In this episode of Ideas Untrapped we discussed the challenges and complexities of education, economic growth, and public health systems in developing countries with two brilliant guests James Habyarimana and Jishnu Das. We started off with an example on the rapid expansion of tertiary education in India and its unmet promise of better jobs, which led to discussions on similar dynamics in African contexts. The conversation explored the balance between market-driven growth and government intervention, emphasizing the need for robust processes and inclusive dialogues to address inequality, improve infrastructure, and shape a collective vision for the future. James Habyarimana is the Provost Distinguished Associate Professor at the McCourt School of Public Policy. His research is focused on identifying low-cost strategies to address barriers to better health and education outcomes in developing countries. Jishnu Das is a distinguished professor of public policy at the McCourt School of Public Policy and the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Jishnu’s work focuses on health and education in low and middle-income countries.

Transcript

Tobi: Welcome to both of you. This is actually the first time on the podcast that i'll be hosting two guests at the same time and i feel so lucky that it's both of you, so welcome to Ideas Untrapped it's fantastic talking to you.

Jishnu: Great to be here, Tobi. Glad we're doing this.

James: I feel privileged to be sharing this time with both of you.

Tobi: Okay, thank you. You can take turn to answer as you choose. What inspired me to do this episode primarily was a very powerful article by Jishnu talking about

(00:00:33):

college education and how young people may have been shortchanged by the promises

(00:00:40):

and what the evidence suggests.

(00:00:43):

So briefly,

(00:00:44):

if you can just summarise for us,

(00:00:48):

Jishnu,

(00:00:49):

what inspired you to write that piece and what were the major findings?

(00:00:54):

Jishnu: Yeah, sure, Tobi.

(00:00:55):

And I'll ask James to talk about the African context.

(00:00:58):

I mean, I know India fairly well.

(00:01:00):

And one of the things that's so surprising and, you know, when people in the U.S.

(00:01:05):

or people elsewhere hear it,

(00:01:07):

they don't realise just how fast college education and college enrolment has

(00:01:12):

increased in the country.

(00:01:14):

Right.

(00:01:15):

So one of the statistics that I got wrong because I couldn't believe it is between 2003 and 2016,

(00:01:22):

India was building a new college every eight hours, right?

(00:01:27):

And you think about a number like that and you say, what happened here, right?

(00:01:31):

It's completely out of the experience that any of us has ever seen.

(00:01:36):

There's a real, real thirst for education among young people.

(00:01:41):

And it's not just a certain group.

(00:01:44):

We are seeing it in all kinds of socioeconomic status, girls, boys, men, women.

(00:01:51):

And it's interesting,

(00:01:52):

like in a country like Pakistan,

(00:01:54):

which is traditionally thought to be very patriarchal than it is,

(00:01:58):

there are more women in college now than men.

(00:02:01):

So there's this huge upsurge,

(00:02:03):

maybe a huge demand for college education that's being met by all kinds of places.

(00:02:08):

And, you know, education is a bit like looking at the stars.

(00:02:11):

You're going to see what happened in the past in terms of, OK, all these guys came into college.

(00:02:16):

What's going to happen to their lives after that?

(00:02:18):

And that part is not clear.

(00:02:21):

So India has grown a lot.

(00:02:23):

It's a huge success story on some fronts, kind of.

(00:02:27):

But really, more than 90 percent of the jobs are still informal.

(00:02:31):

And we keep thinking BPO, you know, business process outsourcing.

(00:02:34):

They're taking a lot of outsourcing jobs.

(00:02:36):

You know,

(00:02:37):

there's so little of that in actual numbers that it supports less than a percent of

(00:02:42):

the population.

(00:02:43):

So the question,

(00:02:44):

the big question that comes is,

(00:02:46):

OK,

(00:02:46):

all these guys who are going into college,

(00:02:49):

they're going in with the expectation that their lives are going to be a lot better.

(00:02:53):

And are we going to be able to meet that expectation?

(00:02:56):

And the phrase that people use is, you know, we have the so-called demographic dividend.

(00:03:01):

where we have lots of young people and fewer older people.

(00:03:05):

And the right way to think about it is how do we make sure that that demographic

(00:03:11):

fraction which we call a low dependency ratio is a dividend and doesn't turn into a

(00:03:16):

nightmare when you suddenly have these tons of people who are like,

(00:03:20):

look,

(00:03:20):

you sold us a dream.

(00:03:21):

You told us that if we make it through the schools,

(00:03:24):

which are not great,

(00:03:25):

and we go to college and we finish our college,

(00:03:28):

We'll get a decent job.

(00:03:29):

Where is that job?

(00:03:32):

That's why I called my blog a coming of rage story, because our college education has come of age.

(00:03:38):

And the big question now is whether it's going to come of rage as well.

(00:03:42):

And that's kind of, you know, where I left it.

(00:03:45):

But I don't know.

(00:03:46):

I mean,

(00:03:46):

James,

(00:03:46):

do you find kind of similar patterns in Uganda or in Tanzania where you work or

(00:03:52):

other countries?

(00:03:53):

James: Right.

(00:03:53):

I guess I want to start by saying, yes, I mean, Africa is in some ways pretty, pretty diverse place.

(00:03:57):

And so I'm going to focus a lot of my comments on the places that I'm familiar with,

(00:04:01):

which would be East and Southern Africa.

(00:04:03):

Tobi: Yeah.

(00:04:04):

James: But I fully expect,

(00:04:05):

as I was saying to Tobi,

(00:04:06):

I've done some work both in Lagos and in northern Nigeria on education.

(00:04:09):

So even though this is a little bit a while ago,

(00:04:11):

so I don't quite understand the long run trends and,

(00:04:14):

say,

(00:04:14):

demand for college.

(00:04:16):

But, you know, Africa is a very young continent.

(00:04:18):

In many parts of Africa, the share of the population is under 30, you know, is close to two thirds.

(00:04:23):

And so, yes, there is the same dynamics in terms of expectations of a better life.

(00:04:29):

And of course, I think this is the challenge for politicians.

(00:04:31):

So

(00:04:31):

So earlier when Tobi was saying maybe,

(00:04:33):

you know,

(00:04:34):

infrastructure projects get more attention than,

(00:04:36):

say,

(00:04:37):

education,

(00:04:37):

I actually think in the places where I work that,

(00:04:39):

in fact,

(00:04:40):

education gets much more attention because politicians are concerned about this rage,

(00:04:45):

right?

(00:04:45):

They're concerned about this gap between people's aspirations and essentially kind

(00:04:50):

of the opportunities that are available when they finish school.

(00:04:53):

I think that is a huge problem.

(00:04:54):

Even in places,

(00:04:55):

actually,

(00:04:55):

the northeastern Nigeria,

(00:04:57):

where I started to do some work on kind of apprenticeship programs,

(00:05:00):

there's a lot of attention being paid to addressing essentially kind of this gap.

(00:05:04):

Because I think ultimately,

(00:05:06):

and I think most political scientists have suggested that essentially kind of the

(00:05:09):

share of males between the age of 15 to 29 who are not engaged in school or active work,

(00:05:15):

in some ways can be a major source of instability.

(00:05:17):

And so I do see the same concerns.

(00:05:21):

There's certainly been an explosion in

(00:05:22):

in terms of tertiary institutions outside of government.

(00:05:25):

And so there are many more private institutions in East Africa than exist,

(00:05:29):

say,

(00:05:29):

you know,

(00:05:30):

20 or 30 years ago.

(00:05:31):

I don't think people are building universities or colleges at the same rate as they are in India.

(00:05:36):

But there's certainly kind of an attempt to respond to the exploding demand

(00:05:40):

And I think ultimately the question for whether there's a demographic dividend or not,

(00:05:45):

I mean,

(00:05:45):

I've certainly made the case in other fora where I've said,

(00:05:48):

look,

(00:05:48):

we need to essentially kind of take advantage of this opportunity and we need to

(00:05:52):

give these young people the skills to be effective in the world.

(00:05:56):

But I think ultimately there is kind of a bigger question about sort of can these

(00:06:00):

places produce the jobs and find the markets to really deploy these people?

(00:06:05):

Yeah,

(00:06:05):

so I hope we won't start the conversation by essentially kind of talking about rage

(00:06:09):

as opposed to the high hopes.

(00:06:11):

But yeah,

(00:06:11):

I think many places where I work are facing the similar sort of challenge of,

(00:06:16):

you know,

(00:06:16):

how do we convert this opportunity into prosperity as opposed to civil conflict?

(00:06:22):

Tobi: So I think for me, the rage...

(00:06:25):

question is sort of unavoidable.

(00:06:29):

Perhaps the evidence might tell us differently, but at least on some level of perception.

(00:06:35):

Certainly, it's a story that resonates with me.

(00:06:39):

I mean,

(00:06:40):

I live in Lagos,

(00:06:41):

Nigeria,

(00:06:42):

and I can certainly tell from my observation that you see an army of young men from,

(00:06:50):

say,

(00:06:51):

18 to 25 with

(00:06:53):

absolutely nothing to do, you know, just walking the streets, standing on the corner.

(00:06:59):

So what I want to tease out with my next question is the intersection of skills and jobs, you know.

(00:07:08):

So on the one hand, there's been this great expansion.

(00:07:12):

I think it's certainly true, also of Nigeria, the expansion in tertiary education is crazy.

(00:07:19):

Like private schools must be

(00:07:23):

Now,

(00:07:23):

I don't have the data immediately,

(00:07:25):

but I think private universities must now outnumber public universities in Nigeria.

(00:07:30):

You can certainly see the same trend in secondary schools.

(00:07:33):

But at the same time,

(00:07:34):

when you speak to employers,

(00:07:36):

the story they tell is that,

(00:07:38):

yes,

(00:07:39):

there's a lot of schooling,

(00:07:40):

but these folks are not really skilled.

(00:07:43):

And then recently,

(00:07:45):

the National Bureau of Statistics did a labour market survey and what they found is

(00:07:49):

like 97% of jobs in Nigeria are still in the informal sector,

(00:07:55):

right?

(00:07:56):

So is it that we are not creating enough formal sector jobs or the inadequate

(00:08:06):

formal sector job is itself a consequence of the quality of education?

(00:08:12):

James: That's a great question.

(00:08:14):

Let me try and take a stab at it.

(00:08:15):

So my view is that clearly causation is running in both directions.

(00:08:19):

But I actually would say that,

(00:08:20):

in fact,

(00:08:21):

I think it's the absence of better jobs that is possibly keeping down the quality

(00:08:26):

of education more than essentially kind of the other way around.

(00:08:29):

You know, we've written about the demographic dividend in, say, Southeast Asia.

(00:08:33):

I think those were places where, in fact, the export markets essentially kind of provided lots of jobs.

(00:08:38):

And it wasn't that the people first got education and then got the jobs.

(00:08:42):

I mean, you know, in some ways, the question is, why do people get educated?

(00:08:45):

There's a nice paper that talks about,

(00:08:47):

ultimately,

(00:08:47):

should we worry about education policy and improving quality of schools?

(00:08:51):

Or should we worry about how to essentially kind of grow the economy, expand opportunities?

(00:08:56):

And then in some ways, people will then respond

(00:08:59):

to those opportunities by getting the education that essentially maximises those opportunities.

(00:09:05):

One way we can generate lots of opportunities is to come up with great new ideas.

(00:09:09):

Great new ideas create new markets,

(00:09:11):

and you could argue that innovation requires a high-quality education system.

(00:09:16):

But I think for many countries that are growing from the levels where Nigeria,

(00:09:21):

Kenya,

(00:09:21):

Zimbabwe are at the moment,

(00:09:23):

My sense is I don't know that the kind of innovation that we're talking about is

(00:09:27):

essentially kind of the most important thing.

(00:09:28):

I think the lowest cost path is to find manufacturing related markets where,

(00:09:34):

in fact,

(00:09:34):

you can employ lots of people, where you don't need people to have PhDs and be

(00:09:39):

creating patents to get the economy started.

(00:09:41):

I suspect Jishnu might have a very different take on this.

(00:09:43):

But I think my view is it's the opportunities first that shape the education system

(00:09:48):

rather than output of the education system in some ways failing the country.

(00:09:52):

Even though I should say I think both of these directions are important,

(00:09:55):

I think, I certainly would put much more weight on the former.

(00:09:59):

Jishnu: So, Tobi, your podcaster is Ideas Untrapped?

(00:10:02):

And the second part you didn't tell us, it's like Speakers Trapped.

(00:10:06):

I mean, that's one of the deepest questions I've heard in a long time.

(00:10:12):

And I'm going to push it back as a question to you and James, but it's a question that worries me.

(00:10:18):

And just to quickly summarise,

(00:10:20):

you probably already know this,

(00:10:21):

but just to summarise kind of three big thought pieces that are out there.

(00:10:26):

So Dan Rodrik,

(00:10:27):

Kennedy School's been arguing that countries that are not already doing a lot of

(00:10:31):

manufacturing have basically missed the manufacturing bus.

(00:10:36):

And he's arguing that unlike, say, the U.S.

(00:10:39):

or U.K.,

(00:10:40):

which deindustrialised much later down the employment chain,

(00:10:45):

a lot of countries,

(00:10:47):

including Brazil,

(00:10:48):

including other places,

(00:10:49):

are deindustrialising prematurely,

(00:10:51):

right?

(00:10:52):

So he's saying, look, the manufacturing bus is lost.

(00:10:54):

I mean, if you think you're going to generate those jobs through manufacturing, it's gone.

(00:10:59):

I don't know how right these are, but let's just put these out there.

(00:11:03):

And then interestingly, Rohit Lamba, who is an economics professor, has this

(00:11:10):

very interesting book with Raghu Rajan,

(00:11:12):

who was earlier our central bank governor and professor at Chicago,

(00:11:17):

basically arguing that if India has to grow…

(00:11:20):

So this is similar to Dani and they're saying,

(00:11:23):

you know,

(00:11:23):

it has to kind of give up on this idea of manufacturing and move to really high

(00:11:27):

scale services and patents.

(00:11:29):

Right.

(00:11:30):

And for that, a whole host of changes are necessary.

(00:11:34):

So then it kind of comes back to this big question of if you are able to create

(00:11:41):

these really high skilled people coming out of the schooling system and the

(00:11:46):

university system,

(00:11:47):

will you be able to transition to a great service economy?

(00:11:51):

And I'm going to put that question back to you,

(00:11:54):

but kind of argue two pieces there,

(00:11:57):

which,

(00:11:58):

you know,

(00:11:58):

I didn't find in Rohit and Raghu Rajan's book or in Dani's thinking.

(00:12:02):

One is,

(00:12:03):

look,

(00:12:03):

if you ask people,

(00:12:05):

and I think this is definitely true for India,

(00:12:07):

I think this is true for many countries in Africa,

(00:12:09):

what do you want from the government,

(00:12:11):

right?

(00:12:11):

They don't get upset.

(00:12:12):

Like, I've never talked to a parent, and I've talked to many parents, but

(00:12:16):

they don't get upset at the schooling system.

(00:12:18):

You ask them, hey, why is your kid not doing great?

(00:12:21):

They'll blame the kid.

(00:12:22):

It's like, oh, she doesn't study enough or he doesn't study enough.

(00:12:25):

They will almost never say, look, the teacher is a disaster.

(00:12:29):

They'll never say, oh, the schooling is a disaster.

(00:12:31):

They'll say, it's my kid, right?

(00:12:32):

Because they see some kids do well and they see some kids not do well and they're like,

(00:12:37):

oh,

(00:12:37):

that's the kid.

(00:12:38):

On the other hand, so when you ask them, what do you want from the government?

(00:12:42):

The number one priority is we need jobs.

(00:12:45):

Now, I don't know, and I'd love to hear from you and James on two things.

(00:12:50):

One is,

(00:12:50):

do you think we can shift or do you think it's even worth saying,

(00:12:55):

you know,

(00:12:56):

how does the government shift expectations from we want a job to we want our

(00:13:03):

schools and universities to function at a totally different level,

(00:13:06):

right?

(00:13:07):

Do you think politicians are willing to take the risk of saying,

(00:13:10):

hey,

(00:13:10):

if we give you really good schools,

(00:13:12):

but you don't get the jobs,

(00:13:15):

you will still re-elect us.

(00:13:17):

I don't know.

(00:13:17):

And I want to hear what you guys have to say about that.

(00:13:20):

And the second one,

(00:13:21):

Tobi,

(00:13:21):

that people are underestimating,

(00:13:23):

and I'm more and more sure in 20 years is going to become a major dynamic,

(00:13:27):

is that Europe is running out of people,

(00:13:30):

right?

(00:13:30):

I mean, the fertility rates are really low now.

(00:13:33):

At some stage, they're going to have to get over their racism and bring people in.

(00:13:38):

I don't know who these people coming in are, right?

(00:13:40):

A big proportion of them are going to be nurses, right?

(00:13:44):

nurses who are comfortable working with old people, right?

(00:13:48):

So we used to think exactly, as James said, export-led.

(00:13:51):

Now, Nigeria already exports a lot of doctors, right?

(00:13:54):

I mean, we know exactly how big that export industry has been.

(00:13:58):

But are we also thinking about a totally different scale of migration into Europe?

(00:14:05):

And what do those skills look like?

(00:14:09):

Because I think in 20 years,

(00:14:10):

this conversation we're going to have is going to take on a completely different tone.

(00:14:13):

Migration is going to be a big part of it.

(00:14:15):

You know, how our countries are sending people to other countries is going to be a big part of it.

(00:14:21):

And I don't know where that leads.

(00:14:22):

So let me put those two questions back to you and James.

(00:14:26):

I mean,

(00:14:26):

this one about are we willing to transition to politicians saying jobs are really

(00:14:31):

the private sector and you guys,

(00:14:33):

we are going to give you the skills.

(00:14:35):

And second,

(00:14:36):

Are we thinking hard about the fact that given how much European fertility is

(00:14:41):

declining and other countries' fertility is declining,

(00:14:45):

that they're going to need people for all kinds of jobs?

(00:14:49):

And is that something on the political horizon?

(00:14:52):

And I don't know the answers to these two things.

(00:14:54):

So let me tee that back to you as a question.

(00:14:58):

Tobi: I think James should go first.

(00:15:00):

James: You know, this is the trouble with having Jishnu on.

(00:15:02):

He's supposed to be answering the questions, but now he's asking a lot of the questions.

(00:15:06):

No, these are the most important questions I think facing certainly our field of development economics.

(00:15:12):

And so I think on the second question about

(00:15:15):

Does the government, is the government willing to change the offer, right?

(00:15:20):

The social contract, change the terms of the contract to say, look, you're on your own.

(00:15:26):

We'll give you the tools you need.

(00:15:28):

You know, I don't know.

(00:15:29):

But let me just say that from what I've observed in a number of places,

(00:15:32):

including even in northeastern Nigeria,

(00:15:34):

in Adamawa State,

(00:15:35):

where we started some work,

(00:15:36):

but then it got caught up in essentially kind of the impeachment of a governor

(00:15:40):

there a few years ago.

(00:15:41):

No, I think that it's extremely hard to change the terms of the contract.

(00:15:45):

I think that voters are thinking about their bottom lines.

(00:15:48):

They're not thinking about,

(00:15:49):

you know,

(00:15:50):

give me the tools and I will do the work myself to put food on my table.

(00:15:53):

So I'm not sure that's an easy thing to do.

(00:15:55):

And if I think about sort of

(00:15:57):

what a number of governments in East Africa essentially kind of doing,

(00:16:00):

at least in this domain,

(00:16:01):

you know,

(00:16:02):

I think they find themselves having to come up with all sorts of cash transfer and

(00:16:08):

other labor market support programs because ultimately it's not enough for them to say,

(00:16:12):

hey,

(00:16:12):

you know,

(00:16:13):

schooling is free because ultimately,

(00:16:15):

as Tobi said,

(00:16:16):

when you see those guys walking the streets,

(00:16:19):

it's not like they stop asking,

(00:16:20):

where is the job that I was promised?

(00:16:22):

I think this deep implicit promise is very, very hard to shift.

(00:16:25):

But to your second question, I'm curious what Tobi will have to say to this.

(00:16:29):

The second question on the global demographic structures and maybe the future of jobs,

(00:16:35):

and yes,

(00:16:35):

the Rodrik and Raghu and Rohit kind of claim that the manufacturing bus has left

(00:16:41):

the station.

(00:16:42):

First of all, I'm not entirely sure that I completely buy it, but of course, we're also in the age of

(00:16:47):

AI and more powerful machines that are essentially kind of around the corner.

(00:16:50):

So it is possible that maybe that bus has left the station.

(00:16:53):

And so maybe the future of,

(00:16:54):

you know,

(00:16:54):

the kinds of jobs that will create opportunities for this large group of young

(00:16:58):

people in Africa and in India is essentially kind of in the service sector.

(00:17:01):

And,

(00:17:02):

you know,

(00:17:02):

I already see some of that,

(00:17:04):

you know,

(00:17:04):

so in East Africa,

(00:17:05):

they're big migrant worker,

(00:17:07):

essentially kind of programs with the Middle East.

(00:17:09):

They are straddled with lots of problems around abuse and exploitation.

(00:17:14):

But I can tell you that if you get on a plane to Dubai or Qatar,

(00:17:19):

that in some ways many of the people that will be surrounding me will be a lot of

(00:17:23):

very young people going to work

(00:17:25):

Either essentially kind of inside people's homes or in some cases as baristas and construction workers.

(00:17:30):

So I think that's already started.

(00:17:32):

And in the places where it's politically, I guess, feasible to do.

(00:17:35):

I mean,

(00:17:36):

I think,

(00:17:36):

yes,

(00:17:37):

Europe,

(00:17:37):

Japan,

(00:17:38):

North America,

(00:17:39):

you know,

(00:17:39):

yeah,

(00:17:40):

I think those are places where in some ways the political barriers remain

(00:17:42):

quite strong.

(00:17:43):

But I do think that politicians are certainly looking at a lot of these programs.

(00:17:48):

I believe in Kenya just recently signed an agreement with Germany along these lines

(00:17:52):

of basically being able to essentially kind of having some guest worker programs.

(00:17:55):

So I think this is top of mind and it in some ways reflects perhaps the difficulty

(00:17:59):

of kind of changing this contract between voters and their governments.

(00:18:03):

Jishnu: Ah, super.

(00:18:03):

And I just wanted to add one more thing to this,

(00:18:05):

Tobi,

(00:18:06):

for your next question,

(00:18:07):

which is,

(00:18:08):

you know,

(00:18:08):

if you look at Kenyans,

(00:18:09):

Nigerians,

(00:18:10):

I suspect,

(00:18:11):

Indians,

(00:18:11):

I mean,

(00:18:12):

we are ingenious people,

(00:18:14):

right?

(00:18:15):

When I came to the US for my PhD, you know, they would teach that the US is a free market.

(00:18:19):

I was like, you guys have no idea what a free market is.

(00:18:22):

A free market is when,

(00:18:24):

you know,

(00:18:24):

there's a traffic jam and the bus breaks down and you have 30 vendors come to your

(00:18:28):

spot in five minutes.

(00:18:30):

Tobi: Yep,

Jishnu: right?

(00:18:31):

Selling everything under the sun.

(00:18:33):

That's a free market.

(00:18:35):

A free market is not having any clue what your tax is going to charge because

(00:18:38):

everyone's going to negotiate depending on whether it's raining,

(00:18:41):

where you're going,

(00:18:42):

what time of day it is,

(00:18:43):

right?

(00:18:44):

That's a free market.

(00:18:45):

And very fascinating,

(00:18:46):

you know,

(00:18:47):

Rem Koolhaas,

(00:18:48):

the architect,

(00:18:50):

he worked in Lagos for like eight years and they have this wonderful book called Lagos: How it Works.

(00:18:55):

And recently, well, not, I don't know, recently, a while back, I think, his co-author, Kunle Adeyemi

(00:19:01):

I hope I'm pronouncing it right.

(00:19:04):

And it's fascinating what they said.

(00:19:05):

They have a Guardian interview where they said,

(00:19:07):

look,

(00:19:07):

Lagos in 1997 was this fascinating city where the government wasn't there,

(00:19:12):

but still people created a lot of structures that allowed that city to function at

(00:19:17):

a fairly high level.

(00:19:18):

I don't know whether you agree with that.

(00:19:20):

I don't know Lagos at all.

(00:19:21):

And in that interview, you know, at that point, the state had really withdrawn from Lagos.

(00:19:26):

The city was left to its own devices, both in terms of money and services.

(00:19:31):

That, by definition, created an unbelievable proliferation of independent agency.

(00:19:36):

Each citizen needed to take in any day maybe 400 or 500 independent decisions on

(00:19:42):

how to survive in an extremely complex system.

(00:19:47):

That was why the title of the book became Lagos: How it Works,

(00:19:49):

because it was the ultimate dysfunctional city.

(00:19:52):

But actually, in terms of all the initiatives and ingenuities,

(00:19:56):

It mobilised an incredibly beautiful, almost utopian landscape of independence and agency.

(00:20:02):

At this point,

(00:20:03):

you know,

(00:20:04):

and James,

(00:20:04):

I don't know whether that social contract will be able to change it,

(00:20:07):

but the ingenuity of our populations is just through the roof.

(00:20:13):

So we have a sense of how to move it forward and thinking about what are the

(00:20:17):

guardrails we need,

(00:20:19):

right,

(00:20:19):

in this kind of new world that's coming up is,

(00:20:23):

I think,

(00:20:23):

the key question.

(00:20:24):

Tobi: Hmm.

(00:20:25):

Before I jump to my next question, I'm certainly not as skilled as you guys.

(00:20:31):

So my observations are just going to be a layman's observation, basically.

(00:20:37):

On Jishnu's point, first of all, Rodrik has to at least I’ve extended an invitation to him.

(00:20:46):

He has to clarify a lot of things with that new paper.

(00:20:49):

Because for years, he has been arguing the opposite.

(00:20:55):

When people point out that,

(00:20:58):

yeah,

(00:20:59):

a lot of low income countries are stuck in low productivity,

(00:21:03):

informal services jobs.

(00:21:04):

And, you know, perhaps the question should be how to make those productive.

(00:21:11):

I think Rodrik is one of the people that has been arguing that,

(00:21:14):

no,

(00:21:14):

you need manufacturing to really,

(00:21:16):

really,

(00:21:16):

you know,

(00:21:17):

do the structural transformation.

(00:21:19):

So I don't know why or if the evidence that he has now is sufficiently robust to

(00:21:25):

like shift really,

(00:21:27):

really big.

(00:21:28):

But I mean, for Rajan and… Rajan, for example, has been like pushing that view for a while.

(00:21:37):

I think I've heard a few speeches before that book.

(00:21:41):

especially on the construction question.

(00:21:43):

So I'll give you an example.

(00:21:44):

In Nigeria,

(00:21:45):

for example,

(00:21:46):

the two largest private employers are construction firms,

(00:21:52):

Julius Berger and the other Chinese company.

(00:21:55):

The third largest is a microcredit bank, right?

(00:21:59):

So I agree with Rajan that construction is something that might

(00:22:07):

provide that sort of soft landing in terms of large-scale employment creation that

(00:22:13):

manufacturing is for some countries.

(00:22:17):

But as for manufacturing bus leaving the station,

(00:22:22):

again,

(00:22:22):

I'm skeptical because if you look at what Bangladesh has been able to do,

(00:22:27):

yes,

(00:22:27):

they are struggling with diversification away from textile.

(00:22:32):

If you look at what Vietnam has been able to do,

(00:22:36):

on manufacturing, then you see that, okay, well, maybe there's still some hope there.

(00:22:44):

In my own view,

(00:22:45):

I think the challenge would be how democracies manage to create… low income

(00:22:54):

democracies manage to create a highly productive industrial sectors.

(00:23:00):

So, and I think all eyes will be on India for the next decade.

(00:23:05):

you know, how the attention, the investment and everything coming in now can create that

(00:23:13):

China-like story.

(00:23:15):

All eyes will be on India.

(00:23:16):

And if India manages to make that a success story,

(00:23:20):

I think it provides a good example for how other democracies will… where the social

(00:23:26):

contract provides a bit of tension,

(00:23:29):

like you said.

(00:23:30):

And I agree with James.

(00:23:31):

It's difficult.

(00:23:33):

Again, if I want to use Nigeria as an example, electoral politics right now is largely redistributive.

(00:23:42):

You know,

(00:23:42):

if you want to shift spending and public investment towards something with,

(00:23:48):

you know,

(00:23:49):

a little more delayed gratification,

(00:23:52):

I'm not sure that politicians are willing to take that risk.

(00:23:58):

And secondly,

(00:24:00):

I would say that even if you find a government that is willing to take that leap,

(00:24:05):

you're going to run into some serious fiscal challenges that you need to figure out.

(00:24:12):

Macroeconomically, a lot of our economies in Africa are challenged.

(00:24:17):

The debt burden is a huge, huge topic.

(00:24:21):

So the kind of financing necessary to improve your education sector,

(00:24:28):

I think a lot of governments look at that and they would rather spend a fraction of

(00:24:34):

that on cash transfer schemes and expanding

(00:24:39):

public employment, public sector jobs.

(00:24:43):

So if we are able to figure out the finance and the level of fiscal investment that

(00:24:51):

that is going to take,

(00:24:52):

that is a question mark that would need to be resolved,

(00:24:55):

which,

(00:24:56):

I don't know,

(00:24:57):

then leads me to my next question.

(00:24:59):

Again, on the quality of education, what are the low-hanging fruits that

(00:25:09):

are available.

(00:25:10):

If we are trying to, say, improve the quality.

(00:25:14):

You know,

(00:25:14):

like I said earlier,

(00:25:15):

you speak to a lot of employers,

(00:25:17):

they tell you that a lot of graduates,

(00:25:19):

yes,

(00:25:20):

they are schooled,

(00:25:21):

but they are not skilled enough.

(00:25:23):

They are poorly matched to the job they are applying for.

(00:25:28):

For example,

(00:25:29):

most of the people you find in the financial sector in Nigeria are people who

(00:25:35):

graduated from STEM subjects.

(00:25:39):

Mathematics students,

(00:25:40):

engineering students,

(00:25:42):

physics students,

(00:25:43):

chemistry students,

(00:25:44):

they come out of school and they go straight to the financial sector,

(00:25:48):

to the banking jobs,

(00:25:49):

investment banking,

(00:25:50):

advisory consulting.

(00:25:52):

And to be honest,

(00:25:55):

you can say that if you have a thriving STEM sector,

(00:25:59):

they will be poorly matched because they did not actually get that STEM education.

(00:26:06):

You know, I went through the Nigerian schooling system.

(00:26:09):

I can tell you how much practical, laboratory or experimental work I did.

(00:26:16):

Very little, you know.

(00:26:18):

So what are the low hanging fruits to improve the quality of education?

(00:26:25):

Because we seem to have gotten ourselves into,

(00:26:29):

to use a phrase I first learned from Lant,

(00:26:32):

isomorphic mimicry,

(00:26:34):

you know.

(00:26:34):

We have graduates,

(00:26:36):

we have tertiary institutions,

(00:26:37):

but the quality is certainly not the same across the world.

(00:26:43):

James: Let me give this a crack and then I'll let Jishnu polish up my response.

(00:26:46):

So I don't know that there are necessarily low-hanging fruit.

(00:26:49):

I mean,

(00:26:50):

in some ways,

(00:26:51):

I think the way to think about an education system is that the people who are

(00:26:54):

producing the outputs are also essentially kind of products of that education system.

(00:26:58):

And so,

(00:26:58):

yes,

(00:26:58):

I certainly think that if you want to improve the education system,

(00:27:01):

you have to start with the teachers.

(00:27:03):

And then you have to make it easy for the teachers to essentially kind of do their job.

(00:27:06):

And in a context of a historical and,

(00:27:08):

you know,

(00:27:09):

pretty unprecedented expansion of schooling,

(00:27:12):

you know,

(00:27:12):

over the last 50 years,

(00:27:13):

you know,

(00:27:13):

these school systems have expanded very,

(00:27:15):

very rapidly.

(00:27:16):

The curriculum that essentially kind of is being taught,

(00:27:18):

I mean,

(00:27:19):

you know,

(00:27:19):

when you were talking Tobi,

(00:27:20):

I thought,

(00:27:20):

OK,

(00:27:21):

you probably had the same curriculum that I went through,

(00:27:23):

which was,

(00:27:23):

I think,

(00:27:24):

in some ways quite challenging.

(00:27:25):

And if you went to a good school,

(00:27:27):

you had good teachers and you were surrounded by students who actually were well

(00:27:31):

prepared to learn.

(00:27:32):

But my sense is an expanding kind of school system cannot maintain the same degree

(00:27:37):

of difficulty of the curriculum.

(00:27:38):

Or even these things like,

(00:27:39):

you know,

(00:27:40):

the language of instruction is a language that nobody speaks at home.

(00:27:43):

And so the teachers might be struggling to teach in English or French or whatever language,

(00:27:48):

you know,

(00:27:48):

in many places.

(00:27:49):

Tanzania and Kenya may be in some ways a little bit different.

(00:27:52):

So I do think making it easy for teachers requires changing the curriculum and

(00:27:56):

making it easy for students to learn.

(00:27:57):

But,

(00:27:58):

you know,

(00:27:58):

also realising that teachers now deal with,

(00:28:01):

you know,

(00:28:01):

in Tanzania where I work,

(00:28:03):

the average class size for a first grader is on an order of 80 to 100 kids.

(00:28:07):

And teaching in that environment is not easy.

(00:28:10):

And so the low-hanging fruit, I think the low-hanging fruit, in fact, is not that low-hanging in my view.

(00:28:15):

It's really essentially kind of to have to invest a good deal more in early childhood

(00:28:19):

education and to really try and make it easy for that first grade teacher to

(00:28:23):

actually be able to give kids the skills they need.

(00:28:26):

There's a really nice paper,

(00:28:27):

and Jishnu can say a bit more about this,

(00:28:29):

that sort of looks at a panel of kids from four countries,

(00:28:32):

I think is Young Lives Data,

(00:28:33):

and compares Vietnam,

(00:28:35):

Chile,

(00:28:35):

and I believe India and Ethiopia.

(00:28:37):

And of course, you know, Vietnam is a high-performing education system.

(00:28:41):

But it suggests,

(00:28:41):

at least to some extent,

(00:28:43):

that much of that great performance actually comes from the fact that the kids at

(00:28:47):

age five are doing much,

(00:28:48):

much better in Vietnam than they are in the other countries.

(00:28:51):

And that if you condition essentially kind of where they start,

(00:28:54):

you know,

(00:28:54):

the trajectories don't look so,

(00:28:55):

so different but if you focus their starting at a much better level.

(00:28:58):

that in fact, they're going to learn much more.

(00:29:00):

That I don't consider a low-hanging fruit.

(00:29:02):

I actually think that's a pretty significant investment.

(00:29:05):

And I think a number of countries are starting to take this seriously,

(00:29:08):

which is to say,

(00:29:09):

should we expand the age range for which we publicly fund education,

(00:29:14):

say from age six,

(00:29:15):

and maybe even think about starting to fund education from age four?

(00:29:19):

Because I think it makes it much,

(00:29:20):

much easier to give kids the foundational skills that then make them,

(00:29:23):

I think,

(00:29:24):

much more productive workers.

(00:29:26):

So I don't think it's low-hanging fruit, but in fact, I think of these two things.

(00:29:29):

Start young and make it easy for the teachers to teach,

(00:29:32):

whether that includes changing the language of instruction,

(00:29:35):

whether it makes it easy for teachers to spend more time teaching kids the

(00:29:39):

foundational skills.

(00:29:40):

So don't make kids at age six learn five or six different subjects.

(00:29:44):

Maybe focus it on two or three.

(00:29:46):

I think all of those things for me are ways to make it easy to really give kids the

(00:29:50):

skills that they need to learn when they're 10,

(00:29:52):

12,

(00:29:52):

and 16.

(00:29:54):

Jishnu: I guess I'm confused about things a little bit, but I'll tell you where my confusion is.

(00:29:59):

So I've heard people say, you know, our education systems are not actually designed to build skills.

(00:30:05):

They're selection systems, you know, by which they mean.

(00:30:09):

We are remnants of the British systems.

(00:30:11):

And the idea was,

(00:30:13):

can we squeeze and squeeze and squeeze and see who's going to be a good person for

(00:30:17):

the British to take on or something?

(00:30:20):

I don't think they're a selection system at all,

(00:30:21):

because if they're a selection system,

(00:30:23):

then we should see that in every grade as we go up and up and up,

(00:30:28):

only certain kids are making it forward who are the best kids with the best test scores.

(00:30:32):

And that's not happening.

(00:30:34):

[No] Data showing that, you know.

(00:30:35):

There's just no evidence that the kids who are very smart are invested in a lot more in our system.

(00:30:43):

So I think one thing that I think is or not is actually sitting down and chatting

(00:30:49):

about what the hell do we want our education systems to look like.

(00:30:53):

And a good starting point is to say what kind of budgets are reasonable.

(00:30:57):

So, you know, I think this is right, right?

(00:30:59):

But the Nigerian education budget 2024 was what, about $2.2 billion or something?

(00:31:05):

Is that right?

(00:31:06):

Tobi: Yeah, something like that.

(00:31:07):

Yeah.

(00:31:08):

Jishnu: And I think Nigeria should have, what, about 35 million students.

(00:31:12):

You know, that's like $60 a student.

(00:31:15):

The place where I live in the U.S.,

(00:31:17):

which is called Montgomery County,

(00:31:20):

the public school system has about 160,000 students and a budget of 3 billion.

(00:31:27):

We might be just off the mark.

(00:31:30):

by hundreds and thousands of dollars in how much we're leaving on the table by not

(00:31:36):

investing in the education system.

(00:31:38):

So I think the biggest low-hanging fruit is the mistake that we have made.

(00:31:43):

I mean,

(00:31:43):

I think it's incumbent on us as researchers and profs and scholars to say,

(00:31:49):

give the politicians the damn numbers,

(00:31:52):

right?

(00:31:52):

We need to give them very clear numbers on if you manage to invest and improve the quality of schools,

(00:32:00):

then 15 years later, these are the wage returns you're going to see.

(00:32:05):

The mistake is ours.

(00:32:07):

The deficiency is ours because I am sure that if we were able to give them the

(00:32:12):

right numbers,

(00:32:12):

there would be a groundswell,

(00:32:15):

both among the politicians and among people to say we should be increasing our

(00:32:20):

education budgets not by 1,

(00:32:21):

2,

(00:32:21):

20%,

(00:32:21):

30%,

(00:32:21):

but by 6,000%,

(00:32:21):

right?

(00:32:26):

And hopefully,

(00:32:27):

you know,

(00:32:27):

in a couple of years,

(00:32:28):

at least from a few countries like these Young Lives or other places,

(00:32:30):

we'll have some of those numbers.

(00:32:32):

And I think we'll all be shocked at how big the returns could really be.

(00:32:38):

So I think the big low hanging fruit is to actually put the evidence and have that

(00:32:44):

discussion on what is it that we want our education system to do,

(00:32:48):

right?

(00:32:48):

And how much should we be investing in it?

(00:32:50):

And at what point?

(00:32:51):

And I think that discussion, including James's idea of how much should we invest in early childhood?

(00:32:56):

Do we want it to be a selection system or not?

(00:32:58):

Given our money, where can we go?

(00:33:01):

You know, how do we invest in the teachers, given that so many teachers are tenured?

(00:33:05):

Should we park some older teachers?

(00:33:07):

Getting some young guys who are teched up, know how to use the technology, the AI may change things.

(00:33:12):

You know,

(00:33:13):

all of these,

(00:33:14):

I think we need to have a forum where we are discussing it in our countries on a

(00:33:19):

regular monthly basis.

(00:33:21):

I think that's going to make a huge change moving forward.

(00:33:24):

And our big job is to give you the evidence to take that forward.

(00:33:28):

Great point.

(00:33:29):

I fully agree that there are high returns.

(00:33:31):

I'm not sure that I agree necessarily that people are not sharing this evidence.

(00:33:35):

You're right that in some ways I think the kind of evidence that is shared perhaps

(00:33:38):

is more short-term in nature,

(00:33:40):

right?

(00:33:40):

But I wonder whether in fact, and this is a question for you, Tobi.

(00:33:43):

Whether,

(00:33:44):

in fact,

(00:33:44):

the political system as it is and essentially kind of this,

(00:33:47):

you know,

(00:33:48):

electoral competition makes it very,

(00:33:50):

very difficult for any sort of policymaker to say,

(00:33:53):

I'm going to make this deep investment that pays off in 10 or 15 years.

(00:33:58):

And, you know, we will all be better off because of it.

(00:34:01):

And I hope to persuade the voters that they should essentially kind of,

(00:34:04):

you know,

(00:34:04):

carry this burden with me.

(00:34:06):

And, you know, things might not be great in the short run when I'm up for re-election.

(00:34:10):

But this is something we need to do.

(00:34:12):

I don't know the Nigeria numbers as well as I know the numbers in East Africa.

(00:34:16):

You know,

(00:34:16):

Nigeria's education still accounts for,

(00:34:18):

you know,

(00:34:19):

20 to 25 percent of the budget in many places.

(00:34:22):

And it's coming down because,

(00:34:24):

in fact,

(00:34:24):

there's actually now pressure from other sectors to say we need roads and we need

(00:34:28):

other kinds of investments.

(00:34:29):

But I get the sense that teacher,

(00:34:31):

you know,

(00:34:31):

enrolments are essentially kind of the largest category of worker they pay.

(00:34:35):

They spend a lot of their government resources on remunerating teachers.

(00:34:39):

I don't know that there is actually a lot of additional money around to really make

(00:34:44):

these big investments.

(00:34:45):

Sure,

(00:34:45):

they could go to the World Bank and other bilateral donors and say,

(00:34:49):

you know,

(00:34:49):

give us the billions we need to buy ed tech or do this big teacher training program.

(00:34:54):

I think they are in some ways, you know, quite constrained.

(00:34:57):

And I don't know that it's the evidence that's lacking as kind of the most binding constraint.

(00:35:02):

I think that the politics and the budget are more important, but I could be wrong.

(00:35:06):

Tobi: That's fantastic.

(00:35:09):

I still partially think that Jisnu is right.

(00:35:12):

And from my experience, so one example I'll give is I was at a conference two years ago.

(00:35:18):

And an outgoing state governor was on the panel.

(00:35:23):

And one of the things he said, which actually kind of resonated with me, was that we are politicians.

(00:35:32):

We don't know everything.

(00:35:34):

As a matter of fact,

(00:35:35):

he said that their knowledge is pretty limited and that the way the political

(00:35:40):

system… now,

(00:35:41):

it may as well just be describing Nigeria,

(00:35:43):

possibly.

(00:35:44):

The way the political system is,

(00:35:46):

is that when there is a knowledge vacuum,

(00:35:50):

other things tend to fill that,

(00:35:53):

which is a lot of political sycophants surround them.

(00:35:58):

And of course, lots of interests.

(00:36:00):

You know, I want you to give my cousin a job.

(00:36:03):

And these are political connections.

(00:36:06):

He basically said that within a short period of time,

(00:36:09):

they are surrounded in this bubble where almost no real actual knowledge about the

(00:36:16):

society they are making policy for penetrates that bubble.

(00:36:22):

For me, it certainly rings true.

(00:36:24):

And I'll tell you,

(00:36:25):

part of the reason why I started this podcast is to sort of create a connection

(00:36:30):

between policy and research,

(00:36:34):

you know,

(00:36:35):

with the politicians and the citizens as well.

(00:36:38):

Because if citizens are also quite well informed, they can ask the right questions.

(00:36:44):

So I think that while we are focused on

(00:36:47):

a lot on the incentive problem for our political system.

(00:36:51):

The knowledge problem is there, but it's not getting all the attention.

(00:36:57):

So you can have a senator or a House of Representatives member in Nigeria with as much as 50 to 70 aides.

(00:37:07):

And they are all media people.

(00:37:10):

There are no technical people on their staff.

(00:37:13):

People that can actually pass them briefing notes on

(00:37:17):

what policy is,

(00:37:19):

what the current evidence is,

(00:37:21):

what is the latest research on the particular committee that that rep member or

(00:37:28):

senator is chairing in the National Assembly.

(00:37:32):

So there's a disconnect

(00:37:34):

in how knowledge penetrates the political system, certainly.

(00:37:39):

And I don't know if it is researchers that can make a lot of difference here.

(00:37:43):

There are certainly a lot of other players,

(00:37:45):

stakeholders,

(00:37:46):

people in the non-governmental sector,

(00:37:47):

people like me,

(00:37:49):

media,

(00:37:49):

that can make a lot of contribution here to make sure that the evidence,

(00:37:54):

the numbers,

(00:37:55):

the knowledge really,

(00:37:56):

really rings and it's loud enough to get the attention of political players.

(00:38:03):

So that's my view.

(00:38:05):

Jishnu: I appreciate both sides of this debate

(00:38:08):

And I want to know whether,

(00:38:10):

you know,

(00:38:11):

I almost feel,

(00:38:12):

Tobi,

(00:38:12):

that we need to do some experiments like,

(00:38:15):

you know,

(00:38:15):

like if you put in aides who actually know the policy a little bit,

(00:38:20):

if we bring in some students and work with the governors and this kind of stuff on this,

(00:38:25):

will things start changing?

(00:38:27):

I'd love to get some answers to that because, frankly, you're right.

(00:38:32):

We need to get these answers down.

(00:38:34):

Tobi: Yeah.

(00:38:35):

James: So Tobi, a lot of these senators and governors, they are pretty sophisticated actors.

(00:38:40):

There's no shortage of very technical and experienced folks in Nigeria and outside

(00:38:45):

of Nigeria that these guys could talk to,

(00:38:47):

right?

(00:38:47):

And by the way,

(00:38:48):

I do agree with you that your podcast is a really powerful vehicle for connecting

(00:38:53):

ideas and policy and implementations.

(00:38:56):

This is an important avenue,

(00:38:57):

also because in some ways,

(00:38:58):

I think sometimes the ideas that researchers produce and other technical folks are

(00:39:02):

locked away in formats that are just generally not readily available to the kinds

(00:39:07):

of people who actually need them.

(00:39:08):

And so I think a conversation is a good way to essentially kind of get that started.

(00:39:11):

And I think even the pressure that will come from voters who listen to your podcast

(00:39:16):

is powerful.

(00:39:17):

Stefan Dercon has a book called,

(00:39:19):

you know,

(00:39:19):

I think,

(00:39:20):

Gambling on Development,

(00:39:21):

which is to say,

(00:39:22):

you know,

(00:39:22):

ideas in the abstract can be powerful ways of transforming systems.

(00:39:27):

But the actual work of actually translating ideas and implementing them is risky.

(00:39:33):

And so for a politician to take on these risks,

(00:39:35):

I don't think many are going to be willing to say,

(00:39:37):

I'm going to sink all my political capital in this big program.

(00:39:40):

It takes a long time, is uncertain, is subject to all sorts of other essential kind of shocks.

(00:39:45):

and fiscal risks and reversals and so on.

(00:39:48):

You know,

(00:39:48):

so that for me weighs a bit more heavily than he's a guy who wants to do great

(00:39:53):

things and is just casting around for ideas and they're just nothing to be found.

(00:39:57):

I think they meet with lots of technocrats and other people who tell them this and that,

(00:40:02):

but ultimately they have to think,

(00:40:04):

can I pull this off?

(00:40:05):

Can I do good and still essentially be successful as a politician?

(00:40:08):

And I think that calculus is still maybe as important as the landscape of ideas that they're exposed to.

(00:40:14):

Jishnu: Yeah, I mean, I don't know that much about politics and politicians.

(00:40:18):

I always have a hopeful view of the future and of our compatriots.

(00:40:23):

And I feel politicians should be creatures of our own creation.

(00:40:28):

And I've seen the democracy work,

(00:40:31):

you know,

(00:40:31):

and when we put democratic pressure and bring a coalition together,

(00:40:34):

it matters.

(00:40:35):

So I'm going to be the hopeful guy here.

(00:40:38):

Look, I think, Tobi, what you're doing is super important.

(00:40:41):

And I think as it starts to deepen and these kind of engagements deepen,

(00:40:45):

you know,

(00:40:45):

as long as we on our side are providing reasonable data,

(00:40:49):

evidence that you can have good discussions on the basis of,

(00:40:53):

maybe things will start evolving.

(00:40:56):

Tobi: So along the line of this conversation, I was thinking one curious question about health.

(00:41:03):

of generally what we call healthcare here.

(00:41:06):

Again, this might just be my imagination going wild.

(00:41:11):

So from an incentive point of view,

(00:41:15):

how much do you think that global public health interventions interferes with the

(00:41:23):

incentive to invest in healthcare locally?

(00:41:27):

So I'll give you an example.

(00:41:29):

Recently,

(00:41:30):

Bill Gates was in Nigeria a couple of weeks ago to talk about malnutrition,

(00:41:35):

which is now a very big problem,

(00:41:38):

particularly in northern Nigeria,

(00:41:40):

because in the last decade or so,

(00:41:43):

consistent with even previous years,

(00:41:46):

it's been one region of the country that is most ravaged by poverty,

(00:41:51):

lack of education,

(00:41:53):

a lot of violence and political instability,

(00:41:57):

and

(00:41:58):

Essentially, it's created this crisis.

(00:42:02):

The latest being malnutrition about one in four kids in northern Nigeria are now

(00:42:09):

chronically malnourished.

(00:42:12):

So recently,

(00:42:13):

Bill Gates was in the country to promote micronutrients and some form of technical

(00:42:20):

intervention that is supposed to make all the difference.

(00:42:23):

And

(00:42:24):

Yeah, of course, it's giving some money, about $600,000 for that initiative.

(00:42:30):

And,

(00:42:30):

I mean,

(00:42:31):

low-income countries like Nigeria are never short of such global public health interventions.

(00:42:38):

But at the same time,

(00:42:39):

I kind of worry how it interferes with the incentive,

(00:42:45):

again,

(00:42:45):

talking about politicians here,

(00:42:47):

to invest locally,

(00:42:50):

whether it is in primary health care or whatever.

(00:42:53):

So...

(00:42:54):

How does global public health interventions interfere with the incentive to invest locally?

(00:43:01):

Because there's always state neglect on some level when it comes to healthcare investment.

(00:43:07):

Jishnu: I think James will be a perfect person to answer that.

(00:43:13):

James: Let me take a crack.

(00:43:15):

I do think that the interaction of external actors in health can sometimes do more harm than good.

(00:43:23):

I've seen both sides of essentially kind of this,

(00:43:25):

where in some ways an external intervention doesn't really improve outcomes and in

(00:43:30):

some ways distorts a lot of the decisions that people are making.

