Last time we spoke about the Rzhev Meatgrinder. On the Volkhov Front, General Meretskov launched bold offensives to relieve Leningrad, penetrating German lines but facing coordination failures and brutal attrition in the "Meat Grinder's Neck." Soviet advances created vulnerabilities, with troops raiding behind enemy positions amid horrific casualties, as described in soldier accounts. Southward, the Demyansk Pocket saw 96,000 Germans encircled, surviving on meager air-dropped supplies, while the Kholm siege endured Luftwaffe support and fierce close-quarters fighting. In the central sector, the "Rzhev Meatgrinder" erupted as Konev's forces clashed with Model's defenses, resulting in piled bodies and desperate counterattacks. In Ukraine, Timoshenko's offensives faltered against fortified villages and snowstorms, leading to disastrous raids. Crimea remained stalled, marked by Soviet landings crushed at Sudak and Nazi atrocities against civilians.
This episode is Who is Circling Who?
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As the month of January gradually shifted into February, the extensive Soviet Winter offensive continued to unfold with considerable force across various fronts. In the northern sectors and within the Crimean region, the momentum of this offensive had significantly diminished, leading both the German and Soviet sides to dedicate their efforts toward recuperation and the formulation of new strategic initiatives. In the Ukrainian theater, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock directed operations aimed at launching counterattacks against the notably overextended military formations under the command of Marshal Semyon Timoshenko. At the same time, the Northwestern Front concentrated its activities on establishing sieges around the isolated German forces that opposed them. Nevertheless, a highly intricate and disorganized situation persisted within the area controlled by Army Group Center, where both the German and Soviet armies found themselves in advantageous positions that could potentially allow for the creation of substantial encirclements targeting large segments of each other's forces simultaneously.
By the commencement of February, historical records compiled by Kershaw indicated that the German forces had incurred severe casualties since the initiation of their invasion: specifically, 200,152 personnel had been killed, 681,236 had sustained wounds, and 43,814 were listed as missing in action. On the Soviet side, analyses by Lopukhovsky revealed that the Red Army had experienced 552,000 casualties throughout December and an additional 558,000 during January, which added to the already staggering total of 3,337,000 casualties accumulated between August and December of the previous year. This composition meant that the cumulative German casualties equated to the loss of approximately 57.1 divisions in terms of officers, 70.2 divisions regarding non-commissioned officers, and 53.8 divisions when considering the enlisted soldiers. These numbers underscored the immense human cost of the conflict, illustrating how entire units were effectively wiped out multiple times over in the brutal exchanges on the Eastern Front. The attrition rates highlighted the desperate need for reinforcements on both sides, as divisions were often reduced to shadows of their former strengths, with officers and NCOs being particularly hard-hit, which disrupted command structures and morale.
Across numerous locations along the extensive front lines, only a comparatively minor forward movement was required to achieve the encirclement and subsequent destruction of significant portions of the opposing armies. As a result, Adolf Hitler and the OKH started to identify potential opportunities to retrieve some form of triumph from the catastrophes that had unfolded during the winter months. In contrast, the Soviet High Command, known as STAVKA, began to exhibit signs of desperation in their pursuit of the decisive victory they perceived to be tantalizingly close at hand. STAVKA also grew increasingly conscious of the swiftly deteriorating condition of their military units and the progressively reduced ability of those forces to sustain offensive operations. This awareness stemmed from reports of exhausted troops, depleted supplies, and the harsh winter conditions that exacerbated every logistical challenge, making even basic movements a test of endurance.
In an endeavor to reduce the mounting pressure on the central forces operating within the Soviet Union, General Eduard Dietl, who served as the commanding general of the Army of Lapland and had in fact voiced objections to his own appointment back in November, made attempts to convince Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim to commence an offensive directed toward Belomorsk. Dietl's role involved commanding the Army of Lapland, which had been formally established on January 14th to oversee the German military contingents in Finland and Norway that were positioned against the Soviet Union. This army was officially placed under Mannerheim's authority, who was recognized as the supreme commander within Finland. The intention behind this subordination was to enhance diplomatic relations with Mannerheim and to exert influence in compelling him to launch an assault on the Murmansk Railroad. Mannerheim managed to avoid issuing a direct rejection but expressed that Finland would possess much greater capacity for conducting offensive actions if the city of Leningrad were to be captured. The internal political dynamics within Finland imposed additional constraints on their potential for offensive engagements, as the general population held the belief that the war was approaching its conclusion and that merely a slight further exertion would suffice. The successful seizure of Leningrad would liberate Finnish troops from their current commitments and elevate national morale to a level that could support a major offensive by Finnish forces. However, there existed an emerging and foresightful apprehension that any forthcoming German spring offensive would primarily target Ukraine, thereby leaving the northern areas of the Soviet Union to deteriorate without significant attention. This concern was rooted in intelligence assessments and strategic analyses that suggested a shift in German priorities toward resource-rich southern regions, potentially abandoning the frozen north to a war of attrition.
