Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

Docket: 8:26-cv-00451-MRA-

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of David Allen Benson’s motion for a preliminary injunction in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking to enjoin pending state criminal proceedings against him. The court held that under the *Younger* abstention doctrine, the district court was required to refrain from interfering with active state criminal cases and determined that Benson failed to demonstrate that any recognized exception to this doctrine applied. Specifically, the court rejected Benson’s allegations of judicial bias as unsupported by the record, citing *Liteky v. United States* for the principle that judicial rulings alone rarely support such claims. The practical consequence is that the injunction request remains denied, allowing the state criminal proceedings to continue without federal interference.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

The Ninth Circuit denied Xiang Zhang Cao’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal. The court held that substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding, noting that under the REAL ID Act, immigration judges may rely on material falsehoods to make such findings even if those falsehoods are not central to the claim for relief. Additionally, the court applied the standard requiring an applicant who committed immigration fraud to present evidence that overrides their intentional deception to the point where the record compels disregarding the fraud; because Cao admitted to lying on his visa application and the agency found he committed fraud, the court concluded there was substantial evidence to support the determination that he was not credible and did not show entitlement to relief. Consequently, the petition is denied and the agency’s order denying relief from removal stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

Docket: 3:23-cr-00291-WHO-1

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 81-month sentence imposed on Lamar Nolan Ryan for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court reviewed the district court’s denial of Ryan’s request for a continuance to obtain a mental health evaluation under an abuse of discretion standard. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the evaluation was unnecessary to assess Ryan’s rehabilitative efforts, which the lower court had already described favorably in imposing a sentence within the lowered Guidelines range rather than varying upward as requested by the government. Consequently, the appellate court found no evidence that a continuance would have served a useful purpose or that the denial prejudiced Ryan, leaving the district court’s judgment and sentence in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Lorin Kal Buckner’s conviction on two counts of conspiracy to commit fraud and his sentence of 120 months imprisonment. The court held that Buckner’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and voluntary under *Faretta v. California*, noting that the district court’s colloquy satisfied the required model inquiry regarding the dangers of self-representation, the gravity of charges, and Buckner’s familiarity with the law. The court rejected Buckner’s argument that his use of “sovereign citizen” legal theories constituted a substantial change in circumstances requiring a new waiver assessment, stating that no degree of legal knowledge is required to waive counsel and that such fringe beliefs do not prove a defendant lacks understanding of the proceedings. Regarding competency, the court applied the standard under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) and found no “reasonable cause” to doubt Buckner’s capacity to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings. Citing *United States v. Coleman*, the court ruled that idiosyncratic beliefs and unconventional legal arguments, even those characteristic of tax protesters or sovereign citizens, do not alone establish mental incapacity where the defendant demonstrates a rational understanding of the criminal process through other conduct, such as filing valid procedural motions and making a lucid closing argument. On sentencing, the court applied plain-error review to Buckner’s unpreserved challenges. It found no error in the district court’s failure to verify Buckner’s review of the presentence report under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, as Buckner could not show prejudice given the meritless nature of his objections to sentencing enhancements. The court also affirmed the application of a two-level enhancement for fraudulent action during a bankruptcy proceeding under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B), reasoning that fraud persists through the proceeding, and upheld the leadership role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) based on testimony regarding Buckner’s control over employees. Finally, the court dismissed Buckner’s challenge to his summary criminal contempt conviction for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B) requires a notice of appeal to specifically designate the contempt order, which Buckner failed to do.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

