Turkish armed forces could play a major role in securing any peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. For Ankara, this would be a chance to reassert itself at a time when many fear it is being sidelined by Western allies.

European and US military chiefs last week reportedly presented ideas to their national security advisers on how to guarantee Ukraine’s security if there is a peace deal with Russia.

The discussions followed a summit of European leaders in Washington with US President Donald Trump on ending the conflict.

"It's going to be a big challenge, but they will find ways of tackling that challenge without the US troops on the ground," said Serhat Guvenc, professor of international relations at Istanbul’s Kadir Has University.

"It will be a novelty because Europe has never carried out any peacekeeping or stabilization operation of this magnitude before."

Turkey, with NATO’s second-largest army, is seen as a possible option.

"Turkey is an option, you know. And it seems that there is some talk of Turkish contribution," Guvenc added.

Armenia and Azerbaijan peace deal raises hopes of Turkish border reopening

Ankara signals readiness

On the same day, French President Emmanuel Macron held a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to discuss Ukraine’s security.

Ankara has already signalled it could take part in monitoring any peace deal, but Moscow’s approval would be necessary.

"If the parties agree, Turkey may send our troops to peacekeeping operations," said Mesut Casin, a former presidential adviser and professor at Istanbul’s Yeditepe University.

Casin pointed to Turkey’s past record in UN operations.

"Turkey joined many UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Korea, and in many other peacekeeping operations. The Turkish army is very powerful," he said.

"Also, remember Putin is talking many times with Erdogan, and at the same time, Zelensky is visiting Ankara."

Turkey and Italy boost cooperation in bid to shape Libya’s political future

Balancing Moscow and Kyiv

Since the start of the war, Erdogan has kept good relations with both Russia and Ukraine.

Ankara has refused to apply most international sanctions on Moscow, while at the same time selling vital military hardware to Kyiv. That balancing act has raised questions among European partners.

"Turkey ought to have been at the Washington meeting," said Soli Ozel, an international relations scholar at the Institute for Human Studies in Vienna.

Even though Turkey borders both Ukraine and Russia, Erdogan was excluded from this month’s summit between Trump and European leaders.

"The fact that it wasn't backs the observation that the bigger players or the major partners are not bringing Turkey center stage, they're sidelining it," Ozel added.

Despite this, Ankara remains strategically important.

"They keep it in the play, it's important because if you're going to need troops, you're going to need Turkey. If you're going to talk about the Black Sea security, you need Turkey. And so you cannot really dismiss Turkey," Ozel said.

But he warned that mistrust is limiting Ankara’s role.

"You're not making it part of the process that will hopefully lead to a conclusion or a peace treaty between Ukraine and Russia. There is a lack of trust, and I think that has something to do with the way Turkey has conducted its diplomacy," Ozel said.

Peace or politics? Turkey’s fragile path to ending a decades-long conflict

Doubts over influence

Some analysts suggest Ankara hopes Europe’s reliance on Turkish forces or its navy for Black Sea security could help restore influence. But others see limited gains.

"There is no automatic increase in Turkey's influence and credibility as a result of taking part in such operations," said Guvenc.

"It does have a certain impact, but on the other hand, such contributions do not change other Western partners' views of Turkey."

Rather than a reset with Europe, Guvenc sees a continuation of the current dynamic.

"What might happen is yet another manifestation of transactionalism on both sides. And if Turkey contributes to peacekeeping in Ukraine, probably President Erdogan expects concrete benefits that will help him manage the deteriorating economic situation in Turkey.

"Therefore, you cannot build a comprehensive and sustainable relationship built on that transactionalism on both sides."

The signing of a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington has raised hopes of ending decades of conflict and reopening Turkey's border with Armenia.

The deal, brokered by US President Donald Trump, commits both countries to respect each other’s territorial integrity – the issue at the centre of bloody wars.

The agreement is seen as paving the way for Turkey to restore diplomatic ties with Armenia.

"Ankara has been promising that once there is a peace agreement, it will open the border," says Asli Aydintasbas, of the Washington-based Brookings Institution.

"There was a brief period in the post-Soviet era when it [the border] was opened, but that was quickly shut again due to the Armenian-Azeri tensions."

Aydintasbas says reopening the border could have wide-reaching consequences.

"Armenia and Turkey opening their border and starting trade would be a historical moment in terms of reconciliation between these two nations, which have very bitter historic memories," she adds.

"But beyond that, it would help Armenia economically because it's a landlocked country entirely dependent on Russia for its protection and its economy."

Turning point

In June, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul. The meeting was seen as a turning point in relations long overshadowed by the memory of the 1915 Armenian Genocide, which Ankara still officially denies.

"There's now a degree of personal chemistry between the Armenian prime minister and Erdogan. This was seen in a June historic meeting, the first ever bilateral contact, a face-to-face meeting," says Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Centre, a think tank in Yerevan.

Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 after ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan seized the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.

The enclave was retaken by Azerbaijani forces in 2022. Giragosian says the peace deal, along with warmer ties between Pashinyan and Erdogan, could now help Yerevan reach a long-sought goal.

"In the longer perspective for Turkey and Armenia, this is about going beyond the South Caucasus. It's about Central Asia. It's about European markets, potentially a new Iran in the future," he says.

Erdogan congratulated Pashinyan on Monday over the deal, but made no official pledge on reopening the border. That decision may lie with Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev.

"They [Ankara] will be looking to Baku. Baku is basically able to tell Turkey not to move on normalisation with Armenia, not to open the border," says Aydintasbas.

"Part of the reason is that Turkey has developed an economic dependency on Azerbaijan, which is the top investor in Turkey. In other words, little brother is calling the shots, and I think that Ankara, to an extent, does not like it, but has come to appreciate the economic benefits of its relationship with Azerbaijan."

Azerbaijani demands on Armenia

Azerbaijan is also pushing for changes to Armenia’s constitution, which it claims makes territorial claims on Nagorno-Karabakh.

"The Armenian constitution refers to the Declaration of Independence of Armenia, which has a clear clause on the unification with Armenia, with Nagorno-Karabakh," says Farid Shafiyev of the Centre for Analysis of International Relations, a Baku-based think tank.

Shafiyev warned that without reform, the peace deal could unravel.

"Let's say, imagine Pashinyan losing elections, a new person says: 'You know, everything which was signed was against the Armenian constitution.' For us, it is important that the Armenian people vote for the change of the constitution," Shafiyev says.

Analysts note that changing the constitution would require a referendum with more than 50 percent turnout – a difficult and time-consuming process.

Time, however, may be running short. Russia is seen as the biggest loser from lasting peace in the Caucasus. For decades Moscow exploited the conflict to play Armenia and Azerbaijan against each other.

Pashinyan is now seeking to move away from Russian dominance and closer to Europe.

Giragosian warned that Armenia’s window of opportunity is limited.

"There is a closing window of opportunity – that is Russia's distraction with everything in Ukraine. We do expect a storm on the horizon, with an angry, vengeful Putin reasserting or attempting to regain Russia's lost power and influence in the region."

Weakening Russia’s grip remains key, he adds. "Armenia, after all, is still a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Russian-dominated trade bloc.

"But it's also a country that has a Russian military base. Russia still manages the Armenian railway network, for example. This is why, for Armenia, the real key here is going to be Turkey and normalising relations with Turkey."

At present, Armenia’s only open land borders are with Georgia and Iran – both close to Russia. Opening the Turkish border would give Armenia a vital new route, while also benefiting Turkey’s economically depressed border region.

But for now, Azerbaijan may seek further concessions before allowing any breakthrough.

Turkey and Italy are working more closely on migration, energy and regional influence as they seek to shape Libya’s political future. Both see the North African country as a key shared interest and are moving to consolidate their positions in the conflict-torn but energy-rich eastern Mediterranean.

Earlier this month, the leaders of Italy, Turkey and Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) met in a tripartite summit – the latest sign of growing cooperation between the three Mediterranean nations.

“Turkey and Italy have both differing interests, but interests in Libya,” explains international relations professor Huseyin Bagcı of Ankara’s Middle East Technical University.

“Particularly, the migration issue and illegal human trafficking are big problems for Italy, and most of the people are coming from there [Libya], so they try to prevent the flow of migrants.

"But for Turkey, it’s more economic. And Libya is very much interested in keeping the relations with both countries.”

Turkey and Italy consider teaming up to seek new influence in Africa

Migration, legitimacy concerns

Turkey is the main backer of Libya’s GNA and still provides military assistance, which was decisive in defeating the rival eastern-based forces led by strongman Khalifa Haftar. An uneasy ceasefire holds between the two sides.

Libya security analyst Aya Burweilla said Turkey is seeking Italy’s support to legitimise the Tripoli government, as questions grow over its democratic record.

“What it means for the Tripoli regime is very positive. This is a regime that has dodged elections for years," she says.

"Their job was to have democratic elections, and one of their ways to make sure they stay in power was to get foreign sponsors, like Turkey... Now, with this rubber stamp from Meloni in Italy, they can keep the status quo going at the expense of Libyans.”

Years of civil war and political chaos have turned Libya into a major hub for people smugglers. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, elected on a pledge to curb irregular migration, sees stability in Libya as key to that goal.

“The migration issue has become very, very urgent in general for Europe, but of course for Italy too,” says Alessia Chiriatti of the Institute of International Affairs, a think tank in Rome.