The Finnish Army allocated a substantial portion of early 1942 to comprehensive reorganization efforts. It was segmented into three distinct fronts: the Maaselkä Front, the Aunus Front, and the Isthmus Front. Moreover, approximately 100,000 older soldiers were released from military service, with plans in place to progressively reduce divisions to brigade-level formations. The personnel liberated through this process were intended to be reintegrated into the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy. In actuality, only two divisions underwent this conversion by the month of May, at which point the program was discontinued. The principal responsibilities for Dietl's forces during January and February involved restructuring their front-line positions and transferring the Finnish units within their operational area back to Mannerheim's direct oversight. Additionally, they were compelled to broaden their front line to encompass the territory formerly managed by the Finnish 3rd Corps, an area that Mannerheim declined to continue covering. This expansion necessitated the importation of two fresh mountain divisions from Germany. These mountain troops were specialized for harsh terrains, but their deployment highlighted the strain on German resources, as units were being pulled from other theaters to plug gaps in the far north.
Within this organizational framework, the commander of the Mountain Corps Norway, Ferdinand Schörner, rapidly earned a reputation for being unpopular among his subordinates due to his motivational speeches, such as encouraging his troops to adopt the mantra “The Arctic does not exist” amidst the harsh, freezing conditions of the Lapland winter. Predictably, Schörner's stringent attitude endeared him to Hitler, who valued such unyielding discipline in his commanders, even if it alienated the rank and file. The offensive launched by the Volkhov Front in January, supplemented by supporting assaults from the Leningrad Front, had predominantly resulted in failure. The singular noteworthy accomplishment was the formation of a salient extending 75 kilometers deep at Lyuban, achieved by the 2nd Shock Army. However, as February began, the German 1st Corps had succeeded in isolating the northern flank of this salient utilizing six divisions, albeit at the expense of thinning out their positions at Kirishi and Leningrad. To the south of the Lyuban salient, the 38th Corps had accomplished a comparable containment with five divisions. Furthermore, the entry point of the salient had remained constricted owing to the shortcomings of the armies on the flanks. Field Marshal Georg von Küchler initiated planning for an offensive intended to seal off the salient's entrance, designated as Operation Raubtier. This operation was conceived as a pincer movement to cut off the Soviet penetration, reflecting the German emphasis on rapid, decisive counterstrikes to regain the initiative.
Nevertheless, Küchler's attention became diverted by worries regarding the inadequacy of the railway systems supporting Army Group North. Employment on the rail lines of the Eastern Front was regarded as the most undesirable assignment for railway personnel, and Army Group North was convinced that it was receiving the least competent workers in its vicinity. To enhance operational efficiency, Franz Halder proposed to Küchler that certain problematic individuals be apprehended and transferred to the Gestapo as a deterrent to others. There is no definitive information available as to whether this recommendation was formalized into orders or executed, but it exemplified the harsh measures considered to maintain logistical discipline amid the chaos of war.
STAVKA acknowledged that unfavorable terrain, commanders lacking sufficient experience, and severely deficient logistics had obstructed the offensive's advancement. To rectify the logistical shortcomings, Andrei Krulev, the deputy commissar of defense responsible for logistics, was dispatched to the Volkhov Front. Concurrently, General Kirill Meretskov expressed growing apprehension about the narrowness of the corridor linking the Front to the 2nd Shock Army. Consequently, a new combat formation was organized to assault the German fortified positions at Liubino Pole and Postki, although this group would not achieve readiness until the subsequent week. This delay allowed the Germans to further consolidate their defenses, turning what could have been a breakthrough into a protracted stalemate. With preparations underway on both sides for forthcoming actions, the front line maintained a state of impasse throughout this period. Intermittent and relatively weak Soviet assaults persisted, but the German forces were too thinly spread to initiate counteroffensives in this area. For multiple consecutive days, Army Group North conveyed to the OKH that there was “nothing particular wrong,” a phrase that masked the underlying tensions and the constant low-level skirmishes that drained resources without altering the strategic picture.