(00:43:33):

But I've also seen it in many ways actually sort of bring attention to populations

(00:43:37):

that perhaps don't have the political clout to get the services they need,

(00:43:40):

right?

(00:43:40):

So I don't know that,

(00:43:42):

you know,

(00:43:42):

in some ways that we could conclude comfortably that in fact,

(00:43:45):

if these guys sort of stayed out of our business and

(00:43:48):

that, in fact, would make better decisions in the health sector.

(00:43:51):

In some ways,

(00:43:52):

I go back to environment where these systems are essentially kind of cash strapped

(00:43:56):

and they can't provide a lot of services to most of their populations.

(00:44:01):

And I think Jishnu has done quite a lot of work on this,

(00:44:02):

where in some ways,

(00:44:03):

a lot of these health systems in some ways have a big urban bias.

(00:44:06):

We spend more on hospitals and less on public health or primary health care.

(00:44:12):

In some ways,

(00:44:13):

I do think that sometimes the arrival of,

(00:44:15):

you know,

(00:44:16):

not Bill Gates per se,

(00:44:17):

but,

(00:44:17):

you know,

(00:44:17):

if I think about the other actors,

(00:44:19):

the WHO and other international actors,

(00:44:22):

I think they sometimes actually try and rebalance these programs to some extent.

(00:44:26):

But yeah, I think they can certainly do more harm than good.

(00:44:28):

I mean,

(00:44:28):

despite their maybe good intentions,

(00:44:31):

I certainly don't want to start any rumours that they don't have good intentions

(00:44:34):

because I think there's also a lot of discussions out on social media that suggest that,

(00:44:38):

in fact,

(00:44:38):

they are malevolent forces.

(00:44:40):

They actually don't mean well.

(00:44:42):

I think many times they mean well,

(00:44:43):

but there are sometimes unintended consequences of those interventions.

(00:44:46):

Jishnu: So, Tobi, here I'm going to go all Shakespearean on you.

(00:44:49):

And, you know,

the fault, Brutus, lies not in the stars, but in us.

(00:44:56):

In this case, at least, you know, in the following sense, right?

(00:44:59):

I mean,

(00:44:59):

I know that Bill Gates was in Africa and there's been a bunch of articles,

(00:45:03):

including in the Mail and Guardian and in other places,

(00:45:07):

talking about farmer Gates and what he's getting wrong.

(00:45:10):

And in Zambia,

(00:45:10):

for instance,

(00:45:11):

there's been this big concern that,

(00:45:12):

look,

(00:45:13):

Bill Gates really,

(00:45:14):

according to the Mail and Guardian,

(00:45:16):

Simon Allison writes that he really pushed monoculture.

(00:45:20):

And now the country's been in a massive drought and people are suffering.

(00:45:23):

And earlier, people used to plant many crops.

(00:45:26):

And that's been a standard problem ever since the British tried to introduce indigo

(00:45:30):

in West Bengal,

(00:45:31):

right,

(00:45:32):

from a long time ago.

(00:45:33):

Now, my point is the following, which is we are a democracy.

(00:45:38):

So Zambia,

(00:45:39):

Nigeria,

(00:45:40):

India,

(00:45:40):

you know,

(00:45:41):

we may argue about how effective we are,

(00:45:43):

but frankly,

(00:45:44):

we gave universal suffrage to our citizens long before we got rich.

(00:45:48):

And it has mattered.

(00:45:49):

It has made a difference.

(00:45:51):

So my question is the following.

(00:45:52):

We absolutely should not go down the line of saying,

(00:45:56):

oh,

(00:45:56):

we can do everything indigenously and we'll do everything in country.

(00:46:00):

And who are these foreigners to come?

(00:46:02):

No.

(00:46:02):

I mean,

(00:46:03):

if somebody has a good idea,

(00:46:04):

somebody has something interesting to say,

(00:46:06):

absolutely listen to them.

(00:46:07):

It sounds to me completely bizarre to say,

(00:46:10):

oh,

(00:46:10):

we'll not take penicillin,

(00:46:12):

even though it's been invented because it came from a foreigner.

(00:46:14):

No, ideas belong to humanity.

(00:46:16):

And we should celebrate ideas.

(00:46:18):

It doesn't matter to me where the idea came from.

(00:46:20):

If it's a good idea, let's use it.

(00:46:22):

Where I think we run into problems is when we say and when we allow rich people to

(00:46:30):

have privileged access to our political leaders.

(00:46:34):

I think that's the big problem, right?

(00:46:37):

And it's not just rich people.

(00:46:39):

You know, these guys are like super rich.

(00:46:40):

But frankly, we allow all kinds of people access to our political leaders outside the democratic system.

(00:46:46):

So Bill Gates wants to come and say,

(00:46:48):

you guys should be growing monocultural maize or whatever he's saying.

(00:46:50):

I'm not an agriculturist.

(00:46:51):

And I do know that,

(00:46:52):

you know,

(00:46:53):

there are huge differences in productivity between African farms and American farms.

(00:46:58):

You know, whatever he's saying, put it in a damn newspaper.

(00:47:01):

Get on your podcast.

(00:47:04):

Make the case to the public.

(00:47:06):

Tobi: Yep.

(00:47:07):

Jishnu: That I'm totally fine with.

(00:47:09):

And if you want to put your money behind your case, great, right?

(00:47:14):

Don't go and try and sell it to the cabinet or to a particular minister without

(00:47:20):

going through our democratic processes.

(00:47:22):

And we are the people who have to go to our politicians and say,

(00:47:25):

look,

(00:47:25):

what the hell are you doing while listening to this guy without going through our processes?

(00:47:29):

So I don't find it a question of

(00:47:33):

foreigner, foreign money, not foreign money.

(00:47:35):

I find it a problem when it becomes this idea that somebody can come in and whisper

(00:47:41):

in the ears of the finance minister.

(00:47:42):

I think that's totally anti-democratic.

(00:47:45):

And we have to fight tooth and nail to make sure that that's not happening.

(00:47:49):

James: But Tobi,

(00:47:50):

I guess to this point,

(00:47:52):

I fully agree that there should be a very transparent process of adjudicating ideas

(00:47:57):

and offers of support from outside.

(00:47:59):

But I guess in this case,

(00:48:00):

what is your concern with saying here's a very short term urgent intervention to

(00:48:06):

address malnutrition in the context?

(00:48:09):

And I don't know the context very well.

(00:48:10):

So please inform me where,

(00:48:12):

in fact,

(00:48:12):

you know,

(00:48:12):

states in northern Nigeria are really struggling to really intervene.

(00:48:16):

Like what is the distortion that is being created by the arrival of this idea and support?

(00:48:21):

Tobi: I do not really have a strong objection.

(00:48:25):

I don't even have a strong view.

(00:48:27):

It's just a question of curiosity because prior to some of these issues,

(00:48:34):

intervention or when the problems become serious enough to get some form of

(00:48:39):

international attention,

(00:48:42):

almost often,

(00:48:44):

at least I can speak for Nigeria to a certain degree,

(00:48:47):

there have been a long neglected advocacy or

(00:48:52):

noise that politicians or whoever makes decisions ignore, usually for years.

(00:49:01):

So malnutrition in Northern Nigeria,

(00:49:03):

I know so many local activists who are actively involved in Northern Nigeria who

(00:49:08):

have been making noise about this problem for a long time.

(00:49:12):

In some cases,

(00:49:13):

four or five years ago,

(00:49:14):

that this is what we are seeing on the ground and this will become a problem

(00:49:20):

Down the line, this is a disaster we tend to happen, you know.

(00:49:24):

And all of a sudden,

(00:49:25):

Bill Gates can fly in,

(00:49:26):

talk about micronutrients,

(00:49:28):

meet the president,

(00:49:29):

put some money,

(00:49:31):

you know,

(00:49:31):

and then it becomes a problem that commands urgency.

(00:49:35):

And,

(00:49:36):

you know,

(00:49:37):

again,

(00:49:37):

James,

(00:49:37):

I hear you on the question of resources,

(00:49:40):

but at the same time,

(00:49:42):

for example,

(00:49:43):

if you go to northern Nigeria and you see the way the political class,

(00:49:46):

state governors live,

(00:49:48):

Of course,

(00:49:49):

there is resource constraint,

(00:49:50):

but you can also say with some level of confidence that there is misallocation

(00:49:56):

going on.

(00:49:57):

If you don't even want to lean too hard on the corruption question,

(00:50:00):

which is,

(00:50:00):

you know,

(00:50:01):

perennial,

(00:50:02):

you know,

(00:50:02):

there is some form of misallocation going on.

(00:50:05):

So I just wonder, it's more of a curiosity for me.

(00:50:09):

I don't have a strong view, particularly.

(00:50:12):

James: But I think my response to this would be to say that in some ways that the

(00:50:15):

political process is not tuned to really reallocate resources in the way that you

(00:50:21):

and I think it should.

(00:50:22):

So ultimately, these activists who are organising and making a lot of noise, they're not being heard.

(00:50:28):

So one interpretation would be to say,

(00:50:29):

well,

(00:50:29):

Bill Gates comes in and has this idea and suddenly everybody thinks,

(00:50:32):

you know,

(00:50:32):

this is something you should be paying attention to.

(00:50:34):

That's one interpretation.

(00:50:35):

And yes, going back to Jishnu's point, I mean, you know, I think the power belongs to the people.

(00:50:40):

in Nigeria and not to wealthy and influential outsiders.

(00:50:43):

But I think another view is that the activists have actually sort of broken through

(00:50:47):

and that sometimes you might need this assist.

(00:50:50):

As much as,

(00:50:50):

you know,

(00:50:51):

it's undesirable,

(00:50:52):

I think we all wanted a system where we don't need outsiders to advocate on behalf

(00:50:56):

of the people on the ground.

(00:50:57):

But that's another view too,

(00:50:58):

which is to say that suddenly these people now have a champion who can actually get

(00:51:03):

the attention of the political class.

(00:51:05):

Tobi: Yeah.

(00:51:06):

Jishnu: Can I add one more thing?

(00:51:08):

Tobi: Yes, please.

(00:51:09):

Yes.

(00:51:09):

Jishnu: So it's worth going back and saying, OK, what was maybe it's worth going back.

(00:51:14):

I won't claim that it is,

(00:51:15):

but it might be worth going back and saying,

(00:51:18):

OK,

(00:51:18):

what did people write about,

(00:51:20):

say,

(00:51:20):

colonial medicine?

(00:51:21):

Right.

(00:51:22):

Which we know is a big, big part of what anthropologists and historians have looked at.

(00:51:26):

Right.

(00:51:27):

The person whose work I found most interesting in this is David Arnold,

(00:51:31):

and he has this book called Colonizing the Body on British medicine in India.

(00:51:35):

And he basically argues that,

(00:51:37):

look,

(00:51:37):

I mean,

(00:51:38):

there was a huge give and take happening between both systems that gradually got

(00:51:42):

transformed into kind of British ideas becoming,

(00:51:47):

you know,

(00:51:47):

the British starting to think that their idea should be widely used and whatnot.

(00:51:52):

And it met with massive resistance.

(00:51:54):

But the very interesting point he makes in the last chapter of his book is because

(00:51:59):

of various missteps they took,

(00:52:02):

the Indian group started mistrusting any advice that they gave,

(00:52:08):

thinking that all of their advice was coloured by,

(00:52:10):

you know,

(00:52:11):

colonial,

(00:52:12):

how do I get the labour kind of ideas,

(00:52:15):

right?

(00:52:16):

And as a result,

(00:52:17):

you know,

(00:52:17):

one of the most troubling things for me has been there were all these sanitation

(00:52:21):

commissions that were set up in India.

(00:52:23):

And there's very nice work that Guha has done,

(00:52:26):

that Harrison has done,

(00:52:28):

showing that when these sanitation systems were put into cantonments,

(00:52:32):

the mortality went down dramatically.

(00:52:33):

Right.

(00:52:34):

What's really interesting is they didn't make it out of the cantonments.

(00:52:38):

And part of the reason seems to me and David Arnold's book kind of talks about this,

(00:52:43):

is people really started mistrusting the Brits and saying,

(00:52:46):

look,

(00:52:46):

you're just doing this because of X,

(00:52:48):

which is self-serving.

(00:52:49):

And that's,

(00:52:50):

I think,

(00:52:51):

one big piece that we need to avoid,

(00:52:52):

which is we don't want to end up in a system where we are saying no to good ideas

(00:52:57):

coming from outside.

(00:52:59):

Because we think they are corrupt.

(00:53:01):

No, I think that's the big risk that we need to avoid.

(00:53:04):

And then on the flip side is how do we actually make sure that bad ideas don't come

(00:53:10):

through because they are actually being supported by money that is outside the system.

(00:53:15):

You know,

(00:53:16):

the World Trade Organisation has this idea of anti-dumping,

(00:53:18):

which is you can't just put products at highly subsidised prices in other countries.

(00:53:23):

It's this anti-dumping law.

(00:53:25):

I think we would have an anti-dumping law for bad ideas.

(00:53:28):

Tobi: That sounds interesting.

(00:53:31):

James: But as Tobi said earlier,

(00:53:32):

we need essentially kind of a pretty good constellation of actors to make judgments

(00:53:37):

on what's a good and bad idea.

(00:53:39):

Jishnu: Yep.

(00:53:39):

And I think that given how he described essentially kind of the people around a lot

(00:53:43):

of these decision makers,

(00:53:45):

I worry that that's actually sort of not trivial.

(00:53:48):

Jishnu: Yeah, and I think part of that, James, is we have to do it, right?

(00:53:51):

I mean,

(00:53:52):

yes,

(00:53:52):

we have to suck up to the fact that our funding gets in danger,

(00:53:55):

that we run into all kinds of issues when we take on these things.

(00:53:59):

But, you know, part of our job is all to say, sorry, man, that's a really bad idea. Like,

(00:54:04):

Gabriel Demombynes did that for,

(00:54:06):

you know,

(00:54:06):

Sachs when they had this article on their big push, millenium covering…

(00:54:10):

he said,

(00:54:10):

look,

(00:54:10):

the data is not there.

(00:54:11):

And they had a big fight and it turned out the data was not there.

(00:54:14):

So I think part of what we should be doing is taking that forward and saying when

(00:54:19):

it's a bad idea,

(00:54:20):

giving people the ammunition,

(00:54:21):

giving Tobi the ammunition,

(00:54:22):

giving others the ammunition to say,

(00:54:24):

sorry,

(00:54:24):

this is a bad idea.

(00:54:26):

Tobi: So, I mean, this has been a wonderful conversation beyond my expectations.

(00:54:31):

I just have a couple of questions left.

(00:54:33):

So I'll go back again to another piece you wrote, Jishnu,

(00:54:39):

which also quite literally lit a fire in my belly,

(00:54:43):

where you basically challenged your colleagues in the development economics subfield,

(00:54:50):

you know,

(00:54:51):

about some moral questions that they should be asking and are not.

(00:54:58):

I don't know why you chose to write that piece or what you saw,

(00:55:02):

but the way I'm going to phrase the question to both of you is like this.

(00:55:07):

I know that economics generally is going through some sort of empirical phase.

(00:55:15):

Do you think that that has been traded up for asking the big questions that I

(00:55:23):

certainly believe are still relevant,

(00:55:25):

which is

(00:55:27):

Essentially, for me, how does Nigeria double its average income in the next 10 years?

(00:55:35):

How does places essentially get out of poverty?

(00:55:41):

Do you think we've abandoned trying to find answers to those kinds of questions for

(00:55:48):

maybe what Lant has militantly called “kinky stuff?’

(00:55:55):

Jishnu: James has been going first, so.

(00:55:57):

James: No, no, no.

(00:55:58):

This is a question posed and motivated by your writing, Jishnu.

(00:56:03):

So you should go first.

(00:56:04):

Jishnu: I'm happy to take a first glance at this.

(00:56:06):

But, Tobi, you have to warn us even to, you know, completely put us over the wringer.

(00:56:11):

I mean, these are very difficult.

(00:56:13):

So two things, I think two things.

(00:56:15):

I was at the World Bank when there was this whole Spence report on what causes growth.

(00:56:19):

And they had this line,

(00:56:21):

if you go back to that,

(00:56:22):

they had this line saying,

(00:56:23):

if there was a magic bullet or if there was a specific set of policy recommendations,

(00:56:28):

we would have come up with it.

(00:56:29):

We spent a lot of time on this and there isn't, right?

(00:56:32):

And I think if you look at what Abhijit writes,

(00:56:34):

if you look at Esther's idea of the plumber,

(00:56:38):

the economist as plumber,

(00:56:39):

it's saying,

(00:56:40):

hey,

(00:56:41):

can we be modest and humble about where we are and what we know?

(00:56:45):

And the fact of the matter is we don't have a really good set of prescriptions for

(00:56:50):

what growth should look like.

(00:56:52):

But

(00:56:53):

By working on all these different issues, we do start to make progress on people's lives.

(00:57:01):

So if you think about the Millennium Development Goals,

(00:57:03):

I feel the biggest thing the MDGs did was it created a deliberative process to say

(00:57:09):

it's not only about growth.

(00:57:11):

We should care about the fact that fewer children are going to die.

(00:57:14):

We should care about infant mortality regardless of whether it affects growth.

(00:57:18):

And I completely agree with that viewpoint.

(00:57:21):

Then what our discipline does or is doing, look, it's always the case that there's a seesaw.

(00:57:28):

You know, we are always on a seesaw.

(00:57:31):

Right.

(00:57:32):

And one part of that seesaw is what's going on in the world.

(00:57:37):

And the second part of that seesaw is let's close off a lot of things,

(00:57:43):

otherwise we cannot make progress,

(00:57:45):

right?

(00:57:45):

Every discipline needs to build walls around itself because if you let too many

(00:57:50):

things in,

(00:57:51):

then you don't make progress,

(00:57:53):

right?

(00:57:54):

So around the early 2000s,

(00:57:56):

we really had a lot of work that said what's going on around the world,

(00:58:00):

right?

(00:58:00):

So we had, oh, lots of kids are in school, but they're not learning.

(00:58:03):

Look, people go to doctors and they don't get the right diagnosis.

(00:58:06):

Look, the teachers are absent.

(00:58:07):

Lots of stuff, right?

(00:58:09):

On a lot of different things.

(00:58:10):

And we've made,

(00:58:11):

I think,

(00:58:12):

tremendous progress over the last 15 years in saying,

(00:58:16):

hey,

(00:58:17):

on some things and less on others,

(00:58:18):

saying,

(00:58:18):

hey,

(00:58:19):

these were great pieces on what's going on around the world.

(00:58:22):

Let's now put that wall around it and make progress on these issues.

(00:58:26):

And some places we've made a lot of progress, others less so.

(00:58:31):

I feel that now that we had the seesaw that said the real world, make progress by building walls,

(00:58:38):

Now I think we need to push that seesaw back.

(00:58:41):

So it's not necessarily the type of work that we're doing.

(00:58:45):

It's more within the disciplinary core because you always need both types of work.

(00:58:51):

It's within the disciplinary core.

(00:58:53):

Which one do you privilege?

(00:58:55):

So I think it's time to go back to saying we need to privilege the basic work that

(00:59:01):

starts re-examining the world and saying 20,

(00:59:04):

25 years later,

(00:59:06):

what are people's lives like?

(00:59:08):

And I'll give you one example.

(00:59:09):

Right.

(00:59:09):

I was in Delhi over the summer and it struck me,

(00:59:12):

you know,

(00:59:13):

so many of our cities because of climate change are now on the verge of being unlivable.

(00:59:20):

Right.

(00:59:20):

If you look at a place like Delhi,

(00:59:22):

you know,

(00:59:23):

January pollution levels that are at 500,

(00:59:26):

600 on the P2 at 2.5.

(00:59:27):

Right.

(00:59:27):

It's unlivable.

(00:59:31):

February, same thing.

(00:59:32):

March is kind of OK.

(00:59:34):

April starting to get hot.

(00:59:35):

May, 52 degrees.

(00:59:37):

June, 50 degrees.

(00:59:38):

Heat stroke through the roof.

(00:59:40):

July, humidity, wet bulb thermometers above what is livable.

(00:59:44):

August, same thing.

(00:59:45):

October, kind of livable.

(00:59:47):

November, the pollution is back.

(00:59:48):

You put it together and you say, how is a poor person going to live in this damn city?

(00:59:54):

And somebody who can put that together,

(00:59:56):

somebody who can start to say,

(00:59:58):

OK,

(00:59:59):

here's how I want you to think about the year and climate change.

(01:00:02):

That kind of stuff we solely need now.

(01:00:05):

And I think we are almost there.

(01:00:07):

So it's not a question of fighting the discipline.

(01:00:09):

It's saying what part of the discipline should at this point get the emphasis?

(01:00:15):

And I think that, you know, it's going to move.

(01:00:17):

It has to move.

(01:00:18):

It has to move.

(01:00:19):

There's just no two ways around it.

(01:00:21):

James: So let me just add a few comments on,

(01:00:23):

you know,

(01:00:23):

maybe going back to Tobi's question,

(01:00:25):

like where is the advice about how can we get Nigeria to double its income over the

(01:00:30):

next 10 years or so?

(01:00:31):

And there's a really nice characterisation of the two kinds of development economists.

(01:00:36):

And I will not name the person who has shared this characterisation.

(01:00:40):

But there's a small ‘d’ development economist and there's the big ‘D’ development economist.

(01:00:45):

And I think historically,

(01:00:46):

if you think about the big push ideas of the 60s and 70s,

(01:00:49):

or even essentially kind of the Washington consensus in the 90s,

(01:00:53):

I think much of that advice was really about the big D development economists.

(01:00:57):

And maybe the conclusion there, you know, at least it has been going back to sort of the Spence report.

(01:01:03):

Maybe we just don't really have, you know, a very clear set of guidelines.

(01:01:07):

We thought we did, right?

(01:01:09):

We thought we did, you know, reduce your fertility, make markets work.

(01:01:13):

It doesn't seem to kind of produce the benefits, I think, that we would like to think.

(01:01:17):

And, you know, Dani Rodrik has a book, I think, I wish it were more accessible to the general public.

(01:01:22):

You know,

(01:01:22):

we have one economics,

(01:01:23):

but many recipes,

(01:01:25):

which is to say the solution for Nigeria might be very Nigeria specific.

(01:01:29):

It might require essentially kind of a very untraditional path,

(01:01:33):

which is not coming out of a 10 point or 20 point economic plan.

(01:01:37):

But my sense is that, you know, what's happened perhaps to the field is

(01:01:41):

is maybe being honest with ourselves that we don't have all of the answers,

(01:01:47):

at least for essentially kind of the big question that you asked,

(01:01:49):

Tobi,

(01:01:49):

that that answer is not going to come in a nice big report.

(01:01:53):

That that answer,

(01:01:53):

in fact,

(01:01:54):

is a process of,

(01:01:56):

you know,

(01:01:56):

trying a bunch of things,

(01:01:58):

establishing,

(01:01:59):

you know,

(01:01:59):

maybe let's go back to Dani's idea.

(01:02:01):

Like, let's do industrial policy, but let's try and do it well.

(01:02:04):

And we're going to fail.

(01:02:05):

And maybe we might discover one or two great ideas where Nigeria can be quite successful, right?

(01:02:11):

But that's in some ways kind of saying,

(01:02:13):

rather than,

(01:02:14):

you know,

(01:02:14):

do this and this will happen,

(01:02:16):

this is basically,

(01:02:16):

you know,

(01:02:17):

establish,

(01:02:18):

and this is… Jishnu will like this,

(01:02:19):

establish a process for discovering essentially kind of good and bad ideas.

(01:02:24):

And maybe that's essentially kind of the way forward.

(01:02:26):

I'm not going to give you a guarantee that you'll be successful.

(01:02:29):

But in fact, this process will essentially kind of at least help you shut down bad ideas.

(01:02:33):

There's nothing wrong with actually sort of disinvesting in essentially kind of

(01:02:36):

things that are not working in general.

(01:02:38):

And then I think the other part of this,

(01:02:39):

for the small ‘d’ development economists,

(01:02:42):

I certainly sort of think I'm in that category,

(01:02:44):

is what can you do today,

(01:02:46):

right?

(01:02:46):

So maybe there are the big questions about sort of growth over sort of the next 10 years.

(01:02:51):

But I think it's important to also try and improve the outcomes of people today, right?

(01:02:56):

And so I do think that there should be room under the umbrella for both types of economists.

(01:03:01):

But yeah, I certainly think that there's been a shift.

(01:03:03):

Like in order to make space for the small ‘d’ development economists,

(01:03:06):

I think the big ‘D’ development economists in some ways have had to take a backseat.

(01:03:10):

And, you know, it might be a good time, as Jishnu says, to bring them back to the front of the class.

(01:03:14):

Tobi: Final question for both of you.

(01:03:18):

So this is a bit of a tradition on the podcast.

(01:03:21):

What is the one idea?

(01:03:22):

It may be something you're working on, maybe someone else's idea.

(01:03:27):

Can be anything.

(01:03:29):

But what is that one idea that you would like to see spread everywhere,

(01:03:35):

have a lot more influence,

(01:03:37):

have a lot more people believe in?

(01:03:40):

What is that one idea?

(01:03:42):

I'll start with James.

(01:03:44):

James: Put it this way,

(01:03:45):

you ask this question at a really challenging time where in some ways there's more

(01:03:49):

dark clouds on the horizon and maybe,

(01:03:51):

you know,

(01:03:52):

less room to be very optimistic.

(01:03:55):

But let me just say that I think, you know, this might not be a completely original idea.

(01:04:01):

We need to rethink what investment in any infrastructure means today.

(01:04:08):

I certainly think that markets are ultimately at the centre of driving a lot of

(01:04:12):

progress and prosperity and markets work well when people are very well connected.

(01:04:16):

And we are pretty well connected in terms of communications infrastructure,

(01:04:20):

but we're not as well connected on the hard infrastructure.

(01:04:23):

If I think about the prospects that are happening in the parts of the world that I

(01:04:27):

do work in,

(01:04:28):

I worry that,

(01:04:29):

you know,

(01:04:29):

Jishnu was talking about temperature and pollution.

(01:04:33):

I'm worried also about, you know, whether we have

(01:04:36):

roads that are climate proof, whether we'll have schools and hospitals that are climate proof.

(01:04:43):

And while essentially kind of this idea in some ways raises the cost of doing

(01:04:46):

business in general,

(01:04:47):

that I think we really need to start thinking about how we can climate proof the

(01:04:52):

infrastructure we have and what we already have.

(01:04:54):

And so,

(01:04:55):

you know,

(01:04:55):

I don't think this is wildly kind of original,

(01:04:58):

but I just finished doing some work in Rwanda and

(01:05:02):

a big chunk of that work is affected on every rainy season where roads get washed away.

(01:05:08):

And, you know, communities are essentially going to cut off for a long time.

(01:05:11):

And,

(01:05:11):

you know,

(01:05:11):

we're certainly seeing this around the world,

(01:05:12):

not just in East Africa,

(01:05:14):

in Nepal and in North Carolina,

(01:05:16):

you know,

(01:05:16):

not far from here.

(01:05:17):

And so my concern is that we need to start preparing for a world in which life is

(01:05:21):

going to be much more challenging.

(01:05:23):

Tobi: Your turn, Jishnu.

(01:05:25):

Jishnu: You know, so a while back, I had this conversation with this politician, right?

(01:05:29):

And he said,

(01:05:30):

look,

(01:05:30):

around the early 90s,

(01:05:32):

you know,

(01:05:32):

all of you guys said,

(01:05:34):

bring in the market,

(01:05:35):

start to liberalise and everything will improve for everybody.

(01:05:39):

And he said,

(01:05:39):

basically,

(01:05:40):

what I've seen is that things have improved massively for very rich people,

(01:05:44):

but the poor are still where they are.

(01:05:46):

And in fact, they would be much worse off if the government was not doing all kinds of things.

(01:05:49):

And I think that's roughly right, right?

(01:05:52):

So, you know, I want to go back and say, look,

(01:05:55):

I think we are at times, exactly as James said, that are very challenging.

(01:06:01):

And one more thing which is worth emphasising and worth remembering is we are at a

(01:06:07):

time of exceptional,

(01:06:09):

I don't know whether it's exceptional,

(01:06:10):

but we are at a time of massive change,

(01:06:13):

right?

(01:06:14):

And I think what we keep doing as policymakers and economists is we keep saying, do this, do that.

(01:06:21):

And I think we need to start thinking seriously about what kind of robust processes

(01:06:28):

do we need to put in place so that our populations have,

(01:06:32):

you know,

(01:06:33):

serious democratic and deliberative discussion about what they want to do,

(01:06:37):

where they want to go next.

(01:06:39):

Right.

(01:06:41):

So it could well be that our democratic discussions and all of that throws up,

(01:06:47):

hey,

(01:06:47):

we want Nigerian incomes to double over the next 10 years.

(01:06:52):

But it could also be,

(01:06:53):

Tobi,

(01:06:53):

that that conversation throws up,

(01:06:56):

I'm fine with our incomes going,

(01:06:58):

I'm not fine with it doubling,

(01:07:00):

if what it means is that the rich are now 30 times richer and the poor are 5% richer.

(01:07:07):

which is what, you know, we measure it as doubling.

(01:07:09):

But look, I mean, if you look at India, you look at the US, you know, what was the thing?

(01:07:13):

Real wages haven't changed since 1980, 1985 for the poor, right?

(01:07:18):

I mean, that's crazy to me, right?

(01:07:21):

I mean,

(01:07:21):

a lot of the growth in incomes that we're seeing in India is coming from some rich

(01:07:25):

people basically exploiting the environment.

(01:07:27):

So I want to say, how do you, me, how do all of us work on saying

(01:07:33):

What's the process that we need to have robust conversations about who we want to

(01:07:39):

be and where we want to be 20 years,

(01:07:41):

10 years from now?

(01:07:43):

Do we want to be working like crazy and have more money?

(01:07:46):

Great.

(01:07:47):

Or do we want that medicines are available to everyone?

(01:07:50):

That's also great.

(01:07:52):

We should not stick to an ideological position of markets are good regardless of what they do.

(01:07:58):

We have to stick to this is who we want to be.

(01:08:01):

And if the markets are not working or something else is not working, let's change it.

(01:08:05):

So if there's one idea I want people to take away,

(01:08:07):

look,

(01:08:07):

the power really is in us and we need to get together and say,

(01:08:12):

what are the processes that we want to live by that makes at least our kids have a

(01:08:16):

much better lives than we?

(01:08:19):

You know, that's our aspiration as all parents is that our kids have a better lives than we did, right?

(01:08:24):

And I would urge that we start thinking about what processes do we need to put in

(01:08:28):

place to navigate us through these difficult times.

(01:08:32):

Tobi: Thank you very much to both of you. It's been fantastic having this conversation.

James: Thank you so much, Tobi. Thanks for having us on and for grilling us with these really challenging questions.

Jishnu: Oh, my goodness. I feel like we've been put through the ringer on this one. No, Tobi, this was really a pleasure.

This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe

In this episode of Ideas Untrapped, I sit down with economist Oliver Kim to explore the complexities of African economic growth and the challenges surrounding industrialisation. We discuss why Africa has struggled to replicate the manufacturing successes of East Asia, touching on issues such as labour costs, political economy, and the global market environment. Oliver also shares his thoughts on the importance of state capacity and regional integration and how to rethink GDP statistics in development research. Oliver Kim is an economic historian and a research fellow at Open Philanthropy. He also writes excellent blog Global Developments.

Transcript

Tobi:Welcome, Oliver, to the show. I've been a fan for a while, and it's fantastic talking to you. So thank you so much for coming on Ideas Untrapped.

My first question to you involves something you wrote a couple of months ago where you talked about African prices, which is always a puzzle that I've been interested in. So, to restate it as simply as possible, we know that manufacturing in Africa has not grown as much, at least relative to other sub-regions in the world. And there are some theories or findings that suggest that it’s because labour cost is too high. And there's a bit of back and forth in the debates about how unique that is to Africa as a continent. So can you shed more light [on that]?

Because you see a lot of comparisons, maybe Ethiopia and Bangladesh…the unit labour cost and how high it is. So, is that really the constraints? What are the nuances based on what you discussed in that blogpost?

Oliver:Yeah. Just to quickly summarise. Africa has kind of missed out on the manufacturing revolution that, for instance, propelled East Asia…so when you think of the East Asian tigers, China, to rapid rates of growth and poverty alleviation. And, i think in some countries, actually, the share of manufacturing value-added or the share of manufacturing employment is the same or lower than where it was in the 1970s immediately after independence. So, from a developmental standpoint, this is a bit of a puzzle and from a poverty alleviation standpoint, it's a tragedy because this is the only sort of way that we know how to lift large numbers of people out of poverty in a rapid sort of fashion. That’s how China did it; that's how earlier, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan did it.

From a prices standpoint, the problem that economists have identified is that labour costs are too high relative to the level of productivity. That's an important qualified statement to make. So most developing countries are poor [and] as a feature of a developing country, one thing that's true is that incomes are relatively low, wages are relatively low, and so labour is relatively cheap. It's also true that if you're a foreign firm deciding where to site a factory, you don't just care about the labour cost. You also care about the productivity of the workforce. And so it works out that what you care about is like the amount of productivity divided by the cost of hiring additional worker.

And on that metric, which is typically measured in something that's called a unit labour cost (the amount that it costs to produce one unit of output), a lot of sub-Saharan African countries turn out looking relatively poor, especially compared to their peers [at] similar sort of income levels.

So there's sort of two dimensions of this problem. One is the productivity side, and then the other is the cost side. On average, it appears basically that African countries have wages that are actually relatively high for their level of development. And so this becomes a further mystery, like why is this the case? One hypothesis that's been put forward in a couple of papers by the folks at the Center for Global Development is that it's because prices are too high. So this is like one step up the causal chain. If prices are high and the goods and services that are to buy cost too much, then you have to pay people a higher wage basically to afford that.

Of course, the sort of factors behind this, I think, are incredibly complex. I think one major, sort of, historical and fundamental feature that I would point to is that historically labour in Africa, sub-Saharan Africa has been relatively scarce. So this is the contrast I guess, with East Asia and potentially South Asia, where population density is incredibly high and labour is constantly in surplus.

So historically, you know, China, East Asia is like one of the most densely populated regions of the world. The opposite is kind of true in Africa. Now the population has grown a lot, but historically you just had actually a lot more land than people. And if you look at the deep history of African sort of polities, a lot of them were trying to economise more on people than on land. So like in East Asia and Western Europe, you know, you had states with very clearly defined boundaries and political control was defined by control over land.

In Africa, there are states, but there are also instances basically where political control was defined more by control over people. And so there was more fluidity in terms of like territorial boundaries. And so control basically of labour, potentially through slavery also, was a way of a political state to assert power. That's a bit of a digression, but historically speaking, you had relatively low population density. I think that's part of the factor into capitalism. why labour was relatively scarce and maybe why wages are low. So in the present day, maybe that's starting to change a little bit. But looking at the sort of deep fundamental factors, it appears that maybe wages are potentially, quote unquote, “too high to enable a sort of African manufacturing revolution.”

Tobi:Yeah, maybe I read that wrong. But one of the things you discussed in that particular essay was the Assam non-linear model or something like that. It was a U-shaped relationship between GDP and price levels, which, again, maybe I'm wrong about this, the conclusion that sort of came out of that, that this might not necessarily be a problem that is unique to Africa. So can you shed more light on that?

Oliver:Yeah. So let me talk about what I talked about in the blog post. So economists have this relationship. It's a purely like empirical one. So if you go out in the world and you observe things, it's called the Balassa-Samuelson relationship, where basically it appears that as countries get richer, prices of things like haircuts and services seem to go up almost more than proportionally, right?

So like, you know, if I go to Switzerland, which is a very rich country, a haircut costs like $30 or something, something ridiculous. Actually, it's probably more than that. It's like $50 or something, 50 Swiss francs versus, you know, if I go to a Kenyosi in Kenya or whatever to go to a barber, that same haircut, which effectively is not that differentiated in terms of quality. Like a haircut is a haircut. Like if I ask for a buzz cut, it's the same thing. It's the same product, but that product in Kenya probably costs a dollar or possibly less. And so this sort of weird differential where richer places seem to have higher prices is known as the Balassa-Samuelson effect. And if you think about like the sort of underlying theoretical mechanism here, basically richer countries have higher productivity. Higher productivity shows up in like higher productivity in let's say like the manufacturing sector or higher tech kind of sectors.

For like service sectors, which everybody needs, right? So everybody needs like barbers, everybody needs janitors, teachers, things that basically don't increase that much in productivity. Even these sectors need to face higher wages in these rich countries in order for them to be able to compete with the manufacturing sector where productivity has gone up a lot, right?

So like people can switch jobs, people can move between different sectors of the economy. And so the price basically of these service sector goods where productivity actually hasn't gone up that much have to sort of keep pace.

And that's how you end up with this phenomenon where - the same haircut, essentially the same quality, costs the same amount across two places with very different incomes. Now, the way that economists typically have thought about this is that there's a linear relationship. So if you drew like a scatterplot of countries by their income levels and their price levels, you'd just get something like a line. That's like the theorised kind of relationship, a linear Balassa-Samuelson relationship. By that logic, if you put African countries on that scatterplot, it looks like basically that their prices are too high.

So they're lying above this line on the scatterplot between GDP and price levels. What I was arguing in this piece is there's some research, in particular a paper from the Journal of International Economics by Hassan, I forget his first name, I think from like 2017 or so, basically arguing that maybe this Balassa-Samuelson relationship is not actually linear. Maybe it's actually nonlinear, right? There's no actually like really strong reason that this thing has to be linear. It's just like it's the easiest model to write down.

And this is like a common flaw amongst economists is that you go with the first thing that's like easiest mathematically to do. And then you forget that it's just a simplification and you start to treat it like a feature of reality. But so he writes out a more complicated model where, you know, as is true in the real world, there's not just like a service sector and a non-service sector, as I laid out just a minute ago. There's agriculture, there's manufacturing, there's services. Countries basically shift between these three things as they vary in their stages of development, right?

Agriculture for a lot of developing countries is actually mostly non-traded. Think of subsistence farmers, people who grow maize or soybeans for their own consumption. And so it's not the same as a big agricultural producer in Europe or whatever that's just trying to sell to the entire world. And so you can think of those agricultural products as more like the services, like those haircuts that I was describing in like a European country. And so it works out if you do the math and you account for basically the movement of labour between these different sectors as an economy develops, you end up with something that looks more like a non-linear Balassa-Samuelson relationship, like a U-shape, right?

So prices may start to go down a little bit as you move from a low level of income to like a medium level of income. And then they start to go up again. And so accounting for this kind of nonlinear Balassa-Samuelson relationship, maybe sub-Saharan African countries don't look like so much of an outlier in a global sense. Maybe this is actually just like a general sort of pattern of development that all countries have gone through, where their prices have started to go down a little bit and then gone up. And so maybe prices are not the reason that African manufacturing has sort of lagged behind.

Tobi:One thing I'm curious about, which I would like you to speculate on a little bit, is how this all relates to food prices. I know that maybe Tom Westland has done a little bit of work here on food prices and divergence in Africa. It's hard to generalise for the entire continent, like you said, but for example, in Nigeria, food inflation is currently 40%. It's been double digits for about a decade. If you further break that down into what, actually, households spend money on, it's mostly food, right? So, like, we have these higher prices, which then feeds into higher wages. What is the relationship to the sort of inability of some African economies to achieve agricultural productivity enough to bring down food prices?

Oliver:Yeah, so this is an incredibly complex issue. I think it plugs into the political economy of a lot of sub-Saharan African states. So the most famous book on this kind of subject is Robert Bates's Markets and States in Tropical Africa. And it's a very slim book, but I think it's a remarkably powerful set of analytic tools for thinking about this stuff. So let's take a step back. Most developing countries, not even just African countries, but most developing countries, what do they have to produce? They have agriculture, right? [In] Most developing countries, most people are farmers.

And immediately after independence, again, not just African countries, but countries in South Asia, countries in East Asia, All of them, they achieved their independence and they started to figure out like, what can we potentially do to start growing? And what sector do you basically have in order to finance development? If you want to import machines, you want to like, you know, foster manufacturing growth. The only sector that you have is basically agriculture, right? And so there's this strong impulse basically to essentially tax agriculture to finance the capital imports and things that you need to foster manufacturing growth.

There's actually a lot of pressure basically to lower the prices that are paid to agricultural producers to finance imports of machines and stuff from richer countries. This process happened not just in sub-Saharan Africa, but again, like in Taiwan and Korea, where basically the state imposed policies that actually had an anti-agricultural bias.

The difference, I think, that Bates argues is that these policies became much more entrenched in sub-Saharan Africa, where basically the state had a lot less sort of penetration into the countryside, where the state was not as beholden, I guess, to the needs and interests of farmers, for instance. And the state basically became captured in the large sense by urban elites who discovered basically that they liked having prices, particularly of food, which as you mentioned [that] for a developing country is the largest portion of the consumption basket, in a lot of places.

And in a trade sense, they also liked having relatively cheap imports from other countries. So for the growing African middle class [and] for the elites, you know, they liked imports of European cars and luxury goods and that kind of stuff. And so that favours an exchange rate that tends to be overvalued to make your imports cheaper. And that actually hurts farmers who are interested potentially in exporting for whom an undervalued exchange rate would actually be the pro-developmental policy.

This is maybe one point of divergence between East Asia and a lot of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, where, you know, you started from a very similar kind of logic, which is that you should try and take resources, pull resources out of agriculture to fund manufacturing growth so that you can have your own sort of industrial revolution. But those sort of policies that effectively tax agriculture and made it cheaper basically for urban consumers, became entrenched in places like Nigeria and Kenya because the political class and the governing elite became beholden to them in a way that was not true in East Asia. So that was kind of a tangent from your original question, but I think the political economy aspects are worth highlighting here.

Oliver:You’ve mentioned You've mentioned East Asia a couple of times in your answers. It's become the model, the standard when we talk about the economic development. I was telling a friend recently that ever I was telling a friend recently that ever since East Asia, the East Asia phenomenon, basically every country has been trying to make a miracle in terms of development. I mean, 2-3% rate of growth no longer suffices. You have to do 7-10%, at least since China. What was so unique about those set of states Japan, Taiwan ,Korea, Singapore to a lesser extent, Hong Kong? What was so unique about them and that time period that made it possible? Because essentially, i would say, that no country has been able to repeat that level of convergence since .

Oliver:Yeah, unless you happen to be lucky enough to find yourself sitting on a gigantic oil field. Though I guess it's also true that that's not even necessarily good for development. There's a couple of factors that I'd highlight. So the first, I guess, is historical stuff. So East Asia, in some sense, is unusual like Western Europe, in that it has a long history of being organised along state lines. In some senses, like Korea, Japan... and certainly China, these are polities that emerged before the emergence of states in Western Europe. And there's been a lot of research actually trying to understand how these states emerged without a lot of the same interstate warfare that characterised Europe in the medieval and the early modern period, but instead through a process of Confucian learning, of an elite that was based around meritocratic civil service kind of stuff.

Historically, this place is like a little bit unique. And it's unlike, let's say, a lot of Sub-Saharan Africa, where at the time of European colonisation, around 50% of the people were living in sort of polities organised as states. That's not a statement about like, oh, states are better or more developed in any sense. But for the specific problem of if we want to do things like industrial policy or like agricultural policy, get growth to happen, it turns out that having things organised as a state turns out to be a very effective sort of organisational form. Again, to go into the deep history of that a little bit more is this was a rational sort of response by people who were living in Africa at the time, in part because of the relatively low population density. The places actually where you see the emergence of states in Africa around like the Great Lakes region, for instance, or the Ethiopian highlands are places where you had relatively higher population density. So in that sense, it tracks basically the broader sort of global pattern.

Anyway, that's a long digression to say that East Asia is kind of unique in having relatively well-defined strong states. And that kind of already solves a lot of the problems that I think a lot of sub-Saharan African countries are facing, where, you know, essentially a lot of them are creations of European colonialists. You have a whole bunch of people from different tribes, different ethnic backgrounds who don't actually have a whole lot to do with each other and they're lumped together in states that just kind of lack coherence. And so the 60 years since independence have been tragically marred by a lot of the adjudication of these disputes. So, you know, in the worst case, civil war, ethnic cleansing, that kind of stuff. But even in the best cases, a lot of distrust, a lot of competition over rent seeking behaviour, our turn to eat when our president wins election, that kind of stuff.

So at a minimum level, I think states are probably like a necessary precondition for rapid development. The second thing that I would point to in a more near-term sense is that the East Asian states were at a critical sort of boundary in the Cold War, right? So, like, South Korea almost got swallowed up by North Korea. Taiwan was sort of the product of the Chinese nationalists losing the Civil War and for the longest time, actually to this present day, they're worried about getting swallowed up by China. Japan was also similarly worried about communist takeover. And so that sort of enabled a set of policies that are also rather unique. The first one, obviously, is land reform. So immediately after independence for these countries, they conducted large programs of land redistribution. I think politically this also helps. So tying into the state stuff, like, having a broad base of support in the countryside where farmers are part of your sort of governing coalition. And there's an incentive basically to engage in broad based agricultural productivity growth, not necessarily as a result of the redistribution, but because the state has penetration into the countryside and is able to do things like agricultural extensions, spreading fertilisers, high yield varieties and all this kind of stuff.

Yeah. So land reform was like a critical policy that had to happen because across the border, like in North Korea, they have a land reform policy. In China, they have a massive land reform. In fact, because it was so unpopular amongst the peasants, that's why the KMT got kicked out of mainland China. And Japan also had one like in the late 1940s. So, you know, that's just like one very critical example.

Industrial policy, also. The fact that basically a lot of these countries also received a large amounts of American military spending that was directly related to the boundaries of the Cold War. The fact that the United States was fighting these wars, these hot wars, first in Korea and then Vietnam. So it's difficult, I guess, to pinpoint a little bit, but the confluence of these factors - like the existential kind of threat, the fact that if you don't get your development policy right, you will just be taken over [by another country]. In Korea, this was like a very real part of the thinking. It energised things like industrial policy, the fact that we need to create our own domestic steel industry so we can build our own artillery, our own tanks and all this kind of stuff, because we're possibly going to be invaded by the North. Yeah, the boundaries of the Cold War are, I think, an understated component of why East Asia took off.

Tobi:Yeah, so, I mean, it's good you mentioned Studwell, did you?

Oliver:Not yet, but like kind of implicitly.

Oliver:I guess we're going to get there at some point.

So, ever since the publication of that book, How Asia Works, it's sort of become the standardised, informal canon of policy advice in this sort of general sense, perhaps not in the technical sense of what went right with East Asia and what you should do, roughly.

And one country that I think went full Studwell was Ethiopia, with the land reform, the focus on agriculture, the intensive focus on manufacturing, but it hasn't really, really worked out so well. So, to the degree that you know, what was wrong with how Ethiopia just sort of went about going Studwell, to use that phrase?

Oliver:Yeah.

There's a lot of different factors here. And again, I would not call myself an expert on Ethiopia. I've not actually physically been to Ethiopia. I've talked to a lot of Ethiopian students here at Berkeley. So qualify everything that I say with that caveat.

Tobi:Yeah.

Oliver:I mean, it's tragic. I know that this big manufacturing push was already not yielding the expected results before the outbreak of the civil war post COVID. That is just so obviously like a first order fact to point out that, you know, Ethiopia had this horrible civil war a couple of years ago and we're still dealing with the ramifications of that.

It's very difficult, I think, to like try and do broad based rapid economic growth if you just constantly have civil conflicts of this kind. The damage is obvious, I guess, from the pure human cost, from the number of people who’ve died, you know, from the war time kind of destruction. But also like whenever there's a stable sort of post-war kind of settlement, the distrust between the Tigrayans, the Amharas, all these different sort of ethnic groups is definitely going to shape policy. And that's like a common feature, I guess, of a lot of sub-Saharan African countries where there's always competition over spoils rather than thinking about things that could broadly benefit people. And I think that's also partly a rational response. I should also say that even though it wasn't colonised, Ethiopia actually, I think, has some features of a lot of well, it was briefly colonised by the Italians, but nowhere near the sort of penetrating kind of colonial regime. But Ethiopia itself was sort of a product in a response to European colonisation of sub-Saharan Africa, where in literal terms an imperial sort of project that sort of absorbed a lot of surrounding ethnic groups and regions to create buffer zones against European colonisation. So that's the underlying structural reasons for why you have a state that doesn't have a strong majority ethnic group. There's a lot of conflict that's been generated by that.

But even before the Civil War, as I mentioned, the sort of big manufacturing push was not yielding the expected results. There had been pretty impressive, I think, overall aggregate GDP growth under Meles Zenawi, where Ethiopia was achieving something like rates of like 10% GDP growth a year. You can quibble about those numbers, but I think it is probably true that Ethiopia was growing very fast. Most of that, however, was not turning up in the sectors that the state was championing the most, which were the big manufacturing push to very explicitly copy the model of Korea and Taiwan and the East Asian tigers.

Just to list some of the things that the state has done. I mean, the state has like invested in massive industrial parks, which are actually state of the art in terms of the facilities. So you have like the famous Hawassa Industrial Park, it has subsidised electricity for these places. So, you know, a common problem in a lot of sub-Saharan African countries that are trying to pursue manufacturing growth, you know, for instance Nigeria is that power is just simply unreliable or it's too expensive as a manufacturing firm you have to install your own generator that's an incredibly wasteful and costly exercise for everybody to have their own generator. The state has been subsidising electricity in those parks that's building you know the grand renaissance dam this huge sort of project to lower energy costs more broadly.

But even with all these massive explicit and implicit subsidies, the textile sector basically in Ethiopia has just like not been achieving the expected growth One factor that I've kind of identified, it again has to do with these labor costs, where there's just like an incredible amount of turnover, it appears, at these firms. Foreign firms who have sited in like places like the Hawassa Industrial Park, where workers will like turn up for like a couple of days, often their first sort of industrial job so they're coming straight from like farming, and they'll find that they just really don't like it. Or they'll find that conditions are horrible. They're not paid enough for their time. And so they just choose to leave. And I think this creates an incredible amount of churn, basically, where you never actually develop the skills to get better at your job. The managers of the firm aren't able to identify who are the highest performers and potentially promote them. And so it's this very low level equilibrium where you have this constant churn of workers who are not getting paid enough, who are very unhappy, and so the sector just never really grows.

