Fixed + Floating - The Credit Podcast

Fixed + Floating - The Credit Podcast

By Josef PschornBusinessInvesting
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Fixed + Floating - The Credit Podcast episodes

  • CoreWeave Bonds Yield 15%. Is the Market Wrong? | Jordan Chalfin (CreditSights) #26

    Jordan Chalfin (CreditSights) on CoreWeave's bonds after the third quarter.


    CoreWeave beat and raised, and its unsecured bonds still yielded about 15% when we recorded. Jordan has a buy recommendation on them. Josef Pschorn talks with him about how a CoreWeave data centre is financed and why the company still loses money. They also cover where the bondholders rank behind the box-level loans. The open question is what happens when contracts roll off and the leases keep running; Jordan places that risk in 2028 to 2030.


    Shownotes and analysis: https://www.fixedandfloating.com/


    Jordan Chalfin, CFA: Head of Technology, CreditSights.

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/jordanchalfin

    CreditSights: https://www.creditsights.com


    Chapters:

    00:00 Cold open

    00:30 CoreWeave after Q3: intro

    02:04 Why buy CoreWeave bonds at 15%?

    04:21 What changed for CoreWeave CDS since June

    05:48 How CoreWeave's business works

    09:35 Data centre delays and moratoriums

    11:34 How take-or-pay contracts work

    14:44 Hyperscalers vs neoclouds: who can build data centres

    18:57 How much of the backlog is investment grade?

    20:44 Why GPU rental pricing is inverted

    22:41 What 1 gigawatt costs: powered shell vs GPUs

    24:44 Inside the box: how a data centre is financed

    27:50 How much of the DDTL debt has recourse to CoreWeave?

    31:02 Customer prepayments and who ranks first

    33:40 Unit economics of a CoreWeave contract

    36:33 When the leases outlast the contracts

    39:22 Why CoreWeave still loses money

    41:55 No new unsecured bonds: what it means for bondholders

    43:16 Funding the next $60 billion: DDTLs, prepayments, Dell

    45:36 What happens when GPU contracts run out

    47:47 Future lease payments vs the backlog

    49:45 Circular financing and Nvidia's backstop

    55:30 How to value CoreWeave

    58:20 CoreWeave vs Oracle credit

    59:59 What the market gets wrong about CoreWeave


    Connect with Fixed + Floating:

    LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating

    X https://x.com/FixedFloating


    Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.


    Recorded: 13.11.2026


    #fixedfloating #creditmarkets #highyield #coreweave #aiinfrastructure

    1 hr 3 min
  • Is High Yield Expensive Near Its Tights? | Marty Fridson (Lehmann Livian Fridson Advisors) #24

    Marty Fridson (Lehmann Livian Fridson Advisors) on whether US high yield is expensive near its tights.


    At the end of October, his fair value model put the index at 275bp against an actual spread of 344bp. CCCs had widened by almost 250bp since the end of 2025. Josef Pschorn speaks with Marty Fridson about why the long-run average spread is the wrong benchmark, as the index changes over time. The open question is whether investors hedging against a weaker economy are right about CCCs.


    Shownotes and analysis: ⁠https://www.fixedandfloating.com/

    Marty Fridson: Chief Investment Officer, Lehmann Livian Fridson Advisors.

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/marty-fridson-7891848

    X: https://x.com/MartinFridson

    Lehmann Livian Fridson Advisors: https://www.llfadvisors.com/

    Website: https://www.martinfridson.com


    Connect with Fixed + Floating: ⁠

    ⁠⁠https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating⁠⁠⁠ | ⁠⁠⁠https://twitter.com/FixedFloating⁠⁠⁠


    Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.

    #fixedfloating #creditmarkets #highyield #creditspreads #distresseddebt

    1 hr 4 min
  • France & AI's Debt Boom: When Do Bond Buyers Push Back? | Matt King (Satori Insights) #23

    Matt King⁠ (Satori Insights) on France's sovereign risk, the hyperscaler borrowing boom and why tight credit spreads can coexist with growing risks.