Further south, the assault by the Northwestern Front had generated an enormous gap between Army Groups North and Center. However, the drive of this assault had been halted as it became mired in efforts to besiege the steadfast German defenses at Staraya Russa, Demyansk, and Kholm. The Front had also transferred the 4th Shock Army to the Kalinin Front, which considerably weakened its overall strength, even though assurances of new reinforcements had been provided. This transfer was a strategic necessity but left the Northwestern Front vulnerable, relying on fresh troops to maintain pressure on the isolated German pockets. The initial reinforcements to reach the area belonged to the 1st Guard Rifle Corps, which were deployed in a fragmented manner as individual elements completed their 110-kilometer march from Valday. The 14th and 15th Rifle Brigades received directives to capture the crossings over the Redya River at Davidovo, with the 7th Guards Rifle Division following in close proximity. Both Generals Kurochkin and Morozov held the view that Staraya Russa represented too formidable a position for a direct assault, though they recognized that the 2nd Army Corps at Demyansk was perilously vulnerable to encirclement. STAVKA became convinced of this evaluation and granted authorization for Kurochkin to prioritize the elimination of this German Corps over any additional pushes westward. This shift in focus reflected STAVKA's adaptive strategy, aiming to exploit perceived weaknesses rather than pursuing overly ambitious territorial gains.
At Davidovo, the 1st Guard Rifle Corps confronted a reinforced battlegroup drawn from the 281st Security Division, which had been augmented with portions of a company from the 18th Motorized Division, reconnaissance elements from the SS Totenkopf Division, artillery units, and armed construction personnel. In aggregate, these defenders totaled 900 troops, equipped with three 105mm howitzers, three 75mm infantry guns, eleven 81mm mortars, two 37mm PaK 36 anti-tank guns, and fifty-three machine guns. These 900 German defenders managed to repel the initial assault on the 3rd, launched by the 15th Rifle Brigade. However, by the 1st, the veteran 7th Guard Rifle Division had arrived on the scene. They proceeded to deploy ski troops into the rear areas of the German position. Subsequently, a meticulously coordinated assault from both banks of the river compelled the Germans to withdraw after coming perilously close to being completely overrun. By the 8th, the 1st Guards Rifle Corps had secured Ramushevo on the Lovat River. At this juncture, the 2nd Army Corps found itself severed from ground-based resupply routes and entirely dependent upon an air bridge for sustenance. This abrupt requirement for aerial resupply contributed to the decision to curtail paratrooper operations behind German lines, rendering them smaller in scale than originally envisioned. The air bridge operations strained Luftwaffe resources, diverting planes from other fronts and highlighting the logistical vulnerabilities of isolated units in the vast Russian expanse.
The delay afforded by the defenders at Davidovo enabled the 2nd Army Corps to readjust its positions. The SS Totenkopf Division was divided into two battlegroups: a smaller contingent maintained the division's standard front-line responsibilities, while the larger force hastened to Zeluchye to safeguard the Corps' rear. The 12th Infantry Division was instructed to dispatch a battlegroup to bolster the boundary between Group Rauch and the 32nd Division. The 290th Division received approval to retreat from its hazardous location in order to connect with the SS troops at Zeluchye. These repositionings were critical, as they prevented immediate collapse and allowed the Germans to form a more cohesive defensive perimeter, even as supplies dwindled. The 2nd Guards Rifle Corps arrived later during the week and received orders to dismantle the German positions surrounding Penno before advancing toward the Polist River. By the conclusion of the week, they began to position themselves just outside the German defensive lines, setting the stage for intensified clashes in the coming days.
