Episode 34: Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc. v. Lourdes Lopez

Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc. v. Lourdes Lopez, argued en banc before Chief Judge Mary H. Murguia and Circuit Judges Kim McLane Wardlaw, Consuelo M. Callahan, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, John B. Owens, Ryan D. Nelson, Eric D. Miller, Daniel P. Collins, Lawrence VanDyke, Lucy H. Koh, and Jennifer Sung for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on September 9, 2025. Argued by Chad Morgan (on behalf of Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc.) and Holly Whatley on behalf of Lourdes Lopez. 

Background of the case [from the Institute for Free Speech case page]:

The City of Oxnard in California crafted a campaign finance law aimed at silencing its most vocal critic. 

That’s why the Institute for Free Speech filed an amicus brief in Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc. v. Lourdes Lopez. The brief argues that “the city’s deliberate attempt to silence a challenger by eliminating the financing that only he used is an attack on the democratic process, and the First Amendment requires an ‘independent and careful’ review under closely drawn scrutiny.” 

The City of Oxnard targeted Aaron Starr and his nonprofit organization Moving Oxnard Forward through Measure B, a ballot measure that included caps on individual contributions to political campaigns. Starr has been a vocal critic of members of the Oxnard City Council, and Measure B’s restrictions would disproportionately affect Starr’s primary form of fundraising. 

Over the years, the Supreme Court has determined that contribution limits must be aimed at “quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.” However, as the panel’s opinion in the case notes, “Measure B’s campaign finance limits were much more closely drawn to the prohibited objective of stopping Starr rather than remedying corruption concerns.” 

In addition to challenging the constitutionality of Measure B, the brief also calls on the Ninth Circuit to overturn decisions in Montana Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddleman and Lair v. Motl., stating that the erroneous decisions “bless government abridgement of speech and association with the use of a standard that falls short even of intermediate scrutiny.” 

Resources:

• CourtListener page for Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc. v. Lourdes Lopez
• Institute for Free Speech amicus brief
• Ninth Circuit Opinion
• City of Oxnard Measure B

The Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you’re enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute’s mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

Episode 33: Lowery v. Mills

Lowery v. Mills, argued before Circuit Judges Jerry E. Smith, Dana M. Douglas, and Carolyn Dineen King in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on August 4, 2025. Argued by Institute for Free Speech Senior Attorney Del Kolde on behalf of Prof. Richard Lowery and Jeff Oldham on behalf of the University of Texas at Austin officials. 

Background of the case [from the Institute for Free Speech case page]: 

Prof. Richard Lowery, an Associate Professor of Finance at the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin (UT), said the officials at the state’s flagship university violated his constitutional right to criticize government officials. With the help of the Institute for Free Speech, Prof. Lowery sued UT officials who threatened to punish him for his criticism of the university administration by threatening his job, reducing his pay, and ending his affiliation with UT’s Salem Center.  One key target of Prof. Lowery’s critiques was the UT administration’s use of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) requirements to filter out competent academics who dissent from the DEI ideology. He also opined during a podcast that part of the job of university presidents in red states is to deceive republicans into funding leftwing indoctrination on college campuses.  

Statement of the issues [from the Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief]: 

1. Have subsequent Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit decisions overruled or cabined to its facts the standard for public-employee First Amendment retaliation claims described in Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150 (5th Cir. 2000)?  
2. Did Plaintiff state a viable claim for free-speech chilling under Jackson v. Wright, 82 F.4th 362 (5th Cir. 2023) and other cases?  
3. Did Defendants’ choice to repeatedly argue that the standard in Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 2002) applied to Plaintiff’s free speech chilling claim, and the district court’s decision to accept this standard, render this standard binding under the law-of-the-case doctrine and judicial estoppel?  
4. Did the district court err when it withheld various UT documents, reviewed by the magistrate judge in camera, under claims of attorney client privilege, including text messages sent by UT President Jay Hartzell shortly before the pressure campaign against Lowery began?  
5. Did the district court err when it granted a protective order to block all discovery into allegations that President Hartzell engaged in nepotism by using state resources to benefit his son in admission to UT?

Resources: 

• Institute for Free Speech Case Page 
• Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief 
• Brief of Appellees 

The Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you’re enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute’s mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

Episode 32: OPAWL – Building AAPI Feminist Leadership v. Dave Yost, et al.

OPAWL – Building AAPI Feminist Leadership v. Dave Yost, et al., argued before Circuit Judges Raymond M. Kethledge, Eric E. Murphy, and Andre B. Mathis in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on July 23, 2025. Argued by Elisabeth C. Frost (on behalf of OPAWL – Building AAPI Feminist Leadership), Mathura Jaya Sridharan (on behalf of Dave Yost, et al.), and Jason Walta (for Amicus Ohio Education Association).

