The US has imposed 50 per cent tariffs on Indian goods. Even as trade talks have resumed, what do you think will be the implications of this on India’s strategic relations with the US in defence, technology, and Indo-Pacific cooperation? We have, in fact, been virtually singled out. Even China has only 30 per cent. What is surprising is that we had already gone through five rounds of negotiations, and a post-trade deal was submitted for (US President Donald) Trump’s approval. His rhetoric has consistently been that India must make very significant concessions in areas where domestic lobbies resist. After decades of careful diplomacy, it is insulting that the relationship is strained in such a manner. Some officials even expect India to apologise for positions taken in our national interest. The Prime Minister has responded positively, underlining the US as a natural partner with limitless potential. The broader aim is to avoid negative consequences, such as rising racial sentiment against Indians and potential dampening of investments. Trump’s unpredictable nature often treats uncertainty as an asset, forcing interlocutors to make concessions. India has remained firm. The Prime Minister has refused unnecessary concessions, and there is no indication that the punitive tariffs will be lifted. Negotiations continue with these tariffs in place, which complicates dialogue. Reports suggest that discussions on tariffs with China are ongoing. While Trump has shown relative softness towards China, his pursuit of a “big, beautiful deal” has not been mirrored with India. This atmosphere of unpredictability colours every diplomatic engagement.  In this light, do you think the tariff episode could prompt India to move closer to Russia or China strategically? India does not see itself merely as a strategic element in the US-China competition. We are an independent, sovereign country and will decide to what extent we confront or engage China. The US, on the other hand, cannot disentangle itself from China economically or militarily. Its largest partner is China, and this relationship encompasses vast commercial and strategic dimensions. Our threat assessment is different. China represents a direct threat to India, both militarily and economically. The US, while a major power, faces no direct threat from China on its own soil. Therefore, while India engages with the US, it must simultaneously engage with China to manage regional security, economic interests, and strategic stability. India has developed policies to engage China while simultaneously building partnerships with the US. We work with European nations, such as France and Germany, in maritime and Indo-Pacific strategies, recognising India’s indispensable role in the region. India is not a pawn in anyone’s strategic calculations; our foreign policy remains sovereign and pragmatic.    Traditionally, the US has regarded India as a bulwark against China. Do you think that this particular tariff episode could trigger India to move closer to Russia and China? I know this is frequently stated — that the US looks at India. But we do not see ourselves merely as an element in the strategic calculations of the US against China.  The prediction you mentioned, in terms of American trust towards India, overlooks the fact that the biggest partner for the US is China. Their relationship is extremely strong; it cannot be delinked. Just look at the number of US companies operating in China. Additionally, the US has a serious military and strategic interest in keeping China engaged. The same considerations apply to us. China is a direct threat to India, not to the continental US. Physically, they are a massive military and economic power on our borders. If the US cannot delink itself from China, how can we expect ourselves to delink from China? Consequently, our trade with China continues, and we maintain a dual policy — both engaging China and simultaneously develop