At Kholm, the siege endured, with General Makarev conducting relentless yet ineffective attacks under persistent urging from STAVKA. His efforts concentrated primarily on the southeastern sector of the town, but he possessed neither a substantial numerical advantage nor superior firepower compared to the defenders. Eventually, General Purkaev recognized that a solitary weakened division lacked the capability to overcome the garrison at Kholm. Reinforcements were accordingly dispatched, including the 391st Rifle Division, the 146th Tank Battalion, the 44th Artillery Regiment, and three BM-8 multiple rocket launchers. Upon the arrival of these units, approximately 23,000 Soviet troops would be engaged in besieging 4,500 German defenders at Kholm, theoretically establishing a 5-to-1 superiority in numbers. This buildup aimed to overwhelm the pocket through sheer volume of fire and manpower, but the defenders' resolve and fortifications continued to hold, turning Kholm into a symbol of German tenacity. The onset of February revealed the primary components of Army Group Center entangled in a disordered and convoluted front line. Even during that time, the configuration of the front line bewildered participants, as evidenced by an entry in the war diary of the 9th Army by one officer, who remarked, “This is the strangest front the army ever had.” This sentiment captured the chaotic, patchwork nature of the lines, where pockets of resistance and salients created a labyrinthine battlefield that defied conventional military mapping.
The offensive led by General Walter Model had previously resulted in the isolation of nearly 60,000 Soviet troops, but the emergence of the 4th Shock Army from Toropets posed a threat to reestablish connections with those isolated Soviets. Moreover, gaps continued to exist between the 4th Army and its adjacent Panzer Armies, through which Soviet units had surged, all directed toward reaching Vyazma. Therefore, although the principal thrust of the winter offensive had been depleted in this region, the circumstances remained highly unstable, with both sides retaining the capacity to encircle and eliminate substantial enemy forces. The potential for mutual encirclements added a layer of strategic complexity, as commanders on both sides maneuvered to avoid traps while setting their own.
On February 1st, STAVKA reestablished the Western Direction command to supervise the Western and Kalinin Fronts under the guidance of General Georgy Zhukov. Zhukov maintained direct authority over the Western Front, with Lieutenant-General F.I. Golikov serving as his deputy for that Front. The mission assigned to this command remained focused on encircling and capturing the German grouping at Rzhev-Vyazma. However, the Northwestern and Bryansk Fronts continued to operate under direct control from STAVKA, which was simultaneously overseeing offensives in the northern regions, Ukraine, and insisting upon a renewed offensive in Crimea. Consequently, while this arrangement marginally improved coordination, it arrived too late and offered insufficient enhancement, as both Fronts had already expended a considerable amount of their strength over the preceding two months. Owing to these substantial losses, STAVKA allocated reinforcements to the Kalinin Front throughout February, including a Guards Rifle Corps, seven rifle divisions, and various air units. In a similar vein, the Western Front received 60,000 replacement troops, a Guards Rifle Corps, three rifle divisions, two airborne brigades, and 200 tanks. These infusions were critical to bolstering flagging units, but the quality of replacements varied, with many being hastily trained conscripts facing veteran German formations.
In opposition, Army Group Center obtained 70,000 replacements during February. Nonetheless, this number was 40,000 less than the casualties they had suffered, elevating their overall manpower deficit to 227,000. When accounting for soldiers returning from medical facilities, the Army Group managed to replace only one in every four casualties. According to Glantz, on January 31st, Army Group Center's shortages encompassed 4,262 antitank guns, 5,890 mortars, and 3,361 larger artillery pieces. To mitigate this partially, new divisions were introduced into their sector. During February, three newly formed WALKUERE divisions arrived, accompanied by six divisions reassigned from occupation duties in the Low Countries and France. These WALKUERE divisions stemmed from Program WALKUERE, which expeditiously generated four divisions for the Replacement Army. A concurrent Program RHEINGOLD was assembling six divisions from workers previously exempted from service due to their roles in industry, though RHEINGOLD was anticipated to require more time for completion. Both programs formed part of the OKH's strategy to mobilize 500,000 soldiers for the Eastern Front. All these units arrived in a piecemeal fashion, with their elements committed to combat as they became available. Frequently, their artillery and support components were delayed significantly, assigned the lowest priority for transportation. To address vehicle shortages, Projects ELEFANT and CHRISTOPHORUS were designed to deliver thousands of new trucks and vehicles, ELEFANT aimed to provide 1,600 trucks, and CHRISTOPHORUS intended to supply 6,000 other vehicles, all designated for Army Group Center. In reality, only 25 out of every 100 vehicles reached their intended destinations; the remainder became stranded in Poland, underwent repairs in stations scattered across the Soviet Union after mechanical failures, or were immobilized by accumulations of snow or frozen road conditions. These logistical programs underscored the Reich's industrial strain, as production struggled to keep pace with the demands of a multi-front war.
