Last time we spoke about Hitler stealing his Armies trains. The year trudged in with a cruel frost as the Eastern Front lurched into a new phase. Zhukov’s Soviet offensives pressed the German lines around Kaluga, Volokolamsk, and Kalinin, not with elegant strategy but with tenacious, grinding persistence. Across the German rear, Hitler’s halting edicts and internecine debates with generals sowed hesitancy, while Kluge’s cautious withdrawals offered few clear strategic answers. Yet within the chaos, a stubborn, almost improvised discipline, Auftragstaktik at the lower levels, kept pockets of cohesion, even as higher echelons floundered. Trains became lifelines and, at times, liabilities: routes clogged by civilian control, fuel dwindling, and spare parts vanishing. The front oscillated between sieges, counterattacks, and painstaking withdrawals along the central and northern sectors, as both sides endured frostbite and morale drains. 

This episode is Stalin’s General offensive: Reinforcing Failure

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Stalin on January 5th, 1942 “The Germans are in disarray as a result of their defeat at Moscow, they are badly fitted out for the winter. This is the most favourable moment for the transition to a general offensive”

Stavka planned once again to encircle and destroy Army Group Center with attacks launched from the North-Western, Kalinin, Western, and Bryansk Fronts. Simultaneously, the Leningrad, North-Western, and Volkhov Fronts, supported by the Baltic Fleet, were tasked with encircling and destroying Army Group North. In Ukraine, the Southwestern and Southern Fronts were directed to liberate Donbas, while the Caucasus Front would reconquer Crimea. Zhukov and Voznesenskii raised objections, arguing that the Red Army should concentrate its resources to smash Army Group Center rather than spreading strength and resources across the entire USSR. Zhukov “On the Western axis, where there is the most favourable set of conditions and [where] the enemy has not yet succeeded in re-establishing the combat efficiency of his units, we must continue offensive operations, but for successful offensive operations it is essential to reinforce our forces with men, equipment and to build up reserves, above all tank units, without which we can have no basis for anticipating particular success. As for offensive operations by our forces at Leningrad and on the South-Western axis, then it must be pointed out that our troops face formidable enemy defences. Without powerful artillery for support they will not be able to break through the enemy positions, they will be ground down and will suffer heavy, not to say unjustifiable losses. I am all for reinforcing the Western Front and mounting the most powerful offensive operations there.” 

However, these objections were quickly dismissed by Stalin. In fact, Stavka had already issued directives for this offensive before that meeting began. Stalin’s detachment from frontline realities meant that the partial victories at Rostov, Tikhvin, and Moscow had led him to believe that Ostheer was on the brink of collapse. He planned to drain German manpower reserves during the winter and to raise new Soviet forces in the interior. Stalin’s 10 January directive  “Our task is to deny the Germans this breathing space, to drive them to the west without a halt, to force them to expend their reserves before spring, when we will have new and large reserves, and the Germans will have no large reserves, and to thus secure complete defeat of the Hitlerite forces in the year 1942”. Stahel later claimed that the Red Army had only 600 heavy tanks and 800 medium tanks still functional. Rather than concentrating these diminished assets in a single sector, the plan called for dispersal across the USSR. Stalin’s isolation from actual conditions caused him to overestimate the Red Army’s capabilities, attributing potential offensive failures to artillery coordination gaps rather than to broader weaknesses within the officer corps. “Often we send the infantry into an attack against the enemy’s defense line without artillery, without any artillery support whatsoever, and after that we complain that the infantry won’t go against an enemy who has dug in and is defending himself. It is clear, however, that such an “offensive” cannot yield the desired effect. It is not an offensive but a crime—a crime against the Motherland and against the troops which are forced to suffer senseless losses”. This detachment from reality was a direct consequence of the purges. No one wished to relay bad news up the chain of command. As a result, reports were sanitized and exaggerated by the time they reached Stavka and Stalin, while orders were followed blindly to avoid taking responsibility for failures.

