Bring out the marching band, episode one of the The Philosofa podcast is now  online!  And it is only fitting that a giant online entrance should be made with that  firecracker of a philosopher himself – a man who without irony once described  himself  as  ‘dynamite’ – Friedrich Nietzsche.  In particular, Helen and Omar discuss  one aspect  of Nietzsche’s philosophy - what Nietzsche says about the value of  truth.  With them in  the studio to help explore the terrain of this philosophical  smoking  gun:  Nietzsche  scholar, Professor Ken Gemes, and veteran TV producer  and author  of, Into the  Woods, a bestselling book about narratives and storytelling, John Yorke.

One of the most compelling characteristics of the 19th century German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, is his tenacious commitment to truthfulness.  Nietzsche was less interested in engaging in the logical analysis of philosophical and moral views, as the psychology that lay behind them.  And his writings are notorious, not just for their reminders and descriptions of the grim realities of human history, but also for his assessment of the importance of some of those realities to many of the cultural achievements of humanity.  In these and other respects, Nietzsche’s allegiance to an ideal of truthfulness seems unflinching.  Pretty surprising then that this is a guy who calls into question the value of truth.

In particular, Nietzsche called for a critique of what he refers to as the ‘will to truth’.  The will to truth is an attitude of unconditional commitment to avoiding error and falsehood in your beliefs regardless of the utility or pragmatic value of doing so.  Nietzsche believes that we see this hidden imperative operating behind the scenes in many aspects of modern European thought and culture – in the activity of scholars and scientists, the predominance of a scientific world view, skepticism about and hostility towards religion, towards metaphysics, and so forth.

In the Third Treatise of his book, On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche argues that the will to truth is an offshoot, or the latest manifestation, of what he calls the ‘ascetic ideal’.  When Nietzsche speaks of an ‘ideal’ here, he means an interpretation of the universe and our place within it that gives an answer to the question, ‘what is the value and meaning of human life?’  The ascetic ideal in particular is the priestly or monkish ideal of the life of self-denial.  It gives a low valuation of the bodily human condition and demands that we sacrifice or repress our emotions and primal drives and instincts in the name of some higher reality, such as God.  Nietzsche claims that the ascetic ideal is the only ideal that humanity has had so far.  It has provided the drive and inspiration for many acts of greatness and overcoming, but also for enormous suffering and cruelty.

Nietzsche associates the ascetic ideal particularly with the Abrahamic religions.  At the core of these religions is an injunction not to deceive or be deceived – to be honest and truthful.  Nietzsche thinks that the elevation of truthfulness and honesty within these religions has led to the rise of the naturalistic attitude and the doing away of the metaphysical belief-systems that propped them up.  He says that ‘intellectual conscience’ is now against these belief-systems.  According to Nietzsche, the result is that God is now dead.  Truth has taken His place.  Scientists and scholars are effectively the new priests.  Science is their religion.  Instead of suppressing their natural instincts and emotions in order to achieve salvation, they dampen the affects in order to achieve objectivity – a hypothetical, non-perspectival description of reality.

Nietzsche was not anti-science.