Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Demyansk Air Bridge. The Soviet 2nd Shock Army captured Krasnaia Gorka, advancing toward Lyuban to potentially relieve Leningrad's siege, where 460,000 had died from starvation since February 1941. The Northwestern Front encircled 95,000 Germans at Demyansk, forcing reliance on a Luftwaffe airlift led by Fritz Morzik. Amid -40°C temperatures, Ju-52 transports delivered minimal supplies. rations were slashed, and horses starved. averting collapse but at high cost. A smaller pocket at Kholm endured Soviet artillery barrages, with defenders sheltering in cellars; airdrops sustained them despite heavy casualties. In the center, Zhukov's forces faced Model's counterattacks near Rzhev-Vyazma. The 29th Army's encirclement ended in disaster, with thousands captured. Ambitious Soviet plans to destroy Army Group Center by March 5th proved unrealistic amid tank shortages. Further south, von Bock stalled Timoshenko, and Crimea deadlocked.

This episode is The start of the Kozlov Offensive

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

As the month of February approaches its conclusion, STAVKA becomes aware that it is engaged in a competition against time. The arrival of the Spring Rasputitsa looms threateningly. The broad offensive has made significant territorial gains but has not secured substantial strategic triumphs. On February 23rd, the Commissariat of Defence issued instructions for preparing operations for the Spring and Summer periods. The directive emphasized that it would be "unforgivably myopic" to be satisfied with the present accomplishments and assume the Germans are defeated.

One potential accomplishment appears to be emerging for the Volkhov Front, with forces advancing to within 5km of Lyuban by February 25th. However, a counteroffensive by three German infantry divisions struck their side. The Germans reclaimed Krasnaia Gorka on February 27th. Two Soviet divisions found themselves surrounded at Riabovo. Although most of these soldiers would ultimately slip away in small units back to Soviet positions, 6,000 would still be taken prisoner by the time the encirclement was fully eliminated on March 15th.

Becoming more irritated by the setbacks of the Volkhov Front, Stalin issued several orders on February 26th calling for additional offensives from both the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts. Both fronts were required to eradicate all German forces at Lyuban and Chudovo by March 5th. Stalin also endorsed the strategies to reorganize and replenish the 2nd Army but demanded that it persist in its assault toward Lyuban without interruptions. Additionally, Voroshilov and Malenkov were sent to Meretskov’s command center to supervise activities. Scholars believe Malenkov was assigned to identify individuals to blame for the offensive's shortcomings thus far and for any forthcoming failures.

One of Malenkov's initial actions was to dismiss the majority of the 2nd Army's leadership team. As per Glantz, “[Stavka directive no. 170134 to the Volkhov Front commander about cadre changes in the 2nd Shock Army] The directive removed Major General Vizzhilin for 'poor work as chief of staff' and replaced him with Colonel Rozhdestvensky, the former chief of staff of the 52nd Army. The same order replaced the chief of the 2nd Shock Army's operations department [Colonel Pakhomov] for 'poor work and false information.' Major General Petr Fedorovich Alferev was assigned to be the Army’s Deputy by Stalin." This occurred following his inspection, along with Meretskov, of the 2nd Shock Army’s headquarters, in addition to evaluating the combat near Krasnaia Gorka. There, they discovered deficiencies in ammunition, absence of aerial protection, and inadequate management of reinforcements. They also noted that the Army’s documentation of casualties was in complete disarray. Beyond the extensive alterations to the 2nd Army’s personnel, Meretskov would send his Front’s Artillery and Tank leaders to the 2nd Shock Army to provide guidance on its operations. Malenkov would further designate the rising officer Vlasov as Meretskov’s Deputy.

