Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-13

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Keshon Baxter’s motion to dismiss his indictment for possessing a firearm as an unlawful drug user under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The court applied the two-part test established in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen*, first concluding that the Second Amendment’s plain text covers Baxter’s conduct because drug users are part of “the people” protected by the Amendment. Consequently, the burden shifted to the government to demonstrate that the statute is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court held that the government must prove this consistency by a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, as the historical analysis is not an element of the crime. Applying the “Terror of the People” historical analogue, which permits the disarmament of individuals who pose a credible threat to physical safety or terrorize others, the court found that the government met its burden. The record supported the district court’s finding that Baxter’s marijuana use rendered him dangerous, evidenced by his chronic use, aggressive behavior during gang altercations while armed, and flight from law enforcement. The court determined this conduct was sufficiently analogous to Founding-era laws prohibiting individuals from going armed in a manner that terrorized the public. As the government successfully demonstrated that Baxter’s indictment aligns with historical tradition under this analogue, his Second Amendment challenge fails. The practical consequence is that the district court’s judgment denying the motion to dismiss stands, allowing Baxter’s conviction and 64-month prison sentence to remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-13

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.’s breach-of-contract claim against Eli Lilly and Company, holding that Teva plausibly alleged breaches of contractual obligations that remained in effect after the relevant Forteo patents expired. The court determined that under Indiana law, a settlement agreement lacking an express termination date is effective for a “reasonable time,” a factual inquiry that cannot be resolved as a matter of law on a motion to dismiss. The court applied the de novo standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) motions, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations in Teva’s complaint as true and drawing reasonable inferences in its favor. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the Settlement Agreement’s text did not explicitly tie the duration of Lilly’s covenants—specifically the promise not to block Teva’s market entry or waive regulatory exclusivities—to the expiration of the patents on August 19, 2019. While other provisions in the agreement were expressly limited by patent expiration dates, Section 5.2 referred generally to the agreement being “in effect” without specifying an end date. The court noted that certain substantive covenants, such as Teva’s covenant not to sue Lilly regarding Forteo-related intellectual property, logically survived the patents’ expiration, implying the broader agreement remained operative. Consequently, the court found it premature to conclude on the pleadings that the contract had expired or that the alleged breaches occurred outside the agreement’s duration. The practical consequence is that the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana for further proceedings. The dismissal was vacated, allowing Teva to proceed with its breach-of-contract claim and pursue discovery to establish whether the Settlement Agreement remained in effect during the alleged breaches and whether Lilly’s actions constituted a violation of those terms.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-13

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s exclusion of expert witness testimony and its grant of summary judgment to the defendant, while dismissing the portion of the appeal challenging the award of attorneys’ fees for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of Bradley Soderstrom because the plaintiffs failed to disclose him as an expert witness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2), and his proposed opinions relied on specialized knowledge and assumptions beyond lay perception, constituting expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The court further affirmed summary judgment on all counts, ruling that without Soderstrom’s admissible testimony, the plaintiffs failed to present competent evidence sufficient to prove damages, as the underlying business records were too voluminous and complex for a jury to calculate without expert assistance. Regarding the attorneys’ fees award, the court dismissed the appeal because the district court had not yet determined the specific amount of fees, rendering the issue unripe for appellate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Consequently, the judgment in favor of Barnhart stands, and the fee dispute must be resolved by the district court before it can be appealed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-13

The federal-circuit dismissed the appeal filed by Tarun N. Surti against a district court order denying his motion to dismiss or transfer venue in a patent declaratory judgment action. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the district court’s decision was neither a final judgment nor otherwise properly before the appellate court. The court applied the final judgment rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which limits appellate jurisdiction to decisions that end litigation on the merits and leave nothing for the lower court to do but execute the judgment. The opinion clarified that denials of motions to dismiss or transfer venue are interlocutory orders that do not qualify as final decisions. The court further rejected potential exceptions: it found no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) because the district court failed to certify the order for interlocutory review, and it determined that the collateral order doctrine did not apply to venue or transfer denials. Additionally, while noting that mandamus could theoretically be used to review a transfer denial, the court found Surti had not petitioned for such relief and failed to meet the high burden of showing his right to the writ was clear and indisputable given the district court’s correct application of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), 1400, and 1404(a). As a practical consequence, the appeal is terminated without review of the merits regarding res judicata or venue arguments, and the district court’s order denying the motion to dismiss or transfer remains in effect, allowing the underlying litigation to proceed in the Western District of Michigan.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-13

