Are concepts innate, learned, or socially constructed? In this episode we dive into the foundations of human thought, exploring how philosophers, theologians, and cognitive scientists have defined and debated the nature of concepts.

From Descartes’ rationalism and Hume’s empiricism to Kant’s categories of understanding, Wittgenstein’s language games, and the latest in cognitive science, this episode unpacks how we form, structure, and use concepts to make sense of the world.

A companion to Episode 1 on ideas, this is essential listening for anyone curious about how knowledge works. Perfect for students, thinkers, and lifelong learners alike.

Part 1 - Early Modern Philosophy (6:44)

Part 2 - Representative Theories (12:41)

Part 3 - Theological Traditions (24:10)

Part 4 - Contemporary Analytic Philosophy (34:40)

Part 5 - Contemporary Continental Philosophy (49:36)

Part 6 - Cognitive Science (1:02:35)

References: https://hypernotepad.com/n/57069bf49ad95217

Get in touch: [email protected]

Everyday we refer to many ideas without giving much thought to the depth and diversity of opinion that surrounds them. For example, when did you last reflect upon what we actually mean when we use the term 'idea'?

What do we mean when we say that we have an ‘idea’? Similarly, what is it to have an ‘idea’ of something? These are just some of the questions we are going to explore in today’s episode, examining schools of thought within a variety of Philosophical traditions, including those that are less well studied within the English-speaking world.

Part 1 - The Theory of Ideas (4:27)

Part 2 - Representative Theories in the Western Philosophical Tradition (10:57)

Part 3 - The Theory of Ideas in Middle-Eastern Philosophy (22:10)

Part 4 - The Theory of Ideas in Hinduism and Theravada Buddhism (32:06)

Part 5 - The Theory of Ideas in Confucianism, Taoism and Mahayana Buddhism (41:44)

Part 6 - The Theory of Ideas in the African Ubuntu Tradition (49:33)

References: https://hypernotepad.com/n/275dddea9235a40c

Get in touch: [email protected]