
Sign up to save your podcasts
Or


This is a follow-up to some things discussed in our last group episode on artificial intelligence. Since that conversation I’ve been digging more into the subject and wanted to share some ideas about it. I’ve been interested in artificial intelligence for a number of years. Part of that interest is because of its practical usefulness, which we’re really seeing explode now, with ChatGPT in particular. But I’m also interested in artificial intelligence as a model that could give us insights about human intelligence.
I have to say that the performance of these most recent models, like ChatGPT-3 and especially ChatGPT-4, is something that has really surprised me. If someone had told me a couple years ago that in 2022 & 2023 a deep learning model would be able to perform as well as these do I wouldn’t have believed it. I’m typically predisposed to doubt or at least be very critical about the capabilities of artificial intelligence. But in this case I think I was wrong and I’m happy to have been wrong about that. I don’t mean to swing too far to the other extreme and get too exuberant about it and overstate the capabilities of these models. But just a little bit of excess excitement might be excusable for the moment.
One claim that would be too extreme would be that these deep learning models are actually self-conscious already. Now I have no philosophical reason to suppose that an artificial device could not be self-conscious. I just don’t think we’re there yet. Another, less extreme claim, but one that would still go too far would be that deep learning models actually replicate the way human speech is produced in the brain. I think the implementations are still distinct. But that being said, I think there are enough similarities to be useful and interesting.
For comparison, there are insights we can gain into sight and hearing from cameras and audio recorders. Obviously they are not the same as our own sense organs but there are some similar principles that can help us think about how our senses work. The comparisons work both at the level of physical mechanisms and at the level of data processing. For example, I think there are some interesting insights about human senses from perceptual coding. Perceptual coding is a method used in digital signal processing that leverages the limitations and characteristics of the human sensory systems (auditory and visual) to provide data compression. For example, in audio, certain sounds are inaudible if they’re masked by louder sounds at a similar frequency. Similarly, in an image, subtle color differences in areas with high spatial detail are less noticeable than in smooth areas. Perceptual coding takes advantage of this by selectively removing the less noticeable information to reduce the data size, without significantly impacting perceived quality. This is done with MP3s and JPEGs. Extending this comparison to large language models, I’d propose that models like ChatGPT might be to human language production what cameras, JPEGs, audio recorders, and MP3s are to sight and sound. They aren’t the same but there are some parallels. ChatGPT is not the same as a human brain any more than a camera is an eye or an audio recorder is an ear. But, more modestly, ChatGPT may have some interesting similarities to human language production.
The most significant developments in this technology are so recent that the most useful reading material I’ve had to go to on the subject is peer-reviewed literature from the past year. Even there a lot of the research was done with GPT-2, which was a much less advanced model than we have available today. So it will be interesting to see what studies come out in the next year and beyond. The papers I want to focus on are 3 research papers from 2022 that present the results of experiments and 2 (just slightly older) perspective papers that offer some broad reflections and theoretical considerations.
In what follows, I’ll proceed in three parts: (1) philosophical background, (2) an overview of neural networks: biological and artificial, and (3) recent scientific literature.
Philosophical Background
Most of the philosophy I’d like to discuss is from the 20th century, in which there was considerable philosophical interest in language in what has been called the “linguistic turn”. But first something from the 18th century.
Something that stood out to me in all the research articles was the issue of interpretability. Artificial neural networks have been shown to have remarkable parallels to brain patterns in human brain production. That’s nice because the brain is so complex and little understood. The only problem is that ANNs themselves are also extremely complex and opaque to human comprehension. This challenges a notion going back to the 18th-century Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico: the Verum factum principle.
The phrase “verum factum” means “the true is the made,” which refers to the notion that truth is verified through creation or invention. In other words, we can only know with certainty that which we have created ourselves, because we understand its origins, structure, and purpose. Vico developed this principle as a critique of the Cartesian method of knowing, which, in Vico’s view, emphasized the abstract and ignored the concrete, humanistic dimensions of knowledge. By asserting that true knowledge comes from what humans create, Vico highlighted the role of human agency, creativity, and historical development in the creation of knowledge.
However, applying the verum factum principle to complex human creations like modern industrial economies, social organizations, big data, and artificial neural networks poses some interesting challenges. These creations certainly reflect human ingenuity and creativity, but they also possess a complexity that can make them difficult to fully comprehend, even for those directly involved in their creation. Artificial neural networks are inspired by our understanding of the human brain, but their function, especially in deep learning models, can be incredibly complex. It’s often said that these networks function as “black boxes,” as the pathway to a certain output given a certain input can be labyrinthine and largely inexplicable to humans, including their creators. So, while the verum factum principle encapsulates the role of human agency and creativity in the construction of knowledge, artificial neural networks illustrate that our creations can reach a level of complexity that challenges our ability to fully comprehend them.
Now turning to the 20th century I think four philosophers are especially relevant to the subject. These are Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ferdinand de Saussure, and Hubert Dreyfus. Of these four Hubert Dreyfus was the one who most directly commented on artificial intelligence. But Dreyfus was also using ideas from Heidegger in his analysis of AI.
Let’s start with Dreyfus and Heidegger. Dreyfus’s main arguments were outlined in his influential 1972 book, What Computers Can’t Do. The core of his critique lies in what he sees as AI’s misguided reliance on formal symbolic reasoning and the assumption that all knowledge can be explicitly encoded. Dreyfus argued that human intelligence and understanding aren’t primarily about manipulating symbolic representations, as early AI research assumed. Instead, he believed that much of human knowledge is tacit, implicit, and tied to our embodied experience of “being in the world”, an important Heideggerian concept. These are aspects that computers, at least during that time, couldn’t easily replicate.
Dreyfus drew heavily on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger to make his arguments. Heidegger’s existential phenomenology, as expressed in his 1927 book Being and Time describes human existence (“Dasein”) as being-in-the-world—a complex, pre-reflective involvement with our surroundings. This contrasts with the traditional view of humans as subjects who perceive and act upon separate objects. According to Heidegger, we don’t usually encounter things in the world by intellectually representing them to ourselves; instead, we deal with them more directly.
Dreyfus related this to AI by arguing that human expertise often works in a similar way. When we become skilled at something, we don’t typically follow explicit rules or representations—we just act. This aligns with Heidegger’s notion of ‘ready-to-hand’—the way we normally deal with tools or equipment, not by observing them as separate objects (‘present-at-hand’), but by using them directly and transparently in our activities.
Another philosopher relevant to this topic is Ludwig Wittgenstein. He was one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. He is considered to have had two major phases that were quite different from each other. His early work, primarily represented in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, proposed that language is a logical structure that represents the structure of reality. But in his later work, chiefly Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein advanced a very different view.
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein introduces the concept of language as a form of social activity, what he called “language games.” He argues that language does not have a single, universal function (as he had previously believed) but is instead used in many different ways for many different purposes.
Language, Wittgenstein claims, should be seen as a myriad of language games embedded in what he called ‘forms of life’, which are shared human practices or cultural activities. Different language games have different rules, and they can vary widely from commands, to questions, to descriptions, to expressions of feelings, and more. These language games are not separate from our life but constitute our life.
Wittgenstein also introduced the idea of ‘family resemblances’ to discuss the way words and concepts gain their meanings not from having one thing in common, but from a series of overlapping similarities, just like members of a family might resemble each other.
He also challenged the idea that every word needs to have a corresponding object in the world. He argued that trying to find a definitive reference for each word leads to philosophical confusions and that words acquire meaning through their use in specific language games, not through a one-to-one correspondence with objects in the world. So, for Wittgenstein, the meaning of a word is not something that is attached to it, like an object to a label. Instead, the meaning of a word is its use within the language game. This was a notion similar to a theory of language called structuralism.
The leading figure of structuralism was the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. His ideas laid the groundwork for much of the development in linguistics in the 20th century and provided the basis for structuralism. In his course in general linguistics, compiled from notes taken by his students, Saussure proposed a radical shift in the understanding of language. He proposed that language should be studied synchronically (as a whole system at a particular point in time) rather than diachronically (as a historical or evolutionary development). According to Saussure, language is a system of signs, each sign being a combination of a concept (the ‘signified’) and a sound-image (the ‘signifier’). Importantly, he emphasized that the relationship between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary – there is no inherent or natural reason why a particular sound-image should relate to a particular concept.
Regarding the creation of meaning, Saussure proposed that signs do not derive their meaning from a connection to a real object or idea in the world. Instead, the meaning of a sign comes from its place within the overall system of language and its differences from other signs; It’s within the structure of the language. That is, signs are defined not positively, by their content, but negatively, by their relations with other signs. For example, the word “cat” doesn’t mean what it does because of some inherent ‘cat-ness’ of the sound. Instead, it gains meaning because it’s different from “bat,” “cap,” “car,” etc. Moreover, it signifies a particular type of animal, different from a “dog” or a “rat”. Thus, a sign’s meaning is not about a direct link to a thing in the world but is about differential relations within the language system.
Saussure’s ideas about language and the generation of meaning can be interestingly compared to the techniques used in modern natural language processing (NLP) models, such as word2vec and to cosine similarity. For example, in word2vec, an algorithm developed by researchers at Google, words are understood in relation to other words.
Word2vec is a neural network model that learns to represent words as high-dimensional vectors (hence “word to vector”) based on their usage in large amounts of text data. Each word is assigned a position in a multi-dimensional space such that words used in similar contexts are positioned closer together. This spatial arrangement creates ‘semantic’ relationships: words with similar meanings are located near each other, and the differences between word vectors can capture meaningful relationships.
A measure of the similarity between two vectors is called cosine similarity. In the context of NLP, it’s often used to measure the semantic similarity between two words (or word vectors). If the word vectors are close in the multi-dimensional space (meaning the angle between them is small), their cosine similarity will be high, indicating that the words are used in similar contexts and likely have similar meanings. There are some interesting parallels between Saussure’s linguistics and AI language models. Both approaches stress that words do not have meaning in isolation but gain their meaning through their relations to other words within the system; language for Saussure and the trained model for word2vec.
Neural Networks: Biological and Artificial
Recall Hubert Dreyfus’s critique of formal symbolic reasoning in artificial intelligence and the assumption that all knowledge can be explicitly encoded. His critique is most relevant to traditional programming in which explicit program instructions are given. In machine learning, however, and in artificial neural networks program rules are developed in response to data. To whatever degree this is similar to the human mind, biology is at least the inspiration for artificial neural networks.
What is the structure of biological neural networks (BNNs)? In the brain connections between neurons are called synapses. Synapses are the tiny gaps at the junctions between neurons in the brain where communication occurs. They play a vital role in the transmission of information in the brain. Each neuron can be connected to many others through synapses, forming a complex network of communicating cells.
Neurons communicate across the synapse using chemicals called neurotransmitters. When an electrical signal (an action potential) reaches the end of a neuron (the presynaptic neuron), it triggers the release of neurotransmitters into the synapse. These chemicals cross the synapse and bind to receptors on the receiving neuron (the postsynaptic neuron), which can result in a new electrical signal in that neuron. This is how neurons interact with each other and transmit information around the brain.
Synapses form during development and continue to form throughout life as part of learning and memory processes. The creation of new synapses is called synaptogenesis. This happens when a neuron extends a structure called an axon toward another neuron. When the axon of one neuron comes into close enough proximity with the dendrite of another neuron, a synapse can be formed.
The strength of synapses in the brain can change, a phenomenon known as synaptic plasticity. This is thought to be the basis of learning and memory. When two neurons are activated together frequently, the synapse between them can become stronger, a concept known as long-term potentiation (LTP). This is often summarized by the phrase “neurons that fire together, wire together”.
On the other hand, if two neurons aren’t activated together for a while, or the activation is uncorrelated, the synapse between them can become weaker, a process known as long-term depression (LTD).
Multiple factors contribute to these changes in synaptic strength, including the amount of neurotransmitter released, the sensitivity of the postsynaptic neuron, and structural changes such as the growth or retraction of synaptic connections. By adjusting the strength of synaptic connections, the brain can adapt to new experiences, form new memories, and continually rewire itself. This is a dynamic and ongoing process that underlies the brain’s remarkable plasticity.
How then do biological neural networks compare to artificial neural networks? In an artificial neural network, each connection between artificial neurons (also called nodes or units) has an associated weight. These weights play a role somewhat analogous to the strength of synaptic connections in a biological brain. A weight in an ANN determines the influence or importance of an input to the artificial neuron. When the network is being trained, these weights are iteratively adjusted in response to the input the network receives and the error in the network’s output. The goal of the training is to minimize this error, usually defined by a loss function.
The process of adjusting weights in an ANN is a bit like the changes in synaptic strength observed in biological neurons through processes like long-term potentiation (LTP) and long-term depression (LTD). In both cases, the changes are driven by the activity in the network (biological or artificial) and serve to improve the network’s performance – either in terms of survival and behavior for a biological organism, or in terms of prediction or classification accuracy for an ANN.
Of courses there are still multiple differences between biological neural networks and artificial neural networks. ANNs usually involve much simpler learning rules and lack many of the complex dynamics found in biological brains, such as the various types of neurons and synapses, detailed temporal dynamics, and biochemical processes. The biological synaptic plasticity is a much richer and more complex process than the adjustment of weights in an ANN. Also, in most ANNs, once training is complete, the weights remain static, while in biological brains, synaptic strength is continually adapting throughout an organism’s life. Biological and artificial neural networks share computational principles but they certainly don’t implement these computations in the same way. Brains and computers are simply very different physical things, right down to the materials that compose them.
