Lina Khatib, associate fellow, Middle East and North Africa programme, Chatham House, tells Satarupa Bhattacharjya in a multimedia interview that the United States (US) and Israel wanted to demonstrate military superiority early to set the stage for what they are trying to achieve in the war with Iran — changing the geopolitical landscape of the region. Edited excerpts:   What you make of the present situation in West Asia?   It’s a historic time in the region and the world. For me, the transformation did not begin with the US’ strike on Iran on February 28. The transformation goes all the way back to October 7, 2023. It is the moment that changed US and Israeli appetite for the status quo that had until then been present for almost 50 years and that status quo was one in which Iran was a dominant actor all over the Middle East. October 7, of course, was an attack by Hamas.   But Israel and the US saw it as something larger than that, they saw it as something that is very much connected to Hamas’ patron, which is Iran. And since then, we have seen a change in the US and Israeli strategy to weaken Iran’s proxies and ultimately aim to eliminate the Iranian regime, as we know it. So, what is going on now is part of this big transformational process, which is not going to be swift, it’s not going to be easy and not going to be cheap.   Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other power elites, including military leaders, were assassinated in Israeli-US strikes. What does that mean for the region and, more importantly, for Iran?   The position of the supreme leader in Iran is hugely important, not just politically, but also religiously for the Shia community around the world. I don’t think anyone expected Israel and the US to be able to be so swift in eliminating not just high-level commanders in Iran but the ayatollah of Iran himself in such a short period of time. I think this caused a huge psychological shock, both for those who follow the ayatollah because of religious and ideological reasons and those who follow for political reasons.   I think that was the intention, a kind of shock and awe. It was a case in which the US and Israel wanted to demonstrate military superiority very early on to set the stage for what they are trying to achieve in this campaign, which is maximalist goals.   I don’t think those who were expecting this campaign to be a symbolic military strike or a limited military campaign were realistic in their expectations.   What role did technology play? For instance, the intelligence that came and the quickness with which the strikes were completed.   Some of the reports coming out have said that the US managed to infiltrate security cameras in Tehran. We know that the US has very sophisticated intelligence capabilities and this is not just technology. There is also a human element involved. It’s the combination of the two, combined with, I must say, miscalculation also and complacency on part of the Iranian regime. Because I don’t think they learned the lesson of Hezbollah. The lesson of Hezbollah (Iran-backed Lebanon-based armed group) being a group that was also infiltrated through technology and human intelligence leading to Israelis knowing exactly where the leader of Hezbollah was and being able to target him directly during the war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2024.   I don’t think the Iranian authorities were able to understand how vulnerable and how exposed they were and still are.   Iran has struck its neighbours in the Arab world. What is your understanding of how Iran is reacting?   The Iranian regime sees this war rightly, I would say, as an existential war. This is a war aimed at ending the Iranian regime. And the Iranian regime, therefore, is using all its available tools in this war against the US and its allies, as well as Israel, mainly but also Arab allies. Even though Iran officially says it is not targeting Arab allies of the

Susannah Patton tells Mohammad Asif Khan that Asia remains fundamentally bipolar, dominated by the United States and China, even as India emerges as a major power. Edited excerpts:   What is the Asia Power Index, and why does it matter in understanding the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific? Asia Power Index is a really unique research product that the Lowy Institute, a think tank based in Sydney, first launched in 2018. What the index aims to do is to compare the comprehensive national power of 27 countries in Asia, so from as far west as Pakistan through south and southeast Asia, including the United States (US), Russia, and Australia, to compare which country is the most powerful. Because many traditional assessments of comprehensive national power really only looked at a couple of things, namely the size of the economy and the size of the armed forces. And so what the Asia Power Index tried to do was to provide a much more modern and contemporary assessment of relative national power. And it’s important to bear in mind that one of the reasons why this is so important is because there are very contested views about which country is the most powerful and by what margin. When I’m talking about the Asia Power Index, I often compare and contrast very conflicting headlines that we see about, for example, the US power. Is it in terminal decline? Is the US still an unquestioned superpower?  To what extent is China on a trajectory to overtake or rival the US? These are the questions which scholars, analysts and everyday people really heavily contest, which is also the case when it comes to questions about India's regional role too. So the Asia Power Index provides a really unique perspective in actually bringing data to bear. So we use more than 130 quantitative indicators, about half our own research and half are drawn from international sources. So it’s a very, very unique research publication.   India has crossed the 40 points mark for the first time (on the Asia Power Index) and is now classified as a major power. What were the creed drivers behind this shift in 2025? I think it’s important to maybe just take a step back and reflect very briefly on the overall dynamics that we see in the Asia Power Index, because the broad picture ever since 2018 has been that the US and China are a long way ahead of any other countries in Asia. Japan and India are kind of in that next tier of powers, but a considerable margin separates these countries from the US and China. And that’s why we describe the distribution of power in Asia as bipolar rather than multipolar. And maybe that’s something we can come back to and talk more about because I think it’s an important question for India’s strategy. But that’s the broad picture that we see things as being largely bipolar. However, when it comes to India, there has been a positive trend in terms of its comprehensive power, not just this year, but over the last few years as well. In the 2024 edition of the Asia Power Index, India overtook Japan to become the third-ranked power in Asia. And then last year, India reached that threshold, which we defined for a major power, which is also a significant milestone. So what are the drivers for India’s improved performance in the Index? I would say economic growth is really fundamental, and the fact that India has a more positive economic trajectory than, say, Japan, which faces long-term demographic challenges, is one reason why India’s power has grown in the Index. I think some of the other things which play into India’s growing power in the Index would also be our measure for diplomatic influence. Diplomatic influence is one of the eight measures of influence which we look at and India has recorded quite a steady growth in its diplomatic influence which is based on both quantitative measures looking at, for example, the size of India’s diplomatic network, membership of regional organisations and groupi