Trump and Erdogan grow closer as cooperation on Syria deepens

Mediterranean ambitions

Chiriatti said Meloni’s partnership with Turkey in Libya also reflects broader foreign policy goals.

“There is another dimension – I think it’s directly related to the fact that Italy and Meloni’s government want to play a different role in foreign policy in the Mediterranean space," she says.

"Italy is starting to see Africa as a possible partner to invest in … But what is important is that Italy is starting to see itself as a new player, both in the Mediterranean space and in Africa, so in this sense, it could have important cooperation with Turkey.”

She points out that both Italy and Turkey share a colonial past in Libya. That legacy, combined with the lure of Libya’s vast energy reserves, continues to shape their diplomacy.

Ending the split between Libya’s rival governments is seen as vital for stability. Moscow’s reduced military support for Haftar, as it focuses on its war in Ukraine, is viewed in Ankara as an opening.

“Russia is nearly out, and what remains are Turkey and Italy,” says Bagcı.

He added that Ankara is making overtures to the eastern authorities through Haftar’s son Saddam, a senior figure in the Libyan military.

“The son of Haftar is coming very often to Ankara, making talks. It’s an indication of potential changes... But how the deal will look like I don’t know, we will see later. But it’s an indication of potential cooperation, definitely.”

Turkey steps into EU defence plans as bloc eyes independence from US

Shifting alliances

Libya was discussed when Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Cairo on Saturday.

Sisi backs Haftar’s eastern government. Libya had been a source of tension between Turkey and Egypt, but with relations thawing, both say they will work together on the country’s future.

Turkey’s position in Libya is strengthening, says Burweilla.

“Saddam is pro-Turkey – there is a huge difference between son and father – and the younger generation is pro-Turkey,” she says.

Such support, Burweilla said, stems from Ankara allowing Libyans to seek sanctuary in Turkey from fighting in 2011, when NATO forces led by France and the United Kingdom militarily intervened against Muammar Gaddafi’s regime.

“I think the Europeans underestimated the political capital that gave Turkey. Turkey is winning the game in Libya,” Burweilla says.

She adds that Ankara’s rising influence is also due to a shift in tactics towards the east.

“What they [Ankara] realised was that you can’t conquer the east of Libya by force; they tried and they failed. And the Turkish regime is very much motivated by business... They don’t care about anything else, and they’ve realised they want to make a business," Burweilla says.

They’ve reached out more to the east, and the east, in turn, has realised that if they don’t want to be attacked by Turkey and its mercenaries, they need to make peace with Turkey as well.”

Ankara is aiming to dodge President Donald Trump’s threat of sanctions against countries that trade with Russia. While Turkey is the third largest importer of Russian goods, it has largely escaped international sanctions against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. However, with Trump vowing to get tough with Moscow if it fails to make peace with Kyiv, that could change.

“I am going to make a new deadline of about 10 or 12 days from today," Trump declared at a press conference on 28 July during his visit to Scotland.

"There is no reason to wait 50 days. I wanted to be generous, but we don’t see any progress being made.” 

The American president admitted his efforts to end the Ukraine war had failed and that his patience with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, was at an end.

Turkish President Erdogan ready to rekindle friendship with Trump

 

Trump later confirmed 8 August as the date for the new measures. With US-Russian trade down 90 percent since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Trump warned that other countries importing Russian goods would also be hit by secondary sanctions.

“If you take his [Trump] promises at face value, then he should look at all countries that import any Russian commodities that is of primary importance to the Russian budget - this includes, of course, crude oil, and here you have China and India mostly,” explained George Voloshin of Acams, a global organisation dedicated to anti-financial crime, training and education.

Voloshin also claims that Turkey could be a target as well. “In terms of petroleum products, Turkey is one of the big importers. It also refines Russian petroleum in its own refineries," Voloshin added.

"Turkey imports lots of Russian gas through the TurkStream pipeline. Turkey is very much dependent on Russian gas and Russian petroleum products."

Turkey's rivalry with Iran shifts as US threats create unlikely common ground

 

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ankara insists it is only bound by United Nations sanctions.

Last year, Turkey was Russia’s third-largest export market, with Russian natural gas accounting for more than  40 percent of its energy needs.

Putin has used Turkey’s lack of meaningful domestic energy reserves and dependence on Russian gas to develop a close relationship with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

“Putin knows that no matter what Trump wants, Turkey is not going to act in any military or sanctions capacity against Russia and Iran. You know, these are Turkey’s red lines. We can’t do it,” said analyst Atilla Yeşilada of Global Source Partners.

“Trump is 10,000 miles away. These people are our neighbours,” added Yeşilada. “So Putin doesn’t think of Turkey as a threat, but as an economic opportunity, and perhaps as a way to do things with the West that he doesn’t want to do directly.”