Artificial neural networks have been in development for several decades. But it is in very recent years that we’ve seen some especially remarkable advances, to which we’ll turn now.
Recent Scientific Literature
I’d like to share 5 papers that I’ve found useful on this subject. Three are research papers with experimental data and two are perspective papers that offer some broad reflections and theoretical considerations.
The 3 research papers are:
“Brains and algorithms partially converge in natural language processing”, published in Communications Biology in 2022 by Caucheteux & King.
“Shared computational principles for language processing in humans and deep language models”, published in Nature Neuroscience in 2022 by Goldstein et al.
“Explaining neural activity in human listeners with deep learning via natural language processing of narrative text”, published in Scientific Reports in 2022 by Russo et al.
And the 2 perspective articles are:
“Direct Fit to Nature: An Evolutionary Perspective on Biological and Artificial Neural Networks”, published in Neuron in 2020 by Hasson et al.
“A deep learning framework for neuroscience”, published in Nature Neuroscience in 2019 by Richards et al.
In each of the three research papers human participants read or listened to certain passages while their brain signals for specific brain regions were measured. Deep learning models were trained on this data to predict the brain signals that would result from the text. Researchers looked for instances of high correlation between actual brain patterns and the brain patterns predicted by the model and mapped where in the brain these signals occurred at various points in time before and after word onset. In particular, they noted whether the brain regions activated corresponded to those regions that would be expected from neuroscience to activate in the various stages of language processing.
In the first article, “Brains and algorithms partially converge in natural language processing”, published in Communications Biology in 2022 by Caucheteux & King the researchers used deep learning models to predict brain responses to certain sentences. Then the actual brain responses of human subjects were used as training data for the models. They used a variety of models that they classified as visual, lexical, and compositional. Then they evaluated how well these different types of models matched brain responses in different brain regions. The brain responses in the human subjects were measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and magnetoencephalography (MEG).
Regarding the 3 different types of models:
Visual models are deep learning models that are primarily used for tasks involving images or videos. They are trained to recognize patterns in visual data, which can then be used to perform tasks such as image classification, object detection, image generation, and more. The most common types of visual deep learning models are convolutional neural networks (CNNs). CNNs are specifically designed to process pixel data and have their architecture inspired by the human visual cortex.
Lexical models are models that focus on the processing of words or “lexemes” in a language. They work with individual words or groups of words (n-grams), treating them as atomic units. Lexical models can learn word representations (often called “embeddings”) that capture the semantic meanings of words, and their relationships with each other. They are often used in natural language processing (NLP) tasks such as text classification, sentiment analysis, and named entity recognition. Examples of lexical models include traditional word2vec or GloVe models, which map words into a high-dimensional vector space.
Compositional models, also called “sequential” or “recurrent” models, handle sequences of data where the order of the data points is important, such as sentences, time-series data, etc. They are designed to process one part of the sequence at a time and maintain a kind of memory (in the form of hidden states) of what has been seen so far. This allows them to capture patterns over time and use this information to make predictions about future data points in the sequence. Examples include causal language transformers (CLTs) like GPT.
Interestingly enough, the accuracy of the different types of models was observed to vary with time from the word onset. And the moments of high correlation of each model type corresponded with the activation of certain brain regions.
In early visual responses – less than 150 ms, when subjects would first see a word – brain activations were in the primary visual cortex and correlated best with activations in visual models, convolutional neural networks (CNNs).
At around 200 ms these brain activations were conveyed to the posterior fusiform gyrus. At the same time lexical models like Word2Vec started to correlate better than CNNs. This tracks with the hypothesis that the fusiform gyrus is responsible for orthographic and morphemic computations.
Around 400 ms brain activations were present in a broad fronto-temporo-parietal network that peaked in the left temporal gyrus. At this point lexical models like Word2Vec also correlated with the entire language network. These word representations were then sustained for several seconds, suggesting a widespread distribution of meaning in the brain.
Around 500-600 ms there were complex recurrent dynamics dominated by both visual and lexical representations.
After 800 ms, brain activations were present in the prefrontal, parietal, and temporal lobes. At the same time compositional models like causal language transformers (CLTs) correlated better than lexical models. The team speculated that these late responses might be due to the complexity of the sentences used in this study, potentially delaying compositional computations.
The researchers concluded from their experiment that the results show that deep learning algorithms partially converge toward brain-like solutions.
In “Shared computational principles for language processing in humans and deep language models”, published in Nature Neuroscience in 2022 by Goldstein et al. the researchers compared the responses of human participants and autoregressive deep language models (DLMs) to the text of a 30-minute podcast.
The authors note that human language has traditionally been explained by psycholinguistic approaches using interpretable models that combine symbolic elements, such as nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs, with rule-based operations. This is similar to the kind of traditional programming that Hubert Dreyfus argued would not be viable for AI. In contrast, autoregressive Deep Language Models (DLMs) learn language from real-world textual examples, with minimal or no explicit prior knowledge about language structure. They do not parse words into parts of speech or apply explicit syntactic transformations. Instead, these models learn to encode a sequence of words into a numerical vector, termed a contextual embedding, from which the model decodes the next word. Autoregressive DLMs, such as GPT-2, have demonstrated effectiveness in capturing the structure of language. But the open question is whether the core computational principles of these models relate to how the human brain processes language. The authors present their experimental findings as evidence that human brains process incoming speech in a manner similar to an autoregressive DLM.
In the first experimental setup, participants proceeded word by word through a 30-minute transcribed podcast, providing a prediction of each upcoming word. Both the human participants and GPT-2 were able to predict words well above chance. And there was high overlap in the accuracy of the predictions of human subjects and GPT-2 for individual words, i.e. words that human subjects predicted well GPT-2 also predicted well. This experiment was determined to demonstrate that listeners can accurately predict upcoming words when explicitly instructed to do so, and that human predictions and autoregressive DLM predictions are matched in this context. Next the researchers wanted to determine if the human brain, like an autoregressive DLM, is continuously engaged in spontaneous next-word prediction without such explicit instruction. And whether neural signals actually contain information about the words being predicted.
In the next experimental setup, the researchers used electrocorticography (ECoG) to measure neural responses of human participants before and after word-onset. Subjects engaged in free listening, without being given any explicit instruction to predict upcoming words. The goal was to see if our brains engage in such prediction all the time as simply a natural part of language comprehension.
The results from human subjects in this experiment were also compared to models. The first model used was a static word embedding model, GloVe. The model was used to localize electrodes containing reliable responses to single words in the narrative. The words were aligned with neural signals and then the model would be trained to predict neural signals from word embeddings. A series of coefficients corresponding to features of the word embedding was learned using linear regression to predict the neural signal across words from the assigned embeddings. “The model was evaluated by computing the correlation between the reconstructed signal and the actual signal” for the word.
In the results of this experiment there was indeed found to be a neural signal before word onset. But what the model also enabled the researchers to do was ascertain some kind of semantic content from that signal, since the model had been trained to predict certain neural signals for given words. What was observed was that “the neural responses before word onset contained information about human predictions regarding the identity of the next word. Crucially, the encoding was high for both correct and incorrect predictions. This demonstrated that pre-word-onset neural activity contains information about what listeners actually predicted, irrespective of what they subsequently perceived.” Of course, sometimes the subject’s predictions were wrong. So what happened in those cases? “The neural responses after word onset contained information about the words that were actually perceived.” So “the encoding before word onset was aligned with the content of the predicted words” and “ the encoding after word onset was aligned with the content of the perceived words.” This all aligns with what we would expect under a predictive processing (PP) model of the brain.
The next level of analysis was to replace the static embedding model (GloVe) with a contextual embedding model (GPT-2) to determine if this would improve the ability to predict the neural signals to each word. It did; an indication that contextual embedding is a closer approximation to the computational principles underlying human language. And the improved correlation from contextual embedding was found to be localized to specific brain regions. “Encoding based on contextual embeddings resulted in statistically significant correlations” in electrodes that “were not significantly predicted by static embedding. The additional electrodes revealed by contextual embedding were mainly located in higher-order language areas with long processing timescales along the inferior frontal gyrus, temporal pole, posterior superior temporal gyrus, parietal lobe and angular gyrus.” The authors concluded from this that “the brain is coding for the semantic relationship among words contained in static embeddings while also being tuned to the unique contextual relationship between the specific word and the preceding words in the sequence.”
The authors submit that DLMs provide a new modeling framework that drastically departs from classical psycholinguistic models. They are not designed to learn a concise set of interpretable syntactic rules to be implemented in novel situations, nor do they rely on part of speech concepts or other linguistic terms. Instead, they learn from surface-level linguistic behavior to predict and generate the contextually appropriate linguistic outputs. And they propose that their experiments provide compelling behavioral and neural evidence for shared computational principles between the way the human brain and autoregressive DLMs process natural language.
In “Explaining neural activity in human listeners with deep learning via natural language processing of narrative text”, published in Scientific Reports in 2022 by Russo et al. human participants listened to a short story, both forward and backward. Their brain responses were measured by functional MRI. Text versions of the same story were tokenized and submitted to GPT-2. Both the brain signal data and GPT-2 outputs were fed into a general linear model to encode the fMRI signals.
The 2 outputs researchers looked at from GPT-2 were surprisal and saliency. Surprisal is a measure of the information content associated with an event, in terms of its unexpectedness or rarity. The more unlikely an event, the higher its surprisal. It is defined mathematically as the negative logarithm of the probability of the event. Saliency refers to the quality by which an object stands out relative to its neighbors. In a text it’s the importance or prominence of certain words, phrases, or topics, a measure of how much a particular text element stands out relative to others in the same context.
What they found in their results was that the surprisal from GPT-2 correlated with the neural signals in the superior and middle temporal gyri, in the anterior and posterior cingulate cortices, and in the left prefrontal cortex. Saliency from GPT-2 correlated with the neural signals for longer segments in the left superior and middle temporal gyri.
The authors proposed that their results corroborated the idea that word-level prediction is accurately indexed by the surprisal metric and that the neural activation observed from the saliency scores suggests the co-occurrence of a weighing mechanism operating on the context words. This was something previously hypothesized as necessary to language comprehension.
The involvement of areas in the middle and the superior temporal gyrus aligns with previous studies supporting that core aspects of language comprehension, such as maintaining intermediate representations active in working memory and predicting upcoming words, do not necessarily engage areas in the executive control network but are instead performed by language-selective brain areas that, in this case, are the ones relatively early in the processing hierarchy.
I found the following comment in the discussion section of the paper quite interesting: “In general, considering that the architecture of artificial neural networks was originally inspired by the same principles of biological neural networks, it might be not at all surprising that some specific dynamics observed in the former are somehow reflected in the functioning of the latter.” I think that’s an interesting point. The whole idea of artificial neural networks came from biological neural networks. We were basically trying to do something similar to what neurons do. We don’t know exhaustively how biological neural networks work but we do know that they work very well. When we are finally able to make artificial networks that work quite well it’s perhaps to be expected that they would have similar characteristics as biological neural networks.
The other two papers were perspective papers. These didn’t present the results of experiments but discussed what I thought were some interesting ideas relating to the whole interchange between language processing in the human brain and in deep learning models.
In “Direct Fit to Nature: An Evolutionary Perspective on Biological and Artificial Neural Networks”, published in Neuron in 2020 by Hasson et al. the authors covered several topics. One thing they addressed that I found interesting was a challenge to three basic assumptions of cognitive psychology. These assumptions are:
1. The brain’s computational resources are limited and the underlying neural code must be optimized for particular functions. They attribute this to Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor.
2. The brain’s inputs are ambiguous and too impoverished for learning without built-in knowledge. They attribute this to Noam Chomsky.
3. Shallow, externally supervised and self-supervised methods are not sufficient for learning. They attribute this to Steven Pinker.
In response to the first assumption the authors argue that the brain’s computational resources are actually not scarce. “Each cubic millimeter of cortex contains hundreds of thousands of neurons with millions of adjustable synaptic weights, and BNNs utilize complex circuit motifs hierarchically organized across many poorly understood cortical areas. Thus, relative to BNNs, ANNs are simplistic and minuscule.” Artificial neural networks are indeed trained on huge amounts of data. GPT-4 is essentially trained on the whole internet. Human children don’t learn to talk by reading the whole internet; that’s true. But the human brain is also a lot more complex than even the most sophisticated artificial neural networks; so far at least. So if GPT-4 is able to perform so impressively with a structure that’s less sophisticated than the human brain we can expect that the human brain’s computational resources are hardly scarce.
In response to the second assumption the authors argue that the brain’s input is not impoverished. Noam Chomsky, arguably the most important linguist of the 20th century, argued for what he called the “poverty of the stimulus,” meaning that the linguistic input children receive is often incomplete, ungrammatical, or otherwise imperfect. But they still manage to learn their native language effectively. How? Chomsky proposed that there is a “Language Acquisition Device” (LAD) within the human brain. This hypothetical module is thought to be equipped with knowledge of a “Universal Grammar,” which encapsulates the structural rules common to all human languages. But Hasson et al. argue that there is no poverty of the stimulus because deep learning models can produce direct fit with reliable interpretations using dense and broad sampling for the parameter space. The model is casting a very wide net. They state: “One of our main insights is that dense sampling changes the nature of the problem and exposes the power of direct-fit interpolation-based learning… The unexpected power of ANNs to discover unintuitive structure in the world suggests that our attempts to intuitively quantify the statistical structure in the world may fall short. How confident are we that multimodal inputs are in fact not so rich?” By the way, I was sharing a draft of this with a friend who shared another recent paper with me by UC Berkeley professor Steven Piantadosi, titled “Modern language models refute Chomsky’s approach to language”. I’m not going to get into that now but just thought I’d mention it.
