Deeplinks

Governor Newsom signed a package of 12 bills yesterday aimed at “protecting children” online. One of them was AB 1709, which EFF has opposed this legislative session and serves as a functional ban on young people under 16 using social media. However, EFF supported two of the bills signed into law, AB 2071 and AB 2298, which require that children learn critical digital literacy and cybersecurity topics. The bills are an affirmative and constitutional way for the state to address valid concerns about young people’s internet use without violating their First Amendment rights.

Unlike blanket bans, A.B. 2071 and A.B. 2298 address online safety through education rather than prohibition. Young people rely on the internet not just for entertainment, but for civic engagement, education, self-expression, and community—especially vulnerable youth who may lack support in their physical surroundings. This is why real digital safety comes from preparation, not isolation. Research consistently shows that open, honest conversations about digital literacy and privacy with trusted adults are far more effective at protecting youth than restrictive censorship laws. Young people themselves recognize this need; in fact, A.B. 2071 was co-authored by a group of students actively seeking better resources to navigate their digital lives safely.

A.B. 2071 and A.B. 2298 fill critical gaps in California’s school curricula by equipping students with actionable skills. A.B. 2071 integrates digital wellness into middle and high school health classes, teaching students how to identify unhealthy tech habits, protect their personal safety, and evaluate digital content—including AI-generated media—for credibility and bias. Meanwhile, A.B. 2298 adds cybersecurity concepts to recommended school curricula, teaching young people how to safeguard their personal data from online threats.

While the state’s turn toward social media bans remains a harmful and misguided policy direction, the passage and signing of A.B. 2071 and A.B. 2298 show there is a better way. Lawmakers must stop treating censorship as a quick fix and instead focus on constitutional, empowering solutions that give youth the tools they need to thrive online. 

Amazon recently debuted a new feature for its Ring cameras that the company is calling Throw Away the Key Encryption (TAKE). The idea is to cut back on the amount of video content available to the company, and thus potentially available to law enforcement. But while it might technically add a speed bump to accessing full video content, it doesn’t deliver nearly the level of privacy we should be demanding from video doorbells and other security cameras.

TAKE introduces a new way for Ring to manage encryption keys, where the user’s device has its key, then the company holds encryption keys temporarily within its own cloud infrastructure. Ring’s servers receive the keys temporarily so it can offer a variety of the features it says it can’t offer when a user chooses to use end-to-end encryption, like video descriptions, smart alerts, video search, and more, then deletes the key after 24 hours. 

This differs from how it works now, where footage is encrypted in transit and at rest, then decrypted by Ring, which always has access to the footage, to process those features. 

Comparatively, this is an improvement to the default settings Ring has now, because it at least puts some restrictions on historical footage, but it has some serious holes worth exploring.

Ring has designed its service so many of its camera features, including smart alerts and video search, need cloud processing to work. That means to provide those features, Ring needs to decrypt the footage while it’s stored in Ring’s cloud servers. 

With TAKE, in order to decrypt footage to offer these features, Ring gets access to footage stored in the cloud for 24 hours. TAKE adds some small measures using secure enclaves to make base key material harder to directly export, but keys are still released to services that can be modified. With access to the keys, the cloud processing does its thing and delivers the requested feature to the user. The key is then deleted 24 hours later—until the user wants to watch an old video or use other so-called “smart” features, at which point the keys are sent back to the server. 

In practice, that makes the system as a whole barely different from encryption at rest where the server holds the keys. The client device essentially takes the place of a hardware security module (HSM), including making those keys available to the server whenever they’re needed. The end result is an improvement from the status quo, but still not even close to the privacy protections of end-to-end encryption. 

The company says it does not keep backups of the keys and there’s no way for a Ring employee to access footage. It also claims that any decrypted content is deleted from its servers. 

But that doesn’t mean much when user actions send the keys back to the server. And making features like “Video Search” and “Smart Video Descriptions” available to the device owner means that while the footage can’t be seen by Ring, descriptions are readily available to the company. In response to a question about capability, Ring responded to us that, “As Ring continues to expand and further strengthen TAKE's protections, video descriptions will be included.”

Plus, account recovery keys are stored in the camera itself by default. When that’s paired with the fact that currently, indices of video contents are available to the company, it means that TAKE isn’t even a protection against mass surveillance. Law enforcement could request a mass search across cameras for certain terms, then delve into further details by seizing cameras of interest from the device-owner, decrypting account backups, and using that information to decrypt encrypted videos. 

Because of the ways the access and key rotations work, it’s technically still possible for Ring to alter its current practice if compelled to do so by law enforcement, in much the same way as other existing encryption-at-rest systems where the company holds the keys. For example, Ring could receive an order that demands they save content encryption keys or unencrypted videos from memory to disk, which would mean they’d retain some level of access. 

In an email to EFF, Ring stated, “By design, under TAKE, Ring will not be able to provide encryption keys or decrypted content. With TAKE, Ring will only preserve and provide encrypted video files in response to valid legal process. It has been and continues to be Ring's policy to object to overbroad legal requests.” EFF specifically asked about the possibility of complying with law enforcement orders to modify existing practice to turn over or preserve unencrypted video, which appears to be technically possible, but the company did not address it.