An expert in European foreign and security policy, SVEN BISCOP tells Mohammad Asif Khan in an audio interview that under United States (US) President Donald Trump, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can work as a military alliance only if Europe builds up its own strength, making it an “alliance of equals”. Edited excerpts: Europe has talked about taking greater responsibility for its own defence for many years, but real rearmament seems to be happening only now. What fundamentally changed after the war in Ukraine that finally pushed Europe from intent into action? The first thing that changed is the war, of course — the large-scale 2022 invasion by Russia of Ukraine — which many European decision-makers see as a direct threat not only to Ukraine, but also to Europe itself. Because the assessment here is that if Russia gets away with the impression that they are allowed to do what they want in Ukraine, that they will not stop there and select another target. And unless Russia is halted in Ukraine, we ourselves will be threatened. So, that required really ramping up our defence industrial capacity, first of all, to support Ukraine and also to strengthen our own defences. But added to that is then the new strategy of the second Trump administration, which early on already in February this year (2025), they sent (Pete) Hegseth, Secretary of Defense at the time (and) now Secretary for War. He came here and said, you have to take ownership of your own conventional defence because the US is going to focus on China. Basically, this has really undermined trust in NATO and the collective security guarantee of NATO. So, the conclusion is Europeans must be able, if necessary, to deter any aggression by themselves or if deterrence fails, to defend themselves at least in conventional terms.   Is Europe's current rearmament best understood as a short term response to the Ukraine war? Or does it represent a deeper structural shift in how European governments think about war, deterrence and military power? The direct cause certainly is the Ukraine war. At the same time, we are seeing a structural change in our alliance with the US. Until now, a basic assumption of all of our strategies of NATO, of the European Union (EU), of our individual states, was that the US is an ally. So, in the end we will always be on the same side. And since the Trump administration published their National Security Strategy, that is no longer the case. In a way, the US is now a normal country to us. We will agree on some things and disagree on others, but you can no longer automatically assume that the US will always come to our aid. That is my assessment. And if such a basic assumption of your strategy is no longer valid, you have to really revisit your entire strategy. But has that sunk in with all of our decision-makers? That's another question. Some of them initially reacted in my way — a very timid way — saying: Oh well, no, in the end the US still loves us, so it's not so serious, and so on. I think that's a wrong reaction. What we see in the security strategy is the explicit aim to do away with the EU, to cultivate resistance against the EU. It is even literally said by supporting extreme right parties. So this US administration can hardly be called an ally of Europe. So, that's a fundamental shift. Some people may argue that there may be a new policy after this current administration, which is true. But we don't know who will be the next president. And President Trump has more than three years to go. So, this will not just stop tomorrow.   Where do Europe's most serious capability gaps lie today and how difficult will they be to close? Our most serious problem is the so-called strategic enablers. We have large armed forces, but they have not been const