In response to the third assumption the authors argue that shallow self-supervision and external-supervision are sufficient for learning. The authors cite Pinker’s book The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language as an example of the view that they are challenging. Pinker’s views are very similar to Chomsky’s. Pinker argues that language learning is not just about imitation or conditioning. Instead, he believes that the human brain has an inherent structure for understanding language, which is why children are able to learn languages so rapidly and effortlessly, often making grammatical leaps that aren’t explicitly taught or present in their environment. But Hasson et al. argue that humans have a great deal of external supervision from our environment, both social and physical. They refer to the importance of embodiment to predictive processing, referring to the ideas of Andy Clark and Karl Friston, among others.
Another subject the authors address is the issue of interpretability. This goes back to the Verum factum principle from Vico. Scientific models, including those in neuroscience, are often evaluated based on two desirable features: (1) interpretability and (2) generalization. We want explanations to have good predictive power but we also want to be able to understand them. Not just verify that they work. If it’s an equation we like to be able to look at an equation and be able to intuit how it works. And this means that the equation can’t be too long or have too many parameters. However, interpretability and generalization are often in conflict. Models with good interpretability may have strong explanatory appeal but poor predictive power, and vice versa.
The authors suggest that the brain is an exceptionally over-parameterized modeling organ. Interpretability in the brain is intractable for the same reason interpretability of deep learning models is intractable. They work with a huge number of parameters. There’s quantification occurring but it’s not like a concise equation that you can look at in grasp intellectually. The authors propose that neural computation relies on brute-force direct fitting, which uses over-parameterized optimization algorithms to enhance predictive power, i.e. generalization, without explicitly modeling the underlying generative structure of the world.
One thing that’s really nice about this paper (and I highly recommend it by the way, it’s a delightful read) is its 3 “boxes” that touch on some key concepts. One box covers the biomimicry of biological neural networks by artificial neural networks. The authors state that artificial neural networks (ANNs) are learning models that draw inspiration from the biological neural networks (BNNs) present in living brains, but that ANNs are a highly abstracted version of BNNs. Some biological nervous systems include functional specialized system-level components like the hippocampus, striatum, thalamus, and hypothalamus, elements not included in contemporary ANNs. ANNs are also disembodied and do not closely interact with the environment in a closed-loop manner. While the authors concede that ANNs are indeed highly simplified models of BNNs, they propose that there exist some essential similarities: they both belong to the same group of over-parameterized, direct-fit models that depend on dense sampling for learning task-relevant structures in data. And, crucially, ANNs are currently the only models that achieve human-like behavioral performance in many domains and can offer unanticipated insights into both the strengths and limitations of the direct-fit approach. Like BNNs, ANNs are founded on a collection of connected nodes known as artificial neurons or units that loosely resemble neurons in a biological nervous system. Each connection, akin to synapses in BNNs, links one artificial neuron to another, and the strength of these connections can be adjusted through learning. The connections between artificial neurons have weights that are adjusted during the learning process based on supervised feedback or reward signals. The weight amplifies or reduces the strength of a connection. And much like BNNs, ANNs are sometimes organized into layers.
Another “box” addresses embodiment. This is something the philosopher Andy Clark has addressed a lot in his work. Not to mention, going further back, the philosopher Maruice Merleau-Ponty. At present, ANNs are disembodied and unable to actively sample or modify their world. The brain does not operate with strictly defined training and test regimes as found in machine learning. Objective functions in BNNs must satisfy certain body-imposed constraints to behave adaptively when interacting with the world. The authors suggest that adding a body to current ANNs, capable of actively sampling and interacting with the world, along with ways to directly interact with other networks, could increase the network’s learning capacity and reduce the gaps between BNNs and ANNs. Interestingly enough, they cite Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical Investigations” when addressing the way social others direct our learning processes.
One other topic in the paper that I found interesting was a discussion of “System 1” and “System 2”. This model was made most famous by Daniel Kahneman in his 2011 book Thinking Fast and Slow. The authors cite Jonathan St B. T. Evans’s 1984 paper “Heuristic and analytic processes in reasoning”. And there are earlier precedents for the general idea going back further in history. System 1 represents fast, automatic, and intuitive thinking, what Evans called heuristic processes. And System 2 represents slow, effortful, and deliberate thinking, what Evans called analytic processes. Hasson et al. propose that we can understand System 1 to be a kind of substrate from which System 2 can arise. System 2 is where things get really interesting. That’s where we find some of the most impressive capacities of the human mind. But they maintain that we have to start with System 1 and build from there. They state: “Although the human mind inspires us to touch the stars, it is grounded in the mindless billions of direct-fit parameters of System 1.” They see artificial neural networks as having the most relevance toward explaining System 1 processes. And the thing is we seem to be continually finding that System 1 includes more than we might have thought. “Every day, new ANN architectures are developed using direct-fit procedures to learn and perform more complex cognitive functions, such as driving, translating languages, learning calculus, or making a restaurant reservation–functions that were historically assumed to be under the jurisdiction of System 2.”
In “A deep learning framework for neuroscience”, published in Nature Neuroscience in 2019 by Richards et al. the authors focus on three key features of artificial neural network design – (1) objective functions, (2) learning rules, and (3) architectures – and address how these design components can impact neuroscience.
The authors observe that when the traditional framework for systems neuroscience was formulated, they could only collect data from a small selection of neurons. Under this framework, a scientist observes neural activity, formulates a theory of what individual neurons compute, and then constructs a circuit-level theory of how these neurons integrate their operations. However, the question arises as to whether this traditional framework can scale up to accommodate recordings from thousands of neurons and all of the behaviors that one might want to explain. It’s arguable that the classical approach hasn’t seen as much success when applied to large neural circuits that perform a variety of functions, such as the neocortex or hippocampus. These limitations of the classical framework suggest that new methodologies are necessary to capitalize on experimental advancements.
At their fundamental level, ANNs model neural computation using simplified units that loosely emulate the integration and activation properties of real neurons. The specific computations performed by ANNs are not designed but learned. When setting up ANNs, scientists don’t shape the specific computations performed by the network. Instead, they establish the three components mentioned previously: objective functions, learning rules, and architecture. Objective functions measure the network’s performance on a task, and learning involves finding synaptic weights that maximize or minimize this objective function. These are often referred to as ‘loss’ or ‘cost’ functions. Learning rules offer a guide for updating the synaptic weights. And architectures dictate the arrangement of units in the network and determine the flow of information, as well as the computations the network can or cannot learn.
Richards et al. make an observation about interpretability similar to that made by Hasson et al. The computations that emerge in large-scale ANNs trained on high-dimensional datasets can be hard to interpret. An ANN can be constructed with a few lines of code, and for each unit in an ANN, the equations determining their responses to stimuli or relationships to behavior can be specified. But after training, a network is characterized by millions of weights that collectively encode what the network has learned, and it is difficult to envision how such a system could be described with only a few parameters, let alone in words. They suggest that we think about this in the following way. Theories can have a compact explanation that can be expressed in relatively few words that can then be used to develop more complex, non-compact models. They give the theory of evolution by natural selection as a comparative example. The underlying principle is fairly simple and comprehensible, even if the actual mechanics that emerge from it are very complex. For systems neuroscience we can start with these three relatively simple and comprehensible principles: objective functions, learning rules, and architecture. Then even though the system that emerges from that is too complex to comprehend at least the underlying principles are comprehensible and give some degree of intuitive understanding.
Conclusion
Something that I find exciting about all this is that it’s an interesting interface between philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and programming. I think that some of the most interesting problems out there are philosophical problems. Even many scientific problems transition into philosophical problems eventually. But our philosophy needs periodic grounding in the world of empirical observations. What we might call armchair philosophy runs the danger of getting untethered from reality. In the philosophy of mind we can speculate about a lot of things that don’t work out very well in neuroscience. That’s not to say that philosophy of mind has to be entirely bounded by neuroscience. Just because human minds work in a certain way doesn’t mean that minds of any kind would have to be constrained in the same way. There could be many different ways for minds to work. But if we’re theorizing about ways other types of minds might work we don’t, at present, have ways to verify that they actually would work. With theories about human minds we can at least try to verify them. Even that’s kind of challenging though because the brain is so complex and difficult to observe directly at high resolution.
Still, there’s a lot about our brains that we do know that we can take into account in our theories of the mind. We know that our brains have neurons and that neurons make synaptic connections. And we know that those synaptic connections can strengthen or weaken. We can at least account for that in our theories. Artificial neural networks patterned after biological neural networks are useful tools to model our brains. We can’t go into every synaptic cleft in the brain to sample its flux of neurotransmitters. Or record the firing frequency of every neuron in the brain. That would be great but we just don’t have that capability. With artificial neural networks, as imperfect approximations as they are, we at least have recorded information for billions of parameters, even if their sheer quantity defies comprehension. And we can try out different configurations to see how well they work.
Another subtopic that’s interested me for a while is the possibility of what I call a general theory of mind. “General” in the sense of applying beyond just the special case of human minds, a theory of the human mind being a “special” theory of mind. What other kinds of minds might there be? What are all the different ways that a mind can work? AI might give us the ability to simulate and test more general and exotic possibilities and to extract the general principles they all hold in common.
I think the recent success of these large language models is quite exciting. Maybe a little bit frightening. But I’m mostly excited to see what we can learn.
With this episode I’d like to talk about some things I’ve been studying about prayer. This may be one of the most practical topics I’ve ever gotten into since it’s essentially about a practice, something that you do. We can talk about it and reflect on it, which is what I’ll be doing here. But prayer is ultimately a spiritual practice. Theology can certainly be theoretical and intellectual. And that’s something that I really like about it. But I always try to remember something that Evagrius Ponticus (345 – 399) said about theology: “A theologian is one who prays, and one who prays is a theologian.”
I try to live my life in imitation of Christ and one thing that stands out to me in the scriptures is that Jesus prayed. And I think this is very significant. In his book Jesus of Nazareth Pope Benedict XVI said:
“Again and again the Gospels note that Jesus withdrew ‘to the mountain’ to spend nights in prayer ‘alone’ with his Father. These short passages are fundamental for our understanding of Jesus; they lift the veil of mystery just a little; they give us a glimpse into Jesus’ filial existence, into the source from which his action and teaching and suffering sprang. This ‘praying’ of Jesus is the Son conversing with the Father; Jesus’ human consciousness and will, his human soul, is taken up into that exchange, and in this way human ‘praying’ is able to become a participation in this filial communion with the Father.” (7)
As is typical with Benedict, he packs a lot into very condensed passages. Three points stand out to me here about Jesus’ practice of prayer.
1. It is fundamental for our understanding of him.
2. It is the source from which his action and teaching and suffering sprang.
3. Our prayer is a way of participating in the communion that Jesus has with the Father.
That prayer was something fundamental to Jesus’ behavior and identity was apparently something that his disciples noticed as well. On one occasion after he returned from prayer they asked him to instruct them.
“And it came to pass, that, as he was praying in a certain place, when he ceased, one of his disciples said unto him, Lord, teach us to pray, as John also taught his disciples.” (John 11:1, KJV)
And we have many examples in the Gospels of Jesus teaching about prayer and how to pray, especially in Luke.
As I’ve reflected on prayer I keep sensing its great importance. It’s such a simple thing. And we even tend to dismiss it as insignificant. Like many things, the phrase “thoughts and prayers” is politicized and maybe that’s an apt indicator of our attitudes about prayer, that it’s something empty and ineffectual. And it’s certainly true that prayer can be empty and vain. Jesus even said as much (Matthew 6:5-8). But I actually believe that sincere prayer, far from being empty and ineffectual, is actually the most important thing that we can do. If we want to change the world, starting especially with changing ourselves, we must pray.
Prayer touches on the fundamental issues of who we are and what we exist for. Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430) said to God in his Confessions, “You have made us for Yourself.” Why do we exist? We exist for God. That’s not what most of us think. We may think we exist for any number of other things, or nothing at all. We could say, as Jesus said to Martha, that we “are worried and troubled about many things” (Luke 10:41, NKJV). Ultimately all of these things, all our desires, interests, projects, and concerns are imperfect reflections of the most fundamental and innate desire for our creator and sustainer. But we often don’t know that that’s what we’re looking for, or even that we’re looking for anything at all.
Each of us is, in many ways, the Samaritan woman at the well to whom Jesus said:
“If you knew the gift of God, and who it is who says to you, ‘Give Me a drink,’ you would have asked Him, and He would have given you living water.” (John 4:10, NKJV)
What an interesting hypothetical. You would be asking for something. You’re not asking for it now. But you would ask for it if you knew about it. It’s this fascinating situation where we’re looking for something without knowing what we are looking for or even that we are looking for anything at all.
I think this is an apt description of the human condition generally. There’s this kind of generalized discontent and incompleteness to our existence. Augustine called it restlessness.
“You have made us for Yourself, and our hearts are restless until they rest in You.”