End-to-end encryption works to maintain trust by its user base because the company that employs it never has access to the keys at any point, making it impossible for itself to access the encrypted contents. This also means law enforcement can’t demand the service retain keys or choose not to rotate them. As described, this level of protection isn’t offered with TAKE.

Ultimately, Ring is the one managing this software and its implementation, and beyond a white paper, “trust us” is the only level of verification they’re offering outside observers. While it doesn’t fix the issues, at the bare minimum, the company needs to open the entire infrastructure up to third-party auditors to verify its claims. Ring seems to agree, as they told us that, “Ring conducts rigorous security reviews of all products before launch and critical components of TAKE’s infrastructure underwent independent security testing prior to launch. We are exploring options for further independent review.”

TAKE is not end-to-end encryption, where Ring would never have access to the keys, and the company thankfully doesn’t claim it as such. Ring already offers the option for end-to-end encryption, and turning that on by default would offer the real sorts of privacy improvements we all want from video doorbells. 

SAN FRANCISCO - Technology and the laws that regulate it should support and empower young people. California’s AB 1709 - signed into law today by Gov. Gavin Newsom - falls far short of this goal, say the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and its allies.   

Using technology is how we learn and build community in today’s world. Laws such as AB 1709, a functional ban on social media use for people under the age of 16, instead cut young people off from essential information and experiences. That particularly harms those already facing increased challenges, who often find safety in supportive online communities that they can’t always access in the physical world.  

"California should be passing laws to ensure that technology really works for people of all ages, not enacting social media bans that cut young people off from digital lifelines, communities, and speech," said EFF Associate Director of State Affairs Rindala Alajaji. "Denying minors access to digital forums - or stripping out basic tools needed to navigate them - is not going to help make young people safer or healthier in the AI age."  

Research shows social media bans are ineffectual, while also denying young people opportunities to develop their own voices and perspectives—to share their art, practice religion or engage in politics.   

Age-gating requirements also force everyone to give up more personal information. To verify who can pass through their online gates, companies will collect even more data, and this further concentrates power in the hands of companies, rather than protecting people.  

AB 1709 is also inconsistent with rights to free expression and California will be spending resources to defend a law tied up in court. Instead, we should redouble our efforts to get technology laws right—and support the passage of new robust privacy laws that target surveillance business models. That’s how we protect everyone in the AI age.   

Young people should be able to use technology in safe and healthy ways. The Golden State should model the gold standard laws that ensure technology works for everyone, rather than shut down access to digital forums in ways that do more harm than good. 

"Social media bans like AB1709 make kids less safe, while undermining privacy and freedom of expression for everyone,” said Evan Greer, Director of Fight for the Future. “Young people have been on the forefront of every social movement throughout history that has led to positive social change. We need policies that empower young people rather than silencing them. These kid-focused bans are a gift to Big Tech giants, allowing them to continue operating their harmful business model while incentivizing them to collect even more data. California lawmakers should be ashamed. They didn't do anything to protect the kids, they just used kids as pawns to make good headlines."  

“In a world of increasing stigma and marginalization for LGBTQ+ families, AB 1709 continues that trend by stripping people with LGBTQ+ parents of the ability to meet and build community with one another on the internet” said Jordan Wilson, Executive Director of COLAGE. “Beyond obstructing the right of youth with LGBTQ+ parents to access information, this bill places an undue burden on all Californians by forcing age verification at a time when digital privacy rights are being eroded globally. We cannot ‘protect children’ by stripping them of their primary avenue for connection.” 

Law enforcement agencies across the country are increasingly relying on spying technologies—automated license plate readers (ALPR), cell-site simulators, and facial recognition, to name a few--causing an outcry in many communities where people are rightly concerned about the threat to civil rights and civil liberties these tools present.

Some authorities are responding to these concerns by trying to hide what they’re doing. Police departments are telling officers not to mention ALPRs when stopping vehicles and concealing their use of ALPRs to avoid citizens’ public records requests. Concealing the use of unpopular spying tools isn’t anything particularly new for law enforcement—cops have been doing it for years—but it’s just as wrong now as it was 20 years ago.

These practices prevent the public from knowing about and questioning how agencies are spending taxpayer dollars on spying technologies and holding them accountable. This is especially troubling when many towns are signing contracts with Flock and other ALPR vendors with little to no public oversight. The practice also violates disclosure obligations, allows cops and prosecutors to hide their tactics from judges, and cheats defendants from being able to challenge the use of evidence gathered by spy tech from being used against them.

404 Media recently revealed that in its usage policy for Flock ALPR cameras, one county in Iowa tells police to keep them a secret when detaining people: “DO NOT MENTION ALPR USAGE TO THE OCCUPANTS OF THE VEHICLE,” the policy document reads. “DO NOT MENTION ALPR USAGE IN YOUR REPORT OR COMPLAINT UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.” If writing a report about an incident, police are told to say they used “county resources” in making a stop instead of acknowledging use of ALPRs.

In Houston, police officers are likewise instructed to “be as vague as permissible” about why they are using Flock because the searches they run on Flock’s surveillance system could be obtained via public records requests.

