Last time we spoke about the end of the first year of the eastern front. The Red Army pressed on Army Group Center, while Meretskov’s Volkhov Front prepared a Leningrad breakout despite crippled supply lines. In Leningrad, famine worsened; cannibalism surfaced and NKVD records show arrests, even as the Kirov Tank Factory kept producing tanks. The Baltic/Sevastopol fronts saw stubborn resistance: the Soviet submarine fleet, though hampered by ice and poor training, managed limited successes; five transports, a submarine, and two tankers sunk by year’s end. Army Group North protected the Leningrad corridor against repeated Soviet attempts to sever it, while Meretskov’s 4th and 54th Armies attempted operations west and south of Lake Ladoga to relieve the siege. In Army Group Center, Hitler’s retreats were banned, but local withdrawals continued, fueling a leadership crisis as Zhukov exploited gaps and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps disrupted Kaluga and Sukhinichi. Guderian’s retreat sparked relief demands and Guderian’s removal. On the southern and Crimean fronts, Sevastopol withstood heavy pressure; Kerch and Feodosia saw mixed Soviet landings and German counterattacks, with Petrov’s defense holding deep into late December. 

This episode is Kluge’s Ultimatum, Guderian goes rogue 

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The early successes of the Soviet winter offensives gave STAVKA a surge of confidence and a growing sense that the war might tilt decisively in their favor. Yet these gains also created friction at the very top of the German high command, where worry and uncertainty began to ripple through the ranks. With the battlefield opening up and the prospect of a sweeping Soviet victory on the horizon, Soviet forces found themselves pressed into a brutal, grinding struggle—what many historians describe as a meatgrinder, as they pressed to push the German invaders back and potentially destroy them. The scale of the effort was immense, and the cost in men and materiel rose quickly as the fighting intensified. Hitler faced a high-stakes decision, weighing whether to back a rapid counterstroke under the seasoned general Hans von Kluge or to lean into the more aggressive, rapid-moving approach associated with Heinz Guderian. The choice would signal not only a tactical shift but a broader strategic direction for the German war effort in the east.

The massive losses of 1941, followed by a rapid and extensive buildup of replacement formations, placed enormous strain on the Soviet officer corps. In an effort to accelerate commissions, the requirements were drastically lowered: six years of general education and no criminal record were deemed sufficient for a lieutenant’s bar. As a result, a large majority of junior officers lacked formal military education or professional skills. Lieutenant-General Filipp Ivanovich Golikov, 10th Army, in Feb 1942 - [His Headquarters staff were] “poorly selected and of low competence. Moreover the poor tactical capabilities of forces led to many mistakes in combat: to frontal assaults, sluggish action, inadequate provision of fire-support when advancing, to inadequacies in co-operation and also to unnecessary losses. The army operated without a fully prepared rear, without regular deliveries of munitions, fuel and provisions. Divisional and army level horse-drawn transports fell behind.” Compounding the problem was the brutal pace of casualties. With so many officers killed or wounded before they could gain on‑the‑job experience, the Red Army often learned through trial and error under intense pressure rather than through thorough, prepared instruction. Personal autonomy within the Red Army was also severely restricted. A telling example: one officer attempted to delay an offensive by a single day, only to discover how little leeway there was for independent decision‑making within the command structure. Taken together, these factors help explain many of the officer corps’ failures that historians have highlighted. They also shed light on why Soviet propaganda tended to spotlight the most senior leaders, like Georgy Zhukov, who would soon become a symbol of unqualified success in the public imagination of the USSR, even as the deeper realities on the ground were more complex and contested.

The mass recruitment and rapid buildup also strained Soviet logistics. Not only was heavy equipment in short supply, but shortages of essential winter gear and field kitchens began to appear as the campaign wore on. These logistical gaps further limited the effectiveness of Soviet troops in the brutal winter conditions, compounding the already severe challenges on the front. Stahel recalled “The Western Front’s initial request for 340,000 sets of winter clothing was met in full, but a subsequent request on October 29 for a further 558,000 sets fell woefully short and meant that even elite guards units were sometimes inadequately clothed.” 

