Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-02

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for detention officers Berry and Linster regarding a § 1983 claim alleging deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee’s serious medical needs, while dismissing appeals concerning Monell liability against the County and Sheriff Blackwood, as well as a state-law bond claim against Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America. The court held that Officers Berry and Linster were not entitled to qualified immunity because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find they violated clearly established law by consciously disregarding a substantial risk of serious harm. Applying the subjective deliberate-indifference standard applicable at the time of the 2020 incident, the court found the officers satisfied both prongs of the test: (1) the objective component was met because audible sounds of moaning, groaning, and labored breathing from an inmate in a segregation block housing violent individuals would alert a reasonable layperson to the need for medical attention; and (2) the subjective component was met because the officers suspected King had been assaulted, yet intentionally delayed checking on him for approximately twenty minutes solely to avoid administrative paperwork associated with logging their rounds early. The court further noted that the officers’ post-incident inconsistent statements and the retrieval of an inhaler prior to entering the cell supported an inference that they knew medical care was needed but chose inaction. Regarding the legal standard, the court clarified that while *Riley v. King* held there is no clearly established right to properly conducted security checks generally, it does not shield officers who have specific, contemporaneous knowledge of a particular inmate’s distress and choose to delay response for non-emergency reasons. The court determined that an officer aware of facts indicating a need for medical care cannot escape liability merely because they lack a confirmed diagnosis, especially when the delay is motivated by avoiding paperwork rather than genuine good-faith efforts to treat the inmate. The practical consequence is that the appeal regarding the officers’ qualified immunity was rejected, allowing the § 1983 claim against Berry and Linster to proceed to trial. However, the court dismissed the appeals concerning the Monell claim against the County and Sheriff Blackwood, and the state-law bond claim against Travelers, for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the resolution of the officers’ qualified immunity did not necessarily resolve those separate claims due to differing legal standards and factual predicates.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-02

The federal-circuit dismissed the petition for review of a Merit Systems Protection Board decision because the petitioner failed to pay the required docketing fee under Federal Circuit Rule 52(d) and failed to file the mandatory Statement Concerning Discrimination pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 15(c)(3). The court determined this failure constituted a failure to prosecute in accordance with the rules. As a result, the appeal is terminated without consideration of the merits, leaving the Merit Systems Protection Board’s original decision in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-02

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s order denying Crosspoint Church’s motion for a permanent injunction against provisions of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). The court held that no case or controversy existed regarding the Employment Rule because existing carveouts already permitted religious organizations to discriminate in favor of co-religionists. The court further affirmed the denial of relief regarding the Religious Nondiscrimination Rule and the Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Rule, concluding that these rules regulate conduct rather than speech and do not violate the Free Exercise Clause or the Free Speech Clause, even when applied to a private Christian school’s admissions and expulsion policies based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The court reversed the denial of relief regarding the Religious Expression Rule, holding that it unconstitutionally violates the Free Exercise Clause by discriminating between religions in permitting religious expression. The court applied strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause for laws not neutral or of general application, rejecting Crosspoint’s argument that 2021 amendments to the MHRA were motivated by specific animus toward the school, finding instead a logical legislative rationale for aligning education provisions with existing employment and housing standards. Regarding the Free Speech claim, the court applied rational basis review, distinguishing the case from precedents like *Hurley* and *303 Creative* because the MHRA prohibited discriminatory conduct based on status rather than compelling the school to convey a specific message or speech. The practical consequence is that the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to enter a permanent injunction enjoining the Religious Expression Rule as applied to Crosspoint Church, while the other challenged provisions of the MHRA remain enforceable against the school.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-02

