German Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo (DIJ) Podcast

The recent upsurge in concern about hate speech has largely focused on a relatively new right-wing group, the Zaitokukai, short for ‘Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai’, meaning ‘the Citizen’s Association that rejects special privileges for Japan-resident (Koreans)’. Officially, this organization has the limited and specific objective of eliminating the legal apparatus which gives special privileges to members of Japan’s Korean community. This is one face of the Zaitokukai: a pressure group lobbying for the correction of what it sees as a social injustice.

The other face of Zaitokukai is the violent hatred expressed against Koreans in street demonstrations, deliberately held in urban districts with large Korean populations, describing Koreans as vermin, calling for them to be killed, and displaying fascist symbols. The leadership of Zaitokukai has not distanced itself from these extremist displays. Clearly we need to look at events on the street, considering not only the meaning of words, but also the way they are uttered, the places where they are heard, and non-verbal expressions such as flags and placards.

But we also need to examine the Zaitokukai’s official face. Though the stress on removing special privileges may be a cynical ploy to gain political respectability, the fact remains that the Japanese state’s creation of the category of “special permanent resident” (tokubetsu eijūsha), and its almost-exclusive application to Japan’s pre-war Korean minority and their descendants, has made Koreans an easier target for the Zaitokukai. We need to study the Korean minority in Japan, what their ‘privileges’ are, how they were won and why they are controversial now.

The recent upsurge in concern about hate speech has largely focused on a relatively new right-wing group, the Zaitokukai, short for ‘Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai’, meaning ‘the Citizen’s Association that rejects special privileges for Japan-resident (Koreans)’. Officially, this organization has the limited and specific objective of eliminating the legal apparatus which gives special privileges to members of Japan’s Korean community. This is one face of the Zaitokukai: a pressure group lobbying for the correction of what it sees as a social injustice.

The other face of Zaitokukai is the violent hatred expressed against Koreans in street demonstrations, deliberately held in urban districts with large Korean populations, describing Koreans as vermin, calling for them to be killed, and displaying fascist symbols. The leadership of Zaitokukai has not distanced itself from these extremist displays. Clearly we need to look at events on the street, considering not only the meaning of words, but also the way they are uttered, the places where they are heard, and non-verbal expressions such as flags and placards.

But we also need to examine the Zaitokukai’s official face. Though the stress on removing special privileges may be a cynical ploy to gain political respectability, the fact remains that the Japanese state’s creation of the category of “special permanent resident” (tokubetsu eijūsha), and its almost-exclusive application to Japan’s pre-war Korean minority and their descendants, has made Koreans an easier target for the Zaitokukai. We need to study the Korean minority in Japan, what their ‘privileges’ are, how they were won and why they are controversial now.

This presentation is about language choice in Okinawa. Three languages are at issue, Ryukyuan, Japanese, and English. The Japanese language spread campaign in the Ryukyus from 1880 onwards entailed restrictions to the freedom of language choices and local identities in the Ryukyus. Hence, it was contested and needed coercion and ideological enforcement in order to be realized. Japanese language use in Ryukyuan families and neighborhoods from the 1950s onwards differs however. It was carried out in a quest for freedom from US occupation by Ryukyuans themselves. That the hopes for improved societal well-being associated with exclusive use of Japanese have not come true is crucial for our understanding of current efforts of language revitalization. These are carried out in the name of freedom and are contested by some because more freedom always coincides with less security. The desire to balance security and freedom makes communal life conflict-ridden. Which of the two desires will prevail over the other in the Ryukyus is not entirely clear yet, but it appears that the pendulum is swinging towards the freedom end at the present.

This presentation is about language choice in Okinawa. Three languages are at issue, Ryukyan, Japanese, and English. The Japanese language spread campaign in the Ryukyus from 1880 onwards entailed restrictions to the freedom of language choices and local identities in the Ryukyus. Hence, it was contested and needed coercion and ideological enforcement in order to be realized. Japanese language use in Ryukyuan families and neighborhoods from the 1950s onwards differs however. It was carried out in a quest for freedom from US occupation by Ryukyuans themselves. That the hopes for improved societal well-being associated with exclusive use of Japanese have not come true is crucial for our understanding of current efforts of language revitalization. These are carried out in the name of freedom and are contested by some because more freedom always coincides with less security. The desire to balance security and freedom makes communal life conflict-ridden. Which of the two desires will prevail over the other in the Ryukyus is not entirely clear yet, but it appears that the pendulum is swinging towards the freedom end at the present.

Could contemporary urban Japan provide a living example of the 18th Century Italian notion of public happiness? The question is by no means far-fetched. Daily life in Japan is rich in examples of “public happiness,” as I’ll show through a number of anecdotes and examples. Yet Japan’s performance is mediocre under the usual subjective and capabilities/eudaemonia-based metrics of well-being. This talk proposes that public happiness ought to be considered a third, collective type of “happiness” that complements the usual, more individually-based conceptions.

