Last time we spoke about Hitler’s Orders vs Reality: Chaos on the Eastern Front. In the summer of 1941, the Wehrmacht aimed to capture Moscow, bolstered by early victories under General Fedor von Bock. However, the Red Army, under Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, mounted a fierce defense, demonstrating unexpected resilience despite heavy losses. The Germans encircled Smolensk, celebrating its capture on July 16, yet their supply lines grew perilously thin. As battles intensified, Soviet forces reorganized, relocating factories to ramp up production of tanks and aircraft. In August, the Germans found their advance stymied by a revitalized Soviet spirit, which mobilized millions to replenish its ranks, even amid staggering losses. The Uman encirclement concluded, forcing the Soviets into a desperate fight, but German victories came at an alarming cost. Encountering manpower shortages, the Wehrmacht faced a critical juncture as the harsh realities of war set in. 

This episode is “We Have Underestimated the Russian Colossus”

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

As the fierce battles of Smolensk and Uman reached their climactic moments, the Wehrmachtwas gearing up for a critical third offensive movement. The Panzers of Army Group Center, which had previously borne the brunt of the assault against the Soviet Union, were now poised to transition into a supporting role. Their mission was no longer directly targeting the heart of Soviet defenses but instead to bolster the ongoing attacks on Leningrad in the north, renowned for its strategic importance as a major port city and Kyiv in the south, the capital of Ukraine and a vital economic center. Before embarking on their new assignments, the Panzers were tasked with securing the flanks of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's forces. This maneuver was essential to ensure the stability of their front lines as they prepared to assist their comrades engaged in combat in both the northern and southern sectors.

Last week, we concluded our discussion with a deep dive into the strategic plans for the impending renewal of the offensive, focusing particularly on the precarious situation surrounding Smolensk. At that juncture, Soviet General Semyon Timoshenko was desperately trying to batter his way back into the city, a vital stronghold that had seen fierce fighting. This week, we will explore how this dramatic saga unfolds during the second week of August, specifically from the eighth to the sixteenth. As the fighting intensified, the other two army groups were left anxiously awaiting the support of the panzer divisions led by Generals Hermann Hoth and Heinz Guderian. These armored units were crucial to the German strategy, their mobility and firepower essential for breaking through Soviet defenses. In our previous discussion, we delved into the manpower reserves of both the Axis and Soviet forces, examining how these reserves were being translated into replacements on the battlefield. This week, however, we'll shift our focus slightly to investigate the status of military aid being dispatched from the United States and the United Kingdom, a critical yet often misunderstood aspect of the War in the East. To set the stage for this discussion, let’s begin with a brief overview of how military and economic assistance was organized and handled in America, an essential factor influencing the overall dynamics of the conflict.

The 1930s began with the Great Depression and experienced a minor recession in 1937-1938. In response to the aftermath of World War I and ongoing war debts, the U.S. Congress enacted several Neutrality Acts aimed at maintaining non-interventionism by prohibiting Americans from selling arms to warring nations. However, as the situation escalated in Europe and Asia, President Roosevelt sought to amend these acts to allow cash sales of military goods to Britain and France, leading to the Neutrality Act of 1939, which marked a shift from isolationism toward interventionism. After the Fall of France in June 1940, the British Commonwealth became the primary force against Axis powers, but Britain faced dwindling resources. In response, Roosevelt proposed the Lend-Lease program, allowing the U.S. to provide military support to Allied nations. Public opinion began to shift favorably towards this aid as Americans recognized the need to support Britain against Nazi Germany, despite initial isolationist sentiments.

The United States had specific legal limitations regarding the aid it could provide, which the United Kingdom did not face during World War II. These limitations are often referred to as Lend-Lease, but it’s important to understand that Lend-Lease was not so much about what aid could be delivered, but rather how it should be funded. This program evolved from the Neutrality Act, which had initially imposed an arms embargo on the nations engaged in conflict. The Neutrality Act was eventually amended to permit military equipment purchases on what was known as a cash and carry basis, an essential framework that allowed belligerent nations to acquire supplies as long as they could pay for them upfront. Cash and Carry was shorthand to mean that purchases had to be made with gold or US dollars and the goods had to be carried on non-American ships with no insurance from the US. This was to limit exposure of the American maritime industry to risk of serious loss by naval action. By 1941, the United Kingdom desperately needed to continue acquiring military equipment and economic supplies to sustain its war effort against Nazi Germany, but its gold reserves were dwindling alarmingly.