Then, on February 28th, Stalin required Voroshilov, Meretskov, and Khozin to formulate a fresh strategy to accelerate the elimination of the Germans at Lyuban and Chudovo. The 2nd Shock Army was to receive reinforcements from the 59th Army and form a substantial assault group to strike Lyuban. The 59th Army was to advance toward Torfianoe Station to obliterate the Germans near Chudovo. The 4th Army was to move toward Smerdynia to connect with the 2nd Shock Army. Stalin also sent the 4th Guard Rifle Corps to bolster the 54th Army. They, together with the 8th Army, were to launch concurrent attacks toward Lyuban from the northern direction. This extensive assault was scheduled to commence on March 4th, with the VVS instructed to bomb defensive positions and rear facilities in every sector before the operation.

In the vicinity of Leningrad, partisan units were progressively attempting to expand and structure themselves. At present, there were approximately 2,000 Partisans formed into the Leningrad, Valdai, and Volkhov Operational Groups, each with multiple units under their oversight. Some of these had tried to aid Red Army efforts, such as at Kholm on January 18th, Iasski on February 5th, and Dedovichi on February 22nd. Yet, none of these initiatives achieved enduring success. Moreover, the Partisans around Leningrad had begun collecting provisions to deliver into the city. The initial shipment would reach Leningrad on February 25th after following a lengthy indirect path. The partisans would additionally dispatch envoys and groups into the city to align with the Leningrad Front.

Beyond the partisan units concentrated on military engagements, there were smaller teams focused on more secretive operations. These “Diversionists” worked to undermine German resources through covert means. These consisted of small groups of 3 to 10 individuals who were kept unaware of other groups within their clandestine network. A broader command structure existed solely to relay orders to the groups and enlist new participants. One such network in Orsha asserted that it had derailed 100 trains and disabled nearly 200 locomotives from December through 1942. Additionally, it is stated that there were more than 700 of these organized saboteurs in Vitebsk.

It is challenging to determine the true scale of the resistance movement, as even Soviet records conflict, and there was only emerging organized control over their activities. The History of the Second World War asserts that by the end of January, there were 20,000 partisans behind Army Group North, 40,000 behind Center, and 35,000 behind South, though some historians think this represents the number enlisted rather than those actively operating. Nevertheless, they posed an increasing worry for the Nazis. The danger from the Red Army hindered the allocation of enough personnel to suppress the uprising. The rear area commander of Army Group Center had already foreseen this risk in December, declaring: “As the Russians have become more active on the front, partisan activity has increased. The troops left to this command are just sufficient to protect the most important installations and, to a certain extent, the railroads and highways. For active anti-partisan operations there are no longer any troops on hand. Therefore, it is expected that soon the partisans will join together into larger bands and carry out attacks on our guard posts. Their increased freedom of movement will also lead to the partisans' spreading terror among the people, who will be forced to stop supporting us and will then no longer carry out the orders of the military government authorities.” By February, the average size of partisan detachments had increased to between 200 and 300 members. This was under 50 in December. Consequently, Kluge deemed it essential to inform Halder about their escalating threat during February as the partisan movement began to expand, organize, and obtain backing from the Soviet government. Some groups had already developed sufficiently to try to dominate whole regions instead of conducting small-scale raids and disruptions. In his update, Kluge stressed: “The steady increase in the numbers of enemy troops behind our front and the concomitant growth of the partisan movement in the entire rear area are taking such a threatening turn that I am impelled to point out this danger in all seriousness.” “While formerly the partisans limited themselves to disruption of communications lines and attacks on individual vehicles and small installations, now, under the leadership of resolute Soviet officers with plenty of weapons and good organization, they are attempting to bring certain districts under their control and to use those districts as bases from which to launch combat operations on a large scale. With this the initiative has passed into the hands of the enemy in many places where he already controls large areas and denies these areas to the German administration and German economic exploitation.”