There is growing public alarm about the threat to civil liberties posed by ALPR cameras and reports of police abusing the tech by using it to spy on their exes. Some cities have the cameras covered up, and others are cancelling their use of ALPR networks. Two states have recently stepped back from ALPRs. This trend is certainly not lost on law enforcement agencies. Hiding the fact that they’re using ALPRs from Flock and other vendors is one way of avoiding scrutiny and bad PR.

But law enforcement and their spy tech vendors keeping people in the dark about the surveillance technologies trained on them predates the Flock backlash by decades. For example, AT&T built a powerful phone surveillance tool for police, called Hemisphere, in the mid 2000s, and the company required agencies not to use evidence gathered by Hemisphere in court unless there was no other admissible evidence. If evidence obtained through Hemisphere was used, police were required to recreate it through a traditional subpoena, a process they called “parallel construction.” We called it “evidence laundering.”

Likewise, police and prosecutors have taken far-reaching steps to hide from the public and courts their use of cell site simulators, also known as stingrays. Police have used these devices, which trick cell phones into connecting to them instead of phone towers to try locating suspects, to obtain people’s location data without a warrant by deceptively obtaining basic pen register orders from courts. Pen register orders are for obtaining call log data and police don’t need to prove they have probable cause to get one.

In Baltimore, for example, a judge concluded that law enforcement had used a standard pen register order to intentionally hide its use of a Stingray from the court in violation of its legal disclosure obligations, leading to a landmark 2015 privacy ruling that cops need a warrant to use the device.

That didn’t stop police from continuing to try to pull the wool over the eyes of courts and defense attorneys when they used stingrays, however. Prosecutors have accepted plea deals to hide their use of cell-site simulators and have even dropped cases rather than reveal information about their use of the technology. U.S. Marshalls have driven files hundreds of miles to thwart public records requests.

Fortunately, our commitment to shining a light on the use of surveillance tech is just as strong, if not stronger, than law enforcement’s quest to hide it. We’re working with privacy advocates and community groups to bring awareness about existing and emerging spy tools that threaten civil liberties and we’re encouraging policymakers and lawmakers to do more to restrain warrantless mass surveillance and stop it before it ever takes hold.  

If you're curious about whether your local police have contracts for ALPRS or other surveillance technologies, you can search EFF's Atlas of Surveillance.

The term “digital sovereignty” has become ubiquitous. European officials invoke it in debates about cloud infrastructure, AI, semiconductors, and platform regulation. Governments throughout the global majority use it to argue for greater control over data and communications infrastructure and boost their economies. Companies market “sovereign cloud” products designed to reassure their customers that their information stays under local jurisdiction. But digital sovereignty could be something more: an opportunity for users around the world to build more resilient, open  systems and the skills and infrastructure to maintain them.

There is no singular definition of digital sovereignty, nor is there a single coherent position in the digital rights space. Despite its growing popularity, the term remains frustratingly vague. Policymakers, regulators, civil society groups, and others can mean very different things when they use the term. But to start simply with a broad definition, we can say that it means having the capacity to control one’s digital destiny—though the implications of that will obviously differ considerably whether you’re talking about an individual or a country.

We can start by developing  a shared understanding of what digital sovereignty actually means. We’ve also included a glossary of terms at the bottom of this post. 

In Europe and other places where digital sovereignty has become a topic of policy, discussions focus on reducing dependency: on foreign (and particularly American) cloud infrastructure, chips, platforms, and at times, foreign political priorities. The concern is both economic and geopolitical. If essential infrastructure is controlled by companies elsewhere—and thus subject to the laws of another jurisdiction—then what control does a country actually have over its own digital future?

In global majority countries in particular, wars, sanctions, and the growing fragmentation of the internet have demonstrated for many that the physical infrastructure that underlies digital life is neither neutral nor invulnerable. 

Amidst this increasing geopolitical instability governments and civil society should consider whether digital sovereignty can help shore up that infrastructure. 

A recent Franco-German joint paper on digital sovereignty defines it as the “capability and capacity to develop, provide, use, adapt and control digital technologies including hardware in an independent, self-determined and secure manner” and puts forward a framework to operationalize Europe’s capacity to act in the digital domain. 

Some governments, such as Germany’s, have started to put funding behind sovereignty efforts through initiatives like the Sovereign Tech Agency, which “invest[s] globally in the open software components that underpin Germany's and Europe's competitiveness and ability to innovate.” 

Positions on digital sovereignty among EFF’s allies across Europe vary. Open Rights Group have defined digital sovereignty as “the ability of a country to have control over its digital infrastructure, data, and technology” and states it to be “critical for the UK’s economic and national security.” 

Similarly, the European Partnership for Democracy has expressed concern that “a few Big Tech corporations decide our collective destiny,” and argue that the EU should explore “alternative ownership models for tech companies and clearly [define] their purpose and mission.” And our friends at EDRi (of which EFF is a member) have stated clearly that “Europe’s digital sovereignty starts with open source.” Some initiatives, such as DI.DAY, consider digital sovereignty an opportunity to free users from Big Tech dependencies.

Elsewhere in the world, conversations about digital sovereignty often take a different shape. Indigenous discussions of the topic have been ongoing for more than a decade and focus on the inherent right of Native nations to govern their own digital ecosystems. In Southeast Asia, the desire for digital sovereignty has created growth in the sovereign cloud industry, but the conversation isn’t purely economic: Concerns about jurisdiction for where data is held are driving much of the conversation. 