The Lend-Lease bill was passed in March 1941, permitting Roosevelt to supply defense materials to any nation deemed vital to U.S. security. Over time, significant aid was extended to the Soviet Union, China, and others, with a total expenditure of about 51 billion. In May of that year, the Act was further modified, allowing the transfer or sale of military equipment to certain governments at the President’s discretion. Crucially, this amendment meant that payment was not necessarily required for the goods transferred, which was a lifeline for the British war machine. Notably, the Soviet Union was not initially included under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act. As a result, they could still place orders for equipment, but these orders had to be paid for in gold or U.S. dollars. Thus, during June and early July, the Soviets began placing massive orders with American industrial suppliers. The first of these orders alone totaled nearly $1.8 billion, an enormous sum at the time. The requests included thousands of aircraft, artillery pieces, trucks, and additional military supplies. Moreover, they sought essential raw materials such as rubber, steel, aluminum, and oil, resources critical for sustaining their wartime industry.

As the desperate situation on the Eastern Front deepened, Joseph Stalin took the extraordinary step of reaching out to American Envoy Harry Hopkins with a bold request: he asked that President Franklin D. Roosevelt consider sending American troops to fight against Hitler's forces. Stalin proposed that these American soldiers could be deployed anywhere along the Eastern Front, operating under the command of American leaders, a significant step that highlighted the urgency of the Soviet plight. This offer mirrored a similar one Stalin had made to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill around the same time, illustrating the level of desperation and anxiety the Soviet dictator felt as he witnessed the Red Army retreat from a series of catastrophic defeats throughout June and July. However, both of these offers were ultimately declined by the democratic leaders of the West, who were cautious about directly engaging in the Eastern Front conflict.

Even as United States forces in Europe and the Pacific reached full operational strength during the critical years of 1943 and 1944, the Lend-Lease program continued to play a vital role in the Allied war effort. By this time, most remaining Allies, particularly those in Europe, had become largely self-sufficient in frontline military equipment such as tanks and fighter aircraft, although arms shipments persisted. However, Lend-Lease logistical supplies, including essential motor vehicles and railroad equipment, remained indispensable for sustaining military operations. World War II marked the first major conflict where entire formations of troops were routinely motorized. Soldiers were not only supported with vehicles specifically designed for combat, but also with a diverse array of transportation and logistical vehicles, enabling rapid movement and supply distribution across vast distances. Despite this, the warring powers significantly reduced the production of non-lethal materials to concentrate on munitions, leading to severe shortages of products necessary for industrial and logistical purposes, particularly unarmored vehicles. Consequently, the Allies became almost entirely dependent on American industrial production for unarmored vehicles, including those specially designed for military purposes.

A prime example of this reliance is found in the Soviet Union, which was heavily dependent on rail transportation. Beginning in the latter half of the 1920s, and accelerating through the 1930s, numerous foreign industrial giants, including Ford, were commissioned to establish modern dual-purpose factories in the USSR, 16 of which were built within just one week, starting on May 31, 1929. However, with the onset of war, these factories transitioned from producing civilian goods to manufacturing military equipment, resulting in a dramatic decline in locomotive production. During the war, only 446 locomotives were produced, with merely 92 built between 1942 and 1945. Remarkably, about 92.7% of the Soviet Union's wartime procurement of railroad equipment came from Lend-Lease, providing a crucial 1,911 locomotives and 11,225 railcars.