I think a scripturally appropriate term would be thirst. Jesus described the object of this thirst as “living water”:
“Whoever drinks of this water [meaning literal, physical water] will thirst again, but whoever drinks of the water that I shall give him will never thirst. But the water that I shall give him will become in him a fountain of water springing up into everlasting life.” (John 4:13-14, NKJV)
This living water is both our source and purpose. It’s the culmination of all our longing but we know, both from scripture and just from experience, that the challenges of finding it are significant. Paul said we seek in the hope that we might grope for and find the Unknown God, even “though He is not far from each one of us” (Acts 17:27, NKJV) Paul also acknowledged that prayer itself is difficult: “We do not know what we should pray for as we ought” (Romans 8:26, NKJV)
In my conversations with fellow Christians we’ve shared this experience that prayer can be difficult. We don’t feel like we’re doing it right or that we’re making that spiritual connection with God. That’s a common experience and has been from the beginning. But we have help. Paul said:
“Likewise the Spirit also helps in our weaknesses. For we do not know what we should pray for as we ought, but the Spirit Himself makes intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered.” (Romans 8:26, NKJV)
It seems appropriate and perfect to me that the Spirit would intercede for our nondescript, generalized restlessness for the Unknown God with unutterable groanings. Even if we don’t know what we’re looking for or that we’re looking for anything at all the Spirit can intercede and act on this most vague longing with groanings which cannot be uttered.
Something that I’ve found helpful in the practice of prayer is making use of the different forms of prayer from the Christian tradition. The Catechism of the Catholic Church identifies three major expressions of the life of prayer in the Christian tradition (2699, 2721):
Vocal Prayer
Meditation
Contemplative Prayer
I find that one or the other of these three expressions of prayer is often most suitable at certain times. I think that sometimes we find prayer difficult because we only know of one form. And even though that one form may be very suitable in many situations it might not be most suitable in others. I’ve found it helpful to weave these three forms together in my practice of prayer.
I tend to think of these three expressions of prayer as sitting on a spectrum of expressibility and expressive content. Vocal prayer is most characterized by expressible content in the sentences that we speak. Contemplative prayer mostly transcends anything that can be expressed in words. And meditation, centering mostly in the words scripture and the life of Christ, sits between vocal prayer and contemplative prayer in its degree of expressibility.
The first major expression of prayer in the Christian tradition is vocal prayer. There are a couple things that strike me about Jesus’s teachings about vocal prayer. And I think they’re related. The first is that in our petitions we must have faith. The second is that we should be relentless in our petitions. I think those two things are related. And they strike me because I don’t feel like I live in an age and culture where we really believe in miracles, especially not to a degree that we would pursue them relentlessly in our prayers. Part of that may be our secularism. And part of it may be a concern that relentlessness would be irreverently presumptuous. But Jesus seemed to have precious little concern about presumptuousness. Consider the following parable:
“Then He spoke a parable to them, that men always ought to pray and not lose heart, saying: There was in a certain city a judge who did not fear God nor regard man. Now there was a widow in that city; and she came to him, saying, Get justice for me from my adversary. And he would not for a while; but afterward he said within himself, Though I do not fear God nor regard man, yet because this widow troubles me I will avenge her, lest by her continual coming she weary me. Then the Lord said, Hear what the unjust judge said. And shall God not avenge His own elect who cry out day and night to Him, though He bears long with them? I tell you that He will avenge them speedily. Nevertheless, when the Son of Man comes, will He really find faith on the earth?” (Luke 18:1-8, NKJV)
Jesus was insistent that God is the most disposed to grant petitions for those who seek after them.
“Ask, and it will be given to you; seek, and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to you. For everyone who asks receives, and he who seeks finds, and to him who knocks it will be opened. Or what man is there among you who, if his son asks for bread, will give him a stone? Or if he asks for a fish, will he give him a serpent? If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to those who ask Him!” (Matthew 7:7-12, NKJV)
I’m struck by the directness and complete lack of qualification in these teachings. But if you’re like me you have doubts that it can really be so straightforward. Why? Because we’ve all had the experience that Jesus’s disciples had, where we pursued a miracle that didn’t come:
“Then the disciples came to Jesus privately and said, Why could we not cast it [the demon] out? So Jesus said to them, Because of your unbelief; for assuredly, I say to you, if you have faith as a mustard seed, you will say to this mountain, Move from here to there, and it will move; and nothing will be impossible for you. However, this kind does not go out except by prayer and fasting.” (Matthew 17:19-21, NKJV)
We’ve all had this experience. We pray for something and we don’t get it. I’ve even considered this an important spiritual developmental step, moving from a more naive conception of God to one that’s more sophisticated, where we can appreciate the various reasons that our petitions in prayer might not be granted. But I’m coming around to question that. I wonder if we’re too quick in our sophistication to enable underdeveloped faith.
This is why I think prayer, far from being vain and ineffectual, is the most important thing we can do. We need, as individuals and as societies and nations, things that we cannot produce on our own. We need God to intervene. There are societies and sub-cultures where these things do happen, where people expect, pursue, and receive miracles. God knows how to give good gifts to his children.
The second major expression of prayer in Christian tradition is meditation. Meditation might not be something we popularly associate with Christianity but it’s definitely part of the tradition. It’s often facilitated by texts of scripture and devotional writings. Also visual arts like icons. Lectio divina is one venerable practice of reading scripture for the special purpose of focusing and meditating on it in prayer. I often use one of the Psalms for this purpose. Events from the life of Christ are also very powerful.
The Rosary is a classic example of a practice of prayer that is focused on events from the life of Christ. Each cycle of the Rosary goes through five “Mysteries” from the life of Christ.
The Joyful Mysteries are:
The Sorrowful Mysteries are
The Glorious Mysteries are
The Luminous Mysteries are
We can read the accounts of these events in scripture and learn about their contents. But in meditative prayer we can go deeper into them to be moved and edified by them. As an example, concerning the mystery of the Carrying of the Cross, Bishop Robert Barron remarked that, “Carrying the cross must become the very structure of the Christian life.” This idea has had a profound impact on me as I’ve meditated on it.
Something I enjoy about scripture is that it’s very intellectually challenging and stimulating. And interdisciplinary. It involves topics of history, philosophy, and linguistics. I think that’s wonderful. But I think there’s sometimes a temptation to compete over who can be the most knowledgeable about the content of scripture. I don’t think that serves the purposes of scripture at all. In The Imitation of Christ Thomas à Kempis (1380 – 1471) warned: “If you wish to derive profit from your reading of Scripture, do it with humility, simplicity, and faith; at no time use it to gain a reputation for being one who is learned.” (Book I, Chapter V) Rather, Thomas said: “Let it then be our main concern to meditate on the life of Jesus Christ.” (Book I, Chapter I)
In addition to meditation of the life of Christ I cannot speak highly enough about the edifying influence of the Psalms. I’ve said at times, and I still think it’s true, that the fastest way to learn about the narrative arc of the Old Testament is to read 1 Samuel through 2 Kings. And of course those four books are books of holy scripture, so well worth reading. But I think now that the most direct path into the spiritual world of the Old Testament is in the Psalms. I admit that I didn’t always appreciate them and couldn’t get into them. Maybe I wasn’t ready for them. But I really appreciate them now. Sometimes if I find it difficult to get into prayer the Psalms are a great way to get started, to get into the right frame of mind.
To paraphrase Ecclesiastes (3:1), there is a Psalm for every season.
Psalms of joy:
“O how love I thy law! it is my meditation all the day.” (Psalm 119:97, KJV)
“How sweet are thy words unto my taste! yea, sweeter than honey to my mouth!” (Psalm 119: 103, KJV)
“Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my path.” (Psalm 119:103, KJV)
“Let every thing that hath breath praise the Lord. Praise ye the Lord.” (Psalm 150:6, KJV)
Psalms of grief and frustration:
“How long wilt thou forget me, O Lord? for ever? how long wilt thou hide thy face from me?” (Psalm 13:1, KJV)
“My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” (Psalm 22:1)
And Psalms of reflection:
“When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars, which thou hast ordained; What is man, that thou art mindful of him? and the son of man, that thou visitest him?” (Psalm 8:3-4, KJV)
“One thing have I desired of the Lord, that will I seek after; that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, to behold the beauty of the Lord, and to enquire in his temple.” (Psalm 27:1, KJV)
In his book Jesus of Nazareth, Pope Benedict XVI said: “The Psalms are words that the Holy Spirit has given to men; they are God’s Spirit become word.” (131) Speaking about the Psalms and the Lord’s Prayer he remarks that certain formulaic prayers like these can help us to get started in prayer and in approaching God.
“Our prayer can and should be a wholly personal prayer. But we also constantly need to make use of those prayers that express in words the encounter with God experienced both by the Church as a whole and by individual members of the Church… In the formulaic prayers that arose first from the faith of Israel and then from the faith of praying members of the Church, we get to know God and ourselves as well. They are a ‘school of prayer’ that transforms and opens up our life… Normally, thought precedes word; it seems to formulate the word. But praying the Psalms and liturgical prayer in general is exactly the other way around: The word, the voice, goes ahead of us, and our mind must adapt to it. For on our own we human beings do not ‘know how to pray as we ought’ (Rom 8:26) – we are too far removed from God, he is too mysterious and too great for us. And so God has come to our aid: He himself provides the words of our prayer and teaches us to pray. Through the prayers that come from him, he enables us to set out toward him; by praying together with the brothers and sisters he has given us, we gradually come to know him and draw closer to him.” (130-131)
The third major expression of prayer in the Christian tradition is contemplative prayer. This is the form of prayer that I think of as being the furthest on the spectrum away from expressibility and expressive content. In the Eastern Christian tradition it’s sometimes called “hesychasm”, derived from the Greek hesychia (ἡσυχία), meaning “stillness, rest, quiet, or silence”. Another descriptive term is “apophatic”, from the Greek apophēmi (ἀπόφημι), meaning “to deny”, which is characterized by negative content rather than positive content. I sometimes think of it as empty space into which the Spirit can freely enter.
Perhaps appropriately some of the greatest spiritual writers in this tradition are anonymous (or pseudonymous). One lived sometime in the 5th or 6th century, writing under the pseudonym Dionysius, whose major work was On The Divine Names. Another was an English writer living sometime in the 14th century, whose major work was The Cloud of Unknowing.
Contemplative prayer is the most unexpressible form of prayer, but it often still involves single words or phases, similar to a mantra in Indian religious traditions. In The Cloud of Unknowing the author instructs that we should use one word of just one syllable in which to enfold our intent:
“If you like, you can have this reaching out, wrapped up and enfolded in a single word. So as to have a better grasp of it, take just a little word, of one syllable rather than of two; for the shorter it is the better it is in agreement with this exercise of the spirit. Such a one is the word ‘God’ or the word ‘love.’ Choose which one you prefer, or any other according to your liking – the word of one syllable that you like the best. Fasten this word to your heart, so that whatever happens it will never go away. This word is to be your shield and your spear, whether you are riding in peace or in war. With this word you are to beat upon this cloud and this darkness about you. With this word you are to strike down every kind of thought under the cloud of forgetting.” (Chapter VII, James Walsh edition)
Other contemplatives haven’t necessarily restricted themselves to one word alone but have also used phrases. The most notable example, especially in Eastern Christianity, is the Jesus Prayer. The Jesus Prayer is this:
“Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me, a sinner.”
The scriptural roots of this prayer are in the Parable of the Pharisee and the Publican in Luke 18:9-14.
“And the tax collector, standing afar off, would not so much as raise his eyes to heaven, but beat his breast, saying, ‘God, be merciful to me a sinner!’” (NKJV)
Paul, in his first letter to the Thassolonians, counseled to “pray without ceasing” (1 Thessalonians 5:17). The Jesus Prayer is traditionally thought to be a prayer that a person can eventually learn to pray continually at every moment. In the 19th century Russian text, The Way of a Pilgrim, the pilgrim learns to pray without ceasing by incorporating the Jesus Prayer into his very breath.
“Begin bringing the whole prayer of Jesus into and out of your heart in time with your breathing, as the Fathers taught. Thus, as you draw your breath in, say, or imagine yourself saying, ‘Lord Jesus Christ,’ and as you breathe again, ‘have mercy on me.’ Do this as often and as much as you can, and in a short space of time you will feel a slight and not unpleasant pain in your heart, followed by a warmth. Thus by God’s help you will get the joy of self-acting inward prayer of the heart.”
I have found the Jesus Prayer to be the most powerful prayer for my practice of contemplation.
The Cloud of Unknowing invites what I interpret to be an inversion in perspective and attitude toward the experience of unknowing. Usually we want to know things but when we approach God in his infinity we find ourselves unable to comprehend him because he exceeds our comprehension. But this very experience of unknowability is itself a form of knowledge. It is in this cloud of unknowing that we must dwell.
“This darkness and cloud is always between you and your God, no matter what you do, and it prevents you from seeing him clearly by the light of understanding in your reason, and from experiencing him in sweetness of love in your affection. So set yourself to rest in this darkness as long as you can, always crying out after him whom you love. For if you are to experience him or to see him at all, insofar as it is possible here, it must always be in this cloud and in this darkness. So if you labour at it with all your attention as I bid you, I trust, in his mercy, that you will reach this point.” (Chapter III)
In scripture the cloud is often where we find and hear the voice of God.
“While he was still speaking, behold, a bright cloud overshadowed them; and suddenly a voice came out of the cloud.” (Matthew 17:5, NKJV)
“Now the glory of the Lord rested on Mount Sinai, and the cloud covered it six days. And on the seventh day He called to Moses out of the midst of the cloud. The sight of the glory of the Lord was like a consuming fire on the top of the mountain in the eyes of the children of Israel. So Moses went into the midst of the cloud and went up into the mountain.” (Exodus 24:16-18, NKJV)
The cloud is not an easy place to be. It requires practice and conditioning. As the author says, “So set yourself to rest in this darkness as long as you can”.
