is a trick-taking game that originated in Thuringia, just near where Clausewitz was living. It was popular at the time. It typically involves three players. Good luck or bad luck can overcome a bad hand or good hand, respectively, irrespective of the skill of the player. But skill is definitely required, as is a good strategy.

And then the third game, again, this is one of the two he explicitly references, is ombre, which was the (probably) card game of the seventeenth and early–eighteenth centuries. It requires an enormous amount of luck. Daring play is often celebrated and rewarded, even if it leads to losses. And so, it‘s the nature of the game, and how you play it is as important as the fact that it‘s a trick-taking card game, that’s inherently luck based. You can have a strategy, but players are celebrated for being exceptionally daring when they play, and that’s something to take into account when we’re thinking of context about how he and his contemporaries would have thought about what this means.

Host

Clausewitz writes about the relationship between risk and chance. Examining his writings through the lens of these card games you just told me about, how might this alter the meaning of previous interpretations of his work?

Murray

I think it’s profound. We tend to see and we tend to think about Clausewitz as, you know, making sure you understand what it is you’re getting into before you start anything. And I don’t think that changes, but it really drives home that if it’s as chance ridden as he is implying with the type of games he has in mind, then that behooves us really to emphasis that question, which is what is it you’re trying to achieve here? What do you think it’s going to take? Because chances are, as soon as you start, it’s going to be far more costly, far more difficult, and far less likely to match any of your preconceptions or ideas.

And so, when we think about it today, what we often see is, if we just do enough analysis (sometimes you’ll see if we’re using the example of whether it’s chess or bridge or things like this, if we count cards, if we play skillfully) we can pretty much guarantee X outcome or Y outcome. And what Clausewitz is saying is, “No, that may help us in terms of if luck is on our side. But in reality, luck plays such a big role, and emotion plays such a big role” particularly if the other side is cheating, and that’s something that’s often not taken into account when we think about this.

With the idea that if we can’t really predict these things, and one of the things that he tells us about this— and it gets often mentioned but ignored—is he talks about (Leonhard) Euler and (Sir Isaac) Newton, two of the greatest mathematical minds of the previous four or five centuries, I should think, and certainly the previous two centuries for Clausewitz. If they can‘t figure this stuff out, these are equations that are beyond them, as he puts, essentially, how are we meant to, sort of, as mere mortals actually figure this stuff out?

And so, one of the points that he’s driving home here is you’re always betting against the odds. And the bank essentially is the opponent or luck or whatever it is . . . fate. And he’s not necessarily always exactly clear about this. So, if that’s the case and we’re always betting against the odds, and luck plays a role, we have to be daring because we can make a series of small bets and hedge our bets or be cautious, but at the end of the day, we can make losses on each of those small bets and we’ll never win big. Even if we win the occasional bet, we’re not going to actually win the war or win that particular part of the campaign or whatever it is that we’re trying to do at that particular moment. So his argument, to a certain extent, is if you believe you’ve made all the right choices, you’ve amassed your force, you’ve done the things you’re meant to do, you need to commit and you need to dare to win, essentially.

So when he’s, then, looking at historical examples, he looks at Frederick. He looks at Napoleon. And he’s often sarcastic, as well, with both of them—but particularly with Napoleon. But one of the things he really highlights is how important daring is and the moral courage to make a bold decision. And he frequently excoriates those historical commanders who fail to do that. He’s absolutely scathing, “feeble minded beetles,” he calls the Austrian generals “scurrying around on the battlefields in 1796.” He’s really trying to drive home this connection between this moral courage, luck, and, obviously, his concept of genius.

Host

What do we need to consider, then, going forward?

Murray

It’s tough because I’m not necessarily 100 percent sure. Partly because, obviously, for me, I’ve been sort of in the middle of this, but also, I’ve been teaching PME (professional military education), and Clausewitz is fundamental to PM...

In an evolving and expanding biothreat landscape caused by emerging biotechnologies, increases in global infectious disease outbreaks, and geopolitical instability, the Department of Defense now faces challenges that alter its traditional approach to biothreats and prompt the need for modernized, improved preparedness for—and response to—potential biothreat scenarios. These challenges further complicate specific weaknesses revealed by the COVID-19 pandemic, including the Department’s inability to sustain the military mission while meeting intragovernmental expectations to assist with civilian public health resources and services.

Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/8/

Episode Transcript: “Responding to Future Pandemics: Biosecurity Implications and Defense Considerations”

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Decisive Point welcomes Drs. Diane DiEuliis and James Jordano, authors of “Responding to Future Pandemics: Bio Security Applications and Defense Considerations,” which was published in the Summer 2023 issue of Parameters.