I don't know quite what the policy prescription to that is. One thing I talk about in my blog is like potentially things like trying to institute like a general minimum wage. So if… let's say, the wage is generally set too low, maybe you could raise it to the level where people are like, hey, this job kind of sucks, but I'm getting paid enough to stay around and do it. And maybe that would enable for skill development, would enable for managers to identify the highest performers. But it is like a general problem. And it's a problem that Ethiopia, it appears, has not been able to crack yet. Unlike the East Asian countries, where the manufacturing sector was able to soak up a tremendous amount of labour that was coming in from the countryside. In Ethiopia, despite all these government subsidies, despite all this government effort to try and promote the sector, there just hasn't been a similar movement.

Tobi:I certainly don't mean to pick on Ethiopia or Studwell here. But I mean, just to double down on that question and, you know, emphasise what I'm really getting at. I mean, you can throw in a couple of scholars and public figures here, Justin Hodge, who look at East Asia and, you know, extract a couple of things as policy advices - do industrial policy, state capacity is the big difference, do you have to do land reform which will bring us to your latest paper - because what's certainly been true in the last couple of years, and I can point to your recent work or someone like Nathan Lane too on industrial policy, is that even a lot of what went right with East Asia, there's a lot of nuance to that story than the generalised, simplified model that we've been used to. So is there something wrong with how people are learning from the East Asia experience generally?

Oliver:So what you described, like my paper, Nathan Lane's work, like this is a historical stuff, right? We're looking at what happened in East Asia. But whenever you're talking about development, there's like this additional inductive step. Like, are the conditions that exist in Africa the same as the conditions that were faced by East Asian countries in the 1950s, 60s, 70s? And the answer is like plainly no. The global environment, the global marketplace looks substantially different. So this is, I guess, the third set of factors I would highlight for why there was a divergence between East Asian economic experience and sub-Saharan Africa’s, which is like the environment in which the sub-Saharan African countries are trying to industrialise is potentially just a lot less favourable than that was faced by East Asian countries. And this goes into things like global movements of prices, the relative price between commodities and manufacturers.

During the 19th century, this is work that's been done by Jeffrey Williamson. So [at] the initial stage of globalisation, it was actually not a bad bet as [for a] poor country, [that is] a country on the economic periphery to be a commodities exporter, right? Europe was industrialising at the time, and factories were going up, manufacturing output was going up, manufacturing productivity was going up, and it was driving the relative price of manufactures down. And so if you were like an Indian artisan making a lot of textiles, that was previously the textile hub of the world, this was a tremendous competitive hit, and this was bad for you. If you were an Argentinian cattle farmer and you're producing cattle that fed people who work in the factories and this kind of stuff, that was actually a really good line of business to be in. And so, you know, throughout the latter half of the 19th century, there was this kind of price movement where being a commodities exporter was good, being a manufacturing exporter was relatively bad, particularly if you were doing like non-industrial production in poor countries.

East Asia got incredibly lucky in some sense in that the period where it was trying to develop was very favourable, basically, to manufacturing productivity growth. Europe was basically starting to get richer. You know, it was escaping, I guess, the destruction of the Second World War and the First World War. and so it was recovering, it was growing economically very quickly and you know as you grow quickly you have greater demand for manufacturing goods. At the same time Europe itself was starting to shift potentially more to the services right and so there was an opportunity for places like Taiwan and Korea to start producing things that other markets would want like TVs radios that kind of stuff.

Yeah, the market environment that was faced by East Asia was like pretty favourable. Now, in the present day, the problem is that it appears that those conditions don't exist. In the West, actually, there's been a lot of development in automation that increases the productivity of manufacturing output. That's also true in the places that have claimed the mantle of being the world's factory, Korea and Japan, and certainly China, most of all, where you already have competitors who are able to produce manufacturing goods at a much higher productivity level than if you're a country starting out. And so it's no longer as easy just to rely on the fact that you have relatively low labour costs, like the East Asian countries did in the 1960s or so, to sort of compete in the global marketplace. You actually need productivity as well. And if you're competing against people who use a whole bunch of robots and machines in their production processes, it's just very hard to compete on costs. And so I think there is a sense in which maybe these lessons are not as applicable as we thought, because the sort of global context is just not as favourable to manufacturing growth as it once was.

Tobi:Again, I'm increasingly skeptical and finding it less useful some of what people say, especially when it comes to learning from the East Asian experience, because, oh, yeah, people say stuff like do industrial policy and once you run into the difficulty of doing that, [they say, oh] it's because you don't have the capacity, and okay, so how do I get capacity? Essentially, it's reducible to get a different history, more or less, which is kind of not so different from the institutional people, which is basically just go get yourself a different institution, which essentially means you get yourself a different history.

So I've become less enthusiastic about that sort of arc. Which then brings me to the question, what is the right way to look at successful countries and learn the right lessons that you can then apply to your own context? I know that it's not all different. There are some similarities. For example, I know that a lot of African countries are extremely protectionist in terms of trade policies and shifting a little bit more towards export-oriented sort of trade policies would help. But as an economic historian, how do we learn from history?

Oliver:Yeah, so this is where I would say that the label that I would wear is I'm a development economist, not an economic historian. Like, I do a lot of economic history stuff. My primary interest is like, what can we actually learn to help people today? The historical interest is very interesting. It's intrinsically important. But what's motivating me is, you know, what is actually useful? And I completely take your point. There's a sense, I think, particularly amongst academics, when you peel back the layers of the onion, in the end, it just comes down to, yeah, get a better history. You know, there's just like fundamental factors that are so deep rooted that, you know, basically you can't do anything about it. One answer that I give that's maybe a weird kind of like metacognition kind of point is that let's say you pose this question in 1945 or something. Right. That's not actually that long ago. My grandparents were alive in 1945. I can talk to them and ask them what it was like.

There was no way that they would have thought that South Korea, Japan would be as rich as in some cases richer than France or Germany. Like it was just like inconceivable at that point. I mean, Korea would have a civil war that would kill like 20 percent of the population in five years. And so the cultural factors were broadly the same. The history, you know, up to like 2000 years subtracting like 30 years or so was the same. But the transformation afterwards was just very difficult to predict. So I think there's a sense in which like when we're talking about these sort of factors behind why countries are richer or poorer, we have to remember that we're looking at them from like a very specific point. In 20 or 30 years things could potentially look very different and they can be very different in ways that are difficult to predict.

One example that i like to give a lot is, um, this is like a view that i'm less fond of, like, cultural kind of stuff. Culture surely matters but i think there's like a very strong instinct to want to say that culture is this fixed kind of entity, like these get a better history kind of arguments. It's like this sort of intrinsic quality that is tied to the people and just stays forever. And that's why you're rich or that's why you're poor. In the East Asian case, the answer that's often given by Lee Kuan Yew and others is Confucianism, right?

Lee Kuan Yew became a bit of a celebrity in the 90s or so, just like going around different countries and saying like, hey, the reason that you're not doing well is that you have not absorbed East Asian values of Confucianism, like filial piety, studying very hard for tests, listening to authority figures, having a well-ordered society along these lines. But if you go back 30 years, 20 years or so, scholars, sociologists, sinologists looking at the trajectory of China would have said that Confucianism was a terrible idea, that basically it resulted in states that were unable to adapt to the sort of conditions of modernity. You know, the Qing dynasty was not a great historical success by any means. It completely failed to adapt to the pressures of Western incursions. And so like there's a sense of which I think our descriptions, I guess, of history and culture should be a lot more malleable than I think these get a better history kind of views. The thing that kind of gives me hope is that I think it really would only take one. I know that there's like Mauritius and maybe some other examples, but it would take, I think, only one sub-Saharan African country. I don't know which it would be. Maybe it's Ghana, maybe it's Kenya, maybe it's Nigeria.

But it'll only take one to start demonstrating, I think, this sort of sustainable pattern of growth for that example to kind of spread. That's essentially what happened historically in East Asia. I mean, if you go back even further in terms of the history, the chauvinistic Western view is, you know, modernity was something that was exclusively a property of Westerners, right? Japan proved that very wrong. And that example spread to other countries in the immediate sort of cultural vicinity. I think the same process is definitely possible in Africa. And there's no reason, I think, that it can't happen.

Tobi:So sort of brings me to, I would say my weirdest question yet. I mean, the reason why people talk about development, the reason why someone like me is interested and doing what I do is that I want Nigeria to be rich in my lifetime. It's possible, but maybe not. But certainly that's the hope. Can you imagine a possible future where, to make it as concrete as possible, where 90% of the global population would be around middle income or something we call rich. Like, can the whole world be developed, essentially, is my question?

Oliver:I think so. I don't think there's any structural reason that's holding that back. I'm sympathetic to a lot of like leftist arguments. Like I know there's like core periphery stuff. Like if you're a big fan of like Raul Prebisch, you think that the world is kind of underladen by the fact that, you know, you have like underpaid people in the global south or doing the commodities extraction or whatever to help the rich world.

I'm sympathetic to parts of that thesis in terms of thinking about like why some countries are underdeveloped, particularly from a political economy standpoint, but I don't think in the long run there's any reason that all countries can't enjoy a decent standard of living.

Tobi:As a development economist, which you say is your preferred label, how do you think that development economics and some of the cool research and informative stuff that's going on there can influence policy more because that's sort of like a big, big thing for me because I see more and more governments in Africa becoming so detached from what works at least to a certain degree. So how can development research essentially influence development policy?

Oliver:Yeah, the framing of that question is interesting. You were talking about earlier, maybe before we recorded, that your concern was that African countries, maybe not even just African countries, maybe like developing countries in general, they're not listening to the policy lessons that academics have prepared for their research. But my take, at least coming from someone who was very recently in the heart of the ivory tower, is that academics, even development economists, which in theory should be like the most applied of fields, are not asking questions that are immediately relevant to governments and to policymakers in African countries.

So maybe both can simultaneously be true, like we're kind of like crossing paths past each other. But at least looking at the research production standpoint, when I look at what's published in top journals, often I'm just like, if the composition of development economists looked more like the people who are being studied, would we be producing the set of research? And my hypothesis is probably not.

The framing that you see a lot of development research, particularly coming out of the United States and Europe, is very much in the mindset of I'm a donor, I'm an NGO, I'm an aid agency. What can I do on the margins to make my program better, right? How can I make it more efficient? How can I like, what intervention would work the best? I think that's like a perfectly fine line of work. For instance, my advisor's work, Ted Miguel, he did a lot of stuff in deworming in Kenya. That has helped tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions of people. That is very clearly good to improve. But this is not a critique that's new to me. But broadly speaking, the area that considers the framing of like, if I'm a developing country policymaker, what sort of macro policies, what sort of like broader industrialisation policies can I pursue to sort of foster growth? I think that's a little bit more of a neglected area in terms of academic research. And so, yeah, I guess I would switch the framing a little bit where it's like, the problem I see is also from our end. We need to be producing stuff that's informed more by experiences on the ground, like people who actually know the problems and less about like what we think or what we can convince a grant maker is interesting.

Tobi:What's the one idea that you are most excited about, that you are most enthusiastic about and that you would like to see spread, become more influential? What is that one idea?

Oliver:So this is a bit of an odd one. It's a very nerdy one, but it's like a question that has been bothering me a lot recently. Maybe you can also react to this. It's like GDP is like a number. I recently read like Poor Numbers by Morten Jerven. Have you read this book?

Tobi:Yeah.

Oliver:Yeah, I read it like immediately at the end of my PhD. I mean, I've essentially done 10 years, 12 years of like economic research and like I first heard of this book. Basically the premise, it's almost like a sociology of how GDP is constructed in developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. And It's not pretty. Like for those 10 years when I was a researcher in academia, you know, when you go to the UN website, you go to the World Bank, the IMF or whatever, and you download the GDP statistics going back to like 1960, you kind of assume that somebody has done the hard work of like making sure that this is correct. You know, there is actually an army of enumerators out there in Kenya or Nigeria or whatever. They've gone to every store and they've counted every capital good and they've done the math on this stuff. Morten Jerven's book shows us that that's just patently not true. Nigeria features prominently in that book. You know, it's not even clear how many people are living in the country. Population censuses are like an incredibly sort of politically divisive thing. I'm sure you could speak more about that. Various ethnic groups don't want to be counted or maybe they want to be counted more. That determines sort of the allocation of public resources. And so, you know, you don't even have the number of people in the country correct.

And I believe it was like in 2014 or so. This is, I think after the book was published, like Nigeria basically did a revision to how its GDP statistics were calculated. That resulted in a revision that was like something on the order of magnitude of 90%.

Tobi:Yeah. We’ll do another one very soon, ‘cause we’re like the fourth largest economy in Africa now, and I'm sure a lot of people are not cool with that.

Oliver:Yeah, Nigeria like spring vaulted past South Africa to become the largest economy. And like maybe both of those numbers are incorrect. Let's just say that one of them is like as a baseline. That means that at one point your number was 90% wrong. Like I think there's a sense in which like economists have been so focused on things like causal identification, all these crazy statistical stuff, ignoring like the basic question of measurement. If you had a thermometer that was like 90% wrong, like you would not read anything into the fact that your temperature goes up by like two or three degrees. You know, if the air is like 30 degrees, it effectively is meaningless to be making a minute decision. You know, it's not the fault of a lot of these governments. I mean, in some cases it is like maybe they mess with the statistics, maybe they underfund their statistical departments. But it is true that just like it is a hard problem to measure your economy.

There's this anecdote in the book where Morton Jerven goes to the Zambian statistical office and it's like one guy who does both the census and the GDP numbers. And so like that guy was like really well-intentioned, he's probably doing the best that he can. Zambia is like a country of 10, 20 million people and you have one person doing all that work. It's just not conceivable that you could have an accurate sort of statistical product. So getting back to your question, Jerven's book came out, I think everybody like kind of cites it respectfully and they're like, oh, you know, GDP statistics are just not something we should have like a high degree of confidence in, but we just like kind of go on using them anyway. Because what else are we going to do?

Tobi:Yeah. It's just a caveat somewhere.

Oliver:Yeah, yeah. The World Bank did some stuff. There's like a database they have of statistical capacity. So they rate countries from like zero to 100 or something like that based on how good their statistical agency is. But like, again, I spent like 10 years doing development stuff and I just didn't even notice it. So one idea that I've been pushing that I hope to maybe put into a blog post, maybe develop into a formal paper. is like we actually do have a way of kind of describing statistics that are very noisy, which is like, you know, it's election season in the United States, you know, you'll see like Kamala Harris versus Donald Trump polls. But if you're like a sophisticated consumer of this stuff, you always look for the margin of error, right?

Like when a poll is reported, If the margin of error is like 5%, which is very common amongst these political polls, whether Kamala Harris is leading Donald Trump by 47 to 46 or 48 to 47, it's effectively meaningless. There's just too much noise in the underlying measure to include anything from the raw number. I guess one idea that I like to promote is we should do the same thing for GDP statistics. For some reason, economists are willing to treat GDP as this very certain kind of metric without the appropriate degree of skepticism that they sometimes apply to other statistics. And so just having the margin of error printed next to the number, I think, is like a good epistemic reminder to be humble and be like, hey, you know, like these policies that we recommended that we claim boosted aggregate GDP by like point one percent this quarter. Like there's actually no way that you can actually detect that. And so I think that should encourage greater humility amongst economists and policymakers about how much do we actually know about the world and how much can we actually affect it.

Tobi:Not to mouth any kind of defense for Nigeria, but I think since Morten's book came out, there's been some improvement, particularly in measurement, because a lot of it is just the fact that funding statistical measurement is not a political priority. So for a long time, and I doubt it has changed currently…for a long time, the National Statistical Agency is funded by the central bank in Nigeria and not even by the federal government itself. So like Morten recalled in that book, when he came to Nigeria to do research on that book, the Statistical Agency was in the midst of a staff revolt due to poor pay. And the guys that head some of these agencies and try to do the work, they are real heroes because they are trying to basically perform magic with resources that are next to nothing.

I know that, again, the National Bureau of Statistics in Nigeria, the United Nations is heavily involved both in terms of funding and reviewing the methodology and improving the presentation and everything. But you would think that it is something that the government itself should be heavily invested in rather than foreign agency or a donor agency or something. So a lot of it is politics, really, because in the end, governments really do not make decisions based on these numbers. Hence it's not really a priority to get accurate measurements.

So, but I mean, hopefully things are improving, but it's not without controversy. The most recent one in Nigeria, for example, is that the World Bank and the ILO recently changed the methodology for unemployment. And Nigeria, again, just like the GDP thing, went from being 33% unemployment rate to 5% overnight. Right? So, we started having these technical subcategories like underemployment and informal employment, you know, and things like that. So it's politics, really. But i like your idea and we'll try our best to help you spread it as much as possible.

Oliver:All right. Sounds good.

Tobi:Yeah, so thank you so much, Oliver, for doing this. It's been fun.

Oliver:Thank you, Tobi, yeah it's been fun

This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe

In the episode, Tobi talks to Dmitry Grozoubinski about the politics and complexities of global trade, emphasizing the tension between free trade and protectionism. Dmitry explains how trade policy decisions involve difficult choices that impact both producers and consumers, using Nigeria's food inflation as an example. They explore the balance between national interests and global commitments, highlighting how protectionist policies are often rooted in political concerns rather than economic efficiency. The conversation also touches on the challenges of multilateral trade agreements like the WTO and AfCFTA.

Dmitry served as an Australian diplomat and trade negotiator at the World Trade Organisation and beyond. He has negotiated complex agreements in Geneva, at WTO and UN Ministerial Conferences in Kenya, and as part of the MH17 task force in Kyiv, Ukraine.

Before joining the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, he was a lecturer and tutor at the Monash Graduate School of Business and with the Australian trade consultancy TradeWorthy. He is the lead trainer of ExplainTrade and a Visiting Professor at the University of Strathclyde’s School of Law.

Transcript

Tobi: The complexity of trade agreements, the bargaining, the negotiation, and everything that surrounds the politics of trade generally does not get covered so much. It's always about the economics of it. And that's what I love about what you do, your project, your book, and everything. So my first question to you is that I know you wrote this basically from the perspective of global trade, and with everything that has been happening, I would say, basically, since the Trump presidency, which, like, brought trade into the headlines, particularly with the US-China “trade war”, quote unquote. And, of course, COVID is what we see with supply chains, decoupling, and so forth. But, I would also say to you that in development, the sub-field of economics that we call development, which is what we try to cover here on the show, trade is also a huge deal.

I'll give you a bit of a background. In Nigeria, currently, one of the biggest policy issues is the government trying to decide whether or not to allow the importation of food, basically rice, wheat, and all this other basic stuff. Primarily because food inflation is way above 40%. There's basically a cost of living crisis that has been going on for a few years. People are hungry, people are starving, people are angry because their incomes can no longer even feed them, you know? And so it generates this intense debate because on the other side of that, you have the producer class - the farmers and various lobby groups and political interests who say that, “oh, you really can't import, you're going to turn the country to a dumping ground, we're going to de-industrialise and so many other things.”

So one practical question I'll start with you is, if I were a politician, for example, and you know, with the title of your book, let's say that I am an honest politician. Let's assume that I'm an honest politician and I'm asking you that, Dmitry, how do I make this decision? What practical advice would you give me when considering trade policies generally? How do I make trade policy?

Dmitry:

I think that's a really good question, and I think it kind of goes to the heart of what trade policy is. Anytime you're doing trade policy, you're making choices, and they're often hard choices. You just laid it out perfectly there. You have farmers and other producers of food in Nigeria that are benefiting from very high prices. And you have consumers that are effectively suffering because a substantial part of their weekly budget is going to food, and more than was going before. You mentioned inflation at 40%. That is hugely unsustainable. So as a politician, when you are talking about the choice of bringing in more food, the first thing to do is you have to be honest. And you have to say that, yes, if you allow more food into Nigeria, you will hurt the interests of producers.

One reason I wrote the book is that politicians will often try to gloss over this and pretend it's some kind of win-win. They'll talk about competition. They'll talk about greater efficiencies. And that's all true to an extent. But in the short term, if currently you're locking out foreign rice, which is considerably cheaper than Nigerian rice, and you allow that rice in, you are going to hurt Nigerian rice producers. There's absolutely no way around it. So the first thing is to be honest about that choice you're making. The second point is to be honest about what you're trying to do versus what you're not trying to do.

So one of the ways that this particular debate often gets twisted into an uncomfortable alley is people will start talking about the notion of food security. So they'll say it's important that Nigeria be able to feed itself. And if we allow foreign food in, that will degrade our ability to be self-sufficient on food, right? To my mind, that's a way of basically misleading the public. It's very, very, very, very few countries are food secure in the sense that if trade were cut off tomorrow, they would produce enough food domestically to feed everyone in the country. Countries like the United Kingdom import something like 65% of their food. Why? Because it's far more efficient that way. And global trade supplies what people need. The amount of work it would take to convert the United Kingdom, for example, into being able to feed itself would mean you have to stop doing everything else in the country and prices would go through the roof. So it's important to be realistic about that.

It's also, I think, really important to say we live in an era of climate change. And one of the real problems we are going to face moving forward is that extreme weather events are going to become more common. So you are going to have parts of let's focus just on Africa, you are going to have in coming years parts of Africa that are in drought or flood, while parts of Africa are having a phenomenal crop. And those parts will shift around over and over. Our ability to feed people consistently moving forward is going to rely on us being able to move food from the places that are having a really good year to places that are having a really bad year. And I think any politician who is trying to say that if we just keep the walls around like the tariff walls, the barriers to importing food high enough, Nigeria will be able to feed itself forever every year without sky-high inflation, I think maybe is skipping over just the reality of where we live.

Tobi:

So, as you know, in places like Washington and the like, which gives advice to poorer countries on how to make policy and what will make them rich, you know that for about three decades, the orthodoxy has more or less been free trade. You know, you need to be more open. You need to allow more trade. You need to allow more goods into your country. Protectionism doesn't work. Which economically seems to be true, but right now, you have some of the richest countries in the world who have been advocates of open trade regimes, actually more or less going back to the mercantilist protectionist policies of the past. Which I think you sort of touched upon, especially the history of this in the second chapter of your book. So can you just give me a brief rundown on some of the shifts that we've gone through historically? And, like, what moves the needle on the dominant thoughts on trade policy?

Dmitry:

Sure. So when economists talk about free trade being the optimal path forward, what they're actually saying is, if you don't have tariffs, if you don't have trade barriers, we can maximise the efficient use of resources. So the free market will sort of allow and everyone will produce things in the most efficient way. And so overall, as a planet, we will be maximising our labor and our resources. And that's the benefit of that. They also suggest that having competition in your market pushes your own producers to work harder and having free trade can attract more capital. So inflows of capital from abroad that can make investments in your country. With the confidence that if they build a factory in Nigeria, if you've got free trade, if you've locked that in with treaties, they know that that factory will always be able to get the inputs it needs from abroad and always be able to sell whatever it produces to buyers outside of Nigeria. So that makes Nigeria a more attractive investment destination, for example.

So that's kind of the logic for a long time. And you mentioned Washington, Brussels, you know, the big economies generally tended to push that line and tended to believe it. Now, I would say straight away, it's important to note that they didn't universally believe it. So, for example, Europe is like, yeah, free trade's great unless you want to sell us certain agricultural commodities. So if you want to sell beef to Europe, suddenly free trade is not so great. And they protect their beef farmers or their lamb farmers or even their wheat and sugar producers. Ditto, America loves free trade when it comes to certain things. But if you try to sell America a light truck, you're paying a 25% tariff at the border. It's virtually impossible to sell certain kinds of services into the U.S. If you want to get a visa into the U.S., you sometimes have to do a job, you sometimes have to wait two years for an interview at a U.S. embassy. So even the rich countries that were preaching free trade were preaching free trade asterisk.

So what they were basically saying is, we believe that this is the optimal way to arrange the global economy, except on the things that we care about, the things that we're really sensitive on, where we think what's important isn't efficiency, but keeping the French farmer employed or protecting the US insurance market. What we're seeing now is that that asterisk is growing. So the US, Europe, China, all of these major players are increasingly saying free trade is great unless we have a national security concern. Free trade is great except when we want to rebuild the factories in the US Rust Belt. Free trade is great unless we want to create an instrument where you can't bully us with trade, so we're going to set up the EU anti-coercion instrument. So all of these kind of asterisks are being piled on top of what they used to be before.

Tobi:

One thing that often challenges observers, and I would imagine policymakers and politicians included, is the balance between, say, national interest, which again is becoming more prominent when it comes to trade policies, and global commitments, especially membership of world trade organisations, bilateral trade agreements, and other forms of multilateral agreements. And I want to get, especially from your experience advising and consulting on trade, what are the challenges or the headaches, the difficulties that leaders often encounter trying to balance between national interests, like, oh, we want to protect certain companies who are national champions, we want to protect certain key industries, and being signatories to a much wider multilateral, even bilateral agreements? How do you balance such contradictions sometimes?

Dmitry:

So the whole multilateral trading system, the WTO, all of it is built on the exact tension that you're talking about. You mentioned sort of balancing the national interest versus being part of the WTO. The WTO fundamentally only works as long as all of its members broadly believe that those two are the same thing—that ultimately what you're doing when you join any kind of trade agreement or really any kind of international agreement is what you're really saying is, "I am going to sign away my ability to do certain things." So I'm going to say I will swear off doing certain kinds of policies in exchange for you doing the same. And that's not because you never want to do those policies. You know you might want to do them in the future. But overall, you think the benefit of being in a world where no one's using those policies outweighs the short-term benefits of using those policies.

I compare it to like an arms ban treaty that bans chemical weapons on the battlefield. Chemical weapons are tempting to use on the battlefield because they can help you achieve a certain objective that might be really effective at what they do. They're horrific. But countries have come together and decided that the benefits of no one using chemical weapons and our battlefields not being full of chemical weapon residue outweighs any of the tactical advantages we might get ourselves from using chemical weapons. We prefer the confidence of a chemical weapon-free world to the benefits of having chemical weapons.

Trade agreements work the same way. You're always signing away the ability to use some policies you find tempting in exchange for that kind of global stability. So the tension tends to come because we are encouraged to be very short-term in our politics. And the benefits tend to be pretty narrowly focused and acute. So a specific industry is saying, "You have to protect me against foreign rice farmers." And that's something you can do today. The benefits of the global trading system and that kind of predictability are much, much broader, but much more diffuse. Everyone benefits from predictability. You get more investment. You get more trade flows. Prices overall are lower. That's all very good. But it doesn't have that acute politics of a particular industry that wants protection and will throw you a party if you give it to them.

So what political leaders are constantly fighting is the temptation to do something in the short term that weakens the system in the aggregate. And one of the few balances we have against that is the sense that if you do something like that, you're going to get retaliated against and other countries will hit you back.

Tobi:

I think one of the reasons why your book is well-timed is that it comes at a time when we are fundamentally learning that trade policy is inherently political, right? So a way to, like, further extend the last question for me is… sometimes I find it surprising that a lot of trade policies or trade agreements or even I would say maybe intellectual consensuses that have formed over time around a particular subject have political, intensely political origins and not economic or positive-sum motivations. So maybe you can provide me with a few examples from history of how politics have come to shape the conversation. An example I have in mind is recently the Biden tariff on electric vehicles from China. Most of the people, smart people, I should say, who have defended that policy would always say something along the lines of national security. America really needs to reindustrialise its core, you know, this and that. Because it's so obvious when you point out that if you want to transition to cleaner energies, if you really want to fight global warming, then slamming tariffs on electric vehicles makes absolutely no sense. But at the end of the day, people easily just recede to political arguments that would hardly pass water a couple of years ago. So I find that just contradictory, confusing. Help me out. I'm drowning here.

Dmitry:

I wish I could. I wish I could make it all make sense. The only thing I could do is first say—and this is a point that I hammer in the book over and over to the point where I'm worried I'm boring people—is that the big issues in trade have always been politics first, second, third, and then economics somewhere around, like, 26th. If you look at any major trade issue, it almost always comes down to, like, highly politicised questions. And there are really lots of examples on this.

So, for example, Japan, which generally has a reasonably liberalised open trade regime, has insanely high tariffs on rice, like hundreds of percent. And there is absolutely no economic reason for that. Rice farming is a tiny, tiny percentage of the Japanese economy. You know, Japan would be fine as a country without rice. But the traditional way of growing rice in Japan is very politically iconic. It's significant. They have a strong lobby. And so Japan, even while sort of preaching free trade, makes it incredibly difficult to sell rice to Japan in order to protect these small group of farmers.

Another story I like to tell is that when Australia did its free trade agreement with China, China is by far Australia's largest trading partner, hugely, hugely significant. And we finished the free trade agreement. It takes many years to finally get done. We sort of announce it to the public. We take it to parliament and everybody, the media, the opposition party, the entire national conversation becomes about this one tiny provision buried somewhere deep in the services chapter that creates a tiny visa subclass for like 100 Chinese workers a year to come work on gas projects in the middle of Australia. 100 people. 100 visas. But that sort of captures the national imagination. It becomes politicis ed. It becomes symbolic. And that's like the only thing we talked about for weeks on this trade agreement.

So we laser-focused on this issue that was hugely politically significant. But in economic terms, it was so small that it wouldn't have registered on any statistics. Like legitimately, if you looked at Australian nationwide statistics, a 100 workers working on a gas project somewhere outside Alice Springs is not going to even turn up on statistics. So this has always been the case. It is everywhere. And so I think what we're seeing now is just a continuation of that.

One thing I think we are seeing more and more of is politicians trying to distort the choices that they're making. You brought up electric vehicles. I think electric vehicles are one example. Solar panels are the example that absolutely gets me. Because there is no way we do anything about climate change without a transition to much cleaner energy. And right now, China is overwhelmingly the largest producer of solar panels. They are doing that through subsidies, and they are dumping these solar panels on the world market. We need to have an honest conversation about the trade-offs involved in taking those solar panels. Are we comfortable with allowing Chinese government money to create this giant industry, to create this dominant position in world markets if it means we get lots and lots of cheap solar panels? It's a hard choice to make, but it's a real choice, and we need to be honest about it.

So to kind of not answer your question properly because I can't think of any way to make you feel better about all this, it's that in some ways, what we had before—so I'm talking about before Trump 15 years ago—the trade conversations were mostly happening below the radar. There was mostly a consensus in the West about how trade policy should work. Trade very rarely made the news. You know, maybe with a big trade agreement, like the one when the US and EU tried to do, maybe around the Seattle round of the WTO, but mostly it was sort of hidden away in a corner and there was no public discussion about it. And now at the very least, it's in the headlines, and we're having conversations about it. And that is an improvement, even if some of those conversations aren't necessarily helpful.

Tobi:

My two-part follow-up question to that would be that regardless of one's disagreement or misgivings, the consensus around how these conversations are happening and how they influence policy changes seems like it's here to stay. I mean, like we talked about before we started recording, Trump might be winning another election and it's going to be another rollercoaster ride. So, I mean, in a common-sense kind of way, hoping that that prevails in actual policymaking, how would you suggest that countries balance the trade-off that may or may not exist between their economic interests and strategic imperatives like national security, trying to build up your defence base or be industrialised, and so many others that are intensely political and won't go away? How do you suggest the politicians or the advisors find a balance? Relatedly, especially in poorer countries, how do they find this balance without resorting to the kind of hurtful protectionism that we've seen with some countries over the years? So those are my questions.

Dmitry:

I think the only way forward is to be really specific and concrete about what you are trying to achieve. Because I think the danger that we're seeing now is that you have politicians identify a very high-level and nebulous objective. So you say like national security or to, you know, defend ourselves against China at some point in the future. And then they create that very, very high-level objective. They don't define what exactly they're picturing in their heads, like what they want the country to be able to do in that regard. And then that opens the door to justifying just about anything they want to do in any area.

So if I say, well, hypothetically, I am worried about the rise of China and I'm worried about having to fight a war with China and my industrial production in that event. Because, like, oh, what if we need to suddenly make a lot of tanks and bullets? If you've kind of set your objective that nebulously, then any time any factory owner comes to you and says, I want you to intervene in the market to help me, you can retroactively justify that. Because you can go, well, this factory is in trouble. If we go to war with China, we're going to need factories. It's important that we save this factory. And so you've kind of opened the door to politicians doing what is easy or tempting or popular on any given moment by not concretely defining your objective.

But I think there's a lot you can constructively do, even in ways that are sort of protectionist, that's fine, if you've narrowly defined your objective. So if you say, I would like to further strengthen Nigeria's IT sector, right? Like that's what you've defined as your objective. You can look at the barriers, the difficulties that the Nigerian IT sector is experiencing, and work out if there are places where a government intervention, including a protectionist one, might really help. And you've got like, I want to boost the Nigerian IT sector. My goal is to create 50,000 new IT jobs within the next three years. And I want us to have a really good ecosystem for entrepreneurial Nigerians who want to build apps. What would that take? What do I need to do? You've defined your objective. You've defined what victory looks like. And then if you say, OK, one of the things I really need to do to make that happen is to make it harder for Nigerians to use apps hosted in other places so that they're more inclined to use Nigerian apps. You can do that. And then two years later, you can see if it worked. We can judge the policy based on like, we wanted to create 50,000 jobs. We want to create lots of new apps. We took this step. It cost us something. It made life more annoying for Nigerians who wanted to use, like, Canva. But do we now have a Nigerian Canva alternative that's good, that people like, that's selling to the world?

So if you concretely define the objectives, are able to identify how what you're doing will deliver those objectives, and then finally have a way of testing afterwards if it worked, you can have a really mature conversation with the public about this is what we want to do. This is how we want to use the levers of government where trade policy is concerned to make your lives better in these ways. And then the public can sort of decide if the trade-offs are worth it. That's what has to be the mature policy discussion that needs to be taking place between the public and leaders, because otherwise you can just kind of justify anything if you say, well, I'm just doing this to create, you know, for prosperity or whatever.

Tobi:

I want to circle back to something you mentioned at the start, which is about winners and losers with regards to trade policies. Of course, there are always losers. I'll first seek a philosophical commitment from you, which is that on what side of the divide do you fall when it comes to wins and losses from trade policies?

Dmitry:

So where I tend to come from is that the kind of winners and losers framework can be really heartless in the sense that if I'm walking down the street and I decide I want to go for a coffee and I go into one coffee shop instead of the other, that is like a winner and a loser. Someone is going to earn my four dollars for my flat white and someone isn't. But that other company is going to be fine. So there's a winner and losers in that scenario, but it's not a big deal. Whereas, let's say you have a small town in Nigeria that's basically grown up around a factory. Let's say that factory makes shoes. And because of international competition, that shoe factory closes.

From an economic standpoint, like pure economic theory, you're like, well, kind of, OK, that's good because now Nigerians on the whole will get slightly cheaper or more better value shoes from abroad. And these guys can be freed up to do something else more efficient. But that's not how anything works, right? A linchpin factory closes in a town. You've got huge rates of unemployment. All of the businesses that feed into that factory are now in trouble. The doctor who treats the workers, they can no longer afford to pay her. So she moves to the city and now the town doesn't have as many doctors. So there's like a cascading effect. And a 53-year-old factory worker who makes shoes probably isn't going to immediately pivot to making TikTok videos for money. You know, they're not going to become a web developer overnight. So we need to be aware of just how bad it can be when trade creates losers. That doesn't mean you have to try to prevent it ever having any losers. But I think we have to be really, really sensitive to what happens when we create losers. And we need to have a plan for how we are going to help those that, frankly, capitalism rolls over.

Tobi:

I think you sort of answered my pushback because what I was going to say was that sometimes in reality, it can be difficult to tell a priori who the losers are going to be. I might be the trade minister, you know, staying in my fancy office in the capital and not aware that this little town somewhere in central Nigeria depends so much on the shoe factory until after we are seeing the effects. Maybe I get to hear it in the news or something. My question then would be that what are the right sensibilities that policymakers need to have as a general rule when dealing with wins and losses from trade policies?

Dmitry:

One of the things that trade ministries really struggle with is exactly what you're describing, which is in order to understand what the consequences of a trade policy decision are going to be, you really kind of need firm-level and local data. If you're just looking at national statistics, you get a very, very stratospheric picture. So one really common example is that the entire UK fishing industry, so absolutely everyone involved in fishing in the UK, contributes less to UK GDP than the company Games Workshop that makes Warhammer figurines. So if you're looking at national-level statistics, you're like, well, one of those is more significant than the other. But if UK fishing were to disappear overnight, that would be tens of thousands of jobs, dozens of coastal communities that would be devastated. And so if all you're doing is sitting in a capital looking at those high-level statistics, you're going to miss these acute pain points.

So one of the biggest challenges is how do you create a consultation system where the ministry and capital is talking to local authorities, talking to kind of mayors, talking to business associations that are spread all across the country and going, what would happen if we did this? Sort of what would be the consequences? Who would the winners and losers be in your local area? And what do we need to think about? What do we need to keep in mind? That's really, really important. I kind of go back to the example used right at the very start about the current debate that Nigeria is going through on importing food or not in the face of food inflation. And I think that's a really good winners and losers story, because whatever choice you make, you can sort of think through who the winners and losers are going to be.

So if you decide to open up your markets, the world price of rice and grain is published. You can have a look. You can examine how much of a hit that's going to be to farmers' incomes. There's no unknowns in that equation. So we can probably figure that out. Then you can decide, OK, if we let in more food, who are the farmers that are likely to be put out of business or significantly hurt, and what can we do to help them? Well, then on the flip side, if you decide not to let that food in, again, you've got statistics on how much does the average Nigerian spend on food? What is the current rate of inflation? Who in our society, if we keep these barriers up, is going to need help making ends meet and being able to afford to feed their family if we keep food prices where they are and we don't let food in? And how do we deploy the resources of the government to help them?

Tobi:

One of the things that I'm most fascinated about is countries that were previously poor a few decades ago, who are today global giant exporters of certain technologies or goods or commodities. So how would you advise a country that is trying to develop a globally competitive export sector in general? Because the consensus in development economics is that exports help your economy, exports help you grow, create jobs, your industries are upgraded, you're able to import technology and upgrade via all that. So how would you advise countries? What policies would you advise countries to focus on that are trying to build from scratch a globally competitive export sector, especially at the firm level? Because we tend to focus on countries, but it's actual firms that are making these goods and exporting these services, you know, and there are international regulations and standards to comply with. So how would you advise countries to do that?

Dmitry:

Really big question. And obviously every country has its own local challenges. But let me try to give you like a big-picture answer. And I respect your audience to know that I'm painting with a really broad brush. So the fundamental issue is you want to build a competitive export sector. Almost certainly that requires investment because unless you are—maybe if you're like growing saffron, you don't need that much investment. But almost anything else you're going to make, you're going to grow, you're going to export, requires capital and investment in order to do.

Capital looks at opportunities, but they're also really sensitive to risk. So, the question then becomes for governments, how do you send a de-risking signal to a potential investor? An investor is looking at your country, thinking about building a factory there. What are the risks that they're thinking about? Increasingly, factories are modular and can go pretty much anywhere. It's not like it used to be where you have to build them only in certain places. Theoretically, a factory can go almost anywhere. Then the question for that investor becomes, firstly, will that factory be able to consistently get what it needs to operate?

What do factories typically need? Well, you need workers who are capable of working at a modern factory. So that means your education system has to be producing good, talented workers. Second, it needs power. So the power grid needs to be reliable. Third, it needs predictability of your trading regime. So it needs to know that that factory will be able to import the parts and the components it needs from abroad reliably and be able to export reliably. Fourth, it needs to know that the infrastructure is there for it to be able to get its stuff in and out of the country. Fifth, it needs to know that your legal and regulatory regime is robust and predictable and that they won't run into legal challenges.

Now, that's really big picture. There are ways that individual governments have been phenomenally successful at ticking all of those boxes in microcosm ways. One concept that's really taking off all over the world is creating special economic zones. So you designate a part of your country, literally like a couple of square kilometres, and you say, this is going to be the special economic zone, and I'm going to focus on attracting investment and production here. And then inside that zone, you create better regulatory conditions. You create better tax conditions. You then deliberately build infrastructure to that zone because you know that's where the factories are going to be. So you can save on rather than trying to sort of do stuff everywhere, you just build like a really good railroad just to that zone.

When you think about the regulatory compliance challenges that a lot of businesses, especially in the developing world, are worried about, what they're actually worried about is the countries we want to sell to are going to increasingly create new regulations on how green stuff has to be, how carbon neutral stuff has to be, how slave labor-free it has to be, all of these kind of new standards and rules. The challenge for most developing countries isn't in meeting those regulations. It's in proving that you've met them because it's not enough to be carbon neutral. The customs official at the port of Rotterdam has to accept that you're carbon neutral.

And one thing that special economic zones allow you to do is that you then set up the trust to say a laboratory that tests your meat products for all of the things that your buyers are worried about, you set it up in one place. And because it's servicing the entire special economic zone with lots of businesses inside it, that makes commercial sense rather than trying to build one all around the country. So one way that you can think about this is by saying, OK, it's going to take too long to raise the entire country up to the level where it ticks all six of those boxes for potential investors. But we can start building individual areas that tick all of those boxes and use those to lift the rest of the country up.

Tobi:

I love the answer so much, especially the latter part. And speaking on regulatory standards and the like, a couple of years ago, and this was after years of debate, African countries finally signed up to what they call the Africa Free Continental Trade Agreement. I'm not sure if you're aware of that. So it has faced difficulties. So I would say it hasn't lived up to its promise. And part of the challenge is that it has been really difficult to scale up or harmonise the regulatory and the standardisation, that is, both legal and logistical and all the other things has been really, really challenging to replicate that across all the signatory countries.

But as we saw with Europe, that in itself can then become a challenge, you know, because you can have farmers in England angry that Brussels is making the rules, or people in France complaining that German goods are unfairly competitive because Germany suppresses industrial wages, or you have Greeks complaining that their tourism sectors cannot compete with Turkey because the euro is overvalued. So my point is, what are the benefits and risks of single market type of trade agreements, and how can you make best use of them, and how can you like, you know, slam on the brakes so that it doesn't break stuff domestically?

Dmitry:

So the dream of the AfCFTA is pooling all of the unique strengths of different African countries together to make a much more competitive whole. If you think about the strength of the US economy, one of the things that makes the US so economically powerful is that you can combine and build something across five different US states. And then you get lower wages because you're manufacturing it outside of Detroit, but you get to bring in capital from New York. You get to bring in design from California. You get to bring in raw materials from the Midwest. And you can do all of that because there are no internal borders to cross within the US. You just load up your trucks with the materials and you drive them across and it's all seamless. And then it goes to a port and leaves, right?

That's kind of the advantage. And that makes the US a lot more economically powerful than the 50 individual states would be on their own. And that's kind of the dream of the AFCFTA too, right? This idea that you'll be able to combine stuff that was made in Nairobi and then sent to Nigeria for further processing and then maybe shipped out of the infrastructure in the ports in South Africa, right? And at the moment, that is a huge, huge bureaucratic challenge. The WTO once screened a documentary where a television crew basically followed a truck driver driving a shipment of flowers from Central Africa-West and eventually to Europe and just photographed all of the paperwork that driver needed to cross each of the individual internal African borders. And it ended up almost being a second truck worth of paper because every single border required a different version of the form that he needed to carry. Because every country had its own export and import declaration, and every country had its own plant health declaration.

All of that makes it much, much harder to manufacture Africa-wide and build a competitive product. That's the advantage. Obviously, there's some benefits to local consumers as well, bringing down prices. The disadvantage is the inability to kind of compete with other African countries on your regulatory regime. Everything becomes a lot slower and more rigid because if you have to design a new regulation, but in order for it to come up, be real, you have to agree it with every other African country in the context of the AfCFTA, you can't be agile and dynamic anymore. Nigeria can't go, I am going to attract more investment than Uganda by having a looser regulatory regime around something. So you lose that ability to compete internally, which can be good and bad.

And as you say, it does tend to generate its own political antagonism, because what you were describing in what all politicians in Europe talk about is the fact that anything bad that happens is the fault of Brussels. Anything good that happens is them. So the system like that builds up its own opposition because it creates the incentive to blame all of the problems on the AfCFTA while claiming all of the good things that happen for yourself. And over time, that builds up resentment and political opposition to the project.

Tobi:

Recently, I was reading in the news something about the Director General of the WTO warning that we must not return to the protectionist policies of the past. I mean, the whole leadership of the WTO, in my opinion, can sometimes cut a hapless figure. Because here you are, sometimes it seems like the wheels are really falling off global trade, and you have the premier institution of global trade basically toothless to do anything about it. But again, when you then talk to countries or you hear politicians from individual countries speak, you turn around and blame the WTO, the inability to enforce certain rules, which then creates this unfairly competitive environment, you know, maybe some accusations that have been levied against China, for example, the China shock.

So my question to you would be, what are your suggestions on how to fix WTO, or do we need an entirely new framework for the governance of global trade?

Dmitry:

So my best advice is to think about what the WTO is set up to do versus what it's not set up to do. I think your diagnosis is 100% right. You're seeing a shift towards other priorities away from just liberalising trade. You see major players doing things like the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, the US's IRA, their big kind of investment, sort of, green energy transition bill that has a lot of subsidies. So you have all of these really, really big things that governments are doing. And expecting the WTO to stop them is crazy. If the European Parliament has just passed the biggest climate deal it's ever going to do, it's not going to reverse it just because someone in Geneva complains about it or because someone takes a dispute with the WTO. So the wrong way to think about the WTO is in preventing all of this. The WTO has to explain what are the dangers and what are the trade-offs, and that's important. But the WTO, I think, also has a really significant role to play in shaping the implementation.

So let me give you like a really concrete example. The way that the EU's carbon border adjustment mechanism is going to be implemented or is implemented is incredibly complicated and has lots of different potential kind of externalities that might be hurting, for example, African firms in a way that the EU never intended. The WTO is actually a really good place for African countries to come and say, hey, EU, the specific way you're doing the CBAM is hurting my companies in this specific way, and we have an idea for how you could fix it. Not by reversing CBAM, but by changing a little bit the way it works. It could be just something as simple as the verification requirements, the forms, the procedures.

And the WTO, because of the way it's set up, because there's procedures, there's committees, there's experts, there's a process to follow, is a fantastic place for us not to prevent deterioration of the trading order and other priorities being pursued, but to shape them in a positive way, to mitigate unintended consequences and kind of add some oil to the machinery of whatever the global trading system is turning into.

Tobi:

So my final question to you, Dmitry, is this, and again, this is a bit of a tradition on the podcast. What is the one idea, just one, that you would like to see spread everywhere, that you would like people to be excited about, that you would like to be more influential? Just one idea. It can be your idea. It can be borrowed. It can be from any source. What is that one idea?

Dmitry:

I think one of the coolest programs I have ever seen is working visas for young people. A lot of rich countries have this between themselves. And what they say is basically if you are under sometimes 35, sometimes 30, you can come over and work in our country for a year or two years. And it's not immigration. You come over, you work. And it is such an amazing way of bringing like the world together, bringing new cultures into other cultures. The people come back with incredible experiences. You know, they come back and they start businesses back home. They bring ideas. And it's so amazingly powerful for spreading ideas, spreading cultures, spreading conversations. It's like stimulating economies, but without brain draining poorer countries. One idea I would love to spread is just the idea of letting young people all over the world spend some time in a hassle-free kind of visa manner, working wherever they want to work, doing the jobs that they want to do, just so that we have a world where more people have experienced what it's really like to live in another culture, and more people have the experience of working with entrepreneurial, exciting young people from all over the world, rather than just their backyard. So that is one idea I would love to see spread, love to see take off. And I think it would genuinely make the world a more pleasant place to be alive in.

Tobi:

Yeah, yeah. And we will do our best to help you spread that idea. My guest today has been Dmitry Grozoubinski. You should check out his wonderful book, Why Politicians Lie About Trade and What to Do About It. I want to thank Dmitry for coming to the show. It's been fascinating talking to you.

Dmitry:

Thanks so much, Tobi.

This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe

Manuel Hinds shared his experience reforming El Salvador's economy post-civil war, highlighting the importance of stabilising the fiscal situation, reducing tariffs, and privatising inefficient public companies to introduce competition. He emphasised the necessity of cutting the central bank's direct financing to the government to curb inflation. He suggested that investing in human capital and education is crucial for long-term economic growth. Hinds also discussed the need for practical and disciplined policy implementation, cautioning against reliance on populist promises and advocating for a pragmatic, reality-based approach to economic management.

Manuel Hinds has served as minister of the economy (in 1979) and of finance (in 1995-1999) in El Salvador, as division chief at the World Bank (in the 1980s and early 1990s), working with more than thirty countries, and as the Whitney H. Shepardson fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (in 2004-2005).

Transcript

Tobi:

Let me get a little background into your period during the reform in El Salvador. I know you spearheaded the reform of the economy, the currency regime, and a lot of things. What was the situation like when you came into the picture? What were the problems, and how did you approach it, especially on the political economy side, you know, getting the buy-in of the elites or entrenched interests who might be opposed to the reforms?

Manuel:

El Salvador, when I came into the picture, I came into the picture in two stages. First, I was working with the World Bank, and then I went back to El Salvador and started as a consultant to the board of directors of the Central Bank. It was just one meeting a week, and that was it. Later, I came in as the Minister of Finance.

The situation was this: El Salvador had been in a civil war. We are a small country, 6 million inhabitants, but the civil war was very bloody. We had 80,000 deaths and the country was, for 10 years, in this terrible division. But then, you know, the people became tired of the war and all the population made it clear that they wanted peace. And then with the help of several friendly countries and the United Nations, we had a peace accord in which there was no winner in the war; the winner was the people. We reformed the constitution and we had free elections. And then, the country started on the right foot, i’d say, because everybody in the different political parties were willing to go the extra mile so that things could be done very well.

In El Salvador, the period of the president is five years. I came in the second, after the peace accords. The peace accords were in 1992 and I came to the government in 1995, January 1995. El Salvador was very similar to many Latin American countries, and actually many African countries as well. We had a lot of protection. The protective tariffs went up to 100 and something. We had Central American common market, but that was a very small market still. And also we had a problem with the pensions. We were accumulating a lot of liabilities for the government without enough income. And also we had very ineffective public companies.

So when I came in, the president invited me to give him a presentation of what I thought we should do. And when I made the presentation, he said, "Well, I'm prepared to do this, but if you are the minister of finance." So he put me in a corner, you know, and then I said, OK, I'm going to do it.

And then we started with number one: we had to stabilise the country, which meant that we have to stabilise fiscally the country because we have been spending a lot, particularly, but not only, in the war, the war effort. So when I came in, I had the advantage that we could reduce substantially expenditures just by reducing the army. So the first one was we were up because the inflation at the time was something like 28%. It was between 20 and 30%. It had started to go down in the first period after the war. So when I came in, inflation was probably 20 to 25%.