February 23rd marked Red Army Day. In his address, Stalin ridiculed the rapid changes in the German high command, though he incorrectly attributed some fatalities to Red Army actions. Stalin also assured that the conflict would now favor the USSR since the element of surprise from the German invasion had dissipated. However, Stalin maintained that victory would still demand sacrifices and diligent effort. He further clarified to the Soviet populace and the international community why the Soviet cause was righteous and honorable. Simultaneously, Stalin moderated his earlier statements promoting animosity toward the Germans, which had resulted in extensive killings of German captives. In his complete declaration on this shift, Stalin stated: “Lastly, the strength of the Red Army lies in the fact that it does not and cannot entertain racial hatred for other peoples, including the German people, that it has been brought up in the spirit of the equality of all peoples and races, in the spirit of respect for the rights of other peoples. The German's racial theory and their practice of racial hatred have brought about a situation in which all freedom-loving peoples have become enemies of fascist Germany. The theory of race equality in the U.S.S.R. and the practice of respect for the rights of other peoples have brought about a situation in which all freedom-loving peoples have become friends of the Soviet Union. This is a source of strength to the Red Army. This is also a source of weakness to the German fascist army. Sometimes the foreign press engages in prattle to the effect that the Soviet people hates the Germans just because they are Germans, because it hates everything German, and that therefore the Red Army does not take German soldiers prisoner. This is, of course, a similar stupid lie and witless slander against the Red Army. The Red Army is free of feelings of racial hatred. It is free of such humiliating feelings because it has been brought up in the spirit of racial equality and respect for the rights of other peoples. Besides, one should not forget that in our country any manifestation of racial hatred is punished by law. Certainly the Red Army must annihilate the German fascist occupants, since they wish to enslave our motherland, and when, being surrounded by our troops, they refuse to lay down their arms and surrender, the Red Army annihilates them not because of their German origin but because they wish to enslave our motherland. The Red Army, like the army of any other people, is entitled and bound to annihilate the enslavers of its motherland, irrespective of their national origin.” This was succeeded on the same day by order No. 55 of February 23, 1942, which affirmed ‘The Red Army takes German soldiers and officers prisoner when they surrender,’. Additionally, Zhuhkov and Khokhlov released a directive across the Red Army rejecting the idea that Stalin had commanded the execution of prisoners and strictly prohibiting such acts, stating: ‘I declare that Comrade Stalin never mentioned the shooting of enemy soldiers once they have laid down their arms or have voluntarily come over to us.’ ‘The shooting of prisoners’ was to be explicitly banned with immediate implementation. This change was prompted by the negative attention from incidents like the killing of 160 wounded Germans in a military hospital at Feodosiya following its seizure at the end of December. It was also concerned that such brutalities would deter German soldiers from surrendering, akin to how German behaviors affected Red Army troops.

February 23rd also witnessed Küchler adjusting the borders between the 18th and 16th armies to run directly west of Lake Ilmen. It was further agreed with Hitler that the units for the intended counteroffensive against the Volkhov Front remain distinct from those being readied for actions against the Northwestern Front. Factors such as weather, supply chains, air support availability, and Soviet movements indicated that timely movement of divisions between the fronts was not assured. The divisions for these efforts were sourced from the stable Leningrad Front or recently established units from Germany.

The day before, Hitler had designated Demyansk as a Festung, thereby prohibiting any withdrawal of the trapped forces. The reasoning for this choice was that by permitting Demyansk to be surrounded, it would lure the Red Army into spots where they could be counter-surrounded and eradicated. Simultaneously, Busch was directed to organize a relief effort, though Hitler insisted it delay until the 8th Light Infantry arrived in mid-March.