DiEuliis is a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University, and Giordano holds several distinguished titles, including the Pellegrino Center professor in the departments of neurology and biochemistry.

Thank you for joining me today, Drs. DiEuliss and Giordano.

Dr. James Giordano

Thank you.

Dr. Diane DiEuliis

Thank you. It’s great to be with you today.

Host

Your article addresses three primary factors that have complicated the evolving landscape of biodefense threats. What are they?

Murray

Giordano

Murray

Let me take the first. The first one that we mentioned is emerging biotechnologies across a spectrum of potential applications in recent developments. These include, but certainly aren’t limited to, things such as gene editing. Probably the one most people are most currently familiar with is the use of a particular gene scissoring tool called CRISPR CAS9. But realistically, what that does is that just adds to our current armamentarium and makes our current armamentarium more facile and far easier to both acquire and use with regard to the existing techniques and technologies for gene editing to modify the genome and perhaps direct various phenotypes (expressions of physical characteristics). Going right along with that is the vast field of synthetic biology. Synthetic biology ranges everything from the molecular to the mass effect to the subcellular all the way to those things that can produce social change and a variety of different applications.

Certainly, we’re concerned about those things that directly affect humans, but realistically, there’s a number of things in synthetic biology that can disrupt and affect the ecologies and the environments upon which humans are dependent and interact. And this can then have ripple effects. And, really, I think the potentiator, and as Diane and I both have argued in print, the force multiplier for these is the use of big data coupled with forms of machine learning that are iteratively becoming forms of artificial intelligence. You put all these things together and you got yourself a juggernaut of biotechnological capability with a broad, broad range and field of different applications and uses and potential misuses. Diane?

DiEuliis

Thanks, Jim. Tagging on to that as a second concern is the fact that we may be looking in future at an increasing incidence of emerging infectious disease. And as the world’s population grows, we see more and more infringement of human populations into natural habitats. And as you know, much of emerging infectious diseases that appear in human beings comes from what are called zoonotic jumps, or a jump from a disease pathogen in an animal that then becomes adapted to human populations. And then we could see pandemics resulting from that. As we move into the future, we may see more incidences of zoonotic jumps, but also, we see things like people living in more close spaces in urban environments, which in some cases could just be an incubator for spreading diseases in a pandemic fashion. So, this is also a reason for why we need to reexamine the biothreat landscape. Jim, did you have more to add to that?

Giordano

If you take a look at the second and the first, in other words, the increased incidence and perhaps prevalence of infectious diseases, both in humans and in other species upon which humans are dependent—and the use of biotech—one thing is not mutually exclusive from the other. As the COVID crisis brought into stark relief, many of our emerging biotechs are prompted by, if not in direct response to what may be seen as biological risks and/or threats such as COVID. But more than that, I think, what tends to happen is that you do get this march along, whereby the biotechnology is beginning to address more and more areas that are so representative of human susceptibilities and vulnerabilities. And in so doing, that interface between those things that are environmental, from the microbial level all the way to the geopolitical level, become the targets of those things that we can use biotechnologically to assess those risks and threats, and to engage those risks and threats, in a variety of different ways. Diane?

DiEuliis

Those are really interesting points, and one of the things that we talk about in the paper is this sort of irony in emerging biotech in that some of these tools and the emerging capabilities that are offered by biotechnology are sort of the same tools that we want to use in order to mitigate things like pandemics, things like COVID-19. The goal is going to be moving forwar how to balance that how to balance the potential emerging threats that can come from these expanded capabilities while at the same time safely leveraging these technologies for the benefits that we can get out of them. And there’s a wide swath of benefits that could be used both by DoD and the community writ large that could be used to combat bio threats into the future.

Host

How do you see these factors playing out against the changing landscape of bio threats?

Giordano

I think we’re seeing an increased ecological disruption, everything from that writ large, climate change, for example, and the total human footprint over a period of time, particularly over the 19th, 20th now to the 21st century. And, I think writ small, as Diane noted, what we’re seeing is urban and suburban spread and sprawl, but also an increased level of commercialization and technologization of various environments that then disrupt those environments in those ways that make those environmental niche factors far more feasible, viable, and, therefore, accessible to humans and human populations.

So, these two things work together, both as respective of human progress and perhaps also as intentional disruption. I mean, seeing the ecology and the environment as a battle space, whereby disruptions of that ecology can then prompt individual and collective notions of dread and threat, forced migration, and/or in some cases, various responses, I mean, true responses, particularly in the psychological operations base, can be seen very, very importantly as a domain of perhaps non kinetic engagement, which then gets us directly into kinetic engagement. The use of these bio threats and bio risks as weaponizable entities on a variety of scales, from the individual all the way to the international.

