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Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to vote — Provincial elections
(00:00:16) Summary
(00:00:17) Facts and Procedural History
(00:01:55) Held (Wagner C.J. and Côté, Rowe and Moreau JJ. dissenting)
(00:02:01) Per Karakatsanis, Martin, Kasirer, Jamal and O’Bonsawin JJ.
(00:07:46) Per Wagner C.J. and Moreau J. (dissenting)
(00:17:03) Per Côté and Rowe JJ. (dissenting)
(00:22:47) Reasons For Judgment: Karakatsanis J. (Martin, Kasirer, Jamal and O’Bonsawin JJ. concurring)
(00:22:56) I. Overview – 1
(00:31:13) II. Background – 15
(00:35:26) III. Judicial History – 22
(00:35:29) A. Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 2021 ONSC 7697, 158 O.R. (3d) 161 (Morgan J.) – 22
(00:36:24) B. Court of Appeal for Ontario, 2023 ONCA 139, 165 O.R. (3d) 241 (Zarnett and Sossin JJ.A., Benotto J.A. Dissenting) – 23
(00:37:33) IV. Analysis – 25
(00:38:19) A. Legal Framework – 27
(00:48:01) B. The Spending Limit Infringes Section 3 of the Charter – 42
(00:58:49) C. The Legislation Is Not Saved Under Section 1 – 59
(01:02:48) V. Conclusion and Disposition – 66
(01:03:29) Joint Dissenting Reasons: Wagner C.J. and Moreau J.
(01:03:36) I. Overview – 68
(01:06:44) II. Legislative Context – 73
(01:06:47) A. Context of Enactment – 73
(01:10:45) B. Legislative History – 79
(01:14:25) C. The Impugned Third Party Spending Limit Scheme Under the EFA – 85
(01:22:30) III. Judicial History — Working Families 2 – 97
(01:22:34) A. Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 2021 ONSC 7697, 158 O.R. (3d) 161 – 97
(01:25:57) B. Court of Appeal for Ontario, 2023 ONCA 139, 165 O.R. (3d) 241 – 101
(01:29:35) IV. Issue – 106
(01:30:05) V. Principles of Law – 108
(01:30:07) A. Standard of Review – 108
(01:30:47) B. The Scope of Section 3 – 110
(01:32:21) C. The Right to Meaningful Participation – 113
(01:41:27) D. The Analytical Framework for Identifying an Infringement of the Right to Meaningful Participation – 126
(01:57:40) VI. Application – 148
(01:58:38) A. The Definition of Political Advertising – 150
(02:03:46) B. The Extent of Permissible Political Advertising – 156
(02:12:24) C. The Asymmetry Between Third Parties and Political Parties – 169
(02:18:06) D. Summary – 177
(02:18:46) VII. Conclusion – 178
(02:19:07) Joint Dissenting Reasons: Côté and Rowe JJ.
(02:19:14) I. Introduction – 179
(02:24:32) II. The Conception of Third Parties – 188
(02:27:46) III. The Purpose of Section 3 – 192
(02:28:58) A. Right to Effective Representation and Right to Meaningful Participation – 196
(02:33:58) B. The Informational Component of Section 3 – 203
(02:36:01) C. The Egalitarian Model of Election Finance – 207
(02:38:29) IV. Section 3 Is Not a “Comparative Analysis” – 211
(02:39:44) A. Section 2(b) Cannot Be Imported Into Section 3 – 214
(02:56:04) B. Asymmetrical Treatment of Political Actors Is Permissible; A Finding of “Disproportionality” in Political Discourse Is Insufficient To Violate Section 3 – 239
(03:03:47) C. Conclusion: The Proposed “Comparative Analysis” Is Incompatible With Section 3 – 253
(03:06:17) V. Determining Whether the Informational Component Has Been Infringed – 256
(03:07:23) A. The Quantum and Temporal Reach of the Spending Limit – 258
(03:08:22) B. The Scope of Conduct Captured by the Spending Limit – 260
(03:10:00) C. The Spending Limit’s Impact on Different Forms of Media and Advertisement – 262
(03:10:18) D. The Asymmetrical Treatment of Different Actors – 263
(03:11:10) E. The Totality of Information Available – 265
(03:12:34) VI. Conclusion – 268