The internal encirclement ring around Demyansk was finalized on February 25th. Now, it became a contest for the Soviets to demolish the more than 90,000 ensnared Germans before rescue could occur. On that exact day, Kurochkin was given orders requiring the pocket's elimination within five days. STAVKA had designated the responsibility for handling Demyansk exclusively to the Northwestern Front and therefore shifted Group Ksensofontov to his authority from the 3rd Shock Army. This followed Stalin's displeasure with the operation's sluggishness, which he attributed to “due to the weak co-ordination of operations between the 3rd Shock Army of the Kalinin Front with units of the 1st Guards Rifle Corps and 34th Army of the North-Western Front and through the lack of a unified command for these forces…” After this determination, the 3rd Shock Army ceased involvement in supplying the separated Group Ksensofontov. Consequently, the inadequately provisioned Northwestern Front quickly transmitted an urgent message to the Kalinin Front outlining the complete absence of supplies reaching these units, including “no fodder, food supplies sufficient for half a day, ammunition nearly exhausted” attached tank brigades had no fuel or ammunition.

Zeluchye emerged as a central point in the battles, with the entire 1st Guard Rifle Corps hurled against the 4,000 soldiers of the SS Totenkopf’s Group Eicke. Despite enduring about 60% casualties, the SS fighters succeeded in repelling the Soviet onslaught for the week while causing significant damage to the Guards.

Concurrently with this intense combat, Kurochkin formulated a plan he anticipated would yield swift success. The Germans in Demyansk depended on air deliveries to endure. This relied on the operation of three airfields near the town. Therefore, he asked for and obtained the 1st Airborne Corps from Moscow. They were to gradually penetrate German lines over a week. On the designated date, the paratroopers would seize the airfields to interrupt the supply stream while the 34th Army, 1st Guard Rifle Corps, and Group Ksenofontov overwhelmed the defenses in a synchronized assault. However, this preparation would require time, and the paratroopers would not arrive in the area until early March. A lone battalion from the 204th airborne brigade was quickly dropped northwest of Demyansk to begin setting up an operational base for the Airborne Corps.

Aiming to broaden the Demyansk air corridor, Morzik persisted in urging the OKL for additional assets. By month's end, he obtained another five transport groups beyond the five he first acquired and the two already present. Yet, by this point, local VVS leaders had acknowledged the airbridge's significance. Fighter patrols had already downed more than 12 transports, and VVS bombers had initiated strikes on the Demyansk airfields. With insufficient fighters to gain air dominance over the region, Morzik had few means to counter VVS disruptions, resulting in progressively intense aerial battles in the ensuing weeks.

In exchange for these assets, however, the OKL compelled Morzik to perform a landing at Kholm. On February 25th, seven Ju-52s touched down at the Kholm airstrip to provide urgently required ammunition. But four of these aircraft were obliterated by Soviet artillery while stationary. Consequently, Morzik was permitted to return to employing gliders and parachuted provisions to maintain the Kholm defenders. Even so, this method remained hazardous, with anti-aircraft fire and VVS fighters exacting losses on the transports compelled to fly low for drops. Overall, 27 Ju-52s would be lost by May on the Kholm path. By February 28th, total supplies delivered to Kholm fell short by 1,900 tons, half of what was necessary.

Meanwhile, on the ground, Purkaev’s offensive intensified. Following two days of combat, the 130th Rifle division, strengthened by two rifle brigades, seized Dubrova. This compelled Group Uckermann to pull back beyond Kholm's artillery reach. Then, the reinforced 33rd and 391st Rifle divisions were deployed against Kholm's southeast. Simultaneously, the new 37th Rifle Brigade struck from the north. Sherer’s forces strained but endured the Soviet attack through fierce close-quarters combat in buildings. A substantial stone structure, formerly a State Political Directorate prison, served as a vital element of the German defenses in the south. Multiple Soviet assaults reached it and occasionally entered, but none secured it. By the end of the month, half the garrison was killed or injured. Some reinforcements arrived via glider, but only sufficient to offset half the casualties.

During this week, the Armies of the Kalinin Front at last initiated their mandated offensives. Daily assaults struck the German positions, particularly at Belyi and Olenino. Yet, minimal progress was made beyond substantial losses on both sides, though the Soviets fared worse in each clash. Likewise, the Armies of the Western Front advanced without significant accomplishments. Both Fronts were grappling with shortages of reinforcements and supply difficulties impeding their performance.