Ankara is performing a delicate balancing act. While maintaining trading ties with Russia, Erdoğan remains a strong supporter of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Turkey is a major arms seller to Ukraine, while at the same time, Erdoğan continues to try and broker peace between the warring parties.

Last month, Istanbul was the venue for Russian–Ukrainian talks for the second time in as many months. Such efforts drew the praise of Trump.

Trump and Erdogan grow closer as cooperation on Syria deepens

Trump's pressure mounts on energy and trade

The American president has made no secret of his liking for Erdoğan, even calling him a friend. Such close ties, along with Turkey’s regional importance to Washington, analysts say, is a factor in Ankara’s Western allies turning a blind eye to its ongoing trade with Russia.

“I think Turkey has got a pass on several levels from Russian sanctions,” observed regional expert Sinan Ciddi of the Washington-based think tank the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

However, Ciddi cautions that Trump remains unpredictable and that previous actions are no guarantee for the future.

“Past experience is not an indicator of future happenings. We just don’t know what Trump will demand. This is not a fully predictive administration in Washington,” Ciddi said.

“We do know right now that he [Trump] is very unhappy with Putin. He blames Putin for prolonging the Ukraine war,” added Ciddi.

Change of stance

"And if he feels sufficiently upset, there is a possibility that no waivers will be granted to any country. Turkey will be up against a very, very unappetising and unenviable set of choices to make.”

Trump has successfully lobbied the European Union to increase its purchases of American liquefied natural gas (LNG), replacing Russian imports. Similar demands could put Ankara in a difficult position.

“If Trump pressures Turkey not to buy Russian natural gas, that would definitely be a huge shock,” warned Yeşilada.

“Trump might say, for instance: 'Buy energy from me or whatever.’ But I don’t think we’re there yet. There is no way Turkey can replace Russian gas.”

However, Trump could point to Turkey’s recent expansion of its LNG facilities, which now include five terminals and have excess capacity to cover Russian imports, although storage facilities remain a challenge.

Turkey’s energy infrastructure is also built around receiving Russian energy, and any shift to American energy would likely be hugely disruptive and expensive, at a time when the Turkish economy is in crisis.

Putin retains another energy card over Erdoğan. A Russian company is building a huge nuclear power plant in Turkey, which could account for 20 percent of the country’s energy needs.

Ciddi argues Erdoğan is now paying the price of over-relying on Russia.

Turkey’s Erdogan sees new Trump presidency as opportunity

“There is no need to have resorted to making Ankara this dependent on natural gas, nuclear energy, or for that matter bilateral trade. This was a choice by Erdoğan,” said Ciddi.

“The fact it is so dependent on so many levels in an almost unique way is something that Turkey will have to rethink.”

But for now, Erdoğan will likely be relying on his expertise in diplomatic balancing acts, along with his close ties to Trump and Turkey’s importance to Washington’s regional goals, to once again escape the worst of any sanctions over Russian trade – although Trump may yet extract a price for such a concession.

Azerbaijan is increasingly engaging in tit-for-tat actions towards powerful neighbour Russia amid escalating tensions in the South Caucasus region. This comes as Baku deepens its military cooperation with long-standing ally Turkey.

In a highly publicised move, Azerbaijani security forces in Baku recently paraded seven arrested Russian journalists – working for the Russian state-funded Sputnik news agency – in front of the media. Their detentions followed the deaths last month of two Azerbaijani nationals in Russian custody, which sparked public outrage in Baku.

"That was quite shocking for Baku, for Azerbaijani society – the cruelty of the behaviour and the large-scale violence," Zaur Gasimov of the German Academic Exchange Service, a professor and expert on Azerbaijani-Russian relations told RFI.

"And the Russian-wide persecution of the leaders of Azerbaijani diasporic organisations took place (this month)," he added.

Tit-for-tat tactics

Tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan have been simmering since December, when Russian air defences accidentally downed an Azerbaijani passenger aircraft. Baku strongly condemned Moscow’s lack of an official apology.

The deaths in custody, which Moscow insisted were from natural causes, and the broader crackdown on Azerbaijan’s diaspora are being interpreted in Baku as deliberate signals.

"This kind of news had to frighten Azerbaijani society, which is aware of the fact that around two million ethnic Azeris with Azerbaijani and Russian passports are living in the Russian Federation," explained Gasimov. "So the signal is that we can oust them, and they would come to Azerbaijan. That should be an economic threat."

Gasimov noted that while Baku may have previously backed down in the face of Russian pressure, this time appears different. "The reaction of Azerbaijan was just to react, with tit-for-tat tactics," he said.

Shifting power in Caucasus

Baku’s self-confidence is partly attributed to its military success in 2020, when it regained control over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region and adjacent territories from Armenian forces after a six-week war.

"The South Caucasus is changing," noted Farid Shafiyev, Chairman of the Baku-based Centre for Analysis of International Relations.