Additionally, trucks were essential to the Soviet war effort. By 1945, nearly one-third of the trucks operating within the Red Army were American-built. Vehicles such as the Dodge 3/4-ton and Studebaker 2.5-ton trucks emerged as some of the best in their category on either side of the Eastern Front. Beyond vehicles, American shipments of telephone cable, aluminum, canned rations, and clothing were equally critical for the Soviet military's logistics and supply chain. Lend-Lease also delivered significant quantities of weapons and ammunition to support the war effort. The Soviet Air Force received approximately 18,200 aircraft through this program, which accounted for nearly 30% of the total Soviet fighter and bomber production during the conflict. While most tank units were equipped with Soviet-built models, around 7,000 tanks acquired through Lend-Lease (in addition to more than 5,000 British tanks) were utilized by the Red Army, making up about 8% of the wartime tank production.

A particularly crucial aspect of the Lend-Lease program was the provision of food supplies. The invasion of the Soviet Union had devastating consequences for its agricultural foundation; during the initial Axis offensive from 1941 to 1942, the total area under cultivation in the USSR plummeted by 41.9%, while the number of collective and state farms decreased by 40%. The Soviets suffered a catastrophic loss of draft and farm animals, as many could not be relocated before their territories were captured. In those regions occupied by Axis forces, the USSR lost an estimated 7 million out of 11.6 million horses, 17 million out of 31 million cows, 20 million of 23.6 million pigs, and 27 million out of 43 million sheep and goats. Additionally, thousands of essential agricultural machines, including tractors and threshers, were either destroyed or seized. The war also took a heavy toll on the agricultural workforce; between 1941 and 1945, 19.5 million working-age men were compelled to leave their farms to serve in the military or work in industry. This agricultural crisis was especially pronounced during Soviet offensives, as liberated areas had been left in ruins, with millions of displaced individuals requiring sustenance. Consequently, Lend-Lease emerged as a lifeline, providing a substantial quantity of foodstuffs and agricultural products that were critical to supporting both the military and the civilian population in the USSR.

Nikita Khrushchev, having served as a military commissar and intermediary between Stalin and his generals during the war, addressed directly the significance of Lend-lease aid in his memoirs: “I would like to express my candid opinion about Stalin's views on whether the Red Army and the Soviet Union could have coped with Nazi Germany and survived the war without aid from the United States and Britain. First, I would like to tell about some remarks Stalin made and repeated several times when we were "discussing freely" among ourselves. He stated bluntly that if the United States had not helped us, we would not have won the war. If we had had to fight Nazi Germany one on one, we could not have stood up against Germany's pressure, and we would have lost the war. No one ever discussed this subject officially, and I don't think Stalin left any written evidence of his opinion, but I will state here that several times in conversations with me he noted that these were the actual circumstances. He never made a special point of holding a conversation on the subject, but when we were engaged in some kind of relaxed conversation, going over international questions of the past and present, and when we would return to the subject of the path we had traveled during the war, that is what he said. When I listened to his remarks, I was fully in agreement with him, and today I am even more so”.

Now turning back to the war in the east. In Ukraine, Army Group South was preparing for its offensive into the pivotal bend of the Dnieper River, a strategic location crucial for controlling the region. However, the logistics situation was beginning to appear increasingly grim. Many of Field Marshal Erich von Rundstedt’s divisions at the forefront were reporting alarmingly low ammunition stocks, with some units dwindling to just 15% of their necessary supplies. The strain was starting to fray discipline within the ranks, as small units found themselves at odds over the limited supplies and who should be prioritized for resupply. By the end of July, General Hermann Kleist’s war diary painted a bleak picture of the supply situation. His quartermaster reported with frustration that in the event of poor weather, the supply convoys struggled to move, even at reduced speeds, often consuming as much fuel as they were able to deliver to the Panzer units. Of the weather and condition of the roads, an Italian journalist said in late summer 1941: “The road, if this species of cattle-track may be so described, is covered with a thick layer of dust, which with every breath of wind rises in dense red clouds. But in places, where the clayey soil has failed to absorb the rain-water, where a stream crosses the track, the sticky, tenacious mud grips the wheels of the lorries and the tracks of the tanks, which sink slowly into the Buna as into quicksand” Rail deliveries were described as inadequate at best, exacerbating the supply crisis. After another week of waiting for necessary provisions, the situation had not improved. The casualty toll was enormous and severely impacting the tactical efficiency of Army Group South. Of the nearly 200,000 losses sustained by the Wehrmacht by early August, more than 63,000 came from Rundstedt’s forces alone. To address this devastating loss, the OKH had dispatched a mere 10,000 reinforcements, a shortage of 50,000 men that was an absurd handicap for an already overextended Army Group. In the first week of July, Halder had confidently boasted about the impending Soviet defeat, celebrating the successes of the Heer. Yet, by mid-August, he had adopted an entirely different tone. The vast expanses of the Soviet Union, combined with its seemingly limitless reserves of manpower and political will, had effectively crushed any hopes of a swift and easy victory for the Germans. The realization of the true scale of the Soviet resistance began to dawn on the German command, marking a pivotal shift in the course of the war. As noted in Halder’s diary entry for August 11th: “Regarding the general situation, it stands out more and more clearly that we underestimated the Russian colossus, which prepared itself consciously for war with the complete unscrupulousness that is typical of totalitarian states [sic]. This statement refers just as much to organizational as to economic strengths, to traffic management, above all to pure military potential. At the start of the war we reckoned with 200 enemy divisions. Now we already count 360. These divisions are not armed and equipped in our sense, and tactically they are inadequately led in many ways. But they are there and when we destroy a dozen of them, then the Russians put another dozen in their place. The time factor favours them, as they are near to their own centres of power, while we are always moving further away from ours. And so our troops, sprawled over an immense front line, without any depth, are subject to the incessant attacks of the enemy. These are sometimes successful, because in these enormous spaces far too many gaps must be left open”