While Meretskov’s Volkhov Front had been engaged in the Tikhvin Offensive, STAVKA had been planning a far larger and far more ambitious offensive in tandem with the Leningrad and Northwestern Fronts. Soviet planning documents believed these Fronts to hold one and a half times as many soldiers as the opposing German forces. Despite the numerous problems and delays facing the combatant Front, Stalin insisted that these problems be ignored and that the rigid timetable be followed. Meretskov, however, also appears to bear partial responsibility for the rushed push, as referenced in a later conversation with STAVKA. Meretskov’s 10th January phone conversation with Stalin and Vasilevsky: "The Russians have a saying: 'Haste makes waste.' With you it is happening exactly like this. Without properly preparing the offensive, you were in a haste to launch it and wasted time. If you remember, I proposed to postpone the offensive until Sokolov's army is ready. You refused and now are reaping the fruits of your haste."

The Leningrad Front had led the offensive initially. On the 4th, the 54th Army once again pushed against Kashira and the surrounding villages, managing to gain only 5 kilometers after two days of fighting. Then the 12th Panzer Division arrived and counterattacked, driving Fediunin-sky’s army back to its starting positions. The attack had been so weak that German sources barely paid attention to it. Halder’s War Diary was exceedingly dismissive.  Halder’s War Diary.  “North. Continued enemy attacks, but nothing on a major scale.”  On the 6th, the Volkhov Front launched an attack despite still concentrating its forces. It would not be until the 12th that all infantry and artillery elements of the Front completed their deployments. Infantry moved forward without adequate support, and reserves were frequently not in position to capitalize on any initial gains. The rush also caused fuel and ammunition shortages to plague the offensive. Worse still, their attacks repeatedly collided with German strongpoints, headbutting them over and over without decisive breakthroughs. Their main offensive began on the 6th and 7th. The 59th Army attempted to expand the Volkhov bridgeheads. Wave after wave of poorly supported infantry futilely attacked, yielding no gains. The 59th Army’s official history. “The regiments of the army's first-echelon divisions rose up to attack in the morning after short artillery barrages. Deep snow hindered the advance, and the subunits managed to cross the Volkhov River, whose width reached up to 400 meters, on the ice, and were immediately exposed to enemy flanking fire. The enemy met the attackers with intense fire from large-caliber machine guns from pillboxes located along the forward edge and from all of types of rifle weapons. Artillery and mortars fired from the depths. Wounded and dead began appearing in the combat ranks. However, despite the enemy's strong resistance, separate subunits managed to overcome the river and dig in on the Volkhov River's western bank. The battle lasted many hours. The soldiers rose up to attack time and time again but, after encountering destructive fires, were forced back. At nightfall, in many sectors the attacking units withdrew to their jumpingoff positions.” Yet Meretskov’s report to STAVKA was more optimistic, claiming heavy enemy losses. It does admit, however, that the 2nd Shock Army was about to launch an assault without fuel, food, artillery, or air support, among other shortages.

Unsurprisingly, the 2nd Shock Army’s attack on the 7th proved disastrous, suffering 3,000 casualties in just the first 30 minutes of their assault. Stalin, however, pushed both armies onward until the 9th, after which the attacks collapsed from exhaustion and confusion. Meretskov managed to secure a three-day halt from STAVKA on the 10th. This development prompted Stalin to dispatch Mekhlis to “supervise” Meretskov. There, Mekhlis uncovered several deficiencies, such as missing artillery pieces and spare parts, and issued orders to address the problems. Another issue that became apparent was the evident incompetence of Sokolov, who was replaced by Klykov. However, Mekhlis would soon gain a reputation as a harbinger of military disaster.

STAVKA had recognized that the area south of Lake Ilmen was very lightly held, and believed this presented an opportunity to sever the link between Army Group Center and Army Group North. OKH had already realized the danger and had moved both the 81st Infantry Division and the 18th Motorised Division into this sector. Nevertheless, the defense remained light, with most of the frontline consisting of small outposts and the occasional strongpoint. Half-strength regiments were manning the frontline, a posture that doctrine would have assigned to a full-strength division. Kurochkin’s Northwestern Front opened their offensive on the 7th, synchronized with the Volkhov Front’s main thrust. Unlike their counterparts, they achieved success. The German commander doubted that the Soviets could move large formations across the frozen lake and also assumed the Luftwaffe would smash such efforts. Catching the Germans completely by surprise, the 11th Army advanced 7 km on the first day and reached up to 50 km by the 9th. The Germans had only defended the coastline of Lake Ilmen, which had now frozen solid, as well as the surrounding marshland. Ski troops were employed to bypass German strongpoints and sever German logistics. General Hasan, commanding, rushed the depleted 18th Motorised and a small detachment from the SS Totenkopf to Staraya Russa to hold the vital transport hub. The appearance of KV tanks crushed the outpost line of the 10th Corps, which had only anti-tank rifles that proved utterly ineffective. The lack of effective anti-tank weapons would contribute to the collapse of the German blocking line and force a retreat to Parfino, where Flak 88s were being rushed forward.