Background of the case, from the Brief of Appellees – Cross Appellants (Second Brief):

It is well established that lawful permanent residents (“LPRs”) are entitled to First Amendment protection, including for their political speech. And the Supreme Court has long held that spending to promote or oppose direct democracy measures is core First Amendment expression. Nevertheless, [in 2024], Ohio enacted Ohio Revised Code § 3517.121 (“Section 121”), making it a crime for any noncitizen—including LPRs—to engage in any political spending.

Section 121’s broad prohibitions reach every conceivable type of spending, from direct contributions to independent expenditures, whether made “directly or indirectly through any person or entity,” and apply even to spending “in support of or opposition to a statewide ballot issue or question, regardless of whether the ballot issue or question has yet been certified to appear on the ballot.” Id. § 3517.121(B)(2). At the same time, Section 121 invites political weaponization, mandating that the Attorney General investigate any alleged violation made by any Ohio elector. Id. § 3517.121(G)(2)(a). The law’s sheer breadth, lack of tailoring, and threat of unrestrained investigations threaten and will chill the core First Amendment activity of not just noncitizens, but also citizens and domestic organizations who take donations from noncitizens or involve noncitizen decisionmakers….

In support, Ohio relies overwhelmingly on a reading of Bluman v. Federal Election Commission, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 n.3 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012), that is at odds with the decision itself. Bluman held that Congress may constitutionally prohibit foreign citizens other than LPRs from directly contributing to candidates or to expressly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate, but in writing for that court, then-Judge Kavanaugh repeatedly cautioned that restrictions on political spending by LPRs or for issue advocacy would raise substantial constitutional questions. See, e.g., id. at 292 (making explicit court was not deciding whether Congress could extend ban to LPRs or restrict noncitizens engaging in “issue advocacy and speaking out on issues of public policy,” warning its holding “should not be read to support such bans”). [Emphasis in original.]

The Bluman court was right to be concerned—and this Court should be, too, now that Ohio has enacted such a ban….

Resources:

• CourtListener docket page for OPAWL – Building AAPI Feminist Leadership v. Dave Yost, et al.
• Ohio Revised Code § 3517.121 (“Section 121”)
• Brief of Appellants – Cross Appellees (First Brief) [Ohio]
• Brief of Appellees – Cross Appellants (Second Brief) [OPAWL]

The Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you’re enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute’s mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

Episode 31: Libby v. Fecteau

Libby, et al. v. Fecteau, et al., argued before Circuit Judge Lara Montecalvo, Circuit Judge Seth Aframe, and District Judge Camille Vélez-Rivé in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on June 5, 2025. Argued by Taylor Meehan of Consovoy McCarthy PLLC (on behalf of Laurel Libby, et al.), Harmeet Dhillon, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights (for Amicus Curiae United States, supporting appellant), and Jonathan Bolton, Maine Assistant Attorney General (on behalf of Ryan M. Fecteau, et al.).

Background of the case, from the Brief of Appellants:

In February, Libby took to Facebook to call attention to Maine’s [transgender athlete] policy, borne out at this year’s high school track-and-field state championship. The championship was a public event; the names, schools, and podium photos of participants were widely broadcast and readily accessible online. Libby re-posted already-public, truthful information showing the first-place girls’ pole vaulter previously competed in boys’ pole vault. That first-place finish propelled the athlete’s high school team to win the girls’ state championship by one point.

Libby’s post put Maine’s policy in the national spotlight, prompting federal investigations regarding Maine’s noncompliance with federal law. Days later, the Maine House censured Libby along a party-line vote of 75 to 70. The censure resolution called on Libby to “publicly apologize” for bringing “national attention” to Maine. H.R. Res. 1, 132nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2025). It denounced Libby’s “statement criticizing the participation of transgender students in high school sports” as “reprehensible” and “incompatible with her duty and responsibilities as a Member of this House.” And while the resolution faulted Libby for identifying a “student athlete by [first] name” and “showing the minor in an athletic uniform” without “consent,” id., the post merely copied public information, showing podium photos from widely publicized state championship events, contained no threats, and violated no law. The resolution omitted that the Speaker and others regularly show minors on their social media, without any indication of consent from the subjects.

Dissenting House members criticized the resolution as “a mockery of the censure process,” “set[ting] a standard … that the majority party, when they’re displeased with a social media post that upsets them, can censure a member of the minority party.” Other representatives raised free-speech concerns and sought clarification on whether members who re-posted Libby’s post could “expect censures to come forth on them as well.” The Speaker disclaimed knowledge of “any other censures.”