Upon his arrival by air at his new command post, General Hans Reinhardt discovered that his newly designated “Panzer” Army possessed very limited mobility in practice. Velizh had been fortified with two infantry divisions and one security division. Demidov, Dukhovshchina, and Belyy emerged as additional primary centers of resistance, serving as rallying points for incoming German reinforcements. Consequently, Reinhardt selected a defensive strategy that involved fortifying populated areas along the path of the advancing 4th Shock Army. This approach was intended to impede the Soviet progress, thereby affording time for additional German forces to assemble in this segment of the front line. The "hedgehog" defense tactic, emphasizing strongpoints in villages, leveraged the winter weather to force attackers into costly assaults on prepared positions.
Meanwhile, the 4th Shock Army had been tasked with severing the Moscow-Warsaw highway to the west of Smolensk and subsequently securing control over the land bridge between the Dnepr and Dvina rivers. These troops had traversed a wilderness devoid of roads. However, they lacked protection for their flanks, and their supply circumstances would have been catastrophic had it not been for the stocks captured at Toropets. When General Eremenko encountered the defenses established by Reinhardt, he found himself compelled to engage in protracted and exhausting sieges for control of each village. Under such conditions, the defending forces held distinct advantages, the most critical of which was access to shelter from the harsh environmental elements. The bitter cold favored those with fixed positions, as attackers suffered higher rates of frostbite and exhaustion.
To the east, the 41st Panzer Corps under General Georg von Vietinghoff persisted with the offensive that had commenced at the close of the previous month. It had been making incremental gains each day, but the arrival of the 5th Panzer Division accelerated the rate of advance. By the 5th, the Corps had bridged the 55-kilometer gap to the 23rd Infantry Corps. The 29th Army now stood fully encircled and disconnected from the 39th Army. Although the 39th Army retained a narrow and precarious link back to the Kalinin Front between Nelidovo and Belyi, both armies depended predominantly on airdrops conducted by the VVS for their supplies. These airdrops were vital but inefficient, with many supplies landing in inaccessible areas or being captured by Germans.
To secure these successes, Model had incurred approximately 5,000 casualties, which amounted to 10% of his combat strength as recorded on January 19th. In return, reports claimed that 26,000 Soviet troops had been killed and 5,000 taken prisoner by the 8th. Numerous additional Soviets had been wounded or were conducting operations behind German lines. For these achievements, Model was honored with the Oak Leaves to his Iron Cross, presented by Hitler. This decoration not only boosted Model's standing but also served as propaganda to inspire other commanders facing similar dire circumstances.
One assessment suggested that the Kalinin Front had endured 80,000 casualties since the initiation of the general offensive. Despite this, STAVKA continued to demand further exertions from it. Assaults persisted into the brutal engagements at Rzhev, aimed at alleviating pressure on the encircled armies. However, the German positions in this sector had been established for an extended period, and construction materials were successfully reaching the front. German fortifications underwent rapid enhancements, with the addition of more bunkers and trenches. The "Rzhev meatgrinder," as it became known, consumed vast numbers of lives in repeated, fruitless attacks, becoming a symbol of the war's futility in the central sector.
On February 3rd, both Generals Richard Ruoff and Gotthard Heinrici launched offensives to close the gap between their respective armies. Heinrici's tactical withdrawals from the previous week had finally liberated sufficient troops to form a potent offensive contingent, though the defensive line now only marginally shielded Yukhnov. The 13th Corps advanced northward and rendezvoused with the 20th Panzer Division, which was spearheading the 20th Corps' southward movement, on the 4th. Thus, the 4th Army finally reconnected with the 4th Panzer Army. This linkage halted the influx of Soviet forces into the German rear and resulted in the encirclement of those Soviet units that had penetrated through the breach. The closure was a tactical victory, but it required constant reinforcement to prevent Soviet breakthroughs.
However, the linkage between the two German armies consisted merely of a slender 5-kilometer-wide corridor. To the west lay the isolated 33rd Army; to the east, the 43rd Army. The Soviet forces in the vicinity had anticipated their role to involve blocking a disheartened German withdrawal, rather than confronting a determined offensive. Certain sources indicate that Zhukov reacted with intense anger upon receiving this news and called for the immediate arrest, trial, and execution of the local commanders who had failed to prevent the counterattack. This reaction exemplified Zhukov's no-nonsense approach, where failures were met with severe repercussions to maintain discipline.