The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of David S. Fritz’s appeal from the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, holding that the Veterans Court lacked jurisdiction because the underlying Board of Veterans’ Appeals decision was fully favorable to the appellant. The court applied the statutory requirement under 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a), which mandates that a party must be “adversely affected” by a Board decision to appeal, and the Article III “case or controversy” standing requirement. Because the Board granted service connection for all claims fairly presented in the appeal (ADHD, bipolar disorder, and depression) without denying any requests, there was no adverse ruling to challenge. The court rejected Fritz’s arguments regarding due process violations related to effective dates or prior TBI claims, noting that those issues were either resolved in previous final decisions, favorably addressed in the current decision, or required administrative review rather than judicial intervention. Consequently, the Veterans Court correctly determined it had no live issue to review and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The practical consequence is that the dismissal order stands, leaving Fritz without a judicial avenue to contest the fully favorable Board decision or pursue claims outside the scope of the current record.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-13

The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order denying a motion to reopen removal proceedings. The court applied the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, affirming the BIA’s decision unless it was capricious, irrational, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or based on legally erroneous interpretations. The court held that the BIA properly dismissed the petitioner’s motion because she failed to satisfy the requirements for an exception to the ninety-day time bar under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Specifically, the court found that much of the evidence submitted was previously available rather than material and previously unavailable as required by statute. Furthermore, the court concluded that the remaining evidence, including family affidavits and country-conditions reports, failed to establish a prima facie case for asylum because it did not connect any threat of persecution to her claimed particular social group. As a result of this denial, the petitioner’s motion to reopen remains rejected, and the original order of removal stands as final.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-13

The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction against the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their patent infringement claims and failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. The court applied the standard for preliminary injunctions under Sixth Circuit law, which requires de novo review of the likelihood of success on the merits and abuse of discretion review for the ultimate balancing of equitable factors. The court determined that the defendants raised substantial questions regarding three specific claim limitations of U.S. Patent No. 9,151,084. First, regarding the requirement that the panel be “flexible along [its] entire length,” the court found that the accused door’s panel was rigid and only made flexible through routed compression gaps, which did not satisfy the plain meaning of the claim language supported by the prosecution history. Second, concerning the limitation that “foam insulating material form[] the second outermost surface,” the court agreed with the defendants that the accused “sandwich” construction, where foam is sandwiched between two thermoplastic membranes, does not meet the requirement that the foam itself form an outermost surface. Third, regarding the term “insulated overhead door,” the court concluded that the specification and industry evidence indicate the term refers to doors suitable for cold storage applications; consequently, there was a substantial question as to whether the accused door met this functional requirement. Additionally, the court ruled that the district court erred in finding irreparable harm. The plaintiffs’ claim of price erosion lacked a causal nexus between their reduced prices and the defendants’ sales, particularly given that the plaintiffs had not sold any doors prior to the first injunction and faced no competition for a year afterward. Furthermore, the court found insufficient evidence that past allegations of false marking or tortious interference indicated a substantial risk of future injury necessary to justify forward-looking injunctive relief. The practical consequence is that the preliminary injunction is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The defendants are awarded their costs on appeal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-13