On the 10th, the 34th Army slipped forces into the outpost line of the increasingly distracted 290th Infantry Division. After encircling and destroying these German garrisons, they pushed the 202 Rifle Division forward to cut the Lychkovo railway line. The 290th Infantry Division was now trapped between the 11th and 34th Armies. Similarly, the 2nd Corps was surprised by the 3rd Shock Army. Its outposts had been too thinly spread to detect the Soviets until they came under attack. Yet the 3rd Shock Army’s logistical situation remained poor, and they failed to rapidly concentrate against the German strongpoints, which managed to repel the initial assaults. On the 9th, Eremenko’s 4th Shock Army surprised the SS reconnaissance cavalry at Peno, which held out only for a single day before retreating. This earned the SS much derision from Army personnel holding out in similarly or worse conditions along this front. On the 7th of January, the Chief of the Finnish General Staff visited OKH. There he formed the opinion that “General Halder was over-tired and depressed.” If true, this would suggest that OKH’s disregard for frontline realities and its comparatively harmonious relationship with Hitler partially stemmed from a reduced capacity for conflict due to fatigue and depression. Yet there are no other accounts presenting Halder in this light, so Halder could also have been merely extremely overoptimistic, fully aligned with the Nazi will.

While Hitler had subordinated the 3rd Panzer Army to Strauss’s 9th Army last week, Reinhardt persisted in the same obstructive pattern as before. He refused to expand his frontline to free up formations needed to seal the breach in 9th Army’s line. Instead, he demanded control of the 6th Panzer Division in return for complying with this order. Reinhardt also insisted that the 5th Army Corps fall under his direct command rather than under Strauss’s. He complained to Army Group Center’s headquarters and to Heusinger at OKH. By the 5th, Reinhardt still had not complied with Strauss’s order, and Kluge called him directly, even threatening a court-martial if disobedience continued. The 86th Infantry was finally released to act as a reserve for the 9th Army. For the entire week, Reinhardt’s front saw only infrequent small-scale actions as the Soviets concentrated on their push toward Rzhev.

German soldiers had learned to keep their weapons in warm shelters until fighting began to prevent the oil in their weapons from freezing. Some scraped and polished away traces of lubrication, believing this was more reliable than the cold’s effects. Others experimented with alternative mixtures, such as petroleum jelly, which froze at a lower temperature. Some even reportedly doused their weapons in gasoline and set them on fire to heat them before battle. To protect themselves, soldiers lacking winter clothing often used newspapers and propaganda leaflets as insulation.

Fortifications were created with explosives, as the ground was too cold to dig effectively. When large quantities of explosives were unavailable, hand grenades were used, though this was slow and dangerous. Werner Adamczyk “scrambling to the ground and hoping the explosion would not hurt us.”  … “A flat hole was created in the hard ground, allowing us to repeat the procedure over and over again, until we hit below the frost line to softer ground. Once this point was reached, everybody jumped in to dig deeper and deeper, until there was enough room to build a bunker.” A bunker could be constructed within two days or faster, depending on the amount and type of explosives, and there was no enemy contact during the build. Where existing peasant houses remained, these were converted instead, because their stoves helped keep the ground from freezing. However, trenches were impossible to dig, making it unfeasible to connect bunkers and foxholes. In settlements, walls of ice were constructed between buildings to funnel attackers into open kill zones. Stahel Retreat from Moscow. “The ice walls were a simple construction, starting with bundles of sticks or fence palings, covered by blankets or a poncho and soaked with water and snow until they were thick enough to stop a bullet.” When possible, trees were felled to create barriers to channel enemy tanks onto minefields. The Germans also exploited the heavy snow to limit movement, guiding Soviet attacks toward strong points with limited flanking opportunities. The snow also helped dampen the impact of the ever-increasing Soviet artillery, which significantly outnumbered German guns.  Hans Roth“The enemy’s artillery is revving up; we are lucky to have such deep snow, for on the rock-hard frozen ground, the effects of the detonations are so much stronger.”

