Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

Docket: 3:22-cv-01670-MMA-KSC

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Theresa Torricellas’s federal habeas petition challenging her murder conviction and sentence. The court held that the petition was timely filed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), as the one-year statute of limitations began running when the California Supreme Court denied review of her resentencing proceedings, making the judgment final on December 14, 2021. Regarding the merits, the court applied the harmless error standard from *Brecht v. Abrahamson*, concluding that any potential error in the denial of an evidentiary hearing regarding her eligibility for resentencing under California Penal Code § 1172.6(c) would not have had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the outcome. The court found that Torricellas remained ineligible for relief because she was liable as a direct aider and abettor who acted with the intent to kill, based on her admissions during the plea colloquy that she knew her codefendant intended to kill the victim, selected the remote location, held the weapon, and acted as a lookout. Under AEDPA deference standards set forth in *Harrington v. Richter*, the state court’s factual and legal conclusions were not unreasonable. Consequently, because the error was harmless, the court did not need to decide whether her claim regarding the denial of an evidentiary hearing was cognizable on federal habeas review. The practical consequence is that Torricellas’s conviction and sentence remain in effect, and she is denied relief.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

The fifth-circuit granted the appointed attorney’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal after reviewing the Anders brief filed in accordance with *Anders v. California* and *United States v. Flores*. The court concurred with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issues for appellate review, noting that the defendant did not file a response. Consequently, the attorney is excused from further responsibilities, and the case is dismissed pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 42.2.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

The Ninth Circuit denied Igor Popov’s petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order that dismissed his appeal of an immigration judge’s decision denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard of review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, affirming the agency’s determination that Popov’s motion was untimely and not eligible for equitable tolling. The court held that Popov failed to meet the burden of establishing equitable tolling because he did not pursue his rights diligently. Although Popov argued that a California Penal Code § 1473.7 order vacating his convictions in 2024 should restart the filing deadline, the court found that Popov waited more than nine years after his removal order to seek relief and made no apparent efforts to challenge his conviction during the three-year period following the enactment of the relevant California law. The court further rejected Popov’s claim regarding the agency’s failure to exercise sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, noting that review is limited to instances where an agency erroneously believes it lacks discretion or that exercising it would be futile, which was not demonstrated here. As a result of this decision, the petition for review is denied, and the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing Popov’s motion to reopen remains in effect, leaving his removal order from 2015 intact.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of April Ann Nelson’s pro se complaint alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Applying de novo review, the court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing the case. The court also denied as moot Nelson’s pending motion to supplement the record.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

The Ninth Circuit denied Isidoro Dominguez Parra’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision dismissing his appeal of an immigration judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied a substantial evidence standard to review the agency’s factual determinations regarding the motive for harm and eligibility for CAT protection, and reviewed de novo whether the immigration judge violated due process. Regarding asylum and withholding of removal, the court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that the motive for the feared harm was financial gain rather than a protected ground, citing incidents involving his family members where perpetrators sought money through extortion and kidnapping threats. Concerning CAT relief, the court found ample evidence to support the denial, ruling that generalized evidence of violence in Mexico was insufficient to establish a likelihood of torture, particularly given the lack of specific physical harm to the petitioner or his family other than one historical incident involving his nephew. Finally, the court determined that the immigration judge did not violate due process by failing to specifically inquire about the petitioner’s multiple sclerosis; the record showed the judge asked open-ended questions and inquired about the petitioner’s medical treatment and fears, providing sufficient opportunity for the petitioner to present his case. As a result, the petition is denied, and the BIA’s order dismissing the appeal stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