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s transfer of a patent infringement case from the Southern District of New York to the Eastern District of North Carolina and its grant of summary judgment of noninfringement. The court reviewed the district court’s claim construction de novo, adopting the interpretation that the term “mounted on” in U.S. Patent No. 5,827,178 means “fastened to the exterior of.” This construction was based on the intrinsic evidence, specifically the patent’s use of contrasting prepositions where “mounted on” is used for the camera and screen while “mounted in” is used for the power supply, indicating a distinction between exterior and interior attachment. Regarding summary judgment, the court applied Fourth Circuit standards to review the noninfringement ruling. It found no genuine issue of material fact for literal infringement because the accused device’s camera was fastened to the interior of the blade, not the exterior as required by the claim construction. For infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision that the patentee failed to meet specific evidentiary requirements, noting that Dr. Berall did not provide limitation-specific arguments or particularized testimony regarding the insubstantial differences or function-way-result tests in his summary judgment briefing. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Teleflex’s waiver or forfeiture of its venue objection; under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c), Teleflex was acting solely as LMA’s successor-in-interest during earlier proceedings and had not waived its right to contest venue until it was sued separately for its own products. As a result, the patent infringement suit against Teleflex Medical Inc. is dismissed with respect to the accused products, and the case remains transferred to the Eastern District of North Carolina where the noninfringement judgment stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

The Ninth Circuit denied Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC’s petition for review of a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) order and granted the NLRB’s cross-petition for enforcement. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s findings that Cemex committed numerous unfair labor practices in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and 158(a)(3), including making unlawful threats regarding wage freezes, plant closures, and job loss; surveilling employees; promulgating an unlawful “company time” rule prohibiting union discussions; and discharging an employee for protected union activity. The court applied the standard that agency credibility findings are entitled to special deference and may only be rejected if a clear preponderance of the evidence shows they are inherently incredible or patently unreasonable, and it affirmed that the Board’s remedy choices are reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion. Regarding the specific remedies, the court upheld the Board’s decision to set aside the election results and issue a *Gissel* bargaining order. The court found the Board did not abuse its discretion because Cemex engaged in pervasive coercive misconduct, including “hallmark” violations such as threats of plant closure and the discharge of a prominent union supporter, which created an atmosphere that rendered traditional remedies insufficient to ensure a fair rerun election. The court also rejected challenges regarding the timeliness of certain allegations, the Board’s authority to find unalleged but closely connected violations, and the Union’s request for additional remedies or further ULP findings, deferring to the Board’s rational decisions on those matters. Additionally, the court addressed a petition for panel rehearing by the NLRB and Union, amending the opinion to remove discussion of *Thryv* remedies after the parties agreed such issues were moot due to the Board’s withdrawal of its request for enforcement of that specific remedy. Consequently, the petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc are denied, and the NLRB’s order is enforced.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

The federal-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction preventing Hetero Labs from marketing a generic version of Otsuka’s Nuedexta drug, but vacated the district court’s order waiving the bond requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). Regarding claim construction, the court held that the terms “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” in U.S. Patent No. 7,659,282 refer to the compounds as administered, including their salt forms (dextromethorphan hydrobromide and quinidine sulfate), rather than limiting the weight-to-weight ratio calculation to the active moiety components of those salts. The court applied de novo review for claim construction and clear error review for underlying factual findings, concluding that intrinsic evidence from the patent’s claims, specification, and prosecution history supported Otsuka’s interpretation that the ratio should be calculated based on the total weight of the administered salt forms. This construction rendered Hetero’s product within the scope of the patent’s 1:0.5 or less weight-to-weight ratio limitation, supporting a finding that Otsuka was likely to succeed on its infringement claim. On the procedural issue, the court applied Third Circuit law regarding Rule 65(c), which strictly interprets the bond requirement and permits waiver only under limited exceptions, such as when there is no risk of monetary loss to the defendant or in non-commercial cases involving important federal rights. The court determined that Hetero’s entry into the market with a generic pharmaceutical product constitutes a commercial, money-making activity, and the Third Circuit has never excused bond requirements in such contexts. Consequently, the court vacated the waiver of the bond requirement and remanded the issue to the district court for reconsideration of an appropriate security amount, noting that the patent’s expiration date is a relevant factor in determining the bond size.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