This week, Stalin sent a series of caustic messages to the newly formed Volkhov Front for failing to achieve the rapid and dramatic gains he demanded. STAVKA had expected the Volkhov Front to seize its jumping-off points and complete its force concentrations for the next stage of the offensive by the 26th. Spurred on by this pressure, the 4th and 52nd Armies pushed to the riverline between Kirishi and Novgorod and began expanding bridgeheads across the river by the 27th. Yet Ivanov’s 4th Army fell short of securing its objective at Tigoda station, leaving that target incomplete. At the same time, the 54th Army continued fruitless assaults on Kirishi and the surrounding villages throughout the week, yielding no gains. To strengthen the defense, Leeb reinforced the Volkhov strongpoint with the 291st and 269th divisions from Leningrad, converting the town into the linchpin of the Volkhov defensive line. Beyond German resistance, adverse weather further hampered Soviet troop movements. Acknowledging the realities on the ground, the next phase of the offensive was postponed until early January and would be launched in a staggered sequence rather than a single, sweeping push.

On Christmas Day, Leeb sought to frame the events as a German victory in an address to his troops. “In the battles on and to the east of the Volkhov—as well as in the withdrawal of the front into a secure winter position behind the Volkhov — you have again met the highest requirements of defensive power and of physical resiliency in fulfilling the mission. The enemy arrives at the Volkhov empty-handed. Since 22 June and up to 20 December, Army Group North has taken 438,950 prisoners and captured or destroyed 3,847 tanks and 4,590 guns. We reverendy bow our heads to those who have given their lives. TheHomeland thanks us for having protected it and counts on us in the future. We shall justify this trust. The New Year will find us ready to repel all enemy breakthrough efforts until the Fuehrer calls on us again to resume the attack”.

Yet, as had become common with German claims of success since the invasion began, the casualty tallies told a different story. The Tikhvin offensive failed to achieve its operational and strategic aims. The plan called for encircling the 54th Army, linking up with Finnish forces at the Sver river, and cutting off supplies to Leningrad. None of these objectives were completed. Historian David Glantz estimates that the Soviets suffered about 190,000 casualties across the Tikhvin offensive, the counterattacks, and the broader operations around Leningrad, drawn from a force of roughly 300,000 troops deployed since October. By contrast, the Germans employed around 180,000 soldiers in the same sector, incurring approximately 45,000 casualties.

Across the frontline, many German officers used their Christmas addresses to persuade their men that the invasion of the USSR was a holy crusade, hoping to reinvigorate the troops with a renewed sense of purpose. By contrast, the Soviets treated Christmas as an opportunity to strike at German morale. One stark example was a so-called “Christmas card,” depicting a snowy landscape dominated by crosses with German helmets hanging on them, captioned simply “Living space in the east.” Halder hosted two massive Christmas parties on December 24, hosting his closest associates and enjoying a rare moment of festive cheer while the rest of the Wehrmacht endured a harsh winter as Soviet offensives raged along the front. Both sides seized any chance to disrupt the other’s calendar, turning holidays into elements of psychological and operational warfare. While Halder luxuriated at Mauerwald, the Ostheer faced empty stomachs or the daily reality of combat conditions.

Despite the optimism in his speech, Leeb doubted his army’s ability to withstand a renewed major attack given the lack of reinforcements. The frozen swamps had stretched his frontline, and he lacked the troops to cover the exposed stretches. The withdrawn 8th and 12th Panzer divisions were forced to devote three battalions each to rear-area security, leaving only the 20th Motorised Division as a true reserve. Leeb feared a Soviet assault would strike the boundary between the 16th and 18th Armies, and this manpower shortage compelled him to order the 225th division airlifted from Liepāja port to speed its redeployment. As December drew to a close, Lake Ladoga’s ice thickened again to about one meter, with a snow cover of roughly 30 centimeters. This thick ice could bear the weight of KV tanks as well as supply trucks, a crucial factor for movement across the lake. Coupled with ongoing organizational reforms, these conditions contributed to a notable uptick in supply flow: about 700 tons on the 22nd and roughly 800 tons by the 23rd. This was significant, marking the first time the Road of Life managed to deliver more than the city’s daily consumption rate under the brutal rationing that characterized Leningrad’s siege.