The author also counsels that such contemplation is the one act that it is not possible to pursue to excess.
“If you ask me the further question, how you are to apply discretion in this exercise, I answer and say, ‘none at all!’ In all your other activities you are to have discretion, in eating and drinking, in sleeping, and in protecting your body from the extremes of heat and cold, in the length of time you give to prayer or reading or to conversation with your fellow-Christians. In all these things you are to observe moderation, avoiding excess and defect. But in this exercise there is no question of moderation; I would prefer that you should never leave off as long as you live.” (Chapter 41)
Not only is excess of contemplation not a possibility or a problem. Unrestrained indulgence in contemplation also rightly orders the soul in regards to all other things, such that they are not taken to excess, but in proper measure.
“Now perhaps you will ask how you shall observe prudence in eating and sleeping and everything else. My answer to this is brief enough: ‘Understand it as best you can.’ Work at this exercise without ceasing and without moderation, and you will know where to begin and to end all your other activities with great discretion. I cannot believe that a soul who perseveres in this exercise night and day without moderation should ever make a mistake in any of his external activities.” (Chapter 42)
Why might this be? The Catechism says, “Contemplation is a gaze of faith, fixed on Jesus.” (2715) With a gaze fixed on Christ all other things become rightly ordered and proportioned. As Jesus said:
“But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you.” (Matthew 6:33, KJV)
I think this coheres with what I said earlier about how I believe prayer is the most important thing we can do. Because prayer, especially prayer of contemplation focuses our gaze singly on Christ. Jesus said to Martha: “You are worried and troubled about many things.” (Luke 10:41, NKJV) That’s all of us. The Greek word merimnao (μεριμνάω), to be anxious, is a word I always pay close attention to in the New Testament when I see it. It occurs a number of times in the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 6: me merimnate (μὴ μεριμνᾶτε), do not worry. “Do not worry about your life, what you will eat or what you will drink; nor about your body, what you will put on… For your heavenly Father knows that you need all these things. But seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these things shall be added to you.” (Matthew 6:25; 32-33, NKJV) As Jesus said to Martha: “One thing is needed.” (Luke 10:42, NKJV) That one thing is the gaze of faith, fixed on Jesus in prayer.
I’ve titled this episode “A Brief History of Secular Thought”, which is kind of funny because it’s one of the longest episodes I’ve done. But it’s brief relative to the potential scope of the subject matter. For example, Charles Taylor’s book on the subject, A Secular Age, is 896 pages. Tyler Roberts’ Teaching Company course, Skeptics and Believers, is 18.5 hours in length. So by comparison the following will be a brief history of secular thought.
Why study secular thought? Well for one thing it’s just interesting. But it’s also important for both secular and religious people to be familiar with it in order to understand the history of the ideas that they hold and respond to. One of the thinkers discussed in what follows, Friedrich Nietzsche, would employ in his philosophy what he called a “genealogy” of ideas. This kind of genealogy explores the history of certain ideas in order to see how they have been dependent on events and cultural conditions of that history. Genealogy reveals how ideas are not absolute but rather contingent; they have a history and could have developed differently than they did. In what follows one of the aims is to situate and contextualize secular thought.
In Charles Taylor’s book A Secular Age he introduced a number of terms and concepts that he used to study the development of secular thought. One of these concepts is the “subtraction story”. James K.A. Smith, in his commentary on Taylor’s book, defined subtraction stories as: “Accounts that explain ‘the secular’ as merely the subtraction of religious belief, as if the secular is what’s left over after we subtract superstition.” (How (Not) To Be Secular) In a subtraction story secular thought is decontextualized and we lose sight of its contingency as a cultural construct. In Taylor’s words subtraction stories are:
“Stories of modernity in general, and secularity in particular, which explain them by human beings having lost, or sloughed off, or liberated themselves from certain earlier, confining horizons, or illusions, or limitations of knowledge. What emerges from this process—modernity or secularity—is to be understood in terms of underlying features of human nature which were there all along, but had been impeded by what is now set aside.” (A Secular Age, 21)
A subtraction story of the secular might be something of this form: Humans used to have all kinds of superstitious beliefs because we didn’t have the scientific knowledge to understand how things really work. But with the rise of modern science we don’t need those superstitions anymore. We used to use religion to help us cope with the hardships of life. But our increased scientific knowledge has brought about technology that has made us wealthier and healthier in ways that religion never could. Now we can cast religion aside and see things as they really are and always were.
As an alternative to this Taylor spends his book arguing that the secular is constructed. It’s a cultural construct shaped by a contingent history of development.
“Against this kind of story, I will steadily be arguing that Western modernity, including its secularity, is the fruit of new inventions, newly constructed self-understandings and related practices, and can’t be explained in terms of perennial features of human life.” (ibid. 21)
By looking at secular thought as a cultural construct I think we’re doing something much more interesting than just a simple deconstruction or takedown of it. Sort of in the way people say that atheism is just another religion, which always strikes me as a bit of an unintentional self-own; I don’t like to use “religion” as a pejorative because I think religion is a good thing. I don’t think that seeing secular thought as a construct rather than in terms of a subtraction story discredits it. Instead I think it gives a fuller and more accurate picture of it. If secular thought as we have it today has been shaped by the contingent events of history we can go back through history and see those decisive points where the ideas we take for granted today started to develop. We can certainly do the same with religious thought, which is basically historical theology, and that is also a valuable exercise.
In what follows I’d like to discuss some of the major figures who shaped the development of secular thought. Two important questions leading into that are: (1) where to start and (2) who to include? Christopher Hitchens edited a volume called The Portable Atheist with writings from many such key figures. And I think his list was pretty good. His first selection is from Lucretius (99 BC – 55 BC). That’s definitely a solid pick but I’m going to narrow my focus to modernity, starting with the Enlightenment. On who to include I’ve focused on: (1) people who are generally considered important in this kind of history, (2) people whose ideas are still in the air today, even if we don’t always name them, and (3) people who were highly influential and popular in their day, who were bestsellers. I think this last point is important because cultural construction of a worldview, or what Taylor calls a “social imaginary”, is about more than just who can make the most logical or academically respectable argument. It’s also about influence. Who were people talking about in parlors and taverns? Today, who are people discussing in book clubs and on social media? Those are the people who are major culture shapers, regardless of their credentials.
It will help to do a quick overview first to see where all of this is going. So here’s a brief summary of the trajectory. Our starting point will be in the eighteenth century with the Enlightenment. Any starting point is arbitrary and there were definitely developments that led into this period. For example, there were important ideas from people like Spinoza, Bacon, and Hobbes. So it’s worth mentioning them in passing. Starting in the eighteenth century Voltaire and Denis Diderot were two important intellectuals, or philosophes, with a secularizing influence in France. In the English-speaking world important Enlightenment figures included David Hume, Edward Gibbon, and Thomas Paine. Thomas Paine is especially interesting because he had transnational influence in America, Great Britain, and France. All these men were quite characteristic of the eighteenth century. They tended to embrace deism which, while still technically theist, was moving far from orthodox Christian theism.
In the nineteenth century important intellectual and cultural developments included Romanticism, higher Biblical criticism, Hegelianism, socialism, and evolution. All of these had secularizing influences. Percy Bysshe Shelley was a poet and essayist who went beyond deism and promoted atheism in the strongest sense, both explicitly and figuratively, in his writing. Many nineteenth century thinkers like Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche also embraced this strong form of atheism. Others like Thomas Carlyle represented and wrote for many in the nineteenth century who continued to hold on to some form of symbolic and experiential theism, even to Christianity if sufficiently reinterpreted. Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx each gave accounts for religious belief grounded in naturalistic explanations. Naturalism then gained considerable support with the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species. Other thinkers following Darwin often referred to his work in support of their own ideas. Two prominent examples of this were Thomas Huxley and Herbert Spencer. Spencer not only promoted and popularized Darwin’s theories but also integrated them into a more comprehensive and total philosophy of progress that dominated the late nineteenth century and early twentieth. Friedrich Nietzsche took some of the boldest and most irreverent positions on atheism and Christianity, declaring the death of God and criticizing Christian morality itself.
In the early twentieth century secular thought and intellectual life more generally was dominated by the ideas of Sigmund Freud. Like Feuerbach and Marx, Freud developed fully naturalistic theories for the origins of religious belief. Freud’s psychoanalytic thought would be foundational in the development of continental philosophy. Around the same time another line of thought was developing in analytic philosophy, led by Bertrand Russell. Russell was a prolific writer and influential both among his technical and academic colleagues as well in the wider public. Public opinion was also heavily influenced by novelists and journalists like Mark Twain and H.L. Mencken. Where scientists and philosophers undermined religious foundations literary figures like Twain and Mencken were able to make it look ridiculous, perhaps an even more significant accomplishment. In the later twentieth century some of the most influential secular thinkers were scientists like Carl Sagan and Stephen Hawking.
At the start of the twenty-first century the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 brought new attention to the dangers of religious fundamentalism and sparked a strong response among a group of writers known as the New Atheists. These included Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, and Daniel Dennett.
That’s the overview. Now let’s go through all that again in more detail.
Voltaire, Diderot, Hume, Gibbon, and Paine were all men of the Enlightenment. All were critical of religion. But none was an atheist either, at least not in his own self understanding. They were Deists and proponents of “natural religion”. This natural religion is theistic but in a deistic conception God is remote and doesn’t intervene in human affairs with miracles and revelations. A deistic God is very different from the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. They admired Jesus, or at least Jesus as they understood him. Jesus was an ancient teacher of natural religion but his teachings had been overlaid with superstitious doctrinal accretions that became Christianity, something quite different from the real Jesus of history. An evocative illustration of this idea is Thomas Jefferson’s editing of the Bible in which he kept Jesus’ ethical teachings but cut out the miracles that later followers ascribed to him.
The stage had been set for the Enlightenment by many events including the Protestant Reformation and the wars of religion, like the great Thirty Years War. Religion, in the eyes of many, was becoming more of a problem than an unquestioned way of life. Another cataclysmic event that rocked Europe was the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755. Europe reacted viscerally to the devastation of this earthquake and traditional religious answers started to be unsatisfying. Philosopher Susan Neiman in her book Evil In Modern Thought argued that the Lisbon Earthquake was a foundational event in modern thought upon which many of the great developments of the next century would build. It was the kind of event after which nothing could ever be the same again, like the Holocaust in the twentieth, but maybe even more so in Neiman’s view.
Well reasoned religious explanations were not lacking. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz had developed an argument justifying God in light of the natural and human evils. Leibniz, one of the inventors of calculus and with a mind honed to think in terms of functions and optimizations, reasoned that the world that actually exists is the world that, out of all possible worlds, has the greatest amount of good over evil: the best of all possible worlds. Any other world that lacked some particular evil that we might want not to exist would, for various reasons unknown to us but known to God, have lower net good overall. And we’ve all probably read enough stories and seen enough movies to imagine how that might work, where something bad is later seen to have been somehow instrumental to the greater good in the long run. It’s a clever argument. But after Lisbon a lot of people weren’t convinced.
One man who was especially not convinced was Voltaire. Voltaire was a master of the pen and wildly popular. In Voltaire’s hand Leibniz became the foolish character Pangloss in the novel Candide. In the face of war, rape, murder, natural disasters, and other forms of suffering and injustice Pangloss always insists that such things happen for a reason, unlike the title character Candide who comes to see that the world often really is just cruel and arbitrary. For deists like Voltaire God is not expected to intervene in harsh realities of the world. God is more of a mathematician and physicist who sets things up with their initial conditions and then just lets the system evolve. If the system happens to have disasters like the Lisbon Earthquake, those aren’t part of any meaningful plan. They’re just meaningless outputs of the system.
Revelation had no place in natural theology. Instead the best way to understand God would be through the sciences. This was an age of massive scholarly studies. Denis Diderot launched his Encyclopédie, a great encyclopedia of all knowledge. Edward Gibbon produced his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. And Hume produced his Treatise of Human Nature and later the more refined and digestible Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. The great thinkers of the Enlightenment were daring to know, to use the words of another Enlightenment thinker, Immanuel Kant. They were amassing knowledge in all fields.
Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall covered the history of Rome from 180 AD with Marcus Aurelius to the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453. Gibbon’s project was to identify the cause of Rome’s decline and fall. And he proposed as an explanation that Rome had fallen because of Christianity. This was actually an argument that many pagans had made at the time of the fall of the Western empire in the 400s AD, which prompted Augustine of Hippo to write his City of God as a response. But unlike Augustine’s pagan opponents who attributed Rome’s misfortunes to abandonment by their gods Gibbon’s explanation was naturalistic and quite characteristic of modern history. Christianity had led to the decline of the Roman Empire because it weakened the traditional Roman social order and values. Christianity interrupted or ended important Roman economic institutions like slavery and trade. Roman soldiers lost their martial virtues and became more preoccupied with religious matters. And preoccupation with religious matters diverted Rome’s citizens from other intellectual and cultural pursuits. As with the Roman historian Tacitus writing about the Germanic barbarians, we might see in Gibbons’ writings about the Romans a critique of the society of his own day. If Christianity caused the decline and fall of Rome how might it be holding us back in our day?
