Last time we spoke about the beginning of 1942. The Red Army pushed against Army Group Center, with Zhukov pressing to push the front back toward pre-Typhoon positions and threatening encirclements around Kaluga, Volokolamsk, and Kalinin. Soviet offensives, however, were hampered by chaotic officer training, rapid but ill-coordinated replacements, and severe winter shortages in equipment, fuel, and winter clothing, which undermined combat efficiency and morale. On the German side, there were intense internecine frictions at the highest levels: Hitler’s halt orders, Guderian’s resistance, and Kluge’s cautious attempts to withdraw where necessary. Autonomy at lower echelons, embodied in Auftragstaktik, allowed some flexible withdrawals behind the front to avoid total collapse, but high-level indecision and miscommunications contributed to disjointed German defense and intermittent retreats. 

This episode is Hitler steals the Army’ Trains

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

As 1941 draws to a close, the Soviet Tikhvin counteroffensive has finally ground to a halt, exhausted from the relentless fighting. Meanwhile, STAVKA shifts its focus to attempts to encircle and destroy Army Group Centre, pressing for decisive gains even as the front line buckles under pressure. They’re hammered by crises from every side as the German defenses hold, while the officer corps sometimes resembles an amateur drama troupe under the stress. The only major German offensive on the horizon faces an additional threat from new Soviet amphibious operations around Crimea. 

Since the start of the invasion, Germany has suffered 621,308 wounded, 173,722 dead, 35,873 missing and this represents  25.96% of the Eastern Army which is about 3.2 million. Soviet casualty figures are notoriously hard to pin down and remain highly contested. In Colossus Reborn, historian David Glantz puts total Soviet casualties for 1941 at 566,852 combat deaths, 235,339 noncombat dead, 2,335,482 MIA and POW. 1,256,421 wounded in action. 66,169 sick. And lastly 13,557 cases of frostbite. Other historians argue the total could be significantly higher, by several million. Civilian losses in 1941 for the USSR are unknown, but estimates suggest they were extremely heavy. Despite these staggering losses, both Stalin and Hitler remained convinced that victory would come in 1942. STAVKA’s optimism and its tolerance for high Soviet casualties were bolstered, in part, by Soviet reports that absurdly claimed 300,000 German soldiers had been killed between 06 December 1941 and 15 January 1942. The December offensives pushed the German line back across the USSR, but they failed to capitalize on any single breakthrough. Now, the Germans have reformed their front, and the push must begin again. Instead of concentrating at one focal point, the burden of the next Soviet offensives is spread across the entire Ostheer, extending the strain and the risk for the German defense. General Nikolai Khlebnikov in his memoir. “Theoretically, in principle, everyone agreed that what would provide for the success of the offensive was decisive superiority over the enemy on the decisive sector of the front. However, in practice … this axiom of military theory was certainly not adhered to in all instances. It hence often happened, that a well thought out deep thrust turned into a series of frontal attacks which only “expelled” the enemy, rather than resulting in his encirclement and destruction”. 

Throughout this week, Meretskov’s Volkhov Front continued to attack in an effort to expand their bridgeheads across the Volkhov River, but the efforts met with little success. By 03 January, those bridgeheads were halted due to exhaustion and mounting fatigue. The Soviets also faced a looming logistical crisis, and Stalin’s exhortations could not push them any further. Any additional offensives would have to wait. On the positive side, they had managed to drive the Germans back to their pre-Tikhvin offensive starting points, with the exception of the villages around Kirishi. On the downside, Soviet hopes to encircle and destroy the German offensive force had failed miserably. As this unfolded, the Northwestern Front slowly prepared for its own offensive operations between Lake Ilmen and Selizharovo, and toward Velikie Luki. The plan was to capture Demiansk and Staraya Russa, then sever Army Group North’s withdrawal routes. This operation was expected to be conducted in cooperation with the Volkhov Front’s next offensive.