In Latin America, digital public infrastructure is often a key aspect of debates. Across Africa, leaders speak of a desire to shift the continent from being consumers of technology to becoming architects of their own digital infrastructure and data ecosystems. And in the Middle East and North Africa, concerns about reliance on U.S. technology companies—which have engaged in conflict and disproportionate censorship (particularly of Palestinian voices) in the region—are often paramount.

Reem Almasri, a senior researcher based in Jordan, recently spoke to EFF about digital sovereignty, which she sees as “the ability of people and communities to choose, control, and use technology that serves their needs and values,” particularly in light of the role that U.S. companies have played in regional conflicts.

In a January article, Almasri pointed to growing concerns about granting greater sovereignty and influence to governments over citizens’ data, communications, and websites, writing: “This is particularly worrisome in countries that impose high levels of internet and media censorship and run unaccountable surveillance programs on their citizens’ data.”

Indeed, while pushing for greater sovereignty from Big Tech has benefits, there is an inherent risk that some states will pursue digital sovereignty as a means of cutting off or splintering access—as we’ve already seen in Iran, Russia, and elsewhere.

For that reason, it’s no surprise that some, such as Iranian professor Azadeh Akbari, believe that “the current wave pushing digital sovereignty as the key to ending dependency on American and Chinese technology is negligent of its Eurocentric bias.” 

In a world where people have digital sovereignty, civil society should be able to communicate freely, privately, and anonymously if they wish. People should be able to easily understand where their data lives and who has access to it. That data should be easily portable between platforms and services.

At EFF, we view digital sovereignty not as a walled garden, but as an opportunity for resilience and development of industries and skills. We believe that governments can and should take a role in crafting digital sovereignty that centers the autonomy of users rather than just re-creating a state of digital dependency with a new set of companies. Governments should support and use free and open source tools and projects built using principles of interoperability and data portability. This support should include employing full-time developers, UX designers, and community managers. Government policy and legislation should grant users control of their own data and a clear understanding of who can lawfully access it. Digital sovereignty should foster users’ ability to choose how they use digital products and services, free from unfair lock-ins, coercive terms and manipulative defaults. It should also foster the broader public interest internet, the part of the web that provides public goods and useful services without requiring the scale or the business practices of the tech giants.

Encryption backdoors are fundamentally incompatible with a vision of data sovereignty that centers user control. Governments should support the development and normalization of reputable end-to-end encrypted communications as well as strong encryption for data at rest. This support should include employing cryptographers and contributing to strong, peer-reviewed encryption standards strengthened by data minimization as a fundamental design principle, as well as refraining from legislating mandates for “lawful access” or any other reason.  

As technologists, we don’t have to wait for governments to act in order to create the digital sovereignty we want. We get the internet that we build. We can contribute to open source, decentralized, and end-to-end encrypted projects. We can build standards that make interoperability and data portability a feature from the very beginning. We can resist the call of proprietary solutions, user lock-in, and encryption backdoors.

And finally, while digital sovereignty is often framed as a response to the dominance of Big Tech, that does not mean that there is no role for private companies to play. There is no point in replacing the influence of a few mostly US-based tech companies with a handful of giants based elsewhere. Companies can and should build platforms and services on top of open source, decentralized protocols and contribute to the ecosystem. Companies should also minimize processing a person’s data except as strictly necessary to provide them what they asked for, and only with opt-in consent that makes it clear to users what data they are gathering, where it is stored, and who has access to it. And companies should build their tools and platforms in a way that allows interoperability and that makes it easy for users to leave with their data. Some of these practices are already required by law in some jurisdictions, but companies don’t have to merely do the bare minimum the law demands: they should respect their users and support data sovereignty right now.

The following terms are useful for understanding this blog post as well as the broader conversation about Digital Sovereignty:

Intermediary liability: the legal responsibility of online service providers (ISPs, websites, social media platforms) for unlawful activities by their users, such as defamation, copyright infringement, or illegal hate speech.

The stack: a secure, open-source technology framework, often focusing on European alternatives, designed to break dependencies on (mostly) US-based technology providers. It comprises interoperable, vendor-neutral, and transparent digital infrastructures designed to regain control over data, infrastructure, and technology.

Digital sovereignty: the ability of people, as nations, organizations, and individuals, to control their own digital destiny by retaining authority over their own data, technology, and infrastructure.

Data sovereignty: the principle that digital information is subject to the laws and governance frameworks of the country or region where it is physically collected, stored, or processed. It dictates that data remains bound by the specific privacy protections and regulations of its originating jurisdiction, regardless of where the collecting organization is located.

Digital commons: a shared, online resource, such as knowledge, software, and data, that is collectively produced, governed, and maintained by a community, intended for public access. Examples include Wikipedia, open source operating systems such as Linux, and Creative Commons licensed content.

Data portability/interoperability: the ability to easily transfer personal data from one service provider to another, or to a personal system, in a structured, machine-readable format. It empowers users to move away from "walled gardens," reducing vendor lock-in and enhancing user autonomy.