While public happiness doesn’t necessarily arise from government policies, it certainly can be impaired by them, particularly when such policies have quantitative targets such as productivity and growth. The failure of metrics to detect public happiness in Japan suggests that policies based on qualitative principles might be better for protecting and promoting it. An historical example of how a local government intervened in a traditional festival illustrates how qualitative considerations can enhance public happiness in practice. To conclude, I’ll propose a group of six qualitative “design principles” as candidate heuristics for policy-makers, among other actors.

Could contemporary urban Japan provide a living example of the 18th Century Italian notion of public happiness? The question is by no means far-fetched. Daily life in Japan is rich in examples of "public happiness," as I’ll show through a number of anecdotes and examples. Yet Japan's performance is mediocre under the usual subjective and capabilities/eudaemonia-based metrics of well-being. This talk proposes that public happiness ought to be considered a third, collective type of “happiness” that complements the usual, more individually-based conceptions.

While public happiness doesn’t necessarily arise from government policies, it certainly can be impaired by them, particularly when such policies have quantitative targets such as productivity and growth. The failure of metrics to detect public happiness in Japan suggests that policies based on qualitative principles might be better for protecting and promoting it. An historical example of how a local government intervened in a traditional festival illustrates how qualitative considerations can enhance public happiness in practice. To conclude, I’ll propose a group of six qualitative "design principles" as candidate heuristics for policy-makers, among other actors.

Entrepreneurship is regarded as an important factor for innovation and economic growth. However, Japan has been characterized by the lowest level of entrepreneurship activity among the OECD countries for more than 20 years. Since the 1990s, the government tried to stimulate business start-ups, especially in high-tech industries, without obvious success. There are only few empirical studies on entrepreneurship in Japan. However, such studies would be necessary to support and evaluate public policy to promote entrepreneurship. This lecture presents the results of a 4-year panel survey of Japanese entrepreneurs in manufacturing and software sectors, who started their businesses in 2007 and 2008. Based on this survey data, we show who research-oriented founders are and how they perform. Moreover, we also investigate the determinants of R&D investment, innovation outcomes, and employment growth of these start-ups.

Entrepreneurship is regarded as an important factor for innovation and economic growth. However, Japan has been characterized by the lowest level of entrepreneurship activity among the OECD countries for more than 20 years. Since the 1990s, the government tried to stimulate business start-ups, especially in high-tech industries, without obvious success. There are only few empirical studies on entrepreneurship in Japan. However, such studies would be necessary to support and evaluate public policy to promote entrepreneurship. This lecture presents the results of a 4-year panel survey of Japanese entrepreneurs in manufacturing and software sectors, who started their businesses in 2007 and 2008. Based on this survey data, we show who research-oriented founders are and how they perform. Moreover, we also investigate the determinants of R&D investment, innovation outcomes, and employment growth of these start-ups.

The historiography of the First World War has over the last few years quickly shifted beyond the confines of the fields of Flanders and the Somme. The ripples from the seismic change that the First World War enacted were instantly felt in countries beyond Europe’s borders. The participation of non-European countries, the economic and military mobilisation of the British and French Empires means that the war must be looked at from a global context. Internment in the First World War perfectly highlights this global phenomenon. Britain ran a global camp network that stretched from the Isle of Man, to South Africa, India, the Caribbean and Australia, while France transferred many of its prisoners of war to its possessions in North and West Africa. Neutral countries as far away from Europe as Chile even had internment camps. Japan housed around 4,800 Prisoners of War, taken after its successful siege of Tsingtao. This talk will offer a comparative perspective on the treatment of Germans in internment from 1914-1920. The “myth” of the good treatment of Prisoners of War in Japan is being challenged as more and more research into the camps is done. In contribution to this debate, the main question this talk will seek to address is how did prisoners from the colony of Tsingtao fare in comparison to their counterparts from the other German colonies?

Mahon Murphy is a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science under the supervision of Professor David Stevenson. His thesis concerns the establishment of prisoner of war and civilian internee camps to house internees from the former German colonies. In the course of his research Mahon has received a one year research grant from the DAAD and a Gerda Henkel/l’Historial Peronne Bourse. He is currently a visiting Research Fellow at the Freie Universität Berlin where he is participating in the 1914-1918-online.net online First World War encyclopaedia. His chapter on the cultural impact of First World War internment in Japan will be published early next year in an edited volume by Brill.

The historiography of the First World War has over the last few years quickly shifted beyond the confines of the fields of Flanders and the Somme. The ripples from the seismic change that the First World War enacted were instantly felt in countries beyond Europe’s borders. The participation of non-European countries, the economic and military mobilisation of the British and French Empires means that the war must be looked at from a global context. Internment in the First World War perfectly highlights this global phenomenon. Britain ran a global camp network that stretched from the Isle of Man, to South Africa, India, the Caribbean and Australia, while France transferred many of its prisoners of war to its possessions in North and West Africa. Neutral countries as far away from Europe as Chile even had internment camps. Japan housed around 4,800 Prisoners of War, taken after its successful siege of Tsingtao. This talk will offer a comparative perspective on the treatment of Germans in internment from 1914-1920. The “myth” of the good treatment of Prisoners of War in Japan is being challenged as more and more research into the camps is done. In contribution to this debate, the main question this talk will seek to address is how did prisoners from the colony of Tsingtao fare in comparison to their counterparts from the other German colonies?