The VVS maintained its advantage over the Luftwaffe during the first month of the winter offensive. In the first 35 days, the VVS logged 7,210 sorties against Army Group Center, focusing on withdrawing columns, command posts, and supply lines. Horses were often a prime target. They were large and hard to hide while also being vital for German logistics.   Hans von Luck “Before long, the narrow roads were choked with cadavers of horses and broken-down vehicles.” One major strike, on the 31st at Oryol, detonated two trains full of fuel; both trains were utterly destroyed, along with nearby trains full of food. German reports consistently complained about the material impact of these frequent air strikes, as well as the lack of fighter protection or flak coverage. Otto Bense“It was a real war of nerves. The planes that came over at night were the worst. They kept on circling overhead, all night long. The Russians left us German soldiers nervous wrecks—for some it was so bad that they went mad.“ However, the VVS proved unfocused, with its effort spread along the entire frontline, which limited its overall effect.

The Luftwaffe was not inactive, but had to concentrate on the most vital sectors, namely the 9th and 4th Armies in January. Richthofen insisted his planes be deployed en masse rather than piecemeal. Despite being outnumbered, the Luftwaffe held the advantage in dogfights, shooting down 119 Soviet aircraft for 33 losses between December 15 and December 30. Hitler had also demanded that the Luftwaffe engage in strategic bombing missions under War Directive 39. “The task of the Airforce is to prevent the rehabilitation of the Russian forces by attacking, as far as possible, equipment and training centers, particularly Leningrad, Moscow, Rybinsk, Gorki, Voronezh, Rostov, Stalingrad, Krasnodar, etc. It is particularly important to harass, day by day, those enemy lines of communication which enable him to exist and by which he threatens our own front.” This directive reinforced the 8th Air Corps at the expense of bomber training programs, stripping over 100 planes from them. Such short-term thinking was evident as all bombers were directed to fly low-level bombing missions even when they were not designed for such tasks. Transport planes remained extremely busy keeping isolated units supplied. Richthofen also ordered all spare ground crew and pilots organized into combat teams and sent to the frontlines. - Hans- Ulrich Rudel “Our staff company commander, gets together a fighting party drawn from our ground personnel and those of the nearest units, and holds the airfield … For two successive days it is attacked by cavalry units and ski battalions. Then the situation becomes critical and we drop our bombs close to the perimeter of our airfield. The Soviet losses are heavy. Then Kresken, one-time athlete, assumes the offensive with his combat group. We hover above him with our aircraft, shooting and bombing down all opposition to his counter-attack … Our Luftwaffe soldiers at the beginning of the war certainly never saw themselves being used in this way” He further ordered all anti-aircraft guns rushed to the most critical frontline sectors. Deprived of support, many divisions were left to defend airspace on their own. The 2nd Panzer Division even decreed that everyone must fire at low-flying aircraft, with the warning: “Whoever does not shoot will be punished.”

Hitler had given Hoepner a poisoned chalice with the Maloiaroslavets breach between the 20th and 7th Army Corps. Hoepner had some reserve formations, but redeploying them south would take time, and supplying them for this move would require a major effort. Many of the Army’s Panzer divisions could only be used for local defense due to the near absence of fuel. As a result, the movement was not completed until the 6th. By then Kübler’s flank had been forced back, widening the breach to 29 km. Soviet divisions had begun swinging northward to flank Materna’s Corps. With their redeployment, Hoepner covertly began planning a major withdrawal of his entire Panzer Army and sought permission to retreat his flank to forestall the Soviet flanking movement. Kluge, however, refused and instead insisted Hoepner attack south. If successful, the maneuver could envelop all Soviet forces that had penetrated the gap.