Also we had very high import tariffs. We had the problem of the pensions. And also this was a time when the communications were starting to have a revolution. This was 1994. So you could already see that this new technological revolution was really connected with communications. And we still didn't have internet. We still didn't have good communications. So we had to do something about it. And also we had very expensive electricity. So I made proposals for each of these things.

In the case of inflation, the problem that we had was that the government had very high deficits and then the central bank would finance them. Because the inflation rate was high, then the interest rates were extremely high. The rates of interest were something on the order of 20 to 25 percent. Since the people didn't trust the currency, it was almost impossible to get mortgages from the banking system and long-term credit for investment. So the government had to spend a lot on subsidies and providing money so that the banks use that money to finance long-term.

When I came in, I was telling you that the inflation was coming down and two years after I was there, inflation was 2%. 2 or 3 percent. So inflation was not the problem, but the rate of interest remained very high, 20 percent. The problem was that people said, "Well, these people, they are not going to devalue the currency, but the next government may devalue the currency because this was what many people in Latin America were doing at the time." So I propose to dollarise, I propose to reduce the tariffs, the import tariffs, also the reform of the pensions, which rather than having a pay-as-you-go, we will have individual accounts and people will save for their own pension in an account under their name. And also the privatization of electricity and communications, the telephone company. But we propose to privatize under competition. You are very young, probably, you never lived in that time when electricity and communications were natural monopolies. And everybody said, "Well, it's impossible to have competition in these sectors because the investments are too high. And if everybody invests in telephone lines, then it will be a waste."

But we said, "No, we are going to introduce competition in the market" because already there were ways in which we could have competition, even with the landlines. But also the mobile telephones were coming. So we issued a law of competition in those sectors. And we privatized these companies in two or three companies, different companies. And also we opened for anybody who could get into these businesses. Mainly in communications, very fast, we had something like 40 different companies with cellular phones. We had this system in which company A could use the lines of company B paying at all. And we did the same with electricity. So this was a success.

Also, the pension funds were created and they started saving a lot and we reduced the protection. This was the most difficult of all the things, because the companies become used to being protected and they don't want international competition. So it became a political problem, really, and we were afraid that we wouldn't be able to pass the new law through the National Assembly. And then the president told me, maybe we are doing too many things. Let's choose three or four and we concentrate on that. And of course, the reduction of protection has to be one of them. We had to increase the value of the tax because we were going to reduce protection and we were going to reduce the income of the government and we were going to need some more revenues and then we increase…and that was also a difficult thing to pass.

Then we dropped dollarisation and all the other things we finished, what we had proposed. Then dollarisation was done by the next government. The country dollarized in 2001. I was no longer the Minister of Finance, but the new president called me just to do that. So I worked with the government just to do the dollarisation with the new government. Dollarisation is not the only way in which you can stabilise or reduce interest rates, but it's a very cheap way of doing it. And it has worked very well. Many people said, if you dollarise, in the first world crisis, you will go out. Because you won't be able to have a monetary policy to survive. And then, you know, in 2008, we had the world crisis. And then in 2020, we had COVID. And actually, El Salvador fared extremely well, better than all our neighbours, because the market controls the supply of money very efficiently.

In 2008, a Marxist government came on board, and they didn't like the dollar for obvious reasons. They asked the IMF to make an assessment of dollarisation. And the IMF made the assessment and they said, well, El Salvador has reduced a dead weight in the economy, which is the currency risk. If you eliminate the currency risk, you can win easily 1% of GDP. So it's a very cheap way of doing it and you reduce the working load on the government because El Salvador doesn't need to worry about the exchange rate or about inflation. It comes automatically, the market does it, so it's very good.

I remember I mentioned this in my plan, but this has not been done in El Salvador. Already in that time, 1994, the world was coming into the knowledge economy. It wasn’t really clear, but now it's crystal clear. The new economy in the world is organized around knowledge. And you can see that in everything. When I was talking about this in 1992, 93, 94, the world's most powerful companies were industrial companies. They have chimneys, they got tremendous industrial production, they produce cars or electric equipment and so on. The largest was General Motors, and they were very noisy companies. Now the largest companies in the world look like universities. It's Apple, for example. Microsoft. All these companies, they produce nothing but knowledge. That's the only thing that they produce, because Apple, they don't produce anything physical. They subcontract that. They outsource the production of the computers and other things. They only produce software, designs, and that's where the big value added is.

So like the industrial revolution, when you have a technological revolution that is very good for us the developing countries, because you can jump without having to go through all the things that you needed to be industrial. Of course it is not easy, you have to invest a lot, but rather than investing in many things, you have to invest in your own people.

When I grew up, people said to have education and health and housing is the social sectors. But before having the social problems we need to produce and we are going to produce this with companies, manufacturing cars and planes or whatever. And then when we become rich, then we are going to spend money on health, education, and housing, and really, now it’s the other way around. Because if you don't have educated people, you cannot grow. What are the countries or the regions that are growing faster in the world? Well, you have Silicon Valley. Silicon Valley, they have Stanford University right there. And also they have many other, San Jose State University, Berkeley, and so on and that feeds these companies with the inputs they need. And the input they need is people, good engineers, good scientists. If I could tell you one thing only, I can say invest in your own people. Invest in education, invest in health, because that will allow them to become more productive and then the country will become rich.

Tobi;

There's so much packed into your answer that I'll have to untangle them one by one, because I feel you are uniquely positioned to untangle some of the questions that I have. You’ve been a researcher, you've been a foreign expert with your work with the World Bank, you've been a senior cabinet member and reformer in your own country, El Salvador. So I would like to start with inflation, right? In my own observation, poor countries in the context of the macro economy stumble periodically and struggle with three crises, which for me are inflation, exchange rates, and debt.

To start with inflation, for example, in Nigeria, we also have double-digit inflation. It's 33% now, food inflation is 40%. It's causing a cost-of-living crisis in the country. And the government through the central bank is struggling to bring this under control, which we have been doing for the past eight, nine years, right? But what I want to ask you is that to the degree that you can generalise from your own direct experience and knowledge, what are the common causes of inflation in poor countries?

And I ask this because there is a lot of mischievous debates when you're trying to talk about inflation, particularly determining whether it is a monetary phenomenon or a non-monetary phenomenon. I feel like people who are addicted or amenable to government spending will tell you, "Oh, it's non-monetary and that Milton Friedman was wrong." And they paint the other side as neoliberal, orthodoxy, textbook economics. So I would like you to help me tease out what are the nuances in the inflation phenomenon in low-income countries.

Manuel;

Yes, well, we can go from the more general to the particular, maybe. Because the problem that you mentioned is the basis of underdevelopment and this is something that Africa shares with Latin America. Do you remember this guy called Sisyphus? Sisyphus was this guy who did something that the gods didn't like, and then they condemned him to push a boulder up a hill. And when he reached the top of the hill, the boulder would come down to the valley again, and then he had to go back and push it back up. And if you look in Latin America and also in Asia, from time to time, you had a good government who come here and stabilise the economy, stabilise the country, the interest rates go down and then you think now we are going in the real path of progress. And then suddenly there is a new populist that comes in and starts promising lots of things to the people. And then they borrow money to spend a lot in the government in things that are not really developmental. And then after a few years, the country is again in the same situation.

Tobi;

Precisely.

Manuel;

In Latin America, you could see the worst case, this happens all over Latin America. But the most dramatic case is Argentina. Argentina in the early 20th century was the seventh richest country in the world. They were very, very, very rich. Because of this thing that they started having high inflation because of populism. You know, people coming, the politicians come and they promise things and get elected, and then they waste the money, and then you start having problems of the problem that you have in Nigeria. Nigeria, compared with Argentina, is moderate. The inflation rate in Nigeria is 40[%], you told me. In Argentina today, it's 300[%].

Tobi;

Yeah. True.

Manuel;

And then because of these things, because of this continuous… this Sisyphus thing, they stabilise, then they destabilise and so on. Argentina now is number 66. Rather than being seventh, now it's the 66th. Because they have spent a century just trying to stabilise the economy.

I think that at the very end, if you analyse the problem, people have the governments they deserve. If they elect populist people, then you have destabilisation. You have there [in Nigeria] a problem of education, exactly like in Latin America, but it is a certain kind of education for that problem. The education is the self-assurance that you can do it without needing a miracle and then “we are going to work hard for one generation. The developed countries, they work for one generation or two generations and we are going to really build a new country.” And the other one is, “no, there is this guy who says he is going to solve all the problems and that this will make us rich.” You know that Latin America has 200 years of independence, 200 years. And in 200 years, we are back in the same position, relative position to Europe that we had in the early 19th century. And Argentina went from rich to poor and Latin America remained poor.

This is an education in common sense, okay? People have to come to the realization that miracles do not happen. That even when they tell you, “well, there is the Japanese miracle,” but that's because the Japanese had educated the population a lot before. And the same in Korea. So what we have to do is we have to invest in the people like Singapore. Singapore was much poorer than Nigeria. It was much poorer than El Salvador also. But they invested in education, in common sense, in saying, OK, we are going to work and then we will become rich. And we are not going to expect a miracle, because expecting miracles, you see what has happened. We are in the same position as 200 years ago.

The question is, why is [it] that countries create so much money? They create so much money because they want to spend, they want to go into very big fiscal deficits and to pay for them, they print money. - MH

So that's the first problem that you mentioned. And that is the basic problem, Tobi, I think that if you solve that one, then you will start seeing solutions for the other things. Because people themselves will find the solutions to the other problems. The other problem is, is inflation a monetary problem or is it a fiscal problem? I think it all depends on what is the angle that you are looking at. I think that inflation is definitely a monetary problem. The question is, why is [it] that countries create so much money? They create so much money because they want to spend, they want to go into very big fiscal deficits and to pay for them, they print money.

In El Salvador, many people believe that we reduce inflation because we dollarised. And that's not true. Inflation came down because we forbade the central bank to finance anybody. A new law for the central bank said the central bank cannot lend to the government ever. Period. And it cannot lend to the banks except in the case of financial crisis. Only in those circumstances. And then the inflation went down, the inflation went down from 20 something, almost 30 percent to 2 percent within three years or something like that (three or four years). But of course, you need the discipline to really not lend into the government. So I was the minister of finance and I could not borrow money from the central bank. So the only possibility I had to do that was to reduce the deficit and also borrow money abroad. And of course, when you borrow money abroad, you are subject to a certain discipline, you know, because you have to convince other people. When you want to finance the government just with the central bank, then the minister of finance just takes the phone and calls the president of the central bank and [says] sell me so much billion. But when you have to go to the international markets or to the World Bank, or to the African Development Bank, you have to justify why you need the money, how you are going to pay, and so on. That introduces discipline to the government. So I think it's very important to separate the monetary and the fiscal, so that you cannot use the authority of the government to force the central bank to give you money. And you can attain that in two ways. One is to have a strong law and applying the law. Or you just outsource the supply of money to the government of the United States, to the Federal Reserve, in the case of dollarisation. Or you could adopt the Euro. But the point is, cut that link. It's like a drug addict. The solution is not to give them drugs, period. That’s it!

Tobi;

That's so deep and apt because, again, with the Nigeria example, we had eight years of unrestricted monetary finance by the central bank, more or less just printing money and borrowing the government to the extent that the existing law, which places a cap on how much monetary financing can be done, was broken several times. Which leads me to my next question to you is that, so you can pass a law, but how does the subject of central bank independence and the politics of it play in here? Because laws can be broken if the political leadership is highly motivated to do so.

Manuel;

The thing is, I am 78 years old. I have worked as an economist for, I don't know, 50 years. And I can tell you, if there is one lesson, there is no perfect system. There is no automatic system. It's people. If you buy a car, and it could be maybe a Ford, you buy a Ford, which is not very expensive, a small Ford. And then you give maintenance to this car and you take care of it, you don't drive it in dangerous circumstances and so on. That car could last for decades. But you can buy a Rolls Royce, and if you go and you crash it ten times, you drive it on the beach and then you go into the ocean with it and the saline water comes in and so on. You will destroy the Rolls-Royce. And it is not because the Rolls-Royce is a bad car, it's because you are abusing the car. And that is what happens. You can have a good central bank and a good government in which you establish a rule, as we had in El Salvador. We had a law saying the government cannot lend money to the government. And we met that, you know. We met that condition. It would never again happen. We were one of the worst risks in Latin America, even if we never defaulted. El Salvador is one of the few developing countries which has never defaulted. But we had a very bad risk ranking. Five years after the war, we became investment-grade. So we could borrow at very low interest rates and so on because we were meeting the conditions we ourselves had established and people respected us. But now, 30 years later, inflation is very low because we are dollarised and the rates of interest for the private sector are very low. But for the government it's 16% because they have been borrowing like crazy in the international markets. And it is because the new government, it's the Sisyphus story, they found that the country had a very good possibility of borrowing money and they borrow and borrow and borrow and they are compromising the stability of the country.

So that's why we go full circle. If we vote into power a populist government which will spend money like crazy, then we will go back. There's no other way. So I think that what you do, for example, is a very good thing. You have your podcast, you are instructing the people so that they can learn. In Latin America, we have a literary style called magic realism. You are familiar with that or not?

Tobi;

Yes.

Manuel;

Yes, magic realism. And then we have been infected with magic realism in economics, which is that you think that you can float in the air, that you can levitate and so on. People have to understand you cannot levitate, you cannot borrow because you will have to pay for this money.

But now I don't know, Tobi, what is happening in the world, because look at the United States, uh?

Tobi;

Yeah, it’s crazy.

Manuel;

They are going down the drain. The same as Nigeria, the same as El Salvador. It's incredible. It's really incredible. I think that at some moment we have to hit rock bottom and say, no, no, no. We have to start over and start seriously and so on.

Tobi;

I hope so.

Let me talk to you a bit about exchange rates. Another thing that poorer countries or low-income countries or what we call developing countries struggle with is this exchange rate problem. In Nigeria, for example, the source, the main source of foreign exchange, which is oil, has collapsed due to incredible corruption, lack of productivity and investment in that sector, years of neglect. The law that was supposed to reform the governance of the sector was held in the parliamentary system for almost 20 years, and the version that got eventually passed was an inefficient one, evidently.

Now, poor countries run into this exchange rate crisis when they run out of dollars, basically, and what you hear is that, oh, you need to diversify your economy in order to bring in more dollars, you need to export more because then you start rationing, the system becomes corrupt, you introduce a peg, suddenly the black market in currency becomes thriving. What are the common sensical ways to manage currency risks? I would emphasise that besides dollarisation, I'm a big fan of the dollarisation idea, but it's just that, for example, in Nigeria, it will be almost like a non-starter. For example, we have a law, I know laws can be changed, but the constitution of Nigeria bans any other currency being used for transactions besides the Naira. Even though that is the law, but in reality, people do transactions in dollars and different currencies all the time because the local currency itself can be so volatile and unreliable as a store of value. So besides dollarisation, how can poor countries manage currency risks? Like in the mood of this conversation, what are the common sense insights that we are missing?

Manuel;

You can do what we did, because we dollarised after stabilising the country. When the inflation was already 2%, then we dollarised. One thing was not the consequence of the other. It was that we dollarised to reduce the interest rates, to reduce the risk. But then a new government came into power when the war was still going. And then with an economy in war, the central bank had done exactly the same things that you are talking [about]. They control the exchange rate. They had strict exchange controls. If you were an exporter, you had to deliver all the dollars to the central bank. If you were an importer, you needed a special license to import. Then there was this black market, and there was incredible corruption. Everything that you described to me, that was happening in El Salvador. So this government, the first thing they did was to say, "We are eliminating all the exchange rate controls." Flatly. That if you want dollars, buy dollars. If you want to take your dollars out of the country, take them out of the country. We are not going to intervene. This goes to the private sector. And then you know what happened? Before that, the money was leaving the country. Whenever you had an opportunity, you took the money out. When the government said, "You want to take it? Take it out." And then money started coming in.

Tobi, it is like I invite you to two parties. In one party, you go there and you can leave whenever you want. And in that one, you can bring your own whiskey. And in the other one, you can come in, but you cannot leave. Once you enter into the party, you cannot leave the party. Which of the two will you go to? If you tell the people you cannot take your money out, people will not bring their money in. We proved that in El Salvador. And there was a war, Tobi. So the problem of the scarcity of dollars stopped just by saying, "If you want to bring dollars, bring them. If you want to take them out, take them out." And then, in net terms, the dollars started coming in. Because people say, "If I'm going to invest, I will try, I will bring dollars. And if I want to take the money out, I can take the money out. And if I want to have interest rates paid abroad or whatever, I will be able to do that." So the first thing, I would liberate the market. And the second one is the other rule I gave you, because we reduce inflation without dollarisation. What we did was we forbade the central bank to lend money to the government. Period. And we complied with the law. That was it.

Because, for example, Argentina has done things like this, but they don't comply with the law. It's the same as not having a law. It is worse. It is actually worse because then you are destroying the rule of law. So it's very simple. For me, the political economy of development is very complex, it's very interesting. It has to do with education. It has to do with opening ways to the world but keeping the economy stable with the inflation rate low and without problems getting dollars is very simple. You don't need an economist for that. Anybody can do it. You call a driver and say, "The only thing that you are going to do is not allowing the central bank to lend money to the government." Period. And then if he does that, he could be a barber, he could be a dancer or whatever, and he will stabilise the country.

Tobi;

Still about reforms, and it goes back to your first answer, which is that as a policymaker, you have to make some very hard decisions, some tough decisions. Reform packages have to be sequenced and well coordinated. So how do you make the trade-offs if you are trying to stabilize a country and get it out of an economic crisis and facing all these problems like you did in El Salvador, a currency crisis, high interest rates, high inflation, high fiscal deficits. What are the quick wins, the first two, three things that you can do?

Manuel;

That's a good question because you say, what are the first ones? Because it's a process. What I would advise, go for the low-hanging fruit, the things that are easier to do. Because if you succeed in doing that, then people will trust you and then you will be able to do the more difficult ones. So in that sense, I think that the simplest thing, simplest, I'm not saying easiest, will be to stabilise the economy. Because it's a simple thing to do. But then look at what is happening in Argentina. You have to do it in a way that you don't destroy the country while stabilising the economy. Because if you just stop printing money or just reduce the fiscal deficit to zero and then it happens that you cut education expenses or you cut the money for the hospitals, as it is happening in Argentina, then you are killing yourself. You are taking a medicine that will kill you in the long run. So what you have to do, I think, is to structure a very good plan so that you can reduce printing money but you don't have to cut all the expenditures immediately. You can go down in expenditures choosing not the most important things. But also you mentioned corruption, there is a lot of money that goes with corruption. So give yourself time, let's say, two or three years to reduce the expenditures in a way that will not reduce the rate of growth of the GDP by reducing corruption, by improving the efficiency of government expenditures. I'm sure that you can probably cut your budget by 50% without really affecting the growth of the country because the resources are being wasted, because there is corruption, and these kinds of things. But you cannot do that in one go because you have to understand how the government is working and then you reduce the waste. So you need some financing during those two or three years and then borrow. Borrow abroad. Borrow abroad, not inside the country. Do not create currency. And then you are going to get money to do that if you present a very good plan. If you show that you have done your homework and then you have calculated how you are going to reduce the expenditures and so on, then you can do it. And I think that is the first thing. Also, you can easily liberalise the exchange rate and the foreign exchange markets. You say, "Well, the central bank is not going to intervene." The price of the currency will be set by the market and you can take the money out if you want. Do it. The currency will not go out. It will come in. You will see.

Tobi;

You talked about having a good plan and one that reflects having done your homework. Which then brings me to my next question. Earlier, you talked about investing in people and human capital generally. And sometimes I do wonder about the human capital in government itself, even at the most senior level. So I would ask you, what are the qualities, intellectual and psychological qualities, that make a good policymaker?

Manuel;

You know, I could bet, Tobi, that you have good people in Nigeria.

Tobi;

Of course.

Manuel;

The thing is how you are going to identify them and get them. But I agree with you that it is fundamental to bring the best people to work in the government, best people in terms of education, in terms of common sense, and in terms of being honest, not corrupt. I'm sure, because for all the waste and for everything that happens, I'm sure that you have very good engineers, oil engineers. You have very good... it's a big country. You must have good people and then bring those people to the government because you don't need to change everybody. You have to change the key people, the people who are going to manage the government, the big policies and so on. And then they will introduce discipline in their own ministries and state-owned companies and so on. You don’t have to change everybody. I'm sure there are many people there who are very good engineers, but they are not producing because the bosses are corrupt or something like that. People have to understand that you cannot arrange all this in one go. The important thing is to start growing consistently, like Singapore.

Tobi;

There's so much I would have loved to talk to you [about], but maybe sometimes we'll find some time particularly on sovereignty and globalisation and your excellent book with Benn Steil. But before I let you go, a couple of quickfire questions. Economics, the field of economics, is getting a bad rap everywhere these days. What has your own experience as an economist, especially in areas of policymaking and the influence of economics on policy generally, what has your own experience been? What are the good and the bad of the influence of economics and policy? And also relatedly, did your earlier education and career as an industrial engineer make you a better economist in any way?

Manuel;

Yes, well, of course, economic theory is very important. It's basic. But the most important thing is to be pragmatic. I am an economist and I am an industrial engineer. Engineering puts you in close touch with reality. If you are going to be a good economist, I think in one way or another, it could be engineering, it could be some other thing, but you have to keep yourself close to reality. That's number one. And number two, never believe that you know everything. Because, for example, I worked with the Soviet Union. I remember many people from the West were coming to the Soviet Union to give advice. And before they left Washington, they knew what they were going to tell the Russians, before knowing Russia. I always found that absurd. You have to approach your work with humility, you know, because normally, what I have found is people themselves give you the solutions. If you know how to ask questions, if you explain these things, if you work with them, then you will find solutions that are workable. You don't want to have economists that come here from any other country to apply the solutions they have applied over there, just like that. Because every government, every country has a difference. You have your own nature, the way things work. And then there are things that you do better than your neighbours also. So if you really know a country, you can produce much better solutions.

Tobi;

Final question. And again, this is a bit of a tradition on the podcast. What's the one idea that you would like to see spread everywhere? It may be your idea. It may be from someone else. It may be from something you've read. But what is that one idea that you would like to see spread everywhere, have a lot of influence, and get people excited?

Manuel;

The best thing that you can do is invest in your own people. Invest in their education, their health, because human capital is not the product of growth. Growth is the product of human capital. The thing that you have to do is educate your people.

Tobi;

Thank you very much, Manuel.

Manuel;

It's been a pleasure.

This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe

Tiago Santos joins Tobi on this episode of the podcast to discuss Parliamentarianism. Tiago believes that if African countries had adopted parliamentary systems during their democratization wave, they would have likely seen better development outcomes, citing the success of Botswana and the economic growth seen in parliamentary countries. He also highlights four main flaws in presidential systems according to political scientist Juan Linz: lack of clarity in authority, rigidity, winner-takes-all nature, and personalism. These issues often lead to ineffective governance, coups, and excessive polarization, which hinder development and political stability. Tiago further argues that better governance structures, like those provided by parliamentary systems, are crucial for economic development. He emphasizes that parliamentary systems lead to greater political stability and more inclusive decision-making, essential for fostering long-term growth and escaping the "Malthusian Trap."

Tiago Ribeiro dos Santos has been a Brazilian career diplomat since 2007. He has a law degree from Pontifícia Universidade Católica in Rio de Janeiro, a professional degree from Instituto Rio Branco (Brazil’s national diplomatic academy), and a master’s degree from the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy. He is the author of the excellent book Why Not Parliamentarianism.

None of the opinions in the interview reflect the views of any institution he has been associated with - and you can find the full transcript of the conversation below.

Transcript

Tobi;

You're, I would say, a strong advocate of parliamentarianism. I wouldn't call myself a strong advocate, but I'm fairly biased towards your point of view and became even more convinced when I read your book. Particularly in Africa, a couple of countries went through long periods of military dictatorship. And around 20, 25 years ago, there came another wave of widespread democratisation on the continent. What happened was, maybe due to the influence of American foreign policy or some other global forces, a lot of these countries opted for the American-style presidential system. And in my own observation, maybe I'm wrong empirically, a lot of these countries, my country, Nigeria included, struggled with the workings of this presidential system, such that there had been constant agitation for a kind of return to the parliamentary system that Nigeria had immediately after independence. My question to you then is that, are you willing to say or assert that perhaps if a bunch of these countries around 20, 25 years ago had opted for parliamentary system, would they have done better development-wise?

Tiago;

I don't think anybody can say for sure, but I'm convinced that they would probably, very likely, had done better. With respect to Africa, I think, yes, there is a strong influence from the American model because it's obviously a very successful country. So it's very easy to model after them. But I think that there is something else also in the choice of presidentialism by African countries. I've read a paper by James Robinson and Ragnar Torvik that argues that there is a tendency for endogenous presidentialism, which is that exactly because in presidentialism the leader has more chances to exert their powers without much resistance. So back in the 60s, a bunch of countries in Africa, I think most of them, had a parliamentary constitution, not only Nigeria, but many other countries had a parliamentary constitution and basically all of them switched to presidentialism at some point. If you look at Botswana, the economic performance that they had since the 1960s is very impressive. I wish Brazil had the rate of growth that Botswana has been experiencing consistently. So looking at the countries in Africa that have adopted parliamentary constitution, I think that it would be the case, yes, that had these countries adopted a parliamentary constitution back when they democratised again, they would probably have done better.

Tobi;

I mean, Nigeria is so loud. that the word restructuring, which is a shorthand for reconstituting the political system, is so common in political parlance and, you know, we kept shouting restructuring, restructuring, and it never really comes to pass.

But given the ubiquity and the allure of presidentialism, at what point, particularly historically, did you become convinced enough to write this book about the superiority of parliamentary systems?

Tiago;

It wasn't something that particularly interested me during the first 40 years of my life, before writing the book. So I wrote a book on the economic effects of the Brazilian Constitution. So the idea was to make this research and check every article of the Constitution, what economic effects we could expect to have in Brazil with my then boss, Otaviano Canuto, in the Brazilian constituency in the Board of Directors of the World Bank. And one of the things that I started researching on was exactly the difference between presidentialism and parliamentarianism. And I started to find some striking results. This was too big to go into the article, so we don't mention it in the article that we published. We mentioned other aspects of the Brazilian constitution, but then I couldn't stop researching this. And I was always also checking myself, trying to push my good economist friends. I was trying to also get comments from many people that have thought about this problem very well and to check that I wasn't thinking something that was completely out of base. And I was increasingly convinced because of the feedback that I got, the continuation of my research, it was then when I combined all the elements that I think are in favour of parliamentarianism that if we just look at countries that are parliamentary or countries that are presidential, you see that parliamentary countries perform better in just about any indicator.

If you look at the history, if you look at the informal theory, if you look at formal theory from economics, if you look at the evidence that people try to do with studies that are not just correlational, but that introduced good statistical controls for things, If you look at complementary evidence from companies - so companies can adopt a parliamentary model, which is having a board of directors and this board of directors can control the CEO. And no company elects a CEO by the shareholders directly. And this CEO will have a checks and balances relationship with the board of directors. This figure doesn't exist. And I think the market is in a very good position to choose the best arrangement. And finally, the council management system in the U.S. that I learned when I was doing this research is a system that is very similar to parliamentarianism. And cities that adopt the council management system perform much better than cities that adopt a strong mayor system, which is similar to the presidential system.

Tobi;

So what are the key flaws that you mention in the book? Perhaps there's more now since you wrote the book. What are the key flaws in presidentialism that you think a parliamentary system addresses effectively?

Tiago;

We were discussing before you started recording. I don't try to be original in my book. I try only to convey the knowledge that's already there. And in this, the most influential thinker is by far Juan Linz, a political scientist. And I think that he has the best frame for this. And he talks about four main flaws in presidentialism that parliamentarians doesn't suffer from. So these flaws are in presidential countries, you don't have a clarity of where the authority lies. So what happens in the end is if you like the policy that Congress is trying to push, then you will stand on the side of Congress and if you like the policy that the president is trying to push, then you will stand on the side of the president. And there will be lots of undermining of initiatives by both the Congress and the president. They won't agree on many things and it will be difficult to have a coherent proposal. Daniel Diermeier has an article on this, on how parliamentary systems are more cohesive.

So the second thing I think is a big problem, also from Juan Linz, is the rigidity. So if a country is presidential and the president is working badly, there's nothing we can do. We just have to wait for the mandate to end. And if this is bad enough, if some sectors of society perceive this to be bad enough, you have often coups that derive from a perception that there's no way that the president can stay in place. And then a majority of the powerful actors in a society will install a coup. So that's why the prominence to coups in presidentialism is so much greater than in parliamentarianism.

Then you have a winner-take-all situation. So if you win the presidency, you have so much power that you will be able to implement so many things and you have almost complete control over so much of government. Whereas if you are the losing side of a presidential election, then you are out of government completely. So there's too much at stake. And this incentivises the kind of polarisation that we see in many presidential countries, a type of politics that is very visceral, that is very combative. That's not the kind of politics that we would hope for. And lastly, it's personalism. The presidential system focuses way too much on the figure of one person instead of different institutions in society, different sectors and different voices. And it's often the case that in many presidential countries, people don't love the candidate that they see. They would never support that candidate if not for the reason that they hate the other candidate that will have so much power. And then they try to minimize the flaws that they would never accept in a normal situation on the candidate they support. And this leads to a race to the bottom sometimes. So the personalism is a disastrous characteristic of presidentialism, too. So I think the Linz framework is still the best description.

Tobi;

Yeah. Two common pushbacks that I get when I try to discuss parliamentarian systems whether amongst friends and other people so i want you to help me respond to them is that first is the issue of capture of the political system. So most presidential system have what we call term limits. In Nigeria, in the U.S., and some other places, you say, oh, a president can only serve two fixed terms concurrently. And after that, it becomes unconstitutional. Even though some countries, their president have successfully overturned constitutional time limits to become de facto dictators. But, I mean, let's leave those aside. Whereas in parliamentary system, it's possible to have the same party, the same ruling coalition in government sometimes for decades, right? So what is the nuance between something like presidential term limits in the presidential system and the prospect of having the same, basically, the same government in power for decades? How do those two systems compare in that regard?

And the second pushback I get is stability. The recent case that comes to mind is the Netherlands, for example. They had an election recently where a controversial candidate and party basically won the election. But at the end of the day, it became impossible to form a government, which is what you don't get in a presidential system. The system is such that there is the emergence of a clear winner who then forms a government and then proceeds to govern. Whereas in some parliamentary systems, in some cases, you can have this persistent chaos for a while, like in the UK now where they've had at least three prime ministers in about six years. So those two push back, how do you respond?

Tiago;

With respect to the first, I think there's a strong consensus in political science that term limits actually are a negative quality for an institutional system, because if you recall in the book, I discuss a model by Persson and Tabellini, two economists that studied this question. And they are the only model that I know of. For the only model that thinks that presidentialism is superior to parliamentarianism, one of the most important characteristics is that there are no term limits. Because the idea is that if there are term limits, then a president will try to grab everything that he can before he loses power. Or try to stay in power forever by demolishing the democracy completely. Because he knows that he will never get a chance to be in power once again.

Whereas in the parliamentary system, there is no ending to what he can do. He can stay in Congress, in Parliament, for as long as the people want him there or her there. So what I would say is that even though there are some countries where you see that happening, that some parties stay in power for decades, they are pretty rare. It's not a very common situation in parliamentarianism. And one thing that I stress in the book is that you cannot expect there to be a guarantee that it will be better, you just have to have an expectation that it will be better. So you have Japan, you have Botswana, they are countries that have parties that stay in power for long. You see that even though these parties stayed in power for long, there was not that much repression of the opposition. And in many cases, at some point, the opposition did win an election.

Whereas in presidentialism, you also have cases where parties have remained in power for very long, like in Mexico. So this particular problem that you point to, I don't think presidentialism solves. And the other thing is that sometimes for the opposition to gain power, they subvert completely the regime. They change the constitution. They get into power by force. So even though there was a change in power, it wasn't a desirable one. So for that, I think one of the advantages of parliamentarianism is exactly that it doesn't need to have term limits because any presidential country will have term limits, at least on the president. Because if you do not have term limits on the president, the chances that they will stay in power, be reelected indefinitely, and thereby destroying the democracy are very high.

So since it was invented, presidentialism, you have that problem. With respect to stability, I think that we need to look to what kind of stability that we want. So I think that presidentialism has an illusory stability often. Because you have the very clear legal mandate for the president and the president has a very clear legal mandate to name whoever he wants to government. And of course, one person will always be able to name a cabinet. You have the illusion that there is a functioning government. But this functioning government will be very often completely disconnected from the true forces of society that want to move in a different direction. Whereas in parliamentary governments when there is disconnect, when there is this fight, it becomes apparent and sometimes you have shuffling of cabinets, very frequent. Sometimes they are not frequent at all. You can have Angela Merkel in Germany that stayed in power for some 20 years, and then she left like nothing happened. It was a very smooth transition. And so parliamentary has this flexibility. If something is working, then they stay in power for very long. If something is not working, they don't stay in power.

And you mentioned the Netherlands. I don't know about the Dutch situation right now, but I recall that Belgium also was without a government for a while. And when we say without a government, we really mean without a cabinet. It's not that there is no government in Belgium. They're still doing all the things. There's still police, there's still courts, there's still schools. So I think that if there is not enough consensus in a society, then not having a cabinet pushing for policies might be a good thing. And if you look at the Netherlands right now, I don't think it's chaos, right? I think it works very well, as Belgium did, still worked very well, even when it didn't have a cabinet. If you look at the Netherlands is one of the most successful societies in history and is still one of the most successful societies right now. So I would never describe their situation as chaos. So what I would say is that, well, if we have to deal with situations where there's no cabinets, then fine. I'm not as bothered by that as I am by a lack of basic sanitation or a lack of economic growth or a lack of health services or a lack of safety in streets, that sort of thing, which presidential countries have much less than the Netherlands.

Tobi;

I would like to stretch that point a little bit. So perhaps it's a good thing that the Netherlands has a parliamentary system and that they are in their current equilibrium because the party that won the election and the individual vying to be prime minister is controversial, is internationally disliked and has some positions that are quite disagreeable. But it's also easy to imagine the opposite. where his party his platform his ideas and his policies might actually turn out to be excellent for the country and for the region and perhaps influential enough for the world but here you are in a system that prevents that person from getting to power. So i'm trying to gauge how earlier, many three systems respond to the good leader, bad leader argument because some would say one of the strengths of the presidential system is if you're lucky enough to get a good leader, he or she can then use all that power, all that legitimacy to then drive transformation and growth and all the good things to the maximum and transform the country within a few years.

What's your response to that?

Tiago;

First of all, I don't think countries have been lucky enough that we would still bet on that. If we look at the history of presidential systems, the evidence shows very clearly that this hope for a very good leader, it's like playing the lotto, I think. The chances are very small. And I think that even if you had a person that had all the vision and the capacity to implement very good policies, if he doesn't command enough support in his society, there will be sabotaging, there will be opposition, there will be people that have capacity to interfere with society, trying to undermine his efforts. Even with this great leader, you wouldn't have the great outcomes that one would expect. So I think the crucial thing, and I think it's central to democracy, is exactly that there is a wide consensus. The thing is that presidential elections do not create wide consensus. They create two rival candidates, two rival sides, and then at the end of the day, one of them wins. And this goes to late[r] part [of the book], which stressed the importance of consensus, the capacity to take into consideration the interests of different sectors of society at once. So this is why I still like parliamentarianism better.

Tobi;

So for the benefits of people that haven't read the book, I'll go through perhaps a few more questions that you should explicate on before I go into what actually interests me, which is how you then relate your argument on parliamentary systems to development or economic development more broadly. So one thing I also want you to clear up is you talked about corporate governance and how they are better under parliamentary system. Can you elaborate on that a bit?

Tiago; 

So corporate governance, we usually think of governments and companies as completely different walks of life, completely different situations. But in fact, they are not. So governance is not a word that came about by chance. It does come from the same principles. And when you look at how boards make decisions, they use something called parliamentary procedure. They use some books like Robert's Rules of Order, which is taken by, I think it was a colonel, it was someone in the military that was very frustrated by how meetings were being used and then he used exactly the sort of decision that was being taken in the United States Congress to take these decisions. And we see, I forgot the name of the author right now, but this book, Shareholder Democracies, he explains how the modern public company takes a lot of how it's governed from the evolution of government, particularly because there was a time that the modern company was started in England.

And there was a time when you would need to have authorisation by the government to create one of them. And then the board members would be often people from government as well. So there was this very intense relationship and this very intense exchange of methods of approaches to problems. And then they had tried many things, many approaches, boards with lots of members, boards with very few members and all sorts of ideas until they ended up with the model that is replicated in basically every public company that we have now, which is the shareholders elect a board of directors, the number may vary, and this board will choose the management of the company, particularly the CEO, which will be kind of like the prime minister, but maybe different from the UK, because in the UK, the prime minister must be from parliament. But in the Netherlands, for example, it doesn't have to. But the board elects the CEO and then they can fire the CEO at any time as well. So this is something that allows for a much more efficient handling of the affairs of the company than the situation where you would have the shareholders elect the CEO themselves. I wrote to one of these authors about this parallel, and he thought it was perfectly applicable… “And yes, yes, I completely understand what you're saying about the presidentialism.” He couldn't think that it had ever been tried by any company, the exact presidential system. One thing that was tried is the shareholders choosing some people in management already. And this didn't work. So I think that this is very strong evidence for that because markets, they have the greatest incentive to perfect their governance systems.

Tobi;

What is the attenuation bias and how does this bias feed into our common understanding of presidential and parliamentary systems?

Tiago; 

So attenuation bias is something that I put in there because when I was discussing this during the process of writing the book, I got a lot of pushback by people. And recently I also had one pushback by people saying, well, but it's hard to classify countries in presidential or parliamentary forms because there are many types of intermediate situations. So you have semi-presidential countries in Africa. We have lots of semi-presidential countries where the president has power, but the prime minister does have power too. So there is this combination where not everyone agrees about which countries should be considered parliamentary or presidential. And also many other political scientists first need to decide if a country is a democracy or not and then classify it as presidential or parliamentary, because they say if it's not a democracy, then it doesn't matter what the Constitution says. The dictatorship can do anything it wants. The Constitution doesn't have any bite.

I disagree with that view. I think that constitutions matter even in situations where you don't have a full democracy. But in any case, people would be saying that this would make the results in terms of stability, political stability, in terms of economic growth, less strong. And then I argue the exact opposite, which is the attenuation bias is the mathematical fact that when you have noise in the explanatory variable, the effect that you see will be smaller than the real effect. Whereas if you have noise in the explained variable, the dependent variable, there's less precision, but the size of the effect is in expectation the same as the real effect. So what I argue is that, yes, there are debates about what countries are parliamentary, what countries are presidential. And if this is hard to classify, then we should expect the effects to be even larger. Many people criticize academics and scholars that raise the issue of attenuation bias because people often raise the issue of attenuation bias even before they convincingly demonstrate that there is a relationship in the first place. But I think that at the point where I make the point about attenuation bias in the page that I make that, I think that I was able to demonstrate that the relationship does exist. So if it does exist and we do have difficulty classifying countries in parliamentary or presidential, then we should have attenuation bias and we should expect the effects to be even larger.

Tobi; 

I would say how your research, your writing, your argument does relate to economic development, or maybe development for shorthand, is what I found most interesting in your book and most relevant to my passion. Because I don't know if you caught this yesterday, Jishnu Das, I don't know if I'm saying that correctly, wrote an essay titled, let me quickly check, "Did Development Economics Lose Its Moral Compass?" Yeah, you're not making similar arguments, but how I see them connected is the fact that development, the field or the development industry has more or less given up on governance. And now everybody is obsessed with whatever tiny interventions you can make that get people from $1.90 to $2.90, and then we can sing hallelujah that we've ended poverty. Whereas I, and I imagine yourself and some other people that we both admire, like Lant Pritchett, are interested in changes that we can make in Nigeria, in Chad, in Ethiopia, that can get those countries to middle-income status and possibly greater than that. So how do you see the relationship between economic development and the system of governance or the political system generally? How does this tie in your head when you were writing the book?

Tiago; 

Okay, so I think that in theory, we should expect this to happen. When we look at the institutional school of economics, they say that the central aspect for growth is institutions. So you go back to Douglas North, you go to Acemoglu and Roderick and those people, and Douglas North in particular. Not all institutionalism put the emphasis that North puts on parliament and he puts because he sees that as protecting property rights, specifically. And I think he goes for too narrow an approach. But if you look at the consensus that there is around institutions being central to economic development, and the consensus that there is in political science that parliamentarism is central for political stability, and if you just connect the dots and say, well, political stability must be important for institutions to work well, right? If you just connect these dots and think that also, if institutions are key and a country doesn't even have political stability, will it have capacity, which is something that Pritchett talks about too, about state capacity for many other things. So if it isn't even able to have stability, will it have the capacity for development to be promoted? And I think not.

And then, going back to Pritchett once again, one thing that I talk about in the book is the Pritchett test. I learned this from Paul Romer in a blog post. He mentions that urbanization passes the Pritchett test. And this is a series of requirements that don't seem to be very stringent, but that Pritchett proposes that any policy that you say will have development should pass this test. And this was relating to the frustration that you were talking about that you have and that I share. And I think that he is the person that talks about this best, which is we are promoting very modest, very unambitious proposals that we don't think would possibly have an effect. And then the test is this. In a cross-sectional comparison of levels, do countries that are more developed have more X? And this is easy. I showed this in the beginning of the book, that parliamentarism does have many more developed countries than presidentialism. There are much fewer presidential countries that are rich or developing in any way.

And then he goes in a cross-sectional comparison of growth rates. Do countries that have rapid growth also tend to experience a rapid increase in standards of living? And I present evidence that we do have that. In my blog, I have a post on how parliamentarism passes the Pritchett test. When we look at the few countries for which we have long historical records, do the ones that become much more developed also acquire much more access? And then we see, this is very interesting, that it's exactly in the two countries that first parliamentarize in Europe that we see the end of the Malthusian Trap, the escape from the Malthusian Trap. So it's the Netherlands and the UK, in England. And then this parliamentarianism spreads around Europe and then Europe itself becomes much richer. A very parliamentary tradition establishes in the U.S., so we tend to think of the U.S. as much less parliamentary than it really is. And you have Canada, you have Australia, you have New Zealand, they are countries that for more than 200 years have had this sort of constitution and also have done very well.

And lastly, if we look for countries that switch from a regime of slow economic development to a regime of rapid development, we see a prior shift. So this is for us to think of this just conceptually. And then we have some studies that show a very strong connection of growth and parliamentarianism. So we have Gehring and other authors from 2009 that shows stronger growth in parliamentarianism. And we have one specific study by Richard McManus and Ozkan from 2019 that shows much stronger growth in parliamentary countries from 0.6 to 1.2 percentage points per year, which is huge. And it would explain a country being developed. If a country did grow 1.2 percentage points per year in its per capita GDP, it would become developed over time, of course, but it would be enough. So that's why I think that the connection between parliamentarianism and development is very strong.

Tobi; 

I guess what I'm trying to get a sense of from you, you're a career diplomat, you've been in some of the rooms where some of these decisions are made, what has become so broken about development in general that we've stopped being ambitious in the sense that trying to change your political system can actually get you more benefits development-wise than whatever tiny little cash transfer you're doing in whatever village in Kenya or Nigeria or… how did development become so unambitious?

Because one of the points you touched on in the book is this fallacy of having tried everything, you know, and, oh, so this is what we have… because the state of particularly development economics for me, the state of things are so terrible in my view. The so-called evidence landscape has become so broad that you can find evidence for anything. For example, if I'm the president or the chairman of a local government in Nigeria and I choose to not fix the road, for example, or choose not to build a power station, I would rather take a fraction of that money and do a cash transfer program. I will find evidence and possibly researchers that will tell me that that is a good thing. So how did development become unambitious from your vantage point?

Tiago; 

I think that's hard. That's something that I will speak with, but without as much conviction as the other things that I'm saying here. But I think there are some different processes going on. One is the idea that there have been some, we haven't tried everything, but we have tried some things. And these things, these specific things that we've tried, the big push theory and some other things like that, did not work out as expected. And then there was this too quick giving up on trying other things. I think there is a fear of being perceived as a failure on part of policymakers, so they would rather be unambitious than being perceived as a failure. And I think that has been married to an academic predilection for precision. So academics are more preoccupied by doing the randomised trial and getting the precise estimate of the effect of something. And then they only care about it being significant in the statistical sense and not on the practical sense. “Oh, this is statistically significant. It makes a difference. Then let's do this.” So I think that these two tendencies have worked.

And lastly, one thing that hopefully I'm not being too centered in parliamentarianism, I think that the fact that we have forgotten key benefits of parliamentarianism has made us look basically anywhere else instead of here and this has consequences because I think that a society that does not have the correct, the best institutions for it to develop will have a very hard time and then any policy that is tried will be perceived as a failure because they don't have the conditions that allow the society to really develop.

Tobi;

I don't want to dump all my frustration about development on you. So let me move on from that.

So practically speaking, now, suppose you get a few elites, leaders in your country that are ambitious and courageous enough to want to make a change from a dysfunctional presidential system to the parliamentary one. What are the useful key elements steps that can be started without tearing their political system apart? Because a lot of the fear also comes from not causing too much political turmoil or alienate an influential group that can then go ahead and form chaos in society. So what are the useful first steps you can take towards parliamentary governance?

Tiago;

So I talk a little about in the book what one can do. And as I said on the last part, these are things that I'm not as sure as I am that parliamentarianism is better. On the how we implement it, I have much more doubts, but I still have some suggestions. And I think that we should try to make the proposal of parliamentarianism similar to the proposal for democracy. Because when you ask for more democracy in a country, it's very rare that anybody will push back. “Oh, this will rock the boat here. Our country doesn't have a strong tradition of democracy, so we should just keep without tradition.” These are not arguments that are accepted by someone that's promoting democracy. They say, “no, no, this is a better situation because this will be able to really convey it the will of the people, so it's not a matter of tradition or not.” So what I would do is try to make this conversation within academic circles, with journalists, with policy makers, and that type of person, because I think the things that do get implemented, they are downstream from these people. I don't know if you read the Stefan Dercon book, Gambling on Development?

Tobi;

Yes, he was also a guest.

Tiago; 

He was a guest too?

Tobi;

Yeah.

Tiago; 

Oh, that's great. I’m in very good company. So he talks about the importance of an elite bargain for a country to find development. In this sense, I would mention the book to convey the importance of trying to convey this through the elite. I don't think it's as disruptive as we make it to be, because if you think about it, think the issue with presidentialism, the winner-take-all. In the winner-take-all, it means that for a presidential candidate that loses the election, it might very well be the case that losing the election has more negative consequences for them than actually switching to the parliamentary system. So he will expect to have a better participation in the political system of his country if they switch than if he loses the election. And I think this is very true. And I see politicians in many countries are favorable to parliamentarianism. In my country, I see that the politicians are the easiest class to convince. I think that because they live it, they know how dysfunctional presidentialism is, and because they perceive that they would themselves benefit. So they are the easiest class. I think that the journalists and the academics in many of these countries are much harder to convince.

In Brazil, it's definitely the case that this happens. So even though there is this strong consensus regarding the superiority of parliamentarianism in political science in the US and in Europe. In Brazil, we don't see anything like that. The political scientists in Brazil are very skeptical of Linz and other authors and there's specifically a Brazilian scholar that's very influential that tries to undermine Linz's arguments. I think that he doesn't do it satisfactorily. But this is how I would do it. And then, I don't know, I think that we should try to do the things that we do for other causes that we see. So climate change, what do people do for climate change when they try to fight climate change? They create think tanks, they create campaigns online, that sort of thing. That's what I miss.

Tobi;

So, I mean, if you look at the world today, especially the trend in global politics with the rise of populism, nationalism, trade wars, the state of global governance generally at institutions like the UN and the prospects of cooperation between the EU, the US, China, Russia, and what is called multi-polarity generally, do you think that parliamentary systems put global diplomacy on a better, steady footing?

Tiago;

I definitely do, yes. And this makes me sound like, oh, I think it's a panacea. It's a problem solver for all things. And anticipating that, I would argue that it's actually presidentialism, personalism is really bad. And when something is really bad, it can harm you in every area of your life. So parliamentarianism solves the problems that presidentialism causes. And with respect to diplomacy, we see that the democratic peace theory is one of the most, I think, the single most established empirical fact in international relations, that democracies don't fight each other. And there are some attempts at trying to make this look not as solid as it is, but it's widely perceived as the most important empirical fact in international relations. And if we think that parliamentarism is so central for democracy, for the democracy level, for democracy duration, then I think that it becomes very clear that parliamentarism will have this effect.

And I think of a book written by Chris Blattman, a professor at UChicago [University of Chicago], Why We Fight. And then he explains the few reasons why countries will fight, because he argues very convincingly that conflict is much rarer than we try to make it to be because the news cycle is so prone to publishing on conflict. But conflict is rare. And then there are several failures that are related to countries fighting. And many of them relate to a country being presidential. So one of the failures is that the government does not reflect enough the will of the people. So the utility function, more or less, the interests that the government is taking into account is not the interests of the population as a whole. So it may make sense for the government to fight a war, even though it will be disastrous for it’s own people. And parliamentarianism is supposed to better convey the interests of the people of a country into government much better than presidentialism does. So this is just one example. And just a better functioning government also will help in diplomacy.

Tobi;

I'm curious, as a way of steel manning your argument, what is the one critique of parliamentary systems that you find persuasive?

Tiago;

Many people ask me that. I have a hard time thinking of something. So the one thing I really think is that it's very counterintuitive. It's something that people just have a very hard time accepting that might be true. People would like to have a good leader and they would like presidentialism to work. So it's very unpopular. It's very hard to convince people that this is indeed the case. I think that it's a lot like, I don't know, like markets in general. I think that people are suspicious of markets in general when they shouldn't be. And I think that parliamentarianism has this flaw. But on a performance level, I really can't think of anything. I know this makes me look like more of a radical than not. But I've looked for it and I couldn't find it.

Tobi;

Final question. This is also a bit of a tradition on the podcast. By the way, you're not allowed to say parliamentarianism. What's the one idea that you would like to see spread everywhere? It might be your idea. It might be from something else. It might be from someone else. What's that one idea you like to see spread around the world? You like to see people get passionate about?

Tiago;

Opening borders. That's one thing that I think would have a huge effect.

Tobi; 

So you're very much a card-carrying member of the open borders movement.