The Ninth Circuit denied Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC’s petition for review of the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) Decision & Order and granted the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement. The court held that substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s findings that Cemex committed numerous unfair labor practices in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and § 158(a)(3), including unlawful threats regarding wage increases, plant closures, and job loss; unlawful surveillance; the promulgation of an illegal “company time” rule; and the discriminatory suspension and termination of employee Ornelas. The court applied the standard that agency credibility findings may only be rejected if they are inherently incredible or patently unreasonable, and found that Cemex failed to meet this burden. Regarding the remedy, the court affirmed the NLRB’s issuance of a *Gissel* bargaining order under 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), reviewing the Board’s discretion for clear abuse. The court determined the Board did not abuse its discretion because Cemex engaged in “hallmark” violations—specifically threats of plant closure, job loss, and the discharge of a prominent union supporter—that were pervasive, coercive, and part of a corporate strategy, rendering traditional remedies insufficient to erase the effects of the misconduct on employee free choice. The court also rejected Cemex’s constitutional challenges regarding ALJ removal protections due to a lack of demonstrated compensable harm and dismissed its arguments regarding the timeliness of certain charges and due process violations related to security guard deployment. As a practical consequence, the judgment is final with no further petitions for rehearing accepted. While the NLRB had initially sought enforcement of “Thryv remedies,” it withdrew that request, and the parties agreed the court need not address their validity; consequently, the court denied the Board’s partial vacatur request as moot and dismissed all pending petitions for panel and en banc rehearing.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

The Ninth Circuit denied Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC’s petition for review of a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) order and granted the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement. The court held that substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s findings that Cemex committed numerous unfair labor practices in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and § 158(a)(3), including coercive statements by managers regarding wage freezes, plant closures, and striker reinstatement; unlawful surveillance; the promulgation of an illegal “company time” rule prohibiting union discussions; and the discriminatory suspension and termination of employee Ornelas. The court applied the standard that agency credibility findings are entitled to special deference and may only be rejected if a clear preponderance of the evidence shows they are inherently incredible or patently unreasonable, and affirmed that the Board’s interpretation of employer speech as unlawful threats was supported by substantial evidence even when conflicting views existed in the record. Regarding remedies, the court applied the “clear abuse of discretion” standard to uphold the NLRB’s decision to set aside the election results and issue a *Gissel* bargaining order. The court found the Board acted within its discretion because Cemex engaged in pervasive coercive misconduct, including “hallmark” violations such as threats of job loss and plant closure and the discharge of a prominent union supporter, which destroyed election conditions. The court determined that traditional remedies were insufficient to erase the effects of this misconduct and ensure a fair rerun election, particularly given the Board’s finding that the unlawful conduct was part of a carefully crafted corporate strategy likely to recur. The court also rejected Cemex’s constitutional challenges regarding ALJ removal protections due to a lack of demonstrated compensable harm and dismissed the Union’s cross-petition for additional remedies or findings as unnecessary given the existing order. As a practical consequence, the NLRB’s order requiring Cemex to recognize and bargain with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters is enforced, and the election results are vacated. The court also issued an amended memorandum clarifying that it will not address the validity of “Thryv remedies” because the Board withdrew its request for enforcement of those specific remedies, rendering the issue moot. All petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

The federal-circuit affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision upholding the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ denial of service-connected disability benefits for a left knee disorder, right knee disorder, right ankle disorder, and sleep disorder, but remanded the case to hold it in abeyance pending proceedings at the Board for Correction of Naval Records. The court held that under 38 C.F.R. § 3.203(a)(1), the Board was correct to rely exclusively on official naval personnel records to determine an applicant’s service classification and properly declined to consider witness testimony or other evidence suggesting the appellant’s service should be classified as active duty. Because the appellant has a separate administrative remedy available to correct her personnel records through the Board for Correction of Naval Records, the court determined that remanding the case is necessary to allow for those proceedings before the Veterans Court can proceed further on the eligibility issue.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision rejecting Graciano Garcia Becerril’s applications for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and cancellation of removal. The court held that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of the CAT claim because the petitioner failed to establish it is more likely than not that he will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the Mexican government upon removal. Specifically, the court found the record did not compel a finding that the petitioner would be individually targeted, noting his lack of contact with the cousin who previously recruited him into a gang for over 30 years and that his family is unaware of the cousin’s whereabouts. Furthermore, the court ruled that generalized evidence regarding violence and corruption in Mexico was insufficient to prove government acquiescence, as it was not particular to the petitioner. The court also rejected the petitioner’s request for a remand to consider prosecutorial discretion, stating it lacks jurisdiction to direct the Government to exercise such discretion. Additionally, the court noted that the petitioner forfeited any challenge to the denial of cancellation of removal. As a result, the petition is denied and the BIA’s order stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.