Chalking it up to the 'you can't make this stuff up' category, the latest Other Transactions (OT) protest highlights the continued need for education and training for all involved in awarding these agreements.  In this case, it appears that no party involved understood the Other Transactions for prototypes statute.

Also in this podcast episode we poke at the much venerated consortia model.  The so-called consortia model does fulfill the DoD's two favorite, but ultimately meaningless, metrics.  They provide an easy way to obligate funding and improve time to contract, but this completely misses the purpose of the statutes.  Using these arrangements as an 'easy button' is understandable and even improvement, but given the purpose and potential of OTs, it is pretty lame.  By the end of this episode we question if the current consortia model, created out of ignorance and replicated dozens of times, is even a legal structure, or is the whole model vulnerable?

It is time to get serious about Other Transactions education and training and dare to comprehend beyond the FAR.

Related articles:

Opening the Floodgates? COFC Hints at Broad Jurisdiction Over Prototype OTA Protests

OT Consortia: Vulnerable to Protest?  

More than 30 years since Other Transactions authorities were first introduced in the DoD, the early pioneers, adopters, and educators still have faith that one day leaders in federal acquisition will have an 'ah-ah' moment of clarity, realizing the potential of these flexible contracting authorities for leveling-up R&D activities and delivering new capabilities.   With policies and Congressional mandates already in place, telling them to do exactly that, all that is needed is action.  The dearth of education and support resulting in a poorly equipped workforce is an easily identifiable and known weakness.  Leading educators and pioneers with fully developed educational curricula are standing-by and are immediately available.  This is a ripe and immediately actionable item!  

It has been nearly 5 years since Congress mandated that DoD leadership provide support, education and training for 'management, technical, and contracting' personnel involved in R&D and prototype projects.  This continues to be ignored, or worse.  To realize success it takes just one senior leader, a champion in the right position, who wants to do things for the common good, because they care, and values the workforce, national security, and the nation.   The fight and hard work has already been done.  Faith remains that a thoughtful, selfless leader will recognize the need and do the right thing as laid bare by the representatives of the people (democracy and law).   If acquisition leaders want a simple action to be a real hero; here is your sign.  This is low hanging fruit hitting you in the face.  With so much unexplored up-side potential, it curious and remarkable to see such unanimous rejection of education and workforce support for innovative, flexible acquisition authorities.  

This is an easy part of the solution.  Go for it and take the WIN!    

In this episode Strategic Institute discusses the lack of "infrastructure" to support federal acquisition that is dynamic and promotes synergy for the best results in R&D and delivering new capability.  Instead,  the government chooses to miss opportunities and potential for improvement to stick with what knows.   The status quo acquisition system is heavy on indoctrination and has the culture behind it.  Shortsightedness perceives it to be the path of least resistance, it's what everybody knows.  Though significant change is and has been needed for decades, the system further degrades, there has been a lack of desire and support for exploring alternatives, even though policies and mandates to do exactly that are already in place and have been for years.   

The continual attempts to be "innovative" within the current system fails repeatedly, one workforce generation after another.   When do we begin to invest in the "infrastructure" to support the change to match the rhetoric?   Folks need education, leadership support,  networks, and community etc.   The current system continues to receive the majority of education and resource investments  - you must assimilate.   Little support is given to anything else.   This leaves ambitious, creative people who want to focus on achieving goals and the common good out in the cold, frustrated.   Will federal leadership ever create and lay down the foundations to support real positive change in acquisition?  To this day,  it remains to be seen.  

The most important federal innovation is its business processes.   

In this episode Strategic Institute talks with Dr. Dolores Kuchina-Musina of REXOTA Solutions to discuss the focus of her PhD dissertation -  Other Transaction Agreements (OTA) and innovation policy.  Dolores approaches her work and study of an often difficult and frustrating topic with cheer and optimism, while keeping in mind the common good.  She shares some findings and what she has learned since embarking on her journey to understand how acquisition authorities and policies effect innovation and ultimately the delivery of new capability. 

We did not totally nerd out on OTAs.  We talked about a number of trends effecting the workforce and general mindset within the federal acquisition space for R&D.  She believes that folks are beginning to earnestly question the status-quo, and that new ideas and concepts are slowly becoming accepted.  However, she does share SI's view that a lack of meaningful education and training opportunities remains a hindrance. 

Dolores's dissertation:   Other Transaction Authorities: Evaluating Innovation Policy
Impact of Alternative Contract Vehicles in the Department of Defense


 

The DoD is notorious for slacking at the front end of R&D programs, preferring to punt and hope that it all comes together at the back-end.  From a business perspective this is sheer insanity!  The more thoroughly an organization identifies problems and solutions sets early, typically the more time and resources are saved with better solutions delivered.   

The DoD, committed to the traditional one size fits all highly regulated purchasing system, has perverted prototyping, seeing it as an early stage purchase of a larger buy.   By the time a prototype is delivered, it is already captured by the traditional procurement system.   Since anything to do with the traditional system is a hassle, DoD is sparing in its prototyping endeavors.   A number of acquisition authorities mandated by Congress, meant to support the DoD in doing smart business for R&D, including better prototyping and early stage efforts, are being irresponsibly  handled by leadership.  Current and recent leadership, purveyors of 'old think' currently bankrupting the Nation, refuses to educate themselves and the workforce on contracting innovations.  This lack of business ingenuity obviously benefits the 'entrenched interests', the  status quo and business-as-usual.  Don't believe hype!  Much of the recent  PR, rhetoric, innovation theater has usurped real efforts to improve the system.