Docket: 5:21-cv-00219-DMG-SSC

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment holding the Compton Unified School District liable for denying a minor student a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs. The court ruled that it had jurisdiction over both the merits appeal and the fee appeal because the district court entered a final judgment on fees while the merits appeal was pending, thereby mooting any objection regarding the timing of the fee motion. Regarding the substantive claim, the court applied de novo review to legal questions and clear error review to factual findings, concluding that the California Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction to determine student residency as it was intertwined with the IDEA violation. The court found that the school district violated the IDEA by summarily disenrolling the student without a formal revocation of her inter-district permit and failing to provide an Individualized Education Program (IEP) by the statutory deadline. The court rejected the district’s arguments that liability was negated because the employment-based permit technically expired due to the parent’s medical leaves or because another district held responsibility for the student during her hospitalization; the court reasoned that the denial of services resulted directly from the district’s procedural violations and its failure to identify the child as having a disability, which precluded other districts from assuming responsibility. On the issue of attorney’s fees, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard, noting that while fee awards must consider the degree of success, there is no precise formula for calculation. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding approximately $770,000 after applying a 30 percent reduction for limited success, as the plaintiffs achieved the most significant possible victory under the IDEA by proving the denial of a FAPE. Consequently, the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs stands, and the school district must pay the awarded fees.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Small Business Administration (SBA), upholding the validity of the agency’s “Corporate Group Rule” regarding Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). The court held that the SBA acted within its statutory authority by defining a “business concern” to include affiliated entities under common control for the purpose of applying an aggregate $20 million loan cap to corporate groups, rather than treating each separately organized limited liability company as an independent borrower. The court applied a standard of review requiring deference to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory terms and its exercise of emergency rulemaking authority granted by 15 U.S.C. § 9012. The opinion reasoned that while the CARES Act sets a $10 million limit per business, it does not explicitly define “business concern” or forbid the SBA from aggregating loans for affiliated entities to ensure equitable distribution of limited funds. The court rejected the appellants’ argument that state law entity status mandates separate treatment, noting that federal agencies routinely treat affiliated businesses as a single unit for regulatory purposes and that the statutory language does not preclude such an interpretation. Furthermore, the court found the rule was not arbitrary or capricious given the agency’s cogent justification to maximize the number of borrowers served, and it dismissed claims regarding retroactive application, concluding that the rule governed loan forgiveness eligibility rather than penalizing past actions. As a practical consequence, the nursing homes remain subject to the SBA’s determination that their loans exceed the allowable cap for their corporate group, meaning they are not entitled to full loan forgiveness for amounts exceeding the $20 million aggregate limit and must repay the remaining balance to their lending banks. The judgment of the district court is affirmed, leaving the administrative findings against the appellants in place.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

The Fifth Circuit granted the Government’s motion for summary affirmance and affirmed Andre Demarcus Rubell’s conviction and sentence for possessing a firearm after a felony conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court held that Rubell’s challenges were foreclosed by binding precedent: his facial Second Amendment challenge was precluded by *United States v. Diaz*, his Commerce Clause arguments were barred by *United States v. Rawls* and *United States v. Alcantar*, and the district court’s reliance on Guidelines commentary defining “large capacity magazine” was controlled by *United States v. Martin*. The court denied the Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief, leaving the district court’s judgment in place.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

The eighth-circuit affirmed Antonio Copeland’s 292-month sentence for distribution and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, concluding that the district court did not commit plain error by applying a presumption that the advisory sentencing guideline range was reasonable. The court applied the plain error standard of review because Copeland failed to object to this alleged error in the district court, requiring him to demonstrate an obvious error that affected his substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Although the Supreme Court’s decision in *Gall v. United States* prohibits courts from presuming that a Guidelines range is reasonable, the Eighth Circuit held that Copeland failed to show such an error occurred based on the specific transcript remarks cited. The court reasoned that while judges may express policy disagreements with sentencing guidelines or reserve judgment regarding potential retroactive amendments, they remain obligated under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to consider the Guidelines as a factor and must still conduct an individualized assessment of the defendant’s offense conduct, history, and characteristics. Because the district court expressly stated it considered all § 3553(a) factors and discussed Copeland’s specific circumstances, the record supported a finding that the sentence resulted from an individualized assessment rather than an impermissible presumption. Consequently, the judgment of the district court remains in effect, and Copeland’s sentence is upheld.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-14

Docket: 8:23-cv-02303-MRA-DFM

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of the Estate of Bibi Ahmad’s putative class action alleging that UnitedHealth Group and UnitedHealthcare deceptively marketed Medicare Advantage plans. The court held that the plaintiffs’ state law claims are expressly preempted by the Medicare Act’s Part C preemption provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3). Under this standard, federal standards established for Medicare Advantage plans supersede any state law duty that imposes obligations on such plans regarding the same subject matter, including marketing and communications. The court reasoned that because the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) extensively prescribes duties for Medicare Advantage plans and their affiliates regarding plan-related marketing, the existence of these federal standards preempts parallel or supplementary state law claims regardless of whether the defendants are direct plan organizations. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint, determining that any proposed amendment would be futile given the binding precedent established in *Uhm v. Humana, Inc.* and the applicability of Part C preemption to derivative claims against marketing affiliates. As a result, the dismissal stands and the case is closed without further proceedings on the merits.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.