Host

So, through this lens, what should the Department of Defense consider when it comes to maintaining readiness and preparing for the next pandemic?

DiEuliis

I really have two areas of response to that, and the first one is . . . of course, we learned quite a bit in responding to COVID-19. That entire experience really highlighted a number of things that DoD needs to be concerned with moving forward. The first of which is DoD obviously does defense support of civil authorities. Sometimes we nickname that DSCA. That’s an expected role that DoD has played for a long time is supporting civilian authorities in responding to disasters, or, in this case, a pandemic of global proportion. But at the same time, DoD needs to protect the warfighting force from whatever it is that’s happening and needs to maintain readiness in the warfighting force.

So, one tension that was revealed during COVID-19 is that our civilian response to the pandemic was leaning heavily on the DoD for logistical and other kinds of support. So that may not be the ideal situation moving forward because DoD quickly learned that extending itself to support the civilian response had some drawbacks on the DoD side. We were quickly depleting some of our stockpiles of response materials in the way of PPE and other kinds of things as simple as nitrile gloves and other things that are involved in that. That is one thing that DoD will have to strike a balance. How much can they lean forward in supporting the civilian response versus how much to continue to maintain their protection of the forces internally.

The second piece of that gets to more of some of the things that we cover in more detail in the paper. And that is this sort of overlap space between the general health and welfare of warfighters versus protecting war fighters from very specific intentional bio threats. Let me describe that in a little bit more detail. It’s general purpose is keeping a healthy...

The US military, intelligence, and diplomatic communities have overlooked a key vulnerability in their assessment of a potential military conflict between China and Taiwan—Taiwan’s growing reliance on agricultural imports and its food stocks (except for rice) that could endure trade disruptions for only six months. This podcast assesses Taiwan’s agricultural sector and its ability to feed the country’s population if food imports and production are disrupted; identifies the food products that should be prioritized in resupply operations, based on Taiwan’s nutritional needs and domestic food production; and outlines the required logistical assets. These findings underscore the urgency for US military planners to develop long-term logistical solutions for this complex strategic issue.

Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/10/

Keywords: Decisive Point Podcast, China, resiliency, Taiwan, food insecurity, naval blockade

Episode Transcript: “Taiwan’s Food Resiliency—or Not—in a Conflict with China”

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You’re listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Today, I’m chatting with Captain Gustavo Ferreira and Major Jamie Critelli, authors of “Taiwan’s Food Resiliency—or Not—in a Conflict with China.” Ferreira is a senior agricultural economist with the US Department of Agriculture and serves as an agricultural officer at the 353 Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserves. Critelli, US Army Reserves, is a civil affairs officer serving as an agricultural officer in the 353 Civil Affairs Command. He’s a seasonal farm business owner and has worked globally in agriculture on five continents.

Welcome back to Decisive Point, gentlemen.

Jamie Critelli

Thank you for having us here, Stephanie.

Gustavo Ferreira

Thank you, Stephanie. Happy to be here.

Host

Your article . . . it focuses on Taiwan’s food resiliency. Please give us an overview of Taiwan’s agricultural sector.

Ferreira

I would like to start by emphasizing how recent supply chain disruptions, crop failures in some key producing countries, as well as the war in Ukraine, have pushed global food prices to record high levels and also reminded many countries about the risks associated with the dependency on food imports to feed their populations. In the case of Taiwan, as this country industrialized its economy and developed key manufacturing sectors such as the semiconductor sector, its agricultural production had been declining for decades. As a result, Taiwan’s ability to feed itself has decreased, and food imports now cover about 2/3s of its annual caloric intake. What’s problematic with this is that contrary to what we’ve seen in Ukraine(where the) United States and other NATO allies are being able to supply Ukraine with massive amounts of supplies through a vast shared land border. A similar effort will not be possible for Taiwan because of A). Taiwan being an island and B). China’s Liberation Army Navy and Rocket Force have now the capabilities of denying freedom of movement to any adversary naval force in the air. In the context of a conflict with China; it will be extremely difficult and risky for cargo ships and airlift to reach Taiwan.

Another challenge will be the fact that China will likely attempt to capture major operational ports to use them to dock their own merchant civilian ships to supply its invasion of Taiwan. As a response, the Taiwanese military will almost certainly try to deny China’s access to these ports via obstacles such as sea mines or sunken ships. With all main ports no longer operational, we believe the United States and its allies will struggle to transport and unload critical food supplies to Taiwan.