However, by the 8th, this offensive had still not succeeded, while Soviet forces had severed the last open road supply to 20th Corps. Hoepner told Kluge that his corps would “go to the Devil” if not allowed to retreat. Kluge contacted Halder for permission. Rather than wait for a response, Hoepner ordered the corps to retreat soon after speaking with Kluge. Hoepner. “Field marshal, I have a duty that stands higher than my duty to you or my duty to the Führer. That is the duty entrusted to me by the troops”. He did not inform anyone in advance, hoping permission would arrive to conceal his disobedience. Kluge learned of it only from the evening report. When Hoepner remained intransigent in the ensuing phone call to Kluge, Kluge did not defend him in his report to Hitler. Hitler flew into a rage, demanding Hoepner be replaced and expelled from the Army in disgrace—with loss of pay, pension, and the right to wear a uniform. Legally, this was beyond Hitler’s formal power to demand. Kluge attempted to curb the punishment’s extremity and even threatened resignation if it were carried out, but Hitler’s fury could not be tempered. Schlabrendorff (Tresckow’s adjutant at Army Group Center)“When Kluge insisted that he was seriously considering not carrying out the order and instead resigning from his command, Hitler retorted sharply that nothing could make him change his mind, and that he would transfer command of Army Group Center to someone else if it became Necessary.” Kluge initially only told Hoepner that he had been replaced by 5th Army Corps’ commander Ruoff, saving the news of the punishment for a private conversation to spare Hoepner public indignity. Hoepner returned to Germany and attempted to challenge his expulsion through legal avenues, but he was arrested and executed in 1944 for his involvement in a plot against Hitler.

Kübler would meet with Kluge and Schmüdtt on the 5th, seeking operational freedom to conduct minor withdrawals. Kübler “If one voluntarily goes back a few kilometers, one takes everything with him; if the enemy breaks through and one must hurry back, everything remains.” However, he insisted the front as a whole could be maintained only if he received adequate replacements and supplies. Schmüdtt claimed 9,000 trucks were already en route to the East, but this was met with skepticism. Even the good news of divisions arriving from France was muted by reports that they lacked winter gear and uniforms. Afterwards, Kluge privately reassured Kübler that the Army would not be sacrificed or wasted; in fact, parts of the 4th Army would be allowed an unauthorized withdrawal. “As the former commander of the Fourth Army, I will see how they can be helped. If this is not possible, a big decision will have to be taken. I have now, by my own decision, withdrawn the left wing of the Fourth Army and it will be difficult to justify this to the high command.”Kluge was relying on his growing reputation with OKH and OKW. While he had requested countless withdrawals, he had not been seen to disobey any explicit refusals, nor had Kluge been seen tolerating disobedience from subordinates. Thus this January 6 withdrawal attracted no attention from OKH. Kluge would then suggest to OKH that further withdrawals could shorten the frontline and free up more reserves.

Schmüdtt then visited the HQ of the 4th Army on the 7th. The Army’s chief of staff was ordered to spare him no detail. Simultaneously, Kluge phoned Hitler for hours, followed by a lengthy conversation with Halder. Both sought to persuade them to permit a retreat before the 4th Army was encircled by the two breaches in its line. While Yukhnov and Medyn remained in German hands, they were only about 50 km apart and deep in the rear of the 4th Army’s main body. Both towns were also the primary roads required for any withdrawal. Hitler refused permission to withdraw on the 8th. Instead, he ordered strong groups be sent to Yukhnov and Medyn “to form pivots.” After these positions were secured, a withdrawal would be considered. By then, even the staff officers of Kirchner’s Panzer Corps were fighting on the line, an engagement that had killed the corps’ intelligence officer and Luftwaffe liaison. When Kluge failed to sway Hitler, an enraged Kübler demanded that Hitler’s order be changed within the next five minutes. Kübler and his chief of Staff, Bernuth, had already threatened ““if the order does not come, we will fight our way back without orders.” earlier that day. Forty-five minutes later, Kluge ultimately won permission to withdraw the 4th Army. Yet, although they had finally been granted an option to save themselves, they still faced the challenge of escaping.

Heinrici’s Corps was trying to recover from its ordeal, but it remained under constant pressure from Soviet attacks. Supplies and ammunition were in short supply, and he was already seeking to withdraw his 43rd Corps further; Kübler refused. “He [Kübler] has been sent here as a strong man; now he should impress upon the high command our opinion, in light of all the circumstances, or declare that he would rather take over a corps again.” On the 5th, Heinrici confronted his commander and asked whether his men should fight like the Soviets, who had held their positions blindly while already surrounded and doomed. Kluge was sympathetic to Heinrici’s plight but could not act on their behalf.