In Leningrad, food supplies continued to dwindle inside the city, even as the flow of sustenance via the Road of Life showed some improvement. The situation reached a low point in early January, with stockpiles down to two days of food and only 217,000 tons of fuel remaining. 980 tons of flour, 2.9 tons of barley, 815 tons of soybeans, 11 tons of malt, 427.7 tons of slab fat, and 1.1 tons of bran. Frantic efforts were directed at pushing the Road of Life even further. It would not be until 18 January that the ice roads would be able to meet all of the mandated norms for the Leningrad Front. During this period, the ice roads faced increasing air attacks and small infantry raids from Finnish and German forces. As a result, the Leningrad Front was compelled to allocate substantial rifle units and naval infantry, alongside heavy anti-aircraft emplacements, to safeguard Leningrad’s lifeline. The PVO Protivovozdushnoy oborony fielded 200 mid-caliber antiaircraft guns, 50 small caliber guns, 100 antiaircraft machine guns, and 100 searchlights to defend against enemy aircraft.

Logistical problems also plagued Germany. On 15 December, the Chief of Wehrmacht Transport, Rudolf Gercke, reported that the Ostheer required 300 trains per day to stay fully supplied. However, shortages of coal, personnel, and other shortfalls meant that only 122 trains could be sent per day by 17 December. That figure was grossly inflated: in reality, only 53 trains were sent each day. 1,643 trains arrived through the entirety of December (58 less than November) fpr the Ostheer. Back in November Army Group Center required 31 trains for basic subsistence but only received 16. By the end of December, Hitler would notice the stark discrepancy between promised trains and actual supply deliveries, prompted by adjutants who had visited the front. In response, all rail operations were transferred to the Reich Ministry of Transport. As a result, the Army lost control of its own supply apparatus, handing it over to civilian administrations running the occupied territories. Under the OKH, rail traffic control was chaotic at best and, at times, trains vanished as local authorities hijacked them. The wounded froze to death on stalled hospital trains, and stockpiles were raided by divisions already low on supplies. Spare parts for repairing tanks and trucks were fiercely contested, and occasionally fighting erupted between teams dispatched by different divisions. This lack of spare parts is also a large reason why so few captured soviet tanks were put into commission. Most of them needed repairs to be useful but repairing the masses of broken German vehicles took priority. 

There was also a massive shortage of trucks and the fuel to move even that small number of vehicles. While each Army was estimated to need up to 3,000 tons of supplies per day, the 2nd Panzer Army was averaging only 360 tons daily, with all other armies in similar plights. This situation was worsened by trucks often being hijacked by divisions and sent back to Germany for supplies. In one notable instance, the 19th Panzer Division sent a truck all the way back to Spandau, Berlin, to bring back utterly vital equipment, sausage production machinery. Despite these supply problems, copious amounts of alcohol appeared for soldiers not on the frontline as a bitter but festive release to celebrate the New Year. Alcohol provided one of the few escapes from the horrors of the Eastern Front for many on both sides. Alcohol and drug abuse would rise in the Wehrmacht following Operation Barbarossa. 1800 would die of alcohol or drug abuse between 1939-1944. Three quarters were from denatured alcohol poisoning and 95.9% were after the invasion started. Soviets and Germans also unleashed massive artillery barrages on each other, which included flare rounds to mark the start of 1942. Diary of Franz Leiprecht “The whole section of front began a hellish shooting. Flares of all colors brightened the sky. Yes, our guns even sent a few New Year’s greetings to the enemy.”

On the 28th, the Germans deployed a new shell type for the first time. With these, a Panzer IV managed to knock out two T-34 tanks at a range of 1 km with a single shell each. General Kluge had repeatedly begged for the newly developed hollow-charge warheads to be released, and it had taken until the 22nd for Halder and Hitler to be worn down. Kluge had effectively given Halder an ultimatum, insisting that unless these warheads were issued, his infantry would have no choice but to retreat from Soviet tank attacks. These shells helped alleviate the tank-panic phenomena that had plagued the German infantry in December, as confidence in their anti-tank capabilities slowly recovered.