Tiago;

I am. I think that, yes, as I said, I'm a fan of Pritchett and others too, Bryan Caplan, Alex Nowrsteh. There are many people, Michael Clemens, there are many people that are working on this. The economic effects of opening borders would be just transformative, double GDP, according to the Clemens estimate. And that would happen exactly by helping the people that are the poorest. So it would also have a great distribution effect. So I think that it's a policy that I would definitely like to see being more discussed on high levels.

Tobi;

Thank you so much, Tiago Ribeiro Santos, for talking to me. It's been wonderful.

Tiago; 

I thank you, Tobi, for the opportunity to talk about these ideas and congratulations on your work. And let's hope for more ambitious developing ideas.

Tobi;

Yeah, thank you.

This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe



In this episode, Tobi talks to David Pilling, Africa editor for the Financial Times. They discussed his book "The Growth Delusion", exploring the significance and limitations of economic growth, particularly in poor countries. David challenges the conventional reliance on GDP to measure economic success, proposing a more nuanced approach that considers wealth distribution, environmental impacts, and overall well-being. He argues for a balanced view that recognises the necessity of growth for development while advocating for policies that prioritise human and environmental health. The conversation also touches on broader development issues in Africa, including the misuse of resources and the political challenges hindering effective governance and equitable progress.

The transcript of the conversation is below, and many thanks to David for coming on the podcast.

Tobi;

This is Ideas Untrapped podcast, of course, and my guest today doesn't need much of an introduction, anybody who reads the Financial Times knows David Pilling. He is currently the Africa editor of the Financial Times newspaper, he used to be the former Asia editor of the newspaper, and he has written many fantastic columns and essays covering a wide range of subjects. And recently he's been writing a lot about Africa, especially stories on development and other related matters. It's a pleasure to welcome David Pilling today.

Welcome, David.

David;

Thank you so much. It's a pleasure to be here.

Tobi;

I want to talk about your book for a bit and one question that keeps popping into my mind as I kept reading, that was a couple of months back last year, the general tone of the book, which is called The Growth Illusion was, you know, one of skepticism, right?Also, the impression that jumps at me from reading your economics-focused stories about Africa is that growth is important. So has your work in Africa forced you a bit to reconsider some of the positions you take in the book?

David;

Yes and no. I mean, the book never said growth isn't important. It is called The Growth Delusion. It's true. And that is a, you know, deliberately, I suppose, provocative title to some extent modelled after The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins. So it was a kind of an echo of that. So, yes, you're right. It was a sceptical title and journalists ought to be sceptical. And what I was doing was I was prodding at the concept of growth, what it is that we measure, how we measure an economy's success.

What I was not saying is that growth is not important. And I think growth is particularly important for poor countries. You know, we can put richer countries aside for one second, but in a poor country where there are not enough resources for people to have what Amartya Sen, the Nobel winning economist, calls sort of what we now know as agency, really. You know, choices over their lives, where they live, what work they do. And those choices can be denied by very simple things. Lack of food, lack of a roof over your head, lack of work, lack of safety and security. Unless those things are satisfied, then I believe that people aren't able to live their full potential. And for that, you need an economy that's firing at a certain level. In other words, you need to go from an economy that isn't firing to one that is. Then, of course, many other things need to happen, including the wealth that is therefore generated to be, you know, relatively equitably shared, for people have to have access to economic opportunities.

But my book was never saying, you know, growth is bad. We need degrowth, which I know is a trend of thought out there. But my book, despite the title, was really looking at other things, which I'm happy to go into if you'd like more of a discussion. But just to make it clear, I was absolutely not saying that if you have an economy where people lack what I would consider the absolute sort of basic minimum to live a fulfilled life, you know, those economies absolutely need to grow and they need to grow fast as the experience of Asia shows with the rapid growth in places like China, which has transformed hundreds of millions of people's lives and opportunities.

Just occurs to me that what just happened, you know, the power going out is in a sense a tiny example of what I'm talking about. You know, there you are making a podcast that you want to be a world class podcast and it's interrupted. I mean, in the end, it's not such a big deal and we are able to carry on. But it's just a little window into, you know, if Nigeria had a decent power system. then you and millions, in fact, tens of millions of other people would have much easier lives, would have much higher productivity, would be able to worry about other stuff. I mean worry in a good way. And, you know, we could call a better power station growth or a better power system, if you want. The money, the resources, the expertise, the systems to produce a good power system for all Nigerians so that all Nigerians can just rely on it and forget about the lights ever going out will make an enormous difference to people's lives. We can call that growth. And so I'm not against growth. I'm for growth.

Tobi;

Especially for the benefit of listeners who haven't read the book that perhaps I didn't frame that first question very well. The book not in any way suggested that growth is bad. And, of course, I urge everyone to read. It's a fantastic book. So what I'm trying to get at is there seems to be a big debate, even in the subfield of development in economics, about the appropriate measure for growth. The measure that best captures what makes a difference in people's lives, what people value, and you do a little bit of that also in the book, particularly in your discussion around GDP. So please just walk me through the history of the GDP, your critique of it, where it falls short, and what are the things, what are the other dimensions of well-being that it doesn't capture, and why is the field or policy reluctant to expand what we mean by growth?

David;

Yes. Okay. That's this very big subject when I wrote 250 pages on it. But let me try to encapsulate a few things. So GDP was invented, if I remember right, invented is probably the right word, in the 1930s, 40s by a guy called Simon Kuznets. And the aim, in a sense, was trying to encapsulate what was happening to an economy. And as hard as it is to believe before the invention of GDP, which really sort of measures all the products and services that an economy produces in a given period, before that invention, a single number to encapsulate what an economy is doing, there was no such number. So you could say, well, things feel good, people have work, the stock market is going up, there seems to be a lot of delivery of coal or whatever.

But there was no single number that said, you know, GDP is this and it grew by this. So the first thing to acknowledge, I think, is that this is a very clever number and it's an important number. And if you only have one number, it maybe is even the best one. Although somebody said in Mozambique, a finance minister, that he used to watch the May Day Parade and he judged the quality of people's shoes. And if people were wearing decent shoes, then he thought things were getting better. And if they weren't, he thought things were getting worse. But clearly, that's a very crude measure. So GDP, I'm saying, is not a bad measure, but it misses an awful lot and it distorts an awful lot. Let me give you a few examples. So the first thing to know about what we call growth, what we call GDP, is that it's a measure of what you might call flow. It measures what an economy produces, let's say, every year. It doesn't tell you anything about the wealth, which is the assets of that economy.

So let's take Nigeria as you're in Nigeria. If you take oil, which is an asset, and you take it out of the ground, you can turn that into GDP, into a flow of wealth. But eventually that oil is going to run out. So if you keep just taking out oil, selling it, spending it, take it out, sell it, spend it, eventually you've got no oil and you've got no money. And you could argue that maybe that's in part what Nigeria has been doing. The best thing to do with wealth like natural capital as it's called, is you turn that into other forms of capital. So you turn it into productive capital, which means infrastructure. So you'd build with those billions of dollars that have come out of the ground in Nigeria, a world class health system, world class transport, world class airports, world class universities, and you'd build human capital. Some of the same things with healthy, well-educated people who can then go on when your oil has run out and do many other things.

Now, it doesn't take a genius to work out that Nigeria hasn't done particularly well in that. Of course, there are brilliantly educated Nigerians and there are some lucky Nigerians in the elites that have access to good healthcare and good education, but often outside the system, sometimes indeed outside Nigeria. But what I would argue that Nigeria and many other countries have failed to do is to move that wealth into different sorts of wealth that will produce GDP again going forward. Because otherwise what your GDP has measured is a kind of a one shot. We took oil, we sold it, it's gone. So that's the first important thing about GDP is it's a flow, it's not the wealth.

Let me give you another example, and this moves into the environment. If you have a forest from the perspective of GDP, the absolute best thing you can do with that forest is chop it down as quickly possible and turn it into something else like a table. Turn your wood into a table or burn it or do something to produce energy or goods that you can sell and forget the forest. The forest is worth zero as far as GDP is concerned. But of course, the forest has its own value and once the forest is gone, it's gone. And our measures of economic progress take no account at all of the environment around us that I would argue has been a perverse incentive that has enabled us to think that we're doing extremely well producing all this growth, all this economic activity, but forgetting that there's a cost to that, which is the environment that we've been ransacking and polluting and degradating. And that can come back to bite us as we're seeing in global heating and in all sorts of other ways. Let me go to just a third thing and then I'll stop. So you can produce GDP and for all its limitations, it does tell you an awful lot. If you're growing at 10% a year, your economy is doing well, as China found out. China grew at 10% a year for 30 years, more or less and it transformed China from a poor country to a middle income one. However, how you distribute that income is also very important. There's a joke that economists tell, which I think is in the book, about Bill Gates, who walks into a bar. On average, everybody in the bar is a billionaire. But of course, the averages don't tell you anything. So you could have very fast growth in an economy.

Let's take Equatorial Guinea [which] grew very fast on the back of oil but most of the population continues to live in poverty. There's really been no attempt to spread that wealth. So no attempt to reinvest that wealth in the health and education that will produce more wealth, like science and development and all of that that will produce more wealth going forward. And also very little attempt to spread it equitably. So again, GDP doesn't tell you really much about that. And so these are three, I would say, fundamental limitations and fundamental different ways that we need to think about, you know, what is it that we're producing? If you say an economy is growing at 10% a year or 0% a year, what lies underneath those numbers? And what are they telling us about how people are living in those countries and the opportunities they have, which after all is the objective of growth. We don't want growth for its own sake, that's pointless. What we ought to want, I think, is to improve people's lives and opportunities. That's what we should be really measuring. And growth tells you part of the story, GDP tells you part of the story, but certainly not the whole thing.

Tobi;

These are important things you've raised. It's an important critique. I would not say that a lot of people who work on policy or who study these things are not aware of some of these things and the illusion of averages around GDP and what it captures, what it doesn't. My question then is, isn't this more of a critique of the politics or should I say the priority of the political class of a particular country as opposed to a critique of the measure itself, because the limitations are well known and how it falls short is known. So if you then persist with this measure that you know does not quite capture the wealth of the country, does not tell you anything about how income is distributed in the country, it does not tell you how much you are destroying the environment, and thus possibly future growth of the country, isn't that then a political problem?

David;

Yes, a very astute observation. Martin Wolf, a very sort of gifted, a brilliant, actually, economist at the FT, in a sense thinks my book is nonsense. I mean, I don't think he would go quite that far, but he would say, look, the problem isn't the measure. The problem is what you do with it. And to some extent, I absolutely agree with that. However, I do think that what you measure in a sense is what you get. If you set up, you know, we want the economy to grow by X amount, let's say, and you're going to be judged by that politically and to some extent you'll miss out on the other things, let's say the impact on carbon emissions, which clearly we have missed for 150 years. I mean, it's not as though we've managed to do both at the same time. We have missed this.

Now, in the end, you're absolutely right. It's a political decision. But I think if you took a political decision that we're going to do things slightly differently, you would probably want to measure different things as well. A lot of these things are measured, actually. If you go to the Office of Statistics in Britain, you'll find that they measure a ton of what I'm talking about. So I'm not after alternative measures or fancy indexes or whatever. In a sense, I'm after slightly different political priorities. So in a rich country, for example, I mean, even in a poor country, it doesn't really matter. You know one thing you might target is life expectancy. Not just life expectancy, I would argue, but healthy life expectancy.

So you might say, look, we think that it's reasonable in a country of our wealth and prosperity for people to live on average, and clearly it's going to be an average, 75 healthy years. And sure, the last couple of years, they're going to be unhealthy. That's just nature. And that's just what happens. But we're going to aim for 75 healthy years. And if that became your political target, lots of other things might change. You might start pumping more money into your health sector. You might start thinking more about primary health care, about preventative medicine, all sorts of things. Because you've tilted what you're measuring and your priorities, as it were, you then begin to tilt how you organise this.

And again, look at Nigeria. I'm bringing it back to Nigeria. If you take the GDP per capita of Nigeria and the GDP per capita of Ghana, I know this is a tetchy, tetchy subject to compare these two countries.

Tobi;

Go ahead.

David;

You know, I think I'm right in saying that the life expectancy of Nigerians on average is 11 years lower than Ghana. So I would say, well, what on earth is happening there? What does that tell you about the priorities of successive Nigerian governments? Now, it's obviously true, tweaking your measure here and there is not going to solve that. I think the life expectancy on average is 54. A lot of that will be because of very high child mortality. So a lot of kids not making it until the age of five. So, you know, you could have a government that says, right, by the end of our term, we're going to raise that to 60 as a start. A big country like Nigeria with all this oil wealth, this incredible talent pool, and anybody who goes to Nigeria knows that, you know, with doctors and nurses who, unfortunately, are all around the world helping other people. We can pull ourselves together and push life expectancy, let's say, to 60 as a starting point, not as a final point. And you could see then government policies shifting potentially in that direction.

So you can kind of see that measurements can lead to policy changes. Maybe they just focus the mind or maybe they're just a shared ambition. The public and the politicians who have entered into a contract, which is what an election is, “we’ll vote for you on the basis that you'll try and do A, B and C. If we don't like you, we'll kick you out.” That's kind of a highly crude definition of democracy. So you can see, potentially, you might say I'm being idealist or unrealistic, or maybe I am, but you can see how that could work as a guiding principle. So how you leave the confines of GDP to push another priority right up your list of what you're going to do politically, and then you're judged against that. That's where politics and measurement kind of meets.

Tobi;

With due respect to my Ghanaian brothers and sisters, there might also be a little bit of statistics going on there because the life expectancy in some parts of Nigeria may actually be higher than Ghana because Nigeria is quite a big area. But your answer, let me pull you into another debate from that answer, which is income versus, should I say, the rest of other measures of well-being. As you've written about, you're familiar with the SDGs and the predecessor - Millennium Development Goals. And I've had guests on the show, maybe someone like Andrew Nevin, who would say that poor countries can do better with alternative measures like what you have on the SDGs, zero hunger, this and that, as opposed to the annual churning out of GDP statistics.

But a different class of economists or thinkers will tell you that what really makes a difference is for the income of the population to grow and that higher income is highly correlated with all of these things that you say, including life expectancy. If you have more money, you will be able to eat better, afford better quality care, and your life expectancy will go up. It also pulls into what some in the economic subdiscipline and some global charities have been doing, which is interventions - deworming, cash transfers, bed nets, and so many ways that they measure that. But again, some economists will insist that, yes, you can do that and it's not a bad thing to do. But if you have the policies that are able, like you mentioned the example of China and some other countries that have been able to transform radically in just decades, South Korea is a fantastic example, then all this other things that we use as a critique of economic statistics become irrelevant once the majority of the population are able to increase their average income. So what's your reaction to that?

David;

Well, I agree with when you were saying there's some economists. So the second half. So if you have to choose between however many SDGs there are, all these different multiple complicated targets versus let's increase the income of each of our people. I'm definitely on the latter side. And in that sense, income, I think, is absolutely key. You'll find a curve when people go from a couple of thousand dollars per capita income towards 15,000, 20,000, things get better along that curve. Of course, you can blow it. You can have terrible policies. But assuming that you have reasonable policies and reasonably equitable distribution of that income, then there's a pretty good correlation. And you're absolutely right. You will move up that curve. Your health will get better. Your opportunities will get better. Your education will get better. Probably you'll have fewer kids. You'll put more money into each of those kids. They'll do better, et cetera, et cetera. And you'll get into an upward spiral. And in that sense, you're absolutely right. Yeah, then, you know, your bed nets become irrelevant because you've got middle income, educated people who know what they need to do and besides, you probably don't have stagnant pools of water. And besides, you probably have enough money to have a mosquito eradication thing. And, you know, a well-organised policy, which is producing that kind of growth is likely to, in a sense, be kind of self-fulfilling.

So absolutely. In that sense, I don't have a beef at all with income as a measure of the potential to improve people's lives. And I think I can hold the two ideas in my head simultaneously. I think I can prod the measure of GDP, particularly, I would argue, or wealthier countries, as well as saying it's probably the best measure, particularly as you go from the poverty, let's say, of a country like, it's invidious in a sense to name countries, but let's say Democratic Republic of Congo, you know, up through middle income, you know, your kind of Malaysias or whatever, there you'll find that rising income. And I keep saying, reasonably, equitably shared among the population, which is important, of course, then that will have your number one transformative effect. I have no argument with that at all.

Tobi;

Maybe I've been, I don't know, unfair to you by putting your book in the context of poorer countries, because certainly that wasn't the primary cohort of the analysis of the book. So, I mean, you talked about healthcare. You cited the American example, which was such a big, big, big talking point until Obamacare, and it still continues to be. For example, if you compare the American healthcare system with the Canadian healthcare system, and I know so many public policy analysts and other forms of thinkers look at Canada and say, oh, that's what we should be when they talk about America. But there are lots of Canadians and other people from countries with fantastic healthcare system who wants to move to America, who would move to the United States in an instant. So, again, does that tell you that a lot of these things that we worry about is not what people care about on average?

David;

Well, this is a very different question, I think. I mean, look, the American health care system, I would call inefficient, unequal and at its best, excellent. And it can be all of those things. So if you're a wealthy American or if you're an American with good health insurance, you probably have among the best health care systems in the world. The problem is if you're not wealthy, you don't have good insurance, then you have a pretty average, even a bad health system. The Canadian health system is probably more equal and certainly more efficient. The Americans also spend too much money for what they get. So they spend, I think, 20% of a very big GDP per capita on healthcare or of their entire GDP on healthcare. And that's quite inefficient. A lot of that is kind of litigation, it's profits, it's insurance and all of that. So it works for a good proportion of the population. As I say, if you're middle class, upper middle class, you probably have the best or among the best health care systems in the world. And that will figure in all sorts of things. Healthy life expectancy, for example, a very crude measure, but worth looking at. But if you're not in that category of people, then you probably have a pretty average health care experience.

And again, averages can tell you something. You know, life expectancy in the US has dropped for 20 years. Tiny, tiny, tiny amount. But what's going on? The economy has been growing, you know, with a few bumps, but it has been growing. There are wealth being created and yet that's not transferring into better life expectancy. You know, there are things like the whole OxyContin issue, et cetera, that begin to explain that. There's what people call lives of despair [Deaths of Despair], you know, suicide and people who just feel pushed out of the middle class. So it's affecting a subset of the American population, but that's enough to kind of bring the average down. So I think you have an unequal system. And that's how I would compare it with the Canadian system. I'm not familiar with the Canadian system at all, but I can imagine it's sort of like a UK style, free at the point of service, roughly like that. And the UK system has all sorts of huge problems. But again, if you have a health emergency, it's probably going to be a pretty good system. It's less good at dealing with sort of preempting health problems and preventing health problems. But again, I think this is possibly leading a little bit off the subject of GDP, but that's how I would explain the differences in different health systems.

Tobi;

Yeah, so my question then is, but a lot of people still want to move to countries where they think they can get rich really fast, where they think their skills can be better compensated and more often than not, that is usually the United States, despite the inefficiencies and inequalities of the health care system at the lower end. So, now does that mean that people do not know what they want or they value growing their personal income better than a lot of these other things that we talk about?

David;

I mean, America is still the biggest economy in the world, measured in dollar terms, not in PPP terms. So it's the biggest economy in the world. It's clearly very dynamic. If you're in tech or IT or AI, this world leading technology, world leading universities. You know, if you're making it in America, you're making it pretty big. And immigrants tend to be people who are ambitious. They're driven. That's why they picked up and left their country and gone somewhere else. You know, America can seem quite attractive. You kind of think if I'm going to roll the dice somewhere, I'll roll it in America. Now, if you're American, social mobility actually is not as good as it has been in the past. And it's not as good as in some European countries. That's quite a counterintuitive. But I've read a number of papers and data to suggest that. But still, you've got a big, powerful, high-tech economy that kind of sucks up labor, that's bounced back much quicker from the global financial crisis, that's bounced back quicker from COVID than most other equivalent economies.

You know, if you're thinking, where am I going to go? Where have I got my best chance of making it? You know, it's not irrational to think, well, America's big enough for me, you know? So I don't see the two in contradiction. I don't think people are saying, I'm going to go to America because on balance, it has the most rational healthcare system that's the best use of resources. People don't think like that. They think like, where am I going to go, fit in, have a chance? So I would say that's what attracts people to the US.

Tobi;

Yeah. Let's talk about the environment a bit. I don't know if I have the right phrase here, but it seems to me, as recently demonstrated by the recent spat on BBC between the host and the president of Guyana, by some countries, again, on the poorer end of the global wealth spectrum sort of fighting for their right to pollute, i would call it, Which is that you cannot tell us now to care about the environment, sustainability, low-carbon green economy, when you've had 150 years to basically do what you want, which sort of then got us into this problem. I don't necessarily agree with that argument and I do think that there's no part of the world that is insulated from some of the big, terrible changes we are going to see from global warming. But what's your reaction generally to that argument?

David;

OK, well, I do have some sympathy with that argument, but again, like most things that are worth talking about, it's complicated. So let's just start with a few basic facts. And, you know, I've never really written about the environment as a core subject, although I have written about it quite a lot both from Asia and increasingly actually from Africa. So bear that in mind. But let's take the per capita carbon emissions of Uganda. When I last looked, I think there was 0.1 tonnes per capita per year. And compare that with America which I think is 20 tons per capita per year. Now, if you say to a Ugandan, you have to be really careful because the world's on the brink of catastrophe so you guys need to cut your carbon emissions. I would agree with people who say, well, that's nonsense. I'm not cutting my carbon emissions. What Uganda needs to do, I would argue quite strongly, is to increase its carbon emissions.

Now, of course, that doesn't mean to say Uganda's ideal path of development is to copy in its entirety everything that went on in the West, which would be massive, crazy pollution with coal-fired power stations and whatever destruction of the environment, followed by a kind of, oh, my God, what have we done moment, drawing back and then are trying to kind of address the problems. Often, by the way, outsourcing your pollution to some other poor country. But anyway, I'm not saying that that is the path to go. But I am saying that from per capita carbon emissions of 0.1 tonnes, then yes, the only way is up for a bit. Because I don't believe that you're going to be able to get out of poverty without increasing those carbon emissions a bit.

Albeit that we have solar power, we have wind power, we have all of this. And clearly one doesn't need to emulate the old fossil fuel model in its entirety. But I think that it's reasonable to assume that, say, in Mali, where per capita people use the same as British people use to boil their kettle. So that's the power consumption in Mali, what we in Britain use to make our tea, basically. And you're saying to a Malian, sorry, that's all you've got. Now, that I think is totally unfair and is unsustainable politically and rightly so. So I think that the Malis and the Ugandas of this world will have to increase their carbon emissions a bit as they become wealthier.

But as soon as possible and wherever possible, they ought to embrace new technologies, green technologies, which in some cases will be cheaper and more efficient anyway. But, you know, we still don't really know, for example, how to make cement using green technologies. It's there or thereabouts, I believe, but it's not really proven technology at scale. And we can't say to Uganda, sorry, you missed out on concrete. You know, that one that one passed you by. Clearly this is ridiculous and unsustainable. So I do have sympathy with the view.

Of course, you can abuse that view. You can say, you know, you polluted for 150 years. Therefore, we're going to just carry on recklessly as normal. Let's take the conversation back to Nigeria. There is a conversation in Nigeria, you know, how dare you tell us that we can't use our oil and gas? Now, I have some sympathy with that, but the corollary and the additional argument is we need to electrify. We need to bring power to 600 million people in Africa and to a 100 million people in Nigeria who don't have power. I completely agree. But I would say, what have you been doing the last 30 or 40 years? The oil's been pouring out of the ground the last 30, 40 years, and that did not translate into electricity for all Nigerians as it should have done.

So it doesn't follow that if you're allowed to follow this fossil fuel path, that all will be right with the world. Policies need to be intelligent. And intelligence means to the extent that you do use fossil fuels, you must use them efficiently and for the benefit of your people. And where possible, you stop using fossil fuels, you embrace new technology. South Africa has a ton of coal, for example, but it also has among the best solar and wind potential in the world. Its problem in transitioning, and of course, as you'll probably know, South Africa is having trouble keeping the lights on. Its problem in transitioning from coal to solar and wind has not been primarily a technical problem. It's been primarily a political problem with people trying to protect the coal industry. That is a mistake. But I don't think you can say to the Ugandans of this world, sorry, you missed the boat. We don't really know how you're going to prosper in this new green world, but good luck. I think that does not wash. So in that sense, I have sympathy with the Guyanas and the Malis and the Ugandas of this world, yeah.

Tobi;

But not Nigeria.

David;

But clearly, you know, you need governments that use their oil wealth better. I don't think you would find a Nigerian that would disagree.

Tobi;

I agree with you. Again, I'm not trying to frame this as a direct consequence of your work or what you've written, just trying to expand the scope a little bit. So I want to get your sense about where you think policy should go in trying to strike a balance. Because as you know, a lot of African countries are in financial distress from sovereign debts. The domestic investment environment is not that great so even if you want to keep insisting that, oh, we're gonna pollute we're going to do this we're going to do that, if the global investment appetite for fossil fuel continues to dwindle as policy in the West is forcing companies to divest, you might not have a choice, even if you want to pollute at the end of the day, because nobody would be willing to invest in that in the next 20 or 30 years. So my question to you then is that how do you think that the policy environment, especially around all these global gatherings and perhaps even some more pragmatic measures can strike the better balance between these two views.

David;

Okay. Well, again, a complicated question, but definitely one worth asking. There are a few things going on there. The first thing I'd say is that finance just sort of cutting off all carbon, all fossil fuels is almost certainly unfair. And the idea that gas, for example, could be a transition fuel is one worth considering. But there's a big caveat here. And the caveat is the following, really. I don't really believe that there are many governments in Africa that have a serious plan for development. I mean, that's quite a big, harsh thing to say. But, you know, you had Stefan Dercon on your program. Gambling on Development was the name of his book. You know, if you're going to use fossil fuels to improve the lives of your people, fine. But where is that being done? Maybe in Senegal, maybe in Ghana. You look around the continent and you struggle to find these success stories where people are saying, no, no, no, world, we're not listening to you, we're going to use our fossil fuels because right now we're in this fantastic phase of growth and development, and, you know, if you cut off our fossil fuels, you're going to stymie that. You've got a lot of countries that are hardly at the starting line, I would say. And again, that sounds quite harsh. But, you know, you take Ghana, which is a relatively successful African economy. But Ghana had the same GDP per capita. This is oft used. In fact, I think it has had a higher GDP per capita. But probably these measures are imperfect, as we’d suggested at the beginning of our discussion. But somehow it was not dissimilar from South Korea.

South Korea is now 20 or 30 times as rich as Ghana in per capita terms. South Korea has done something that Ghana never did. And Ghana is a relative success story. So South Korea has certainly done something that Democratic Republic of Congo or Niger or Angola or Liberia or Zambia have never done. It's managed to take off economically. Yes, using fossil fuels. Now what we're being told is, you know, you can't use fossil fuels. But I'm also asking, where is the plan for development? Where is that big transforming development happening on the continent? That's what's necessary. That's what I want to see. But you have to kind of look quite hard to find it. And you're going to be finding the kind of the beginnings of it. Let's say in Ghana, in Senegal, you know, maybe in Rwanda, maybe in Ethiopia before it blew up politically. But you do have to look quite hard to find it. So yes, the world's saying fossil fuels, you can't have them. We're not going to finance them. That's potentially a big obstacle to growth and development. But just as big an obstacle to growth and development is governments that don't seem to be there in the fight to produce growth and development. And I think this gets back to politics. There are too many governments who get to power And their reason for getting to power is to extract, extract wealth for, you know, themselves, their families, their regions, maybe, if you're lucky, but not for the whole country.

Tobi;

It's an interesting observation. I'm going to ask you a speculative question and trust me, I don't want to put you in any kind of trouble. So, I mean, if you look at a set of countries that I call the tragic trio, which is the three biggest economies on the African continent, Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, it's a useful comparison to me because they sort of went through a major transition in terms of power right around the same time. Nigeria it was 2015 when we had the first opposition leader coming to power since democratic governance started in 1999. South Africa, I think, was 2014. And I think Egypt was around the same period. If you look at that decade for all these three economies, what you see, it's not a pretty picture, unemployment is quite high. Youth unemployment particularly is through the roof. All three economies are chronically indebted. Inflation and the general macroeconomic policy environment is just a terrible mess. So I'm asking you, as someone who has been on the ground a couple of times in some of these countries, what do you think from an outsider's perspective, has gone seriously wrong with the political class in countries that can actually pull their weight on the continent if they are doing better.

David;

Sure. You mentioned, obviously, the three biggest economies on the continent. Now, first thing I should say is I can't really talk about Egypt because I don't cover it. For whatever reason, the Financial Times' definition of Africa is sub-Saharan Africa. So I cannot really talk with any legitimacy about it. But Nigeria and South Africa, you know, I've been to, I don't know, 20 times each. I've thought about them both quite hard, I suppose. And I would first say that they're just very, very different cases. The overriding factor of South Africa was the apartheid regime and the liberation from this horrendous apartheid policy, which deliberately impoverished a section of the population, the non-white section of the population, particularly the black majority. And extricating South Africa out of that is proving extraordinarily difficult. And South Africa is failing at that. And I could go into that in much more detail if you want. Nigeria, I think, is a whole different case. Nigeria never really had, well, it didn't have an apartheid system. It had a colonial oppressor: Britain; colonial occupier: Britain; then Britain left. But Nigeria doesn't have the terrible racial legacies of apartheid that South Africa suffers from.

In that sense, I actually think Nigeria starts from a better position than South Africa, albeit that South Africa had much more sophisticated some kind of world-class industries, manufacturing base, etc. Still, I would argue that the politics in South Africa is so complicated that Nigeria weirdly starts in a better place. However, one of the things that I think has gone wrong in Nigeria, and again, I don't think there'd be many Nigerians that would disagree with me, is that you discovered oil and lots of it. So you discovered oil and lots of it, but weirdly not enough. So if you take a Qatar or a Kuwait, one of these rich Gulf states, they have huge quantities of oil and very few people. So it doesn't take a kind of genius government to be able to spread that wealth kind of around, you know, to bring in foreign labor if required, et cetera.

Nigeria has a lot of oil, but not enough oil for 200 million people. If you gave all that oil wealth to each of 200 million people, you wouldn't have very much, which creates an incentive to try and get your hands on it. So it creates a perverse incentive, I would say, and the resource curse sort of starts there and did start there. And so the point of government becomes to share oil wealth, get your hands on the oil wealth, share it, share it among the political class, keep out everybody else and use your political influence to get as much of that oil wealth as possible. One obvious sort of result of that is the highly logical thing to do if you have oil is you begin to move up the value-added chain. This is what you should do if you're trying to develop any economy. So what do you do with oil? Well, you turn it into petroleum products, into the fuel you put in your car, to heating, electricity, all of this stuff. And again, you don't need me to tell you that Nigeria has not done this. It has refineries that have not worked. Now, of course, you have the Dangote Refinery, And there's a lot of hope, some hope anyway, attached to the Dangote refinery.

But in the past, what the Nigerian elite, and I can only blame the elite because they've been the ones in charge, what they've done is they've taken that oil, they've sent it abroad for somebody else to add all the value, and then they've bought it back, spending all the money that you've earned from the oil in the first place to somebody else because they've got a refinery. I mean, this is crazy, crazy policy and crazy politics. And this, I think, has been the curse of Nigeria that has informed much else. Of course, there have been many, many other problems, some of which go all the way back to colonialism and the colonial legacy. The fact that Nigeria was kind of jammed together by Britain, that it's a nation state if you draw it on a map, but it struggles to be one in reality.

And you could argue that Nigeria has been successful in creating this kind of feeling that there is such a thing as Nigeria, that we're all in it together. But you can also say that the elites, those who reach and by that, I guess I mean those who reach political power and those who enable them to reach political power, they have not really treated Nigeria as a nation because otherwise there wouldn't be 10 million kids out of school. There wouldn't be these massive disparities between different states, some with very much better health outcomes, et cetera, some with much lower levels of people in school, some with much better infrastructure, some with much worse infrastructure. That wouldn't exist to the same extent if your elites had treated the country as a real state and the purpose of the oil being to fuel that state and to fuel its development. That has not been what's happened. You've had an elite that has, in a sense, followed a colonialist model, which is to extract wealth and sometimes to send it abroad, which is why a lot of people go for their health and their education abroad, because they haven't bothered building it to the extent that they ought to have done in Nigeria itself. So these are very different stories. They may lead to the same or similar positions. You started by asking about why these three big economies have not fulfilled their potential, let's say, to put it kindly. So I think the reasons are quite different, particularly in the case of Nigeria and South Africa. But your end point is similar, if not exactly the same.

Tobi;

I want you to talk a little bit about South Africa, and especially in the last 10 years, what has gone, maybe that's not fair, but what has gone really, really wrong? I mean, to paraphrase someone I listened to during the lecture, I'd rather not say his name, is that South African elites care more about making the elite structure blacker than making South Africans wealthier. How should you think that conforms to reality?

David;

Well, that is a controversial statement. I mean, I think the ANC has become increasingly a kind of a black South African party. And it's to some extent losing some of that kind of rainbow nation, colourblind, non-racialism that was kind of, in a sense, so inspiring in 1994. So there's a couple of ways of answering that question. I mean, you said the last 10 years have been bad. I mean, I know that some people think the following: It's been 30 years since apartheid they kind of compare it to a football match - first 15 years, first half, pretty good. Second half, pretty disastrous. Lots of own goals. And that's one way of looking at it. The cutoff point is Zuma. So you have Mandela, you have Mbeki, sort of technocrat, reasonable growth that's growing at 5%. You do have a commodities boom, it's true. Then the financial crisis hits and Mbeki is dislodged by his own party, only a year before he was due to leave anyway, but still dislodged. Zuma's put in and Zuma starts the process of state capture and the real kind of erosion of some of the institutions that South Africa had maintained for those first 15 years. So that's one way of looking at it.

I think there's another really sort of, in a sense, more interesting way of looking at it, which I first read, again, in a Martin Wolf column. And he talked about the concept, which was originally applied to Brazil, actually, of Belindia. And Belindia is a combination of Belgium and India, a small, in this case, white economy. It doesn't really matter what the colors are, but a small white economy surrounded by much, much poorer black economy. That's what South Africa looked like in 1994. It had been deliberately engineered by a white racist system. So that's what you got. The question is, what policies do you have to deal with that? Because you've got two economies.

If you think about the trouble that Europe had when Europe joined and you were trying to set interest rates across Europe for different economies, for Spain and Germany, let's say. Now you've got Belgium and India. What policies do you put in place to maximise the potential of both of those? Because one of the things that you obviously try to do is you basically raid Belgium. You redistribute from Belgium to India, which is what's been done. And that's, I think, perfectly fair and a perfectly rational thing to do. You redistribute from the wealthy part of your economy to the less wealthy part of the economy. But that's not all you can do, because if that's all you can do, then eventually you're going to just impoverish Belgium and you're just going to have an impoverished country. So you can't do that. You've got to somehow turn India into Belgium. And it's not really clear how you devise policies that can do that.

You know, if you're India, it's much easier. You're a poor country and you trade, in a sense, off your poverty like China did. You know, China moved people from the countryside in China into factories in the cities. So it transformed inefficient farmers into increasingly efficient players in the global supply chains. But it did that via low wages. It's not really possible in South Africa because of the political inheritance that it's had. So one of the policies, for example, that the ANC tried was black empowerment. Which is, again, rational and completely understandable. They wanted to create a black middle class and people like Cyril Ramaphosa, who was put on various boards and given shares in various companies. He became very wealthy through that. And a black middle class was created. But you can also see how there are problems there. One is that this can lead to corruption. You know, you get those opportunities based on who you know and who you know means knowing the ANC. So you can see how that reinforces or could reinforce bad politics and cronyism. And indeed, that is exactly what's happened, unfortunately.

And second, you can see how it can lead to inefficiencies. So a well-known example was that, you know, even the airline needed to buy its planes. you know, Boeings, et cetera, through a black empowerment business. So, of course, no planes are made in South Africa. So the only way of doing that is a black company is set up to buy planes and then they sell them to South African airways with a markup 10 or 20 percent. So immediately you have an airline that's 10 or 20 percent less efficient. And that's kind of mirrored in the rest of the economy. So in trying to adjust to the hundreds of years of historical injustices that you've had, you kind of fall into policies that are going to be counterproductive and make your economy inefficient. Having said that, the ANC has also just failed flat out, right, in some policies that it also have got right. The biggest of all being education. Under apartheid, you had an education system that was deliberately tailored to keep black people poor and to limit their education so that they could work in the mines and work as domestics in people's houses. A vile system.

That was the starting point. It ought to have been really easy to improve that by leaps and bounds. And South Africa has actually put quite a lot of money into its education system. But for one reason or another, some of which I don't fully understand, to be honest, it's failed. And the education system for most people is failing. And so it's failing to transform people's opportunities via education, which would be not a simple, not a salvo either, not a panacea, but certainly it ought to be a very important part of the ANC's armory in transforming that society. And it's failed.

Tobi;

That's deep. And I agree it's a complex problem. I mean, They have an election also this year, and in Nigeria we had ours last year. From the field currently and how the political dynamics is evolving, what do you think is the hope of turning some of this around, at least for the people?

David;

Sure. Well, there are a few things. I mean, like you often say with development, well, I wouldn't start from here. I mean, it's not a particularly good place to start from. That Belindia image, I think, is quite powerful. And you can't just wish that away. That's history. That's going to take a long time to overcome. What is going to happen in this election, what is likely to happen, is that for the first time, the ANC's majority, i.e. its 50% plus of the vote, is going to be challenged. So last time it got 57.5. In previous iterations under Mbeki, for example, it got, I think, in the high 60s, certainly in the mid 60s. So the ANC sort of was dominating politics. Now, I think disillusion with the state of the country is such that that majority will be challenged. So it's possible, it's not definite, but it is possible that the ANC will fall below 50%. That opens up all sorts of possibilities, some of them more promising and some of them less promising.

So if the ANC does very, very badly, let's say it gets 40%, I think this is unlikely, but possible, then it's It may go into coalition with a party like the Economic Freedom Fighters, Julius Malema, who's a breakaway, sort of a radical breakaway. They want to nationalise the commanding heights of the economy to expropriate a lot of the land without compensation, maybe nationalise the central bank and then sort of change central bank policy so that it's much more in favour of growth distribution than in sort of tackling inflation. Now, you know, maybe this will all go brilliantly well, but experience and history tells you that that's not likely to go very well, that project, and could impoverish South Africa further. So the loss of the ANC majority, while important and necessary, I think also sort of opens up the country to danger.

I think much more likely is the ANC will get in the mid 40s or high 40s and therefore will go into coalition with some of the smaller parties. And this, I think, is where the hope lies. So you have a number of smaller parties, some of which are pretty terrible, but some of which are really good. There's a party called RISE Mzanzi, for example. A former journalist, Songeso Zibi, has formed this party. A lot of people really think that this is a good guy, progressive, forward-thinking, not attached to the ANC, not attached to the DA, which is the right-of-centre kind of party that has tended to be a very white party and therefore is really not electable in the country as a whole. So I'm not saying that RISE Mzanzi is the great hope of South Africa. I'm not saying that at all. I don't really know that much about them. What I am saying is that you can see how the breakdown of this ANC monopoly could lead to new ideas, some of which will be bad and some of which could be much more hopeful and progressive. And, you know, come the next election in five years' time, you could see some of those parties that have established themselves now growing their support base and maybe changing the policies of South Africa for the better.

But I do think that the ANC, you know, as amazing a movement as it was and as necessary a movement as it was to overthrow apartheid, after 30 years of unchallenged power, it's hardly surprising, is a sort of a pale shadow of its former self. And it'd be difficult for it to reform within without losing power, or at least having its power seriously challenged.

Tobi;

For the sake of the millions of South Africans whose lives depend on their government getting things right, I hope they do. My final question before I let you go, David. So I'm going to ask you one big question and maybe a couple of two or three more rapid fire questions. And this is a bit of a tradition on the show, which is talk to me about one big idea. It may be yours, it may be an idea of someone else, but just one idea that you are excited about, that you love very much and that you would like the world to be excited about as well. Possibly could change the world.

David;

That is a… you should have warned me about that question type. So my mind's going blank. The thing I'm thinking about is so far from what we've been discussing that I don't know that it's relevant. I mean, let me name two things and they're quite different. What is very well established, but I think very important, and I'm not trying to be trendy here, but I think the idea that if you concentrate on giving women opportunity in society that a lot follows is very promising in development.

If you look around, women kind of hold families together, their kids' health and education, they are the guardians of that. If they're empowered, given opportunities, I think huge amounts can follow. And if you want to kind of a way of unlocking growth and development, you could do a lot worse than thinking, what are we doing for women at all levels of society? This doesn't mean women in boardrooms or women in this. Of course, it means that, too. But it means policies that enable women to take control of their finances, take control of their bodies, take control of their education, take control of their destiny. If you get that right, I think an awful lot follows.

Second, totally different and something I hardly know anything about, but I keep hearing about it. It's something called eDNA. This is a way of measuring biodiversity. As far as I understand it, you take a measurement from water or soil and rather than counting the number of animals or trying to count, you know, the number of bacteria or worms or whatever it is, you kind of have a baseline of the biodiversity of an area.

And given that baseline, you can then work out, are we improving this area or are we degrading it? And it may be the kind of the GDP of the environment, let's say, a one shot measure that enables you to say, let's leave this country, this wetland, this region, this forest in a better state for the next generation than we found it. I think that could be a very powerful idea.

Tobi;

Charter cities, which is something you've written about, are something with a big potential for change, especially in the context of Africa. Do you find it promising or a fad?

David;

I'm highly skeptical. You can see where it comes from. You know, Shenzhen in southern China, you could say it was a charter city. You could say Singapore kind of acted like a charter city, Hong Kong. If that's what you mean by a charter city, then maybe. But look, if you have policies that are good, then you should roll them out to the whole country. Why should they be in some isolated little part? I don't see why you need to start from scratch. You could say, yes, we could experiment. We could try Charter City A, Charter City B, Charter City C, see which does better and then roll that out to the country as a whole. Fine. Okay. But the idea that you can get around government, you know, outsource public goods to the private sector, start totally from scratch. I am quite skeptical of that idea. I find it intriguing and I've written about it in a way that may not necessarily show my skepticism. But if you ask me, do I think it's a great hope or a fad? I lean towards the faddish end of the spectrum.

Tobi;

Senegal, Nigeria or Ghana, who has the best jollof rice?

David;

Yeah, if you make me answer that, then I'll never be allowed back in Nigeria again. So the best jollof rice I've probably ever had was in Lagos, actually. Not meaning that there's not fantastic jello fries in the other two countries, but the best one that I happened to have had was in Lagos. Kind of spicy, pretty good.

Tobi;

Okay. Generally, from your travels across Africa, where to you has the best food scenes, the best restaurants, best coffee shops?

David;

South Africa is an obvious example that has good food. I like some of the food I came across in Madagascar, in Antananarivo. And in West Africa, I'm going to say Lagos and Accra draw, just to be diplomatic. But there are certainly some very cool places in both. And I've noticed that, I mean, clearly in Lagos, Some things happened in the last few years because there's been a kind of a mushrooming of places, some of them very high end, which, you know, have limited use for me. But, you know, there is clearly some interesting stuff happening.

Tobi;

Finally, Labour or the Tories, who do you think will win the next UK general elections?

David;

Labour.

Tobi;

Thank you, David Pilling. It has been a pleasure to have you on Ideas Untrapped.

David;

Thanks, Tobi. I really enjoyed it.



This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe

In this podcast episode, Tobi interviews Rasheed Griffith - who is the CEO of The Caribbean Progress Institute, and host of The Rasheed Griffith Show explores the adaptability and policy implementation in smaller countries compared to larger ones, noting that smaller nations can change more swiftly due to simpler institutional structures. Rasheed contrasts this with larger countries like China and India, where changes, although rapid, are often driven by cultural homogeneity and authoritarian governance, which may not be desirable in Western democracies. The discussion also touches on the impact of leadership and institutional capacity on economic development, emphasizing that the quality of governance often outweighs the mere structure of political systems in influencing a country's developmental trajectory.

You can listen to episodes of Rasheed's brilliant podcast (The Rasheed Griffith Show) here. You can also subscribe to the Carribean Progress Institute newsletter here, where you can read many interesting and important writings.

Transcript

Tobi;

Welcome to the show, Rasheed.

It's great to talk to you.

I want to start with something that you mentioned in our first conversation, which has stayed with me. I haven't been able to stop thinking about it since, which is that small countries are somewhat more amenable to change than big countries. You know, when we talk about ideas and policies and economic development,

I just want you to expand on that a bit. I know I'm paraphrasing, but I want you to expand on that a bit.

Why do you suppose that is?

Rasheed;

Small countries have less people to influence politically, economically, socially. So ideas can spread faster and ideas can spread deeper in small countries. So for example, if you have a country like Nigeria, you have over 200 million people, you have vast, vast institutions that are captured or incentivized in very radically complex ways.

Compare that to a country like Saint Lucia that has 180,000 people. Very small institutions, very small number of schools, very small number of just social actors.

For the difficulty of idea spread and idea capture, it's a lot less in a very small place, and yet these are still essentially independent sovereign UN vote countries that have as much rights in that league as Nigeria.

You know, Walmart...Walmart in the US has more employees than all of Saint Lucia has population. Or even Saint Vincent, or even Trinidad, Walmart has more employees.

So, when you talk about turning the ship of these small countries, it's a lot less complicated than trying to influence Nigeria or Ethiopia or the US or Canada.

Tobi;

I want to square that a bit with what we saw in China in the last 40 years.

China is obviously a very large country and some people would say that it went through a process of rapid change, I mean, after the 1978 reforms. How did a country like China and to some extent what we are seeing in India recently, do you think that having, even if you're a big country, having a homogenous culture, language, ethnic population, does that also help speed up the process of change.

China, obviously, communism being the central guiding ideology and of course, majority of the population is Han Chinese. And we're seeing Modi, you know, rally around Hinduism as the national identity of the country. So, how does homogeneity play in here? And you see some pretty screwed up small countries, you know, Haiti…

What are the constraints and what are the catalysts?

Rasheed;

So China is obviously a good example, but China didn't just transform itself via ideas. It transformed itself via a dictatorship. And I think most people would not want that trade-off. You know you go to Shanghai, [which] I've been to many times, you go to Shanghai and you say “it's so great here, the transportation is fantastic the skyline is amazing, all this happened in 30 years” but then the problem is this; the way [and] how it's done, the effects, the results are quite spectacular but for most people in Western countries, you are not willing socially, morally, to make that trade-off even if the trains are so nice. Because you don't want to have the authoritarian system that China has.

So, you know, you can describe China as communist and of course the party structure is very Leninist communist structure [but] of course how the economic stuff operates is very open in terms of price mechanisms that you typically find in other capitalist operation. But, you know, don't make no mistake, this was a very harsh trade-off that the Chinese people did not have a chance to make particularly because they had a very authoritarian, still has a very authoritarian party.

And I would also say that a lot of the transformation of China that has happened it wasn't particularly directed by the party. People always use Deng Xiaoping as the start point for the opening up policy. But when you look at the proper historical literature, he really just allowed the people to do what they were starting to do already.

The market reforms were a very bottom up process. So it wasn't like they kickstarted the actual change themselves. As usual, it's a market system that happened first. So, again, I don't think in Western countries that have a history of democracy, a history of institutions, history of social liberties would want the kind of trade-offs needed that China used to rapidly push in one direction.

Now, India is tricky because India, of course, had a lot of growth, but India has very weak institutions. You know, when you are there on the ground, there is a massive difference between India and China, even states like Bangalore, for example, or New Delhi.

It is still quite a developing country because there's so much development, the numbers kind of look good but in my opinion no unit, no particular place itself can be called developed yet and a lot of the really massive growth in India… again, its government has not really been very good at capacity building, although at some measurements of state capacity India still runs very high for some strange reason but it is always a bottom-up process in India. However, depends on where you go in India, again, there are some parts that are still very far, far behind and some parts that are very, you know, far forward.

Again, same in China. You go to Western China, it's as poor as it was 50 years ago. Because those are big places, very big populations, it's very difficult to look at macro measurements as like default indicators, whereas if you go from Shanghai to even like Jiling, it's a very, very, very difference in economic proportionalities.

Tobi;

Yeah.

It brings me to this question of democracy versus autocracy in the context of economic development. As you know, a lot of African countries, especially around 20, 25 years ago, after a very long history of military coups and dictatorships, started democratising, you know. And if I use Nigeria as an example, the challenge and why there seem to be a pining for autocracy, especially if you look across and, you know, compare what East Asia was able to do, there seem to be no continuity.

For example, in Nigeria, the way I describe Nigeria is bad ideas are immortal, but good ideas have no continuity, right? So what is the nuance, precisely, in this democracy versus autocracy debate when you want to kickstart development and sustain it, you know, and try to reach for high income?

Rasheed;

See, it really depends on what people mean when they say democracy, because oftentimes I get the sense people really mean just voting and competitive elections.

Is that what you mean by democracy or they mean something deeper?

Tobi;

Well, that's a good distinction because I think loosely we use democracy basically to mean that, okay, you have cyclical elections, you have a constitution that grants people relative freedom, on paper, in practice might actually be very different. You have a somewhat independent judiciary and there is separation of powers.

So that's how I would describe what I'm talking about.

Rasheed;

I see that's tricky, right? Because England does not have separate powers. It doesn't have a separate judiciary. People still call it democratic. So it's a complicated question there.

Also they don't even have an actual constitution either.

Tobi;

Yeah, they don't. I'm fascinated by how that works, by the way, but i'll say maybe from the 2000s upward, most new states or newly democratising states have gone for the American-style presidential system, you know, and i feel like that is part of the struggle with a lot of states especially in Africa. For example in Nigeria, after independence it was a parliamentary system of government then there was the war and the coups and then during the second republic we kind of went the way of the American presidential system and then there's always this constant debate about: do we really have a federal system, how do we handle things like state independence, how do you balance minority rights versus rule of majority, right?

Now, for states that have opted for this American federal system, you know, without having the same history and the same institutions, they seem to struggle. And I'm trying to understand why.

Rasheed;

So the basic premise on which you structure your electoral process is not enough to govern a country. And new states tend, by definition obviously, don't really have a history of institutional capacity behind the electoral process. And many states probably of course in African states, also even Latin American states to be honest, they never actually stabilise on a particular path of institutional growth, capacity building, and so on. So you can look at Nigeria, Burkina Faso, you can even look at Peru or look at Guatemala and Nicaragua, these countries have very constant states of flux all the time. And, you know, a lot of that is obviously a remnant of how the independence movement happened and what happened after independence and things were essentially kind of, you know… the the way how the state itself was set up, the initial premises, obviously caused a lot of problems going forward but it's [a] difficult question because in my mind the literal category of electoral process you have isn't really that important.