Shafiyev argues that the era of Moscow treating the region as its backyard is over. "Russia cannot just grasp and accept this change because of its imperial arrogance; it demands subordination, and that has changed for a number of reasons. First of all, due to the Russian-Ukrainian war, and second, due to the trajectory of events following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The third very important factor is Turkey," added Shafiyev.

Turkey, a long-standing ally of Azerbaijan, has significantly increased military cooperation and arms sales in recent years.

Turkish-made drones played a key role in Azerbaijan’s 2020 military campaign. In 2021, the Shusha Declaration was signed, committing both nations to mutual military support in the event of aggression. Turkey also plans to establish one of its largest overseas military bases in Azerbaijan.

"A very strong relationship with Ankara, marked by strong cooperation in the economic and military fields for decades, as also outlined in the Shusha Declaration several years ago, is an asset and one of the elements of Azerbaijan’s growing self-confidence," said Gasimov.

Azerbaijan and Turkey build bridges amid declining influence of Iran

Strategic rivalries 

Turkey’s expanding influence in the South Caucasus – at Russia’s expense – is the latest in a series of regional rivalries between the two powers. Turkish-backed forces countered a Russian-aligned warlord in Libya, and Turkey-supported factions have contested Russian influence in Syria.

These confrontations have strained the once-close ties between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"No doubt that the Putin-Erdogan relationship is not as good as it used to be because we’ve either instigated or become participants in events in the South Caucasus and Syria," said analyst Atilla Yeşilada of Global Source Partners.

Growing military buildup in Azerbaijan and Armenia a concern for peace talks

Nevertheless, Yesilada believes pragmatism will prevail – for now – given Turkey’s dependence on Russian energy and trade.

"The economic interests are so huge, there is a huge chasm between not being too friendly and being antagonistic. I don’t think we’ve got to that point. If we did, there would be serious provocations in Turkey," he warned.

Until now, Turkish and Russian leaders have largely managed to compartmentalise their differences.

However, that approach may soon face its toughest test yet, as Azerbaijan remains a strategic priority for Turkey, while Russia has long considered the Caucasus to be within its traditional sphere of influence.

"We don’t know what will be Russia’s next target. We cannot exclude that Russia might be quite assertive in the South Caucasus in the future," warned Shafiyev.

"I think the easiest way is to build friendly relationships and economic partnerships with the countries of the South Caucasus. Unfortunately, Moscow looks like it’s not ready for a partnership. But if it’s ready, we would welcome it," he added.

With political landscapes across Europe shifting, in this edition of International Report we explore the growing influence of Donald Trump's "Make America Great Again" movement on the continent's politics. 

Conservative think tanks, whose influence was once limited to Washington's corridors of power, are now establishing connections with political actors and organisations in countries such as Poland and Hungary, working to shape Europe's future.

This report delves into the activities of the Heritage Foundation and its burgeoning alliances with groups including Ordo Iuris in Poland and the Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Hungary.

These organisations advocate for conservative cultural and economic reforms, sparking heated debate over national identity, the structure of the European Union and the future of liberal democracy across the region.

Can Europe withstand the ripple effect of the MAGA political wave?

As alliances form and agendas clash, a crucial question looms: are these movements charting a course toward genuine European reform, or steering the continent toward greater division? 

Voices from both sides share their perspectives, revealing the complexity behind this transatlantic ideological exchange.

Our guests: 

Chris Murphy, Senator (D, Connecticut)

Kenneth Haar, researcher at Corporate Europe Observatory 

Zbigniew Przybylowski, development director at Ordo Iuris

Rodrigo Ballester, head of the Centre for European Studies at Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC)

One of the world's most protracted armed conflicts could finally be drawing to a close in Turkey. This month, a small group of fighters from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has been waging an armed struggle against the Turkish state for greater minority rights, voluntarily disarmed.

At a ceremony in northern Iraq, PKK commander Bese Hozart announced that the disarmament by 30 fighters - 15 men and 15 women - was undertaken freely and in line with the group's commitment to pursue a democratic socialist society through peaceful means. The fighters' weapons were burned as part of the symbolic event.

The move came just days after the release of a video message from imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who reiterated his call for an end to the armed struggle and the formal dissolution of the group. It was the first time the Turkish public had heard Öcalan’s voice since his incarceration in 1999.

PKK ends 40-year fight but doubts remain about the next steps

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan responded by telling supporters that the country had reached a historic moment. Ankara now expects a complete disarmament of the remaining PKK fighters by autumn.

Since the beginning of the peace process last year, Erdoğan has ruled out making concessions, insisting the rebels are unilaterally surrendering. However, the high-profile nature of the disarmament ceremony is increasing pressure on the government to respond in kind.

