This is a link post.
{Epistemic Status: Repeating critiques from David Thorstad's excellent papers (link, link) and blog, with some additions of my own. The list is not intended to be representative and/or comprehensive for either critiques or rebuttals. Unattributed graphs are my own and more likely to contain errors.}
I am someone generally sympathetic to philosophical longtermism and total utilitarianism, but like many effective altruists, I have often been skeptical about the relative value of actual longtermism-inspired interventions. Unfortunately, though, for a long time I was unable to express any specific, legible critiques of longtermism other than a semi-incredulous stare. Luckily, this condition has changed in the last several months since I started reading David Thorstad's excellent blog (and papers) critiquing longtermism.[1] His points cover a wide range of issues, but in this post, I would like to focus on a couple of crucial and plausibly incorrect modeling assumptions [...]
---
Outline:
(01:14) Model assumptions noted by Thorstad
(01:18) 1. Baseline risk (blog post)
(03:54) 2. Future Population (blog post)
(06:21) Other model assumptions/considerations I think are important
(06:27) 1. Intervention decay
(08:28) 2. Suffering risks (S-risks)
(11:06) Counter-arguments for the value of existential risk reduction
(11:11) 1. The ‘time of perils hypothesis’ versus ‘baseline risk’ and ‘intervention decay’
(14:06) 2. Hedonic lotteries
(15:22) Final thoughts
The original text contained 6 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.
The original text contained 11 images which were described by AI.
---