In this episode Strategic Institute makes a case for the DoD to get serious about prototyping and  front-end work.   We advocate for prototyping prototyping, not just early stage buying.  We want DoD leadership to be bothered to understand the potential of Other Transactions and related acquisition authorities.  Why not!?  Assemble knowledgeable teams, empower them with education and leadership support, and compare the results with traditional DoD acquisition system.  If the traditional federal acquisition system is superior and cannot benefit from flexibility or by approaching business differently, then the government can say earnestly they are doing their best.  Maybe failing the warfighter, burdening taxpayers, shriveling the industrial base, inhibiting innovation, putting national security at risk, and unfathomable waste is the best result.   That is likely not the case, but those invested in the current system (leadership, prime defense contractors, contracting offices, lawyers etc.) will have to loosen their grip and be open to something other - Other Transactions.    

The secret to federal business ingenuity and greater acquisition success for R&D and delivering new capability lies in educating people, whereas the secret for maintaining the status quo is in keeping them ignorant.

The federal government has been "gifted" with highly flexible contracting instruments, meant to encourage desperately needed business ingenuity for the acquisition of knowledge and delivering new capabilities efficiently and effectively.  Despite 30+ years of information to draw from and a 2018 Congressional mandate, leadership has not supported meaningful education and training for innovative acquisition authorities.  There is much talk of acquisition innovation, but actions continually prove to the contrary. 

In this episode Strategic Institute explores the known, and maybe not so known consequences of shunning education and the development of new ideas and concepts, for business-as-usual and old think.  Decades of unsuccessful acquisition reform teach us that dressing something up and calling it innovative does not make it so.  However, by supporting learning, new opportunities arise. 

Supporting education for the use of mandated flexible contracting authorities should not be viewed as controversial, not doing so should be.   

Strategic Institute is one of the few advocates for education, training, and supporting the workforce to best utilize highly flexible contracting authorities, other transactions and related for R&D and delivering new capability, available to the federal government.   DoD leadership has ignored the 2018 Congressional mandate telling them to do exactly that!  So as to not be swept under the rug, we got louder and created more content.  In this podcast episode Strategic Institute makes a case for education and training for leadership and the workforce; a common sense action that will positively effect federal acquisition for R&D and delivering new capabilities and help break the shackles of indoctrinated old think. 

If you would like to take education and training into your own hands, check out our recently updated: Guide to Other Transactions Authorities

Related Links:
Appropriate Contractual Instruments for R&D
Helping the "Old Think" Bureaucrats and Their Lawyers get to "Yes"

Do we need a better acquisition system to exploit the fruits of R&D and deliver new capabilities?   While the often mouthed rhetoric says "yes" actions by leadership send the opposite message "NO!"   The piece parts of what can easily be understood to be an alternative acquisition system for R&D exists!    These authorities, that provide contract flexibility and much more,  permit the DoD to approach the business of R&D in different ways, even radically different ways.   Though Congress pinned the responsibility on DoD leadership to ensure the workforce receives adequate training and education to make the best use of these authorities, years later that remains largely unsupported, perhaps even opposed.  

DoD:   The system is terrible.   We need an alternative to do all these things we need to do.  

Congress:  Okay.  You got it.  Make sure you support the workforce.

DoD:  Maybe the current system isn't so bad after all.  

Congress, Warfighter, Taxpayer:   Seriously?!

Defenders of the status quo, old think are a domineering force.   But maybe, just maybe, those of us who advocate for doing things differently and supporting the workforce to do so are not the crazy ones.

 The United States Air Force was once a leader in technological developments.  Before WW2 Assistant Chief of Staff for Procurement Maj. Gen. H.H. "Hap" Arnold took advantage of commercial developments that increased the octane-rating of aviation gasoline to ensure that the U.S. led the world in fuel for high performance aero engines.  Those commercial developments were spurred by Army Air Force reservist Jimmy Doolittle. The 100-octane story (Richard Dunn).  After the war Arnold created the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board headed by Theodore von Karman with Jimmy Doolittle as a member.  Support staff included Col. Bernard A. Schriever.  Bennie Schriever later headed the organization that developed and fielded an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in just five years.   In retirement, Gen. Schriever was a key ally in helping me get Other Transaction authority enacted for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).  That authority was later expanded to all of DOD. Maj. Gen. Claude Bolton, USAF, was an advocate in getting the Air Force to recognize the utility of OTs.  The first major system developed using OT authority was a joint project of DARPA and the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office.  Developed in record time Global Hawk was used operationally during its demonstration phase and later transitioned to the Air Force where it is still in operational use.  Current Air Force and Space Force leadership needs to overcome the inertia of "costs too much, takes too long" business as usual.  Leadership needs to execute the mandates of Congress to adopt a preference for using OTs, exploit dual-use as its default approach to R&D, and get serious about educating management, technical, and the contracting workforce in the use of OTs and related authorities.  Cut out the "just another tool" rhetoric and create the alternative acquisition system to benefit the warfighter and tax payer!  

In this episode Strategic Institute discusses the toxic DoD acquisition workforce culture where fear and lore is enabled and perpetuated by entrenched interests.  The DoD acquisition system for R&D and delivering new capabilities failed sometime ago by any metric that really matters.  However, the DoD uses metrics that do not really matter.  The continued use of a system  that fails its own stated purpose and in real outcomes must be addressed.  That this has gone on for decades indicates deeper problems.   The question is who should be held accountable?  Like the disgraceful exit of the Afghanistan war, nobody in DoD leadership has ever been held accountable for the chronic and continued failure of the DoD acquisition system to deliver new capabilities efficiently and effectively in support of the warfighter and national security.   This is important work, but is treated less so.  The DoD Acquisition System is a place where the common good and public interests are being trounced by self interests of insiders who benefit from perpetuating fear and lore.    

Related article - The Agreements Officer Conundrum:  https://strategicinstitute.org/other-transactions/agreements-officer/