Where Gibbon concerned himself with history David Hume worked in the space of ideas. Hume is one of my favorite philosophers and I really recommend reading his work, especially his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. I think most of the problems of the philosophy of science that we’re still grappling with all go back to Hume, in particular his problem of induction. He was the kind of thinker who would pause over the things we take for granted and ask, “Now how do we really know that?” And then after leaving us all sufficiently perplexed he’d go play a game of backgammon and not worry about it for several hours. On religion Hume was maybe the closest to an atheist among this group of Enlightenment thinkers since he criticized even the idea the universe had been set in motion at all by an intelligent being. His most important work on the subject is his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Here, in the mouths of his fictional characters, Hume pokes fun at the notion of a deistic God of supernatural intelligence, proposing instead some much less attractive possibilities.
“This world, for aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work only of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to his superiors: it is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventures, from the first impulse and active force which it received from him.”
This is all delightfully sacrilegious and though Hume was naturally criticized by many people he also faced no real consequences and his wit and irreverence were no doubt celebrated by many other Enlightenment readers.
No treatment of the Enlightenment is complete in my opinion without touching on one of its most popular and towering figures across the Atlantic: the American pamphleteer Thomas Paine. His Common Sense is still read by school children today and was immensely influential among the American colonists. Just listen to these classic lines:
“We have it in our power to begin the world over again. A situation, similar to the present, hath not happened since the days of Noah until now. The birthday of a new world is at hand, and a race of men, perhaps as numerous as all Europe contains, are to receive their portion of freedom from the events of a few months.”
Paine was a hero not only to Americans but also to the French, having the distinction of being an influential pamphleteer in two great revolutions. Paine’s The Rights of Man was exceptionally popular among the French.
Relevant to our topic here, another of Paine’s great works was The Age of Reason. It’s something of a deist manifesto. It’s favorable to natural religion and a deistic understanding of God but very critical of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Some key passages:
“Every national church or religion has established itself by pretending some special mission from God, communicated to certain individuals. The Jews have their Moses; the Christians their Jesus Christ, their apostles and saints; and the Turks their Mahomet; as if the way to God was not open to every man alike… No one will deny or dispute the power of the Almighty to make such a communication if he pleases. But admitting, for the sake of a case, that something has been revealed to a certain person, and not revealed to any other person, it is revelation to that person only. When he tells it to a second person, a second to a third, a third to a fourth, and so on, it ceases to be a revelation to all those persons. It is revelation to the first person only, and hearsay to every other, and, consequently, they are not obliged to believe it… When Moses told the children of Israel that he received the two tables of the commandments from the hand of God, they were not obliged to believe him, because they had no other authority for it than his telling them so; and I have no other authority for it than some historian telling me so, the commandments carrying no internal evidence of divinity with them. They contain some good moral precepts such as any man qualified to be a lawgiver or a legislator could produce himself, without having recourse to supernatural intervention.”
This is very direct and bold stuff. And it’s characteristic of the Enlightenment or Age of Reason as Paine called it.
As we move into the eighteenth century the spirit of age starts to look different. On the one hand there was a reaction to the heady rationalism of the Enlightenment, a response that came to be known as Romanticism. And in some ways this constituted a return to spirituality of a sort. But it was very different from that of orthodox Christianity. Something more pantheistic like Hegel’s Geist, a spirit or mind present in the events of history. But secularism also started to become more blatant and atheistic.
Percy Bysshe Shelly was an interesting combination of the Romantic poet and blatant atheist. He was kicked out of Oxford after writing a pamphlet called “The Necessity of Atheism”. No deism here anymore. Shelly, one of the greatest poets in history, said that “Poets and philosophers are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.” (A Defense of Poetry) This is an important theme that I’d like to stress and return to in this episode. I think Shelly was right on the money. Philosophers are maybe more acknowledged. But we sometimes forget about the influence of the poets, artists, comedians, and other entertainers. They have a lot of influence on how we think. Probably more than the academics. I think Shelly is also a good example of an important trend in the development of secular thought, and that is the self-image of a secular person. For Shelly to be an atheist was to be among an elite group of people who were more reflective and intelligent than most others. Consider the following passage from his essay “A Refutation of Deism”:
“That the frequency of a belief in God (for it is not universal) should be any argument in its
favour, none to whom the innumerable mistakes of men are familiar, will assert. It is among
men of genius and science that Atheism alone is found, but among these alone is cherished an
hostility to those errors, with which the illiterate and vulgar are infected. How small is the proportion of those who really believe in God, to the thousands who are prevented by their occupations from ever bestowing a serious thought upon the subject.”
Shelly has plenty of arguments in the essay but I think this passage, while not one of the arguments, is actually more effective than any of them.
Not everyone was as radical and celebratory as Shelley. Another literary figure significant in the development of secular thought was the essayist Thomas Carlyle. Charles Taylor, in his book chapter on nineteenth-century trajectories, used Carlyle as a representative for much of the social imaginary of that century. Taylor characterized the nineteenth century as one of a “cross-pressure” between the unviability of religion on the one hand and the seemingly unbearable emptiness of the void it left behind. People could not believe but neither could they bear the implications of unbelief.
“Thus for many whatever in the traditional faith went beyond or contradicted the notion of impersonal order was no longer believable; but at the same time, their sense of the weaknesses, ugliness, or evils of their age forbade them to accept the more reductive, scientistic or Utilitarian modes of order.” (A Secular Age, 377-378)
And to explore this he chose to look at Carlyle:
“A good reason for looking at the advance of unbelief in these terms is the influence and impact of Carlyle… In the 1830s and 40s, he was immensely popular. When I speak here of a vector of the advance of unbelief, I mean that Carlyle’s solution to cross-pressures which he was responding to provided the bridge by which many members of the elite public could distance themselves from their ancestral faith.”
“In giving Carlyle such a central role, I am deviating from what is often seen as the standard story of the Victorians’ loss of faith. Somewhat oversimplifying, this is thought to have been caused by the impact of Darwinian evolution, which is held so directly to have refuted the Bible. This created an agonizing conflict for many people of devout religious upbringing, which was in the end resolved by many, often with a poignant sense of loss, by the abandonment of their faith. There is some truth in this story, especially about the agonizing, and sense of loss (which seems to have been felt by Darwin himself). But it leaves out something crucial: that evolutionary theory didn’t emerge in a world where almost everyone still took the Bible story simply and literally; that among other things, this world was already strongly marked by the ideas of impersonal order, not to speak of the dark abyss of time; and that an influential formulation had already been given to the displacement of Christianity by a cosmic vision of impersonal order, that of Carlyle.” (ibid)
Carlyle himself said, “This is not a Religious age,” (Signs of the Times) but he was hardly pleased with that fact:
“To me the Universe was all void of Life, of Purpose, of Volition, even of Hostility; it was one huge, dead, im-measureable Steam-engine, rolling on, in its dead indifference, to grind me limb from limb. O the vast, Gloomy, solitary Golgotha, and Mill of Death.” (Sartor Resartus)
The machine was an important idea for Carlyle, one he saw as the biggest threat. He said in “Signs of the Times”:
“Were we required to characterise this age of ours by any single epithet, we should be tempted to call it, not an Heroical, Devotional, Philosophical, or Moral Age, but, above all others, the Mechanical Age.”
Carlyle bemoaned this fact but believed that most of his contemporaries viewed it with indifference.
“The singular conclusions at which Hume, setting out from their admitted premises, was arriving, brought this school into being; they let loose Instinct, as an undiscriminating ban-dog, to guard them against these conclusions; — they tugged lustily at the logical chain by which Hume was so coldly towing them and the world into bottomless abysses of Atheism and Fatalism. But the chain somehow snapped between them; and the issue has been that nobody now cares about either.” (Signs of the Times)
Nevertheless the influence and popularity of his writings would suggest that this was not entirely true and that he was giving voice to a general reaction that was anything but indifferent. Rather the toppling of traditional religion was a huge problem that needed to be solved. For Carlyle this looked something like an impersonal order. There was a need to “embody the divine Spirit of that Religion in a new Mythus, in a new vehicle and vesture, that our Souls, otherwise too like perishing, may live”. (Sartor Resartus) In Taylor’s view this kind of “not purely human spiritual force” had two important effects. One was to serve as a bridge by which people could “be both against Christianity and for it”. The other was to accustom people to start thinking in terms of impersonal order rather than personal order. Carlyle was not alone in this even if he is representative. Hegel would certainly be another important proponent of this notion, albeit in more complicated terms that were not so clearly impersonal.
The notion of impersonal general order is important because the nineteenth century gave rise to three major intellectual systems of impersonal order: Hegel’s Geist, Marx’s dialectical materialism, and Darwin’s evolution by natural selection. Secular thought in the nineteenth century moved away from deism but it did not jump straight to positivism; that idea from Auguste Comte would have to wait until the next century. Reality still had order and, significantly, direction. But it was impersonal.
I made an episode a couple years ago about how Hegel is much bigger and more interesting than the compressed picture we get through Marx. His Phenomenology of Geist is, in my interpretation, an epic-scale general study on how the mind comes to understand things. Nevertheless for present purposes of the history of secular thought it makes some sense to do violence to his work and view it through Marxism. The idea of Hegel’s that was most relevant to Marx was his theory of history which, far from being just one damned thing after another, was a rational progression. History and ideas develop together in a rational way such that, “What is real is rational, and what is rational is real.” Marx took this notion but then stood Hegel on his head so to speak. Whereas for Hegel the progress of history took place through ideas, for Marx history was emphatically material and especially economic. He took the notion of a dialectic – which would normally be something like a conversation, a dialogue, an exchange of ideas – and made it operate in economics. Later Marxists called this “dialectical materialism”.
For Marx economics was what really mattered. Everything else was “superstructure”. In Marx’s model society was composed of two major parts: base and superstructure. The base was all the modes of production and the superstructure was everything else like law, politics, art, philosophy, and religion. As he laid out in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859):
“In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely [the] relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political, and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness… The changes in the economic foundation lead, sooner or later, to the transformation of the whole, immense, superstructure. In studying such transformations, it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic, or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production.”
Note Marx’s comment that “one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself”. This is an extremely important idea and something we will also see in Nietzsche and Freud. Paul Ricoeur proposed that these three engaged in a “hermeneutic of suspicion”. This is a way of analyzing how the reasons that you think you have for believing something may not be your real reasons for it. For Marx if you are religious the reasons you have for being religious are not the reasons that you think they are. You are not religious for spiritual reasons but for economic reasons. The economic reasons for religion are, most importantly, the desperate conditions of poverty. Marx explained this in Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right:
“The criticism of religion is the prerequisite of all criticism… Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo.”
“The opium of the people” is probably Marx’s most famous statement about religion. And it’s a good symbol summarizing his thoughts on the subject. Why do people need such an opium? Because of the suffering produced by their economic conditions. Religion gives an illusory reprieve but it doesn’t resolve the underlying conditions, which are economic. Religion is a problem for Marx precisely because it masks the underlying conditions. It needs to be swept away so that people can see their economic problems clearly and then act on them
Marx critiqued the ideas of many of contemporaries, taking resources from their ideas where he found use for them and pointing out where he thought they did not go far enough. One such thinker was Ludwig Feuerbach. I also did an episode on Feuerbach and his fascinating book The Essence of Christianity. One of Marx’s significant works is his brief Theses on Feuerbach, with eleven theses on Feuerbach’s thought. The eleventh and most important of these theses is: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” Marx and Feuerbach were both atheists and so Marx essentially agreed with that aspect of Feuerbach’s work. But he criticized Feuerbach for extending his analysis of Christianity only to its ideas rather than to its underlying material causes and for neglecting to promote any kind of action or response to it.
Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity is fascinating for all the reasons Marx disagreed with it. When reading Feuerbach I get the sense that he was someone who really understood Christianity well and thought seriously about it, even while rejecting it. Topics he addresses in his book include: sacred immanence, providence, metaethics, spiritual existence, the elevation of anthropology to theology, religious process, God the Father as understanding, Trinity as relation and self-consciousness, Christ as mediator, the Son as Word, the Son as Love, and the Incarnation as manifestation of God in man. These are all great theological topics but Marx wanted nothing of all that since these are matters of ideas rather than material realities. But there was one idea from Feuerbach that stood out and would have the most significance in the development of secular thought and this was Feuerbach’s concept of projection. This is the idea that humans project their own attributes onto God, basically creating God in their own image. He wrote:
“Man cannot get beyond his true nature. He may indeed by means of the imagination conceive individuals of another so-called higher kind, but he can never get loose from his species, his nature; the conditions of being, the positive final predicates which he gives to these other individuals, are always determinations or qualities drawn from his own nature—qualities in which he in truth only images and projects himself.”
We take the human attributes that we most admire and project them onto this being that we call God. Feuerbach finds this problematic and calls for people to stop doing it and instead to re-internalize the qualities that we project onto God and find them in ourselves. For one thing projection diminishes our self-regard: “To enrich God, man must become poor; that God may be all, man must be nothing.” And Feuerbach also thinks that our projected regard for God is completely misplaced: “All those dispositions which ought to be devoted to life, to man— all the best powers of humanity, are lavished on the being who wants nothing.”
There are two important ideas here in Feuerbach. The first is a secular account of the origin of God. And this is the process of projection, creating God in our image. The second is more of an ethical stance, that we ought not to be distracted by concern for supernatural matters in Heaven from the important issues of material and social realities. We should be thinking more about making the world a better place rather than thinking about God.