Digital dependency: the opposite of digital sovereignty. The inability of people as nations, organizations, and individuals to control their own digital destiny through control over their own data, technology, and infrastructure. 

Decentralization: a shift away from relying on centralized, often US-based, corporate platforms toward a distributed, user-centric internet where individuals, communities, and nations maintain control over their data, digital identity, and infrastructure.

End-to-end encryption (e2ee): a secure communication process where only the sender and intended recipient can access, read, or decrypt messages or data.

Fairness (à la the Digital Fairness Act): the absence of deceptive, manipulative, or addictive design practices that distort consumer choice and exploit vulnerabilities. 

User sovereignty: the concept that individuals possess absolute control over their personal data, digital identity, and online privacy, rejecting the centralization of power by large technology platforms. It emphasizes user consent, decentralization, and the ability to manage personal data using secure and independent tools.

EFF is pleased to announce that Access Now, 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, DeFlock, and New Media Rights have received 2026 EFF Awards for their vital work in ensuring that technology supports freedom, justice, and innovation for all people. 

The EFF Awards recognize specific and substantial technical, social, economic, or cultural contributions in diverse fields including journalism, art, digital access, legislation, technology development, and law. 

For the past 30 years, the EFF Awards—previously known as the Pioneer Awards—have recognized and honored key leaders in the fight for freedom and innovation online. Started when the internet was new, the Awards now reflect the fact that the online world has become both a necessity in modern life and a continually evolving set of tools for communication, organizing, creativity, and increasing human potential.  

Supporting a global community advancing digital rights, defending digital access in crisis zones, empowering communities to take action against surveillance, and providing free legal assistance for creators and consumers to fight back against digital threats are high callings that help bring about a better tech future for all. We are pleased to honor these organizations with 2026 EFF Awards. 

Access Now, founded in 2009 as an emergency response team helping Iranian activists get back online and communicate safely, has grown into one of the world’s foremost organizations defending and extending the digital rights of people and communities at risk and supporting the global fight against technological repression.  

Its 24/7 Digital Security Helpline offers real-time, direct technical assistance and advice to civil society groups and activists, media organizations, journalists and bloggers, and human rights defenders. It provides grants to frontline organizations working with people and communities most impacted by digital rights violations. It educates decision makers and pressures the powerful. And it organizes RightsCon, a leading annual summit on human rights in the digital age, where activists, technologists, policymakers, business leaders, journalists, philanthropists, researchers, and artists can connect, collaborate, and drive change at the intersection of human rights and technology. 

7amleh - The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media protects and expands digital access and rights for Palestinians and across the MENA region. The nonprofit investigates and monitors challenges to digital rights, focusing on internet access, privacy, freedom of expression and association online. It builds the capacity of activists, human rights defenders, and civil society organizations to provide training about digital rights, gender sensitive digital security, and effective online advocacy.  

7amleh also advocates for changes to the digital rights policies and practices of governments, corporations and other influential institutions and individuals locally, regionally and internationally. It plans and manages advocacy and awareness-raising campaigns and builds networks and coalitions to promote access to safe, fair and free online spaces. For example, 7amleh has led the #ReconnectGaza campaign, supported by dozens of international NGOs including EFF, to restore full internet access in Gaza – a crucial lifeline for residents, journalists, activists, and first responders.  

DeFlock is an open-source, volunteer-powered project that maps surveillance devices across the world, helping communities hold their governments and surveillance vendors accountable and understand where and how they're being watched. Founded in 2024 by software engineer and privacy advocate Will Freeman, DeFlock shines a light on the widespread use of automated license plate reader (ALPR) technology and the threats it poses to personal privacy and civil liberties.  

DeFlock resources help people request public records, speak to local lawmakers, and take action against ALPR surveillance. Its work has helped foster a national grassroots community of anti-surveillance activists fighting back against this dangerous surveillance technology. 

New Media Rights (NMR) is a San Diego-based nonprofit program of California Western School of Law dedicated to defending digital rights through legal services, education, and public policy advocacy. Since its inception, NMR has been at the forefront of protecting creators, entrepreneurs, and internet users from digital threats such as copyright abuse, online harassment, and privacy violations. 

In addition to providing free legal assistance, NMR has produced hundreds of freely available video and written legal education guides for creators and consumers, including the Fair Use App for filmmakers and video creators. It has participated in regulatory proceedings on net neutrality, Digital Millennium Copyright Act anti-circumvention, and copyright reform. Its work has also helped support access to public information and greater business and government accountability. 

EFF sued the government back in March for information about the Wasteful and Inappropriate Service Reduction (WISeR) model, a new Medicare program that uses AI to evaluate prior authorization requests for certain medical services. Today, we’re releasing approximately 1,000 pages of records obtained from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through this litigation, including contracts with tech companies, internal status reports and providers’ complaints about the program. The documents (available here) show that WISeR has resulted in widespread delays and denials of care, operational chaos, and reports of patient harm.

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EFF filed the FOIA lawsuit to gain badly needed transparency into an experimental AI program that could jeopardize Medicare beneficiaries' access to care. In January 2026, CMS launched the WISeR model, subjecting seniors in six states to AI-driven prior authorization decisions. Medical providers must now request permission before delivering certain medical treatments if they want assurance that Medicare will cover them. Private companies contracted by CMS evaluate the requests using AI. In the absence of rigorous safeguards, AI-driven prior authorization determinations can lead to unwarranted—and even discriminatory—delays or denials of necessary medical care. 