“This is a historic moment; this is a conflict that has been going on for nearly half a century. Now it's the government's turn to actually open up the political space,” said Aslı Aydıntaşbaş of the Brookings Institution in Washington.

“Both the Kurdish side and the Turkish side are telling their own constituencies that they’re not giving up much—trying to convince their bases, which, in both cases, seem unprepared for such a radical shift,” she added.

Kurdish leader Ocalan calls for PKK disarmament, paving way for peace

Opaque negotiations, rising distrust

As a gesture of goodwill, the government has reportedly improved Öcalan’s prison conditions and allowed communication through a so-called “secretariat.”

However, the PKK continues to press for broader concessions, including an amnesty for its members and the right for ex-fighters to return to Turkey. There have also been calls for Öcalan’s release, alongside the release of tens of thousands of individuals jailed under Turkey’s broad anti-terror laws.

Yet concerns are mounting over the transparency of the peace negotiations. “It’s really difficult even to assess it because we don’t really know what’s going on,” said Zeynep Ardıç, an expert on conflict resolution at Istanbul’s Medeniyet University. “Some negotiations don’t need to be public, but the public should still be informed,” she said.

Ardıç warned that the current polarization in Turkish politics and a legacy of mistrust built over decades of conflict make transparency essential. “There should be a bit of transparency, because people don’t trust state institutions, people don’t trust each other, people don’t trust the government or the judiciary.

So, it’s not easy to succeed under these circumstances. The government needs to reinstall trust - not just among Kurdish people, but among Turkish people as well.”

Politics could undermine fragile progress

Following the disarmament ceremony, Erdoğan announced the formation of a parliamentary commission to oversee the process, including members from his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), his coalition partner the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the pro-Kurdish People's Equality and Democracy Party (DEM). Notably absent was the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), whose exclusion is fueling fears that Erdoğan is politicizing the peace process.

Erdoğan requires the support of Kurdish parliamentarians to amend the constitution and potentially remove presidential term limits—allowing him to remain in power indefinitely.

Turkey's Saturday Mothers keep up vigil for lost relatives

“Erdoğan is trying to juggle two conflicting priorities,” noted analyst Atilla Yeşilada of U.S.-based consultancy Global Source Partners. “A: give the Kurds the least of what they want in return for a constitution that allows him to run again, and B: broaden his war against the CHP. I don’t know how he can finesse that.”

While Erdoğan speaks of a new era of unity between Turks, Arabs, and Kurds, he is simultaneously escalating a legal crackdown on the CHP, even going so far as to label the party a terror threat. This is a risky move, given that the pro-Kurdish DEM party has previously supported CHP candidates in both presidential and mayoral elections.

Kurdish analyst Mesut Yeğen, of the Center for Social Impact Research in Istanbul, warned that Erdoğan may be overplaying his hand. “If Erdoğan’s pressure on the CHP continues, then it’s likely that DEM’s electorate, members, and cadres could grow discontent,” Yeğen predicted.

“They’ll think that if Erdoğan succeeds against CHP, he’ll start a similar campaign against the DEM. So I think they will strike a kind of balance.”

Turkey's rivalry with Iran shifts as US threats create unlikely common ground

Despite the uncertainty, powerful incentives remain on both sides to pursue peace. With the PKK largely pushed out of Turkish territory and facing military defeat, and Erdoğan in dire need of parliamentary support, momentum for a resolution is strong.

But with negotiations shrouded in secrecy, many remain skeptical about what kind of peace this process will ultimately deliver.

Forty years after the bombing of its Rainbow Warrior vessel, Greenpeace International’s executive director Mads Christensen tells RFI that the attack not only failed to silence the movement, but made it stronger than ever. In an exclusive interview, he reflects on how an act of violence became a rallying cry.

Christensen, who was 13 years old at the time of the sinking, remembers being inspired by the courage of the crew, who sailed into danger to protest French nuclear testing in the Pacific.

The bombing, which killed photographer Fernando Pereira, revealed the extreme lengths to which governments were willing to go to protect their interests – and the power of peaceful resistance in the face of aggression.

You still can't sink a rainbow, Greenpeace boss says 40 years after bombing

The slogan “you can’t sink a rainbow” became a symbol of defiance and resilience for Greenpeace.

Christensen argues that the bombing ultimately gave the movement greater momentum and visibility, proving that when governments attempt to crush protest they often strengthen it instead.

Today, Greenpeace faces new threats – from SLAPP suits to fossil fuel giants using legal action to intimidate activists. But just as in 1985, Christensen says Greenpeace will not be silenced.

The Rainbow Warrior’s legacy lives on in every campaign, every act of mobilisation and every young activist who refuses to look the other way.