To the south, the 216th Infantry Division had thrown itself into the line at Suchinitschi. They were alone in the midst of a 90 km breach in the German front. The first 4,000 men arrived on the 4th and were almost immediately enveloped by Soviet forces. They managed to repel several assaults, but by day’s end they were signaling that they were completely encircled and cut off from supply. Hitler insisted they hold to the last, even likening their stand to the Alcázar in the Spanish Civil War. Their only hope lay in an offensive from Stumme’s reinforced 40th Panzer Corps, or whatever forces could be scavenged from the 2nd Panzer Army. Yet Stumme’s corps was himself struggling to defend Yukhnov, where Kübler’s command post was being evacuated. On top of that, Schmidt’s cobbled-together battlegroup assault collapsed as fresh Soviet forces poured into the breach. By the 6th, they reported only a few days’ worth of ammo and food remaining and pleaded to be allowed to withdraw. On the 7th, Schmidt ordered the 24th Army Corps to join the 4th and 19th Panzer Divisions in a major relief effort for the trapped defenders at Suchinitschi. They would be reinforced by the newly arrived 208th Infantry Division. German intelligence estimated that they faced five Soviet cavalry divisions and five to seven rifle divisions.

Schmidt had been able to pull these resources northward thanks to the solid positions of the 2nd Panzer Army along the Oka and Zusha rivers. As last week, the Bryansk Front maintained a steady cadence of attacks, but they did not unduly trouble the German defenders. In fact, the Germans along this sector often mocked the Soviet assaults. Wilhelm Prüller dairy entry 1st January. “During the past days—quite often in the nights too—the Russians attacked, but were beaten back. They advanced in such a silly way that the whole thing looked more like a demonstration than an attack. They would stop on the incline, apparently to rest, and made a wonderful target for our artillery. And after a few shots they would disappear over the brow of the hill again, running like stuck pigs”  They frequently launched small raids of their own against Soviet positions, such as the 29th Motorised attacking the villages of Butyrki and Shalamovo on the 6th with small attack groups. After capturing each village, the Germans would seize equipment and supplies, then destroy shelters and fortifications before rapidly retreating to German lines to avoid counterattacks. Unknown German soldier. “In front of us, in the direction of the enemy, is a desert zone many kilometers deep, all the villages are burnt down, the inhabitants are driven eastwards, we have taken those fit for military service as prisoners!—Unspeakably great misery all round!”  That looting helped offset the Germans’ appalling logistical system, while the raids’ disruption kept the Soviet forces opposing them weakened and off balance.

In December, Timosheko approached STAVKA with plans for a broad front January offensive, but requested half a million reinforcements and 15 full tank brigades. Those demands were impossible to fulfil, forcing the plans to be scaled down. The operation began on January 1 with attacks toward Kursk and Oboyan, spearheaded by the 40th and 21st Armies. Initial gains were followed by a counterattack from the 3rd Panzer Division last week. This fierce mobile fighting, conducted away from shelter, produced heavy frostbite casualties on both sides and persisted until January 8. German intelligence theorized that the Soviets were shifting attention toward the gap between the 2nd and 4th Armies to the north. As pressure on the front eased, Schmidt’s forces took revenge with multiple raids on unsuspecting Soviet positions. On January 5, the 38th Army was committed to an attack on Belgorod, though Maslov’s cautious approach squandered the element of surprise. Hans Roth dairy 8th January“The surprise of the sleeping Russians is one hundred percent successful. Most of them do not even get the chance to get up. Without mercy everything and everybody is gunned down or clubbed to death on their sleeping cots. The whole nightmare lasts about a half hour. Strelekaja [the village] burns down to the ground, in every hut there are twenty to thirty dead Russians; the houses become places of cremation.” 