The dispersal of German units across a vast front line significantly weakened the army's overall strength and exposed a critical shortage of resources. This fragmentation undermined every attempt at effective concentration, which was essential for launching successful offensives. The realization of this dire situation had a sobering impact on General Franz Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, who candidly articulated the challenges facing the German military. He understood that the army's ability to wage war effectively was being severely compromised, as logistics and supplies were stretched thin, making it increasingly difficult to coordinate movements and sustain their operations in the face of a resilient Soviet resistance. “What we are now doing is the last desperate attempt to avoid positional warfare. The High Command is very limited in its means. The army groups are separated by natural boundaries (marshes). Our last reserves have been committed. Any new grouping now is a movement on the baseline within the army groups. This takes time and consumes the power of men and machines.”

On August 8, Army Group South had successfully advanced to the Dnieper River, just south of Kyiv, a city of great strategic importance in Ukraine. However, the situation took a dramatic turn when the Southwestern Front managed to exploit a weakness in the lines between Kleist’s Panzer Group and the 4th Infantry Corps. The limited reserves within Army Group South triggered a sense of panic as elements of the Soviet 26th Army launched a bold counteroffensive, advancing an astonishing sixty kilometers towards the town of Bohuslav. As the situation grew increasingly desperate, construction battalions, typically engaged in building infrastructure, were hastily sent into battle to help stem the tide of the advancing Soviet forces. To the north of Kyiv, in Korosten, the Red Army was also in a precarious position, retreating but not being encircled and annihilated like their comrades had been during the disastrous encirclement at Uman. The 5th Army had successfully fulfilled its mission of delaying the German advance, buying crucial time for the Red Army to regroup. It became increasingly evident that Army Group South lacked the resources necessary to encircle Kyiv independently. This shortfall cast a shadow over their operational capabilities and highlighted the challenges they faced in maintaining control over occupied territories in the face of mounting Soviet resistance.

At the far southern flank of Army Group South, the advance was proceeding at a much slower pace than anticipated. The Red Army was stiffening its resistance, determined to hold the line against the German onslaught. Contributing to the agonizingly slow progress were the exhaustion and fatigue felt by the troops, compounded by increasingly poor supply lines. Soldiers found themselves struggling not only against the enemy but also against the relentless toll of war. One soldier serving in the 11th Army documented his thoughts on the drawn-out advance in his memoirs, capturing the grim realities faced by his fellow troops. His reflections offer a poignant glimpse into the mindset of those fighting on the front lines, illustrating both their physical hardships and the psychological strain that accompanied the prolonged conflict. “Our lines of supply became more strained with each day’s advance, and as our momentum slowed to a crawl we continued to experience everincreasing sporadic shelling...In this sector we found ourselves facing an enemy who held superiority in heavy weapons, and our own artillery units were now compelled to ration ammunition because of our strained supply lines. The depth of our penetration into the Soviet Union began to take its toll”. 