How do you assess the strategic impact of Operation Sindoor on South Asia’s security landscape?  It didn’t change Pakistan’s calculus on using terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. It may have had a lot of domestic fillips for Prime Minister (Narendra) Modi and his government, but at the level of strategic impact, none are visible.   How do you view Pakistan’s internal instability and economic fragility in this context?  Before Operation Sindoor, the Pakistan Army was really on the back foot because of the way it was treating (former Prime Minister) Imran Khan. And Imran Khan is very popular in Pakistan. After Operation Sindoor, the criticism of the Pakistan Army went silent. And we know that Asim Munir crowned himself Field Marshal. So the Pakistan Army is very good at calibrating public support for the institution.   With regards to Pakistan's economic fragility, Pakistan has always been, for as long as I've been following it, economically fragile. Going back to the years after the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, Pakistan has always been economically precarious. But what Pakistan can do: it's actually able to use its nuclear weapons to extract aid from the international community.   For example, I and countless Indians, among others, watched in complete shock as Pakistan remained on the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) grey list, instead of getting a blacklisting as it so rightly deserved. And then it was eventually removed from the grey list altogether. Well, the reason for that was if it got a blacklisting, it would no longer qualify for IMF (International Monetary Fund) funding, which would be economically disastrous for Pakistan.   So, Pakistan is able to use its nuclear weapons to make sure that it is able to get buyout packages from the international community. And those international buyout packages allow the army to continue doing what the army wants to do.   How do you see the Pakistan–Saudi Arabia defence pact in this larger context of regional security and India’s growing alignment with the US?  I don’t think there’s much to the Pakistan–Saudi pact. There was some discussion about whether or not Pakistan would extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, but the question has to be asked: who would attack Saudi Arabia with nuclear weapons? So, there was a lot more signalling than substance in that pact. I don't think we have a new geopolitical arrangement that changes things in any substantive way as a result of that.   What I think is more disconcerting has been the collapse of Indo-US relations under the Trump administration, because this is a relationship that has been built bilaterally on both sides, going back to (US President) Bill Clinton in the 2000s.   With the latest ceasefire in Gaza, how do you assess India's role? Should it take more of a role in the peace talks?  India has had no role, so whether or not it should have more is kind of off the table. India has basically refrained from any kind of morally informed position on Gaza. So I don't think you're going to expect India to do anything more than it's already done, which is pretty much nothing.   Do you think the US is ceding strategic ground to China, particularly in South Asia?  I think it has. It's really difficult to tell what's going on with Trump's policy towards India because it is so opaque. And the issues that seem to be driving it are India's continued petrol-laundering of Russian oil, which was something that the Americans had actually wanted India to do. This is something that Trump has made quite a bit of hay about.    He also erroneously claimed that India had agreed not to do that. There's absolute silence about that tweet on the Indian side. And of course, this tariff issue. So, if you look at what Trump is doing everywhere, he's ceding ground to China not just in South Asia, but everywhere.   How do you assess the

The US has imposed 50 per cent tariffs on Indian goods. Even as trade talks have resumed, what do you think will be the implications of this on India’s strategic relations with the US in defence, technology, and Indo-Pacific cooperation? We have, in fact, been virtually singled out. Even China has only 30 per cent. What is surprising is that we had already gone through five rounds of negotiations, and a post-trade deal was submitted for (US President Donald) Trump’s approval. His rhetoric has consistently been that India must make very significant concessions in areas where domestic lobbies resist. After decades of careful diplomacy, it is insulting that the relationship is strained in such a manner. Some officials even expect India to apologise for positions taken in our national interest. The Prime Minister has responded positively, underlining the US as a natural partner with limitless potential. The broader aim is to avoid negative consequences, such as rising racial sentiment against Indians and potential dampening of investments. Trump’s unpredictable nature often treats uncertainty as an asset, forcing interlocutors to make concessions. India has remained firm. The Prime Minister has refused unnecessary concessions, and there is no indication that the punitive tariffs will be lifted. Negotiations continue with these tariffs in place, which complicates dialogue. Reports suggest that discussions on tariffs with China are ongoing. While Trump has shown relative softness towards China, his pursuit of a “big, beautiful deal” has not been mirrored with India. This atmosphere of unpredictability colours every diplomatic engagement.  In this light, do you think the tariff episode could prompt India to move closer to Russia or China strategically? India does not see itself merely as a strategic element in the US-China competition. We are an independent, sovereign country and will decide to what extent we confront or engage China. The US, on the other hand, cannot disentangle itself from China economically or militarily. Its largest partner is China, and this relationship encompasses vast commercial and strategic dimensions. Our threat assessment is different. China represents a direct threat to India, both militarily and economically. The US, while a major power, faces no direct threat from China on its own soil. Therefore, while India engages with the US, it must simultaneously engage with China to manage regional security, economic interests, and strategic stability. India has developed policies to engage China while simultaneously building partnerships with the US. We work with European nations, such as France and Germany, in maritime and Indo-Pacific strategies, recognising India’s indispensable role in the region. India is not a pawn in anyone’s strategic calculations; our foreign policy remains sovereign and pragmatic.    Traditionally, the US has regarded India as a bulwark against China. Do you think that this particular tariff episode could trigger India to move closer to Russia and China? I know this is frequently stated — that the US looks at India. But we do not see ourselves merely as an element in the strategic calculations of the US against China.  The prediction you mentioned, in terms of American trust towards India, overlooks the fact that the biggest partner for the US is China. Their relationship is extremely strong; it cannot be delinked. Just look at the number of US companies operating in China. Additionally, the US has a serious military and strategic interest in keeping China engaged. The same considerations apply to us. China is a direct threat to India, not to the continental US. Physically, they are a massive military and economic power on our borders. If the US cannot delink itself from China, how can we expect ourselves to delink from China? Consequently, our trade with China continues, and we maintain a dual policy — both engaging China and simultaneously develop

