Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-09

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Joshua Wright’s § 1983 claim alleging that Illinois Department of Children and Family Services employees violated his deceased son’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect him from private violence. The court held that Wright failed to state a valid claim under the “state-created danger” exception to the general rule that the state has no affirmative duty to protect individuals from private actors. To establish liability under this exception, the plaintiff must allege that (1) state actors’ affirmative acts created or increased the danger, (2) those acts were both the actual and proximate cause of the injury, and (3) the conduct was so egregious that it “shocked the conscience.” The court found Wright’s allegations insufficient on two primary grounds. First, regarding causation, the court determined that the employees’ investigative actions—such as interviewing the child or closing the case after finding abuse “indicated”—did not cause J.W.’s death. The children were already living with an abuser prior to state intervention, and the timeline between the alleged negligent acts and the fatal assault was too attenuated to establish proximate causation. Second, regarding the conscience-shocking standard, the court ruled that mere negligence or bad decision-making in the execution of a statutory duty does not meet the high bar required for constitutional liability; the employees’ errors did not rise to the level of egregious conduct necessary to shock the conscience. Because Wright failed to state a substantive due process claim, the district court properly denied his motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to vacate the judgment or amend the complaint to file a third amended complaint, as further amendment would be futile. The affirmation results in the final dismissal of the federal constitutional claims against the defendants.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-09

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of Nautilus Insurance Company, holding that a “Prior Work Exclusion” in Bee Quality Inc.’s commercial general liability policy effectively barred coverage for claims arising from work completed before the policy’s inception date. The court applied Illinois law, which mandates that clear and unambiguous insurance policy terms be enforced according to their plain meaning unless they render coverage illusory. While acknowledging that exclusions are generally construed liberally in favor of the insured, the court determined that the exclusion did not swallow the entire policy because the contract still provided “plenty of room” for completed-operations coverage regarding work performed after February 8, 2022. Consequently, the court rejected Bee Quality’s argument that the premium paid or the potential limitation of coverage rendered the policy illusory, noting that courts cannot rewrite unambiguous agreements to make them more equitable. The practical consequence is that Nautilus owes no duty to defend or indemnify Bee Quality for the underlying state court negligence lawsuit regarding the fatal building collapse, as the claims stem from repairs completed in December 2020, which falls outside the scope of coverage under the policy’s specific exclusion.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-09

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals that dismissed Jianming He’s appeal of an immigration judge’s denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal. The court held that substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding, noting that a reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to find the petitioner credible given the totality of the circumstances. Specifically, the court cited the petitioner’s failure to disclose an arrest in Cuba on his asylum application and inconsistent statements regarding the length of his trip and detention in Cuba as valid grounds for the determination under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Consequently, the court denied the motion to stay removal and lifted the temporary stay of removal that had been entered pursuant to General Order 6.4(c), leaving the petitioner subject to removal proceedings.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-09

Docket: 1:23-cv-00149-TJC

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order upholding the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Daniel B. Boos’s application for disability benefits. The court applied a de novo standard of review, reversing only if the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision was based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The court held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings across all key issues. First, the ALJ correctly determined that Boos’s spine disorder was not a severe impairment, relying on medical records and testimony indicating only mild to moderate limitations; the court noted that where evidence is susceptible to multiple rational interpretations, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld. Second, the ALJ properly assessed Boos’s residual functional capacity by considering his mental impairments, noting that while Boos claimed an unspecified personality disorder and ADHD, he provided no medical documentation for these conditions, and the ALJ still accounted for potential symptoms based on available evidence. Third, the ALJ correctly concluded that Boos did not meet the statutory listing criteria for disability, finding only moderate limitations in mental functioning areas rather than marked ones. Fourth, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to reject Boos’s subjective testimony regarding symptom severity, citing inconsistencies between his reported symptoms and his self-described daily activities, as well as evidence that his impairments responded well to treatment. Finally, the court rejected arguments regarding an incomplete hypothetical posed to a vocational expert and a claim of legal error based on *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, holding that both issues were forfeited because they were not raised before the district court. As a result of this affirmation, the denial of Boos’s disability benefits application remains in effect, and he is not entitled to the requested social security payments.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-09

The ninth-circuit denied Odel Alberto Sarantes-Marin’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal regarding the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied the substantial evidence standard to factual findings and de novo review to constitutional claims. Regarding the substantive claims, the court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s adverse credibility finding based on significant inconsistencies between Sarantes’ credible fear interview statements—where he attributed potential harm to his grandfather’s political role rather than his own—and his later testimony claiming active membership in the Independent Liberal Party. The court also noted unexplained omissions regarding a 2010 beating and demonstration. Because Sarantes failed to meet his burden of proof through independent documentary evidence, the denial of withholding of removal was upheld. Similarly, the denial of CAT relief was affirmed because, absent credible testimony, the record did not compel the conclusion that he would more likely than not be tortured upon removal to Nicaragua. On the procedural claim, the court rejected Sarantes’ due process argument that the Immigration Judge acted as an advocate. The court found no violation because the record showed the IJ addressed Sarantes’ explanations for inconsistencies, asked further questions, and provided opportunities to discuss flaws in his statements; the IJ’s ultimate disagreement with Sarantes’ testimony was deemed inherent to the adjudicative process rather than advocacy. As a result of these holdings, the petition is denied and the BIA’s order dismissing the relief requests remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-09