Nevertheless, it’s important to note that Taiwanese authorities are well aware of these vulnerabilities, and the build-up of public food stocks have been a central component of the country’s food resiliency strategy. And I’ll give an example, during the COVID-19 crisis the Taiwanese government shared that the population that the nation had enough Food and Agriculture commodity stocks to handle disruptions in agriculture trade for six months. That was their promise. Our own analysis also shows that Taiwan has enough food reserves to feed its population for about six months. After that, the island will have to import food products to meet its nutritional needs.

Host

In the event of a naval blockade enforced by China, which food products should be prioritized in early stock build-up efforts or resupply operations based on Taiwan’s nutritional needs and domestic food production?

Critelli

Taiwan, population 23 million, is actually the 16th largest food-importing country in the world. As you heard from Gus, it’s heavily reliant upon food imports to meet its needs, and certainly, any naval blockade will disrupt these flows. Food products must be prioritized in any efforts to build up stockages pre-conflict and should be included in US and allied resupply operations during a conflict.

Specific food products we consider are prioritized based upon two factors. First is widespread consumption of the food product already by the Taiwanese population, so we know that they eat it. And number two, a large volume of Taiwan imports due to the inability of domestic production to meet the demand nationally. When we look at the food that the Taiwanese are eating, about 50 percent of the calories come from grains. A large chunk of this is covered by domestic rice production, so we can exclude that, but wheat, corn, and soy are almost completely imported to meet the needs because there is no domestic production. In fact, the imports of wheat, corn, and soy amount to some 9 million metric tons annually. Wheat is used for them to produce flour, while corn and soy are almost exclusively used as livestock feed, predominantly for poultry and hogs. Next up on the list would be animal protein, 50 years ago, the average Taiwanese citizen derived 75 percent of their protein needs from plant sources and 25 percent from animal sources. The new mix is now nearly 50/50. A third of this animal protein comes from fish. The grains that I mentioned earlier are used to feed poultry and hogs. There is barely a domestic beef sector in Taiwan, so all beef is imported. With fish, however, the coastal and deep sea fishing industries provide it, but in the event of any naval action, these industries will be limited as well. So to produce fish, it will need to move on to shore into aquaculture facilities. Both fish and chicken are remarkable at transforming their rations into protein and should be prioritized in production to reduce the grain import needed to provide protein sources to the population in the first place.

Finally, while it isn’t a food stuff, do not forget about chemical inputs. These would include fertilizers and pesticides needed to grow plants as well as any chemical inputs and antibiotics needed for increased levels of dry land aquaculture. Despite whether the country needs to transition to a higher level of domestic production or it needs to start eating lower on the food pyramid due to a naval embargo, it will still need the means of sustaining itself with increased domestic agriculture.

Host

What logistical assets would be required to strengthen Taiwan’s food resiliency?

Ferreira

In this study, we developed three scenarios that assess the ability of Taiwan’s food system to endure a partial or a total Chinese Navy blockade. These scenarios are not intended to be exhaustive.

We started with scenario number one, which assumes that China effectively denies US and Allied food resupply operations. So, in other words, Taiwan becomes completely cut off from the rest of the world. Under this scenario, Taiwan will not be able to get external assistance. They will need to have sufficient food supplies at hand right at the beginning of the conflict. This is because while the current food stock levels may sustain Taiwan for six months, they will be insufficient in the event of a much more prolonged naval block. And let’s not forget it has been a year and two months since Russia invaded Ukraine, so nothing is certain about how long any military operation will last. So Taiwan will be better off being prepared for a longer-term scenario. To do so, we proposed two particular strategies. The first one is to increase its food reserve levels, and the second one is to increase its domestic food production. But we gotta say that, unfortunately, these two options also come with their own challenges and limitations, and we’ll cover those in a minute.

Starting with the first one, increasing food reserve levels for that, Taiwan will have to make major investments in storage capacity and strengthen its strategic stockpiles of key materials to include foodstuff. The problem here is the large storage facilities, and you can think of grain silos or cold storage warehouses; they’re also very vulnerable targets. Therefore, you know, Taiwan’s military will have to, at the same time as they build this infrastructure, they will also have to think about developing protective systems to defend this critical infrastructure from either kinetic or cyber attacks. The second option, which will be to increase domestic food production in order to make Taiwan more resilient, will come with also some problems.

So first, in order to boost more traditional agricultural production, that will take time, and it will require significant changes in the country’s rather antiquated agricultural system. The...