With time having clarified much of the disinformation surrounding Operation Sindoor, and early analyses now exhausted, India’s last High Commissioner to Pakistan and later envoy to Canada, Ajay Bisaria, speaks about apprehensions of an India-Pakistan rehyphenation, the role diplomacy can play in cementing battlefield gains, and what might lie ahead with China.   With Operation Sindoor paused, who emerged as winners and losers?   This conflict played out across three domains: military foremost but also diplomatic and informational. In the military domain, India clearly had a battlefield advantage and dominated not just the conflict itself but also the escalation ladder. At each stage, India pushed the battle up a rung, then offered an off-ramp for de-escalation, which Pakistan eventually took on May 10. It was an overwhelming military victory for India, despite Pakistan also claiming victory, as it always does. Anything short of a crushing defeat is portrayed by Pakistan as success. In the diplomatic domain, India’s strategy worked well. Military action drove the engagement, while diplomacy supported and facilitated a kinetic response to cross-border terror. India gained significant global traction from the outset first in terms of support for punishing terrorism, and later for its cross-border kinetic action deep into another country’s territory. The only global caveat was the call to de-escalate after escalation. Post-conflict diplomacy is now visible through all-party delegations. In the information domain, the outcome is more clouded. India arguably underperformed, as Pakistan typically seizes the advantage of the first lie rushing into the information space with disinformation, while India waits for verification. Compounding this was the poor performance of Indian electronic media, which spread incorrect information. This highlights the need to strengthen strategic communication and war reporting.   Apprehensions have emerged in India that it has been re-hyphenated with Pakistan, and that Kashmir has been internationalised...  Neither of these concerns hyphenation or internationalisation have materialised. That was early, lazy analysis. The US role here was no different from its position after the 2019 Balakot airstrike. The only change is Trump 2.0, a different figure from Trump 1.0 who was in office in 2019. The outcome clearly stemmed from India’s military pressure on Pakistan, especially on the night of May 9–10, which forced Pakistan to climb down there’s no doubt about that. What’s different now is that Trump’s social media post appeared around 5:35 pm, before Pakistan claimed a ceasefire and well before India’s official announcement. This reflects Trump’s tendency not necessarily his administration’s to insert himself into situations and claim quick victories, especially when there was no breakthrough in Gaza, Ukraine, or with China on tariffs. This seemed like a  low-hanging fruit. At that point, Trump did not represent the official US position, or even that of his own administration. It was simply Trump being Trump. Policy circles recognised this, which is why there was no serious pushback just a reiteration of India’s position that the pause was the result of a bilateral agreement. Other global actors, including Saudi Arabia, may have reinforced India’s message to Pakistan and acted as supplementary channels but certainly not the primary one. The same happened in 2019, though without public credit-claiming. On the broader point of hyphenation: The India–Pakistan hyphen disappeared in 1999 and hasn’t returned. Media mentions of both countries in the same breath don’t amount to hyphenation. A hyphen implies the false equivalence common in the 1990s. That ended on July 4, 1999, when President Clinton summoned Nawaz Sharif to the White House and backed India’s coercive diplomacy, telling him to withdraw from Kargil or face consequences. Since then, given the trajectory of