Logistical difficulties afflicted all military units in this sector. The 4th Army faced acute supply shortages by February, stemming from repeated interruptions to its supply route over the preceding week. Nonetheless, German intelligence intercepts disclosed that several Soviet formations trapped behind the 4th Army were experiencing starvation. The operations of the 40th Panzer Corps along the Yukhnov road succeeded in restoring the supply flow to the 4th Army by the week's end. The Soviet forces isolated behind Army Group Center had no comparable relief on the horizon, leading to desperate measures like foraging and reduced rations that further weakened their combat effectiveness.
Having traversed the Warsaw highway during the previous week, General Pavel Belov proceeded with his directives to reach Semlevo station and merge with General Sokolov's 11th Cavalry Corps from the Kalinin Front. Their combined objectives involved disrupting the rail and road connections west of Vyazma. However, the rifle units, artillery, anti-aircraft elements, and rear support services of Group Belov remained predominantly stranded on the Soviet side of the Warsaw highway, unable to maneuver through alongside the cavalry. This separation hampered Belov's operational flexibility, as his mobile forces lacked the infantry support needed for sustained engagements.
It required until the 4th for Belov's Corps to finalize the capture of their initial village targets. Immediately following this, they pressed onward toward Vyazma, where they were expected to coordinate with the 33rd Army in seizing the city. Vyazma functioned as a crucial rail hub that supplied the bulk of Army Group Center. Nevertheless, Belov harbored doubts about achieving success, given that his forces lacked any medium or heavy artillery and were grappling with supply deficiencies. He advocated for uniting with the 33rd Army to establish a secure base for operations. However, Zhukov disagreed with Belov's evaluation and issued orders stating, "Junction links with infantry /33 Army not necessary." Zhukov was of the opinion that Vyazma was defended lightly and that its garrison teetered on the brink of collapse. Therefore, direct frontal assaults were mandated, even though the cavalry's primary assignment was to interrupt supplies destined for the 4th Army. In actuality, Vyazma preserved the elaborate fortifications constructed by the Red Army prior to its capture, and these were manned by motorized infantry and tanks from the 5th Panzer Division. The mismatch between expectations and reality led to high casualties in ill-suited attacks.
Puzikovo, located just 8 kilometers from Vyazma, was captured during the night of the 4th. However, only limited advancements were achieved on the 5th and 6th, attributable to escalating German resistance and heightened Luftwaffe involvement. Belov's Corps constituted one of the Luftwaffe's chief targets in early February, frequently necessitating movements restricted to nighttime to evade aerial interdiction. Pastikha fell by the 7th, but each gain came at the cost of mounting losses and depleted ammunition. Belov's Corps also facilitated the rescue of the 8th Airborne Brigade in the vicinity of Vyazma. In a manner akin to the drops at Zhelane, their deployment was mishandled due to insufficient air transport and inadequate planning. Only 39 PS-84 and 22 TB-3 aircraft were available, whereas the planners had anticipated 40 PS-84 and 25 TB-3; they had disregarded the impacts of weather and mechanical wear, which further diminished aircraft availability. An entire airborne corps had been slated for deployment, but only one brigade was parachuted over the final days of January, resulting in extreme dispersion. Merely half of the dropped supplies and equipment were retrieved. The paratroopers were promptly encircled by German forces, prompting Belov to intervene. Luftwaffe activity also precluded the landing of the remaining corps elements. By the time linkage was established with Belov, the brigade had already suffered significant attrition. Only 746 men had gathered with the brigade commander by February 1st, a number that later increased to 1,300 as additional paratroopers were located. Nonetheless, the dispersed paratroopers stimulated partisan activities in the region, and authorization was granted to conscript local residents. Brigade Commissar I. V. Raspopov noted: “If one announced a levy, one could completely outfit the battalions as well as form partisan detachments. And many responded to that call. A radiogram to the commander of airborne forces sought permission to call up military age youth in local regions to form partisan detachments and fill up brigades of up to 1,000 men from encircled commanders and men.” During February, 2,436 partisans were incorporated into the 1st Cavalry Corps. Two such partisan groups assisted in the capture of Komovo village on the 5th. The 8th Airborne Brigade was formally placed under Belov's command on the 6th, along with its affiliated partisan units. This was succeeded by orders on the 7th directing them to disrupt the Vyazma-Izdeshkovo rail line while establishing contact with Sokolov. The integration of partisans added irregular warfare elements, harassing German supply lines and providing intelligence, though their lack of formal training limited their effectiveness in pitched battles.
