DEF CON 23 [Audio] Speeches from the Hacker Convention

Materials Available here:https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2023/DEF%20CON%2023%20presentations/DEFCON-23-Ionut-Popescu-NetRipper.pdf

Whitepaper Here: DEFCON-23-Ionut-Popescu-NetRipper-WP.pdf

NetRipper - Smart traffic sniffing for penetration testers

Ionut Popescu Senior Security Consultant at KPMG Romania

The post-exploitation activities in a penetration test can be challenging if the tester has low-privileges on a fully patched, well configured Windows machine. This work presents a technique for helping the tester to find useful information by sniffing network traffic of the applications on the compromised machine, despite his low-privileged rights. Furthermore, the encrypted traffic is also captured before being sent to the encryption layer, thus all traffic (clear-text and encrypted) can be sniffed. The implementation of this technique is a tool called NetRipper which uses API hooking to do the actions mentioned above and which has been especially designed to be used in penetration tests, but the concept can also be used to monitor network traffic of employees or to analyze a malicious application.

Ionut works as a Senior Security Consultant at KPMG in Romania. He is passionate about ASM, reverse engineering, shellcode and exploit development and he has a MCTS Windows Internals certification.

He spoke at various security conferences in Romania like: Defcamp, OWASP local meetings and others and also at the yearly Hacknet KPMG international conference in Helsinki and Berlin.

Ionut is also the main administrator of the biggest Romanian IT security community: rstforums.com and he writes technical articles on a blog initiated by a passionate team: securitycafe.ro.

Twitter: @NytroRST

Materials Available Here: https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2023/DEF%20CON%2023%20presentations/DEFCON-23-David-An-When-the-Secretary-of-State-says-Stop-Hacking-us.pdf

When the Secretary of State says: “Please Stop Hacking Us…”

David An Former U.S. State Department

Senior American officials routinely hold dialogues with foreign officials to discuss cyber espionage. However, if a cyber attack can be performed through proxy servers jumping several countries before reaching the U.S., then can anyone ever be sure of who is really behind the attack? Yet we often see newspaper headlines clearly identifying that one country is hacking another country through state-sponsored, cyber criminal, or hacktivist means. Even if government cyber analysts with TS/SCI security clearances have high confidence in the identity of an attacker based on forensics and human intelligence, what are the challenges in effectively addressing the topic in a diplomatic or military dialogue with the attacker country?

Two major roadblocks in cyber diplomacy are the "attribution problem," and the related "disclosure dilemma." If there is indeed an attribution problem--when a country cannot be sure which other state is hacking it because a third country could be using it as a proxy--then a country could never accuse another countries of state-sponsored cyber attacks. Yet, countries routinely accuse others of cyber attacks, the public sees this in newspapers almost every day, and it is often an important topic in bilateral dialogues. Furthermore, the disclosure dilemma occurs when a country has both incentives and disincentives to disclose details on how it was hacked. On one hand, evidence will prove its case, but on another hand, evidence will make the attacker more savvy and careful not to repeat the same mistakes next time. Disclosure could create a stronger adversary. These are major concerns in the practice of cyber diplomacy today.

My presentation identifies how government-to-government cyber diplomacy works, examines the attribution problem and disclosure dilemma more fully, and shows how the U.S. approaches this topic differently with partners versus potential adversaries. This is not a technical presentation, but rather it is a policy presentation on cyber diplomacy drawing from political science and my diplomatic experience.

David was a tenured U.S. diplomat before leaving the U.S. government to consult for the private sector, and to write policy and academic papers. At the State Department, he was the senior political-military affairs officer covering the East Asia region and his responsibilities included coordinating diplomatic dialogues, formulating plans with the Pentagon, notifying Congress of U.S. arms sales, writing the Secretary of State’s talking points, and traveling overseas with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense for bilateral dialogues. His other assignments included the U.S. embassies in Beijing, Tokyo, Wellington; U.S. consulates in Sydney and Perth; American Institute in Taiwan; and U.S. Pacific Command. He completed his B.A. at UC Berkeley; M.A. in international affairs and business management, and political science Ph.D. courses at UC San Diego.

Obligatory disclaimer: The comments are his own, and do not represent the U.S. government. Since Jeff Moss famously said in 2013: “Feds, we need some time apart,” David emphasizes that he is no longer a fed.

Materials Available Here: https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2023/DEF%20CON%2023%20presentations/DEFCON-23-Ryan-Castellucci-Cracking-Cryptocurrency-Brainwallets.pdf

Cracking Cryptocurrency Brainwallets

Ryan Castellucci Security Researcher, White Ops

Imagine a bank that, by design, made everyone's password hashes and balances public. No two-factor authentication, no backsies on transfers. Welcome to "brainwallets", a way for truly paranoid cryptocurrency users to wager their fortunes on their ability to choose a good password or passphrase.