Forty years after the Rainbow Warrior bombing, activists still under attack

Turkey's main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) is warning that the future of democracy in the country is at stake, as a legal crackdown against it intensifies. This month has seen three more city mayors arrested in anti-corruption probes, while half of CHP parliamentary deputies are facing having their legal immunity lifted.

Thousands marched through the streets of the Mediterranean city of Adana in protest at the arrest of its mayor on alleged corruption charges. The mayors of Antalya and Adiyaman have also been detained on similar charges. More than a dozen mayors of Turkey's main opposition CHP have now been jailed.

The legal crackdown began in March with the jailing of Istanbul's mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, and on Wednesday, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowed there would be no letting up.

"We launched an investigation into the largest theft ring in the history of the Republic, the most reckless organised crime organisation ever," Erdogan told his parliamentary deputies.

"Those who took bribes, those who practically held cities under extortion, those who put people in a difficult situation and then robbed them were all CHP people," he continued.

A battle for survival 

Erdogan further ratcheted up the pressure on the CHP with a presidential motion calling for the lifting of parliamentary immunity from 61 out of CHP's 121 deputies.

CHP leader Ozgur Ozel is also under investigation for allegedly inciting public hatred and insulting the president.

Ozel is at the forefront of leading anti-government protests across the country, which continue to attract large crowds as the party builds a significant lead in opinion polls over Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The CHP claims their growing success is what is motivating the recent prosecutions, rather than corruption. "These are politically driven arrests and investigations," declared party spokesman Ilhan Uzgel. "Not a single government party mayor is even investigated."

Uzgel admits that with more than 500 of its officials having been arrested, the party is facing a battle for survival. "The government has all the instruments of the state. They control the judiciary, they control the police force etc etc. So it's very difficult to stop it."

Despite mounting pressure, however, Uzgel insists they will not back down.

"We are organising rallies twice a week, our leader is very energetic. He [Ozel]... said we are not going to back down. The government, they don't want the opposition party to challenge Erdogan's authority. This is the core of the issue right now."

Turkey walks a fine line as conflict between Israel and Iran cools

Broadcasting bans

However, the political noose around the neck of the CHP continues to tighten. This week, the opposition Sozcu TV station was banned for 10 days by regulatory authorities for "inciting public hatred" after broadcasting protests against the jailing of the Istanbul mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu.

Another opposition TV station, Halk, is facing a similar ban. The two are among the few media outlets that continue to report on the ongoing CHP protests against the waves of arrests.

The broadcast bans are being seen as a sign that the days of critical media could be numbered.

"I believe by the end of this year we might be hearing of the start of the liquidation of critical TV channels," claims Erol Onderoglu, Istanbul representative of the Paris-based NGO Reporters Without Borders.

Fears are growing too that the threat against independent media is part of a much more worrying process of the dismantling of the pillars of democracy.

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Opinion polls

However, the government appears to be losing the battle for people's minds, with several opinion polls reporting that more than 60 percent of people polled believe the legal crackdown on CHP is politically motivated.

Anger against the government also continues to grow over 40 percent inflation.

Sezin Oney, an analyst for the independent Poltiyol news outlet, fears a political showdown is looming. "Turkish democracy is on its deathbed, actually. Erdogan envisions a political stage where we don't have a really challenging opposition. [Arrests] will escalate and escalate. They will go as far as they can until they reach their target."

While Erdogan remains in a strong position, the opposition is still a threat to the president. "He does have most of the cards," said Oney, "but he doesn't have the support of the public in general. So, at the end of the day, at one point it will be the people versus Erdogan."

"What matters is where the security forces stand," he added, "When it comes to a point when the people take to the streets en masse, will the security bureaucracy go against their own people?"

Neither the CHP nor Erdogan are showing any signs of capitulating, with protests expected to continue and likely to intensify in September, coinciding with the reopening of universities and the return of people from summer holidays. Court cases against the CHP are also scheduled to resume then.

With both sides insisting they are fighting for the future of their country, it could well be a fight that leaves only one side standing.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s June visit to Turkey marks the latest step in the ongoing rapprochement between the two countries. The move comes as Ankara seeks to expand its influence in the Caucasus, amid the waning power of regional rivals Iran and Russia.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s hosting of Pashinyan in Istanbul last month represents a notable diplomatic effort to normalise relations. Ankara had severed diplomatic ties and closed its border with Armenia in 1993 following the war between Armenia and Turkey’s close ally, Azerbaijan, over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.

However, Pashinyan’s Istanbul visit is being hailed as groundbreaking. “I believe it was very significant for several reasons. It was the first bilateral diplomatic summit between the Turkish and Armenian leaders,” explains Richard Giragosian, Director of the Regional Studies Centre, a Yerevan-based think tank.

Until now, interactions between the two leaders had been limited to multilateral engagements—such as Erdoğan’s inauguration and meetings on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. But Giragosian argues that the Istanbul meeting carries deeper significance.