    At recording, French five-year CDS were about 80bp and OATs were at their widest to Bunds since 2011, yet European corporate credit was still near its tights.


    Josef Pschorn speaks with Matt King about "The Great Deferral": borrowers that keep issuing despite higher yields, and buyers that demand more. The open question is when sovereign stress becomes a corporate credit problem.


    Shownotes and analysis: https://www.fixedandfloating.com/


    Matt King: Founder, Satori Insights. Previously Global Markets Strategist (and previously Global Head of Credit Strategy at Citi and Head of European Credit Strategy at JPMorgan.LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/matt-king-0147194/

    Satori Insights: https://satoriinsights.com/


    Connect with Fixed + Floating: ⁠⁠https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating⁠⁠ | ⁠⁠https://twitter.com/FixedFloating⁠⁠ | Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.


    Recorded: 13.10.2026


    #fixedfloating #creditmarkets #sovereigndebt #hyperscalers #privatecredit #bondmarket

    1 hr 6 min
  • Why Is CLO Equity Underperforming? And Can Private Credit CLOs Do Better? | Shiloh Bates (Flat Rock Global) #22

    Shiloh Bates (Flat Rock Global) on CLO equity returns, loan repricing and private credit CLOs.CLO equity returned about −8% in 2025, on Flat Rock Global's CLO Equity Index. Defaults on 2021-vintage LBOs rose, recoveries fell to around 50 cents, and performing loans repriced tighter.


    Josef Pschorn speaks with Shiloh Bates about why reinvesting prepayments at a discount, the self-healing mechanism, no longer offsets those losses.


    Shownotes and analysis: ⁠https://www.fixedandfloating.com/


    Shiloh Bates: Partner and Chief Investment Officer, Flat Rock Global.

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/shiloh-bates-186ab28/

    Flat Rock Global: https://flatrockglobal.com/

    The CLO Investor podcast: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLnbXP4G8NDQI85q1cD--dAW6L5o0fKVWQ

    CLO Investing (book): https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0CHN94H8G


    Connect with Fixed + Floating: ⁠https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating⁠ | ⁠https://twitter.com/FixedFloating⁠ |


    Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.


    Recorded: 23.09.2026


    #fixedfloating #creditmarkets #clo #privatecredit #leveragedloans #structuredcredit

    1 hr 18 min
  • Credit Risk's Left Tail: How Much Can You Lose? | Michael Gatto (Silver Point) #21

    Michael Gatto (Silver Point Capital) on what decides a lender's recovery: the credit agreement, not the default.


    A lender can be right about the business and still lose money. Josef Pschorn speaks with Michael Gatto about the second question a credit committee tends to skip. Not whether a borrower defaults, but what value and control leave the structure when a structure cracks.


    Shownotes and analysis: https://www.fixedandfloating.com/


    Michael Gatto: Partner and Head of Private Side Businesses, Silver Point Capital.

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-gatto-8a322b66/

    Silver Point Capital: https://www.silverpointfinance.com

    The Credit Investor's Handbook: https://www.amazon.com/Credit-Investors-Handbook-Leveraged-Distressed-ebook/dp/B0CR4MMD29?ref_=ast_author_mpb

    Michael's latest articles: https://www.silverpointcapital.com/uploads/2026/05/47c34854a238cfef86eb78e3800da100/what-questions-should-allocators-ask-when-evaluating-direct-lending-managers.pdfhttps://www.silverpointfinance.com/images/news/pdf/What%20Can%20We%20Learn%20From%20First%20Brands%20-%20SPC%20Credit%20Lessons.pdf

    Connect with Fixed + Floating: https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | https://twitter.com/FixedFloating |


    Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.


    Recorded: 10.09.2026


    #fixedfloating #creditmarkets #privatecredit #liabilitymanagement #directlending

    1 hr 27 min
  • Who Pays for the GPUs? How Lenders Underwrite AI Infrastructure | Ankur Patel (Ares)

    Ankur Patel⁠ (Ares Credit Group) on asset-based finance for data centres, power and GPUs.

