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Enterprise tech just invented a new kind of worker, the AI agent, and handed it our files, our credentials, and our production databases before teaching it to say no. This episode follows that one missing lesson through three real incidents.
First, a finding from our own lab: an open-source MCP server whose "attach a file" tool would read any file on the host, secrets included, and hand it back in plaintext. We reported it, the maintainer patched it, and it is now public as CVE-2026-75612, credited to Levinity Cyber. Then the honest footnote, a real authorization bypass we found in Google's Gemini CLI tooling and lost to a duplicate ticket, no credit, kept in the episode anyway.
From there we leave the lab: the dealership chatbot talked into selling a Chevy Tahoe for one dollar, and the airline that told a tribunal its chatbot was a "separate legal entity." Same root cause every time, agency plus untrusted input plus zero refusal logic. The fix is not a smarter model. It is the oldest principle we have, least privilege.
Evidence, or it doesn't count.
https://github.com/velesnitski/yt-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-99mq-fjjc-6v9j ·
CVE - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-75612
- The $1 Chevy Tahoe bot: https://incidentdatabase.ai/cite/622/ (canonical incident record) ·
news write-up: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/chevrolet-dealership-chatbot-hack/
- Air Canada chatbot ruling (Moffatt v. Air Canada, 2024 BCCRT 149): https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bccrt/doc/2024/2024bccrt149/2024bccrt149.html (the actual tribunal decision)
https://levinitycyber.com/research/ ·
https://levinitycyber.com
A vendor found a bug in their own software and shipped a fix. Then my engine found
the exact same hole, still wide open, because the patch cleaned up six fields and
missed the seventh. This episode is the story of that one forgotten field (an
unauthenticated, High-severity cross-site scripting flaw in a popular WordPress
plugin, reported responsibly, fixed, and credited), and the attacker's playbook that
makes "incomplete fixes" one of the most common ways real systems get broken. No
hype, no fear-selling. Just the work, with the receipt public.
https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/survey-maker/vulnerability/wordpress-survey-maker-plugin-5-2-3-3-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability
CVE record (CVE-2026-65565):
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65565
More findings (public, credited):
https://levinitycyber.com
The show on Spotify:
https://open.spotify.com/show/6nnIrwWqzXKmnwJXK00Dp9
The show on Apple:
https://podcasts.apple.com/il/podcast/evidence-or-it-doesnt-count/id6803924573
An AI I built found a real vulnerability in an AI built by IBM. In the first episode of Evidence, Or It Doesn't Count, I walk through exactly what happened: my autonomous engine found an arbitrary file read in IBM Research's open-source CUGA agent, where a tool the model could call opened a file at a path the model itself controlled, with no fence around it. Chained with a second tool, a prompt injection could read the host's secrets, including the API keys, straight out of the agent's own tools. Classic path traversal, wearing an AI costume.
IBM Research reproduced it, fixed it, and published a security advisory crediting LevinityCyber. I break down how the bug worked in plain language, why the "tool boundary" is the new front line in AI security, and the three things to check in any agent you are shipping.
No hype. No fear-selling. Just the real work, with the receipts public so you can check every word.
Reference (public): GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-q5xm-fr98-g4j5 (path traversal, High, fixed in cuga-agent 0.3.1).
More of the engine's published, credited findings: https://levinitycyber.com
Find me on LinkedIn and X https://x.com/levinitycyber,
Linkedin - https://www.linkedin.com/in/moshe-levi-/
or email [email protected].
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From the publisher's feed