Over the last decade, we've seen the same story play out dozens of times - a website is broken into, the user database is posted online, and most of the password hashes are cracked. Computers are now able make millions, billions or even trillions of guesses per second. Every eight character password you can type on a standard keyboard and every combination of five common english words could be tried in less than a day by today's botnets. Can people come up with passphrases able to stand up to that when money is on the line? Let's find out.

For this talk, I will be releasing my high speed brainwallet cracker, "Brainflayer". I'll cover a history of brainwallets, safer passphrase-based wallet generation, passphrase security, in-the-wild cracking activity, and how I accidently stole 250 Bitcoins (and tracked down the owner to give them back).

Ryan Castellucci has been interested in cryptography since childhood when his parents gave him a copy of "Codes, Ciphers and Secret Writing". He soon learned to program and wrote a tool to crack simple substitution ciphers. More recently, he co-spoke with Dan Kaminsky at DEF CON 22 and was a finalist in the 2014 Underhanded Crypto Contest. For his day job at White Ops, he finds new and exciting ways to tease out the subtle differences between bots and human-controlled web browsers.

Twitter: @ryancdotorg

Web: https://rya.nc

Materials Available Here: https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2023/DEF%20CON%2023%20presentations/DEFCON-23-Ian-Latter-Remote-Access-the-APT.pdf

Remote Access, the APT

Ian Latter Midnight Code

ThruGlassXfer (TGXf) is a new and exciting technique to steal files from a computer through the screen.

Any user that has screen and keyboard access to a shell (CLI, GUI or browser) in an enterprise IT environment has the ability to transfer arbitrary data, code and executables in and out of that environment without raising alarms, today. This includes staff, partners and suppliers, both on and off-shore. And implementation of best practice Data Center (Jump hosts), Perimeter / Remote Access (VPN, VDI, ..) and End Point Security (DLP, AV, ..) architectures have no effect on the outcome.

In this session I will take you from first principles to a full exploitation framework. At the end of the session you’ll learn how build on this unidirectional file transfer and augment the solution into a full duplex communications channel (a virtual serial link) and then a native PPP link, from an user owned device, through the remote enterprise-controlled screen and keyboard, to the most sensitive infrastructure in the enterprise. In this special DEF CON presentation I will also be releasing the new high-speed data exfiltration tool, hsTGXf.

This is an exciting and cross-discipline presentation that picks up the story in the DEC VT220 terminal era and will take you on a journey to exploiting modern enterprise security architectures. So join me, whatever your knowledge or skill-set and learn something interesting!

A 20 year veteran of the IT industry, Ian has spent 15 years working in security in a number of positions including Penetration Tester, Security Architect and most recently, a Security Governance role at a blue chip corporate. Ian teaches the Practical Threat Intelligence course at Black Hat and has spoken at key international hacking and security conferences including COSAC (Ireland), Ruxton (Australia), and Kiwicon (New Zealand). If he had spare time, Ian would be pursuing a number of private software and robotics projects, including the Barbie Car that he promised his daughter (wiser friends have advised that I finish this project before she’s old enough to ask for a real Corvette).

Fighting Back in the War on General Purpose Computers

Cory Doctorow Author & Activist, Electronic Frontier Foundation

EFF’s Apollo 1201 project is a 10-year mission to abolish all DRM, everywhere in the world, within a decade. We’re working with security researchers to challenge the viability of the dread DMCA, a law that threatens you with jail time and fines when you do your job: discover and disclosing defects in systems that we rely on for life and limb.

Cory Doctorow (craphound.com) is a science fiction author, activist, journalist and blogger — the co-editor of Boing Boing (boingboing.net) and the author of the YA graphic novel IN REAL LIFE, the nonfiction business book INFORMATION DOESN’T WANT TO BE FREE< and young adult novels like HOMELAND, PIRATE CINEMA and LITTLE BROTHER and novels for adults like RAPTURE OF THE NERDS and MAKERS. He works for the Electronic Frontier Foundation and co-founded the UK Open Rights Group. Born in Toronto, Canada, he now lives in London.

Materials Available Here: https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2023/DEF%20CON%2023%20presentations/DEFCON-23-Sean-Metcalf-Red-vs-Blue-AD-Attack-and-Defense.pdf

Red vs. Blue: Modern Active Directory Attacks & Defense

Sean Metcalf CTO, Dan Solutions, Inc.

Kerberos “Golden Tickets” were unveiled by Alva “Skip” Duckwall & Benjamin Delpy in 2014 during their Black Hat USA presentation. Around this time, Active Directory (AD) admins all over the world felt a great disturbance in the Force. Golden Tickets are the ultimate method for persistent, forever AD admin rights to a network since they are valid Kerberos tickets and can’t be detected, right?

This talk explores the latest Active Directory attack vectors and describes how Golden Ticket usage can be detected. When forged Kerberos tickets are used in AD, there are some interesting artifacts that can be identified. Yes, despite what you may have read on the internet, there are ways to detect Golden & Silver Ticket usage.