This week, both Panzer Groups endured frequent attacks, though their sector remained relatively quiet compared with their flanking Armies. Their positions were well defended, protected by the Lama and Rusa Rivers. Any breakthrough was met with rapid counterattacks and crushed. Both formations had been in place long enough to improve their positions, such as installing heating in the dugouts. Despite these small gains, the Panzer Groups were bleeding men, equipment, and supplies. Hoepner letter home to his wife 1st January “The troops are screaming for replacements, munitions and fuel.” Food, in particular, remained a pressing concern as rations needed to be increased to offset the cold. Reinhardt stated he needed an increase in his men’s fat ration to seventy-five grams a day as well as two warm meals and half a loaf of bread each. In isolation he was correct, in context this was impossible with the logistical situation which was not able to sustain even the normal ration amounts. In fact, 80% of the 46th Panzer Corps were without food and were urgently requesting Luftwaffe air drops of rations. Attempts to clear snow from the roads often proved fruitless due to heavy snowfall. Diary of Otto Will - a soldier in the 5th Panzer Division  “ We can shovel as much as we want; the road cannot be cleared. We work like crazy and still progress only gradually. Throughout the whole day, we are working without break in this weather”.

Kluge wanted to pull troops away from the secure Panzer Groups to help rescue the crises emerging in the 9th and 4th Armies. This move fostered a perception among Hoepner and Reinhardt that Kluge posed a greater threat to them than the Soviets. Both commanders believed themselves in extraordinarily weak positions. Hoepner letter home to his wife on 1st January “When, with all manner of chicanery, I have made a reserve, the army group takes it away to fill a hole of the neighbors. They can or must always withdraw, while I am supposed to hold.” They remained potentially traumatized by the extreme material losses of their winter retreats and were determined to avoid a repeat. Each refused to consider the wider situation outside his own sector.  Reinhardt’s letter home to his wife 31st December.“Both sides cause us worry [Strauss and Hoepner]. We are always standing between two fires, whether we should take the last shirt off our back to help, whether it really is so bad at our neighbors, or whether we should remain hard, so that we ourselves are not placed in danger. In addition, we are pressed from above, we should obviously help because apparently there is unexpected confidence in the panzer troops. You can just imagine how stressful this game of nerves is. We can always only tell our commanders that we are not guilty of this disquiet and have to hope that, with the help of God, everything will be well.” Ultimately, Kluge was forced to bargain with Reinhardt to secure at least a single battalion with a few tanks to aid the collapsing 9th Army on the 31st, with Reinhardt demanding their return by the latest on 2 January. Kluge, a field marshall commanding 6 Armies and on paper 1.7 million soldiers, was forced to reason with Reinhardt “that help is in your own interest [and] absolutely necessary, even if only a battalion with a few tanks”.

This self-centered selfishness extended to sabotaging Kluge’s attempts to withdraw the 9th and 4th Armies. Both commanders were desperate to maintain their river defenses, which withdrawing the two infantry armies would have required them to abandon. They bypassed Kluge to report directly to Halder their apparent fuel shortages, claiming they would only be able to engage with their carbines. Reinhardt “If Panzer Group 3 should have to withdraw, I’ll only come with the carbines on the shoulder.”Rather than facing punishment for breaching the chain of command, both were rewarded. Hoepner was promoted to Colonel General, and Panzer Groups 3 and 4 were redesignated as Panzer Armies on 1 January. Their pettiness extended even to each other, as Reinhardt pressed Hoepner to return the 10 tanks loaned to support the 106th Infantry Division. Hoepner argued that the tanks could not be returned until the 5th of January at the earliest.

Strauss’ 9th Army would suffer through a baffling sequence of events this week. Last week, Kluge had granted permission for the 6th and 23rd Corps to withdraw, starting on the evening of the 27th. However, it would not be until the 29th that Kluge finally spoke with Hitler about the 9th Army’s precarious situation. Hitler claimed that the two Panzer Groups on the 9th Army’s eastern flank did not have the fuel to withdraw alongside them, and thus he outright rejected Strauss’ request to withdraw to the Königsberg line. He then presented a report from Richthofen, commander of the 8th Air Corps, claiming that aerial intelligence contradicted the 9th Army’s reports. Richthofen asserted that many villages the 9th Army said they had lost were still in German hands, and that the Soviets were in full retreat after several German counterattacks. The report also apparently disputed the existence of Soviet cavalry totally raiding German supply lines, and concluded by noting that the 6th Corps commander was very nervous.