This would mark a turning point in the siege era, signaling the first real opportunity to increase rations since September. Bread rations were adjusted: workers and engineers would receive 350 grams of bread, while employees, dependents, and children were limited to 200 grams. Despite these adjustments, famine and disease continued to ravage the civilian population as many basic food needs remained unmet. In an effort to relieve some of the suffering, the Leningrad Front released 300 tons of food stockpiled in Kronshtadt and other nearby forts for distribution to civilians. Soldiers themselves also stepped forward, voluntarily reducing their own rations to conserve resources for the starving population. Even with these measures, December deaths totaled around 50,000. Clearly, more work was needed to increase throughput along the Road of Life in order to sustain the city.

Traditionally, Hitler’s Halt Order on the 18th is cited as having saved Army Group Center. This interpretation was widely promoted by Nazi propaganda and early histories of the Eastern Front. In the moment, halt and hold decisions did provide strategic clarity at a time when few were willing to assume responsibility for a decisive move. Moving forward could have meant a longer retreat, which seemed disastrous to many commanders, while fighting in place appeared to offer a defensible alternative. The short, incremental withdrawals that did occur were devastating for the units involved: vast quantities of equipment were abandoned, and troops endured extreme strain from marching, exposure to the cold, and exhaustion. Yet the halt orders were often too restrictive, preventing necessary movement or delaying it when urgency demanded action. Even at the company level, commanders technically needed Hitler’s personal permission to advance or retreat. In practice, obtaining Hitler’s approval could take hours or days, even as crises mounted toward a breaking point.

While the Nazis believed they were destined to triumph and had indoctrinated a large portion of the officer corps, the Wehrmacht operated under Auftragstaktik. Manstein Lost Victories post war.“This brings me to the factor which probably did more than anything else to determine the character of Hitler’s leadership—his overestimation of the power of the will. This will, as he saw it, had only to be translated into faith down to the youngest private soldier for the correctness of his decisions to be confirmed and the success of his orders ensured … Such a belief inevitably makes a man impervious to reason and leads him to think that his own will can operate even beyond the limits of hard reality—whether these consist in the presence of far superior enemy forces, in the conditions of space and time, or merely in the fact that the enemy also happens to have a will of his own”

This philosophy entrusted subordinates with the initiative to achieve the mission, rather than rigidly following orders from above. - Stahel summarizing mission based tactics/Auftragstaktik “If the mission (the intention of the order) was endangered or an unanticipated opportunity arose, but authorization from higher command was impossible owing to time pressure or communication difficulties, then the officer on the spot was empowered to act—even against his orders—to achieve the mission” In practice, many German officers interpreted this autonomy as a mandate to keep their formations alive rather than to hold ground at all costs, and some acted without communicating in what they claimed were time-pressured circumstances. An informal form of elastic defense emerged: formations would withdraw without explicit permission to avoid needless losses, only to be restored later through timely counterattacks. The vast scale and static nature of the strategic maps at Hitler’s HQ meant he rarely, if ever, saw these on-the-ground movements, remaining unaware of how battles were evolving in real time.

Recent studies have found that disobedience and independent action were widespread across Army Group Center, though most of the officers involved were junior enough to keep these events hidden from Hitler. In many cases, divisional or even corps-level officers covertly assisted these efforts. There are numerous diary entries documenting retreats that were never authorized by high command. For instance, the war diary of 46th Panzer Corps notes the 5th Panzer abandoning the villages of Lyzlovo and Kuz’minskoe, only for these positions to be recaptured later that same afternoon in a counterattack with heavy enemy losses. This autonomy helped mitigate the worst implications of Hitler’s orders.

Last week, the Soviets had managed to push the Germans away from Moscow and now pursued an ambitious objective: encircling and destroying Army Group Center. Pravada had wanted “proof” of Soviet victory so staged a shot of Germans retreating with POWs marching through the snow and wind created by airplane propellers. At a minimum, Zhukov aimed to force the German forces back to their pre-Typhoon positions. Zhukov’s second phase began on the 18th, though in some sectors the attacks were delayed. By the 22nd, Soviet efforts were hammering at every segment of the German line, probing for weak points. Across the front, Strauss’s 9th Army was in a cautious, deliberate retreat toward Staritsa, losing only a few kilometers each day to preserve frontline cohesion. Yet Staritsa was little more than a map point, lacking terrain features favorable to defenders. Strauss sought permission from Kluge to continue retreating all the way to Rzhev, where the Volga offered natural protection. But the 9th Army appeared to be the most secure sector of Army Group Center, and Hitler had already deemed a retreat to the Königsberg Line through Rzhev a waste of equipment. Kluge, reluctant to invest time and effort in pleading Strauss’s case, left the army defending Staritsa. Complicating matters, the Kalinin Front had been reinforced by Stalin, and the 9th Army had no mobile reserves to draw upon.