Skip the fluff and dive right into the technical detail describing the latest methods for gaining and maintaining administrative access in Active Directory, including some sneaky AD persistence methods. Also covered are traditional security measures that work (and ones that don’t) as well as the mitigation strategies that disrupts the attacker’s preferred game-plan. Prepare to go beyond “Pass-the-Hash” and down the rabbit hole.

Some of the topics covered:

Sneaky persistence methods attackers use to maintain admin rights.

How attackers go from zero to (Domain) Admin

MS14-068: the vulnerability, the exploit, and the danger.

“SPN Scanning” with PowerShell to identify potential targets without network scans (SQL, Exchange, FIM, web servers, etc.).

Exploiting weak service account passwords as a regular AD user.

Mimikatz, the attacker’s multi-tool.

Using Silver Tickets for stealthy persistence that won’t be detected (until now).

Identifying forged Kerberos tickets (Golden & Silver Tickets) on your network.

Detecting offensive PowerShell tools like Invoke-Mimikatz.

Active Directory attack mitigation.

Kerberos expertise is not required since the presentation covers how Active Directory leverages Kerberos for authentication identifying the areas useful for attack. Information presented is useful for both Red Team & Blue Team members.

Sean Metcalfe is the Chief Technology Officer at Dan Solutions, a company that provides Microsoft platform engineering and security expertise. Mr. Metcalf is one of about 100 people in the world who holds the elite Microsoft Certified Master Directory Services (MCM) certification. Furthermore, he assisted Microsoft in developing the Microsoft Certified Master Directory Services certification program for Windows Server 2012.

Mr. Metcalf has provided Active Directory and security expertise to government, corporate, and educational entities since Active Directory was released. He currently provides security consulting services to customers with large Active Directory environments and regularly posts useful Active Directory security information on his blog, ADSecurity.org. Follow him on Twitter @PyroTek3

Twitter: @PyroTek3

Web: ADSecurity.org

Materials Available Here: https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2023/DEF%20CON%2023%20presentations/DEFCON-23-Jeremy-Dorrough-USB-Attack-to-Decrypt-Wi-Fi-Communications.pdf

USB Attack to Decrypt Wi-Fi Communications

Jeremy Dorrough Senior Network Security Architect / Genworth Financial

The term “Bad USB” has gotten some much needed press in last few months. There have been talks that have identified the risks that are caused by the inherent trust between the OS and any device attached by USB. I found in my research that most of the available payloads for the USB rubber ducky would be stopped by common enterprise security solutions. I then set out to create a new exploit that would force the victim to trust my Man-In-The-Middle access point. After my payload is deployed, all Wi-Fi communications will be readable, including usernames, passwords and authentication cookies. The attack will work without the need of elevating privileges, which makes it ideal for corporate environments.

Jeremy has built his career around protecting assets in the most critical IT sectors. He started his career working in a Network Operations Security Center for the US Army. He then went on to work as a Network Security Engineer defending Dominion’s North Anna Nuclear Power Station. He is currently a Senior Network Security Engineer/Architect at Genworth Financial. He is a MBA, CISSP, CEH, GIAC GPPA, CSA CCSK, ABCDEFG… Blah Blah Blah. Jeremy has spent over 10 years researching and implementing new ways to defend against the latest attacks. He enjoys creating new exploits and feels it makes him a more well-rounded defensive Security Engineer. He is happily married and a father to two soon to be hackers. When he’s not staring at a command prompt, he is busy building and driving demolition derby cars.

Twitter: @jdorrough1

Welcome to DEF CON 23!

The Dark Tangent and Staff give thanks and hand out awards during the DEF CON 23 Closing Ceremonies.

Materials Available Here: https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2023/DEF%20CON%2023%20presentations/DEFCON-23-Rickey-Lawshae-Lets-Talk-About-SOAP.pdf

Extras here:https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2023/DEF%20CON%2023%20presentations/DEFCON-23-Rickey-Lawshae-Extras.rar

Let's Talk About SOAP, Baby. Let's Talk About UPNP

Ricky "HeadlessZeke" Lawshae Security Researcher, HP TippingPoint

Whether we want it to be or not, the Internet of Things is upon us. Network interfaces are the racing stripes of today's consumer device market. And if you put a network interface on a device, you have to make it do something right? That's where a Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) service comes in. SOAP services are designed with ease-of-access in mind, many times at the expense of security. Ludicrous amounts of control over device functionality, just about every category of vulnerability you can think of, and an all-around lack of good security practice about sums it up. In this talk, I will discuss this growing attack surface, demonstrate different methods for attacking/fuzzing it, and provide plenty of examples of the many dangers of insecure SOAP/ UPnP interfaces on embedded and "smart" devices along the way.

Ricky "HeadlessZeke" Lawshae is a Security Researcher for DVLabs at HP TippingPoint with a medium-sized number of years' experience in professionally voiding warranties. He has spoken at the DEF CON, Recon, Insomni'hack, and Ruxcon security conferences, and is an active participant in the extensive Austin, TX hacker community. In his meager spare time, he enjoys picking locks, reading comic books, and drinking expensive beers.

Twitter: @HeadlessZeke