This comedy of a report led Hitler to conclude the problem was one of will and to demand the immediate replacement of Förster, despite Kluge’s protests. It grew even more insane when Richthofen was deemed the best man for the job. Richthofen thus became commander of the 6th Army Corps alongside his role as commander of the 8th Air Corps, but he lasted only three days before being replaced by Bieler on 2 January. Strangely, Richthofen never interfered with Wehrmacht affairs again. It should be noted that Halder should have served as the link between the troops and Hitler, but he had long since abdicated those responsibilities. Halder’s Diary “very difficult crisis at Ninth Army, where apparently the leadership temporarily lost their nerve.”. This left it to Kluge to fight every political battle on behalf of the troops. OKW was becoming more like OKH, transforming into Hitler’s mouthpiece rather than representing Army interests. This is underscored by Hermann Balck, who claimed in his memoirs that the Halt Order was the greatest clemency to the front-line troops. “I pleaded with Hitler not to withdraw under any circumstances … This was a crisis that could not be solved operationally … The demand to hold under such conditions might sound brutal, but in reality it was the greatest clemency”.

This insanity left Strauss lamenting, “we will fight to the last, but I am convinced it is senseless.” While Strauss was willing to fight to the death, his subordinates were not. His corps and divisional level commanders were ready to withdraw under pressure rather than remain in place. Orders of 129th infantry division commander Stephan Rittau “Fight with maneuver! Inflict losses on the enemy, if necessary, abandon a few strongly attacked villages. Avoid costly counterattacks which are not absolutely necessary! Allow enemy to accumulate! Enemy also lacks sufficient reserves.“ Unfettered, Kluge pressed Hitler for several hours on the 30th and 31st to allow the 9th Army to retreat. Kluge had also tried to speak with Halder, who refused to pass the information on to Hitler. Halder to Kluge to justify his inaction. “the Führer will never agree to a withdrawal to a predetermined line”. Kluge was unimpressed with Halder’s vacillation. “must demand, that Colonel-General Strauss relocate, so that a catastrophe does not result on the Staritsa front … You cannot see how the people look!… If, as I have proposed for a long time, we had relocated earlier, this would have been planned and done in full order. Now this cannot be guaranteed with stricken divisions that are incessantly attacked. We are falling back, whether we want to or not!”While Halder hid behind inaction, Richthofen’s corps was shattered on the 31st and retreated without any authorization. 

Kluge sought freedom to maneuver and proposed an elastic defense, arguing that Hitler must trust him to function effectively. Kluge  “I ask for freedom of maneuver. You must trust me that what I do is right. Otherwise I cannot function. We do not only want what is the best for Germany, but also for you.“ Hitler and Halder flatly refused. When Kluge informed Hitler that Strauss was retreating, Hitler raged and ordered the 9th Army to defend in place. In response, Kluge seized on ambiguous wording in one of Hitler’s orders to justify some freedom of movement for the beleaguered 9th Army. Hitler “It is impossible to initiate an operational movement without the approval of the high command. The troops will have to stop right where they are.” He argued that their retreats could be explained by enemy pressure, while insisting to Strauss that any movements must be local to avoid detection by Halder and Hitler. “to give permission freely, in the area of a division, to conduct fighting withdrawals.”Yet not all corps commanders shared that caution.

Gablenz openly informed the 9th Army’s chief of staff that his corps would not stop until they reached the Königsberg Line, despite Hitler’s prohibitions. Even Richthofen now admitted Hitler’s order was impossible and accepted the need for a fighting retreat. This caused Kluge’s ploy to fail on the 2nd, but his reputation meant Hitler believed the deception originated with OKH. Halder’s Diary “The withdrawal of the Ninth Army, against the will of the supreme commander, occasioned irate scenes at this morning’s conference. The OKH is charged with having introduced parliamentary procedures in the army and lacking firm leadership. These statements, which are completely untenable criticisms, take up time and undermine fruitful cooperation.” However, Hitler demanded that the 9th Army’s current position be held to the last man, no matter what. “until the last man, without consideration for breakdowns in command at the front, without consideration for holes in the front, without consideration for responding to dangers, without consideration for supply difficulties”.Kluge was forced to act against Gablenz, who refused to accept this order. If he continued to retreat while the other corps held, a corps-sized breach in the German lines would open and disaster would follow. After Kluge’s ultimatum, Gablenz resigned and was replaced by the compliant Joachim Witthöft on the 2nd. Kluge’s ultimatum. “I just want to tell you the following: It is the clear will of the Führer that no step backwards be taken. If you want to take the consequences for doing so, please report it. I ask only one thing: When you go, your chief of staff must accept the order to hold in the present line.” That day, the 6th Corps lost contact with both neighboring corps as the Soviets broke through. Counterattacks managed to restore the link to the 27th Corps. The newly arriving SS Cavalry Corps was ordered to counterattack the other breakthrough, but they would not arrive until the 7th. The week ended with Soviets flooding through the breach and threatening the important city of Rzhev. In response to this crisis, Hitler subordinated Reinhardt to Strauss.