All this set the stage and prepared the intellectual environment for the most important of the three major intellectual systems of impersonal order: Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection. Darwin’s work is principally scientific but that’s not the main aspect to look at for present purposes. For the subject of the development of secular thought the main issue is the intellectual implications of evolution by natural selection. What sorts of secondary ideas developed from the scientific work? Darwin himself was non-religious and his own scientific work did contribute to that. He wrote in a letter to Asa Gray:
“With respect to the theological view of the question; this is always painful to me.— I am bewildered.– I had no intention to write atheistically. But I own that I cannot see, as plainly as others do, & as I [should] wish to do, evidence of design & beneficence on all sides of us. There seems to me too much misery in the world. I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent & omnipotent God would have designedly created the Ichneumonidæ with the express intention of their feeding within the living bodies of caterpillars, or that a cat should play with mice. Not believing this, I see no necessity in the belief that the eye was expressly designed. On the other hand I cannot anyhow be contented to view this wonderful universe & especially the nature of man, & to conclude that everything is the result of brute force. I am inclined to look at everything as resulting from designed laws, with the details, whether good or bad, left to the working out of what we may call chance. Not that this notion at all satisfies me. I feel most deeply that the whole subject is too profound for the human intellect. A dog might as well speculate on the mind of Newton.— Let each man hope & believe what he can.”
Part of Darwin’s development of the theory included the study of Thomas Malthus, an economist who had observed that while population increases geometrically, food production increases only arithmetically (or at least it did at that time). The dismal conclusion from this is that there would always be unavoidable periodic famine and population reduction through starvation. With limited resources populations are necessarily limited. Some members of the population will survive and others will perish. And this brings up an important question: is the question of who will survive and who will perish random or are there factors that make the survival of some individuals more likely than others? And Darwin determined that it would not be random; that certain traits would be comparatively advantageous to survival. Thus natural selection depends on two important facts: (1) populations being limited and (2) diversity of traits within a species.
The most careful expositors of Darwinian theory are diligent to remember that the process of natural selection is completely non-directional. Species are not evolving toward anything, to become stronger, faster, or more intelligent. Those things may happen but it’s not because of any teleology. There’s no right or wrong direction for evolution to go. And humans are no more evolved than bacteria. That’s when we’re being careful. But we’re often not. And it’s been very common in the wake of Darwin’s Origin of Species to think of evolution in terms of progress. And this was the mindset that dominated the intellectual environment of the nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Two of the most important expositors of Darwin and evolution were Thomas Huxley and Herbert Spencer. Thomas Huxley was a biologist who was a very public debater on behalf of Darwin’s theory. He came to be known as “Darwin’s Bulldog”. His debating opponents included prominent religious figures, like bishops and archbishops. One of his most famous debates was with Bishop Samuel Wilberforce in 1860. In the course of the debate Wilberforce asked whether it was through his grandfather or his grandmother that he claimed his descent from a monkey to which Huxley responded that he would not be ashamed to have a monkey for his ancestor, but he would be ashamed to be connected with a man who used his great gifts to obscure the truth.
Herbert Spencer was a philosopher, scientist, and social reformer and one of the most famous intellectuals of the nineteenth century. Spencer took the science of Darwinism into new areas of social theory and politics. It was Herbert Spencer who first used the phrase “survival of the fittest”. This idea came to be understood not only as a description of natural processes but as a prescription for how things ought to be. Spencer had a comprehensive, “synthetic” philosophy that incorporated science and sociology into one great system. Characteristic of this synthesis were progress and perfection. He saw things progressing toward “the perfect man in the perfect society”. In his book Social Statics he advocated for laissez-faire policies and a kind of Larmarkian evolutionary idea that only by placing humans in strenuous laissez-faire conditions would they be able to adapt to those conditions and eventually reduce the need for government:
The philosophy of progress was extremely compelling and fashionable in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It seemed that man truly had the means to bend nature and direct his own destiny. One manifestation of this was a view known as “Social Darwinism”, though it should be noted that neither Darwin nor Spencer called themselves social Darwinists. Social Darwinism was the idea that humanity could be improved through free competition and survival of the fittest. In particular it rejected the idea that charity and assistance to the impoverished are virtuous. Under social Darwinism such charity is actually harmful because it preserves habits and traits that prevent humanity from progressing. Instead the survival and growth of inferior persons and populations should not be enabled. They should be allowed to die out and diminish according to the natural course of things. Social Darwinism and Spencer’s writings were especially popular in the United States. This was also the age of large-scale colonization, which expanded the ideas of survival of the fittest to nations and races. Eugenics also naturally followed from all this as another project for the improvement of humanity.
In late nineteenth century and early twentieth century social Darwinism, imperialism, and eugenics were all intellectually respectable and reputable ideas. Eugenics especially was considered consummately scientific and progressive. Because of certain contingent historical circumstances and events these ideas happened to be associated with secular thought. Richard Hofstadter commented in his book Social Darwinism in American Thought about the unusual secular character of this kind of conservatism in America:
“Social Darwinism was certainly one of the leading strains in American conservative thought for more than a generation. But it lacked many of the signal characteristics of conservatism as it is usually found. A conservatism that appealed more to the secularist than the pious mentality, it was a conservatism almost without religion.” (Hofstadter, 7)
This association wasn’t absolute but there was a pattern. Things changed dramatically following World War II and these ideas quickly fell out of favor. Secular thought persisted and continued to develop, shedding its former associations with social Darwinism, imperialism, and eugenics. So the association of these ideas with secular thought was certainly nonessential. It was contingent and ultimately dispensable.
We can see an example of this older association in the 1914 textbook Civic Biology, written by George William Hunter. This was a widely used biology textbook in the early twentieth century and was the one famously used by John Scopes to teach evolution, for which he was prosecuted in the 1925 Scopes trial. Civic Biology divided humans up into five races and taught that “it is not unfair to ask if the health and vigor of the future generations of men and women on the earth might not be improved by applying to them the laws of selection.” It included the following passages:
“Parasitism and its Cost to Society. – Hundreds of families such as those described above exist today, spreading disease, immorality, and crime to all parts of this country. The cost to society of such families is very severe. Just as certain animals or plants become parasitic on other plants or animals, these families have become parasitic on society. They not only do harm to others by corrupting, stealing, or spreading disease, but they are actually protected and cared for by the state out of public money. Largely for them the poorhouse and the asylum exist. They take from society, but they give nothing in return. They are true parasites.”
“The Remedy. – If such people were lower animals, we would probably kill them off to prevent them from spreading. Humanity will not allow this, but we do have the remedy of separating the sexes in asylums or other places and in various ways preventing intermarriage and the possibilities of perpetuating such a low and degenerate race. Remedies of this sort have been tried successfully in Europe and are now meeting with some success in this country.” (Civic Biology, 263)
I don’t share these troubling passages to propose that evolution and secularism are of necessity linked to these kinds of views. Quite the opposite actually. They were associated at the time but these sorts of views have fallen out of favor even as secular thought persists, demonstrating that they are most certainly not inseparable. The Scopes trial was a watershed event in the development of public opinion toward evolution. That effect persisted even as the other troubling views in the text of Civic Biology were abandoned.
Another atheistic perspective in the later part of the nineteenth century was that of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s contributions to the development of secular thought take a few forms. Most famously he proclaimed that “God is dead”. But in the context of his writing this proclamation was more cautionary than celebratory. Nietzsche was absolutely an atheist. But he didn’t expect that the death of God was unproblematic. The “God is dead” line comes from the following passage in The Gay Science:
“Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly: ‘I seek God! I seek God!’—As many of those who did not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? emigrated?—Thus they yelled and laughed
“The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. ‘Whither is God?’ he cried; ‘I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying, as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.’”
“’How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and whoever is born after us—for the sake of this deed he will belong to a higher history than all history hitherto.’”
“Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too, were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke into pieces and went out. ‘I have come too early,’ he said then; ‘my time is not yet.’”
You can get a sense here of Nietzsche’s wonderful writing style, which is both entertaining and provocative. The first thing I’d like to point out with this passage is the character of the crowd. They already didn’t believe in God. You can imagine this is how Nietzsche sees Europe. By saying “God is dead” Nietzsche wasn’t saying anything new. The people of Europe already no longer believed in God. The madman wasn’t announcing the fact that God was dead. What he was trying to get across to the people was that they had not yet comprehended what that meant. That the earth had been unchained from its sun. And I think that’s an interesting way to think about a certain stage along the development of secular thought. There’s the propositional assent to atheism. But that doesn’t necessarily include a full comprehension of what that means existentially. And Nietzsche is often considered one of the early precursors to twentieth century existentialism.
What else do we get from Nietzsche? He also has a very interesting critique of Christian morality. In his book On the Genealogy of Morality he characterizes Jewish and Christian morality as “slave morality”. In an older form of morality before Judaism and Christianity, among the aristocrats, the most important value distinctions were “good” and “bad”. Strength, power, and excellence were good. Weakness and failure were bad. In this aristocratic understanding of value, people who were weak and failures were not evil, they were just not the kinds of people you would want to be. You would want to be strong and successful. But eventually the weak were able to create a morality that reversed things. In a perversion of healthy values domination and strength came to be understood not just as bad but evil. And a person should feel guilty for them. It was better to be meek and humble. And here we see how Christian morality would figure into Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals. Christianity corrupted value by making excellence, what was actually good, seem evil. Furthermore Christianity esteemed attributes of human failure. As with Feuerbach we might say that Nietzsche got Christianity pretty much right. David Bentley Hart remarked that Nietzsche “had the good manners to despise Christianity, in large part, for what it actually was… on account of its enfeebling solicitude for the weak, the outcast, the infirm, and the diseased.” (Atheist Delusions, 6)
Along with Marx and Freud, Paul Ricoeur saw in Nietzsche a certain hermeneutic of suspicion and included him among the three great “masters of suspicion”. Nietzsche challenged conventional accounts of morality through his process of “genealogy”. Michel Foucault would later apply this kind of “genealogy” to ideas in the twentieth century. One of the effects of such a genealogy is to expose, similarly to other hermeneutics of suspicion, that the reasons you think you have for thinking a certain way are not the real reasons. A genealogy contextualizes our ideas in the process of history and exposes how they are contingent and might have been otherwise. And so they are not as self-evident and products of pure reasoning as we might have supposed.
The third of Ricoeur’s masters of suspicion was Sigmund Freud. And with Freud we move into the twentieth century. Freud’s hermeneutic of suspicion occurs in psychoanalysis in which a patient (or any person) has behaviors, fears, desires, or other impulses for reasons hidden to that person. They are hidden in the unconscious mind and need to be retrieved by the psychoanalyst to be properly treated. So again, the reasons you think you have for your ideas are not the real reasons for them. Freud’s psychology addressed the unconscious roots of many tendencies and impulses, including religious impulses. Freud addressed religion in his books: Totem and Taboo, Moses and Monotheism, and The Future of an Illusion.
In Totem and Taboo Freud theorized about the origins of religion in its most primitive social setting, in what he called the “primal horde”. Freud understood his own work as scientific and he based his theories on work of the anthropologists of his day, particularly studies indigenous Australians. He saw his own work as continuous with Darwin. A totem for Freud was a symbolic object or animal that is revered by a group. He understood the totem to be representative of the group’s primal father figure.
“Psychoanalysis has revealed to us that the totem animal is really a substitute for the father, and this really explains the contradiction that it is usually forbidden to kill the totem animal, that the killing of it results in a holiday and that the animal is killed and yet mourned. The ambivalent emotional attitude which to-day still marks the father complex in our children and so often continues into adult life also extended to the father substitute of the totem animal. But if we associate the translation of the totem as given by psychoanalysis, with the totem feast and the Darwinian hypothesis about the primal state of human society, a deeper understanding becomes possible and a hypothesis is offered which may seem fantastic but which has the advantage of establishing an unexpected unity among a series of hitherto separated phenomena.”
One thing to point out here, important to all of Freud’s works, is the Oedipus complex. The Oedipus Complex is a complex of emotions associated with a boy’s sexual desire for his mother and resentment toward his father. Oedipus, in Greek mythology and tragedy, killed his own father and married his mother. Hence the name. This is the “ambivalent emotional attitude which to-day still marks the father complex… extended to the father substitute of the totem animal.” Freud then asserted the following origin story of such a totem that would have taken place, perhaps in multiple occasions and places, among a primordial horde ruled over by an authoritarian father father figure:
“There is only a violent, jealous father who keeps all the females for himself and drives away the growing sons… One day the expelled brothers joined forces, slew and ate the father, and thus put an end to the father horde. Together they dared and accomplished what would have remained impossible for them singly… Of course these cannibalistic savages ate their victim. This violent primal father had surely been the envied and feared model for each of the brothers. Now they accomplished their identification with him by devouring him and each acquired a part of his strength. The totem feast, which is perhaps mankind’s first celebration, would be the repetition and commemoration of this memorable, criminal act with which so many things began, social organization, moral restrictions and religion.”
The sons killed and ate their father and took the females, their mothers; acts of murder, cannibalism, and incest. But after this act of patricide they felt intense guilt which worked itself out in the forms of rituals and taboos. Religion for Freud is itself a neurosis and he sees religious rituals as the same in essence as nervous tics and other compulsive habits associated with neurotic disorders. And in Freud’s psychology these are generally associated with some kind of repressed guilt or trauma. He sees religion as basically a large, group manifestation of the same thing. This primordial horde would have developed the trappings of religion as a way to deal with their simultaneous triumph and guilt:
“In order to find these results acceptable, quite aside from our supposition, we need only assume that the group of brothers banded together were dominated by the same contradictory feelings towards the father which we can demonstrate as the content of ambivalence of the father complex in all our children and in neurotics. They hated the father who stood so powerfully in the way of their sexual demands and their desire for power, but they also loved and admired him. After they had satisfied their hate by his removal and had carried out their wish for identification with him, the suppressed tender impulses had to assert themselves. This took place in the form of remorse, a sense of guilt was formed which coincided here with the remorse generally felt. The dead now became stronger than the living had been, even as we observe it to-day in the destinies of men. What the fathers’ presence had formerly prevented they themselves now prohibited in the psychic situation of ‘subsequent obedience’, which we know so well from psychoanalysis. They undid their deed by declaring that the killing of the father substitute, the totem, was not allowed, and renounced the fruits of their deed by denying themselves the liberated women. Thus they created the two fundamental taboos of totemism out of the sense of guilt of the son, and for this very reason these had to correspond with the two repressed wishes of the Oedipus complex. Whoever disobeyed became guilty of the two only crimes which troubled primitive society.”