By late July 1941, the degree of German overextension on the southern flank had prompted urgent calls for independent Romanian action against Odessa. Unlike the Finns, who were hesitant, the Romanian Head of State and self-appointed field commander, General Ion Antonescu, readily responded to the call for a renewed offensive. He launched a series of successive, but ultimately failed, assaults in an effort to capture the city by force. Despite his determination, the situation in Odessa became increasingly dire for the Romanian forces. The Southern Front's 9th Independent Army found itself effectively boxed into the confines of the city, a critical port on the Black Sea. To capture this strategic location, several separate German battalions were deployed alongside the 72nd Infantry Division to support the Romanian 4th Army in its assault. However, the Romanian forces were poorly equipped for an urban battle, yet they were tasked with the daunting challenge of breaching the city’s defenses. The fighting for Odessa was ferocious and quickly devolved into brutal hand-to-hand combat and artillery duels, transforming the city into a battlefield of devastation. What started as an assault turned into a prolonged siege, resembling a meat grinder that inflicted heavy casualties on both sides. The battle raged on for a staggering 73 days, a testament to the tenacity of the defenders and the determination of the attackers. In this grueling conflict, the Romanian Army suffered significant losses, with around 90,000 soldiers falling in the fight for Odessa. The Red Army, for its part, would ultimately report approximately 60,000 casualties among its ranks during the fierce engagements in the city in 1941.

The city was eventually evacuated by the Soviets and subsequently awarded the distinguished title of "Hero City" of the Soviet Union for its courageous defense. Antonescu attempted to claim some semblance of victory; however, the staggering losses incurred during the campaign were undeniable. The Romanian forces suffered catastrophic casualties, with approximately 80% of the 12 divisions involved experiencing heavy losses, amounting to around 98,000 casualties in less than two months of brutal fighting. Though Antonescu was willing to accept such high casualties and insisted on continuing his campaign, losses of this magnitude severely undermined the effectiveness of his military forces. Ultimately, the entire Romanian army was forced to reorganize and undergo further training to address the devastating impact of the conflict. In the grander strategic picture, while Hitler faced setbacks in Finland due to the growing threats of war on the Eastern Front, he effectively lost Romania as a frontline ally, further complicating his military objectives in the region. 

The Stavka, the Soviet high command, understood that it was only a matter of time before Army Group North resumed its offensive operations toward Leningrad. In response, they hoped to catch the Germans off guard by launching a counter-offensive aimed at the 16th Army, commanded by Colonel General Busch. General Nikolai Vatutin, riding high on the prestige gained from his successful attack at Soltsy, was entrusted with the responsibility for planning this more extensive counter-offensive. He was given essentially complete freedom and granted access to the entire resources of the Northwestern Front. However, his initial draft plan was met with immediate rejection from both Joseph Stalin and General Aleksandr Shaposhnikov. They deemed it far too ambitious for their strategic tastes. Vatutin was ordered to scale back his plans significantly, facing serious restrictions on aspects such as the speed of his advance. This caution was likely wise, rooted in a newly acquired understanding of Wehrmacht tactics. The Stavka had legitimate reasons to fear that Vatutin's forces might overreach, risking encirclement and annihilation, a fate that had befallen many earlier in the war. In previous campaigns, the Stavka had been overly ambitious, leading to the loss of hundreds of thousands of men due to reckless assaults characterized by inadequate reconnaissance and insufficient preparation. Now, they were striving to temper the aggressive inclinations of their commanders, a prudent shift given the challenging circumstances faced by the Red Army by mid-August. Although they could mobilize replacements for the lost soldiers, the Soviet Union was rapidly running out of space to absorb further losses. They urgently needed to secure victories, and soon. Vatutin was seen as the right leader for this critical task, believing he had devised a competent strategy to reclaim lost territory and begin reversing Army Group North’s fortunes. Unfortunately for him, on August 10, he was preempted by the onset of a planned German offensive, which would significantly complicate his ambitions.