Kübler had arrived from the relative calm of the 39th Mountain Corps along the Mius river to a calamity facing the 4th Army. An operational breakthrough to the south, which OKH was deliberately hiding from Hitler, had already prompted Kübler to covertly withdraw the wings of the 4th Army last week. Soviet attacks struck the entire front and threatened a fresh breakthrough at Borovsk on the 30th. Kübler reported, “the divisions can no longer hold. I have never had such an urgent report from the troops.” Yet if Kluge wished to withdraw his line, he also needed it to hold periodically. He sought to show that withdrawals were forced by Soviet action to avoid being fired like Guderian. He found himself trapped in a give-and-take between the needs of frontline commanders and the politics of high command. Thus Kübler was informed that he must hold for the time being. “In these positions we cannot capitulate so quickly.”

Kluge did attempt to request withdrawal permission for Kübler, but he was met by an angry Hitler who exaggerated that the retreats would “go right back to the Polish border. Every retreat requires loss. If this withdrawal only ends at our border, we will have no more matériel and without matériel everything is lost”. Hitler then insisted that, because he endured ten-day artillery barrages in the First World War, German soldiers would simply have to endure their current conditions. This conveniently ignored that it was never -30 degrees Celsius in France, among other details. Kluge could only relay Lieutenant General Hell’s comment: “The commanding general has insisted that if one ordered the 15th Division to hold, the troops would cease to do so as a result of excessive exhaustion.” Hitler’s only retort was, “If that is the case, then it means the end of the German army.”

An hour later, Hitler called Kluge back but remained obstinate. The 15th Division and the 4th Army were ordered to stay in place, yet the 98th Infantry continued its retreat despite multiple orders from multiple levels of command. As a result, its commander, Schroeck, was replaced on the 31st. On the 2nd, the frontline was breached between the 57th and 2nd Corps, a gap that rapidly widened to 18 kilometers. Even Halder, in his diary, conceded that it was unlikely to be sealed. Meanwhile, Hitler wasted time asking irrelevant questions of Kluge, such as how many machineguns were in action at Maloiaroslavets’ cemetery. When the inquiry traced down to the relevant battalion and back up. HITLER: Herr Feldmarschall, how many machine guns are currently in action at the cemetery in Maloiaroslavets? KLUGE: I’ll have someone find out right away.…..KLUGE: Mein Führer, there are four machine guns in action at the Maloiaroslavets cemetery. HITLER: Herr Feldmarschall, see to it that there are at least six machine guns assigned there. Hitler demanded that the answer, initially four machines, be increased to six. Maloiaroslavets was liberated by the Soviets on the same day. After another request to withdraw, Hitler questioned Kübler and Kluge’s courage to make hard decisions, then ordered reserves found from other formations. He then assigned the front sector to Hoepner’s Panzer Army to punish Kübler’s perceived inability to handle the situation. This left Kübler with five corps that were being encircled from both the north and the south.

The 19th Panzer Division counterattacked the Soviet breakthrough between the 43rd and 13th Army Corps on the 28th, restoring contact between the two corps and preventing the threatened encirclement of the 43rd. Yet small groups of Soviets still remained behind the German lines. An 80-kilometer gap persisted between Kaluga and Schmidt’s forces. In that space, Soviets began air-dropping small teams behind the German lines, joining roving bands of cavalry harassing German supply routes.

