A 74-year-old port magnate known in the underworld as Antikvar is arrested by an FSB team, hauled into Moscow’s Basmanny Court, and suddenly the ghosts of St Petersburg’s wild 1990s feel very alive. Ilya Traber's career took him from from antiques monopolies to oil terminals, in the murky interface between “authoritative business” and outright organised crime. And much of it thanks to his relationship with Putin in and since the 1990s.

Traber's name has run through the bloody annals of 'Banditsky Peterbug,' so why act now? My theory: he overstepped the bounds of the new rules, at a time when serious figures within the FSB, including First Deputy Director Korolev, had reason to go after him.

But this would have come to nothing had Traber's old partner Putin not given the green light. When the decision is made at the top, even yesterday’s “untouchables” can become expendable.

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Peace gets talked about as if it is a destination we can spot from the front line, but the closer we look, the more it feels like a mirage. Ukraine’s mid-range strikes and tactical gains tempt commentators into declaring a decisive shift, and then into assuming peace is near. Real progress matters, but overconfident stories can set the public up for disappointment and push policymakers towards shortcuts. 

I take an article by British ex-diplomat Ian Proud on what he thinks a peace would require - I agree with many of his diagnoses, but not with a lot of his prescriptions - as a starting point to explore the different moving parts within any peace process. I don't end up feeling especially optimistic, although Russia could still just stop fighting at any time.

The Proud article, by the way, is here: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-russia-europe-talks/

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Russia still talks about the “Near Abroad” as if the map never changed, but the region is changing anyway. After a quick touch on Zelensky's open letter to Putin and the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, I dive into the relative trajectories of Armenia, currently at the polls, and Belarus, emphatically not. Despite its continued use of this problematic, imperialist term the "Near Abroad," in different ways, Moscow’ is finding its influence  fraying across the former Soviet space, and why the Kremlin is leaning harder on pressure, deniability, and narrative spin to compensate for a shrinking sphere of influence. 

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A Russian drone hits a Romanian apartment block, two civilians are injured, and suddenly a stray weapon becomes a case study in how Putin’s Kremlin handles bad news. Why does the Kremlin’s crisis management default to a belligerent, self-sabotaging sequence that turns a manageable incident into a wider political problem?

It comes down to the priorities of an insecure, personalistic authoritarian system that equates any admission of failure with weakness, that regards information as a battlefield, and which lacks institutional filters between personality and policy.

Details of the 23 June event in Potsdam I mentioned are:

https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/marc-galeotti-autocracy-vs-technocracy-explaining-ukraine-war-6107930

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After Putin's Beijing visit - long on rhetoric, short on results - I look more broadly as Asia: the limits of the "friendship with no limits" with China, heding with India, and the ebbing of hegemony in Central Asia. In short, everyone is a transactional pragmatist, behind the talk of "all-weather partnerships" and "eternal friendships." But then again, isn't everyone everwhere, these days?

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First, a round up of some current issues: Putin heading to China, two governors out (and two men with Ukraine war connections in), party politics and the jostling for second place, and how the Council of Europe is implicitly encouraging Putin to stay in power until he dies...

In the second half, the opening episode of a series of alternative history (the rest will be available to paying Patrons) exploring some of the great what-ifs. This time, what if Kyiv had surrendered to the Mongols in 1240 and never lost its pre-eminence? Following that single fork in the road leads to a different centre of gravity, different institutions, and maybe even a world where “Ukraine” never emerges in the way we know it. 

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

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No tanks, great camera work. Victory Day is supposed to be Russia’s most unshakeable story, the moment when the state proves its strength, its allies, and its confidence on Red Square. Yet watching this year’s parade, I can’t escape the sense that the symbolism is working harder than the reality: fewer troops, no heavy hardware in Moscow, and security concerns hanging over the whole performance. 

In the rest of the podcast, I look at a leaked report on spinning peace and wonder if it part of an attempt to lobby Putin indirectly, the appointment of a new commander of Aerospace Forces, Colonel General Chaiko, and that (to me, pretty dodgy) 'European intelligence report' that has caused such a storm.

The bigger point is simple and uncomfortable: disinformation and psychological warfare are part of how this conflict is fought, and they thrive on our appetite for certainty.

The Kyiv Independent report I mentioned is here.

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A battlefield setback in Mali sparks a much bigger question: what kind of power is Russia now, and what kind of power can it afford to be? Is it a superpower? No. Is it a great power? It depends what you mean. It certainly is not just the "gas station with nukes" of the cliche. 

Putin’s language of “sovereign civilisation” recasts greatness as resistance rather than dominance, especially as Victory Day messaging leans on endurance. I argue Russia is a middle power that can pivot, triangulate and sometimes punch above its weight without shaping the world order. 

That's no bad thing. Russia (and Putin) are not "failures" as some would suggest, even if they have by no means hit their grand, aspirational goals. Russia would be a lot happier if it accepted this status but for Putin and his Homo Sovieticus peers, alas, this is not enough - and that is what has lead us all to the present unhappy place.

The article I mentioned from The i Paper is here, and the Deutsche Welle video is here.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

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Putin didn’t pick a battlefield hero to run Russia’s Defence Ministry. He picked Andrei Belousov, an economist with a planner’s instincts and a technocrat’s patience. Thats what the Kremlin thinks it needs most right now: a 'Quartermaster-in-Chief,' who wouldn't tangle with Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov, but instead focus in procurement that works, production at scale, drones that reach units fast, and a defence industrial complex that can keep up with an ugly, grinding war economy. 

He is satisfying Putin, the generals and society -- for now. But his legitimacy depends on results, he is boxed in by a team of deputies representing other factions and interests, and in many ways the real tests begin when the war ends.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

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The fastest way to lose your grip on Russia is to reach for the word “war” every time a scary headline lands. The incentives are everywhere: politicians who want public backing for big defence spending, media outlets that live on attention, and all of us who share first and think later. 

I look at two particular examples: the current fascination in the British press with the idea that Russia may launch an attack using long-range missiles, and a truly insane essay by Konstantin Malofeyev in his Tsargrad media outlet  fantasising about a tactical nuclear strike to end the Ukraine war. 

The British article is here, the Russian one here.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here. 

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