“This is the first bilateral invitation from Turkey to the Armenian leader. That reflects a second important development: Turkey is seeking to regain its options with Armenia,” observes Giragosian.

Armenia looks to reopen border with Turkey as potential gateway to the West

Zangezur corridor at centre

One of the key issues discussed was the creation of a land bridge through Armenia to connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave, which borders Turkey. Known as the Zangezur Corridor, this project is a strategic priority for Ankara. It would not only link Turkey directly to its key ally and vital trade partner Azerbaijan, but also open a new route for Turkish goods to Central Asia.

“It is especially important now from an economic standpoint,” notes international relations professor Hüseyin Bağcı of Ankara’s Middle East Technical University.

Pashinyan’s visit is seen as part of a broader Turkish diplomatic push to secure regional support for the Zangezur Corridor. “This is why Prime Minister Pashinyan came to Turkey,” says Bağcı, who suggests Erdoğan is attempting to counter Iranian resistance. “The Zangezur Corridor should not be held hostage by Iranian opposition. It shouldn’t be conditional on Iran’s stance,” he adds.

Iran, Armenia’s powerful neighbour, strongly opposes the corridor. Currently, Turkish goods must transit through Iran to reach Central Asia—giving Tehran significant leverage. Iran has often restricted this trade during periods of diplomatic tension with Ankara. More critically, Tehran fears the proposed 40-kilometre corridor would cut off a vital route it uses to bypass international sanctions.

Despite Turkish diplomatic efforts, Iran remains firmly opposed. “Nothing has changed in Tehran’s position regarding the Zangezur Corridor. Iran is still against the project,” warns Prof Dr Zaur Gasimov of the German Academic Exchange Service.

Growing military buildup in Azerbaijan and Armenia a concern for peace talks

Gasimov notes, however, that recent geopolitical developments—particularly Israel’s ongoing conflict with Iran—have shifted the regional balance in Ankara’s favour. “As of July 2025, Iran’s diplomatic, political, and military capabilities are far more constrained than they were just a few years ago, due to Israel-led and US-led operations,” says Gasimov. “In both military and political terms, Iran is now significantly limited.”

Yet Azerbaijan’s insistence that the Zangezur Corridor operate independently of Armenian control remains a major sticking point for Yerevan, says Giragosian. Still, he believes the broader aim of establishing a new trade route—combined with Turkey’s willingness to reopen its border—offers the region both economic incentives and a path towards stability through mutual dependence.

“The reopening of closed borders, and the creation of trade and transport links, reshapes strategic thinking. It makes any renewal of hostilities far more costly,” says Giragosian.

“In this context, it lifts all boats. It’s a win-win for everyone,” he continues. “And I do think the real sticking point now will be Russia’s reaction, more than any resistance from Turkey, Armenia, or Azerbaijan.”

Russia and Iran push back

Initially, Moscow supported the Zangezur Corridor, particularly since Russian personnel were envisioned to administer it under the original proposals. But Gasimov notes that Russia’s enthusiasm has cooled as it grows increasingly wary of Turkey’s expanding influence in a region it still considers part of its traditional sphere.

“Moscow is very concerned about Ankara–Yerevan relations. Turkey, after all, is a NATO member—even if Russia cooperates with it in several areas,” says Gasimov.

France pushes for peace in the Caucasus amid heat over Iran detainees

 

Despite being heavily engaged in its war in Ukraine, Gasimov suggests Russia still has leverage in the South Caucasus

“After three years of war and sweeping sanctions, Russia’s capabilities in the region are diminished. But it continues to try to assert itself—by intimidating vulnerable regional economies and exploiting internal political instability, as it did in Armenia just two weeks ago,” says Gasimov.

Last month, Armenian security forces arrested several opposition figures, claiming to have foiled a coup attempt.

As Moscow remains bogged down in Ukraine, Yerevan may have only a limited window of opportunity to capitalise on Russia’s distraction and weakness. “We do see a storm on the horizon,” warns Giragosian. “With an angry and vengeful Putin lashing out at Russia’s neighbours, he’s seeking to reassert Russian power and influence across the near abroad—from Central Asia to the South Caucasus.”

Armenia reconsiders alliances

Giragosian argues that such threats could be the catalyst for historic diplomatic realignments. “From an Armenian perspective, it’s deeply ironic. For decades, Armenia feared Turkey and turned to Russia for protection. Now, Armenia is looking to Turkey for a greater role—and seeking to distance itself from the Russian orbit.”

Pashinyan has made no secret of his intent to pivot Armenia away from Russia and towards Europe. But with neighbouring Georgia increasingly under Moscow’s sway, and with Iran and Azerbaijan offering few viable alternatives, Turkey may now represent Armenia’s best chance to achieve that strategic realignment.