Casualties rapidly mounted as the 9th Army continued its withdrawal. By the 25th, even Halder began to fear that the army was starting to crumble from its losses. Bolstered by the misleading reports from Foreign Armies East, Strauss clung to the hope that the Kalinin Front would run out of manpower before his own forces did. Yet Konev faced strict orders to attack and paid little heed to his army’s distress. Day after day, attacks were poured into the grind of battle. His commander’s terse reply was: “You will attack at once. If not, I’m afraid your health will suffer.” The extreme cold forced fighting to focus on villages and their shelters, while the stretches of ground between them were held only lightly by reconnaissance units. By the 26th, the 6th Army Corps had exhausted its reserves and urgently requested permission to withdraw. Strauss refused, citing Hitler’s order. Kluge supported the decision but added a caveat to the order. “only when the VI A.C. threatens to be smashed, is withdrawal (but not to a great degree) in order.”  On the 27th, both the 6th and 23rd Corps again requested an immediate withdrawal, which was granted for the evening of the 28th. 9th Army’s War diary for the 27th “For the first time, under the power of events beyond human control, the difficult decision was taken to withdraw the Staritsa Line at certain points, which was to have been held under all circumstances according to the Führer’s order. Without this, the front, in view of the evergrowing enemy pressure, would rupture. Then the connection would be broken, leadership and influence on the individual units would be eliminated, and a rapid dissolution of the army would be the inevitable consequence. However, in these fateful hours the [Ninth] army command feels the great responsibility of saving the army from its otherwise certain destruction.”

To the East, Reinhardt remained focused on his own sector, paying little heed to the wider frontline. He had already ignored Hoepner’s orders to cover a broader stretch of the line. Hoepner would later accuse Reinhardt of falsifying reports from neighboring units’ retreats to justify his own unauthorized withdrawals. On the 21st, Reinhardt refused orders to send the 2nd Panzer to aid the 5th Corps at Voloklansk. After several hours of debate with Hoepner, Reinhardt reluctantly agreed to dispatch a single panzer battalion from the 6th Panzer. Reinhardt to a Staff officer complaining about even this concession.  “what is the point of us holding if the right [flank] breaks” 

Both Panzer Groups remained under the 4th Army, but Kübler had not yet arrived from Ukraine to replace Kluge as its commander. As a result, Kluge endured ongoing friction from the Panzer commanders. In the end, Kluge returned both Panzer Groups to Army Group control, and temporarily designated Reinhardt as commander of the 4th Army, with Panzer Group Three to be merged with the 5th Army Corps. Reinhardt, however, managed to delay his departure long enough to derail this plan. Stumme of the 40th Panzer Corps became the temporary commander of the 4th Army instead. Reinhardt’s diary entry on the 24th “12 o’clock, decision that I can stay. Thank God.”  Kübler finally arrived on the 26th. The 4th Army’s Chief of Staff, Blumentritt, was replaced the next day by Colonel Bernuth. Kübler came into prominence by writing a falsified report of Uman encirclement in which he glorified his own role as a Corp commander. He then covertly sent it to Hitler’s headquarters and other high offices.  

The Grosstransportraum simply lacked the fuel and trucks needed to deliver the munitions required for intensive defensive battles. Despite the heightened consumption, train deliveries declined only in December, worsening the supply strain. After days of relentless fighting, the 5th Army Corps was forced to surrender Volokolamsk and then Ivanoskoe by the 24th due to ammunition shortages. Neither withdrawal had received permission, and Ruoff did not receive any rebuke. Once again, Reinhardt refused to assist Ruoff despite orders from Hoepner, only being pressured into sending a single battalion more in reinforcement. On the 26th, a major assault breached the lines of the 106th Infantry Division, which had been reduced to about 300 combat-effective troops. Reinforcement was limited to 10 tanks from the 6th Panzer Division, sent only on the condition they would be returned afterward. By the 28th, the 5th Corps managed to rally and counterattack, retaking the heights west of Ivanovskoe and encircling several Soviet formations. Ruoff benefited from secure flanks and the proximity of mobile divisions. Throughout the week, multiple small Soviet breakthroughs occurred, but these were quickly counterattacked and crushed by the mobile forces.