The initial plan was for the 48th Army to launch an attack at Utogorsh, situated west of Lake Ilmen, while the 11th, 34th, and 27th Armies positioned themselves south of the lake to launch a broad offensive aimed at recapturing the line at Soltsy. The objective was to encircle and cut off the 10th Infantry Corps, commanded by General of Artillery Hansen, with the intention of pushing back the remainder of the 16th Army. This counter-offensive was set to begin on August 12. However, when the Germans initiated their planned offensive on August 10, it disrupted the preparations of both the 48th and 11th Armies. Consequently, the Soviet response became disjointed, with some units engaged in defensive actions while others were still preparing for the assault. Despite these challenges, Vatutin made the bold decision to send the remaining units forward as originally planned on the morning of August 12. Initially, this choice appeared prescient, as the 10th Infantry Corps, moving northeast, was inadvertently advancing deeper into the expected encirclement. Remarkably, the 34th Army managed to push all the way to the Staraia Novgorod-Dno rail line in less than two days of intense fighting. This level of success was almost unexpected, marking a gain of over forty kilometers that outpaced the movements of other Red Army forces in the area. Within hours of reaching the rail line, the 34th Army successfully cut off the 10th Infantry Corps, making it seem as though Vatutin had orchestrated another triumph akin to his success at Soltsy.

However, this situation mirrored previous experiences in more ways than one. Upon learning of the encirclement, Army Group North reacted with remarkable speed and efficiency. Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb redirected the 3rd Motorized Division and the SS-Totenkopf Division to relieve the isolated 10th Infantry Corps, placing General Erich von Manstein in charge of the operation and providing him with resources from the 8th Air Corps for the counterattack. He was to initiate the assault immediately, but it took several days to redeploy these forces from the Luga-Leningrad axis to the southern area near Lake Ilmen. By the third week of August, Manstein would finally be in position to aid the encircled 10th Infantry Corps. For the time being, however, those troops were essentially on their own. Despite being well-equipped, the 10th Infantry Corps managed to fend off the weakening assault from Vatutin’s forces. Vatutin found himself in a similar position to that at Soltsy: he had a large enemy unit cut off, numerical superiority, and the initiative. Yet, the challenging terrain proved indifferent to the allegiance of the armies traversing it. The harsh landscape was as unforgiving to Soviet trucks and tanks as it was to German ones. The offensive became literally bogged down in the swampy, roadless terrain, complicating logistics and operations. Communication faltered, preventing Vatutin from effectively coordinating his forces. Command and control broke down at the small unit level, a recurring issue that had plagued the Red Army since the earliest hours of the war.

Late in the first week of August, General Heinz Guderian was relieved of his command at Yelna, a transition carried out by the 20th Infantry Corps. Seizing this opportunity, Guderian swiftly moved south across the Sozh River on August 8, launching a direct assault into the 13th Army’s defenses, which were now part of the newly formed Soviet Central Front. His objective was to capture Gomel, thereby securing the flank of Army Group Center to the north of the Pripyat Marshes. Guderian recognized this as another chance to demonstrate his capacity for independent command. Within days, he successfully pushed aside the 13th Army and began to roll up the right flank of the 21st Army. By August 12, Colonel General Maximilian Weichs and his 2nd Army joined Guderian in the push for Gomel. The collaboration between their forces resulted in several small tactical encirclement battles, effectively destroying the Soviet units in their path. By the end of the week, the 13th Army was rendered combat ineffective, having lost nearly half its units to the relentless assaults by Guderian and Weichs. Despite their successes, the pair would continue their advance towards Gomel throughout the week, not reaching the city until later in August. The Stavka, recognizing the impending threat, could see that the Central Front was in danger of being encircled and potentially destroyed. This scenario would inevitably open the path to Kyiv from the north. In an effort to rectify the situation, on August 14, Soviet high command deployed General Aleksei Krieger’s 3rd Army and Major General Mikhail Petrov’s 50th Army to reinforce this critical front. Together, they formed the Bryansk Front under the command of Lieutenant General Andrei Eremenko. Eremenko was tasked with defending the approaches to Kyiv from the north and securing the line between the Southwestern and Western Fronts, aiming to stabilize the deteriorating situation and prevent a complete collapse on the Soviet side.