On Tuesday, the Supreme Court came down heavily on Patanjali Ayurveda for what it called "misleading" advertisements and restrained Yoga guru Ramdev-controlled firm from advertising its medicinal products. The direction came on a petition filed by the Indian Medical Association. But where does the buck stop? And what is the way out?  After the Supreme Court corridors, let us now see how firms are competing to make our daily lives better. Quick commerce platform Blinkit is stepping into the turf of e-commerce giants Flipkart and Amazon. After groceries, vegetables, fruits and mid-range electronic gadgets, the Zomato-owned firm is looking to expand its shelves by adding a range of new products from various categories. So soon, you can get a new phone or maybe a laptop within 10 minutes of placing the order. But can Blinkit take on Flipkart and Amazon?  But these quick commerce firms are also giving a tough time to humble kirana stores as their sales are dipping. These startups now make up 40-50% of all e-commerce sales of FMCG firms. Moving on, Vodafone Idea crashed up to 14% in the last session after its plan to raise Rs 45,000 crore prompted sharp selling in the counter. This comes after the stock had rallied 163% in the last one year in anticipation of a turnaround aided by fund infusion. So, why did the fundraising announcement disappoint investors?  Huge debt is clearly casting a long shadow over Vodafone Idea. Moving on, Indian steel and aluminium exporters are staring at tough times ahead as the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism has entered the transition phase. Beginning January 2026, when the new tax regime will come into force, select imports into the EU will face 20-35 % tax. Listen to this episode of the podcast for answers.

Innovative solutions by fintech companies are essential to the financial services sector, Nirmala Sitharaman said on Monday. But in the same breath, the finance minister also said that they must ensure strict compliance with regulations. The FM’s statement came during her meeting with fintech leaders, which was called against the backdrop of RBI’s strict action against fintech giant Paytm. So, will the FM’s reassurance soothe the nerves of fintechs and ensure a sustainable path ahead?  Clearly, fintech firms have to strike a delicate balance between growth and compliance. Moving on, a lot of people are currently trying to strike a balance between their earning and outgo. And for those living on rent, it’s a tightrope walk. Recent government data revealed that today our rent commitments occupy more of our budgets than what was the case ten, or even twenty years ago.  Let us now turn our gaze towards the sky. The recent relaxation in space FDI norms by the government has provided a boost to related stocks in the defence and aerospace industry. As these shares remain upbeat, should you also join the rally or can valuations play spoilsport? And in this race to unravel the mysteries of space, companies and startups are increasingly taking help from Artificial Intelligence. In fact, AI is marking its presence in almost every sphere. But there are worries too. Like the effect of AI-generated fake videos on voters during elections. Against this backdrop, major tech companies have signed an AI accord in Munich committing to tackle deep fakes and AI generated content that could influence elections and misguide voters. Listen to this episode of the podcast for answers.

India’s paint industry is on the cusp of a churn. Entry of three new players, which includes Aditya Birla Group, is set to intensify competition in the sector - where top five players have cornered 90% of the organised market. But exactly what is drawing big players to the paint industry?  Stock of Asian Paints fell by over 5% on Monday after Hong Kong-based brokerage CLSA downgraded it, saying that stiff competition may take a toll on the paint maker’s near-term growth and margin. Moving on, like India’s paints industry, its space sector too is painting a promising picture. The government recently amended the FDI rules, allowing up to 100 per cent investment through three categories. So will it make India a space superpower?  After space, let us now see what is happening in the world of cryptocurrencies. World’s largest cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, has jumped over 20% so far this year to 52,000 dollars. Its market value has also breached the 1 trillion dollar-mark for the first time since late 2021. However, the crypto community is abuzz with two questions: Has the market already adjusted itself to factor in the halving’s impact? And, where is the price headed in the next 3 - 6 months?  Do you want to know more about Bitcoin ‘halving’? Well in our explainer segment, Shivam Tyagi breaks it down for you. What is this event all about? How does it work? Find everything about this event and more in this episode of the podcast.

Trade ministers from over 100 countries are set to meet in Abu Dhabi for the 13th ministerial conference of the World Trade Organisation. The three-day meeting beginning today is likely to be stormy as India will oppose adoption of a China-led proposal on investment facilitation. But why is India opposed to this initiative? And why does it want the investment agenda kept out of WTO?    India will also oppose the European Union’s proposed carbon tax on imports of steel, iron ore and cement at the upcoming WTO meeting. New Delhi believes that it would be akin to a new trade barrier. Moving on, Indian roads are witnessing a big change. More and more electric cars are rubbing shoulders with traditional ICE run vehicles. But there is more to it than meets the eye. A recent report has indicated that hybrid cars seem to be outpacing EVs in the race towards the future. Despite the steeper price tag and limited variants, hybrids are gaining traction among consumers. But why? Will this trend sustain? And will it push automakers to diverge from their EV goals?  Let us now shift our focus to financial markets. While the markets consolidated with the benchmarks declining over 1 per cent initially in February, they have rallied around 4 per cent from their monthly lows since then. The Nifty, in fact, has registered a fresh life-time high in the second half of the current month. In our next report, find out the five key factors that could impact the market trajectory this week. Meanwhile, the United States has announced to impose another round of sanctions on Russia as the world marks the second anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine war. But ever wondered what economic sanctions are? And how do they work? Listen to this episode of the podcast for answers.