Kluge’s former 4th Army had been the only formation not to undertake a major retreat by the time of the renewed Soviet offensive. This left them protruding as a bulge in the front line when Hitler’s Halt Order was issued. Their front ran along the Nara River, fortified with bunkers and trenches. Yet Guderian’s negligence created a crisis to the south, where the Soviets had split the 43rd and 24th Army Corps. Guderian repeatedly refused to act, even with both corps under his command. With Guderian abrogating his responsibility, the 43rd Corps was transferred to the 4th Army. Despite Hitler explicitly denying permission, Kluge granted Heinrici limited autonomy to maneuver his corps away from the Soviets. Heinrici’s letter to his wife December 22.“I am again standing at the high point of Russian pressure. Basically, we are already fully encircled. Yesterday the situation was hopeless. We were anticipating our end in the encirclement. At the very last minute, Kluge gave permission to withdraw again. That prolonged our existence a little bit longer.” We know of this withdrawal only from Heinrici’s letter home to his wife; there are no other records of it.

As we can see, Kluge was not inclined to blindly hold the frontline, opting for small retreats where necessary to avoid endangering neighboring formations. While we only have documented evidence of the 43rd Corps withdrawal, it remains possible that Kluge issued additional covert orders to retreat, though no records survive to confirm it.The withdrawal of the 43rd Corps came just in time, as a new Soviet attack on the 22nd broke through to their north, leaving the corps exposed on both flanks, at risk of encirclement, and cut off from the rest of the 4th Army. This also left the 13th Corps with an exposed southern flank and put the entire 4th Army at risk of being rolled up from the south. Kluge pleaded to be allowed a substantial withdrawal, but Halder did not heed his pleas. Halder’s diary 23rd December. “Kluge judges this situation as operationally very serious, I see it less operationally and more tactically very uncomfortable.” Eventually, Hitler was worn down and granted Kluge permission to withdraw if needed. Consequently, the 13th Corps pulled back to the north while the 43rd Corps fell back toward Kaluga. To reinforce the line, Kluge also pulled the 19th Panzer Division out of the front and redirected it south to counter the Soviet breakthrough, though that counterattack would not reach the front until the 28th.

This, however, weakened the 57th Panzer Corps, whose frontline collapsed on the 27th. The 98th Infantry Division began to disintegrate under Soviet pressure, though it managed a fighting retreat. “The division reports that the individual leaders and the troops lost their nerves, even the word ‘panic’ is used” 98th division’s report to Corp Hq. With no reserves to plug the gaps, Kluge pressed for permission to withdraw further, either the entire Army’s flank or the whole Army. 

Army Group Center’s war diary recorded the conversation. “[HALDER:] I dare not tell the Führer that I have received reports that eighty percent of a battalion froze to death during the retreat. The Führer would reply that these casualties would not have occurred if positions had been held. [KLUGE:] The men are not freezing to death because they are on the march, but because they are standing outside and fighting outside and have no positions. Is the army command staff hiding the fact that we are dealing with an operational breakthrough here? Has the army command any other ideas? [HALDER:] The right wing of the Fourth Army should be withdrawn and mobile elements pitted against the enemy. [KLUGE:] I have no more mobile forces!… An operational breakthrough must be expected … Whether the Führer likes it or not he will have to order a retreat. If supplies cannot be delivered, things will soon collapse….  The Führer will have to come down from cloud-cuckoo-land and have his feet set firmly on the ground. Halder blocked him, effectively stonewalling any withdrawal. In the absence of explicit authorization, a coordinated withdrawal began on the Army’s right wing, while a more limited withdrawal started on the left wing, involving only a few kilometers. There is no surviving paper trail indicating who authorized these movements, but the timing and coordination suggest it was Kluge.