On the other hand, the Germans' sole offensive endeavor advanced slowly toward Kirov, with the 24th Panzer Corps overly extended to be impactful. Recognizing the necessity to release more troops, Kluge organized for Heinrici to confer with Hitler on March 1st regarding Heinrici’s earlier suggestion to retreat from Yukhnov.

While unproductive battles persisted along the whole frontline of Army Group Center, its rear zones remained battlegrounds. The 11th Cavalry Corps continued their minor incursions from their protected villages. Meanwhile, Belov’s push to sever the Smolensk-Vyazma road had arrived at Rebrovo but could not capture the area by February 21st. On February 22nd, the Germans launched a counterstrike. The 8th Airborne brigade was encircled once more in Bekasovo but managed to counterattack to reestablish links with Belov’s cavalry. During this engagement, scouting units had progressed far enough north to try connecting with Sokolov’s 11th Corps but could not locate them before being repelled by February 24th. Belov would praise the paratroopers' accomplishments on February 22nd, leading to their receipt of the Order of the Red Banner, with the praise noting: “…in January 1942 thrown into territory occupied by the enemy in the Viaz’ma area [you have] performed your immediate mission excellently, having destroyed several hundred fascists. The Western Front’s Military Council holds up the actions of the brigade as an example for others. Now [you have] successfully fulfilled the mission as first echelon of 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and approached Semlevo Station. You are deserving of the award of the Order of the Red Banner.”

Meanwhile, the 41st Cavalry division had tried to seize Iakovlevo to additionally disrupt the railroad. They succeeded in nearing the location before German reinforcements, including three armored trains and aerial assistance, repelled them by February 25th. Likewise, additional German forces arrived to assault the 8th airborne. The forfeiture of Bekasovo and adjacent villages to this German counteroffensive divided the 8th Airborne and 41st Cavalry from the remainder of the Corps. They retreated to Izborovo while Belov halted his other activities and directed three divisions to aid them. By the morning of February 26th, the encirclement was shattered, with the 41st cavalry and 8th airborne pulled back to Kaledino and Vysokoe. Losses had been severe. The 8th Airborne had only three diminished battalions remaining functional.

The remainder of the Corps gathered around Zabolote and Byshkovo, except for the 75th Cavalry division protecting the Corps' southern side at Semlevo. This setback signified the conclusion of the Soviet threat to permanently sever Army Group Center’s supply line. German defenses proved too robust for Belov’s depleted units to overcome. However, Belov’s forces were too agile to be captured and annihilated, enabling them to persistently conduct raids on the Germans.

By the week's close, Stalin would authorize an order placing all paratroopers and partisans in the area under Belov’s leadership. Many had already moved toward his units. Thus, Belov would accumulate 6,252 personnel as February transitioned to March, despite prolonged combat behind enemy lines, armed with 3,421 rifles, 5,166 horses, 128 submachine guns, 1,047 light and medium machine guns, 43 heavy machine guns, 19 anti-tank rifles, 24 76mm guns, 13 light anti-tank guns, and 61 mortars of assorted calibers. The primary issue was provisioning, as they relied on foraging or seizing from the Germans. This was eased by discovering forsaken Soviet stockpiles that the Germans had not plundered or demolished. Moreover, medical services posed a serious challenge due to the scarcity of medical personnel who had reached behind German lines. He possessed only the regimental aid posts and the 75th division's medical unit. They were restructured into 10 improvised field hospitals. Local women assisted the medical team. Some severely injured were evacuated by air. Locally obtained radishes were utilized to avert scurvy.

Last week, the 4th Airborne Corps had been deployed in a dispersed and disorganized manner, and it was not until February 24th that they were prepared for actions. They still needed to traverse over 30km of difficult, snow-laden landscape before arriving at the rear of German positions battling the 50th Army near Sapovo and Savinki. The 9th Brigade was directed to advance to Liudkovo and join with the 50th Army. The 214th brigade was to secure several villages to protect the advance’s eastern side. The 1st partisan regiment, drawn from the existing 8th Airborne brigade, was to safeguard their rear. Some partisans would be assigned to assist the 9th Brigade in capturing Ugra Station. All travel was mandated to occur at night to avoid detection and prevent Luftwaffe strikes.