    A one-gigawatt data centre costs $15–20 billion to build. The GPUs and servers inside it can run $40 billion-plus, and they are the shortest-lived asset in the project. Josef Pschorn speaks with Ankur Patel about how that credit is structured so a lender is not relying on residual chip value to get repaid.


    Shownotes and analyis: https://www.fixedandfloating.com/⁠


    Ankur Patel: Partner, Ares Credit Group (Alternative Credit).

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ankurjpatelcfa

    Ares Management: https://www.aresmgmt.comConnect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn ⁠https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating⁠ | X ⁠https://twitter.com/FixedFloating⁠ Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.Recorded: 11.08.2026#fixedfloating #creditmarkets #assetbasedfinance #privatecredit #gpufinancing #datacenters #aiinfrastructure

    57 min
  • Do Restructurings Still Cut Debt? How Amend-and-Extend Took Over | Mike Harmon (Stanford GSB)

    An amend-and-extend moves the maturity and leaves the leverage where it was. A debt-for-equity swap cuts the debt and dilutes the equity. The first is routine and the second is rare, and the constraint is not legal - most of the holder base cannot take the equity or does not want it.


    Josef Pschorn speaks with Mike Harmon of Stanford Graduate School of Business about why out-of-court restructurings extend maturities without reducing debt, and what has to be true before a company actually deleverages.


    • Once a company is worth less than its debt, the equity is an out-of-the-money call option, so shareholders buy time and volatility rather than repair the balance sheet
    • Without maintenance covenants, creditors cannot force a reduction in debt
    • Most of the holder base does not want equity: CLOs have equity buckets, mutual funds have mandates, and only distressed funds want the position
    • Creditors are not one actor - a lender hedged with CDS or a par lender who has not marked down has a different payoff from a discount buyer
    • Private credit changed the composition of the holder base rather than the law, which is where debt-for-equity swaps are actually getting done
    • The US has liability management at one end and Chapter 11 at the other with nothing in between, while the UK, Japan, France and China all run a lighter court-supervised path


    Mike Harmon: Stanford Graduate School of Business. https://www.linkedin.com/in/mike-harmon-92b130184

    The Financial Restructuring Tool Set (Columbia University Press): https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-financial-restructuring-tool-set/9780231216982/

    Liability Management’s Limited Runway: Corporate Restructuring Today, Mark J. Roe, Vasile Rotaru - Oxford Business Law Blog

    Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating

    Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.

    Recorded: 24.08.2026

    #fixedfloating #creditanalysis #liabilitymanagement #distresseddebt #restructuring #privatecredit

    1 hr 6 min
  • Inside a Long/Short Credit Hedge Fund: Sizing, Shorts and LME Risk — Frits Lieuw-Kie-Song (Ironshield Capital)

    A fifteen-billion-dollar manager's European analyst can look at three or four situations before the rest fail his liquidity screen. Frits Lieuw-Kie-Song runs a few hundred million and can look at hundreds. This is a full walk through how a long/short credit hedge fund is actually run.

    Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/how-a-longshort-credit-hedge-fund?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true


    Josef Pschorn speaks with Frits Lieuw-Kie-Song ofIronshield Capital about building a market-neutral high yield book: which credits are eligible, how positions get sized, when a short earns its borrow, and where the tail hedge sits.

    • Liability management exercises now bring the mediancompany back within roughly a year, because the fee-driven process fixes the balance sheet without fixing the business.
    • Being in the co-op group is not the same as sitting on the committee, and Frits will pass on a situation where he cannot influence how the pie is divided.
    • A 400 million single-bond capital structure is too small to matter for a fifteen-billion manager, which is where in-depth research still earns its keep.
    • Position size is dictated by the downside case, with a loss budget of roughly 50 basis points of the fund per position.
    • The tail hedge is put spreads 5 to 15% out of the money, six months out, rolled regularly, written for the event where correlation goes to one.
    • Two worked trades: Evoke after the UK online gamingtax move, bought at a 70 LTV with a takeover catalyst, and Volta Grid during the data centre construction scare.

