The US cannot defeat ISIS with weapons only. Russia has attempted to do just that, but after literally turning Aleppo into rubbles, it realized that ISIS, with pockets of resistance, was still alive and well. While a physical ISIS sanctuary is easily destroyed by drones, its ideology that can command the hearts and minds of “lone wolfs” in cities from Miami to Madrid, needs more than just gunships and smart bombs. Therefore, and in addition to the US and Russia, the direct and explicit involvement of the Sunni nations at the forefront of this war is crucial. To name but the key nations, one could list: the UAE, Jordan and Egypt. Egypt with Al Azhar, the world’s Sunni equivalent to the Pontifical theology schools of Rome, can de-legitimize the radical and terrorist Islamist rhetoric. Banning the killings of innocents, repudiating the Caliphate of ISIS, expressing outrage for slavery, sex abuse, and child labor, and respecting all religions, could be a start. On a more earthly level, the UAE and Jordan have terrific intelligence services that have cooperated with the US and other Western counterparts over decades, and have successfully foiled many an Islamic plot on their own soils and abroad.

However, eradicating ISIS from the face of the earth is not sufficient if Iran’s own brand of radical Islamic terrorism (which is disguised in liberation, popular mobilization, and resistance movements) is not put on the same footing. Otherwise, the Sunni nations would view this war on ISIS as one-sided, aimed at Sunni Islam itself, and chiefly rewarding the Mullah-led regime of Tehran. The Obama administration never got that one right. The Trump administration and its NSC do.

Once the Sunni nations are ‘re-checked’ onboard, the US then needs to drive Russia away from Tehran. At face value, the Russo-Iranian alliance seems sacred and long-lasting. In reality, it is not. The Russo-Persian relation has oscillated -over centuries- between uneasy cooperation and fierce rivalry over the Caucasus. More importantly, Russia is suspicious of any Islamic movement –whether Shia or Sunni- on its borders or within its zones of influence. Coming to the aid of the beleaguered regime of Bashar Al Assad, Russia did not aim to shore up a Alawite rule against its majority Sunni population, or to impose Shia-dominion over Syria, or to further the strategic interests of Iran in the eastern Mediterranean. Whomever misses on such strategic fine points has a blurred view of Russia’s true aims in the Syrian conflict.

Russia wants to achieve few key goals from its Syria adventure.

Russia wants to maintain and grow its military presence through the three bases already erected in Syria for its naval, ground, and air forces. Any government of post-war Syria would need to legitimize this presence and shall necessarily require the Sunni majority’s vote (not Iran’s approval) since they represent the largest part of the country’s population.

Russia yearns for a seat on the negotiation table of any future Arab-Israeli peace accord. All previous US administrations have denied it this honor, but this might change under the current one. Russia could bring to the fore a dominated Syria, and a domesticated Palestinian Authority whilst offering comfort to Israel as it did throughout the Syrian conflict. Putin could even dream of a Nobel Peace Prize.

Russia is bent on controlling all gas flows from the eastern Mediterranean into Europe. So exports from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Cyprus could be coordinated through an Opec-like cartel led by Russia. As a result, Europe would be caught in a pincer movement, giving Putin greater hold on the continent than any armored division deployed on the eastern front.

The Trump administration finally stands a true chance to pick up from the failure of the Obama policy, by galvanizing the Sunni nations and incentivizing Russia to bring Radical Is...