Little is known about the AI systems that WISeR vendors are using to process prior authorization requests. Although CMS says that a qualified human clinician must review all denials, research has shown that AI-generated recommendations often influence human decisions. And the design of the WISeR program creates a financial incentive for vendors to deny care, since they are paid for averted expenditures. Just months after the program launched, medical providers reported improper denials, administrative friction, and lengthy delays that have left patients waiting in pain.

EFF’s FOIA request sought records pertaining to the CMS contracts with WISeR software vendors; any tests for accuracy, bias, or hallucinations in vendors' technology; and any audits, monitoring, or evaluation of WISeR and participating vendors.

CMS records obtained by EFF echo issues that medical providers, patient advocates, and lawmakers have warned about since WISeR began. This includes long wait times, rampant technical failures, inappropriate denials, and harm to patients.

CMS publicly states that WISeR vendors should respond to prior authorization requests within 72 hours, but records received by EFF show widespread delays. Internal status reports from the first few months of the program show that a significant number of prior authorization requests took far longer than 72 hours to resolve. One status report cites a prior authorization request that went unanswered for 83 days ("WISeR FOIA Response - Combined Records," page 234). These delayed responses can have serious consequences for patients. Medical providers reported that WISeR has delayed medically necessary care and left patients in pain as they waited for approvals.

Timeliness data for two WISeR vendors in January 2026 show that a significant number of requests did not receive a response within 72 hours (WISeR FOIA Response - Combined Records, page 410)

The released records confirm that WISeR’s payment methodology creates a financial incentive to deny care. Specifically, WISeR vendors are paid for requests that they deny (though not for denials reversed on appeal). This profit motive aggravates the risk that AI-assisted decision-making may unfairly deprive people of the services they need.

CMS publicly claims that it safeguards against inappropriate denials by tying vendors’ payment rates to “quality scores,” which reflect the timeliness and accuracy of vendors’ decisions. However, the recently released WISeR Data Reporting Guide shows that low quality scores reduce payments by only 5-10%.

Impact of low quality scores on payment rates described in the WISeR Data Reporting Guide (WISeR FOIA Response - Combined Records, page 99)

Documents obtained by EFF appear to support reports that WISeR vendors may be denying claims at unusually high rates. Two companies alone denied 5,944 prior authorization requests in the first 3 months of the program. One company, Virtix, the vendor that CMS required to submit a Corrective Action Plan, denied more requests than it approved during this time period.

Prior authorization decision data for two vendors in a March 30th, 2026 status report (WISeR FOIA Response - Combined Records, page 322)

Feedback from medical providers emphasize that WISeR delays have harmed patients. The released records include March 2026 responses to a feedback form about Innovaccer, the WISeR vendor processing requests for Ohio. Medical providers complained about a lack of communication, administrative issues, and long response times. Several responses emphasize that long response times from the WISeR vendor harmed patients ("WISeR FOIA Response - Feedback Survey Responses"):

“We have patients calling our offices crying in pain because their procedures are being delayed while awaiting approvals or guidance tied to this model. A 3–4 day delay for necessary pain procedures is already difficult for vulnerable patients, but when providers cannot obtain answers for weeks, the situation becomes unacceptable.”

“I HAVE HAD TO WATCH 3 PATIENTS CRY AT BEDSIDE FOR NOT HEARING BACK ON THEIR PRIOR AUTH FOR KYPHOPLASTY/VERTABRAL AUGMENTIATION PROCEDURE. THESE PATIENTS ARE IN DEEP PAIN.”

“I have had cases submitted and waiting over 1 1/2 months for a UTN to be generated… In the meantime patients are having to be cancelled for surgeries they need. This is not acceptable they are severely hindering patient care.”

CMS WISeR launched in January 2026, just six months after it was announced. Despite warnings from both medical providers and a vendor about insufficient preparation time, CMS chose not to delay the launch. 

Approximately a month before the launch, one of the vendors, Innovaccer, alerted CMS that it intended to go live with a version of its software that lacked full functionality and had not been fully tested. It cited several barriers to going live with full functionality, including changing requirements and expectations, unclear governance processes, and lack of time for end-to-end testing with the provider community ("WISeR FOIA Response - Combined Records,", page 216-217). Innovaccer said it would auto-affirm all prior authorization requests until it could develop full functionality and explained that “Given CMS's decision not to delay the model start date, auto-affirming is the only path available” ("WISeR FOIA Response - Combined Records," page 217).

Innovaccer had not yet finished developing or testing some features several months into the program, according to an April 2026 status report. Innovaccer was not the only vendor who faced technical challenges before and after WISeR launched. Weekly status reports and provider feedback in the released records show widespread challenges associated with WISeR’s rushed rollout (for example, "WISeR FOIA Response - Combined Records," pages 238 and 383).