The important thing is who are actually working in the governance mechanisms.

What kind of people are working in the public sector?

What kind of trainings do they have?

What are their histories?

How much power do they have to actually form ideas and make choices and so on?

Those things are the more critical things in governance, not the electoral process per se.

Well, yes, we need to have an electoral process that is fair, but so what?

I mentioned in England, they don't have a separate court, really, up until 10 years ago in 2013.

The parliament and legislature are the same thing, they don't really have that either, the separation…so you don't need, even in theory, to have these things all separate. But the difference is that in England the institutions that govern so you manage your finance and treasury so on, they have very high capacity people and they are allowed to make decisions and the people in charge follow the decisions that they make because they have these reviews they have these regulations that affect how you make choices in governance. Where[as] in new countries, they don't have these things, they don't have these systems of stability. I don't know how one creates these things because these are such old states, we really have no idea how these things form themselves. You could say, yeah, if there was one very strong impactful leader who happens to be governing very well, then yeah, let's pass forward. You know, we all use the Singapore example but that's a minefield full of history. There's nothing you can do to create the conditions to make that happen.

You can say also maybe Rwanda, maybe, is another example - Kagame - of this, but again, before Kagame, there's no way to a priori determine if a particular strong leader will actually be a good governor. You can't decide those things a priori you kind of have to go with the luck of the choices. So I don't have a good answer to you because I think no one has a good answer to that question.

How do you build institutional capacity in countries that don't have it and have never had it that well is probably the most important question in development economics that no one actually tries to think about that much or at least outside of very niche academic circles.

Tobi;

Another thing that comes to my mind is the people question - speaking about the policies themselves, I know you can't separate it from the people, but a lot of policies especially around economic governance is more towards socialism and leftist ideas… I can say for Nigeria and of course a lot of African states.

So my question then is, did colonialism, for example, or the history of exploitation, especially in countries that have a history of such, did it make capitalism a bit of a tough sell?

You know, because during the Cold War and before that, the fight for independence and the liberation of these states was supported by the communist bloc and there was a lot of knowledge transfer, there was a lot of personnel transfer within that period. Was that why we still have this persistence in terms of socialist ideas which are clearly not working but are very very difficult to get rid of. Nigeria is going through a period of extremely high inflation and macroeconomic distress right now, and what you still hear from the people that are responsible for policies are still the same ideas that we have tried that have failed.

A Lot of Statism, A Lot of Protectionism.

Why do these ideas have such persistence?

Is it history?

Rasheed;

So history is a very, very big part of it.

So you pointed out that the decolonial movement, a lot of the ideas were anti-colonial powers.

That was the basic premise. England, France did this, therefore we need to do X, something different. And at the same time, as you mentioned, at the time, a lot of the Soviet bloc, East bloc at the time, were communists, very pure communists. Then that kind of influence also went towards their anti-imperialism, which was again, anti-Western.

So everything kind of fused into one thing.

I don't know, really, how much you can call it anti-capitalist, I think it's most anti-imperialism and by default it means anti-Western institutions and I'm trying to sort of grouped in capitalism as the exploitation, you know, is clearly not a very strong argument of course but that's what they did and the same thing happened in Caribbean, same thing happened in Latin America and it still persists the same way also in Latin America, also in Caribbean, also Africa.

And the persistence is really a matter of ideology. You can't really think outside your own ideology if you don't have any interest in thinking outside your own ideology. So [the] leadership who come up [is] all Marxist training, all socialist training, very anti-imperialism, those kind of things, and they don't have any instinct to think about alternatives that they would never try.

But in Tanzania, after Nyerere, the next president, I think it's Mwinyi, I don't remember his name properly unfortunately, he was much more pro-market.

And why was that?

I don't know, actually.

It can't be education. He had the same, essentially, education notice as Nyerere, and Nyerere was a shrugging, you know, socialist believer.

So what was the difference between those two people?

I don't know that much about it.

But he had an instinct that was much more pro-market, pro-capitalist, pro-freedom, where he really transformed […] policies in Tanzania. And his son is now the president of Zanzibar and again [with] that same instinct of openness and more free market liberal policies. So you see that now play out in Zanzibar.

So you have an instance where the two leaderships, one family, has had a massive impact on these policies.

But why do they have these different views?

It's hard to say.

Why does Kagame, for example, have the view of more liberal policies while having also very strong, strong, state arms on security and so on. Economically, he has more liberal policies. He doesn't have any distinct, highly distinct educational backgrounds, not much, but instinct-wise, he is very liberal.

Why is that?

These are the kind of questions I think people don't really grapple with. Because it's not a theoretical issue. It's a leadership problem. So why do leaders that should come up in African states, but again, same for Latin America, same thing in Caribbean. Like, why don't more of the people who have more liberal instincts go to vie for leadership in countries like these where we live?

I don't know.

But that's the key point.

That's the key change.

The people that have an instinct of liberalism must lead the countries.

Tobi;

Sticking with the colonial question, as someone who work with ideas, I really want to know what is the persuasive framing for this debate around exploitation and growth, right?

You have this movement, not just individuals, who are absolutely convinced that not just modern economic growth that started with the industrial revolution was built on slavery, but that the extension of that or the correspondence of that period with colonialism was the instrumental thing. It's a bit similar to the 1619 project in the history of capitalism in America. And this group of people, sometimes very loud, are absolutely convinced that they are right.

And they use history as their evidence.

Do you want to deny that X happened?

Of course it did.

How then can you say that it was this exploitation that gave these people prosperity and obviously retarded us?

What is the place of better balance in that debate? And what do you think is the persuasive framing to make people understand that exploitation by itself is not what gives you productivity? You can't really exploit your way to TFP growth.

Rasheed;

These are two different questions.

The first part is the historical thing.

Now, the historical problem is very challenging because the people who are based on the idea that the colonial exploitation is the thing that made the West rich and the thing that made Africa poor versus people like me or, I guess, you that have the view that, no, that was not the base reason. The problem is coming to a centre point is that we exist in two different planets, unfortunately. Because history happened. It's in the living past but how you interpret history is the really important aspect of it.

So you say, oh, they use history. They don't use history. They use interpretations of history. And it’s similar on our side as well.

But the problem is that it's very difficult to get someone to drop their interpretation of history for a different interpretation of history when they have emotional resonance towards their own interpretation.

It's very difficult.

In some cases, perhaps even impossible. If you have a very strong view on this topic, it's very difficult for people to change your view because it's not actually based on fact it's based on interpretation. Because, again, ideology is almost like a religious view at that point in time but it's not actual quote-unquote fact. Now people, the general audiences, don't have as much strong view as someone who has a firm ideological commitment on the view and that is usually people you need to target.

Because they don't really know the names, they don't really have any dates, they don't understand the actual contours of the argument, they just come up hearing something all the time and those are people that have a better chance of changing their mind on things. And especially in Africa, especially in the Caribbean, this argument about historical exploitation of colonial capitalism is the reason why the country is poor is extremely persistent in a very perverted way and I feel in some ways the governments that currently exist…

I think some of them do really believe that's true but I also think many especially in the Caribbean where I'm from use it as an absolution. They don't want to really put any hard work to get things done so they admit this argument and say hey it's not our fault it's 200 years ago fault. Therefore, that’s why we can’t get anything done properly now.

So they kind of absolve themselves of responsibility in the present by using history, bad history, as a clutch. At least, in the Caribbean I know that’s true and Africa also, I can’t really say definitively. So that's the big issue.

Now, on the other side, in terms of the present and what has changed or and what has not? Again, if particular leaderships don't have an instinct of liberal change, i don't know if there's any education you can do, particularly speaking, to change their minds about how things should be done. Especially also [somebody] who have so much power, so i think it's very difficult in that situation that's why I'm saying when it comes to changing big countries it's so hard because the entrenchment is so deep that where do you pull levers to get things done? Who's actually in charge of this particular thing? You don't know.

In small countries you know exactly who's in charge of what, from when, and who they know, why they know it, and so on. So the tapestry which you can go about plotting change is a lot more direct in small countries. In big countries, it's a lot more difficult.

But I say I'm telling you, the thing you have to do is obviously encourage the spread of more liberal ideas, but in reality, the really, really key things that the people who go up and try to transform states, they need to have the gut instinct of liberal thinking.

Tobi;

That brings me to reparations and one of my favourite essays of yours. Uh, the reparations movement if we can call it that has gained some traction obviously in the Caribbean of course, and to some extent, perhaps not as loud, in Africa as well. What is your case against reparations?

Rasheed;

Reparations is based on a few things at the same time and I think people really kind of fuse it all together as one argument. And I say that in the Caribbean part because that's the most vocal element of the British Reparations Caribbean-Africa, a lot of it actually is very Caribbean-driven which is actually very surprising because the Caribbeans do a lot better off than African states on any metric.

But again, it's not too surprising given that the very most famous books about the exploitation argument is How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, which is a very famous book actually written by a Caribbean person.

So I suppose it's not too surprising when it's a Caribbean-led movement in that sense.

Now, the arguments are based on history, economics, and philosophy. Those are the three primary basic categories of the argument.

The history argument is simple in the sense that sugar plantations in the Caribbean were the main economic engine of industrialisation in England. That is the really core argument. But the problem here is you can look back in economic data to see how big the sugar industry was as a percentage of all industry in the UK at that time, the 1700s and early 1800s but, you know, mostly late 1700s. You can look back at data and see at best, sugar production was about two percent of overall income in England. That's very very small. That's as much as other industries, for example like agriculture, for example, like imports of copper from Ireland is about also 2%. But no one makes the argument that copper imports from Ireland was the reason why you had industrialisation in the UK.

No one makes that argument.

So why make the argument sugar?

You can go back to, for example, and see things like the amount of slave trading you could get. You should also see numbers and impact and revenue numbers.

All these data are collected. England, luckily, was very anal about numeric analysis of their economy and their systems so if you go in the British archives [there’s] so much written, captured reporting on numbers through time. One of my favourite time series is the Millennium Time series by the Bank of England that goes back A Thousand Years of Economic Growth in the UK.

So you can make accurate measurements of all these things going back a thousand years and definitely 300 years. When you read the arguments of the pro-reparations people about the economic impact, you will notice they never actually give a good economic analysis of the sugar production to impact in the UK.

They literally never mention actual econ numbers on these things.

They say, yes, this happened, believe me.

And they go as far as saying, if you don't believe me, you're racist.

That's also part of the argument, it's literally in the books. I have it in my essay. Another aspect is the… let's call it the philosophical or moral argument. I think at this point anyone would say, slavery was bad, it was evil. Okay. I don't think people debate this. I don't debate it, at least. But they leap and say therefore you owe me money and that therefore is where all the work needs to be done and they don't actually do the work. Because of the Caribbean centre argument, it's a very difficult one to do. Because, again, the Caribbean is actually doing decently well. It's not doing great, you know, comprehensively like Singapore, Taiwan, sure, okay, but it's doing good.

And if you look at the Caribbean data when it comes to this, the bulk of Caribbean economic growth happened in the late 50s, early 60s, late 60s, literally right on the beginning, even before independence and going into very early independence. So the time when it had the most colonial influence still is when it had the most growth.

And then as the colonial influence goes down, growth actually also went down in the Caribbean.So also, you can look at the other counterfactual, which is the Caribbean still has British colonies. You can look at the other counterfactual, which is there are independent Caribbean countries that were part of the British Empire. They are not independent. And at the same time, concurrently, they have Caribbean countries that are still part of the UK, like Bermuda, BVI [British Virgin Islands], Cayman Islands, you know, those countries and all of them are performing better than the equivalent independent Caribbean country.

So if the British part is exploitation, there's something breaking down where the British colonies have better performance than the independent ones and that is very difficult to square off and the reparations debaters or pro-reparations never try to discuss this point either, they always avoid it. Actually I don't even think they even think about it as a thing to think about in that sense.

So then you look at the moral part. Now you realise that the decline in growth happened well into independence, so it can't be the British exploitation that made the growth worse because you were already independent countries when you had a decline in growth after the late colonial period actually growth started to happen. So who's to blame if you're going to blame someone for post-independence growth, given that pre-independence growth was higher?

It has to be the independent countries, not the British.

Black, it's the leaders of those countries that have failed to do good policies to bring up the countries. Again, this is another way to absolve themselves of responsibility.

It's not our fault we have bad policies that don't grow the country. It's 300 years ago that put us on this path, even though most of the growth happened while you were still a colony. So the pro-reparations argument really based on nothing. However, it's ideologically soothing so you think it's good.

Tobi;

That's deep.

How do you reckon that their influence, especially in terms of policies, in terms of how they influence the general direction of what young people think and believe, how would you gauge the influence of the reparations movement, their ideas, their arguments?

Rasheed;

At least in the Caribbean, it's quite, quite impactful.

I think, not I think, every Caribbean country, these are independent English Caribbean countries are pro… as official policy, pro reparations from the UK. All of them.

So it's very impactful.

And I think if you talk to the average person on the street in Barbados or Jamaica, they will likely also be pro reparations too.

They haven't thought about it that deeply, to be clear, but just growing up in this context you will probably also be pro this thing. You know, there are people who are not either, of course, but I say on average people will be more leaning towards, yes, the idea is good and as an official policy that you should get reparations in the independent English Caribbean from the UK. So it's one of the most impactful movements, I think, in the entire region.

Again, it's not new, it's an old movement, but it has had very big impact.

And then on the UK side, it's gaining more traction by, for example, the Labour Party in the UK.

On the UK side, you know, I guess you call it woke liberalism these days as the term people use in America.

That's more why they believe it's correct. Not for any historical reasons either. So when those two things combine themselves you have a very powerful movement.

Tobi;

It will be really hilarious to me, at least, personally, if a pro reparations government actually that comes into power in the UK because I doubt the UK can afford what the reparations government is asking for.

Rasheed;

The thing that the people are, so Labour Party is very likely going to win the next election and they are going to discuss this topic a lot more, but the things that the reparations people are asking for isn't pure money.

I think that's a misconception.

I think maybe years ago that was the main thing they wanted but they're not actually asking for cash per se. So they're asking for things like better education support, perhaps even more scholarships to the UK, they're asking things like better funding for health systems in the Caribbean, they're asking for funding to do like arts and museums to have more African Culture in the Caribbean and people can understand African culture.

Things like that, also for like debt cancellation, things that still cost a lot of money, but they're not necessarily asking for direct cash transfers, particularly speaking.

Tobi;

You follow Latin America pretty closely. Are you bullish on Argentina, especially in the light of Milei's election?

Rasheed;

I think bullish would be a very strong word to use.

I would say, I think Milei has a 30% chance of getting this things done, which is, I think, so high. It's a high chance for Latin America. But I'm not going to use the word bullish. I think that's too strong a word to use in this case. It's a very, very tough road ahead.

I think people are a bit too optimistic about Milei's administration. I like Milei, I love Milei's policies and his administration, but you have to understand in the context of Argentina, the institutions are so captured by Peronist people, socialist interests that is very difficult to get really deep change happen and, of course, also the countervailing forces like the the trade unions for example, the population themselves, generally speaking, is very very pro socialist policies. The different governors in different regions are also often very pro socialist policies. So getting all of that on a correction path is going to be very very difficult.

So because of the different administration levels in Argentina the governors, the trade union leaders, the people working in the public sector, the population, it's still very directionally socialist.

See, saying the word Peronism is difficult in Argentina because Perón himself was actually a lot more liberal than Kirchner. But they're both called Peronists so it's difficult to use that term but the socialist leaning governors and people and so on make it very difficult to get really hardcore liberal change happen in Argentina. So I want it to work to be clear. Now, if he gets the dollarisation plan pushed forward and actually implement dollarisation, I think that would be a very good sign that many other things will get done. But they're really delaying dollarisation and I think they need to push that forward ASAP.

That should be the first thing they've done, but they went a different route to do it.

That was a very incorrect move.

So I wouldn't say bullish, but I'm 30% optimistic about Argentina.

Tobi;

Do you think countries that are poor today or I would say low income, that is below middle income, do you think that they can benefit from this multipolar world where global trade is fracturing and there are now talks of nearshoring and friendshoring. What are the chances that some of the countries that are poor today can, you know, seize those opportunities?

Rasheed;

See, generally speaking, I think these are more concepts in the academic sense than in practical sense.

You hear about nearshoring, for example.

What does nearshoring actually mean?

A lot of manufacturing has really been put in China but that hasn't actually changed in the last two years. People always use the examples of, oh trade between Mexico and the US are going up; okay, fine, yeah, but the manufacturing concentration in China didn't go down. [It’s] still as high as it was. So it's very difficult to really understand what these concepts really mean in practice

I don't think multipolar world makes anyone's life any easier. It probably makes it more difficult. I don't think nearshoring will have a very big impact on anything in the short term. What would happen, or what will happen, is that China, as they go up the income ladder, in theory, will be more expensive to manufacture goods in China, some goods.

Again, these are very basic goods.

It'll be more expensive to manufacture in China and therefore they might go to Bangladesh and so on. The problem there unfortunately is China is still very poor in terms of population proportions. There are 40 percent of China so literally poor. So the next China will still be China in this sense. They already have the baseline manufacturing talent, machinery, managers, you know, chemicals, all the know-how is still there. So they can just essentially push that game for at least 20 more years as things go on.

So I don't know if you want to wait 20 years for China to be completely middle income for thinking about if that kind of near-shore, offshore benefit can benefit countries in Africa, for example, as that's too long a period.

So I don't think that will have a material impact in any way as a strategy particularly to use it as growth in these small, currently poor countries.

Tobi;

Can you see a future where the Commonwealth, for example, can be a trade bloc or maybe even a loose political union like the EU?

If no, why not?

Rasheed;

No.

And the Commonwealth is not a real thing for 50 years.

Like, the only thing, the only thing the Commonwealth has in common is the English language.

Tobi;

That's something.

But go on.

Rasheed;

Well, that's a nice thing, right?

Netherlands speaks English better than some states in the Commonwealth, right?

So that's not enough. There's no core in the system. There's no common policy. There's nothing. There's literally nothing you can do to put Sri Lanka, Barbados, and Canada in the same block politically.

There's nothing you can do.

And no one wants it, it's not going to happen.

Tobi;

Would it be a worthwhile economic project though?

Maybe something like NAFTA? Or…

Rasheed;

No, it would not be. Again, you import things from China, not from, you know, the UK. So if China is not inside the bloc, the goods don't change prices. Also, you export to the US and there's no way the US is going to give you preferential taxes.

Tobi;

We are seeing things flaring up in the Middle East.

There's Russia and Ukraine.

There's Sudan, Central African Republic that is getting really ugly. Do you see a sort of global conflict similar to, say, World War II in the next decade?

Rasheed;

It's obviously very difficult to predict things like that.

If we were to assign a probability, maybe 5% chance, which is, I think, too high, but perhaps 5% chance in a decade.

A decade's not that long, so probably 5% chance.

Tobi;

Final question, which is kind of a tradition on the show. What's the one idea that you would like to see spread everywhere?

It might be your idea. It might be something you're working on. It might be an idea from anywhere.

But what is that one idea that you would like to see gain a lot of prestige, like to see spread, like to see have a lot more influence?

Rasheed;

Small countries should get Rid of Their Local Currency and Use the US Dollar.

Tobi;

Why?

Rasheed;

It is better for them because it doesn't allow their governments to monetarily finance the deficit. It allows you to have more economic freedom because you are not constrained by local capital controls. It also allows obviously low inflation because the U.S. inflation will be there for your inflation. And I trust the U.S. Central Bank a lot more than I trust Nigeria Central Bank, for example. And also it allows you to trade a lot more easier because you don't have to worry about currency exchange risk.

In terms of foreign investment, that's also a lower barrier to entry because foreign investors don't have to worry about things going, spiraling around in Nigeria where they have high inflation, they have exchange rate risk, or if, for example, the government decides, okay, we are going to put laws so you can't take your money out of the country.

So dollarisation is the general term that's used to call this concept I'm talking about. It’s actually one of the most pro-liberal, pro-free market, pro-freedom policies a country can do that doesn't actually require that much work.

Tobi;

That's interesting.

Thank you very much, Rasheed. It's been fantastic talking to you.

Rasheed;

You're very welcome.

This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe

In this episode, I had a conversation with economic historian Johan Fourie, who is a professor of economics at Stellenbosch University, and the author of one of the most enjoyable books on economic history called Our Long Walk to Economic Freedom. We spoke about the resurgence of economic history, particularly in Africa. Johan attributes this revival to multiple factors, including an interest in understanding past economic patterns, technological advancements enabling data analysis, and scholarly work drawing global attention to the field. We discuss Africa's economic development, noting the continent's reliance on primary goods and the impacts of political and economic policies on growth. Johan stresses the heterogeneity within Africa and warns against generalizing the continent's economic narrative.

The discussion then delves into the role of ideas in shaping economies, with a focus on industrial policy. Johan highlights the importance of empirical evidence in policymaking and warns against the potential misuse of industrial policy for political gains. He emphasizes the need for a more inclusive research ecosystem in Africa, advocating for better representation and the promotion of economic history as a vital sub-discipline.

Johan also addresses the importance of economic freedom, defining it in simple terms and discussing its implications in policy decisions. He touches on the challenges of racial history and representation in academia, emphasizing the need for diverse voices and a marketplace of ideas for better policy formulation.

Finally, Johan discusses the optimism inherent in economic history, acknowledging the significant progress humanity has made while remaining cautiously hopeful about the future. He advocates for policies that ensure the equitable distribution of the benefits of increased productivity, highlighting the potential of new technologies to contribute positively to Africa's economic growth.

Transcript

Tobi;

Welcome Johan. It's good to talk to you. I guess where I’ll start is economic history is enjoying a bit of a renaissance, I'd say. Personally, for me, I'll say in the last five years I've read more economic history books and papers than actual economics itself. So I just want to ask you, what was the turning point, at least in recent time, why does economic history seem to be having a moment or its moment right now?

Johan;

I think there are many answers to that question. I'll focus on African economic history because I think that's something, firstly, that I know a little bit of, and secondly, that the factors that affect African economic history might be slightly different than those that make economic history attractive to, kind of, global audience.Although I do think your sentiment is true also for for global economic history, that there's certainly been a resurgence in interest. Of course, they were previous episodes where this also happened in the 1960s there was a great interest in econometrics, but that kind of died down by the 80s and 90s. And certainly I think in the last decade or two that's made a comeback, but certainly in African economic history, also by the 60s and 70s, for different reasons, again, because of the end of the colonial period and many Africans being interested in their own economic pasts;  it was, you know, certainly intended to improve the development outcomes of many of these countries. And so studying what had happened in the past became important. And then by the 80s, you know, for reasons like the shift in history towards more cultural aspects of African history and, perhaps, also, to some extent, the fact that economics became more technical, more mathematical.

The fields really, economic history really, had kind of dialed down interest in Africa's past, but perhaps also to some extent, the fact that many African countries were struggling to grow. And so there was little interest in understanding of why these things had persisted. But by the 2000s, of course, African growth turned around and, you know, this is a continent [where] there were several countries that were growing quite rapidly and you had this covers of The Economist and Time magazine and all that was talking about Africa Rising, all these things, but also, I think, an interest by scholars, often scholars based outside of Africa, to understand this resurgence or what Morten Jerven called the, kind of, recurring African growth. So we know actually in the past that this had happened, that there were periods of growth. But understanding why there are these fluctuations became quite important. And then that combined with the ability to transcribe large historical data sets. Find many of these sources in African archives and then transcribe them and analyze them. So access to computing power also.

So it was both from a demand side like interest in Africa's past and also the supply side, the fact that they were now tools that would help us analyze what had happened in the past, that really kind of created this resurgence or Renaissance as some might call it. Of course, you know, initially led by economists in some of the leading universities. Work by, you know, James Robinson and Acemoglu, Nathan Nunn who wrote a book on slavery that was quite prominent and really pushed interest into the field. And so various kinds of groups of people, you might kind of think of them as two types, the one with the economists interested in kind of causal persistence studies. So thinking of how past shocks still affect the present outcomes and others, who're more kind of classically more like an old school economic historians that are interested in actually understanding long term patterns. So thinking of wages or standards of living or trade statistics that are actually trying to collect them and rebuild them for many African countries, because we don't actually have long term series for many of the regions across Africa. So I think that's really the main reason why we see this kind of renewed interest. And you can see that in, you know, participation of African Economic History Network meetings where you see papers maybe 10 or 15 in the early 2010s. And now you have, you know, the most recent conference in Pretoria was about 100 people attending. So it's a really massive growth in the participants and researchers trying to study Africa's past.

Tobi;

What immediately comes to mind, and when I talk to people, ordinary Africans, I should say, is that how did Africa sort of missed the boat on prosperity? I mean, as you said in your answer, growth has been recurring in Africa, but it has not been sustained enough for Africa to really join that group of countries that had a sustained growth spurt for decades. It happened a little bit in Latin America. Of course, East Asia is the most famous example of this. I mean from history what happened in Africa? 

Johan;

Yeah, I think the thing to stress is that Africa's experience has been quite different from, say, you know, a Western Europe, or if you want to take the kind of country where it'll started… this sustained period of economic growth - Britain or, you know, England more specifically. So what you find is you also find periods of quite rapid growth in Africa. But then, as you've just mentioned, there are periods of stagnation or even decline in many countries. I mean, that's a very valid question, is why is that? And again, there are, you know, a myriad of different reasons. I think one of the things that one should keep in mind is that Africa's economies are often tied very closely to kind of mineral resources, and even before that, before the mineral era, to cash crops. And these prices often fluctuate quite a lot. And so you would find periods when there's a boom cycle, you would find obviously countries doing quite well. But then when these prices collapse, then of course these countries suffer. So that's a very obvious reason. And of course there are other countries in the world that also are tied to kind of cash crops or minerals, and they seem to have experienced less of this. And that is also, of course, true.

But it's worth keeping in mind that for many African countries, they have a pretty short history of independence. So it's really only in the last 70 years or so that African countries are independent and where the economic policies are not determined by some, you know, European power. Of course, you can think of pre-colonial times before the kind of mid-19th century, but even then, these were mostly kind of subsistence based or focused on trade in commodities, cash crops and, even before that, of course, in slave individuals. So it's really only in the last 70 years that we can think really of kind of modern economic growth in many of these economies. And then, for example, think about industrialization, you know, growth of manufacturing and more recently, service industry. But many countries are still very much tied to primary sector exports and therefore are closely correlated to these international price fluctuations. So that's kind of one reason.

Of course, one could also think of political economy reasons that we see quite also large fluctuations in terms of political regimes. Often we find coups that undermine kind of longterm economic planning. Many people will also argue that, you know, there was involvement of international organizations setting certain rules for African countries, certainly in the 1980s and 1990s [that] put them on a different trajectory. But I think the kind of point is that actually many African countries were relatively young and therefore tied to very much primary goods exports and it's only really in the last 3 or 4 decades where we could see this kind of shift. And in fact, by the 2000, when we do see some growth, I suspect we do see lower levels of fluctuations than we did, say, 50 years earlier. So maybe we’re just too soon yet to think of African countries as echoing some of the trends that we would see elsewhere in Europe, maybe from the early 20th century.

Tobi;

I want you to, like, disentangle this for me a little bit more. So I'll give you one example. There is a famous graph. I think I've made my own versions of it as well of income per capita growth, say, for Nigeria in 1960 and, say, South Korea. And you could see this huge difference as time goes on.

Johan;

Yeah.

Tobi;

And you speak to an average African, and especially in today's world, what you hear is that why can't it be here? You know, what is so different about Africa, especially given the experience of other countries that started seemingly at the same level over the same time period, same 60 years or 50 years, or however it is you want to slice and dice it? So really, what are the factors that we can point at? Because, I mean, this leads to various speculative theories, whether it is culture, corruption or the kind of leaders we have, you know, so many things. So just disentangle for me, what makes Africa… I don't want to say different, but why has growth really been sluggish? 

Johan;

Yeah.

Tobi;

Because people are impatient.

Johan;

Yeah.

No, no, and I understand fully the impatience. I mean, I'm also impatient. Right. And so when I was a student we had many of these issues and now we still have many of these issues and then, you know, you study economics often with the hope to help improve [the] living standards of people obviously in [your] own area, own country, but also across the continent. And yet, you know, it doesn't happen as fast as you hoped it would. I think the one thing to say, first up, is to say Africa is obviously a large continent. So there's also a large variation within the continent. And I think we tend to forget this.

You know, we treat Africa quite often and when I say we, I think scholars often treat Africa is a kind of homogeneous place when we talk about Africa or sub-Saharan Africa. But in fact, there are many, many lessons on the continent where different countries experience very different things at different times. They might be, you know, a stereotype of, in the 80s and 90s things were bad, in 2000 things were better. And so, you know, a generalization guess. But even within that, you know, the fastest growing country in the world in the 1980s and 1990s was Botswana. So there are exceptions to that rule. And I think those are the helpful exceptions, because they help us understand that perhaps these things are not kind of cross-cultural. Right. So it's not the Africa dummy, for example, the famous 1990s papers that try to understand this coefficient that was called the Africa dummy that you would always throw in in Africa coefficient and it would come out negative. And so it seemed to be this universal truth that there were something different about Africa. And the kind of underlying message was that it was something wrong with Africa. But in fact, you know, again, if you look at within continent variation and even within country variation, you find very different stories that there are certain places that are doing quite well and others that are not. And so it can't be just some unilateral thing that's true for the entire continent.

But you are indeed correct, right? So if you look at 1950, 60, South Korea versus African countries, that many African countries, cities, the labour, the average wage rate of unskilled labor in African cities were higher than those in South Korea or several other Asian countries. And so what has happened in the last 50, 60, 70 years that meant that, you know, South Koreans became much more prosperous versus Africans? I think the one thing leads back a bit to the earlier conversation we had about minerals in Africa, had minerals and focused on cash crops. Again, Africa's geography means that there's a lot of variation and so different countries focus on different things. In South Korea, what many thought was a disadvantage in that they weren't any minerals. agriculture is not a main export commodity for South Koreans, which meant that they we're almost forced to go the industrialisation manufacturing route. Right. So focus a lot on education, perhaps bringing in some imports that will allow them to disentangle those things and rebuild them much cheaper and then export them. So an export-oriented view of their industrial policy versus African countries that often try to do their own thing.  

They say, well, we're going to substitute our imports. We're not going to import. We try and build our own factories here, produce our own cars here, models very similar to what had happened in Latin America, which, you know, clearly wasn't the kind of successful model that many had hoped it would be. And so it's in some sense a policy decision of what had happened, what was available, and the potential for growth choosing a sector that perhaps in Africa means some growth in some years. Right. So the minerals again, but in other years stagnation and decline, whereas South Koreans would shift their focus towards really building on the inputs that are necessary for an industrial society. So focusing on education, it's not to say that it wasn't education in Africa in the 50, 60s and early 70s. There was a lot of spending on it. To some extent perhaps too much almost on basic education and too little on the higher education, which is also like those incredibly valuable technical skills that you need mathematics, engineering, you know, to build a manufacturing base. So it's a policy choice. And it, again, kind of linked to the fact that there wasn't immediate successes, meant that there was always an opportunity for political rivals to make the case that change is too slow. Right. So we see in Ghana, for example, Kwame Nkrumah comes to power with promises of growth and in fact does.

In the early 1960s we do see some growth, right, with advice from leading experts, investments in infrastructure, big plant, you know, massive dam that is built, hydropower, but that comes almost too slow. And a few months after the dam is completed, he is replaced in a coup. And so it's the frustration with the slow progress that ultimately puts Africa in this… well, I make the same mistake,  generalisation. But in many African countries, you see this kind of process of growth and then kind of decline, stagnation, either because of declining prices, international prices, or because of local politics that intervene.

Of course, there are many other things to also add to that story, but I think that kind of summarizes it quite well. And the idea now, I think, is by the 2000s, we, again, see this surge in mineral prices. We see a surge in many African countries’ economic growth. But, you know, can that be sustained? In some cases we see in the 2010s it has been sustained. You know, Ethiopia was shifting towards a manufacturing base. Of course, there were other political concerns that had happened since. But in other places like Angola, you know, quite rapidly growing country, but then when the oil price collapsed, again, struggling. So, again, experiencing that volatility that is so characteristic of many African countries. I'm not sure if that answers your question, but that at least is. So, you know, I will just end by saying it's not just something that's innately Africa. I mean, think that's exactly the wrong conclusion to come to because that doesn't help us. Right? So that doesn't leave us with any policy interventions that we can, you know, lessons that we can learn. It basically seems like it's deterministic, it's fatalistic. In fact, that's just, I think, the wrong approach. I think it's really trying to understand what are, in fact, in each country, the reasons that we see growth and then stagnation, and then trying to understand what could be done differently now to prevent that from happening again.

Tobi;

I mean, I will say that I am also guilty of generalization, and I do take your point on variation very seriously. So when I do say Africa, just know that there's a caveat to that. Um, so let's talk a little bit about ideas and the role of ideas. Ideas do not exist in a vacuum. They do have influences. And also in my own experience, I've seen situations where you have scholars making arguments that are highly contextual to their environment, and you see those same ideas being used either in policy or as justification for an existing policy here in Africa, I would say in Nigeria more personally to my own experience. So I'll take one example with industrial policy which is back in fashion right now, and you see arguments from … I mean also quite relevant to a recent blog post. Industrial policy is really, really, sexy right now. It's in fashion and many people are talking about it in the context of what is happening in the United States, in Europe, in China. But the point is, over here in Africa, in Nigeria specifically, we've been here before. Industrial policy works rather differently here. And what I mean by that is, it is very, very sensitive to capture, you know. But you do not get that carefulness when scholars are making such recommendations, you know, so it's always like industrial policy works and if you are against it, you are an ideologue. So the role of ideas, especially, also historically, post-independence, you talked about this a little bit in your book, how ideas influenced the trajectory of growth and social development generally in Africa, of course with variations, I know.

Johan; 

Oh, yeah.

And I think that's a great point, is that ideas do matter. Right. And sometimes you do feel like you're swimming against the tide when you make a case for, you know, let's use the example of industrial policy, when you make a case for, well, we should be cautious for using certain industrial policies in countries like South Africa or Nigeria, when, you know, you're indeed right that everyone seems to be on the bandwagon of yes, industrial policy can work and should be implemented if you are at all concerned about, you know, development or growth. And that's very difficult. And I must also add that you're also right that politicians in a very rational way, from their perspective, abuse some of these ideas, right? So they choose which ideas suit them in a specific context. You can always find an economist that, you know, would be able to convince you of a certain policy. Right. If you think of kind of labour policy like minimum wages, you can find economists that will say, yes, minimum wages is a great thing. And then you would find someone that would cite the first year textbook saying, no, it's a terrible thing, right?

My hope, I guess, and I'm not sure this is in fact viable, but it is that we move increasingly towards a more empirically based, and certainly economics has done that over the last two decades. To focus on what can we actually prove? Maybe we've gone a little bit too far. But the idea that we can actually test whether, you know, something like a minimum wage works is a very useful way of saying, okay, well, instead of focusing too much on theory and making certain assumptions and thinking what might happen, let's see what has happened in the past and potentially then make decisions based on that. Industrial policy, in fact, as you say, that there's a new literature on this, and many of these scholars actually make the same claim and say that we haven't actually indeed tested the impact of industrial policies to any great extent. And the cases where it has happened, we find actually evidence that in some cases it worked and in others it hasn't. And so understanding when it works and when you know when to say works mean really leads to actually, you know, economic growth and where it really seems to have made very little difference.

We need to understand why that is. And this is really where history is very valuable, that you can construct the theory and test it in one setting, and it seems to have a positive impact. But if you use that same theory and test it somewhere else and it doesn't, then clearly we need something more in that theory, right? We need to have the factors that affect the success, the outcome of these policies. We need to understand what they are. And this is really where context, I think, is incredibly important. I think some of that just to, kind of, you know, make the point about industrial policy. One of the things that seem that these new authors, [when] I say new authors, they, you know, they are not young authors necessarily, but they’re returning a discussion on industrial policy that, perhaps, was lost for a decade or two. I think what they have now agreed on is that, [and] one of the things that I find striking is that actually it's more likely to work in big countries than in small countries, and that almost all countries in Africa are small. And so that's something very important think to take note of, which also to me is a signal that we should be more cautious than optimistic about the likely effect of these policies. But as I've just said previously, politicians tend to also abuse, you know, these things. And certainly from a political economy perspective, for a politician, an industrial policy seems like something that can sell to voters. So to say that I am going to build a, you know, special economic zone and we're going to attract X number of jobs. And, you know, I'm going to be at the ceremony where I can cut the ribbon and show you that this has been done. That is a very, very attractive thing. Whether that actually in 5 or 10 years down the line have any impact, that's a very separate thing. And by the end, the politician’s probably not really in the game anymore.

And I think, my sense is, I'm not sure this is what the authors have said, but my sense is that that is far more likely to happen in a small country than in a much bigger economy. So that's partly why I think in smaller countries, with smaller I don't necessarily mean, you know, few people, I mean low GDP per capita, I think politicians have a greater ability to exploit the weaknesses of industrial policy than in larger economies. And so that's why I am a little bit wary of these policies. That's, again, not to say that the state shouldn't have any involvement in the economy. Right. So they are certainly places where the state, of course, it should provide public infrastructure. Right. So, you know, no private sector should just have 100% authority on what infrastructure is built. The state has an incredibly important role there, and that inevitably does imply industrial policy. If you choose between an airport or a harbour or, you know, new a telecommunications cable or whatever, that's an industrial choice that you make. So it's inevitable that you're going to make industrial policy choices. But I think where it gets to policies here where you can have politicians exploit that for their own benefit, I think one should be very cautious, right, where it’s, you know, favoring certain industries with tax policies or these kinds of things that just seems like you're setting yourself up for failure.

Tobi;

I mean, still on that particular idea and the role of ideas generally, one could also come to my mind and that I'd like you to help me understand historically is the issue of state control. Because I mean, like the title of your book, and a theme that you consistently explored throughout the book, the importance of economic freedom seem to be something that a lot of African countries struggle with.

There is an overwhelming sense that the state has to be involved in everything, not just the political life, the economic life, the social life. And sometimes I find that very contradictory, especially given the history of repression that happened all over the continent with slavery and colonialism. So how has this evolved into what it is now? Why is economic freedom or the idea of freedom generally, but don't want to see freedom because no democracy is quite popular. You cannot struggle to find democratic movements anywhere in Africa. So, but, especially getting the government relatively out of the economic life, why is it such — sometimes you feel like it's a taboo idea. It's almost unAfrican to even suggest it. You’re labelled a libertarian or a neoliberal. You are someone that is bringing unrealistic ideas that is not African.

Johan;

Yeah.

Tobi;

So, where did that come from?

Johan;

Yeah. So I think that's a great, great question. It's something that I've thought about a lot. And sadly I don't think I have an easy answer. I think where economic history can help… So so let me start with economic freedom before I get to where history can help is, you know, there are many different definitions of what economic freedom is. Mine would be very simple. And that is that you've got the freedom to choose what you produce, how much you produce and what you consume, and how much you consume and from whom you consume. And so that's a very simple definition, but it's a very valuable definition when you think about any state policy or government policy. You know, if there's an increase in taxes, does that remove people's freedom to produce or consume, or does it add to their freedom to produce or consume? Almost always, when the state enacts a new policy, it seems like it removes people's freedom. If you raise the tax rate, obviously, so let's say you've got a value added tax, if you increase that, obviously you remove people's ability to consume, right? Because they now have to pay more to the government. And so prices increase and therefore they can consume less.

Industrial policy often means that it benefits one sector, but at the cost of others. Then you have to weigh up the freedoms to produce for different sectors in the economy. In my own country, of course, for very long, black South Africans before 1994, they were forced to live in certain areas. They were forced to own certain land in certain areas, they were forced to buy from certain retail stores and not from others. So it's a very, very clear limitation on their economic freedom and the, kind of, to some extent, ironies of post 1994 is that for the area that was considered white South Africa before 1994, these freedoms, well, these unfreedoms were removed. So they gained the freedom, black South Africans in those areas, but actually in many of the former homelands, the previous unfreedoms, right, so, because, again, there, you're not allowed to own private property in many of those places, there is traditional systems that stood in place, property owning systems, you actually see that those unfreedoms have remained.

So if you look at a map of South Africa today, a third of South Africans still live in the former homelands, the only way you really escape from those unfreedoms is if you move to the cities, right? And so it's a very useful way, I think, to think about the underlying things that allow you to prosper. The underlying factors, the ability to consume and produce what you want. You know, the kind of classic Adam Smithian invisible hand that should be able to be dictated by market forces. Now, again, that's not to say that the state has no role to play, but every additional policy that the state intervenes with does have limitations on freedom, and one should keep that in mind. Now, of course, you know, certain state policies promotes freedom, right? So in South Africa we have a large grant system. So we tax the very wealthy part of the population. It's actually one of the largest transfers anywhere in the world. We tax the rich and we provide grants, 350 rands a month, to the poorest of the poor. A very well targeted grant, I must add as well. So that lifts the freedom of the poorest, which is correct. Right. That's exactly what the purpose is. It provides them with some form of income which allows them to buy the basic necessities. So I would argue that actually a pro-freedom policy, even though it's a state policy, it's not determined by the markets. But in many other cases, we find where policies are actually doing the opposite. They actually promote coercive involvement in the economy. And actually that leads to inefficiency, which is, you know, terrible for promoting prosperity, for annihilating poverty, all of these kind of things that we actually care about.

And then to kind of get back to your question about whether this is, again, like, something very uniquely African, I don't think that it's something that is particular to this continent. I think even if you just look around the world today there are unfreedoms everywhere in many countries. But I also think if you just look in history and this is really why I think the study of economic history is so important, that this was true for almost any society before the 1800s. So, basically, the state was there to kind of coerce people into producing certain things and consuming certain things. And it's only through a very kind of slow process over decades and centuries that these freedoms were relaxed. Right? Often competing elites and, you know, the one elite will promote the freedom the other one wouldn't. And then ultimately, these economic freedoms were relaxed. It was combined with the opening up of democratic freedoms and political freedoms, which, as you have rightly mentioned, is something that is very valuable in Africa. Right. And that's exactly why we want to promote that further, right? That people ultimately have the right to vote against policies that limit their economic freedom. And so I am kind of optimistic that ultimately, you know, again, this won't happen next year or the year after, but that more democratic freedoms will lead to greater economic freedom. But of course, with kind of a large confidence bound. Right. So there will be some variations. Some countries will slip back becoming more authoritarian or coercive, and others will hopefully allow people their economic freedom. And then those should act as lessons for other countries who suffer from the poorer standards of living, to hopefully see what is happening elsewhere, and then learn from that and enact the right kind of policies.

Tobi;

My next question is a bit of a two part question. So the first part would be if you look at the policy circle today, I'll say it's been, you know, monopolised by the development industry or development community. So you do not get a sense that policymakers think that we can learn anything from economic history. So if you can just tell me a few things that you think economic history can teach us, especially on development.

Johan;

Yeah. I think you're right to say that there are many policymakers who don't even know about economic history. So maybe that's a good start, right? 

Tobi;

Yeah.

Johan;

Ecause it's not a field, a subdiscipline of economics that is very well known. But I think to make the case for it is to say, we are all humans and often the only way we learn is by telling stories. If you're a politician and you cite statistics to an audience, no one's going to remember the statistics, right? Then certainly if you tell them something about economic theory, they're not going to remember that, but they are going to remember stories. I mean, I think politicians know this very well. […] has called this analogical reasoning. So you take some event in the past and you turn it into a story analogy for today, and you repeat that story, and then people tend to get on board. Right. And so the famous example, of course, is the Great Depression that was used as an analogy for the Great Recession in 2007. You know, Ben Bernanke, who had been a student of the Great Depression, could tell that story to policymakers, to the public, and convinced them that, actually, what happened in the 1950s, you know, there were these different policy interventions that were illthought through and ultimately had bad consequences, and we should do something different. So quantitative easing in 2007/08 was the, kind of, response to that. And, in fact, that was why it turned out to be a recession and not a deep depression for many years.

So those I think are valuable. So your question is about, you know, what do we learn about development? You know, this is massively broad. So but I want to return to the to the industrial policies of Latin America and to some extent many African countries. Where you find these import substituting policies that were implemented. This idea that, you know, we should make our own stuff, we should build our own cars, we should build our own manufacturing, our toys, our own manufactured goods. And then that will give us, you know, the factories that will ultimately lead to an industrial workforce and, you know, make us prosperous. That's a very attractive story to tell, right. And think, by the 1950s, many of the leaders in Latin America and in 60s in Africa could tell these stories because they could witness what had happened, say in the Soviet Union, maybe even an illinformed opinion about what was happening in China. And this gave them the stories to convince their electorate or their constituents that this was really the way forward. Right. And the attraction there that it's an active intervention, right, that we can do something about it as a state rather than just say, you know, laissez-faire and things would go on as normal. The sad reality is that, actually, agriculture in Africa was doing quite well by the 1950s and 60s. It would have been far more sensible thing to support those sectors - and these were African farmers doing very well, they were producing for the international market, they were exporting their goods - instead of taxing them.

So, what was the ultimate implementation of the policy was that agriculture got taxed with the intention to build these factories of manufactured goods that were clearly, you know, inefficient and failed dismally. But in fact, if agriculture had been supported, you could have imagined a very different outcome. And I think that's really a lesson that hopefully we don't see a repeat of what we did in the 1950s and 60s. But there are, of course, many, many other lessons as well. Education. You can think of health spending. You can think of various kinds of monetary policies and, you know, high levels of debt. With the expectation that they will be very high growth many countries borrowed excessively. And then when the growth didn't materialize, then, of course, they fell into massive debt and they had to cut back and there were all these structural adjustment programs.

So almost in any subfield of economics I think there are lessons from the past that you can learn. I think that the challenge that economic historians have is to sell those, right, to sell those lessons in a way that is attractive to a policymaker and to a broader public, because I don't think there's enough of us that's trying to do this. This is partly what I'm trying to do through the blog. But of course, you know, this is only one blog and I don't have any direct links to governments, but I hope that there would be a new generation of African economic historians who would be able to do that, that would be able to tell these stories. And so, you know, I've studied what happened in Ghana. There's great work being done by Emanuel [...], for example, at Harvard on this period. And so taking those lessons and saying, you know, what is it that we can learn from this for industrial policy today? I think that would be a wonderful contribution to economics, rather than simply saying, okay, you know, let's just look at what economic theory tells us. Not to say that that's unimportant, but I don't think that's how you sell policy interventions to politicians, because ultimately what they want is they want the narrative, they want the story - how do I convince my electorate or my constituents that this is the right thing to do? And so we need to be storytellers. And I think Africans are great storytellers. We just need to tell the right stories. So, hopefully we can see that happening in the next couple of years.

Tobi; 

One of the things I like most about your work is not just the output itself, but the kind of research ecosystem that you're building around you, and how do we get more of that in Africa? How do we expand the research ecosystem? Not in an exclusionary way, but I think it helps bring the evidence, the practice, closer to the policy and the politicians and the other people of social influence that matters. So, what are the levers to pull to expand economic research, scientific research and other things in Africa generally?

Johan;

Yeah, I think there are multiple levels to answer that question. The first is, I mean, if there are any listeners that are keen, you know, that are economists or historians and keen on economic history, then signing up to the African Economic History Network, for example, where every year there's a conference and that network is supported by some of the leading economic historians of Africa, often based in Europe or the US, some also on African soil. And that is a scholarly environment where you can really get to the frontier of what is happening in the field. So that would be a great first step, I think, even for students, right, that are, you know, keen to follow this kind of path of economics or economic history and just to see what's happening at the frontier. So that would be. But of course, and I've mentioned before, there is quite a lot of, still, education spending and high levels of literacy in Africa. But often where we lack is the higher education level, and even at the higher education level, we don't really see this kind of broad-based approach rather than a focus on specialisation. So I do think that there's scope for African universities to expand their offering of economic history specifically, but also focus on economics.

And here I should mention, Leonard Wantchekon at Princeton, who is investing an incredible amount of time and resources in building what he calls the African School of Economics, right? So he started in Benin and then expanded to other West African countries and now he's also planning to do this in East Africa and Southern Africa, which is an incredible, you know, achievement to build these universities from scratch, to engage students in there, and then hopefully some of the best students, to send them to the US, to top universities. And to build, really, a cohort of new trained economists in some of the frontier fields of their disciplines. And hopefully those economists could either stay in the US and train more students or come back to Africa and become policymakers themselves, or at least interact with policymakers. So that's at the kind of the macro level.

At the micro level, I would say just getting more people interested in economic history, turning economic history into courses that economists can take. There's a wonderful textbook produced by the African Economic History Network that is freely accessible on the website that would serve an undergraduate course very well. I would also note that my book textbook, of course, would be able to do that. But there are resources available, and the hope is that more Africans actually access it. The wonderful thing is, if you look at the statistics of these textbooks, most of them do come from Africa. So that's really great, so it is already being used, but that's a very kind of at the undergraduate level. And the hope is that more graduate students in economics specifically would take up economic history, an interest in economic history, and then do their PhDs, you know, somewhere in Europe or the US, and then return.

And think at the macro level, Wantchekon’s African School for Economics is a great model that can be expanded across the continent, where you can have a large cohort of really excellent students. And I'm not saying that, you know, those are the only universities where you can study, of course, Stellenbosch and UCT and University of Pretoria, all are great universities to also study it. And then of course move to the US or Europe where you can do a PhD, but ultimately build up the capacity at that very high level of specialization, where you can interact with policymakers and say, you know, these are the lessons that I've studied or that my peers have studied, and that we can now replicate and ensure that the policies are at least not disastrous. I think that's almost often the best we can hope for, is that we just make sure that we don't implement terrible policies.

No policy, I don’t think, you know, a single policy will be able to turn a country around. But what it certainly can do is to destroy a country's economy. So we should just make sure that, at least, the lessons we learned from the past helps us to not implement those terrible ideas that often quite popular and can sell to an audience, but that we try and avoid them as much as possible.

Tobi,

Final set of questions. Um, so this question is motivated by a recent experience I had which is rather depressing, I should say. So I was planning a conference and I wanted to invite a very prominent scholar, I'm not going to mention his name, who is also South African, and the organizers basically said no, because he's a white South African. So I want to ask you, how have you being able to navigate that as a historian who ask and study the questions that you do, given the racial history of that country and apartheid?