After the censure resolution passed, the Speaker summoned Libby to the well of the House chamber and demanded she apologize. When Libby refused to recant her views, the Speaker found her in violation of Maine House Rule 401(11), providing that a member “guilty of a breach of any of the rules and orders of the House … may not be allowed to vote or speak … until the member has made satisfaction.”

Ever since, Libby’s district has had no voice or vote on the House floor. The Speaker has stopped Libby from speaking on any bill, including even posing a question in a recent debate on an equal rights amendment proposed for the state constitution.

Statement of the Issue, from Brief of Appellants:

Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction on their claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Guarantee Clause [of “a Republican Form of Government].”

The Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you’re enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute’s mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

Episode 31: Johnson v. Watkin, et al.

Johnson v. Watkin, et al., argued before Circuit Judges Consuelo M. Callahan, Bridget S. Bade, and Lucy H. Koh in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on June 2, 2025. Argued by Alan Gura of the Institute for Free Speech (on behalf of Daymon Johnson) and Jay C. Russell, Deputy Attorney General of California (on behalf of Defendant-Appellee Sonya Christian, Chancellor of the California Community College System), and David A. Urban (on behalf of the Bakersfield College Defendants-Appellees).

Background of the case, from the Appellant’s Brief:

School officials have investigated history Professor Daymon Johnson for his private political speech and warned that they could investigate him again. Johnson heads the faculty’s dissident Renegade Institute for Liberty (“RIFL”) [named for the school’s “Renegade” mascot] because officials fired his immediate predecessor as RIFL Faculty Lead, Professor Matthew Garrett, for his protected First Amendment political speech. (RIFL takes its name after the school’s athletic teams.) Among Garrett’s speech offenses: writing newspaper editorials, giving media interviews about political topics, and, like the activity for which officials investigated Johnson, discussing politics on social media. Some of the Facebook posts for which officials punished Garrett were actually Johnson’s.

Making matters worse, the Chancellor of California’s community college system now maintains a pervasive set of “competencies and criteria” enforcing an official political ideology—diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (“DEIA”), which includes “anti-racism”—that faculty must incorporate into every facet of their professional and even personal life.
…
Fearing additional reprisals for his political speech, unable to continue participating on school committees that now require DEIA compliance, and unwilling to teach or otherwise kowtow to the state’s official political ideology—despite knowing that his performance evaluations and thus continued employment hinge on doing exactly that—Johnson sought relief securing his First Amendment rights. In an exhaustive, 107-paragraph declaration spanning 29 pages, Johnson detailed not only how the school investigated him for his political speech and terminated his colleague for speaking similarly, but also the speech he refrains from expressing and the speech he is compelled to make in violation of his conscience.

The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation explaining why Johnson is entitled to a preliminary injunction on nearly all his claims. But Johnson’s preliminary injunction motion languished, remaining undecided for well over a year. When the district court finally turned to the motion (after Johnson petitioned for mandamus relief), it claimed that Johnson failed to plead highly specific details of his planned speech, which are either readily inferable, unnecessary, or, in some instances, set forth in Johnson’s declaration. The court also found that Johnson’s speech isn’t proscribed by the challenged provisions (that defendants invoked when punishing speech), and failed to acknowledge the threats to Johnson should he speak freely.

Resources:

• Institute for Free Speech case page for Johnson v. Watkin, et al. (which includes all briefs)

The Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you’re enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute’s mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

Episode 30: Americans for Prosperity, et al. v. Meyer, et al.

Americans for Prosperity, et al. v. Meyer, et al., argued before Circuit Judges Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Patrick J. Bumatay, and Gabriel P. Sanchez in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on May 15, 2025. Argued by Derek L. Shaffer (on behalf of Americans for Prosperity, et al.) and David Kolker (on behalf of Intervenor-Defendant Voters’ Right to Know) and Eric Fraser (on behalf of Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission).

Background of the case, from the Institute for Free Speech amicus brief:

Proposition 211 imposes sweeping disclosure rules unlike anything seen before. On every metric, the law expands on its predecessors. It covers more people, more speech, for a longer time. Where other laws narrow, Proposition 211 widens.
….
Proposition 211 expands on other disclosure rules in virtually every way. It does not limit disclosure to speech about elections, to speech close in time to elections, or to speech by those engaged mainly in election advocacy. It does not limit disclosure to donors who intend to support election advocacy, or even donors who know their dollars might be used for election advocacy. By expanding every part of an ordinary disclosure rule, Proposition 211 “accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree.” See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 583 (2012) (“NFIB”) (Roberts, C.J., op.). And that shift in kind turns a series of individually problematic provisions into a cataclysmic First Amendment violation.