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying Ikechukwu H. Okorie’s requests for leave to file “Barton motions” and to file a bankruptcy trustee’s surety bond under seal. The court applied the standard established in *Barton v. Barbour* and its progeny, which requires that before a suit is brought against a bankruptcy receiver or trustee, leave of the appointing court must be obtained. Okorie sought this permission to initiate four state court lawsuits against the trustee and third parties acting on her behalf. Because the district court had already denied these requests and the Fifth Circuit found no error in that determination, it affirmed the lower court’s decision for the reasons stated by the district court. The practical consequence is that Okorie may not proceed with the proposed state court litigation against the trustee without first obtaining leave from the bankruptcy court, which was previously denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-09

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) because the agency abused its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to reopen immigration proceedings based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). The court held that the BIA erred by concluding it lacked authority to consider IAC claims involving conduct occurring after the final order of removal, specifically the failure of prior counsel to notify the petitioners of the decision and the deadline to file a petition for review in this court. Citing *Li v. Bondi*, 139 F.4th 1113 (9th Cir. 2025), the panel affirmed that the BIA has the discretion to consider such claims and must provide a reasoned explanation if it declines to do so, which the BIA failed to provide. Furthermore, the court ruled that the service of a courtesy copy of the BIA’s decision directly to the petitioners was insufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice resulting from counsel’s deficient performance. Applying the standard for IAC claims where counsel’s error denies a noncitizen the right to appeal altogether, the court held it was unreasonable to expect unrepresented or non-English speaking petitioners to decipher complex filing deadlines without their retained counsel’s guidance. Consequently, the BIA is required on remand to apply the presumption of prejudice and adjudicate the merits of the IAC claim in the first instance.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-09

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Anthony Baker’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. The court applied a mixed standard of review, assessing factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, affirming unless the denial was unsupported by substantial evidence or based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. The court held that the initial stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because snow obstructed Baker’s license plate, providing probable cause to believe a violation of South Dakota law requiring conspicuously displayed plates had occurred. Furthermore, the court rejected Baker’s argument that the stop was unconstitutionally prolonged; it found that the officer’s detention of Baker and subsequent inquiries were justified by reasonable suspicion arising from the totality of the circumstances. These circumstances included Baker’s inability to provide a driver’s license or proof of insurance, his nervous and evasive behavior, the discovery of a pill bottle near him, and his admission of being a felon in possession of a firearm. As a practical consequence, the conviction for being an unlawful user in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) stands, and Baker’s appeal is dismissed with no relief granted.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-09

The sixth-circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Kyle Millis’s federal habeas corpus petition as untimely and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that it was not “plainly apparent” from the petition and exhibits that Millis was not entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The court applied a de novo standard of review to the district court’s refusal to apply equitable tolling, as no material facts were in dispute. Under the standard established in *Holland v. Florida*, equitable tolling requires a petitioner to demonstrate both reasonable diligence and that an extraordinary circumstance stood in their way. The court found that Millis presented colorable arguments on both prongs based on the Michigan Supreme Court’s conflicting correspondence. Specifically, Millis received a series of contradictory letters: initial notices rejecting his application as untimely, followed by a November 14 docket entry and a November 21 letter explicitly stating his application was “accepted for filing” and notifying the government that the filing was complete. It was only five months later, after Millis inquired about the status, that he received a final letter confirming the November 21 acceptance was generated in error and that his appeal had been dismissed on November 20. The court reasoned that placing the burden on a pro se petitioner to independently verify the accuracy of conflicting official court communications would be unreasonable. The court distinguished this case from precedents where petitioners ignored counsel or relied on ambiguous secondhand advice, noting instead that Millis received direct, affirmative assurances from the clerk’s office that his filing was accepted. Consequently, the district court erred in dismissing the petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases without allowing the state an opportunity to respond or develop the record further. The practical consequence is that the habeas petition will proceed, and the government will be given the chance to file a response and submit evidence regarding Millis’s claim for equitable tolling.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-09

The Fourth Circuit granted Maximino Ramos’s petition for review, vacated the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal, and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings. The court held that Ramos’s conviction under Virginia Code § 18.2-111 does not categorically constitute an “aggravated felony” involving fraud or deceit under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). Applying the categorical approach, the court determined that the statute criminalizes the wrongful taking of property by a person entrusted with it but does not require, as an element, intentional misrepresentation, trickery, or concealment. The court noted that under Virginia law, “fraudulently” refers to wrongful intent rather than deceptive conduct, and because the statute punishes the unauthorized taking regardless of whether the perpetrator conceals the act or discloses their intent beforehand, the offense does not necessarily entail the fraudulent or deceitful conduct required for removal eligibility. Consequently, Ramos is no longer subject to removal based on this conviction, and the government’s error in deporting him prior to a final order was remedied by vacating that order.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.