A status report from April 6th, 2026 describes issues with incomplete solutions from Innovaccer (WISeR FOIA Response - Combined Records, page 200)

In its first year, the WISeR model introduced prior authorization requirements for a set of 13 medical services. The June 2025 Innovation Center Investment Plan for WISeR lists medical services that could be added to the program in future years. This planning document considers the possibility of adding services “where prior authorization would have to be done on a more urgent or emergent basis,” including air ambulance transport, cancer treatment, MRI scans, and medications without publicly available coverage criteria.

A planning document from June 2025 lists ideas for the expansion of WISeR to additional medical services (WISeR FOIA Response - Combined Records, page 22)

CMS continues to produce records in response to EFF’s lawsuit. Records released thus far echo concerns that providers have raised since WISeR launched, including long delays, financial incentives to deny care, and technical problems. But important questions remain about the AI systems private companies are using to inform decisions about whether to provide people with Medicare benefits. As CMS continues to produce documents, we will continue to make them available to the public. The public deserves to know how AI is driving decisions that affect patients’ access to care.

Correction: An earlier version of this post misstated the number of prior authorization requests that had been denied by two WISeR vendors in the first three months of the program. This version has been corrected to reflect that the number of denials was 5,944. The post has also been updated to clarify that reported turnaround times reflect the full request pathway and are not solely controlled by WISeR vendors.

A federal court in Massachusetts has ruled that copyright holders can issue online takedown notices based on a subjective belief of copyright infringement, even when that belief is unreasonable and self-serving. The case was brought by our client, Channel 781 News, after takedown notices temporarily shut down the citizen journalism group's YouTube channel. We think the court set the bar far too low for copyright takedowns, and we plan to appeal.

Channel 781 is a group of independent, volunteer journalists who report on local affairs in Waltham, Massachusetts. That includes posting short, newsworthy excerpts from recordings of city government meetings produced by Waltham Community Access Corporation (WCAC), the city's public access television station.

In September 2023, WCAC sent three copyright takedown notices to YouTube targeting fifteen of Channel 781's videos. YouTube removed the videos and, under its three-strikes policy, temporarily disabled Channel 781's entire account—just days before a local election.

Represented by EFF and Brown Rudnick LLP, Channel 781 sued WCAC under Section 512(f) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which provides a remedy when a copyright holder knowingly makes material misrepresentations in a takedown notice.

Fair use is the legal right to use copyrighted material without permission, when doing so serves purposes like criticism, commentary, or creating something new. Fair use is not copyright infringement, and courts have recognized that copyright holders must consider fair use before using the DMCA's powerful notice-and-takedown process.

In this case, Channel 781 argued that WCAC accused it of copyright infringement without making a good-faith assessment of whether its videos were fair use.

The evidence showed that WCAC's analysis was seriously deficient. The court noted that Chris Wangler, the WCAC employee who sent the notices, didn’t consider several facts relevant to fair use. For instance, Channel 781 used relatively small portions of WCAC's recordings, and the underlying recordings were factual public meetings, not a creative work. WCAC also gave little or no weight to whether Channel 781's use harmed any market for the recordings.

There’s also strong evidence that WCAC had motivations unrelated to copyright. WCAC objected to its footage being used to criticize local officials and advance political viewpoints. And WCAC sent the takedown notices during a local election, shortly after Channel 781 posted a campaign statement by Waltham's mayor that WCAC had mistakenly made available online.

Despite this evidence, the court concluded that WCAC had a subjective good-faith belief that Channel 781's videos were infringing. We disagree.

Channel 781 argued that a copyright holder’s belief that material is infringing must be both genuinely held and objectively reasonable. WCAC argued that a subjective good-faith belief is good enough. Unfortunately, the court agreed with WCAC.

The court emphasized that Wangler had read up on fair use, watched a short YouTube video explaining the doctrine, and distinguished between videos he thought might qualify as fair use and those he believed did not. That was enough, the court concluded, to establish subjective good faith—even though Wangler’s analysis ignored important facts relevant to fair use. As the court put it, Section 512(f) does not require “a perfect or even reasonable fair use analysis.”

That is an alarmingly low bar for copyright holders seeking to remove someone else’s speech from the internet. A DMCA takedown can cause lawful speech to disappear almost immediately. As Channel 781 experienced, multiple notices can even result in an entire channel being disabled.

If a copyright holder can avoid liability despite a cursory, incomplete, and objectively unreasonable analysis that ignores important facts—even when there’s evidence that the copyright holder wanted to suppress critical speech—the obligation to consider fair use risks becoming little more than a box-checking exercise. That interpretation threatens to strip Section 512(f) of much of its force.

Even accepting the court’s subjective standard, WCAC's cursory consideration of fair use should not have been enough. WCAC disregarded important fair use considerations, and the record included statements suggesting that it believed people generally needed permission to reuse its footage—an understanding at odds with fair use. There was also evidence that WCAC objected to Channel 781's political use of its footage, and had motivations for the takedowns unrelated to copyright.

Taken together, these facts raise serious questions about whether WCAC genuinely considered fair use, rather than using copyright as a rationale for removing material it did not like.

Importantly, the court's analysis recognized Channel 781’s strong fair use argument: the group used short excerpts from factual recordings of public government proceedings, selecting clips for their newsworthiness, and making them easier for the public and journalists to find, share, and discuss.

