German Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo (DIJ) Podcast

If the 2008 financial crisis has taught us anything, it is that Americans save too little, spend too much, and borrow excessively. How did Americans come to be such miserable savers, and what might they learn from Japan and European countries which have fostered enduring cultures of saving while often restraining consumption and credit? Drawing from his new book, Beyond Our Means: Why America Spends While the World Saves, Garon tells the story of how states in Japan and Europe actively shaped popular savings habits over the past two centuries by means of moral suasion campaigns, postal savings systems, and other institutions for small savers. Japan looms large in this global and comparative history, for it both emulated European practices and offered its own savings-promotion models to the West and rising Asian economies. The lecture is illustrated by evocative savings campaign posters from Japan and other nations.

If the 2008 financial crisis has taught us anything, it is that Americans save too little, spend too much, and borrow excessively. How did Americans come to be such miserable savers, and what might they learn from Japan and European countries which have fostered enduring cultures of saving while often restraining consumption and credit? Drawing from his new book, Beyond Our Means: Why America Spends While the World Saves, Garon tells the story of how states in Japan and Europe actively shaped popular savings habits over the past two centuries by means of moral suasion campaigns, postal savings systems, and other institutions for small savers. Japan looms large in this global and comparative history, for it both emulated European practices and offered its own savings-promotion models to the West and rising Asian economies. The lecture is illustrated by evocative savings campaign posters from Japan and other nations.

Based on recent research on happiness undertaken by psychologists and economists, several countries such as France and the United Kingdom have made the happiness of the population a major policy goal, thus following the lead of the Kingdom of Bhutan whose king invented the notion of Gross National Happiness decades ago.

This lecture will deal with two sets of questions:

- What do we know about the determinants of happiness? Is it true that an increase in income does not raise individual well-being? What are other significant factors? What open questions remain?

- Should governments strive to maximize people’s happiness or life satisfaction? At first sight this appears to be an attractive goal; however, I will argue that it is not. For the notion of a happiness maximizing government resembles that of a “benevolent dictator” which should not be pursued in a democracy.

Based on recent research on happiness undertaken by psychologists and economists, several countries such as France and the United Kingdom have made the happiness of the population a major policy goal, thus following the lead of the Kingdom of Bhutan whose king invented the notion of Gross National Happiness decades ago.

This lecture will deal with two sets of questions: 1. What do we know about the determinants of happiness? Is it true that an increase in income does not raise individual well-being? What are other significant factors? What open questions remain? 2. Should governments strive to maximize people‘s happiness or life satisfaction? At first sight this appears to be an attractive goal; however, I will argue that it is not. For the notion of a happiness maximizing government resembles that of a “benevolent dictator” which should not be pursued in a democracy.

This paper presents the results of a panel survey (N=10744) that examines how the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 2011 has affected the happiness of young people in Japan outside of the afflicted area. Our dataset consists of Japanese in their 20s and 30s from all non-afflicted prefectures. We conducted two surveys on happiness – one before the earthquake (December 2010) and one after (March 2011). The results suggested that about half of the Japanese youth have changed their life values after the earthquake even though they were not in the afflicted area, especially in terms of valuing social connectedness and ordinary life. In addition, people who were thinking about the earthquake when they completed the second survey were happier after the earthquake, showing that reflecting on the earthquake had prompted them to reevaluate their definition of global happiness. They also experienced temporary negative emotional reactions more frequently after the earthquake.

This paper presents the results of a panel survey (N=10744) that examines how the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 2011 has affected the happiness of young people in Japan outside of the afflicted area. Our dataset consists of Japanese in their 20s and 30s from all non-afflicted prefectures. We conducted two surveys on happiness – one before the earthquake (December 2010) and one after (March 2011). The results suggested that about half of the Japanese youth have changed their life values after the earthquake even though they were not in the afflicted area, especially in terms of valuing social connectedness and ordinary life. In addition, people who were thinking about the earthquake when they completed the second survey were happier after the earthquake, showing that reflecting on the earthquake had prompted them to reevaluate their definition of global happiness. They also experienced temporary negative emotional reactions more frequently after the earthquake.

On March 11, 2011, Japan was hit by the most severe natural and nuclear disaster in its history. How does the triple catastrophe bear on the Japanese economy today? The presentation will consider the economic recovery and look at the present situation in the most hit prefectures, before turning to the major challenges that Japan‘s economy is facing today. Special emphasis will be put on energy policy, government debt and the position of Japan in the world economy.

University-industry research collaborations (UICs) are globally increasing and offer substantial potential benefits for both sides. However, they are difficult to manage due to strong differences in organizational cultures between academia and industry. An analysis of survey data from more than 600 UICs and of case studies in Japan, the United States and Korea reveals various similarities and differences across the three countries. UICs in Japan and the United States tend to benefit from the richer experience companies and universities in the two countries have with such projects when compared with Korea. In contrast to the two Asian countries, demands by universities’ technology transfer offices tend to hamper UICs in the United States. Across all three countries, key UIC success factors are pre-existing ties between the partners, similarities in backgrounds and working styles, the existence of innovation champions who promote the project, and inter-organizational trust.

University-industry research collaborations (UICs) are globally increasing and offer substantial potential benefits for both sides. However, they are difficult to manage due to strong differences in organizational cultures between academia and industry. An analysis of survey data from more than 600 UICs and of case studies in Japan, the United States and Korea reveals various similarities and differences across the three countries. UICs in Japan and the United States tend to benefit from the richer experience companies and universities in the two countries have with such projects when compared with Korea. In contrast to the two Asian countries, demands by universities’ technology transfer offices tend to hamper UICs in the United States. Across all three countries, key UIC success factors are pre-existing ties between the partners, similarities in backgrounds and working styles, the existence of innovation champions who promote the project, and inter-organizational trust.

During the two "lost decades" Japan's industry has been working as hard as ever. Companies had to adapt to the changing and decreasing demand of the ageing economy, work off inflated prices through cost-cutting, and jump from their mature growth markets (in the US) into emerging markets (in Asia). The success of the exercise is reflected clearly in the data: deflation has brought down producer prices to international levels; high paying manufacturing jobs for the old have been replaced by low paying service jobs for the young; emerging country exports are now three times higher than exports to the US; and the yen is among the strongest currencies in the world.

What had been "lost" during this workout, however, is the life-blood of growth and success: effective innovation, career opportunities for the young, global integration, and most forms of "future" investment. Will they return? Certainly. By looking at long-term (investment) trends, the presentation will show that Japan currently seems to be at a turning point from two decades of cutting back and restructuring to more future-oriented investment in domestic services and Asian markets. While taking a decisively positive perspective on Japan's potential, however, it will also be shown which head winds of globalization are currently blowing in Asia's increasingly competitive markets.