Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

Docket: 1:23-CR-00104-DDD-1)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed Charles Lacona’s convictions for two counts of wire fraud and one count of money laundering. The court held that the government presented sufficient evidence to establish the required interstate-commerce link for the wire-fraud charges, finding that a rational jury could conclude Lacona knowingly submitted loan applications via digital means to an out-of-state bank, thereby foreseeing that his fraudulent scheme would involve interstate wire communications used to process fees and disburse funds. Regarding constructive amendment, the court ruled that the government did not broaden the indictment; it maintained a single theory of a unified fraud scheme throughout the trial, and the proof presented corresponded to the offenses charged in the indictment. Furthermore, the court found no prosecutorial misconduct, determining that the prosecutor’s closing argument statements regarding an accountant’s records were proper summaries of admitted evidence rather than improper assertions of facts not in evidence. As a practical consequence, Lacona’s convictions stand, and he remains subject to his original sentence of 24 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and nearly $550,000 in restitution.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

Docket: 4:22-cv-00467-WS-MAF

The eleventh-circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to correctional officer Boyce Turner and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Officer Turner violated Akeem Muhammad’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from unnecessary and excessive force during a May 9, 2019 incident at a Florida prison. The court applied the standard that summary judgment is inappropriate when video evidence does not “clearly or blatantly” contradict a plaintiff’s version of events, requiring facts to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. The court found the security camera footage ambiguous due to obstructed views and poor audio, meaning it did not disprove Muhammad’s account that he was handcuffed, non-resistant, and subjected to a violent takedown followed by pain-compliance techniques while pinned on the floor. Under the *Skrtich* test for excessive force claims, the court determined a reasonable jury could find the force was applied maliciously and sadistically rather than in good faith to maintain discipline, particularly given Turner’s alleged threat that Muhammad would “pay” for filing a grievance and his statement that the pain on the floor was “only the beginning.” Additionally, the court ruled that Turner is not entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from gratuitous force against a subdued prisoner was clearly established at the time of the incident. The practical consequence is that the case proceeds to trial, where a jury will determine whether Officer Turner used excessive force in violation of the Constitution and whether he is liable for damages.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

The First Circuit dismissed the appellants’ appeal regarding their administrative fee claim and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of their interest claim. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the administrative fee claim because the suit was filed in violation of the automatic stay provisions under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). The court reasoned that the appellants’ demand for the return of the 15% administrative fee constituted a “claim against the debtor” (the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) for “property of the debtor,” thereby triggering the stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 and 922, which were incorporated into PROMESA. Because the claim was filed in violation of the stay without relief from the Title III court, the action was void and without legal effect, precluding appellate review of its merits. Regarding the interest claim, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal based on a lack of standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court found that the appellants failed to allege an injury in fact sufficient to confer jurisdiction because they did not plead that they had requested disbursement of their accrued interest; consequently, their grievance regarding the lack of transparent notice and calculation procedures was deemed abstract, hypothetical, and akin to a generalized grievance. As a practical consequence, the appeal is dismissed, the district court’s summary judgment on the administrative fee claim is vacated due to lack of jurisdiction, and the dismissal of the interest claim stands, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

Docket: 5:24-cv-00015-WFJ-PRL

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Publix Super Markets, Inc., dismissing Adrian Clark’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 alleging race discrimination after employees denied his request to purchase a $15,000 money order. The court applied the “but-for” causation standard established in *Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media*, requiring Clark to prove that his race was the decisive factor in the denial of his contractual rights. The court held that Clark failed to present sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence to satisfy this standard. Regarding direct evidence, the court ruled that an employee’s ambiguous use of the phrase “you people” did not constitute a blatant remark proving racial animus as a matter of law. Regarding circumstantial evidence, the court found Clark failed to establish a prima facie case under *McDonnell Douglas* because he offered no comparators of a different race who were similarly situated and treated more favorably. Furthermore, under the “convincing mosaic” standard, the record showed that the store’s assistant manager, the ultimate decisionmaker, denied the transaction based on objective red flags regarding suspicious monetary activity—specifically Clark’s claim of having no income while attempting to pay a full lease in advance—and not because of his race. The court also rejected Clark’s argument that an employee’s alleged racial comments influenced the decision, noting that the non-decisionmaking employee had no determinative influence on the final denial. Additionally, the court dismissed Clark’s new legal theories raised for the first time on appeal and his claim of judicial bias as insufficient to warrant relief. The practical consequence is that the district court’s judgment in favor of Publix stands, and Clark’s § 1981 race discrimination claim is permanently barred by the appellate ruling.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

Docket: 1:24-cv-00244-C

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Austal USA, LLC, dismissing Zane Byrd’s claims of discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA). The court held that Byrd failed to establish a prima facie case because he was not a “qualified individual” capable of performing the essential functions of his position as a B-Class Electrician. Specifically, the court determined that regular attendance was an essential function of the job due to Austal’s role as a Navy contractor with strict deadlines and the operational necessity for crew members to cover for absentees. Furthermore, the court found that Byrd caused a breakdown in the interactive process by failing to provide requested medical documentation required to process his accommodation claim through Unum, thereby relieving the employer of its duty to engage further. Regarding the “convincing mosaic” standard used to overcome summary judgment, the court ruled that Byrd failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer intentional discrimination or pretext. The court noted that the five-month gap between Byrd’s accommodation request and his termination was too attenuated to establish causation for a retaliation claim, particularly given that Byrd continued to accrue unexcused absences during that period. Additionally, the court found no evidence of suspicious timing or systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees, as Byrd’s performance reviews consistently flagged his attendance as “Not Effective” and noted he only met minimum standards. The practical consequence of this ruling is that the judgment in favor of Austal USA remains in effect, and Byrd’s appeal is denied without a trial on the merits of his discrimination or retaliation claims.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

The Fifth Circuit granted the appointed attorney’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal after reviewing the Anders briefs and relevant portions of the record. The court concurred with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presented no non-frivolous issues for appellate review, applying the standard established in *Anders v. California* and *United States v. Flores*. As a result, the attorney was excused from further responsibilities, and the criminal appeal was dismissed without reaching the merits of the case.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

Docket: 1:14-cr-20674-DSL-1

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Daniel Ochoa’s motion to correct plain errors under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). The court held that Rule 52(b) does not apply to district courts, as it grants only courts of appeals the limited power to consider forfeited errors affecting substantial rights. Furthermore, the court determined that even if the motion were construed under different remedial frameworks, it would remain cognizable. If treated as a Rule 33 motion for a new trial, it was untimely because it was filed nine years after conviction, exceeding the rule’s strict time limits of three years for new evidence or fourteen days for other grounds. If treated as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, it would constitute an unauthorized second or successive motion; since Ochoa had not obtained prior authorization from the court of appeals to file such a motion, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider it. Consequently, relief was denied, and the conviction stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Joseph Anthony Reyna’s lawsuit challenging Texas’s ballot-qualification system under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the imposition of a pre-filing bar against him. The court held that Reyna lacked Article III standing because he failed to allege any concrete intent to initiate a political campaign, relying instead on vague assertions regarding barriers faced by Hispanic and Native American Texans; under *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, such “some day” intentions without concrete plans do not establish imminent injury. Regarding the pre-filing bar, the court applied the four-factor test from *Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC* to review the district court for an abuse of discretion, concluding that Reyna’s history of filing 13 suits since June 2025—three dismissed as frivolous and six recommended for dismissal—along with repeated warnings against such conduct, justified the sanction to prevent the waste of judicial resources. As a result, the underlying claims are dismissed without prejudice to standing, and Reyna is prohibited from filing future lawsuits in the district court without prior judicial approval.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer Landon Tucker, dismissing Christopher Dilworth’s § 1983 claims for false arrest and excessive force. The court held that Officer Tucker is entitled to qualified immunity because Dilworth failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the officer violated clearly established law. Applying a two-pronged inquiry, the court resolved the case on the second prong: whether the right in question was “clearly established” at the time of the incident. The court explained that for a right to be clearly established, the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct must be “beyond debate,” requiring the plaintiff to identify controlling authority where an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the Constitution. Dilworth failed to cite any case with analogous facts where an officer was found liable for false arrest or excessive force under comparable conditions. The court noted that abstract statements of law, such as the general proposition that excessive force violates rights, are insufficient, and the unpublished cases cited by Dilworth were distinguishable from the facts at hand, which involved a suspect fleeing an officer who believed he was trespassing on property he did not own. Because no reasonable officer could have known that his actions were unlawful under these specific circumstances, the court concluded that qualified immunity shielded Officer Tucker from liability. As a result, Dilworth’s claims were dismissed, and the judgment of the district court remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-01

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Norman Tarver’s Title VII retaliation suit against his former employer, First Student, Incorporated. The court held that reporting workplace safety violations does not constitute “protected activity” under Title VII because the statute only prohibits retaliation for opposing practices made unlawful by the law itself, such as race or gender discrimination, whereas safety violations are not covered by Title VII. The court relied on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) and precedent establishing that OSHA or safety complaints do not support a Title VII retaliation claim. Additionally, the court noted that Tarver forfeited any further review by failing to object to the magistrate judge’s report in the district court or address the specific legal reasoning for the dismissal on appeal. As a result of the affirmation, the dismissal of the case remains in effect and no relief is granted to the appellant.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.