The Sixth Circuit denied Luis Miguel Nava-Hernandez’s petition for review seeking cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). To qualify for this relief, an applicant must demonstrate that their removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative, defined as hardship significantly different from or greater than what a deported alien’s family member would ordinarily experience. The court applied the substantial evidence standard of review, which requires affirming the Board of Immigration Appeals’ factual findings unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. Because the court lacks jurisdiction to reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for the agency’s on factual matters, it accepted the immigration judge’s finding that Nava-Hernandez’s mother could continue receiving medical care and support from her other children without his financial assistance. The court further noted that Nava-Hernandez failed to provide documentary evidence corroborating his claimed monthly contributions or a direct link between his deportation and a worsening of his mother’s health, while also observing that he likely retains the ability to send money from Mexico and has housing options there. Consequently, the court found substantial evidence supporting the agency’s conclusion that the petitioner did not meet the statutory hardship requirement and affirmed the order of removal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, holding that Officer Felipe Gallegos is entitled to qualified immunity for the deaths of Dennis Tuttle and Rhogena Nicholas. The court applied the two-step qualified immunity analysis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: first determining whether a constitutional right was violated, and second, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the incident. The court concluded that Gallegos did not violate the Fourth Amendment because his use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the *Graham v. Connor* standard, which requires assessing whether an officer’s actions were reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the benefit of hindsight. The court emphasized that in tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving situations involving an active gunfight where multiple officers had been shot, officers must make split-second judgments about threats. Regarding Nicholas, the court found that even viewing facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, a reasonable officer would have perceived her as posing a threat of serious physical harm given her proximity to a wounded officer and her movement away from the couch. Regarding Tuttle, the court held that although a factual dispute existed regarding whether his injuries incapacitated him, Gallegos could not have known this because Tuttle’s back was turned and he continued to move, meaning a reasonable officer would still perceive a threat. The court further rejected plaintiffs’ arguments based on video evidence and expert testimony, ruling that these materials blatantly contradicted the plaintiffs’ version of events or did not establish material facts sufficient to defeat summary judgment under *Scott v. Harris*. As a practical consequence, the Fifth Circuit’s reversal mandates that the case be remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Officer Gallegos on the excessive force claims, effectively granting him immunity from liability for damages.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez’s second motion for compassionate release. The court limited its review to the issues raised in the appellant’s informal brief, applying an abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the defendant established an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that the necessary basis was not met, the court affirmed the denial without oral argument. Consequently, the district court’s order denying release remains in effect, and the appellant’s request for sentence modification is denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

The Fourth Circuit dismissed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court. The court held that while an appellate waiver does not bar a colorable challenge to the validity of a guilty plea, Makwana’s plea was valid because it was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an adequate factual basis following a thorough Rule 11 colloquy conducted before a magistrate judge; consequently, no plain error occurred. Regarding the appeal waiver itself, the court applied de novo review and found it enforceable under the totality of the circumstances, noting that Makwana knowingly and voluntarily agreed to waive his right to appeal with limited exceptions not applicable here. Relying on *Anders v. California*, the court reviewed the entire record, found no meritorious grounds for appeal outside the waiver’s scope, and granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal as to all issues covered by the waiver while affirming the conviction and sentence. The practical consequence is that Makwana’s conviction and two-year sentence stand, though counsel was required to inform him in writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court for further review.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

The Fourth Circuit dismissed in part and affirmed in part John Maurice Anderson’s criminal conviction and sentence. The court held that Anderson’s appellate waiver, contained within a written plea agreement for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine, was valid and enforceable because the district court complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, ensuring the plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. Applying de novo review to the waiver’s validity and plain error review to the plea’s acceptance, the court determined that Anderson knowingly waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence on any ground except ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or future changes in the law. Consequently, the court concluded that challenges regarding the reasonableness of the sentence and the validity of the plea fell squarely within the waiver’s scope. In accordance with *Anders v. California*, the court reviewed the entire record for any potentially meritorious issues outside the waiver’s scope, found none, and granted the Government’s motion to dismiss those claims while affirming the remainder of the judgment. The practical consequence is that Anderson’s 130-month imprisonment and five years of supervised release stand, though counsel must inform him in writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court for further review.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

The seventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Clayton Creason’s claims under the Indiana Wage Payment Statute and his request for class certification. The court held that Elanco US Inc.’s “vacation buy” program did not constitute an illegal assignment of wages requiring a written rescission notice, as the arrangement involved a voluntary salary reduction in exchange for additional paid leave rather than a deduction from earned wages or a transfer of funds to a third party. Furthermore, the court ruled that Indiana law does not mandate payment for unused vacation time at the end of employment unless the employer has explicitly promised to do so; because Elanco’s policy required the use of pandemic-era rollover hours before termination and did not promise cash payout for unused time, no compensation was owed. Regarding jurisdiction, the court addressed whether the case should have been remanded to state court under the Class Action Fairness Act’s “local controversy” exception (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)), which generally requires federal courts to decline jurisdiction when more than two-thirds of proposed class members are citizens of the state where the action was filed and the principal defendant is a citizen of that state. Although the court acknowledged that Creason’s putative class likely met these criteria, it held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the motion to remand because Creason failed to raise the issue for 171 days after receiving evidence supporting it, despite litigation having already progressed significantly. The court noted that while there is no strict 30-day deadline for seeking remand under § 1453, a “reasonable time” standard applies, and Creason’s delay was unreasonable given the substantial steps taken in federal court. On the procedural issue of class certification, the court observed that the district judge incorrectly dismissed the motion as moot after ruling against the plaintiff on the merits; under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is not moot simply because the class loses. However, the appellate court declined to order remand for certification, reasoning that Creason would be an inadequate representative for a class given his request to certify a class only after losing on the merits and seeking to take other workers “down in flames” with him. The practical consequence is that the judgment dismissing the individual claims stands, and no class action proceeds against Elanco on these grounds.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.