In the void south of the 4th Army, the Soviets surged toward the vital supply hub at Kaluga and enveloped the 43rd Corps. On the 21st, the Soviets reached Kaluga, and their initial assault was barely repulsed by the city garrison. However, German forces panicked during the attack, and several trains carrying supplies, including Christmas presents, were destroyed to prevent capture. While the first assault was repelled, the encirclement of Kaluga seemed only a matter of time unless a means could be found to close the breach in the German lines. The threat was intensified by rampaging Soviet cavalry. Although assaults on well-defended positions often ended in disaster, the cavalry maintained mobility even in deep snow and operated with a relatively limited logistical footprint. Soviet cavalry formations would increasingly disrupt German supply routes behind the front lines.

On the day Guderian reached the Wolf’s Lair, Kluge covertly moved a regiment from each division behind the Oka River, more than 70 km to the west, where a new defensive line was being prepared. This act was not only open defiance of Hitler, it would also leave a massive void in the German front, threatening both Army Groups Center and South. Outraged, Kluge informed Halder, who then briefed Hitler on the matter. Kluge “Guderian’s conception is so pessimistic, one must assume that he has lost his nerve.”Guderian had hoped to present a fait accompli, his retreat, but this was not tolerated. It is remarkable that Hitler spent several hours trying to secure Guderian’s obedience despite the insubordination. By the end of the day, Hitler believed he had won Guderian’s obedience, if not full agreement. GUDERIAN:] Then this means taking up positional warfare in an unsuitable terrain … If such tactics are adopted we shall during the course of this coming winter, sacrifice the lives of our officers, our non-commissioned officers and of the men suitable to replace them, and this sacrifice will have been not only useless but also irreparable. [HITLER:] Do you think Frederick the Great’s grenadiers were anxious to die?…[GUDERIAN:] The intentions I have heard expressed will lead to losses that are utterly disproportionate to the results that will be achieved …[HITLER:] But you are seeing events at too close a range. You have been too deeply impressed by the suffering of the soldiers. You feel too much pity for them.

Meanwhile, Schmidt faced a Soviet breakthrough. Kluge sought to pull the 48th Panzer Corps back behind the river and abandon Livny to free forces for a counterattack, but Hitler refused. Halder informed Kluge that they could only retreat to the Tim River if “that the rearward line is so prepared that a successful infantry defense can be guaranteed”The 9th Panzer Division nonetheless managed a counterattack between the 20th and 22nd. The series of actions temporarily stabilized the situation and restored German lines. By this point, Guderian had returned to his headquarters and reiterated Hitler’s orders to the complaints of his officers. The 2nd Army was instructed not to surrender any more ground, though Schmidt protested. “Rigidly conducted, however, the order leads to very great dangers. We have the thinnest front, reserves are absent. The Russian is superior. He is close to his good railway network. He can move operationally and tactically and thus form points of concentration. These circumstances must lead to break-ins and breakthroughs. Breakthroughs can only be rectified by counterattack … [If] one has no forces to counterattack, then local relocation mixed with counterthrusts must be used to restore the situation.”

On the 22nd, a Soviet offensive broke the lines of the 296th Division. When permission to withdraw was denied, Guderian nonetheless withdrew. The following day, he ordered his entire Army Group to retreat to the Oka River, ignoring Kluge’s counter-orders. On the 24th, Kluge contacted elements of Guderian’s forces and quickly confirmed that the withdrawals were continuing, and that Guderian had repeatedly misrepresented their positions. Although this could have been an opportunity to remove Guderian, Kluge described the retreats as being “under the compulsion of circumstances,” which was arguably true to some extent. Having just covered for Guderian, Kluge expected loyalty in return. Guderian was ordered to close the gap between Belev and Kaluga and to strengthen his left flank. His response was extremely hostile and culminated in a demand to be removed from command or placed before a military tribunal. Army Group Center’s war Diary “ Colonel-Gen. Guderian replies that he does not have the slightest hope that anything will be changed due to the unending interference and the intended measures in the overall situation … He then asks for removal from his post because, according to him, the measures which were ordered would not change the overall situation. He had no objection if one was to bring him before a military tribunal” On the 25th, the conflict flared again as Kluge learned of the 47th Panzer Corps’ unauthorised withdrawal from Chern. Guderian’s initial response was simple ““In these unusual circumstances I lead my army in a manner I can justify to my conscience”In response, Kluge presented Halder with an ultimatum: “either he or I must go.”“I have the greatest respect for Colonel-General Guderian and he is a fantastic commander, but he does not obey. In this situation, I can only transmit and execute the Führer’s orders if I can rely on my army commanders” Kluge to Halder.  “I am basically entirely on Guderian’s side, one cannot simply let himself be slaughtered, but he must obey and keep me oriented. Guderian again requested relief from command. Hitler dismissed him on the same day, and Schmidt then took command of the small Army Group. Schmidt, however, continued in the same pattern, repeatedly withdrawing without Kluge’s permission until his group reached the Oka River. There they fortified themselves and began repairing worn-down equipment.