Despite reestablishing contact with the 4th Army, Heinrici prepared to abandon Kaluga. Kaluga, however, was too important to relinquish without permission. Kluge argued with Hitler that Yukhnov and Suchinitschi were vital transportation hubs that could only be defended if Kaluga was sacrificed. The former two locations were already under threat from fast-moving Soviet forces. The 2nd Panzer and the 4th Army depended on these locations for their supply lines. Hitler initially balked at sacrificing too much equipment during 43rd Corps’s retreat. In the end, he recognized that if the Corps remained at Kaluga, they would be totally lost, leaving the supply routes undefended. Their retreat was authorized late on the 29th.

Heinrici’s retreat moved through contested terrain as infantry leapfrogged from village to village, seeking shelter from the cold and Soviet fire. Small bands of retreating German troops were encircled by roving Soviet forces in a chaotic intermingling. Some would be rescued; others would not. By the time they rallied at their new positions, ammunition had become so scarce that soldiers not on the front line were forced to surrender all but their last clip to keep the frontline firing. Kluge had compelled Hoepner to send the 40th Panzer Corps south to reinforce the limp of the 4th Army. The 19th and 10th Panzer Divisions, along with the 10th Motorised Division, were reinforced by an eclectic mix of supply troops and military police. This force was to launch a major offensive to destroy the Soviet penetration. In addition, the newly arriving 216th Division was ordered to Suchinitschi, right in the middle of the 90-kilometer breach in the German lines. Both forces were due to arrive next week.

Schmidt's Armies spent the week fortifying their new positions along the Oka and Zusha river lines as replacements arrived. Eberbach even suggested recruiting Soviet POWs and arming them with captured equipment, but the proposal was not adopted despite the desperate manpower shortage. The recruitment of Hilfswillige (Hiwis) or Auxiliary volunteers was already becoming increasingly widespread even if unofficially due to Hitler’s ban on any recruitment of Slavs into the Ostheer. They worked jobs such as translators, drivers, medics, horse grooms, cooks, servants, and guards. The practice of arming them however was not as accepted with only small groups active usually as police forces. In his diary Goebbels blamed the manpower shortages at the front and domestically on the Germans “who have brought too few children into the world and now must pay dearly.”Soviet attacks remained frequent, but many were halted by German static positions. Those assaults that found any success were rapidly countered and destroyed by small mobile battlegroups. Soviet losses were disproportionately high.

Guderian’s removal meant the 2nd Panzer Army could no longer ignore the Soviet offensive to its north. Its river-line positions provided a strong defensive stance, allowing German forces to withstand the Bryansk Front’s frontal attacks. When a Soviet thrust appeared dangerous, the German defenders briefly retreated to let the Soviets cross the river bank. Shortly after, reserve forces counterattacked the surprised Soviets and restored the frontline. Captured equipment was often used to replace losses from the earlier retreat. For example, on the 1st, the 4th Panzer Division logged in their war diary over 1,000 enemy killed and 139 prisoners of war, while suffering only 74 casualties in a major counterattack. Raids and spoiling attacks were also frequently launched to disrupt Soviet formations. Unknown German soldier’s diary entry. “In front of us, in the direction of the enemy, is a desert zone many kilometers deep, all the villages are burnt down, the inhabitants are driven eastwards, we have taken those fit for military service as prisoners!—Unspeakably great misery all round!” These factors enabled the Panzer Army to begin sending formations north to counter the northern threat.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Army’s line stretched about 200 km, leaving divisions often without firm contact with their neighbors, though Kursk and Oryol served as supply hubs behind both flanks. A Soviet tank offensive forced a limited withdrawal of the 48th Panzer Corps on January 1st. The 9th Panzer Division could muster only four serviceable tanks in support of the 16th Motorised, necessitating the stronger 3rd Panzer Division being sent south to aid in securing contact with Schmidt’s forces for Army Group South. By the third day of fighting, the battles had become desperate, with mobile engagements breaking out across open terrain. The cold sparked a massive frostbite outbreak among the 16th Motorised, the nearby 299th Infantry Division, and the attacking Soviets, with one regiment reporting 80% of its soldiers suffering frostbite. Leonid Rabichev, Red Army Officer.  “I saw a horrifying sight. An enormous space stretching to the horizon was filled with our tanks and German tanks. In between them there were thousands of sitting, standing or crawling Russians and Germans frozen solid. Some of them were leaning against each other, others hugging each other. Some propping themselves with a rifle, others holding a sub-machine gun … It was terrible to think of the wounded, both ours and Germans, freezing to death. The front had advanced and they had forgotten to bury these men”.