The 9th Brigade's attack initially succeeded until they met the fortified positions around Kliuchi. Additionally, Ugra station was barricaded, with the smaller Verterkhovo station taken along with its supply storage. The 214th Brigade endured intense aerial bombardment and failed its opening offensive. Moreover, the German garrison at Ivantseva had spotted the Brigade’s scouting teams, which warned nearby garrisons of the upcoming assault. This alert also provided the Kliuchi garrison time to ready itself. Without mortars and artillery to surmount prepared defenses, the Airborne corps became stalled along a chain of company-level strongpoints staffed by rear support personnel from the 131st, 31st, and 34th divisions.

Frostbite quickly started to affect the airborne soldiers exposed in the open. Nevertheless, commands still compelled them to proceed with their offensive. Kliuchi and Pesochnia became their main targets. A joint assault was initiated on February 26th. A minor breach was achieved at Pesochnia but was expelled by a counterattack. Near Kliuchi, the paratroopers tried to methodically break down the network of village strongpoints. Then, under the cover of a snowy night, the attack was launched from various directions. By the morning of February 27th, Kliuchi would be captured by the Soviets, with the surviving Germans escaping to Malyshevka. The 9th Brigade would seek to capitalize on this victory, but German reinforcements counterattacked with tank, artillery, and Luftwaffe backing. The closeness to the Moscow-Warsaw highway enabled quick German unit redeployments once the 50th Army’s assault was halted. The paratroopers soon found themselves besieged around Kliuchi. The 4th Airborne Corps had already suffered 25% losses by month's end and could not progress further south. Their reserves of food and ammunition were depleting. However, the 50th Army accomplished even less in its efforts to advance north and sever the Warsaw highway.

On February 23rd, as Soviet forces completed their preparations for Kozlov’s offensive, Luftwaffe aircraft distributed propaganda flyers over Red Army locations on the Kerch Peninsula. These mocked the Soviets, asserting that the Germans were aware the Soviet offensive would begin on February 27th. Despite this compromise of secrecy, the offensive proceeded as scheduled on February 27th at Mekhlis’ urging. 230 guns shelled the German fortifications. However, most of the artillery consisted of small 76mm guns that could scarcely harm the stone reinforcements in many German positions. These guns also possessed very restricted range. With only thirty 122mm howitzers as his heavy artillery, Kozlov could not demolish these fortifications or neutralize German artillery.

Following this bombardment, formations of infantry and tanks advanced across the rain-drenched terrain. The heavy KV tanks rapidly became mired in the mud, but the light T-26 tanks were deployed against the two battalions of Romanian infantry defending Tulumchak. Lacking adequate anti-tank armaments, the Romanians were soon compelled to withdraw, enabling the supporting German batteries to be overrun. Eighteen 10.5cm l.FH 18 howitzers and fourteen 3.7cm Pak guns were seized. 4km was advanced before Group Hitzfeld arrived to steady the line in the confined marshland.

In other areas, the assault stalled in the mud and marshland filled with standing water so profound that lying down was impossible in some spots. Sappers intended to help the tanks in this environment had lagged behind right away. German artillery and anti-tank guns devastated Soviet units exposed in the open without protection. The VVS executed over 100 missions on the first day alone, while the Luftwaffe managed only three. Yet, even their contributions could not alter the outcome.