With the 2nd Army pushed back so far, Army Group South transferred the majority of the 168th Division and some of the 62nd Division to the 2nd Army to shore up its boundary with 6th Army. On the 25th, Soviet attacks began hitting the northern wing of the 1st Panzer Army. Additional Soviet offensives were launched toward Kursk and Kharkiv. None of these efforts achieved significant gains. Both Germany and the USSR remained focused on other sectors of the front, preventing major operations in this area. At Sevastopol, the assault by the 22nd Division was halted by the arrival of the 79th Naval Brigade, which had forced marched north to reach the breach. This allowed the 8th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 95th Rifle Division to withdraw from the Mamaschi salient to the Belbek Valley on the 22nd. The well-trained and equipped 345th Division would arrive later in the week. These reinforcements, along with relentless shelling from the Battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna and its naval group, blunted the German attacks. The only noticeable Axis success occurred to the south, where the 170th Infantry Division alongside the Romanian 1st Mountain Brigade finally captured and held Chapel Hill after several days of a seesaw battle. This had been a key position for Soviet Defensive Sector II, but the Germans were not able to exploit their success.

Hansen ordered the attacking forces reorganized on the 23rd for a renewed assault at the end of the week. Manstein, however, pressed for an all-out attack on the 25th, believing the Soviet defenders were about to crack. The plan failed when the main effort struck a fresh defense instead of the expected weak point, encountering troops from the 345th Rifle Division. Manstein halted these attacks the same day, but pushed for a more focused offensive against the Mekenzievy Mountain positions. By this time, the Soviets had received over 26,000 reinforcements, while the German divisions had received none. Early morning on the 26th, the 51st Army returned to Crimea. About 5,000 men landed in the first wave of amphibious operations around Kerch. Tolbukhin had wanted to showcase his initiative and devised an overcomplicated naval landing plan. As a result, the initial assault consisted of multiple small landings north and south of Kerch. The plan depended heavily on fire support from the VVS and the Black Sea Fleet to keep these small groups alive. Storms forced two landings to be cancelled. In addition, a shortage of landing craft forced the use of whaleboats to transport men and equipment to shore, leading to numerous drownings and cases of hypothermia in the rough seas. This left five disjointed beachheads with frozen, lightly equipped, exhausted troops unable to coordinate effectively. The plan assumed they would eventually connect up, but instead they dug in and awaited a German counterattack. Furthermore, one landing had been opposed and quickly contained by a small German force. All this left Manstein believing that the 46th Infantry Division could handle the Soviet attack alone. The Reichenau concluded that the 46th plus two Romanian brigades were insufficient to withstand a major Soviet offensive, so he sent a single regiment from the 73rd Infantry Division to bolster the defenses. He also ordered the port facilities at Kerch destroyed if the defenders were forced to retreat. And on December 22, the Arcadia Conference began, with the United States ultimately agreeing to a Germany First strategy.

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Despite initial winter gains and rising STAVKA confidence, Soviet logistics, leadership inexperience, and grinding attrition challenged sustained advantage. German command salvaged some stability through halting withdrawals, but internal frictions, Hitler’s demands, Guderian’s resistance, and Kluge’s cautious improvisation, undermined cohesion and exposed vulnerabilities. The siege of Leningrad and the siege dynamics around Kaluga, Volokolamsk, and Kalinin highlighted a war of endurance more than decisive victories.