Statement of the Issues, from the Appellants’ Opening Brief:

1. Whether the district court erred in concluding that Proposition 211 is facially valid even though its disclosures are untethered to electoral activity, its burdens surpass the strength of the State’s asserted interest, and its requirements are not narrowly tailored to the problems it purports to solve.
2. Whether the district court erred in concluding that Proposition 211 is valid as applied to Appellants, even though Appellants alleged a reasonable probability that disclosure of their donors’ names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals.
3. Whether the district court erred in concluding that Proposition 211 does not compel association even though its disclosure requirements tie organizations and their donors to candidates and causes irrespective of their actual beliefs.

Resources:

• CourtListener docket page for Americans for Prosperity, et al. v. Meyer, et al.
• Appellants’ Opening Brief
• Defendant-Appellees’ Answering Brief
• Answering Brief of Appellee-Intervenor Defendant
• Appellants’ Reply Brief
• Institute for Free Speech amicus brief

The Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you’re enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute’s mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

Episode 29: Institute for Free Speech v. J.R. Johnson, et al. 

Institute for Free Speech v. J.R. Johnson, et al. argued before Chief Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod and Judges Kurt D. Engelhardt and Greg Gerard Guidry in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on April 28, 2025. Argued by Del Kolde (on behalf of the Institute for Free Speech) and Cory R. Liu (on behalf of J.R. Johnson, et al.). 

Case Background, from the Institute for Free Speech website: 

Texas law prohibits corporations—including nonprofits—from making “in-kind contributions” to candidates and political committees. The Texas Ethics Commission (TEC) recently interpreted this ban to extend to pro bono litigation services, even when such services aim to challenge the constitutionality of state laws. 

The Institute for Free Speech (IFS) filed a federal lawsuit against the TEC commissioners and executive director over this ban on pro bono legal services. This law stops organizations like IFS from advocating for the civil rights of Texas candidates and political committees in court. It imposes stiff civil and criminal penalties for violations. 

The lawsuit argues that the TEC’s interpretation of the Texas Elections Code violates IFS’ First Amendment rights to free speech and association. The TEC’s reading of the law prevents IFS from representing potential clients like Chris Woolsey, a city councilmember in Corsicana, and the Texas Anti-Communist League PAC, headed by Cary Cheshire, both of whom want to contest a state law that compels speech on political signs. 

Resources: 

• Institute for Free Speech case page 
• Institute for Free Speech press release 
• Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief  
• Complaint  

The Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you’re enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute’s mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

Episode 28: Associated Press v. Taylor Budowich 

Associated Press v. Taylor Budowich, argued before a three-judge panel in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit on April 17, 2025. Argued by Eric D. McArthur (on behalf of Appellants Taylor Budowich, et al.) and Charles D. Tobin (on behalf of Appellee Associated Press). Lawyers for the Trump administration are seeking a stay on the DC District Court’s preliminary injunction rescinding “the denial of the AP’s access to the Oval Office, Air Force One, and other limited spaces based on the AP’s viewpoint.” 

Case Background, from the Memorandum and Order of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia: 

About two months ago, President Donald Trump renamed the Gulf of Mexico the Gulf of America. The Associated Press did not follow suit. For that editorial choice, the White House sharply curtailed the AP’s access to coveted, tightly controlled media events with the President. The AP now sues the White House chief of staff, her communications deputy, and the press secretary (collectively, “the Government”), seeking a preliminary injunction enjoining the Government from excluding it because of its viewpoint.  

Today, the Court grants that relief. But this injunction does not limit the various permissible reasons the Government may have for excluding journalists from limited-access events. It does not mandate that all eligible journalists, or indeed any journalists at all, be given access to the President or nonpublic government spaces. It does not prohibit government officials from freely choosing which journalists to sit down with for interviews or which ones’ questions they answer. And it certainly does not prevent senior officials from publicly expressing their own views. 

No, the Court simply holds that under the First Amendment, if the Government opens its doors to some journalists—be it to the Oval Office, the East Room, or elsewhere—it cannot then shut those doors to other journalists because of their viewpoints. The Constitution requires no less. 

Resources: 

• District Court Memorandum and Order
• Court Listener Docket 

The Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you’re enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute’s mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

Episode 27: Local 8027, AFT-New Hampshire, AFL-CIO v. Edelblut

Local 8027, AFT-New Hampshire, AFL-CIO v. Edelblut, argued before Circuit Judge Lara Montecalvo, Senior Circuit Judge William J. Kayatta, Jr., and Circuit Judge Seth Aframe in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on April 8, 2025. Argued by Charles G. Moerdler and Gilles R. Bissonnette (on behalf of Local 8027, AFT-New Hampshire, AFL-CIO, et al.) and Mary A. Triick, Senior Assistant Attorney General (on behalf of Edelblut, et al.).