While Strauss’s army was the strongest advocate for recruiting Hilfswillige, he was not alone in seeking extra manpower sources. In January, several attempts were made to form a Russian counter-government. Otto Bräutigam proposed establishing a parallel government to resemble a Vichy-style regime in the USSR. Likewise, Professor Theodor Oberländer approached Hitler with the idea of a Ukrainian puppet government. Hitler rejected both proposals, his ideological hatred outrunning any practical need for manpower from the occupied territories. Hitler to Oberländer“You don’t know what you are talking about. Russia is our Africa, and the Russians are our n****rs.” Nonetheless, Hitler did authorize the use of Soviet POWs as slave labor in Germany. By the end of 1941, roughly 308,000 Soviet POWs had already been forced to work in Germany. In addition, 3.5 million workers were brought from conquered territories into the German labor pool. Even this was not enough, and Fritz Sauckel demanded another 380,000 agricultural workers and 247,000 industrial workers from the USSR’s captured lands. Polish and Soviet workers endured horrific conditions, with constant corporal punishment, abuse, and malnutrition. 14 year old Olga Selezniova’s letter home. “It would be better to die than to be here … We were sold … as if we were slaves”.  As this week began, a mass week-long collection drive organized by Goebbels concluded. In total, the German public donated over 67 million items to supply winter equipment for the Ostheer. The donations ranged from ladies’ scarves to jackets with golden buttons and fastenings. For the vast majority of German civilians, this campaign marked their first clear indication of a crisis unfolding in the East.  Arvid Fredborg, the Swedish journalist in Berlin observing the impact Goebbels’s speech had on the public.  “Fell like a bombshell among the public” … “was it not reasonable to expect winter at the beginning of December” Some soldiers mocked the effort, saying it would be Easter before any of the supplies reached the front.

Due to the front’s split, the 2nd Army fell under Army Group South. Hitler ordered transfers from the First Panzer Army to the Kharkiv area, anticipating a major Soviet assault. Reichenau, however, preferred moving these forces further north to bolster the 2nd Army. He also argued for keeping the mobile divisions off the line where possible, to restore their strength and keep them in reserve. To this Sodenstem remarked: "At present there are no motorized units capable of movement with First Armd. Army. Tactical mobility can be expected only after arrival of new vehicles and rehabilitation”.

"Following the earlier amphibious successes at Crimea, Soviet planners concluded that further operations would stretch Manstein's forces to the breaking point. One landing was mounted at Yevpatoriya on the 4th, but this time the coastal garrison was prepared and effectively contested the assault. Although the naval infantry secured the town by day’s end, the blocking positions pinned them in. A race then began to reinforce the troops around Yevpatoriya. Admiral Oktyabrsky dispatched additional naval infantry backed by the destroyer Smyshlyonyi, but violent storms prevented this force from reaching the harbor until the 7th. By then a regiment from the 72nd Infantry Division had arrived and destroyed the Soviet infantry in the town. Of the 800-plus Soviets, only four sailors managed to return to Soviet lines at Sevastopol; one additional sailor swam out into the icy water and was recovered by a Soviet patrol boat. German troops subsequently carried out reprisals on the town’s civilians, accusing them of aiding the Soviet troops."

Another landing took place on the 5th at Sudak, though the Germans merely deployed a single company to contain it. They treated the operation as a nuisance, but Kozlov read it as a sign of weakness. Mainstein ordered Sponeck replaced for disobeying orders last week, appointing Mattenklott in his place. The 132nd Infantry Division was sent to reinforce the 42nd Corps, joining the previously deployed 170th Division. The Romanian 18th Infantry Division was dispatched as an additional reinforcement. Due to a shortage of security troops, Manstein sought and received permission to raise security forces from the local Tartar population. The Soviet 51st Army began arriving at the Parpach Narrows by the 5th, but they took no offensive action against the opposing 46th Infantry Division. Lvov moved extremely slowly, and it wasn’t until the 12th that he managed to deploy two of his four rifle divisions on this front. There, they joined the 23,000-strong 44th Army. Neither Soviet formation used this time to entrench; instead, slow preparations proceeded for their own offensive.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Stalin, overestimating capabilities and underestimating logistics, pushed a broad, rapid push, while Stavka ignored frontline realities. Zhukov urged concentrated reserves and heavy tank reinforcement, but decisions favored wide-front offensives, draining scarce resources. Early Soviet gains came through bold assaults on the Volkhov, Kalinin, and Leningrad axes, aided by poor German logistics, winter adaptations, and Luftwaffe constraints. Yet repeated Soviet attacks suffered from fuel, artillery, and coordination gaps, leading to costly, grinding advances and high casualties on both sides.