The Soviets continued their relatively ineffective probes against Army Group South. German intelligence detected a large Soviet buildup between Lisichansk and Kupyansk, signaling an imminent large-scale offensive toward the Dnieper. In response, Hitler reminded Army Group soldiers to take the Halt Order literally and seriously. He also ordered preparations to repulse a major attack on Kharkiv, and instructed the Army Group to be ready for a potential popular uprising. On January 1st, Friedrich Paulus was appointed General of the Panzer Troops and assigned to the 6th Army to replace Reichenau who was now commanding Army Group South. Last week, Tolbunkhin’s plan dumped frozen and poorly supplied troops across the Kerch Peninsula. They failed to expand their bridgeheads as planned, but nonetheless drew in German and Romanian forces. Landings at Capes Zyuk and Khroni were crushed by the evening of the 28th, and the remaining landings were contained by thin covering forces. Also on that day, the second stage of Tolbunkhin’s plan commenced as the winter storms abated.

Two cruisers and eight destroyers brought the 44th Army ashore at Fedosia early on the 29th. Last week’s landings had drawn away the infantry regiment defending the port, leaving only two artillery battalions and 800 engineers. The defenders were taken by surprise, and the Luftwaffe arrived too late to contest the landings. By the end of the day, large parts of three Rifle divisions had landed with remarkable speed. The Romanian 4th Mountain Brigade was ordered to form blocking positions around the port, while the 8th Cavalry Brigade was ordered to hurry back. Sponeck requested permission for his corps to retreat to the Parpach Narrows, but Mainstein refused. Instead, he promised to send a group from the 73rd Infantry Division and the entire 170th Division. Hitler also promised that 50 tanks would be sent to restore the situation.

In a maneuver that seemed to be a German officer’s tradition, Sponeck cut communications with Mainstein and withdrew anyway. The 46th Division forced marched 75 km west. To buy time, the Romanians were ordered to attack the Soviet landing at Feodosia on the 30th, but the assault proceeded without air or artillery support and was easily repulsed, with the Soviets counterattacking afterward. The 46th Division’s route was cut off at Vladislavovka on the 31st. After failing to defeat the Soviet roadblock, the division detoured cross-country through the remaining six-mile gap between the Soviet positions and the coastline, all while contending with heavy harassment from Soviet paratroopers.

By January 1st, the 42nd Army Corps had reformed a defensive line 12 miles west of Feodosiya, aligned with the first of Mainstein’s reinforcements. Kerch had been liberated as the 51st Army landed safely and began expanding from its bridgeheads. However, the three Rifle divisions of the 44th Army were too dispersed to threaten the 42nd Corps’ line until reinforced by four divisions from the 51st Army. That waiting allowed the Germans to regain the initiative, and worse, Soviet forces failed to entrench themselves as the Caucasus Front commander believed the Germans too weak to counterattack. This delay interrupted Manstein’s offensive on Sevastopol. On the 28th, Manstein had concentrated his remaining infantry and launched a surprisingly successful offensive, capturing a large portion of the Mekenzievy Mountain sector. The arrival of the fresh 386th Rifle and 3rd Guards Divisions, along with news of the Feodosiya landings, would bring this offensive to a halt.

Several assaults against a position the Germans dubbed Fort Stalin failed under heavy artillery fire. Afterwards, German forces withdrew from their more advanced positions to straighten their line in preparation for counterattacks. In the December assault on Sevastopol, German and Romanian forces incurred 9,856 casualties, leaving many divisions combat-ineffective. During the same period, Petrov’s Coastal Army suffered an estimated 17,000 casualties.

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German planners, pressing to hold off the advancing Soviets, watched as Zhukov’s forces pressed relentlessly on Army Group Center, threatening to erase the gains of earlier campaigns. The Soviets, meanwhile, contended with rear-area disarray and frostbitten civilians, yet exploited every opportunity to stretch German lines. As the fronts cooled, both sides learned anew the brutal calculus of attrition, logistics, and the hard math of cover and collapse.