Case Background, from the Brief for Plaintiffs—Appellees Local 8027, AFT-New Hampshire, AFL-CIO:

New Hampshire’s “Banned Concepts Law” (or the “Law”) is unconstitutionally vague. Enacted in June 2021, the Law bans the teaching, instruction, advocacy, advancement, and training of—or compelling a student to express belief in or support for—four concepts in public schools and places of public employment. The four concepts implicate aspects of “age, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, marital status, familial status, mental or physical disability, religion or national origin.”

Statement of Issues Presented for Review, from the Brief for Plaintiffs—Appellees Local 8027, AFT-New Hampshire, AFL-CIO:

1. Did the district court correctly hold that the Law violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause on its face because its “prohibitions against teaching banned concepts are unconstitutionally vague,” and because the law contains “viewpoint-based restrictions on speech that do not provide either fair warning to educators of what they prohibit or sufficient standards for law enforcement to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”?
2. As an independent basis for affirmance, does the Law violate the First Amendment where it implicates the private, extracurricular speech of educators on matters of public concern?

Resources:

• CourtListener case docket for Local 8027, AFT-New Hampshire, AFL-CIO v. Edelblut
• New Hampshire “Right to Freedom from Discrimination in Public Workplaces and Education” law
• Brief for Defendants—Appellants
• Brief for Plaintiffs—Appellees
• Reply Brief for Defendants—Appellants

The Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you’re enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute’s mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

Episode 26: Parents Defending Education v. Olentangy Local School District, et al.

Parents Defending Education v. Olentangy Local School District, argued before the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on March 19, 2025. Argued by Cameron Norris (on behalf of Parents Defending Education); Elliott Gaiser, Solicitor General of Ohio (on behalf of Ohio and 22 other states as amici curiae); and Jaime Santos (on behalf of the Olentangy Local School District Board of Education, et al.).

Background of the case, from the Institute for Free Speech’s second amicus brief (in support of reversal):

While students may freely identify as having genders that do not correspond to their biological sex, other students enjoy the same right to credit their own perceptions of reality—and to speak their minds when addressing their classmates. Students cannot be compelled to speak in a manner that confesses, accommodates, and conforms to an ideology they reject—even if that ideology’s adherents are offended by any refusal to agree with them or endorse their viewpoint. Yet that is what the Olentangy school district’s speech code does.

“Pronouns are political.” Dennis Baron, What’s Your Pronoun? 39 (2020). History shows that people have long used pronouns to express messages about society and its structure—often in rebellion against the prevailing ideology. And the same is true today. Choosing to use “preferred” or “non-preferred” pronouns often “advance[s] a viewpoint on gender identity.” Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492, 509 (6th Cir. 2021). So mandating that students use “preferred” pronouns or none at all elevates one viewpoint while silencing the other. It compels students to adopt the district’s ideology on gender identity while at school, and in doing so, “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.” W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

Statement of the Issues, from the Brief of Appellant Parents Defending Education:

The use of gender-specific pronouns is a “hot issue” that “has produced a passionate political and social debate” across the country. Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492, 508-09 (6th Cir. 2021). One side believes that gender is subjective and so people should use others’ “preferred pronouns”; the other side believes that sex is immutable and so people should use pronouns that correspond with biological sex. Id. at 498. Like the general public, students have varying views on this important subject, and the Supreme Court has long recognized that students don’t “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Yet the Olentangy Local School District has adopted policies that punish speech expressed by one side of the debate—the use of pronouns that are contrary to another student’s identity. The district court upheld the Policies as consistent with the First Amendment and denied PDE’s preliminary-injunction motion.

The issues presented in this appeal are:

1. Whether the District’s speech policies likely violate the First Amendment because they compel speech, discriminate based on viewpoint, prohibit speech based on content without evidence of a substantial disruption, or are overbroad.
2. Whether, if PDE is likely to succeed on the merits, the remaining preliminary-injunction criteria favor issuing a preliminary injunction.

Resources:

• CourtListener docket page for Parents Defending Education v. Olentangy Local School Dist, et al.
• Brief for Appellant Parents Defending Education
• Brief for Appellee Olentangy Local School Dist, et al.
• Supplemental En Banc Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Parents Defending Education
• Institute for Free Speech first amicus brief (in support of rehearing en banc)
• Institute for Free Speech second amicus brief (in support of reversal)