Following the merger with Belov, Colonel Soldatov's 250th Airborne Regiment accompanied the Cavalry Corps. However, upon nearing Vyazma, it received orders to proceed northeast to connect with the 33rd Army. By the 4th, it had joined the 329th Rifle Division and continued operations with them, engaging in battles for the approaches to Vyazma. This redirection aimed to create a unified front but stretched already thin resources. Belov anticipated support from the 33rd Army advancing westward. However, the closure of the gap between the 4th Panzer and 4th Armies introduced uncertainty and alarm within the 33rd Army, which impeded their progress. Prior to this development, the shock group of the 33rd Army, comprising four rifle divisions, had advanced 25 to 90 kilometers in just two days through German lines. This positioned 10 to 16 thousand men of the 33rd Army in an extremely extended formation, with some elements still proximate to the German 4th Army while others fought 8 kilometers southeast of Vyazma. Several strongpoints had been circumvented, with the assumption that trailing divisions would address them. The rapid advance left supply lines vulnerable and units isolated, exacerbating the risks of encirclement
Meanwhile, Sokolov's 11th Cavalry had succeeded in severing the roads west of Vyazma at the end of January. During the first week of February, they were gradually driven back by German counteroffensives, which methodically reclaimed territory through coordinated infantry and armor pushesTo address these threats, the German 5th Corps was tasked on the 6th with defending the Vyazma-Smolensk and Vyazma-Yukhnov roads. Two Panzer divisions and one infantry division were assigned to protect the zone between Vyazma and Smolensk. The 5th Panzer Division dispatched a battlegroup to support the 3rd Motorized Division in containing the Soviet 33rd Army. The 5th Panzer was also directed to reinforce the strongpoints confronting Belov's forces. All divisions were required to engage in at least two directions concurrently, a feat accomplished by fragmenting into battalion-sized battlegroups. This dispersion allowed flexibility but weakened overall cohesion, making each group vulnerable to concentrated attacks.
By February 1942, the Red Army had expanded its cavalry forces from 13 to 81 divisions. Experiences during 1941 demonstrated their proficiency in navigating challenging terrains such as swamps, forests, and deep snow, which impeded motorized units. Cavalry formations proved far less expensive to establish and sustain than motorized equivalents and were simpler to supply. When executing traditional cavalry raids, they effectively generated confusion and disrupted enemy logistics. The Cavalry Arm of the Red Army had not been as severely impacted by the Purges as other branches, leading to a generally higher caliber of senior officers compared to other sectors of the military. However, the swift expansion and wartime attrition meant that not all officers met the desired standards of competence. Nonetheless, they were vulnerable to air attacks and lacked the firepower for dismounted infantry roles, being equipped with lighter weaponry than standard infantry. Their artillery consisted solely of light horse-drawn pieces, which possessed inferior range and destructive power compared to infantry artillery. Compounding this, commanders did not always employ this artillery effectively. Efforts to enhance cavalry units with additional artillery and tanks to offset firepower deficiencies did not yield the results anticipated by theorists. Cavalry units were also smaller in size, thus lacking the manpower reserves for prolonged engagements akin to those of infantry formations. Despite these limitations, cavalry's mobility made them ideal for exploitation roles in breakthroughs, though sustained combat exposed their weaknesses.
Belov would later reflect on the difficulties encountered: “Every success we gained, even the smallest, was won at a high price. Only the heroism and selfless courage of the soldiers and commanders gave us a chance to move forward, albeit slowly, forcing back the superior enemy forces. But our offensive effort soon dissipated. Many unit commanders were killed in the fighting. The commander of 96th Cavalry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Danilin, was evacuated by air after being wounded. After ten days we had almost completely exhausted our ammunition. The command of Western Front promised to resupply us with shells and bullets through General Efremov’s 33rd Army, but it was simply impossible to keep this promise. The troops of 33rd Army were in the same position as us. General Efremov and I exchanged information on the radio regularly and we believed that it would be expedient for us to create a continuous front line, thus protecting our inner flanks. This would then allow us to manoeuvre more freely with our limited forces. But we were not permitted to do this. Front headquarters sent me a strange order: ‘You don’t need to be shoulder to shoulder with the infantry.’ However, I believe that it would have been worth uniting our forces all the same … Our reconnaissance reported the appearance of new enemy units in the front line. On 10 February, the enemy struck at 75th Cavalry Division and surrounded it. To free the division from encirclement we had to withdraw forces from other sectors. The Germans took advantage of this and launched attacks where we had weakened our defences. After a stubborn battle, 75th Cavalry Division escaped from the enemy ring. We saved our comrades but the group as a whole was thrown back 12–15km from Vyazma. There was no longer any thought of attacking the city.” This quote encapsulates the frustrations of field commanders caught between tactical realities and higher command's directives, highlighting the human element in the midst of strategic maneuvering.