Johan; 

Yeah, that's a great question. So, of course, I understand something about the history of South Africa that allows me to acknowledge that, you know, I am fortunate to be in a place where I can do research, where many other South Africans who would have probably been equally or better researchers don't have that opportunity. So that's the first thing, is to say that in South Africa, it remains a very unequal place, often very clearly along racial lines, although not exclusively so. But understanding that it is a privilege to do research, that's a very important point to start from. And so that also allows me to set agenda, research agenda, where many South Africans who would probably be, again, focused on different things in doing research, are not able to do so. Right. So one, I think, important aspect of that is that I try and build a group of scholars and, at least, some of that at Stellenbosch, but but not exclusively at Stellenbosch, where we do try and make economic history accessible to a larger cohort or a more representative cohort of scholars. And that's difficult to do because, you know, as economists, we understand market attractions. And so, if you're a black South African student, to remain in academe is almost an irrational decision because the private sector will simply pay you much, much more certainly as an economist than what we can pay you at a university. So these are not easy problems to solve. If they were easy, we would certainly have done so already. But it is something that I tend to think about a lot. Right? We want to make the field as broadly accessible as possible, of course, with the focus on the exceptional. So we want to bring in the exceptional students from all across South Africa to do research with us.

I think in asking certain questions, I think there are certain topics where I certainly know that I'm not an expert in, and therefore I would make sure that I am not the one who try and write the expert pieces on this. Right? So I, for example, would not be the one studying Nigerian economic history simply because I think you need a lifetime almost of research to know the diversity of Nigeria's both current society and historical trajectory. And the same is true for many other West African countries. So much of my own research is focused actually on South Africa, and even in fact more narrow on the Cape Colony, simply because I do have a little bit of that historical awareness of the different influences of our own place, of our place here in the Western Cape of South Africa. So I think it's important to have that awareness that, you know, I'm not an expert on all aspects of African economic history. And certainly, I don't think anyone can be given what I've mentioned before about the diversity of the continent.

What I do think I can add is, again, this emphasis on making economic history an important subdiscipline of economics. So more than just the pure content of producing new research on a specific area or other specific time period, it is to emphasize how important understanding our contexts are and then making that accessible to a broader audience. And think there are wonderful scholars already doing some of that, historians doing great work in writing more broadly accessible histories of Africa. And of course, I would challenge some of my historian colleagues to say that I think more economic history should be included there, and some of the latest research can really help in doing that. But, you know, my position here at Stellenbosch is really to try and encourage as much, and a kind of inclusive, broad-based research endeavor, and in helping that research or supporting that research to become accessible to a broader audience, both public audience and policy making audience.

I mean to, kind of, you know, get back to your very sad example is, I mean, to some extent understand the response that they are representative claims in who should inform policy and given Africa's history for how long, you know, white scholars or European scholars have acted as if they, you know, understand exactly the local context and have a full grasp of local knowledge and how that was, you know, illfitted to the advice that they gave, just simply didn't fit the kind of local context. So I think one needs to be aware of that history. Right. It will certainly be wrong to ignore that and say, you know, this is a move that, for whatever reason, seems illogical. I don't think it's completely illogical. I think history matters in explaining this behavior. What I hope is that there will be multiple voices, so that people can interact with one another, that it's not simply only one group or one person or, you know, one ideology we can pick and the others are not allowed, but that there will be engagement. And, in fact, that’s exactly what you are doing now is a great example of that, that there would be engagement and that we could be able to listen to one another and think all… well, maybe not everyone's voice. It's difficult to incorporate everyone's voice, if we say that. But ultimately, I think there should be a market for ideas, right? And ultimately the right idea with the right empirical support should be the one that wins out. And the only way we establish that is to contest ideas in this marketplace. And if we don't allow that, then sadly, I think we are going to sometimes hit it lucky and we can have the right idea for the right time and great. But often, more than often, we're going to miss the right idea and then the consequences would be sad. So i think that's the way I would think about it.

Tobi;

Mhm. I mean, I realize I could spend another hour barraging you with questions, but I think market for ideas is a good way to close this out. So my last question would be: what's the one idea, it may be something you're working on, may be an idea from someone else, but what's the one idea that you think deserves to be more popular, deserves to be more influential? It could be anything. What's that one idea for you?

Johan;

Oh, it's a tough question. I guess if you asked me a week ago, I would have one, and the next week I would have another. But let me try. I think there's a really fascinating area of research and this is I mean, might even to some [seem] quite controversial, but I think it's the idea of beliefs, of how much beliefs matter in shaping our economic behavior, and when I say “our”, I mean both at an individual level and at a kind of group or society level. And there's some wonderful work that's been done on the DRC, on the Democratic Republic of Congo by some Harvard economists. And that's been expanded now to other settings also outside of Africa. But understanding why people believe certain things, so, again, this obviously has close ties to history. So, you know, to what extent, for example, does the slave trade affect people's beliefs today or colonialism affect people's beliefs today, or, you know, access to education that might have changed certain beliefs in the past and now is reflected still in the present. Simply because one belief, to mention a single, you know, there are many different kinds of beliefs across the world, but there’s something that I would call the monopoly mindset. It's actually a blog post that's coming out soon, but it's basically this idea that the world is a zero sum game. So for you to win, I need to lose. And this seems to be quite prevalent across the world, but also in Africa. And so I want to understand firstly, how prevalent is this? Because if that is true, right, if people think the world is a zero sum game, then that also means that they would be unlikely to be entrepreneurs because basically what then believe is entrepreneurs must exploit, you know, either their workers or someone.

You must basically obtain profits that you make from some other poor soul that then loses out. Which is, of course, you know, the world is a positive sum game that entrepreneurs are profit seeking, yes, but the profit is simply a signal that they’re doing something right. That the market really enjoys the product or the service that they deliver. Right. And ultimately, we've seen over the last two centuries remarkable increases in our material welfare. So the world as a whole has become fabulously rich, 18 times more prosperous than they were 200 years ago. And even in the poorest places in Africa, you see that the average person is almost six times as affluent as they were 200 years ago. So, you know, these are rough GDP per capita estimates, but in general, that is true, right? We live longer. We live with more access to various kinds of goods and services. So clearly the world must be a positive sum game and yet many people believe it isn't. So understanding how prevalent it is and then most importantly, what determines it. Right. So what causes people to believe that the world is a zero sum game? Or, you know, to have a monopoly mindset? And if we can understand that and then change that, we might open up a much larger and, hopefully, younger generation to the possibilities of progress. Right? So entrepreneurs, innovators, so it can unlock, in some sense all, of this and empower is probably a better word people with opportunities that the market society offer. And that really is to me a fascinating question. I'm not sure to what extent I would be able to contribute to that, but I think that's an idea worth studying, and especially if we then identify those factors. So it might be very difficult and intractable to study or to change. But if we do find those factors that can shift this mindset, then I think that's an incredibly powerful tool in the hands of a policy maker to build a prosperous society.

Tobi;

I realise I cannot let you go without asking you this question. And full disclosure, I'm trying to cheat because I'm currently writing a review of your book. So this is like me trying to cheat, in a way. So I find that attitude towards history, that is, speaking about beliefs and positive sums and zero sums… attitude towards history seem to be divided, in my opinion, between pessimism and optimism. And I like the strong opening in your book, especially with the metaphors of the monopoly game and Settlers of Catan. So do you think that history has an optimistic bias? Does history always favour the Optimist? 

Johan;

So is the question whether it's historians that fail the optimist, or whether it’s the arc of history? So who… do the winners…

Tobi;

The long arc of history itself. Like, will things always be better?  

Johan; 

Yeah. No. Because, I think firstly, to answer the first one, I think historians are quite pessimistic people. So I don't think they’re necessarily…[laughs]

That's probably why often like we don't get to hear about economic history because it is an incredibly optimistic story to tell. Right. And so if you're a pessimist, you typically are not going to tell that story. But the point is that we have made incredible progress. Not to dismiss the fact that there are major challenges in the world today, of various kinds, but we are certainly living in a better world than we did 500 years ago. But the question is whether that will continue or not. And If I knew it, I would be rich. I don't know. The one thing I would say is that there were over the last two centuries, there have been multiple scholars, intellectuals, experts that have predicted the demise of societies or the end at least of this progress that we've seen. And they've been wrong every time.

So it would be a pretty bold move now for me here at the South of Africa to claim that, you know, progress is ended. Even though there certainly are a lot of people in the world that at the moment think that, you know, either progress is too fast or the consequences might be too negative and so we need a degrowth movement or something along those lines which which I think, you know, for someone living in any developing country would find quite strange. It would be very strange for me to go to a poor neighborhood in South Africa and convince people that your incomes shouldn't grow. That's a strange idea. So I think the one thing we have that's going for us is that most people, certainly in South Africa, would agree that we still need to grow. There's still a reason to have policies in place. We might disagree on the policies, but we still want policies that ultimately lead to economic growth. Yeah. So I think that's something worth keeping in mind.

And now I've completely lost track of what the initial question was. Oh, okay. This long arc of… whether we're going to make progress? At least we want still progress in South Africa. That's the point I wanted to make. And I think that's true for many other African countries. Whether we will achieve that, you know, I simply don't know. I hope so. I think they are major innovations that are fundamentally changing our productivity. In the book, I've mentioned Joel Mokyr’s two rules that we've learned. The two things that we've learned in history is the fact that we need to use our knowledge of science to make ourselves more productive. We are doing that at a rapid rate at the moment, we are learning things in bio sciences, in natural language processing. Between all of these things, we are learning things in robotics. And you know, we're flying to space at much cheaper rates than before. So we are learning in many different industries, things, and that will certainly make us more productive. So that's great.

The second rule is or the second lesson is that we should use those surpluses that we generate and ensure that everyone benefits from it. That might be more difficult. But again, the only way you do that is through kind of a democratic system, which again, even though there has been some coups and some shift back in political freedoms in Africa in the very recent past, I still am hopeful that, you know, ultimately we will implement policies that will allow those surpluses to be shared. But Acemoglu and Johnson in a very recent book, say that, you know, some of these innovations in AI are very limiting and they will only benefit a small few. I'm less pessimistic than that. I think the ability for every African, whether that's rich or poor to access these systems is incredible and so I certainly am of the view that they are massive gains to be had in productivity. And then my hope would be that we implement the right institutions that allow these surpluses, these benefits from this higher level of productivity to be shared more equitably across the distribution.

Tobi;

Thank you so much. It's been amazing talking to you.

Johan;

Thanks, Tobi. It was great being here.

This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe

In this episode, I had a conversation with Kurtis Lockhart who is the executive director of Charter City Institute - a non-profit that thinks and executes governance models for cities to power developing economies into growth and productivity.

Our conversation started with an update on the concept of Charter Cities and how they differ from traditional models like Special Economic Zones (SEZs), particularly in the context of economic development. Kurtis describes Charter Cities as new cities with distinct governance models designed to drive sustained economic growth and alleviate poverty, primarily in lower-middle-income countries. This approach is seen as an alternative to the model first prescribed by the economist and Nobel Laureate Paul Romer, which involved a high-income country importing its governance to a low-income nation. Kurtis emphasizes a public-private partnership (PPP) model, where a host country collaborates with an urban developer, ensuring local involvement and sustainable development.

The conversation addresses concerns about Charter Cities being enclaves for the wealthy, clarifying that the Charter City Institute (CCI) focuses on broad-based economic growth and poverty alleviation. Kurtis highlights the importance of political buy-in and stability, acknowledging the challenges of expropriation and policy consistency across different political regimes. He suggests mitigation strategies like revenue-sharing agreements, equity stakes for host countries in city developers, and political risk insurance.

Discussing the geographical constraints, Kurtis acknowledges that location and economic geography play a crucial role in the success of Charter Cities. However, he argues that geographical advantages can evolve with changing technologies and transportation networks, as seen in historical examples like the Erie Canal.

Addressing concerns about existing urban challenges and inequalities, Kurtis talked about CCI's involvement in upgrading existing cities and supporting secondary cities, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, where most urban growth is anticipated. He shares plans to collaborate with Kenya's State Department for Housing and Urban Development to empower select secondary cities through the Special Development Zone initiative, leveraging their success as models for other cities.

Transcript

Tobi;

Welcome to Ideas Untrapped. It's fantastic to talk to you, Kurtis. I've been wanting to do this for a long time.

Kurtis;

Yeah. Thanks, Tobi. I know we've been trying to do this for a while. It's good to finally be on with you. 

Tobi;

So let's start from the absolute basics. I'm trying not to get carried away because Charter Cities are something that sort of excites me as well. I should also say it annoys me, possibly in equal measure. So I'll try not to get carried away, but if you can just give me an elevator pitch, so to speak, but you can go as long as you want. What are charter cities and how are they relevant to issues surrounding economic development, particularly in the 21st century?

Kurtis;

Yeah, so thanks again. And I'll start at the highest level I can, and then you can ask more specific questions as we go on. So at the very basic level, the definition of charter cities is new cities with new rules to improve governance. And so why do we think that that's really important? Zooming out, the best way to lift people out of poverty at scale is through sustained economic growth over one, two, three, four- decades. That's what happened in East Asia, in Japan, in Taiwan and South Korea. It's what happened in China, and I think it's what's happening in India now. You then have to ask yourself, how do we increase economic growth rates over sustained periods of time? Economists are pretty agreed that the single greatest determinant of long-run economic growth rates is governance, right? It's institutions. And the problem with governance and institutions and getting good governance is many countries, especially across the global south, lower-middle income countries are, you could say, stuck in poor governance traps.

So the question becomes, okay, how do we reform and change this governance institutional structure to improve governance? It's really hard to do that, it turns out, at the national level. And so we see charter cities as a mechanism - a localised mechanism - in a concentrated geographic area where there are no incumbent or entrenched special interests in that localized area. You can get a lot deeper governance reforms at this local level and that gets people rich within that jurisdiction, within that concentrated space, number one, as well as number two, it's able to serve as a demonstration effect to the broader host country that then hopefully sees that demonstration effect and scales up those governance improving policies across the whole country. And this is what you saw in China when Deng Xiaoping instituted the opening up and reform in 1979-1980, with four Special Economic Zones in the south, Shenzhen being the most famous. But we can get into that if you want to later. Anyways, that's the high-level pitch.

Tobi;

Yeah. So for a lot of folks like me, and I'm sure some other people in the international development community when they hear charter cities, you immediately go back to Paul Romer, the Nobel Laureate economist Ted Talk in 2009. That's the popular conception of charter cities. But like you and your colleagues have reiterated over and over again that your model and the vision that you are pushing differs from that. Can you spell out the differences from Romer's charter city model?

Kurtis;

Yeah, I'm glad you asked this. So basically to go back first, so Paul Romer in 2009 gave his now pretty famous Ted Talk on charter cities, and he basically proposed that a high-income, well-governed country like a Canada come into a low-income, poorly governed country. His example was Honduras. Honduras would then cede [a] city-scale chunk of land to Canada. Canada would then, "import its good institutions" into that city-scale chunk of land and therefore that better governance within that concentrated piece of land would crowd in investment, it would spur business formation, job creation and sustained economic growth. That's the very high-level Romer model. And we can call that the Guarantor Model, [with] Canada as the foreign guarantor. CCI's model is different. We advocate for a public-private partnership between a host country and an urban developer, a city developer. So we don't think, number one, Romer's Foreign Guarantor model is either feasible or number two, very desirable.

Why isn't it feasible? I think you saw in the feedback in the response to Romer's Ted Talk. It smacked a lot of people - this foreign guarantor model smacked a lot of people as a form of neocolonialism. I don't think that's a very fair characterization, but still, it got taken by a lot of people in the international development world as a form of that. I don't think it's fair because charter cities as Romer proposed them were completely voluntarily entered into. It was a free choice among both parties to enter into these things, whereas colonialism was a form of coercion usually done at the barrel of a gun or through some sort of violence. So I don't think that's necessarily a fair critique, but it nonetheless was a critique and speaks to the feasibility of this model. I don't think it's desirable, number two, because I think a lot of the process of institution building needs to involve the host country in the institution building. And I think when you have a foreign guarantor like a Canada just stepping in and bringing in their institutions without involving or partnering with the host country, that kind of cuts off the learning and the muscle building that needs to happen in order for the host country to develop itself more broadly. So, we propose this public-private partnership because we think it's a lot more feasible, number one, especially if you're partnering as a host country with a domestic urban developer that knows the context and what‘s not. And then, number two, we think it's sustainable because developers they have an incentive to maximize land values over time. That's how they make their profits. How do developers maximize land values? They attract as many firms and residents to their cities as humanly possible. How do you do that? You create a fantastic city with urban amenities, good public goods and service provision, with a great business environment, so firms are attracted to locate there. So we think it aligns incentives in that way and also has a mechanism to be financially self-sustaining over time through the profit motive. So that's why we think our kind of PPP approach is both kind of more attractable and more desirable over time.

Tobi;

Okay, so another key distinction I like you to make before we go on is usually when we talk about charter cities, special economic zones come up a lot. Is there a particular distinction between a charter city and a special economic zone or multiple variations of SEZs like export processing zones, free trade zones and the likes?

Kurtis;

Yeah, so this is a great question. So really CCI's version of charter cities, this PPP model is what we can call the next generation of Special Economic Zones. So a lot of Special Economic Zones are restricted to what sectors can operate and get incentives in that zone. So there are textile zones or there are, you know, manufacturing zones or high-tech zones, etc. And then oftentimes these Special Economic Zones are small in scale, so they can be limited to smaller industrial parks where you don't really get the agglomeration benefits that come with bigger size urban agglomerations in cities. So the big differentiator between a charter city and Special Economic Zones is around those two things. So charter cities would be mixed-use developments. So it's not just industrial uses that are able to operate in the city, but also commercial uses and really importantly residential uses. Right? Because then you have people not just moving and commuting to a charter city for nine to five and then they all pile out of the charter city and leave it vacant overnight until the next workday like most special economic zones. Instead, these city cities are places where people not just work, but play and live as well. So you're generating those agglomeration effects that economists hold so dear. 

[The] second is size. Right. I mentioned zones are often restricted and become like small industrial parks or export processing zones around ports. Charter cities are city-scale developments, right? And so the big one we use here is Shenzhen was technically called a Special Economic Zone, but it's really a proto-charter city because it was 326 square km (the zone). And this is what we're talking about when we're talking about city scale and you're able to get a lot more co-location of firms and people spillovers from that and then the positive effects of agglomeration can spin out from there. And then the third really important differentiation is decentralized or devolved powers to the charter city. A lot of the time when a zone has and is empowered to operate via a Special Economic Zone piece of legislation at the national level and when they figure out at the zone level that, okay, we got some of the provisions in this legislation wrong, we need to amend this legislation. In order to amend it, they got to go to higher tiers of government like the state level or the national level and negotiate and barter with the parliament for months or sometimes years to get these changes passed. And you and I know that that really stifles business dynamism that slows down an ability of a zone to adapt. And so we think by a charter city having devolved powers over things like business registration, land administration, land registration, immigration, taxation, things like these, and their ability to really adapt on the fly as the environment in that city changes, that'll allow the city to be a lot more dynamic to a rapidly growing city.

Tobi;

I know recently there was a Wired profile about a project you're working on in Nigeria. And one thing that also comes up a lot is, given the sort of informal or affiliation with the sort of libertarian seasteading community, how would you respond to people who say that charter cities are just a way for the rich people or people who don't like government to create an enclave for themselves and not live within the rules of a particular country? So, like, this is a libertarian non-state project so to speak. How would you respond to that?

Kurtis;

Yeah, I'm really glad you asked this because in that Wired article, we spoke with the journalists, we had a good conversation and kind of explained how CCI works with these projects, including Itana and E [Iyinoluwa Aboyeji]. The main push-back that I and CCI give when we're asked this question around, “Well, aren't charter cities just this libertarian kind of project for having political exit?”, is, no. These are co-development strategies [that] you enter into with the host country. As I said, CCI envisions charter cities as a public-private partnership between these urban developers and a host country. And again, I use the term charter cities in our version as the next generation of Special Economic Zones.

Special Economic Zones are a very common form of industrial policy used throughout the entire world. The vast majority of the world's countries have Special Economic Zones within them. There are some 5,500 zones across the world. Not to mention, you have complete UN agencies like the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) dedicated to pushing forward industrial parks and Special Economic zones. Right? And the UN is, like, the main upholder of sovereignty and sovereign nation-states across the globe. I don't think the UN would be involved in anything [that has to do with] subverting these nation states projects as that Wired piece suggested. So that's my main response - is like given most of the world's countries are engaged in these special economic zones that allow for unique rules within their own jurisdictions and given organizations like the UN are involved in promoting these special economic zones and industrial parks, the notion that these are a tool to undermine territorial sovereignty or get these “stateless vacuums” [which] is the term I think the article used is, I think, a total[ly] misleading exaggeration.

Tobi;

But again, I'm trying to look at the nuances here, because taking a broad view and a sort of micro view, at the same time, you've had circumstances or situations where even within the legitimacy of a sovereign state and a national government, a certain class of people who can't find ways to create different space for themselves where they don't have to experience dysfunctions, they don't have to interact with much of what is wrong or bad about the state itself. So how do charter cities, at least your model and your vision, sidestep some of this critique around, you know, inequality, class differences and things that regularly come up, especially low-income countries?

Kurtis;

So I would, number one, grant that some of these new city projects proposed around the world, they're like real estate development projects that are kind of catering to higher income segments. So I'm not going to deny that there are projects that some developers are making that are kind of totally marketed towards being enclaves for the rich. Those exist. Those are not something that CCI cares about, right? Those are real estate projects. We're interested in these city developments. Our vision is to empower these new cities with better governance, to lift tens of millions of people out of poverty. So if we're not having an impact on poverty alleviation and we're solely engaged with projects that only focus on the rich, we're not achieving our mission or our vision. I'll just put that out there.

Now, on your inequality point, I view inequality as like… the Kuznets curve is talked about a lot in economics. I don't like to talk about the Kuznetsk curve because you lose people in the abstract. I think Albert Hirschman, who is an economist that wrote about Voice and Exit, he talked about this analogy of the highway where he said inequality is a bit like being caught in a traffic jam on the highway. Once you're in the traffic jam and you see the other lane beside, you start to go, even though you're still stopped, the fact that the other lane is moving means that the roadblock up ahead, whatever it is, has been removed, and you'll likely be moving ahead soon as well. It's only when there's a huge delay such that you see that other lane going and you guys still have to wait another four or five, six minutes that you start to get really frustrated and angry. So too with inequality and economic growth.

If growth picks up but is only concentrated in, say, upper and upper middle-income segments and is not fully broad-based, some people [to] most people would prefer that to the situation of complete stagnation, right? At least some parts of the population are moving. That's good. It's only when that growth doesn't become more broad-based over time that frustrations will arise. So our hope is that charter cities will kick-start growth no matter how, and then eventually, the growth can become more broad-based over time. And you even have some projects and zones and parks and new city developments that are able to be extremely broad-based from the very outset. So I'd use examples like the garment industry operated through industrial parks in Bangladesh. This garment industry employs, like, 80% women, right? And these women, it's often their first jobs in the formal sector, their first time getting formal wage labour, their first active time in the labour market. And they have upward mobility to go from sewers to middle managers to upper management. And so, sure, some of these are enclaves for the rich. But equally, on the flip side of the coin, some of these projects can be mechanisms for alleviating inequality.

And I want to give one other example above and beyond the Bangladesh garment industry example in lifting up women. I’m a Canadian and in Vancouver, I got to talk about this project called Senakw in Vancouver, where this First Nations indigenous group called the Squamish Nation in Vancouver, they were kicked off their land in downtown Vancouver in, I think, 1910. And fast forward about a century in 2002, I think, the First Nations sued, and the court ruled that they were to receive some of their downtown Vancouver land back. And so the First Nations got this land, this scarce urban land that was undeveloped, and they were like, what are we going to do with this? So they decided overwhelmingly, I think 90% of the First Nations group voted in favour of entering into a public-private partnership with a Canadian developer called West Bank. It's a 50-50 partnership. So the First Nations group would get half of the proceeds and West Bank would get the other half. And the bottom line or the upshot of this is that if this project is successful, it would generate, over the lifetime of the project, $8 billion in the coffers of the Squamish Nation. And that would be the biggest economic empowerment program in Canadian history. So if you structure these things right from the get-go, far from being mechanisms for exacerbating inequality, they can serve just the opposite.

Tobi;

I want to return a bit to the legitimacy question, especially within the sovereign authority and political capabilities of the national governments. I see a bit of a self-selection problem in special economic zones/charter city projects, in that they are successful within the context of a national government that takes development policy seriously. Because when we talk about Shenzhen and China, we know that that project came about out of a shift in national policy when Deng Xiaoping, along with key members of the CCP, chose to open up China and modernize. If you compare with, say, a country like Nigeria, Nigeria's first Special Economic Zone was in 1992. So they are not really particularly a new idea, but they haven't had equal success everywhere. So how does your model sort of control for this? We'll get to the PPP problems much later, but how do you solve the self-selection problem?

Kurtis;

Yeah. So, I mean, there are a few above and beyond the self-selection problem. There are a few other points implicit in your question. Number one is, like, the success of zones and industrial policy and these new city developments in China and East Asia versus the largely kind of lack of success we've seen with things like Special Economic Zones in Africa. Let's take China as the example because it has by far the most special economic zones of any country on the planet. So China's approach to zones, I think, largely derives from its history as a country with a high degree of state capacity and a long history of statehood. It's the most ancient state in existence on the globe, I think. It's been in existence for a long time. And so a lot of special economic zones across China were driven by the public sector, and they were extremely successful. Not all of them were as successful as Shenzhen. Right. The first four were established in 1980. They demonstrated the success of this policy such that they were scaled up again in 1984 with a few more zones, [in] 1988 with a few more zones and more such that by 2010, some 90% of China municipalities had some form of Special Economic zone within them. And these were again largely driven by the public sector.

If we then go to sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa does not have the same history of statehood or the same level of state capacity as Africa China, right? African states emerged 60, 70 years ago in the independence era in the 50s and 60s mainly. And so we just don't have the same level or ability of the state to be driving forward these massive industrial policy projects as China did. So that's number one. I think the zones will be a lot more and charter cities will be a lot more successful in Sub-Saharan Africa if they are driven largely by the private sector or as we say at CCI, through a public-private partnership. That's number one.

Number two is the location question. In China, special economic zones were paired very closely with urbanization. Shenzhen where 326 sq km of that city were declared a zone, likewise in the other initial four zones, those two things went hand in hand. Whereas in Africa, a lot of zones that are declared, for whatever reason, are declared in the middle of nowhere. So they're not piggybacking off of existing labour markets in already existing cities. They're not piggybacking off of preexisting infrastructure. So, it's oftentimes really costly to build infrastructure completely from scratch in these complete greenfield sites. And so I would say those are the two key differences between why we saw [the] success of these zones in East Asia and China, and we've seen largely a pretty lack of success across Africa with zones. And then that's the first part of my answer. The second part, just to get back to the self-selection problem that you mentioned, I mean, I think you've had Stefan Dercon on your podcast, Tobi, and this gets back to his point that because we envision these not as a form of political exit, because CCI does not mess with sovereignty. These projects are by definition part of the broader host country. And so you do need a degree of political buy-in. So to Stefan Dercon's point, you need the political elites, a group of the political elites on board and backing these projects. And ideally, you have long time horizons as well. This is why, for example, we're operating in and have partnerships in the countries that we're working in. So, [in] Zambia, President Hichelema was just elected relatively recently, I think if he gets a second term, he'll have nine more years in office. We're about to sign a partnership and engagement in Kenya, right? And Ruto was elected last August, so if he gets a second term, he'll have ten more years. In Tanzania, President Hassan took over from the former president who died of COVID and so she has two more years in his term and then another ten years if she gets a second term. So that's twelve years. And so we're in places, number one, where we have some political elites on board and bought into this, and number two, we have long time horizons available to us. 

Tobi;

So that sort of gets into my point, right? Because, yes, you may have buy-in for now, but there's also the question of consistency. I'm sure before Hichilema in Zambia, the previous guy was not excited. Or I would say would not be excitable about a project like this. And what if someone that succeeds Hichilema says, “Oh, well, charter cities will only take you so far, I have other priorities. Let's concentrate on the mineral sector, this and that,” and then regulatory and bureaucratic barriers to this kind of project…[inaudible]

I'll give you a specific example. The Lekki Seaport in Lagos is usually celebrated as a win for this kind of big project, public-private partnerships. But, and I'll put up a link to that in the show notes, there was an interview by the CEO of one of the key participants in the project, the Tolaram Group, along with the Chinese investors, that basically, I'm paraphrasing… that basically said that his experience working with the government on this project left him deeply scarred and he does not envision ever doing this kind of project again. So that's my point. Like, how do you get around the consistent issues, the succession issues, the things that come up in a context where development, economic growth in itself are also burdened by this same problem? So I guess that's my point.

Kurtis; 

Yeah, so this is a great point. So basically your kind of question is, okay, given these charter cities, as CCI proposes them, what do you do about the expropriation problem? Right? This problem of how do you prevent the host country government, across regimes, over time, from killing the goose that laid the golden egg? Or how do you get political regimes, different political regimes across time, credibly committing to what former regimes before them committed to? Right. That's the biggest kind of question. And because [in] our proposed model, charter cities are part of the host country, they are not sovereign entities. There are multiple things that you can do to mitigate the risk of expropriation to better align the incentives such that it nudges the host country to want the project to succeed rather than want the project to be expropriated and fail. But at the end of the day, if the government is determined to expropriate and undermine this project, there's not much you can do. But I would argue that's the same thing for any type of project. If the sovereign government of a place is determined to have malaria bed net interventions fail or the ZEDE projects in Honduras were pretty much Romer's model of charter cities, and yet still the regime that succeeded the original regime was able to repeal the ZEDE law. Right? So it's not just our model that suffers from this goose that laid the golden egg problem. I think it's other models of charter cities as well as all kinds of development interventions.

Okay, given there's this problem, how do you mitigate the risk of expropriation? And CCI, we thought about this and there are several ways. So number one, we think that there should be a revenue-sharing agreement embedded in the public-private partnership such that the host country gets a percentage or proportion of all the land rents, all the taxes, all the user fees raised in a given year should be to the host country so they have a stake and they receive a sort of stream of revenue every year from it. The other similar point around these kinds of financial inducements is we think that the host country should have an equity stake in the developer, in the city developer. That way, if the city developer is a success by creating a thriving city, the host country will have a significant financial windfall from that success as well. Other things that can be done: I know there's something called the New York Convention of 1958 that recognizes and then enforces arbitral awards. So for example, if the developer is expropriated in year eight or nine by the host country, it's then able to go and sue in arbitration for compensation for those seized assets and then have those assets enforced overseas.

So this convention is basically a form of enforcement of international arbitration. Now, the question there is like, okay, well, if your host country, say you're operating in Zambia, the future Zambian regime after Hichilema expropriates, and you then get an arbitral award in Dubai, in DIFC or something, how do you get the Zambian government to actually kind of pay? One thing that you can do, it's called political risk insurance - so MIGA [Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency]. It’s under the World Bank Group. They have political risk insurance. That Political Risk Insurance product says if an entity like this developer receives an arbitral award in international arbitration and the host country refuses to pay, we, the political risk insurer, will pay the amount of that arbitral award quickly, right? So that the developer quickly recoups its cost. So that's one. Another thing that could be done is the developer could float its company on the stock exchange and that way you get influential entities from the business sector, for example, investing in the developer. So entities like powerful domestic business constituencies like pension funds, if they are invested in the success of the developer and they have significant influence and clout with the existing political regime, oftentimes supporting various parties and whatnot, you don't as an incumbent politician want to piss off these pension funds that are helping you and your regime stay in place. And if the pension fund has invested in this development, then you don't want to jeopardize that development. There are a few other things you can do, but I've gone on long enough on these various ways. The main point here is you can do a lot of things to mitigate the risks, to adjust both benefits to the government of hosting and having a thriving charter city, and increase the costs of expropriating that charter city in such a way to skew the development such that the government buys into it over the long term. But you can't, because they're not sovereign entities, totally get around this risk entirely.

Tobi;

When we look at Shenzhen again, for example, its location is sort of unique. And I think that contributed a great deal to its success. The proximity to Hong Kong, and particularly the fact that it's a place that had a lot of potential to do better had it not been deliberately held back, if I can use that phrase, by the security concerns of the Mao government and, you know, so many other things. Because, as a matter of fact, when the original plan was proposed for Shenzhen, the Bao’an County government already had a plan on building out the city, of populating the city, the industrial zone and so many other things. But these are natural advantages that are not replicated everywhere, especially in Africa. You see so many places that are landlocked. If you take a place like Nigeria, most of the investments would likely come to Lagos being the economic nerve of the country and the only city that has the functional port. So are Charter Cities also implicitly limited by the location advantages or disadvantages of the host country, by economic geography, basically? 

Kurtis;

I mean, I'll give a pretty short answer here, I think, undeniably, yes. If you picture a spectrum or a distribution of unsuccessful to hugely Shenzhen levels of success on the other side of the spectrum, geography kind of limits that distribution. Based on things like proximity to international trade routes, for example, I'm pretty bullish on East Africa for this reason. It's on the Indian Ocean, I think India, South Asia, Southeast Asia, these are rising regions in the next few decades. And so proximity to that bodes well for charter cities established on the coast in East Africa. Things like, locationally, are you piggybacking off of preexisting cities? Are you kind of on the outskirts of a Dar es Salaam or a Mombasa or a Lagos or a Port Harcourt? The reason being, and I alluded to this earlier, it costs a lot to build infrastructure, especially in the middle of nowhere in Africa. If you can instead locate on the edges, on the extension of a fast-growing preexisting city, you get to piggyback off of their roads, their other modes of public transit that they've already built, so you lower your unit infrastructure costs.

And number two, you get to piggyback off of their labour market. Right. And in places like Nairobi and Lagos, they're known for having, among African cities, like, very highly skilled constituencies of people. So to the extent that you create this new, thriving, dynamic charter city that is a space where talented people are attracted and entrepreneurs see a lot of opportunity, it's a lot easier for [a] highly talented, highly skilled individual from Lagos to go move to a city that's on the outskirts of Lagos than in the middle of nowhere in Nigeria somewhere. So my short answer to your question, Tobi, is absolutely these projects are constrained by geography. It's not the sole determining factor. There are places…you know, I would consider Abuja a pretty successful new city, and it's not on a port or seemingly has many other key geographic advantages other than being a strategic spot between Nigeria's north and Nigeria's south, but it is a significant factor in its ultimate success.

Tobi;

I disagree on Abuja but I would save that for another day. So I guess my final question to you would be… so I know that embedded in…uh…

Kurtis;

Can I? Sorry, Tobi, Can I add to that? I'll just add a little something to my last answer too.

Tobi;

Yeah, sure.

Kurtis;

I want to say, like, geography, contrary to a lot of people's opinion on it, I don't think it's this static factor. Geographical advantage can change given changing technology and changing transportation networks across time. And we've seen this in history. For example, when in the 1800s, the Erie Canal connected New York City to Lake Erie, that new canal, that new mode of transportation created and resulted in the rapid, rapid growth of a bunch of Midwestern and Western cities. So Buffalo was at the other end. It was created as a direct result of the Erie Canal, but also Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis. You could even say New Orleans, right? Because it was at the end of the Mississippi that created this huge water arc from New Orleans to New York City. And so I'll just say, you know, analogous to the Erie Canal, a comparable big infrastructure building project that could result in a bunch of new cities becoming much more viable as a result of changing the geographical advantage of these urban agglomerations is the Belt and Road Initiative, right? You have a bunch of large infrastructure projects and ports and highways and all these things being built and that means that at the nodes of this new infrastructure, it's a lot more viable for some new cities to sprout up. And we're actually seeing this across Central Asia, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent Africa.

Tobi;

I think you sort of got into my next question with that answer which is, what's the intersection or should I say affiliation of CCI as an institution and the model of charter cities generally that you're pushing with this new network-state type of digital city enthusiasm that is sort of everywhere, that's sort of driven by technology, driven by virtuality and the likes. Is there an intersection with your vision of new cities?

Kurtis;

So there are a couple [of] things. So, first, the big differentiation is at CCI, our focus is on poverty alleviation. So we're focused on low- and lower-middle-income countries. And oftentimes these countries are far away from the technological frontier. So we're focused more on catch-up growth, right, which is very substantively different than growth at the technological frontier. And so I would say the network state people, a lot of them come from cryptocurrency and tech in San Francisco. And so they're focused on pushing the technological frontier and the frontier of innovative governance, and we're focused on catch-up growth. So that's number one. Distinction number one.

And I guess commentary number two is kind of my thoughts on the viability of network states. I tend to think that, you know, this has been tried in the past, basically using not online communities, but like the kind of analogous concept to an online community before the Internet was shared values over a large number of human beings, right? Not necessarily territorially connected human beings. And there have been a few moments in history when leaders have tried to channel those shared values and relocate large numbers of people in the physical world that share those values, which is basically the network state concept, right? That was tried, for example, in the US. I think a bunch of libertarians, I believe this was in the early 2000s, tried to find a small state in the US to say, “Hey, if all of us libertarians that share these particular ideological inclinations all move to the same state”, I think they ended up choosing New Hampshire. They said, “Okay, let's all make an oath to move like ten years from now. And if we do so, we'll then be the majority in New Hampshire because it's a pretty small state, therefore we'll be elected to powers of government and we can kind of control policy and swing it in our sort of direction.” It turns out [that] in year ten when that move was supposed to take place, a lot of the people who had made that commitment, they had had families, they now have a spouse, they have kids that go to particular schools. Their spouse has a job that he or she really likes. That individual also has a job that it's going to be hard to relocate from. And so it turns out that community, like place, is actually pretty rooted and it's hard to just uproot yourself and your family from kind of a community that's been established and go to this other kind of community that has no sort of binding glue that you currently have. So that's number one.

And number two, the kind of historical example that happened, but almost didn't happen, is Israel. Right? Judaism is this millennia-old religious tradition. You could say that it's a millennia-old tribe that has its traditions, its values that are thousands of years old. And it had this other historical event that happened at the time of the formation of the Jewish state [Israel] being this Holocaust, a genocide that tried to wipe out this tribe and that also resulted in this really unifying force calling for a place where the Jewish people can practice their religion in peace and tolerance. And even with those factors, even with this thousand-year history and this kind of world-changing genocide, the Israeli state was very close to not being successfully established. Right? It was kind of Truman's recognition of Israel that actually kind of resulted in the thing happening. Without that, I don't think it would have been a success. It was sort of 51-49 as to whether this thing would take off. And so my point with Israel is like, even with these enormous advantages and crazy factors in your favour of pulling off a network state-y situation, it almost didn't happen. And so that gives me pause about the tractability of this model.

Tobi; 

My final question and I'm happy you mentioned poverty alleviation and fast broad-based growth as the things that motivates the model of charter cities that you are pushing. So this question would be one of my critiques of charter cities and I want an answer from you, which is, at the heart of this model is political decentralization particularly because like you said, there is a lot of stasis and constraint at the national level. And also, talking about governance innovation, do you think that the charter city space, if I can call it that, is leaving a couple of low-hanging fruits unplucked in the sense that where are the plans of fixing existing at a very local, decentralized level, of fixing some of the, should I say, existing problems in actually existing cities rather than building new cities? Where is the plan, for example, for upgrading slums in existing cities? Where is the plan for transforming Makoko, for example, in Lagos? So do you think that those are low-hanging fruits that you're leaving unplucked? If yes, is there a reason? Is it because there is no obvious potential gain for private capital? And of course, if "no", is that something you are working towards in the future?

Kurtis; 

[The] short answer is yes, we are involved in this area. So I'll just give the example of one of the reasons I'm here in Nairobi right now is to push forward our MoU with Kenya's State Department for Housing and Urban Development. So this department, well, they just finished its [program] called the Kenya Urban Support Program, the 300 million dollar program under the World Bank that's ending I think on June 30. And then a new KUSP program, KUSP Two, another 300 million dollar program supporting local urban institutional capacity building at the local level is happening in the next fiscal year, July 1, here in Kenya. And so we're talking with the Department for Housing and Urban Development on this list of 71 secondary cities that they've selected with the World Bank to channel this 300 million dollar KUSP 2 program over the next three, four, five years. And my prior on these big development programs is that rather than spreading this 300 hundred million dollars across a swathe of stuff, you should prioritize. And so I said, okay, you do that with the World Bank. Why don't we CCI, we identify three to four bright spots on that list of 71 cities, secondary cities - existing cities, that are already doing well with their current resources and we empower those three to four cities by designating them as a Special Development Zone or Special Economic Zone or Special Economic City, basically a charter city. And that way not only, you know, presumably if they're already doing well with their existing resources by empowering them further, they just double down on that success, number one.

But number two, if they are then successful, they serve as a much, much greater and more powerful demonstration effect to the list of the other 67, 68 cities on that list of the KUSP 2 program. Right? If I'm a mayor in Kenya, my neighbouring mayor, if they are one of these three to four bright spots, and I see them and they're doing amazing stuff, that's way more influential to me and shows me that it's very possible to do this as my neighbour is doing it than some world banker coming in for a couple of weeks and giving a workshop. Right? So that's one way in which CCI is working with existing cities.

And I think one of the low-hanging fruits, to use your term, is these secondary cities, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. I think, like, a large swathe of the urban growth and the growth in urban population is going to happen in small, secondary cities and towns of kind of 100,000 people and under. And I think most of the oxygen in the room, whether that's time, attention, funding, gets sucked up by these mega-cities of Lagos and Kinshasa and Nairobi and Jo-burg. But a lot of these secondary cities have number one, less capacity than these mega-cities and are going to see growth rates that oftentimes surpass the rates of growth of these mega-cities at four, five, 6% per year. And so focusing there could be hugely impactful. Plus, I mean, I'll just say, Shenzhen, at the time it was designated a Special Economic Zone in 1980, had a population of between a 100 and 300,000 people. So by all intents and purposes, it was a secondary city at the time of its initial takeoff and so you could consider what I just outlined an analogous situation.

Tobi; 

Okay, I hope to see that workout. Thank you very much, Kurtis. It's been fantastic talking to you. It's been an amazing hour. Thank you very much.

Kurtis;

Likewise, Tobi. Thanks so much for having me. And I'm glad we finally got to schedule this. Thanks so much.

This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe

Welcome to another episode of Ideas Untrapped podcast.

In this episode, I spoke to Portia Roelofs who is a Lecturer in Politics at the Department of Political Economy at King's College London, and also a research associate at the African Studies Centre in Oxford. She is the author of a fantastic book titled Good Governance in Nigeria; Rethinking Accountability and Transparency in the Twenty-First Century.

Portia critiques the "good governance" agenda, arguing it's a continuation of structural adjustment programs from the '80s and '90s, which focused on market-driven development, privatization, and state withdrawal. She asserts these reforms didn't consider the social and political realities in African countries, leading to significant challenges, including a narrowed policy scope and "choiceless democracies."

Portia proposes a more socially embedded approach to governance, emphasizing the need for government officials to be accessible and accountable in more culturally resonant ways, beyond just transparency and efficiency. She suggests practical steps like politicians residing in their constituencies and being directly reachable. The conversation also explores the tension between technocratic and populist approaches in Nigerian politics, highlighting the importance of addressing immediate social needs alongside long-term developmental goals.

Despite the critique of current governance models, the conversation acknowledges the complexity of governance in Nigeria and the need for nuanced solutions that consider both the efficiency of the civil service and the broader economic and social goals of the state. The discussion concludes by reflecting on the need for a more comprehensive discussion on the role and aims of the state in Nigeria, beyond just improving civil service efficiency.

Transcript

Tobi;

I'll start with where you started your book. I should say I enjoyed your book very much.

Portia;

Thank you.

Tobi;

It's very interesting, and I really connected with it as a Nigerian. So, what you described as the good governance agenda and its challenges, its failures, and way it has come short in the context of Africa and Nigeria, in this case, is where I’ll like us to really start. So just give me a brief rundown of that, because what you call the good governance agenda or the technocratic World Bank-type description of what good governance is, is still the popular and, I should say, acceptable form of discourse in the popular mind about how we think governance should be. So, just give me a brief rundown of your critique of that.

Portia;

Okay, sure. So, I think to understand a good governance agenda you really have to understand what it was a response to and, kind of, the immediately preceding history. So in the 1980s and the 1990s, you have the structural adjustment programs which are promoted by the World Bank and the IMF and adopted by many, many countries both in Africa and in the global south. And these are programs that take aim at the kind of bloated state and too much state intervention in the economy. And they say the economy needs to be structurally changed to allow market forces to drive development. So you see a kind of consistent pattern of privatization, liberalization, devaluation, removal of capital controls. And that was driven by a strongly ideological belief that the market is the best allocator of resources and the best driver of development.

And Nigeria, in 1986, under Babangida adopted something that was basically the structural adjustment programs, albeit not quite in name. And then by the kind of 1990s, the early 1990s, the late 1980s, people were starting to realize, actually, these structural adjustment programs don't work. They don't achieve what we wanted them to achieve. In many places, they had absolutely disastrous results. And a lot of the critique of that is coming from places like CODESRIA (Council for the Development of Social Science in Africa). So African scholars, from a more heterodox perspective saying: you can't rely on the market to just fix all of Africa's problems. And actually, in doing so, you did things like eliminating much of the middle class, these are hitting a lot of people who were otherwise in the professions. So there are lots of controversy over the structural adjustment, and it's seen as being a very ideological project.

And then in response to this, within the World Bank, there was thinking about, okay, maybe the problem isn't necessarily at the level of the policies, it's at the level of how does government itself operate. And so you see this move - you've got reports from the early 90s like governance and development, this move towards saying, okay, we need to reform how government operates. And this is actually applicable to all governments. All governments should be accountable. All governments should be transparent. All governments should be made more efficient. And if we do this by focusing on how government itself operates, then that's a better route to development. It's kind of like way of answering some of the critiques of structural adjustment.

However, many people say that the good governance agenda was really just a continuation of much of the structural adjustment policies. That the core ideas that you need to withdraw state intervention in many, many areas of the economy, privatize, liberalize, adopt private sector methods of operating and import them into the public sector, kind of lived on. So there's as much continuity as there is rupture. And so in practice, a lot of what the good governance agenda was doing was things like public finance reform or civil service reform and that kind of lives on. But I should also say that the word good governance has been used to cover many, many different things. And so people aren't always talking about the same thing when they use the term.

For example, in the early 90s, you have this, like, third wave of democratization. And in some ways, the good governance agenda was a bit interwoven with this. It was seen as multiparty democracy, elections. So there are definitely different debates to be had. But the one I guess I'm interested in is this one that says good governance is accountability, transparency, and the public-private divide. And the interesting thing there is it really promotes this idea of good government is technocracy. And so that means the people who are making decisions really should be the people with technical knowledge. That's often like public finance experts or economists. And the interesting thing is that that immediately sets up a bit of a tension, not necessarily with politics, which I know we've touched upon already, but with democracy.

Because if you've basically got, like, philosopher kings, wearing suits, with their degrees, then what's the role for the people? What's the role for mass participation? So the Thandika Mkandawire's critique of this was he said that you create choiceless democracies. So at a time when African countries were often opening up to democratic governance, in 1999, in Nigeria, for example, it also came at the same time that the kind of menu of policy options that it was acceptable to pursue and that were permissible within this kind of good governance framework and aid conditionality and increasing controls from the IMF and the World Trade Organization was really narrowing.

So finally people have the vote, but what can they vote for? Actually, quite a narrow set of kind of pro-market policies that pursue development in quite a narrow way as defined by international institutions. So that's kind of what I see as being some of the central tensions of the good governance agenda. And in the book, I kind of explore how does this play out at the level of state government in Oyo State, for example, or how is this playing out in debates in Lagos State government’s new agencies or whatever. So, yeah, I'm really standing on the shoulders of other people like Yusuf Bangura, and other Nigerian political scientists, people who were critiquing the good governance agenda as it was developing in the 90s.

Tobi;

We'll get into your field work in Oyo States, and I'm curious what the Lagos model really is, and I know a lot of people in the audience are curious as well. But I want you to help me contextualize the good governance argument better. So I think where I share your sentiments, especially around the Structural Adjustment Program and other donor driven programs of the like is that they are very antidemocratic, they are not even accountable in the sense that they define accountability to be. And I think we share similar sentiments in that regard.

So let me take one very popular example that sort of intersects with the discourse around governance, which is that in Nigeria we've been talking about corruption for decades, right? There are always stories in the news of bureaucrats, civil servants and even politicians misappropriating public funds, you know, and the way the good governance narrative sort of feeds into that is that if you then have a process of rules that holds people accountable, it then becomes difficult to misappropriate public funds. Funds that should be invested in social programs or infrastructure that then find their way into people's accounts via very clever and, in some cases, not so clever means.

But what we have seen is that despite all the talk of instituting all these frameworks and rules, we haven't really solved the corruption problem. It never really goes away. Even under a President Like Buhari who was strongly seen as clean and incorruptible, there were still massive news reports of corruption under him. So help me use corruption to contextualize the failure, I would say, of the good governance agenda. And what's the alternative to that? How can we better understand the concept of good governance?

Portia; 

Yeah, so this is such an important thing to talk about. And actually, when I first came to studying southwest Nigeria, I thought that my project was going to be about corruption, because I thought, why not? I'm coming to Nigeria, that's a constant critique Nigerians have of their own country. And what I found was, first of all, trying to research corruption, the interviews were often quite boring. Because it's almost like there's this script. You ask people about corruption in Nigeria and they have a lot to say about it, but it often covers kind of very, very similar sort of themes. I kind of got used to hearing the same things over and over again. And I found this interesting of, like, if this feels like there's a very, very standard kind of script, maybe more conceptually, what I realized was that something happens when we talk about corruption - and when we focus on critiquing corruption as a kind of, like, dominant aspect of Nigerian politics - is it creates a false illusion of consensus.

Because if we spend all of our time talking about what's wrong, it gives this impression that we agree about what corruption is, thus we must agree about what the opposite of corruption is. As if we all want the same thing. If only we could get rid of corruption, then we could do X, Y, or Z. And actually, X, Y and Z are quite different options. And that's why we have democracy. That's why we have political debate and contestation. Because actually, people's visions of what the state should do and what society should look like are not all the same.

So I decided that it would actually be much more interesting to look at what are the positive visions that people have of what they think government should be doing if it weren't corrupt. So that's kind of why I wanted to start finding out, okay, what are people's kind of visions of good governance? Also on that, I found that there were some interesting instances where we think that corruption and good governance are the opposite of each other, and yet there were things that people were doing where some people thought, oh, that's an epitome of corruption, and other people would think, no, Hooray, this is the epitome of good governance.