    Ironshield Capital: https://ironshieldcapital.com/
    Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedInhttps://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | Xhttps://twitter.com/FixedFloating
    Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only.Not investment, legal, or tax advice.
    Recorded: 27.07.2026
    #fixedfloating #creditanalysis #highyield#longshortcredit #liabilitymanagement #europeancredit

    1 hr 12 min
  • Illiquidity in Private Credit: Why a $25M Loan Takes Six Weeks to Sell | Alex Cordover (Tradable)

    Private credit has grown to roughly $2 trillion, but selling a single position remains a manual, bilateral process. Exiting a $25 million loan means NDAs, a data room, agent and borrower consents, and bespoke documentation — four to six weeks from decision to settlement, if a buyer is found at all.

    Full analysis: [INSERT SUBSTACK LINK]

    Josef Pschorn speaks with Alex Cordover, CEO of Tradable, about the exact mechanics of private credit secondaries — what happens between the decision to sell and settlement, and what a functioning secondary market requires.

    • The full transfer anatomy: NDA, data room (loan tape, financials, original IC memo), non-binding IOI, consents, documentation, settlement
    • Participation vs assignment: in a default, participation rights typically run against the seller, not the borrower
    • Marks vs prices: every deal closed on Tradable has printed at par plus a buyer's premium, while valuation lag persists in software and direct-lending books
    • Why trades die: information asymmetry and GPs unused to working together — not asset quality
    • Where liquidity comes first: asset-backed, equipment and real estate finance before bespoke unitranche and distressed names


    Guest links: https://tradable.xyz | https://www.linkedin.com/in/alex-cordover-72a0a276

    Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating

    Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.

    Recorded: 15.07.2026

    #privatecredit #privatecreditsecondaries #creditmarkets #fixedincome #assetbackedfinance

    1 hr 5 min
  • Stress in MicroStrategy’s Preferreds: Why the Doom Loop Didn’t Happen | Mark Palmer (StoneX)

    MicroStrategy’s preferred shares dropped more than 20% over a few weeks. Then an 8-K reversed the mood, handingthe company buyback authority over both its preferred and common stock for the first time. The headlines focused on a small Bitcoin sale; the more important story was buried underneath it.


    Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/stretch-is-not-cash-the-lesson-from?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web


    Josef Pschorn speaks with Mark Palmer of Benchmark-StoneX, the first Wall Street analyst to cover Strategy, about how the company’s capital structure actually holds together and what genuinely changed.


    Key takeaways:

    • The 8-K gave Strategy “two-way capital management” for the first time — the ability to buy backpreferred and common stock, not just issue new securities to buy Bitcoin.
    • Perpetual preferred stock behaves like near-permanent capital: no maturity wall, not dilutive while outstanding, and tax-advantaged as return of capital for as long as the company posts no positive net income.
    • The recent Stretch selloff was driven by forced deleveraging among investors who had levered the position, not by any change in the Bitcoin backing the instrument.
    • A common misconception — that a falling Stretch price increases Strategy’s cash dividend obligation — is simply wrong; the dollar obligation is fixed regardless ofprice.
    • Strategy’s $6.75 billion convertible debt carries a blended coupon of just 0.52%, with the real risk being the 2028–2032 maturity wall rather thaninterest expense.


    Guest links: https://www.benchmarkcompany.com/leaders/1601/


    Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedInhttps://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | Xhttps://twitter.com/FixedFloating


    Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.

    Recorded: 01.07.2026

    1 hr 6 min

About Fixed + Floating - The Credit Podcast

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Fixed + Floating is a credit podcast for investors and finance professionals. Hosted by credit portfolio manager Josef Pschorn, the show features conversations with leading voices from investing,…