Further south, the Panzer Army commanded by General Erich-Heinrich Schmidt was effectively immobilized due to contradictory instructions. Hitler advocated for a northward thrust toward Yukhnov, which would seal the breach to the 4th Army and encircle all Soviet forces within the former salient. Schmidt and Field Marshal Günther von Kluge favored a more cautious approach, extending the left flank of the 24th Panzer Corps northward to the Spas-Demensk-Sukhinichi road, thereby closing the Kirov gap and reducing the salient by half. A third alternative of simply closing the Kirov gap was not given as much consideration, as the other options would inherently accomplish that objective while yielding greater advantages. As a consequence, the 2nd Panzer Army received a series of orders to prepare for one of the three potential offensives, with each directive specifying a different course. By the 13th, an exasperated Schmidt responded to one such order in Latin: "Difficile est, satiram non scribere," which translates to "It is difficult not to write a satire." This witty retort illustrated the frustration with bureaucratic indecision that hampered effective operations, as conflicting orders prevented cohesive planning.
In Ukraine, Bock's counteroffensive commenced in full force, having been ordered late on the 31st. The extreme sub-zero temperatures, strong winds, and heavy snowfall reduced all movements to a painstakingly slow pace. Despite these adverse conditions, territory was gradually reclaimed from the cavalry vanguards of Timoshenko. Each advance required meticulous coordination, as the weather not only slowed troops but also froze equipment and complicated supply deliveries, turning the counterattack into a grueling test of endurance. At Kerch, precedence for crossing the ice road was accorded to combat units, resulting in support and logistical elements being left behind. The supply situation for the Crimean Front was in complete disarray, further aggravated by heavy rainfall that transformed unpaved roads into impassable mud. Additionally, the Luftwaffe in Crimea concentrated its efforts on intercepting supplies traversing the Kerch Straits. Artillery units arrived without accompanying ammunition, and food supplies were frequently inadequate. These shortages led to demoralized troops and reduced combat readiness, as units could not sustain prolonged operations without basic necessities.
Lev Mekhlis persistently pressured General Kozlov to initiate the offensive ahead of schedule. He interfered in every aspect of the operations of the three armies in the Kerch area, despite his own lack of expertise. One of Mekhlis's directives prohibited the excavation of trenches, viewing them as a distraction from preparations for offensive actions. This order exposed troops to unnecessary risks, as defensive positions could have provided cover against artillery and air attacks. The planned assault involved advancing across an approximately 9-kilometer by 10-kilometer expanse of flat, grassy steppe in the northern Parpach Narrows. Apart from a handful of villages that the Germans had already fortified, there was minimal natural cover available for the attackers, leaving any advancing forces fully exposed to enemy artillery fire and aerial bombardments. In other parts of the Eastern Front, German divisions typically defended fronts spanning 19 to 24 kilometers, but in this location, they held much narrower sectors of 3 to 6 kilometers. The operational plan disregarded these realities, along with the appalling weather conditions; while Crimea experienced less snowfall than other regions, it was plagued by persistent heavy rainstorms that could last for days, turning the ground into a quagmire that bogged down vehicles and infantry alike. Mekhlis's meddling, driven by political zeal rather than military acumen, exemplified the interference of commissars in tactical decisions, often to the detriment of frontline effectiveness.
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On the Volkhov Front, Meretskov's forces struggled to relieve Leningrad, forming a vulnerable salient. Northwestern Front encircled German pockets at Demyansk and Kholm, relying on air supplies. Army Group Center saw chaotic encirclements, with Model's counterattacks isolating Soviet armies near Rzhev-Vyazma, while Zhukov pushed for breakthroughs. In Ukraine, Bock's counteroffensives reclaimed territory from Timoshenko. Crimea remained stalled, hampered by poor planning and Mekhlis's interference. Both sides suffered immense losses, with reinforcements failing to reverse the brutal stalemate.