As Guderian and Weichs advanced through the Central Front’s defenses, Soviet Generals Georgy Zhukov and Vasily Timoshenko were still hammering away at the German positions around Yelna. Throughout the first week of August, Zhukov requested and received substantial resources from the Stavka reserve for his planned assault. While the Red Army continued to struggle with the challenges of bringing modern equipment and well-organized units to the front, Zhukov was determined to maximize the best that the Stavka could spare. As he built up his forces, he managed to secure two tank divisions, the 102nd and 105th, along with two motorized divisions and an independent company of T-34 tanks. This allowed him to assemble a formidable core of about three hundred tanks for his offensive. Zhukov made the tactical decision to attack from a single direction, a choice that drew criticism from some historians who felt he should have orchestrated a more ambitious plan, perhaps utilizing a double pincer maneuver against the German salient. However, these critics often overlook the realities of Zhukov’s situation.

He faced a significant shortage in manpower and materiel, and time was not on his side. Timoshenko's offensive to the north was faltering, and it would not be long before the Germans could reinforce their positions in the encircled zone. Delaying his attack could lead to the risk of being outflanked, as the Wehrmacht might successfully break out of the pocket if given the luxury of time and the opportunity to choose where to strike. Zhukov was acutely aware of the limitations of his command and control capabilities, something any general on the Eastern Front, be they German or Soviet, would recognize. While he was not a master of maneuver warfare, he had proven himself capable of adapting to the circumstances at hand. He understood well the shortcomings of the Red Army at this stage, particularly as he dealt with a mix of raw recruits and a sprinkling of veterans. His forces lacked many seasoned non-commissioned officers, and numerous officers were occupying roles two or even three grades above their actual rank and experience. Yet, despite these challenges, this was the army he had to work with. Zhukov chose an imperfect plan filled with compromises, tailored to the realities of his situation. From the outset, he recognized that his attack on Yelna could not replicate the circumstances at Khalkhin Gol; the two situations were fundamentally different, and Zhukov was fully aware of this disparity.

On August 8, General Zhukov initiated his onslaught against the German positions. A shock group was formed around the 102nd Tank Division, designated to attack the northern sector of the salient. Shock groups were ad-hoc formations intended to be the main strike force of an attack. Their role was to break the enemies line open. In theory, this would then be followed up by reserves to exploit the gap. These were the primitive predecessors of the later Shock Armies that would be used later in the war. This was only one part of the Red Army’s ideal concept of the breakthrough operation, but we will cover that in more detail in a later podcast. Zhukov skillfully targeted his strike at the critical juncture between the 15th Infantry Division and the SS-Division Das Reich. However, despite the careful planning, the combination of shortcomings in tactical leadership and the Germans' well-prepared defensive positions meant that little progress was achieved. After just two days of fighting, this initial attack was called off. Yet, Zhukov was undeterred. He remained steadfast in his determination to evict the Wehrmacht from this side of the Desna River. To this end, he continued to organize and plan a much larger and more sustained operation aimed at recapturing Yelna. Fortunately for him, Army Group Center had been forced to halt its own offensive operations to the east, creating an opportunity that Zhukov was determined to exploit for as long as possible. The first serious counterattack at Yelna marked the beginning of a battle that would rage for several weeks. Although the Heer managed to hold its lines, it paid a heavy price for this defense. The two divisions facing Zhukov’s shock group suffered approximately two thousand casualties within just two days of combat. The pace of the Soviet assault was relentless, and there would be no respite for the invaders. Zhukov's resolve and the pressure his forces applied promised to make the defense of Yelna a costly endeavor for the German troops.

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Despite capturing Smolensk, German supply lines faltered, and Soviet forces reorganized production to restore their ranks. The Germans underestimated the Soviet spirit, leading to heavy casualties. As they advanced toward Kyiv, logistical issues and low morale plagued German troops. Counteroffensives struck with force, revealing the vast Soviet manpower reserves. By mid-August, the Germans recognized their underestimation of the Soviet Union's capacity for war, which shifted the tides of the Eastern Front.