The opinion even states that WCAC's fair use analysis “may have been deficient.” But under the purely subjective standard it adopted, the court concluded that it could not reject WCAC's professed belief—even if the court itself “would have reached the opposite conclusion” on fair use.

We plan to appeal this decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Copyright law should not allow a rightsholder to suppress critical reporting or political speech through the DMCA and escape accountability simply by claiming it believed the speech was infringing. Section 512(f) is supposed to provide protection against wrongful takedowns. We will keep fighting to ensure that safeguard actually protects people. 

Within the last few days, two important state actions have dealt a big blow to automated license plate reader (ALPR) networks. This is just the latest proof of the growing tide of public opposition to mass surveillance. After years of successful grassroots battles to pull these cameras from local streets, bipartisan momentum is sweeping the country.

On August 28, Texas Governor Greg Abbott banned state agencies from spending public funds on Flock cameras. The order dropped just as The Texas Tribune prepared to publish an investigation revealing that a state agency had quietly funneled at least $30 million into building a sprawling surveillance network. 

Then on August 31, the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) issued a memo, announced by Governor Ron DeSantis, ordering the removal of all ALPRs from the right-of-way on state highways within 30 days. The order revokes all previously approved permits to install ALPRs, and bars transportation officials from issuing future permits. 

FDOT officials stated that “the recent exponential increase in deployments along our roadways, coupled with concerning reports of misuse, data privacy concerns, and surveillance schemes merit immediate action to preserve Floridians’ sovereignty and quality of life.” FDOT’s action has been followed by a surge of local governments in Florida canceling or pausing their vendor contracts.

Much more work remains. Many ALPRs in Florida are not on state highways, but sit on city streets, county roads, residential driveways, and shopping center parking lots—and FDOT's order doesn't touch any of them. Likewise, the Texas directive leaves local agencies free to use city, county, federal, and private funds to install cameras.

This week’s good news follows years of pushback from local advocates that has seen dozens of cities sever ties with surveillance companies. According to some metrics, during the last 30 days, an average of three localities per day has halted contracts with Flock. Other advocates have been resisting ALPRs in statehouses and court houses, and by blowing the whistle with investigative activism.

The moves in Florida and Texas also illustrate the power that the executive branch can wield to curtail mass surveillance with almost immediate results. We hope that the California Governor Gavin Newsom and the California Department of Transportation will take notice and initiate steps to curb this technology, starting with removing the ALPRs that U.S. Border Patrol and the Drug Enforcement Administration have installed on California highways.

EFF’s position remains: ALPR mass surveillance – the indiscriminate, continuous collection and retention of location data on every driver, regardless of suspicion – should not exist. This past week’s actions in Texas and Florida are good steps forward, but we are still far from the finish line. We will continue working alongside community groups to keep cameras off local streets, while urging judges and state lawmakers to impose enforceable restraints on this warrantless mass surveillance.

A federal judge has sided with Anthropic on its claims that the Department of Defense illegally retaliated against Anthropic’s protected speech by labeling the AI company a “supply chain risk.” The judge found that designation, intended to penalize Anthropic for telling the U.S. military it would not allow their technology to be used for mass surveillance of U.S. persons, “constituted unlawful retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.” EFF joined a coalition of organizations in filing multiple amicus briefs (here, here) arguing that the Pentagon had trampled on Anthropics First Amendment rights. We agree with the court’s decision and applaud the judge for slapping down such an obvious act of illegal and unconstitutional retribution by the Pentagon—even as the court left open the broader question of whether a company’s choices about how its technology may be used are protected speech in their own right. 

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From the start of this conflict, EFF argued that companies should not be penalized for not wanting to conduct mass surveillance of US persons. Nor do we want to live in a legal system where our susceptibility to surveillance is hashed out and decided in closed-door contract negotiations between a few powerful people at the military and an AI company. Unfortunately, this ruling does little to address the bigger problem: that Congress has abdicated its responsibility to adopt statutory safeguards to protect our privacy, and instead left us reliant on the whims of private companies to decide when they are and are not willing to help the government conduct mass surveillance. 

In February 2026, the government began threatening to penalize Anthropic unless it backed off its position that it did not want the U.S. military using its AI product Claude for mass surveillance of Americans or to power autonomous weapons systems. Ultimately, the Department of Defense, deciding that it did not want military contractors dictating what its products could or could not be used for, declared the company a “supply chain risk.” This national security designation means the government and companies that do business with it cannot use the company’s products for government projects. It was, in essence, an attempted blacklisting of Anthropic for setting boundaries and articulating unacceptable use cases for its products. 

None of this is to say that Anthropic is a morally unimpeachable company, or that it and other companies would never permit their products to be used under specific conditions to aid in surveillance or analysis of collected data that could affect U.S. persons—but the facts remain: the government cannot punish a company for having preferences regarding unconstitutional uses of its technology. 

Unsupported claims that a company poses a national security risk should never be an excuse for government retaliation. This ruling correctly recognizes the dangerous implications of allowing the government to punish a company for its critical speech and for refusing to allow its technology to be used for mass surveillance. While we applaud the court's decision, we continue to urge lawmakers to take the protection of our privacy seriously. We shouldn't have to rely on private companies to protect us from the surveillance state. It's past time for Congress to act.