And I think by understanding those more ambiguous, more puzzling, more tricksy cases, we learn much more about the underlying values of what good governance could mean. And I think this comes out maybe most clearly in the study of transparency, for example. So one of the things that governments have kind of position themselves as succeeding in this good governance agenda, one of the things that they did was tend to put more documents and budgets and statistics and data online. And this is seen as an unambiguously good thing. It makes them more transparent. There are lots of NGOs and civil society organizations in Nigeria like BudgIT that are pushing for this, and it's broadly seen as like a measure of transparency.

And yet at the same time, there's also a kind of popular suspicion among people about what this data and these budgets and these documents hide as much as reveal. Or the idea that, well, you know, if you're educated enough to put together these very complex accounting documents, maybe you're also smart enough to kind of use them to cover your tracks or to bamboozle people. And so in the chapter of the book where I talk about transparency, I give a couple of examples. And first of all, is this kind of Nigerian idiomatic idea of speaking grammar. That you're using very fine, beautiful, elevated language, but that doesn't mean, oh, you're upright and trustworthy. It means you're kind of obfuscating. And that actually it'd be more truthful if you spoke in a more accessible register.

But also there's a debate from before the 2015 Oyo state election that was on the radio, where one of their  other candidates is talking about Ajimobi, and Ajimobi says, oh, you know, we built this bridge, and you can't say it's corrupt because we spent this much, this much, this much. Look at the budget. And his opponent says, oh, my brother is very good at giving statistics. And there's a glint in his eye or a smirk on his face, and the implication is like, you know, statistics is not everything. So I think it's really important to probe into that suspicion of these traditional good governance methods, because otherwise we don't understand why something that we think should work and be a solution isn't necessarily working. And it also helps us understand why when you have governors who are really performing kind of good governance in these standard ways that we expect, they're not always reelected and they're not always locally popular. And I think the standard account or the standard kind of interpretation of this by academics and commentators is, well, when you fight corruption, corruption fights back. And there's this idea that Nigerian voters are incorrigible. They're just totally committed to just taking rice and chicken from people and giving them their vote, and just that they're so kind of entrenched in these patrimonial ways of thinking that even when they're offered something better, they don't take it.

And I think I'm a little bit skeptical or hesitant about embracing that narrative in an uncomplicated way, because I think actually voters are often doing something much more sophisticated. They're looking at what politicians are doing, and they're comparing them to more popular or more kind of broad based ideas of what accountability and transparency should mean. So we shouldn't see it as a war between accountability and corruption, but we should see it as a conflict between different ideas of what accountability might mean. And that would require us to take Nigerian voters much more seriously.

Tobi; 

That's interesting. There’s also… if we look at even the last election, which the issue of vote buying was really a big issue around the elections and it was even one of the reasons why the central bank engaged in the really expensive and economically destructive currency change policy. And I've never really agreed also with that narrative of voters being stupid and they are selling their votes and basically selling their future for stipends. And I think it's condescending and it gives people less credit about their ability to make choices about their lives. So which then brings me to… I think it takes me back a little bit to early in the book where you talked about the sort of progressive era in Southwest politics. One of the things I love about the book is the concept of olaju - enlightenment - which you used really well, where you had this political movement that grew out of olaju, the enlightened participation in governance. And, of course, how Awolowo was a key figure in that and how there was so much focus on technocratic governance. And the trouble it eventually ran into with voters and some of the local political dynamics. So, walk me through the… I should say I don't want to use the word failure or the challenges of technocratic conception of what governance should look like. Sort of walk me through that.

Portia;

Sure. Yeah. So, I'm so glad that part of the book resonated with you because it was a really interesting part to kind of research and think through. So with this concept of olaju, which is this Yoruba word and apologies, I can't do tonal pronunciations, but this is drawing on the work of people like Wale Adebanwi or J.D.Y. Peel and Olufemi Vaughan, who've looked at this historical thinking about the evolution of Yoruba ideas of what it means to be a good leader. And even if we look in precolonial times, there's this idea that the leader should be the point where power and knowledge meet and that a good leader is someone who has maybe a type of knowledge that other people don't have. So we see, up to 150 years ago, this idea of leaders and enlightenment being overlapping. And then this takes on certain forms in the establishment of the colonial bureaucracy.

You know, in precolonial Ibadan, to be powerful, you had to be a really good warlord. You had to be a powerful head of household and show virtue in war. And then the bureaucracy comes, and actually, you need to start to be able to read and write and to be able to kind of participate in these kind of Westernized forms of bureaucratic control as well. So this is detailed really beautifully in the work of historian Ruth Watson as well. So you have this evolution of what does that enlightened knowledge that leaders need look like? And then you have Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who's very influential in Yoruba politics. He's not from Ibadan, but he's called the Sage. And he takes on this figure of being, like, leader of the Yoruba, whatever that might mean, and he's seen as being a perfect fulfillment of Olaju and this idea of enlightened leadership. And he sets up the party - Action Group, which is a progressive party that starts first under colonialism and then leads into the First Republic, and later also founds the UPN - Unity Party of Nigeria, which carries forward similar ideas, which many of your listeners will be familiar with.

So I characterize this in the book as being a form of government that not necessarily is technocratic, but maybe it falls under a wider umbrella that I call epistocratic. And so we take the word like epistemology means a study of knowledge. So epistocratic is the rule by people who have the knowledge. And it can include technical knowledge, but can include other thoughts as well, kind of. And so this kind of Yoruba progressive movement that I should say is also linked into certain ideas of Yoruba cultural nationalism that maybe I can't really touch upon in this discussion, but are important to it as well, the formation of the Yoruba ethnic identity, cultural practices, linguistic practices, et cetera, et cetera.

But the problem with focusing on a kind of epistocratic approach to governance is often it means that you neglect other elements of governance that are equally important. And so the one I kind of emphasize in the book is the social dimension. I think there's also the material. And I think when we study African politics, we're often obsessed with the material. Like, what are people doing? What are they giving people? Are they giving public goods or private goods? So I try to set that to one side and then kind of bring it in a bit later. So this kind of progressive form of governance inspired by Awolowo has a certain position in terms of the social relations it posits between leaders and followers, which is one of elitism. And you see a really, really interesting use of the idea of elites and what's a relationship between elites and masses. And you have this idea that, okay, well, if the elites are the people who have enlightened knowledge, they've been exposed, they've been abroad, they have Western education, then their job is, first of all, to set the direction of society, because the masses don't have their abstract knowledge, they're not enlightened, they don't necessarily know where we should be going. But also that it's the job of the elites to make the masses more like the elites. And that means you don't necessarily need to listen to what the masses are saying. It has certain antidemocratic threads running through it because you're basically saying that the masses don't know what they want.

And so in the book, I link this to something that Governor Ajimobi says in one of his speeches, where he says, a good leader takes people where they want to go, a great leader takes people where they need to go. Actually, if you're enlightened leader, you don't necessarily need to be accountable to what the people want or what the people are saying that they want to happen. You need to be accountable to serving their best interests. And so you often get this kind of idea, what I call the Lagos model, the Tinubu project, followed up by Fashola and extended into the southwest of wait and see what we can do in four years. And then at the end of the four years, look at what we've done, have we performed? And if so, that means everything that we did during that four years was worth it. So you often had this idea also of accountability to performance, but also the legitimacy and the necessity of sacrifice. And in some of my other work, I look at this in the context of urban renewal, which in Ibadan and Lagos basically entailed the demolition and destruction of thousands, if not tens or hundreds of thousands of small scale shops, for example. So people losing their livelihood where they'd been based for decades, potentially.

And what was really interesting in places like Ibadan, under Ajimobi, was Ajimobi wasn't downplaying the cost of demolition. He wasn't saying, no, no, it's fine. He wasn't ignoring it. He wasn't trying to silence people when they complained about it. So very pro-Ajimobi newspapers were recording people saying, you know, my life is a disaster now, I can't make money. And he was saying, yes, but it's a sacrifice. So this very explicit acknowledgment of you need to trust what we're doing. And he uses the image of sometimes when you're a parent, you have to make the kid take the bitter medicine because the parent knows what's best. So this is all a very long way of saying, why is it that this kind of progressive project runs into trouble? And I think it's because it neglects the kind of appropriate social relations that say that the constituents want to be connected to their followers, they want to be taken seriously, they want to be listened to. Whereas if you kind of position yourself in this progressive mindset, you don't necessarily need to listen to voters that much. Because they're not the people who have the answers. So I think often you've seen, running parallel to this kind of Yoruba progressive line, an equally deeply rooted and equally historically established, more kind of populist conservative line in Yoruba politics. Which is embodied by people like Adedibu, Adelabu, these kind of figures who like, if you go to the streets of Ibadan, people are still singing songs about them. They still remember them now in 2023. And they're seen as being the people who care for the people. They're sensitive to their needs. And often this has been performed in ways that are very, very material.

So, in Oyo State we talk about amala politics. Amala is a staple food, it's like a swallow that you have in Oyo State. And people like Lamidi Adedibu would literally have people gathering outside of his house and he'd feed them amala and gbegiri. And again, there are lots of  dominant conceptions of politics in Africa that say this is just standard patrimonialism. This is just standard getting people to support you politically by catering to their most base needs. But I think it's not only the kind of material exchange, but it's also the symbolic and the ideas of sociality that this conveys, which is you're hungry, so I'm going to take that seriously. I care for you. I care for the everyday people. Yeah, I think that's why it runs into trouble. And whenever the progressives have become kind of too elite, too enlightened, too like haughty, there's always been this alternative line waiting to step into the vacuum when they're not able to kind of meet popular demands for both epistemic and social rule.

Tobi;

So in a contested kind of way, as you posited in the book, isn't this also like a kind of political entrepreneurship? So it's kind of like two rival products going to the market and see who can persuade the consumer.

Portia;

Yeah, absolutely.

Tobi;

How much of that was going on at the time time, as opposed to maybe like a failure of technocracy. And you're absolutely right about the progressive era in Southwestern politics, by the way. I recall that I've seen copies of Bola Ige's letters to students every term during their resumption. So there was this idea of, you know, we won't really run a progressive, elitist government. And I also think that some of their goals were not necessarily bad. Even some of their policy positions or proposition or programs and agendas are also quite populist as well, like universal education, universal health care and things like that. So I wonder how much of the failure we saw was due to political entrepreneurship and just the savviness of their political rivals being able to look at the people, look at their complaints and find a way to sort of appeal to that.

Now, it may not be in the Patrimonial Condescending way, but we see you, we look at you, we know what you feel and this is where these people are messing up and we are offering something better. Because when I look at the outcomes of, should I say, these two rival conception of government, even in cases where the amala politics, to put it that way, was able to weaponize people’s discontent to sort of kick out the progressives, the rivals generally often do not do better. Right? You often find people at the end of it almost complaining about the same thing. This person's out of touch or we got him there, but now… so just walk me through that. How much of it is the failure of the progressive project per se, as opposed to just the contested nature of politics?

Portia;

Yeah. Yeah. So I think that's a really great point, and I love your characterization of, like, can we think of these two things as different products which are being offered to the electorate? And so I should issue the caveat that the story I'm telling of Yoruba politics is a stylized narrative. And I do believe that there are these two kind of like ideological threads that we can trace, which is somewhat contested in the history of studying Nigerian politics where people say there's no ideology. But to make that point, you have to erase some of the details and the complexity. So if any historians of Yoruba politics read the book, I'm sure they'll have many points where they're like, oh, but it's more complicated. So, you know, Adedibu, he started his political career in the Action Group, so I'm taking him as the embodiment of the kind of opposition to Awolowo. But he actually has very strong links as well to these guys. And also, everyone in Ibadan knows each other. So there's definitely more kind of complexity there. But I think it's still a useful way of thinking about how politics has evolved.

And I also wanted to…you know, you're saying these progressives, they've done some good things as well. And I really want to emphasize that many of the achievements that have put the Southwest Zone in the position it's in today of having often the highest socioeconomic indicators, highest levels of education, high levels of human capital, whatever, they were achieved because of the kind of four pillars of the Action Group and the kind of transformative decade under Awolowo. And that's kind of part of my academic motivation is it's easy to critique the bad guys. It's much more interesting to critique the good guys. And for many people, they quite rightly feel that Awolowo is the best president that Nigeria never had, that he's the best offering that Nigeria had. But I think we find out most from then saying, okay, but still, what's missing? Even from the people who we wish that they could have done more. That has relevance when you're thinking about the Lagos model, because the Lagos model was really, really popular with donors. So organizations like USAID, the EU, what was formerly DFID, the British Department for International Development. I quote some things in the book where development professionals are looking at Lagos, and they're like, there are reforms that we've been trying to push in Nigeria for 20 years at the federal level, and we've had no success. And here's a state government which is taking on these reforms and driving them of their own accord.

So not necessarily saying, oh, everything they did was a failure or their approach is totally wrong, but saying where we have these examples that many people think are the best offerings Nigerian politics from the last 30 years, we still need to be aware of where do they fall short? And why might they fail to command popular legitimacy in the ways we might expect? And then finally, in terms of thinking about political entrepreneurship. So when I talk in the book as a whole, I kind of conclude that what we need to be thinking about is socially embedded good governance. Which is defined by more socially embedded conceptions of accountability, accessibility, transparency in people, et cetera, et cetera. And I'm not saying that this approach is something that the populists are doing. And I talk about a number of quite unsavory figures, people like Ayo Fayose in Ekiti State, and I'm definitely not saying, oh, let's copy them, or they've got the solutions. But what I think we see is that there are kind of a number of underlying either reference points or demands that voters as a whole tend to have.

They tend to want some attention to the epistemic dimensions of government. Like, you definitely don't want a leader who's not enlightened, but that's not enough on its own. And there's some demand to have appropriate social relations with leaders or leaders who perform the appropriate social relations and kind of has socially embedded forms of governance. But again, that on its own is not enough. Yeah, you need a government that can deliver, whether that's long term infrastructure or immediate economic benefits. 

One of the figures I talk about in Oyo State is Lam Adesina. A very highly regarded public intellectual, you know, he was a teacher, he was a really smart man. But it's not just enough to do that kind of enlightenment side of it. He wasn't able to deliver that kind of material element of government quickly enough in response to those demands immediately after the return to democracy in 1999. So I'm kind of saying there's like a triangle at the heart of what good governance means. And if you neglect any of those points, then other people will step in. And these, like, political entrepreneurs, as you say, will see an opportunity and say, actually, we can step in and offer some of what you're neglecting to offer. And what I would   say is that it's Populists who have a natural affinity with the social element of government. So they're often the people where we see the most exaggerated, almost like pantomime versions of accessibility and socially embedded good government, because it's often something that they kind of have an instinct for, but that doesn't mean that what they're doing is actually being accessible or actually having appropriate social relations. Often they're kind of like…

Tobi;

Performative…

Portia;

Yeah, it's like a kind of very exaggerated performance. So, yeah, I hope that kind of contextualizes a little bit how I see these two lines of politics, and it's a stylization, but I still think it's useful.

Tobi;

We've been talking about certain things in the course of the conversation that we haven't really clearly defined yet. So, tell me what and I know a number of my audience would be very interested in this, especially given the current political climate. So what is the Lagos model? Because we know the current president more or less ran on his record in Lagos. Record of performance in Lagos. He is generally seen as the man who built Lagos, but this isn't about him personally. So just what is the Lagos model as conceptualized in the book and your choice of Oyo State as the sort of case study to look at that. Why?

Portia;

Yeah, so the Lagos model is a term that I coined, but I also think it describes something that a lot of people are talking about, but maybe in other kind of terms. And so at its most basic, it's the form of governance that Tinubu initially develops and then extends under the Fashola leadership from 1999 2015 in Lagos state. So it's kind of what he's doing. And then this is replicated in other southwestern states from 2011 onwards. Okay, so what is the content of the Lagos model? Well, we've talked a lot about its historical, ideological antecedents, so it draws a little bit on this, like Awolowo progressivism. That's definitely part of the picture. But Tinubu's position within that history is a little bit ambiguous. He's definitely not the clearest example of a descendant of Awolowo, politically.

Tobi;

Yeah, his Awoism is contestable.

Portia;

Yes. He's also informed by what was happening in the southwest in the 1990s under Abacha. We have the leadership of General Babangida in the 80s and early 90s. We says he's going to open up to democracy. We then have the June twelveth election with MKO Abiola, who's a Yoruba Muslim businessman. But basically you have the prodemocracy movement that uses this June 12 election that was annulled. And we have the arrival of General Sani Abacha, who becomes the most despicable, violent, despotic dictator Nigeria has ever seen. And under Sani Abacha, you have various kind of slightly younger politicians organizing as part of the prodemocracy movement and NADECO, and that's where we see the rise of some figures like Tinubu, Dr. Kayode Fayemi, who also goes on to be governor of Ekiti State. So you have these variety of influences and then what we see in Lagos is a kind of package of policies and reforms and approaches that comes to characterize the Lagos model more specifically.

So I would say that it is a model of development that involves a very strong state, but the state using its power to drive private sector driven development, or to kind of facilitate private sector driven development. So common policies that make up this model are the expansion of the tax net with the intention of driving internally generated revenue. Interestingly, this kind of serves a variety of ends. So, as you talked about at the very beginning, this was partly a way of enabling Lagos State to have financial autonomy from the centre in a country where many states were just relying on the statutory allocation of oil revenues from the Federal Government, which was very patchy and erratic.

In the case of Lagos State, which was often knocking heads with the Federal Government at the time, you often see like a digitization of tax records, a professionalization of the tax department, in this case Lagos Inland Revenue Service. This tends to come along with civil service reforms. So one of the things that Tinubu did, and that often is then created in other states, is the creation of kind of executive agencies or new forms of trans-urban governance. So in Lagos you see things like LASTMA, LAWMA, Kick against Indiscipline, so a real changing of the structure of urban governance. And then we also see the embrace of certain kind of private sector driven initiatives or ways of bringing the private sector into development, especially in the promotion of public private partnerships. In Lagos state that often took the form of things like the Lagos State Security Trust Fund, which is a collaboration between state and the private sector.

And behind this is this wider justification that you need to bring in investors and that the state needs to bring in investors by controlling and changing public space, which is why urban renewal and the improvement of transport infrastructure in big cities is so important to this model. So you see a lot of discussion, especially in the work I did in Ibadan, on people in Ibadan need to learn to see their city through the eyes of investors. They need to learn to see their city through the eyes of people who are coming anew. And they need to realize how dirty and old and backwards and African the city looks. And we need to make it look more new and modern and international, and otherwise we won't have the investment we need to kind of grow our economy and grow our internally generated revenue. There are some critiques I can talk about with this, but maybe I'll leave it there. I'm aware you also asked, why look at Oyo state for this?

Tobi;

Exactly. Because Oyo state kind of like…

Portia;

It's not Lagos.

Tobi;

Not that. I find that interesting choice because I can see why it makes sense. It sort of clearly demonstrates the way you sort of built your narrative in the book and, I mean, with the Fourth Republic and Lam Adeshina coming to office, who is as Awoist as they come, as progressive as he is and who also possess the sort of technocratic mindset and the challenges he then had in governance. And then you had someone like Ladoja coming into government and his own struggles also with the Adedibu brand of politics and the challenges he experienced before he was impeached and then brought back in the government. And we then saw the rapaciousness of Alao Akala…

Portia;

Yeah, ATM.

Tobi;

Yeah. And how the other model of governance can run away and then culminating into Ajimobi finally getting into government and to sort of bring back the professionalism and the technocracy. So the choice of Ibadan and Oyo State clearly comes alive in the book and the story you were trying to tell.

Portia;

So maybe in the interest of transparency I should set out both my academic justification, but also my practical justification. I mean, in a lot of ways, Oyo State is like the heartland of Yoruba land. It's kind of like the psychic heartland. Ibadan itself claims to be often the seat of the Yoruba, even though that's contested. So there are various reasons why it kind of makes sense to talk about Oyo State in terms of its resonance in the Yoruba imagination. Also, what I wanted to do, I wanted to look at the Lagos model without Tinubu. Because in our discussion, we've often been conflating them. But I think it was really useful to go somewhere and say, okay, how can we study this package of policies, reforms and kind of practices and ideas without necessarily always talking about the man himself?

And what we also lack is we lack the money and the economic base of Lagos. And so at the time I was studying it, Ibadan's state budget was about 10% that of Lagos. And so you're looking at often the contradictions and the tensions within the Lagos model become a lot sharper in somewhere like Oyo State because they don't have the money just to buy people off. And so where we saw in Lagos the ability to do things, for example, achieve security by demobilizing the area boys, but by also incorporating them into new forms of state patronage, which is what LASTMA, LAWMA, Kick Against Indiscipline, a lot of the waste management staff…

Tobi;

Yeah, yeah.

Portia;

You know, it created a lot of new jobs. Then it was kind of possible to say to people, this is a sacrifice, but there's going to be a reward to the sacrifice. Whereas in Oyo they were much more constrained. And also at the time I was there in 2015, they'd been suffering from very, very low oil revenues, which had led to plummeting budgets in states across the country. So across the country, civil servants hadn't been paid for a very long time. And suddenly the priorities of how you spend the scarce funds that you had became a lot more highly charged. So I think that also enabled the kind of ideology behind this to come out much more clearly, because people are having to really say, what are your priorities in politics?

Whereas, as you say, Ajimobi's predecessor, Akala of the PDP, was known as being the most profligate, the most venal. There were times when Obasanjo had be called in to try and make up with some of the local traditional leaders because Akala had offended them, because he was just so kind of difficult to tame. So there are a variety of reasons why it's worth studying the Lagos model in Oyo State. And also, it gives a nice kind of story of transformation.

Before Ajimobi came to power, there was this idea that you go to Ibadan and you have to sleep with one eye open because the insecurity was really terrible.

Tobi;

Yeah.

Portia;

And Ajimobi is able to do very similar to what Tinubu did in terms of Operation Burst, which is its security operation and the demobilization also of the NURTW, which is for listeners who aren't familiar with it, it's the National Union of Road Transport Workers. So the people who control the buses and the motor parks, and under Lamidi Adedibu had been the kind of foot soldiers of street violence and the source of a lot of that kind of insecurity. So those are the kind of analytical or academic reasons, but I also have to be transparent. So, one, Ibadan is a lovely place to stay. 

Tobi;

Okay.

Portia;

And there are really great research networks there. So you have the University of Ibadan, and I had a lot of support from the Political Science department there, so I really have to appreciate that. I also had support from the French Research Institute in Ibadan, which is called IFRA, they were able to host me. They're the center of a lot of academic organizing. You have organizations like NISER (Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research), so there are various reasons it makes sense to be an academic researcher hosted and based in Ibadan. And so I think sometimes as researchers, we have to be a little bit honest about [how] we also have to try and have an easy life. So that was kind of part of the picture as well.

Tobi;

I mean now, extending the Lagos model, like you said, which I sort of agree with [is] Tinubu looms too large in discussions about governance in Lagos and he has been out of power for a long time, as a matter of fact. Now, looking at the Lagos model and how it extended to other parts of the country, in this case in Oyo State, which was your primary focus in the book, and also you touched upon Ekiti State. Now, how did it play out? And what were the… I know you talked about the constraints, resources…what were the other tensions you found in this extension of the Lagos model of governance, which is a very strong state that is then trying to use the power of the state to get private businesses and economic growth and transformation going locally? What problems did it run into?

Portia;

So something…when we were talking about before, this idea behind a lot of the active state of intervention was this idea that we need to attract investors. And so what is it that investors need? Whatever it is investors need is the top priority. And this led to, I think, sometimes a slightly confused understanding of different political priorities. Something I look at, and I don't think it's actually in the book, but it's something I'm looking at in a subsequent article, is I often found that people were talking about Maslow's hierarchy of needs. So, in general, this is like a little pyramid that says the most basic needs that people have is for material survival, and then it's psychological survival, and then at the top is something like self fulfillment or whatever. The meaning it was given in different political discussions was about how do you rank the priority of different needs and priorities in government? And it was often used in kind of opposing ways. I think it helps us kind of understand some of the contestation that was going on in Ekiti and also Oyo.

So if we take the list of priorities from the kind of Ajimobi progressive train, there's this idea of, first of all, we need to attract investors. To attract investors, we have to make the city attractive and accommodating to them. And there's explicit discussion of, like, so we need some good nightclubs, and we need a five star hotel, and the government should be active in creating these things. Which is rather odd because we tend to think of the government's obligations primarily in the spheres of things like health and education and security and whatever. And definitely there were elements where the Lagos model in Oyo state was very attentive to these things as well. So I'm not saying they ignored them. But what was interesting was you have this situation where we say the top priority is for the state to make sure that there are good nightclubs and recreational facilities for investors coming from outside. And we do see the development of things like Agodi Gardens… I forget the name, is it Premier Hotel, the one on the top of the hill?

Tobi;

Yes.

Portia;

And basically being told that this is the number one development priority. And yes, at the same time, people who are more everyday people in the state maybe who don't have that much money or who are struggling with unemployment or whatever, they're looking at this and they're thinking the government says that it won't do amala politics, it won't give out up small, small money to ordinary people on the street. It's knocking down our shops, it's doing demolitions, it's making our livelihoods hard, it's telling us we have to be making sacrifices. And yet the elite seem to be getting all of these benefits as if it's the most essential thing for development. I think you see this kind of debate about what should be prioritized? Who is it who has to wait for development? And often the outcome of this is that the poorest people are being told they have to wait and that the immediate benefits are going to go to the richer people. So, for example, one of the achievements of the Ajimobi governorship was that they built a flyover in Mokola in Ibadan, and that speeded up journey times. But who benefits from that? It's people who own cars, because often the buses are not even allowed over the flyover.

And so, in a very kind of everyday, direct way, people were seeing infrastructural development and they were seeing that it benefited the richer, more elite people. And I think there are genuine ideological tensions there over, like, what is the best route to development? What are the models we should be pursuing? But this came out really clearly in the Ekiti State election. So in 2010, there's the election of Dr. Kayade Fayemi, who in many ways is like the prime example of a technocratic politician. Very highly educated. He actually has a PhD from my own institution, King's College, London. Really smart guy. People describe him as omoluabi, so very cultivated. Not only is he smart, he has the correct moral dispositions, you know? And so he came to power in 2010, and he was seen as delivering this long term progressive vision. And yet in 2014, he came up for reelection, and his opponent was this guy, Ayo Fayose the Populist, this kind of pantomime expression of all of these more patrimonial tendencies. And from the Fayose campaign, we get this idea of “stomach infrastructure”.

Tobi;

Yeah. A phrase he popularised by himself, no less.

Portia;

And so we have, like, a challenge. Okay, well, Fayemi, he builds infrastructure. Me, I'm going to build stomach infrastructure. And there's a phrase that originates in Yoruba, I only know the English version of it, which is, you cannot tar a road without tarring the stomach. And so he was famous for distributing bags of rice, chicken, just very short term goods that fill people's bellies, but don't necessarily contribute to long term development. I know a lot of people who are more progressive just see this as an example of corruption fighting back. But I think it's important to pay attention to the temporality, by which I mean, like, how does this connect to different ideas of time? So if on the progressive approach, the kind of Fayemi approach, we have this idea that you have to wait for development. It's a long term project. You have to make sacrifices. You won't see the benefits today. And yet the people who are benefiting today are often the kind of people at the richer end of the spectrum, and then you're saying to the poorer people, you have to wait. It's not surprising that you have political entrepreneurs, as you say, emerging, who are offering much more short term benefits.

And this is in a country where a lot of people don't know how they're going to get to the end of the week, the end of the month. So telling them they have to wait is quite unrealistic, or this is the kind of argument that was put forward. So I think these ideas around what does development look like? What should the priorities be? They were real areas of contestation in places like Oyo and Ekiti. And the interesting thing was that so in 2014, Fayemi loses the election, and this becomes like a warning sign to all of the other Lagos model governors who were elected in 2011, because it shows, you know what?

Tobi;

It was a real shock.

Portia;

Yeah, like, people were shocked. And if you look at what progressive commentators are writing around the time, they're really despairing at the state of Nigerian democracy. And there was a sense of, well, we thought we were doing everything right, but maybe our diagnosis was wrong or maybe our approach was wrong. So there's also a real moment of soul searching among progressive politicians. Then the 2015, the following year, when a lot of those state elections were taking place, including in Oyo, they were kind of in the shadow of Fayose's victory in Ekiti. And when I was doing my fieldwork, everyone in Oyo state knew who Fayose was. Sometimes they laughed when I mentioned him or they gave me this look, but he kind of loomed large, this specter of even if you haveTinubu support, even if you have all of the donors cheerleading what you're doing, there's still this specter, this ghost…

Tobi;

They’re still vulnerable.

Portia;

There's still this vulnerability. And I guess my book is really trying to make sense of that vulnerability and get beyond this kind of corruption fights back narrative and ask was there something maybe deeper going on?

Tobi;

So one of the things I was able to and you can correct me if I'm wrong about this… one of the things I was able to abstract from the book and even from your answer right now, is that I think part of the failures of the progressive kind of governance and epistocratic model of the Awosit movement, which Fiami also kind of sort of represents in a way, though he’s from a different era, is that sometimes I think economic transformation for that model is not really about the people. Because it's one thing to ask voters to wait, but they have to know what they are waiting for. The signs really have to be there that things really will get better if we persist with what we are doing. It's not a case of oh wait, your tone will come, you know, it may never come. This is politics. There are other dynamics at play. Like you said, these are places where some times the livelihood of the population is really vulnerable. Many people live on daily wages, even from their micro businesses. So I feel perhaps maybe the progressives and this whole idea of technocratic epistocracy, you know, they have the wrong priorities sometimes. Like you said, the hotels, the bridges. Imean if we compare with Asia there are also transformative policies and public spending that you can do even alongside your hotels - things like agriculture that really touches upon the lives of the everyday people. Oyo state is very, very huge in agriculture. Ekiti state, I imagine the same thing. So I see your point that they are really out of touch, and I see how that can be quite vulnerable to the brand of politics of Fayose who will sit with you and eat corn on the road and convey the image of a guy who really feels the pulse of the street.

Portia;

Yeah, I think what you said, you're asking people to wait their turn, but their turn may never come, I think is a really interesting way of thinking about it. And all I can say on this point, really, is that I think this debate is only more relevant today than it was when I was writing, because we've had the announcement of the withdrawal of the fuel subsidy. I'm sure most of your listeners will know what this is, but the Nigerian government subsidizes the price of petrol, which means it's available at a cheaper rate than it would be at market prices. And for many people, this is the only thing they get from government, right?

Tobi;

Yeah.

Portia;

They're paying taxes. Government makes their life hard in terms of getting a visa or a driver's license. There are so many ways in which they are suffering from government and the only thing they get is they get slightly cheaper petrol. It's been on the table for a long time. There have been multiple attempts to remove it and Tinubu has, again, committed to remove it. And talking to people, being in Lagos kind of this past week and talking to people, people are really worried that they kind of think it's going to happen. And I think this will be a test case for how is Tinubu and the people around him, many of whom have long experience, but some of whom are kind of young, more technocratic, fresh blood, how are they going to navigate this point when exactly what you say [that] you can't ask people to wait for that long without giving them something in the meantime? I guess it really just demands statecraft of how do you maintain legitimacy whilst withdrawing the kind of one benefit that a lot of people see that they have from government? Especially at a time of massive economic depression and the currency, cash crisis, all of the other things that are kind of making life in Nigeria hard for many, many people.

And I should say, when I talk about people are struggling to get to the end of next week or the end of next month, this isn't people who lack education, this isn't people who lack the skills. You know, oh, we should empower them to give them some skills, they have the skills. They probably have a university degree. You've got people out there with pharmacy, engineering degrees and they're in exactly the same position. So just to say that, just to prevent against kind of mischaracterization of the Nigerian voting public. So I guess, yeah, it's a test case. Tinubu has been a great political operator. He's been able to achieve some of these things where you demand sacrifices of the population, but you kind of keep them on board. You carry them along, as perhaps Nigerians might say. And so on this front, you know what? Maybe it's unwise, but I do have a little bit of optimism. Because I feel like if someone is able to balance the competing demands and to push something through and really make something happen? You know, Tinubu does have track records in this regard in a way that Buhari just was not active. Like he wasn't proactive. He wasn't able to balance different competing groups, different competing elites, different competing demands. So a little bit of me is looking to the President and hoping that he's able to pull off a miracle.

Tobi;

Two things I would love us to touch on before we wind down this conversation. And one is, you know, it’s one of these things like corruption that never really goes away, which is accountability. If we look at the technocratic sort of conception of good governance, accountability then means that there's a rule book and there are things you have to conform to. For example, in the context of the new government; we are talking about asset declaration, and early in the conversation we talked about the use of numbers and statistics and this is what it really means to be transparent. Transparency as accountability.

But one point you drove home in the book which I found relatable was sometimes for the voters, accessibility is what they find accountable. How accessible are you? How approachable are you? How much of you can they see and interact with? From there I want us to then move into this your idea of socially embedded governance, because sometimes the challenge when we talk about the social dimension of governance is that they do not acquire the necessary inertia because they are weakly institutionalized. So where I want you to sort of close off is how can we then practically institutionalize some of these lessons that we have learned from looking at the social dimension, not just the material and the technical dimensions of government?

Portia;

Great. Thank you so much. So I want to get to accessibility, but if I can just come back on this idea of is technocracy always a case of setting stronger rules and setting up the rule? But I'm not sure that's always what's happening. And this is actually one of my critique of the kind of newer forms of governance reform that a lot of donors and the World Bank and DFID and the British government are pushing. And I think sometimes it's lost in the debate. So traditionally, yeah, the critique of the African state, the post colonial African state, is it's weakly institutionalized. So it's neopatrimonial. Like, maybe it has some of the trappings of rules and this idea of having, like, a Weberian rule bound state, but in reality, it's run like a private household. The big man sitting at the center just gets to decide what to do.

So the goal has always been stronger rules, greater institutionalization, more predictability. And yet this has kind of been intention, this idea of good governance as being mimicking the private sector. We don't necessarily always talk about, oh, government would be better if it had more rules. We say government should be more agile, it should be more lean, it should be more innovative, more entrepreneurial. And actually, some of the things that we see be these good governance, kind of friendly, donor friendly, Lagos model governments doing actually lead to the kind of underinstitutionalization of the state. So I'm thinking of things like outsourcing, the creation of public private partnerships to deliver infrastructure and services and the use of consultancies. And so this often leads to a situation where actually the rules that govern how the state behaves, so the civil service or laws are basically being circumvented and bypassed by the bringing in of private sector agents to do things that the state would otherwise be doing. And often that's seen quite favorably, like, great, the private sector is more efficient, it has better ways of working, maybe it brings in international best practice, these are people who've worked in very high achieving international environments.

But we see things like consultants, they're not necessarily accountable to the people, they're accountable to their shareholders or kind of the pursuit of profit. And I'm not saying they aren't doing good things at the same time, but there are definitely democratic concerns around that. And I'd also really highlight the case of PPPs. So, public private partnerships. So it used to be that privatization was at least quite straightforward. We had a state water company and then we transfer ownership of it to a private water company and we can try and work out what the private water company, are they doing well or are they doing badly, et cetera, et cetera. The form of public private partnerships that we're currently seeing emerging and backed very, very strongly by international financial institutions are some of the most complex legal and financial instruments you've ever encountered. It's often hard to work out even who the private partner is, because they come around via special purpose vehicles that are created by consortia, by asset managers, often bringing together very complex financial arrangements, often hosted offshore. So there are kind of confidential and kind of tax arrangements that mean we don't even know who run them.

One of the things I have concerns about is that we think that these kind of technocratic, PPP, private sector led development is going to bring in clearer rules and less corruption. And yet often they're creating a situation where it's impossible to know what the rules are because they're so complex. And you need to be, like, quite an advanced kind of corporate lawyer to even understand what's going on. I guess I'm raising it because it's a bit of a kind of concern of mine, and I think it's something that we really don't understand enough as scholars or commentators. So I just wanted to kind of flag that. And I think it's something that I'd really like to see more discussion of within that kind of, like, Nigerian public sphere. Because my sense is that people have a very, very positive understanding of public private partnerships without necessarily knowing on a case by case basis, are these working in favor of the people or are they just kind of a big shift of risk onto the state? But I know your question was much more tightly linked to this question of accessibility.

Tobi;

Yeah.

Portia;

The idea of accessibility, for me, it's an example of how we can learn from Nigerian politicians and voters. How the rest of the world can look at what Nigeria is doing, and actually, you know, you're able to articulate something that's valuable for the rest of us. So in political science, we don't really have a term that captures what accessibility gets at. And yet whenever I spoke to people, okay, you said, you think this politician is doing a great job, why is he doing a good job? Oh, he's accessible. Or contrastingly, when people criticize politicians, they often said, well, he was arrogant, he was aloof, he was inaccessible. And so something I try and do in the book is I try and delve down into, okay, but what does accessibility mean if we had to give it an academic definition? And I define it as the maintenance of space for direct communication between the ruler and the ruled. So in practice, this normally means face to face, but it can also be by, like, telephone or something. And the thing is, in that moment when you're directly communicating with your ruler and with your kind of followers, is a moment where accessibility can happen through social sanctions. So all politicians, no matter how rich they are, no matter their control of party structures, the one thing they don't like is being booed or being heckled. And if they know that they're going to be booed, they often try and hide. They don't want to be accessible. So it doesn't necessarily happen all of the time when people in communication with their leaders, but there is a kind of possibility for alternative forms of accountability to play out in those moments of communication and accessibility. So this often relates to things like people say, we voted for this politician, he ran off to Abuja, and we haven't seen him in four years. How can you be accountable if I've never seen you? And this is something that people say in Nigeria, but it's also something that I found in studies of politics in places like Ghana and the UK. So a bit further afield.

So this is why I think we have it's a case where we can say that Nigerians were the initial originators of this idea, but it's actually universally applicable. And then you asked, okay, if accessibility is one of the elements of socially embedded good governance, how can we institutionalize it? How can we create rules or procedures or expectations that enable us to kind of put this into practice? And so I do this in the book. I give some very, very basic suggestions, and yet they're rather different from what you would see in good governance agenda set of recommendations. So one thing, maybe you should live in your constituency. If you're a politician, you need to live where your constituents are, because otherwise, how will they have access to. And maybe that sounds kind of willfully simplistic, but I think it's kind of a good, provocative idea, especially as people often like to run away to the nicer, richer areas. But also there's something that Nigerians are already doing that I think kind of captures this idea of accessibility. So if you go on the website of a lot of government agencies, and Lagos State were really the forerunners of this, you'll see the personal telephone numbers of the people who are running these agencies. And that kind of speaks to this level of accessibility of, like, the state is both a bureaucracy, but it's also a set of people. And you need to have access to those people. And often this is being seen as a liability for government that if the people have access to politicians and elected officials, they'll ask them for money or chop or they'll make these personalistic demands. And I address some of the kind of critiques around that in the book. But I also think that we have to think about how can we open up government and have more accessibility rather than less? So that, for me, would be like an example of how we could institutionalize socially embedded good governance.

Tobi;

I mean, I asked that question because I think and this is more of a personal point for me and it's a bit of a Marxist point, if I should say, is that my personal frustration with the works of people like. Thandika and the rest is that they are often very short on practical proposals. Whereas what you're critiquing, at least if we look at Washington Consensus, there's a list of ten clear policies that you should pursue. But there's always a shortage of, okay, so if this falls short in some very important ways, then what next? What should we do? If I win office tomorrow and we've done this and it doesn't work, then what do I do? Now. So it's always short on practical part. That was why I asked you. I like your answer. It sounds simple, but I like it. Live in your constituency is something we can really, really make a hard rule, because, like you said, you're right. My local government chairman does not live in my neighborhood here in Lagos, actually. [S]he lives in a much more nice, richer, high part of the state. And, I mean, she only comes around for party constituent meetings. It sounds very simple, but it’s a very…

Portia;

Maybe let me add to that a bit then, just because sometimes I wrote this book, it's like 80,000 words long, it took like seven years to write. And then people are like so your conclusion is we should put telephone numbers on websites, that's it? 

[laughs]

So let me maybe add to this a little bit. So I think there are a number of things that already happen in Nigerian politics, almost like traditional conventions of how you do politics. And I think we can understand them in terms of accessibility. So there's a long history of rulers holding court by sitting outside of their residence or their palace and being accessible to the people. So they might come with with petitions, they might come with complaints, but they basically have to spend some of their time sat on view, not so surrounded by security that you can't reach them at all. There are these ways of making those who have power have to be on show and have to be visible. You know, there's a Nigerian tradition of the courtesy call. And when I first arrived and I started reading Nigerian newspapers I couldn't understand why every… so many of the stories were this head of government office has paid a courtesy call to this traditional politician, this head of this party has paid a courtesy call to the… and I was like what is? It was clear that there was something going on that I didn't fully understand. And so my attempt to make sense of this over time has been that what they are saying is I was accessible. I created a moment of communication between me and this representative of this social constituency or this trade union or this community. It's showing that they are keeping open the lines of communication. And of course we don't necessarily know what is said in those places. And what is said in those places may be negotiations or demands that we're not very happy with. But at least I think it's the signaling of respect by maintaining communication.

So I think maybe we need courtesy calls from the leader of Islam or an informal settlement. Maybe we need more courtesy calls. And this was something that came out if you look at the campaign materials of Ayo Fayose in 2014, this kind of big populist figure, something that really stuck in my mind was on his website. He said what is the most common phone number in Ekiti? It's my phone number. Everyone has access to me. Not only that, but he says if you call this number I will pick it myself. What he's saying is, it's not like you call my number and you get through to a secretary or a handler and they'll just fob you off, and actually you'll never get to talk to me. Which was often the complaint made of Ajimobi that these civil society groups that had been working for many years, they'd go in and they'd say, we want to see the budget, we want to talk to the governor, and they would wait hours and they'd come back day after day and they'd never get to speak to him. So I think this idea of being accessible and available is really, really important. But think the wider point is also to think that you can't monopolize accountability with only one understanding of what it means. And so when I talk to these people who are in this technocratic class, they often think like, well, all we need to do is deliver and perform. What is it that we need? We need roads, fine, we'll build roads.

But that, I think it gives you a very fragile understanding of accountability that doesn't serve everyone, it doesn't meet everyone's demands. But also, maybe this is a pessimist in me, but there are going to be times when even the most fantastic government cannot deliver and cannot perform, because there are certain factors beyond the control of the government - world oil prices, currency fluctuations, and increasingly, as we look to the future, Nigeria is very, very vulnerable to climate change. So there may be years where even the most fantastic, technocrat, highly educated leader is not able to deliver much that is visible to the population. And so the question is, how will they remain accountable? And how will they keep some trust and legitimacy among the people, even when things are going really badly? And I think that's where you need to be attuned to these alternative understandings of accountability, so that you can carry people along with you, even when that village is flooded and there's nothing you can do, even when there's drought, whatever it is. So I think the  wider argument for socially embedded good governance is that it makes states more resilient, and it makes that legitimacy deeper and stronger and kind of more multilayered. Rather than just relying on this idea of, okay, we can perform, we can build the infrastructure, we can give people the public goods that they need, because that's only one strand of it.

Tobi;

Like you said in your allusion to Fayose, I was going to say that accessibility has never been a problem for amala politics. I mean, you can, at least, relatively…you can see Adedibu on a Friday. The chances of you seeing Adedibu and having a very short conversation with him on a Friday, the chances are very high, unlike some other political figures who are a bit more progressive or technocratically minded. And I'll tell you one interesting story about Akala, actually. But on this point of accessibility in his hometown in Ogbomoso, he comes around every weekend. And I've also seen scenes of this, so it's not just hearsay. So he comes “home” every Friday and you see lines of people. Pool that are in his house just to collect cash, not just handouts, oh, I want to start a business, I want to pay school fees. And he just hands out cash, sometimes unbelievable sums of money to people. But the funny story I have about Akala, which made me laugh when I read that part in your book, of him being an ATM. So I think this was in 2011 when he was campaigning. So I was traveling, I was driving to Ilorin, so I stopped in Ejigbo to buy fruits. So after buying a very large basket of mangoes, I was out of cash. So I wanted to go to the... I think it was just one bank in Ejigbo at the time, Skye bank it was called back then. So I wanted to get some money. Unfortunately for me, Akala was campaigning in Ejigbo that day. So he basically walked into the bank and after making a withdrawal, the bank had to shut down.

So I think a bank staff sort of told us that he collected 200 million naira and the bank just had to close shop that for today, no cash. So Akala was really an ATM.

Portia;

Yeah. So like this point you make about if you wanted to see Adedibu, you could probably see him. And I think that links to a critique that sometimes I've got from people when I presented my work, which is maybe what you're talking about accessibility, maybe it works at the village level, maybe it works at the local government level, maybe it works at the city level. But like realistically, in a country of 200 million people, is this an idea that can actually work at the macro level? Because it's impossible for 200 million people to see to newborn on a Friday. And so what I'd say to this is when we think about accessibility and what are the correct social relations that politicians are meant to have with their constituents, it's not necessarily about direct personal experience necessarily. So it's not necessarily the question of how does the governor treat me, but it's often the question how does the governor treat people? So what I really noticed in the run up to this most recent election is that we saw one of the candidates, Mr. Peter Obi, often celebrated for this exact reason that he was accessible. And people used this word he's accessible. They're not saying necessarily that they themselves met him. What they're saying is that maybe they saw a video online of him interacting with someone he just met in an airport or someone in the street. And so it's about people's understanding of the social relations that these leaders have even if it's not with them directly. And I think this is why in the book, when I get into the more like analytic, academic, theoretical part, I really emphasize that I'm not talking about personalistic relations or private relations between me and you as individuals. I'm talking about social relations which might just be what are the sort of relationships that someone cultivates, what are the sorts of ways of behaving and then judging someone on the basis of that. And often when we talk about clientalism, we talk about relationships where the followers of the voters are directly known to the leader or the person who's their kind of patron. And that's not really what I'm talking about in the book. I'm talking about more this intermediary level of kind of social relationships that can go beyond just individuals. And so that's why I think it's possible for even the president to demonstrate that he's accessible without having to be directly accessible to every single Nigerian citizen. But that's one, I think, very sensible critique that sometimes people do raise to this argument.

Tobi;

Also, I would like to respond to something which relates to your point on what you are seeing as an increasing embrace by the donors of a different way of doing things in government. So I did election special for the podcast. I'll send you a particular episode we did with one of the persons that used to run the Lagos State Emergency Service Management. So we did a very interesting episode on some of the challenges in trying to run public service and provide public goods alongside.

And one thing that actually came up, which it's not a defense of that approach, but which just sort of made me see maybe as a runaway pragmatism, is that sometimes and you see this with the federal government as well, the civil service, the rules around hiring are very amorphous, they’re not very clear. So sometimes using consultants are sort of the easiest way to get things done and not be buried in the bureaucracy. I used to live in Abuja and you have cases where literally your file go missing trying to get approval for one thing or the other. Your file just sits there in somebody's desks who wants something or forgot or doesn't think it's priority enough. And I think that civil service, which then sort of feeds into what you talked about with the Lagos model and how sometimes public services and the civil service is usually used as an employment creation scheme and sometimes very loose culture, or should I say ethics around professionalism and what the job actually entails and how that can then slow down the process of execution of policies in some cases. So, and I think that using consultant sometimes is [practical]….it’s not an ideal solution. Personally, I don't like it as well, especially on the accountability point. But I see it as a sort of runaway pragmatism.

Portia;

Yeah. So I think your point about the civil service and the challenges of getting things done really resonates with so many of the critiques of the state in Nigeria. And a lot of the people I've been talking with in my new project have shared similar concerns, and it's obviously like a major issue. But again, I think I would kind of return to the question I posed at the very beginning of our discussion, which is that often when we spend spend a lot of time thinking about the critique decrying corruption in Nigeria, it creates, again, a false consensus about what it is we actually want. And when we come to that kind of positive vision of the future, there's no guarantee there's going to be full agreement. And actually, that's where the contestation lies. So my question would be, if we want a more efficient civil service in Nigeria, what do we want it to do more efficiently? To what purpose do we want to put that efficiency? So, again, if we want to build state capacity, okay, but what are the goals to which we want to direct that state capacity? And it makes me think of an article again by Thandika Mkandawire where he talks about monocropping and monotasking, and he talks about how the good governance agenda and public sector reforms in the 1990s basically prepared states to do one task and one task only, and that was to attract FDI and to guarantee the property rights of foreign investors.

So that basically is taking risk away from foreign investors and allowing them to do what they want, but also not demand from them to really give back or kind of guarantee any benefits. And that you can build up a state to be very, very efficient for some things, and yet you don't necessarily have kind of democratic consensus on what those goals should be. And so I think there are different things that the state in Nigeria could be aiming for. And it relates to conversation we were having before the recording started as well of, what actually is the economic ambition of Nigeria. And people put it very simply of, oh, we want more investment, we want more growth. But what is it that you want to do? Do you want to build up domestic firms? Do you want to enforce economic activity that is maybe more decentralized or more labor intensive? There are a whole number of different ambitions. The word that's often the elephant in the room is redistribution. Maybe you want a stronger state so that you can radically redistribute and eliminate the kind of off the charts inequality that we see. But that's definitely not the sort of thing that the good governance agenda or public finance initiatives are going to equip you to do. No one is talking about a cap on earnings, for example. And again, I'm not saying this is necessarily the solution, but I just want to highlight the way that there are certain things which are not currently on the menu. And if you're going to have a full discussion of the full range of things that Nigerian state and government could work towards, these need to be some of the options just so that you know that you've kind of explored all of it. And people say there's no ideology in Nigerian politics, and here I'm borrowing from the work of Saeed Hussaini, but often the ideology happens before you even notice it, in limiting the menu of options of what it is a state can do. So I think even in what seems like quite an uncontroversial discussion about the civil service, it probably should be more efficient. There's still something hiding there of what is it exactly that the civil service would be able to do in ideal situations? To what ends do you want to kind of make it work? In that regard, I'd kind of highlight the work of people like Mariana Mazzucato and the idea of the state that is much more focused on specific agenda, whether it's around climate change or whatever else, or if you look at the experience of the South Korean government and their kind of industrial policy. So I think we should be alert to just having an efficient civil service does not exhaust the discussion of what it is that we need to be doing in civil service reforms.

Tobi;

This has been a very interesting conversation.

Portia;

Thank you very much. And thank you so much for having me for this really fascinating and insightful discussion. It's such an honour to have someone read it so thoughtfully and intelligently and then connect it to clearly a very wide kind of political experience and insights.

Tobi;

Yeah. Thank you. Thank you very much.

This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe