Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-30

Docket: 5:25-CV-01349-PRW)

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition filed by Rigoberto Santillan Quiroz, an unadmitted noncitizen detained in the interior of the United States pending removal proceedings. The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which mandates detention for “applicants for admission” who are not clearly entitled to be admitted, applies only to noncitizens at the border or ports of entry and does not extend to those arrested within the country’s interior. Consequently, Quiroz is subject to the authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which permits immigration officials to release a noncitizen on bond pending removal proceedings. The court applied de novo review to interpret the statutory text and context of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The opinion established that while “applicant for admission” is a defined term encompassing unadmitted persons present in the interior, the phrase “seeking admission” requires an ongoing action to request lawful entry from abroad. Because Quiroz had already entered the country without inspection, he could not be “seeking admission,” thereby excluding him from the mandatory detention scheme of § 1225(b)(2)(A). The court rejected the Government’s argument that the statutory definition of “applicant for admission” implicitly deems all such persons to be “seeking admission,” noting that such an interpretation would render the phrase “seeking admission” superfluous and contradict the statute’s border-focused structure. Furthermore, the court found that interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) to cover interior arrests would create surplusage in § 1226(c), which provides exceptions to bond eligibility for inadmissible aliens under § 1226(a). The decision was also supported by the canon of constitutional avoidance, as the Government’s interpretation would raise serious Due Process concerns regarding the indefinite detention of millions of noncitizens without individualized bond hearings. On remand, the district court is ordered to grant Quiroz’s petition and direct the Government to either provide him with a bond hearing or release him within seven days.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-30

The Fourth Circuit denied Jamell Tremaine Robinson a certificate of appealability and dismissed his appeal from the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. The court held that an appeal in such cases is not permissible unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, which requires a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Under the standard applied, because the district court denied relief on the merits, Robinson was required to demonstrate that reasonable jurists could find the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims debatable or wrong. After independently reviewing the record, the court concluded that Robinson failed to make this requisite showing. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed without oral argument.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-30

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying relief on Ronesha Greene-McNeil’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition challenging the execution of her sentence. The court held that the petitioner failed to exhaust her administrative remedies regarding the claims raised and failed to demonstrate that exhaustion would have been futile. Applying a standard of review that found no reversible error in the district court’s factual findings and legal conclusions, the appellate court affirmed the denial of habeas relief without oral argument.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-30

Docket: 4:24-CR-00076-GKF-1)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s convictions on counts involving assault and firearm use but reversed his first-degree murder conviction due to a jury instruction error. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a tribal database screenshot under the business records exception (Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)) and found no Confrontation Clause violation, as the record was non-testimonial and contained verified information from an outside source. Regarding jury instructions, the court rejected the defendant’s claim that adding language about the duty to retreat to the perfect self-defense instruction was erroneous. However, the court agreed with the defendant that the district court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that the government must disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Citing *United States v. Maryboy*, 138 F.4th 1274 (10th Cir. 2025), the court ruled that because imperfect self-defense negates the malice element required for murder, the government bears the burden of disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt. The court determined this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the district court had already ruled there was sufficient evidence to warrant an imperfect self-defense instruction, and the jury structure precluded them from considering its effect on the murder charge. Consequently, the court remanded with instructions to vacate the first-degree murder conviction while affirming the remaining convictions.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-30

Docket: 1:19-cv-02047-SCJ

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Officer J. Grubbs regarding qualified immunity and in favor of the City of Atlanta regarding municipal liability, while also upholding the reduction of punitive damages awarded against the officer. The court held that Officer Grubbs was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable jury could find he violated Jerry Blasingame’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Applying the *Graham v. Connor* objective reasonableness standard and the six-factor test for use of force, the court determined that tasing an unarmed, fleeing suspect who posed no immediate threat of serious physical harm while standing on a steep embankment constituted deadly force under the circumstances. The court found this conduct was clearly established as unconstitutional by *Tennessee v. Garner* and the circuit’s prior decision in *Bradley v. Benton*, which held that using a taser on an elevated surface against a non-dangerous fleeing suspect is excessive. Regarding municipal liability, the court affirmed the grant of judgment as a matter of law to the City of Atlanta under *Monell*, concluding that Mr. Edwards failed to prove the City’s failure to enforce its body-worn camera policy was the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation. The court found no evidence of a pattern of similar violations or deliberate indifference, noting that the audit data did not link unrecorded calls to excessive force incidents and that the City had disciplined the officer for the camera failure. On the issue of damages, the court affirmed the district court’s reduction of the $20 million punitive damages award against Officer Grubbs to $1 million. Applying the three *BMW v. Gore* guideposts, the court found the original award constitutionally excessive due to the degree of reprehensibility (which was not overly egregious), the 1:1 ratio between compensatory and punitive damages given the high compensatory award, and the disparity with comparable civil and criminal penalties. The court declined to determine a specific alternative amount between $1 million and $20 million because the parties did not brief the issue. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of Mr. Edwards’ Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment regarding medical expenses as abandoned due to lack of briefing, and upheld the deferral of attorney’s fees pending the conclusion of the appeal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-30

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Damian Costello’s conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The court applied the plain error standard of review because Costello failed to make relevant objections regarding a prosecutor’s alleged improper vouching or the district court’s application of two sentencing enhancements before the trial court. Under this stringent standard, the court found no reversible error in the record. Consequently, the conviction and sentence stand without oral argument.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

A building owned by 3371 Reading burned down during renovations. The insurer, Ohio Casualty, denied the claim because the insured had not erected a fence around the construction site as required by the policy’s Protective Devices Endorsement. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurers on all claims, including breach of contract, bad faith, fraudulent inducement, and a violation of the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

The court applied Ohio law to interpret the insurance policy, noting that provisions must be construed in favor of the insured if ambiguous but applied as written if unambiguous. The court found that while the policy required a fence that completely surrounds the jobsite, the physical layout of the property made compliance impossible because the building shared a wall with a neighbor. The court held that the fencing provision was illusory and unenforceable under Ohio law because performance was impossible. The court rejected the dissent’s argument that a three-sided fence would suffice, stating the policy required a complete enclosure. The court also affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of bad faith and fraud claims, noting that negligence in drafting the policy does not constitute fraud and that the ODTPA does not apply to consumer fraud claims in this context.

We are simply assuming that there is and then holding that it is unenforceable because performance was impossible.

3371 Reading, LLC v. Liberty Mut. Grp., Inc., No. 25-3439, at 6 (6th Cir. 2026)

The doctrine of impossibility of performance applies only where an interceding, unforeseen event renders performance impossible.

Paul G. Readler

Insurers in the Sixth Circuit must now recognize that fencing requirements in insurance policies may be unenforceable if the physical layout of the property makes complete enclosure impossible, even if the policy language appears clear.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

Docket: 2:25-CV-00211-JNP)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Lynda Kozlowicz-Gardner’s suit against Ute Tribal Council Members for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court applied a de novo standard of review and held that sovereign immunity bars the action because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the tribe or its officials waived immunity or that an exception, such as the *Ex Parte Young* doctrine, applies. Additionally, the court determined that neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction exists; the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act does not provide a private cause of action for the alleged misuse of funds, and Native American tribes are not citizens of any state for diversity purposes. As a practical consequence, the appeal is dismissed with no further relief granted to the appellant, leaving the district court’s dismissal order in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing all of Howell’s claims except for a breach of contract claim remanded to state court. The court held that appellate review of the magistrate judge’s recommendation was foreclosed because, although Howell filed timely objections, they failed to specifically address the particularized legal recommendations made by the magistrate judge. Under Fourth Circuit precedent, including *Martin v. Duffy* and *Thomas v. Arn*, specific objections are required to preserve issues for appeal when parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance; because Howell’s objections did not reasonably alert the district court to the true grounds for his objection, he waived appellate review of the substance of the recommendation. Consequently, the judgment is affirmed without oral argument, and all pending motions, including a motion to take judicial notice, are denied.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

Docket: 3:23-cr-00153-WWB-LLL-1

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the 51-month sentence imposed on Nicole Danielle Devilbiss for conspiracy to create and distribute animal crush videos in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 48(a)(2) & (3). The court held that the district court did not commit procedural error by applying a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for Devilbiss’s role as an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants, nor did it err in denying her a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1. The court applied clear error review to the district court’s factual findings regarding Devilbiss’s leadership status, concluding that her exercise of authority to remove members, moderate content, and control access to the Telegram group constituted sufficient “control and authority exercised over others” under the relevant sentencing factors, even if she was not the sole leader. Regarding substantive reasonableness, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and found the sentence reasonable because it fell within the correctly calculated advisory guidelines range. The court rejected Devilbiss’s arguments that the district court improperly relied on a public petition expressing public outrage or failed to give sufficient weight to her mitigating circumstances, noting that the district court explicitly stated the petition would not be the basis for its decision and that sentencing judges have discretion to weigh factors differently based on the nature and circumstances of the offense. Consequently, Devilbiss’s conviction and sentence remain in effect, and she must serve the 51-month term of imprisonment.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.