Kozlov would dispatch the 77th Mountain Rifle division to bolster his success against the Romanians on February 28th. While the 51st Army had succeeded in its offensive, the supporting 44th Army’s attack had been lackluster. Only minor harassing strikes hit the defending 30th Corps, easily permitting the movement of reserves northward. Thus, at the same time, Mattenklott sent a reinforced rifle regiment to support the Romanians and focused the 46th division around Koi-Asan. As they reached the area, the German reinforcements counterattacked the Soviets and recovered territory lost by the Romanians. The arrival of the Mountain Rifles then triggered a crisis as they penetrated the Romanian lines and took the village of Kiet. Any additional Soviet progress would flank the German defensive line. However, a counterattack by German infantry would recapture the village by nightfall. When the fighting subsided on February 29th, Mattenklott rotated the Romanians into reserve for recovery, with portions of the 170th Infantry division substituting for them. Recognizing the need to protect Crimea, OKH designated the 22nd Panzer and 28th Light Infantry Divisions to reinforce the 11th Army after completing their organization, anticipated sometime in March.

On February 26th, Petrov launched an attack from Sevastopol to aid Kozlov. The 345th rifle division, along with the 2nd and 3rd Naval infantry regiments and the 125th separate tank Battalion, assaulted the unprepared 24th Infantry Division near Mekenzievy Mountain. They succeeded in regaining 1.2km of territory before the Germans regrouped and stopped the offensive. Subsequently, intermittent clashes continued in this region until March 6th, by which time the 24th Infantry had incurred 1,277 casualties, with 288 killed or missing. This was comparatively low against Petrov’s 1,818 killed and 780 wounded, with an undetermined number injured.

Petrov’s assault had been backed by a minor partisan raid. Of the 134 partisans involved in the incursion into the 11th Army's rear, 117 were swiftly eliminated. Soviet Commissars had coerced the partisans into the action under the erroneous assumption they could penetrate to Sevastopol. The Germans viewed Crimean partisans as mere criminals suitable only for assaulting unprotected villages or isolated vehicles.

The partisan movement in Crimea consisted of isolated Soviet soldiers, NKVD Border Guards, and civilians who had escaped from the Germans. Underage Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Young Communist League) members were also strongly urged to participate. Despite this, they had limited access to food, arms, or shelter throughout the winter. As a result, many perished from starvation or exposure during the winter due to Mokrousov’s poor leadership. He had led the partisans into the mountains without any strategy or provisions and made no genuine effort to address these problems. They were also cut off from external assistance. During the whole winter, only one aircraft attempted to resupply them once in March. Compounding the issues, Mokrousov had prohibited enlisting from the Tatar population and even promoted raids on their communities. This further pushed the Tatar populace toward the Germans. Partisan actions were employed to rationalize the extension of SS Einsatzgruppe D’s operations in Crimea, with them executing 1,515 individuals in the final two weeks of February. According to Forczyk, “In the last two weeks of February, Ohlendorf claimed that his group shot 1,515 people, including 729 Jews, 271 communists, 74 partisans, and 421 Gypsies or other 'anti-social elements.'”

On February 24th, a diplomatic event involving Turkey took place when the Soviet Submarine Shch-213 sank the refugee ship Stuma 16km from Istanbul. 781 Jewish refugees lost their lives. This was among several occurrences where Soviet submarines assigned to interfere with Axis maritime traffic in the Black Sea mistakenly targeted and attacked Turkish ships. Their effectiveness was highly inadequate, with 20 of the Black Sea Fleet’s 43 submarines destroyed by the end of 1942 for merely 33,500 tons of Axis shipping. Frequently, Soviet submarines failed to strike moving vessels due to insufficient training. Many of the lost submarines had inadvertently entered Axis minefields.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Soviet forces, hampered by mud and inadequate artillery, advance 4km against Romanian lines but are halted by German counterattacks. Stalin orders renewed offensives on the Volkhov Front, leadership changes, and airborne drops. Demyansk and Kholm pockets endure via Luftwaffe airlifts amid fierce Soviet assaults. Partisan activities intensify, Stalin's Red Army Day speech promotes prisoner treatment, and isolated battles rage across fronts, with limited gains amid heavy casualties.