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Dartmouth College on all counts of Amro Farid’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e) and New Hampshire’s employment discrimination statute (N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A). The court held that no reasonable jury could find in Farid’s favor because he failed to provide sufficient evidence that Dartmouth’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for denying him tenure and investigating research misconduct were pretextual. Applying the *McDonnell Douglas* burden-shifting framework, the court analyzed Farid’s discrimination claim by examining three categories of alleged pretext: disparate treatment, policy violations, and an unfriendly work environment. The court found that Farid failed to establish disparate treatment because his comparator, Professor Vikrant Vaze, was not similarly situated in all relevant respects; Vaze possessed superior qualifications regarding scholarship, including more competitive funding and fewer self-citations, as well as significantly better teaching evaluations. Regarding alleged policy violations, the court determined that Dartmouth’s failure to warn Farid of the consequences of a tenure denial applied generally to all applicants rather than targeting him specifically, and any procedural errors were corrected by allowing him to reapply. Furthermore, the court found no evidence that actions taken against Farid, such as discouraging his involvement with a Muslim student group or restricting access to research data, were motivated by discrimination; instead, the record supported Dartmouth’s explanation that these actions were based on concerns regarding Farid’s performance and teaching evaluations. On the retaliation claim, which alleged that Dartmouth initiated research misconduct proceedings against Farid after he filed a discrimination complaint, the court applied a similar burden-shifting standard. The court concluded that Farid could not prove pretext because there was no evidence that the investigation into his student’s plagiarism allegations was motivated by retaliatory animus. The record showed that the investigation was conducted by individuals uninvolved in the tenure dispute, followed standard procedures under Dartmouth’s Research Misconduct Policy, and resulted in a finding of no research misconduct despite identifying professional ethical breaches regarding authorship credit. The court rejected Farid’s arguments that procedural irregularities or comments by the Director of Research Integrity demonstrated bias, noting that the investigation committee ultimately made independent decisions and that Farid’s own uncooperative conduct hindered the process. As a practical consequence, the judgment in favor of Dartmouth College stands, dismissing Farid’s claims for discrimination and retaliation. The court also ruled that Farid’s separate challenge to a district court discovery order compelling the production of metadata was moot due to the affirmation of summary judgment on the merits.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-13

Docket: 2:22-CV-00406-KWR-GJF)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Walmart on the plaintiff’s disparate-treatment claims regarding his demotion and temporary termination, his retaliation claim, and his constructive-discharge claim, but reversed the summary judgment ruling on his hostile-work-environment claim. The court held that the demotion-based disparate-treatment claim was barred by the statute of limitations under Title VII and the New Mexico Human Rights Act because it constituted a discrete act that accrued in 2019, well before the lawsuit was filed in 2022. Regarding the termination claim, the court affirmed summary judgment because the plaintiff waived his challenge to the district court’s finding that the prompt reinstatement without lost wages did not constitute an adverse employment action. The retaliation claim failed because the plaintiff provided no evidence that he engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, as his complaints regarding favoritism and his response to a harassment investigation did not convey a concern about unlawful discrimination under Title VII. Similarly, the constructive-discharge claim was affirmed because the alleged working conditions, while discriminatory, were not sufficiently intolerable to force a reasonable person to resign. The court reversed on the hostile-work-environment claim, finding that the district court committed legal error by excluding relevant evidence and misstating the applicable standard. The appellate court clarified that discrete, independently actionable acts—such as demotion or termination—can be considered as part of a hostile-work-environment claim if they contribute to the overall pattern of discrimination, rejecting the district court’s reliance on a “steady barrage” formulation that implied a rigid frequency requirement. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court determined that a reasonable jury could find the workplace permeated with discriminatory intimidation and insult, including egregious comments comparing homosexuality to pedophilia and bestiality, the use of homophobic slurs like “faggot,” and the display of a derogatory drawing. Furthermore, sufficient evidence existed that Walmart supervisors knew or should have known of the harassment, including instances where supervisors mocked the plaintiff or ignored severe incidents. The practical consequence is that the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings specifically on the hostile-work-environment claim, while all other claims remain dismissed with prejudice.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Petitioners sought review of decisions by the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals to pretermit their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture relief. The Board affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision citing Burbano, deeming all issues exhausted. The Immigration Judge had required petitioners to file proof of active pursuit of biometrics compliance but never ordered them to complete biometrics by a specific date or informed them directly of their obligations.

The court held that where the Board of Immigration Appeals issues a Burbano affirmance, the court reviews the Immigration Judge’s decision as if it were the decision of the Board. The Immigration Judge abused its discretion by pretermitting the applications because it failed to provide adequate notice of the biometrics obligations under the relevant regulation. The Judge never ordered the petitioners to complete biometrics by a certain date and communicated directions only through counsel without an interpreter, unlike in Gonzalez-Veliz where adequate notice was found.

The case is remanded to the Board of Immigration Appeals for further proceedings consistent with the court’s decision, and the motion to stay removal is granted pending issuance of the mandate.