Thus murder and incest became taboo and the primal father figure a totem, an object of worship.
Freud follows a similar path in Moses and Monotheism but this time with reference specifically to Israelite religion. Freud asserted that Moses was actually an Egyptian, originally a devotee of the Egyptian monotheistic religious experiment of Akhenaten. Moses led a revolt and liberated a band of fellow rebels whom he led out of Egypt. Moses was their political and religious leader but his religious rule was so demanding that the group revolted and killed him. So here we have another father figure as in Totem and Taboo and another instance of the Oedipus complex. The people felt remorse for what they had done and developed a system of belief in which Moses was the founder of their religion.
For us today Freud’s supposedly “historical” accounts seem rather fanciful. I don’t think anyone believes them even if Freud did. But what remains relevant are not the details but the overall interpretation of religion as neurosis and an instance of some kind of Oedipus complex. Today we might refer instead to something like religious scrupulosity. We still understand people to have motivations for religious practice and ritual that are rooted in psychologically unhealthy sources.
In The Future of an Illusion Freud looks forward to how religion might develop into the future as humanity becomes more advanced and, as he sees it, outgrows its need for religion. As in his subsequent book, Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud recognized that the aggregation of human beings, with all our destructive impulses, into the close quarters of a society requires repression of those impulses, which is also a source of frustration or discontent. Frustrating but necessary. For premodern, primitive humanity religion serves an important function, helping us deal with the discontent and guilt of social life by providing the illusion of a strong and loving protector and father figure. The father figure in The Future of an Illusion is much more exclusively positive than in his other two books on religion. The father is an object of love. We crave the comfort and security that a father could provide in childhood. The illusion of religion is that our wish for this father figure is actually true. Although Freud understands religion to have played an important role in humanity’s pre-modern immaturity he thinks that it is time to grow out of it.
“Our knowledge of the historical worth of certain religious doctrines increases our respect for them, but does not invalidate our proposal that they should cease to be put forward as the reasons for the precepts of civilization. On the contrary! Those historical residues have helped us to view religious teachings, as it were, as neurotic relics, and we may now argue that the time has probably come, as it does in an analytic treatment, for replacing the effects of repression by the results of the rational operation of the intellect.”
I think this is an idea that persists in secular thought. We don’t necessarily disparage our ancestors for their religious beliefs. Of course they needed them and didn’t know any better. But in our scientific and technological age we ought to move beyond religion.
Two important intellectual trends in the twentieth century were in continental philosophy and analytic philosophy. Freud’s influence has continued more in continental philosophy than in his own field of psychology. Prominent Freudians include Jacque Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, and Judith Butler. One of the founders of analytic philosophy was Bertrand Russell. Where Freud worked in the unobservable phenomena of the mind and relied on the narrative accounts of dreams and culture the analytic school valued empiricism and precision. One early form of this was Russell’s logical atomism, which aimed to break concepts down into their most basic components for the purposes of analysis.
Bertrand Russell was one of the most important and prolific philosophers of the early twentieth century and he wrote on a number of subjects, including religion. Through logical atomism he sought to eliminate ambiguity and the potential for obfuscation. Naturally when it came to religion Russell found its scriptures, doctrines, and rituals nonsensical. Later analytic philosophers like A.J. Ayer in the school of logical positivism would similarly call them “meaningless”. Like Freud, Russell believed that religion was something humanity had outgrown:
“We want to stand upon our own feet and look fair and square at the world—its good facts, its bad facts, its beauties, and its ugliness; see the world as it is, and be not afraid of it. Conquer the world by intelligence, and not merely by being slavishly subdued by the terror that comes from it. The whole conception of God is a conception derived from the ancient Oriental despotisms. It is a conception quite unworthy of free men.”
This passage is from the conclusion of Russell’s essay Why I Am Not a Christian. In the same text he argued against the merit of Jesus as a moral exemplar. To us today some of the most compelling arguments from this essay are likely the moral ones. For example, many have advanced a similar argument as the following:
“You find as you look around the world that every single bit of progress in humane feeling, every improvement in the criminal law, every step towards the diminution of war, every step towards better treatment of the coloured races, or every mitigation of slavery, every moral progress that there has been in the world, has been consistently opposed by the organised Churches of the world. I say quite deliberately that the Christian religion, as organised in its Churches, has been and still is the principal enemy of moral progress in the world… There are a great many ways in which at the present moment the Church, by its insistence upon what it chooses to call morality, inflicts upon all sorts of people undeserved and unnecessary suffering. And of course, as we know, it is in its major part an opponent still of progress and of improvement in all the ways that diminish suffering in the world, because it has chosen to label as morality a certain narrow set of rules of conduct which have nothing to do with human happiness; and when you say that this or that ought to be done because it would make for human happiness, they think that has nothing to do with the matter at all. ‘What has human happiness to do with morals? The object of morals is not to make people happy.’”
There are of course arguments against Russell’s point here but it certainly carries force. It also resonates with some of the most prominent religious-secular conflicts of the twenty-first century in which progressive secular values and traditional Christian values really are just contradictory, as with issues of abortion, sexuality, and gender.
One of Russell’s most famous illustrations is his teapot analogy. This comes from his article “Is There a God?” In this article Russell makes the case that the philosophic burden of proof rests on religious people who are making empirically unfalsifiable claims. He writes:
“Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of sceptics to disprove received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is, of course, a mistake. If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.”
This analogy has been highly influential and the basic idea has taken on other forms. For example a common version today is the Flying Spaghetti Monster, sometimes seen as a car decal. The Flying Spaghetti Monster originated from a satirical open letter in 2005 demanding that science classrooms give equal time to the Flying Spaghetti Monster alongside intelligent design and evolution. Russell’s Teapot and the Flying Spaghetti Monster play an important role in the development of secular thought, which is to make religious belief seem ridiculous.
Making things look ridiculous has a celebrated history and there are a couple American examples worth mentioning from this time period in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century: Mark Twain and H.L. Mencken.
The novelist Mark Twain was especially well known for his wit, satire, and irreverent sense of humor. He had a number of memorable one-liners. For example: “Faith is believing what you know ain’t so.”
The most important example of a critique of religion in his fiction is in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn where Huck is deciding whether or not to turn in his traveling companion Jim, who is also a runaway slave. What’s important to the story is that Huck thinks that he’s supposed to turn in a runaway slave and that it’s what God wants him to do. (He wasn’t aware that Deuteronomy 23:15 says exactly the opposite). In fact Huck thinks that he’ll go to Hell if he doesn’t do it. So in his mind all the weight of religious authority is pushing him to betray his friend. But in an act of heroic defiance he refuses to do so and says, “All right then, I’ll go to hell”.
Twain also wrote essays criticizing religion. In his essay “Fables of Man” he invited readers to think how they would feel if anyone other than God created the world in the way that it is. He used the example the fly, if anyone other than God were to create a pest like the fly:
“Let us try to think the unthinkable: let us try to imagine a Man of a sort willing to invent the fly; that is to say, a man destitute of feeling; a man willing to wantonly torture and harass and persecute myriads of creatures who had never done him any harm and could not if they wanted to, and–the majority of them–poor dumb things not even aware of his existence. In a word, let us try to imagine a man with so singular and so lumbering a code of morals as this: that it is fair and right to send afflictions upon the just–upon the unoffending as well as upon the offending, without discrimination.”
Twain’s problem here with the state of nature is quite similar to Darwin’s problem with the Ichneumonidæ feeding within the living bodies of caterpillars. In Europe and Elsewhere he pointed out many instances in which the Bible has been the cause of evil and how humans have only progressed morally in cases where they have rejected it. He says:
“The Christian Bible is a drug store. Its contents remain the same; but the medical practice changes… The stock in the store was made up of about equal portions of baleful and debilitating poisons, and healing and comforting medicines; but the practice of the time confined the physician to the use of the former; by consequence, he could only damage his patient, and that is what he did.”
Twain admits that there is much in the Bible that is good. But people seem to know the difference between the good and the bad independently of the Bible. In fact, people are able to discern the difference between the good and the bad that is in the Bible. And happily, it has been by and large only the bad parts, so Twain believed, that people rejected as they have progressed morally:
“Is it not well worthy of note that of all the multitude of texts through which man has driven his annihilating pen he has never once made the mistake of obliterating a good and useful one? It does certainly seem to suggest that if man continues in the direction of enlightenment, his religious practice may, in the end, attain some semblance of human decency.”
Twain accused the churches of following rather than leading moral progress, usually after some period of opposing it. But then have the audacity to take credit for it:
“In all the ages the Roman Church has owned slaves, bought and sold slaves, authorized and encouraged her children to trade in them. Long after some Christian peoples had freed their slaves the Church still held on to hers… So unassailable was her position that in all the centuries she had no word to say against human slavery. Yet now at last, in our immediate day, we hear a Pope saying slave trading is wrong, and we see him sending an expedition to Africa to stop it. The texts remain: it is the practice that has changed. Why? Because the world has corrected the Bible. The Church never corrects it; and also never fails to drop in at the tail of the procession–and take the credit of the correction. As she will presently do in this instance.”
I include Twain in this history of secular thought precisely because he was not a philosopher or an academic but, like Shelley, an unacknowledged legislator who shaped the character of a nation through literature. Another man I’d include in this class is H.L. Mencken, a wildly popular journalist, essayist, and critic. Mencken had an acerbic wit that would be pitiful to fall victim to. Like Twain, he was also a master of turns of phrase. One of my favorites is: “Conscience is a mother-in-law whose visit never ends.” Another classic, this one on the subject of religion is: “Puritanism – The haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy.” (A Mencken Chrestomathy, 624)
In his essay “Memorial Service” Mencken paid mocking memorial to the numerous gods of ages past who are no longer worshiped:
“Where is the graveyard of dead gods? What lingering mourner waters their mounds? There was a time when Jupiter was the king of the gods, and any man who doubted his puissance was ipso facto a barbarian and an ignoramus. But where in all the world is there a man who worships Jupiter today? And who of Huitzilopochtli? In one year – and it is no more than five hundred years ago – 50,000 youths and maidens were slain in sacrifice to him. Today, if he is remembered at all, it is only by some vagrant savage in the depths of the Mexican forest.”
Mencken then gave a long list of two columns with many other such deceased gods and concluded:
“Ask the rector to lend you any good book on comparative religion: you will find them all listed. They were gods of the highest dignity – gods of civilized peoples – worshipped and believed in by millions. All were omnipotent, omniscient and immortal. And all are dead.”
Richard Dawkins would later make a similar point to Mencken that, “We are all atheists about most of the gods that humanity has ever believed in. Some of us just go one god further.” (The God Delusion)
One event of particular importance where Mencken played a role was the Scopes Trial of 1925. As mentioned earlier, John Scopes was prosecuted for teaching evolution in school. It was arguably the trial of the century, a total media spectacle, and very public. In a sense there were two courts: the actual legal court and, more significantly, the court of public opinion. In the actual court of law Scopes was convicted for violating the law. But in the court of public opinion creationism suffered a disastrous defeat. And Mencken, writing at the time for the Baltimore Sun, played no small role in that. He delighted in lampooning the southern Christian fundamentalists of this Tennessee town. He famously quipped: “Heave an egg out of a Pullman window, and you will hit a fundamentalist anywhere in the United States.” He was especially merciless in his accounts of the prosecuting attorney William Jennings Bryan.
The Scopes trial reinforced an important perceived division between religion and science. One was legitimized at the expense of the other. And many of the scientists who were most well-known to the public reinforced this idea. In the later twentieth century two important publications that brought the latest developments of physics and cosmology to household libraries and television screens were Carl Sagan’s 1980 television series Cosmos and Stephen Hawking’s 1988 book A Brief History of Time. Sagan and Hawking were both scientists at the top of their fields but they were also public figures and household names. The combination of their legitimate expertise and communications skills meant that their opinions carried weight, not just in their scientific fields but in many subjects, including their views on religion.
Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History of Time was a major bestseller, especially for a science book. When I was a kid a number of my friends and I had that book on our shelves. Hawking was a major role model. Religion didn’t feature heavily in that book other than the comment, “What need for a creator?” In the 2011 television series Curiosity he expressed quite genially that “We are each free to believe what we want” but also acknowledged, “It is my view that the simplest explanation is there is no God. No one created the universe and no one directs our fate.” Like Freud, he thought that belief in God made sense for premodern peoples but that it was something we can now move beyond: “Before we understand science, it is natural to believe that God created the universe. But now science offers a more convincing explanation.” Hawking suffered from a slow-progressing form of motor neurone disease and death was a constant prospect for him. Remaking on this he said in a 2011 interview with The Guardian: “I have lived with the prospect of an early death for the last 49 years. I’m not afraid of death, but I’m in no hurry to die. I have so much I want to do first… I regard the brain as a computer which will stop working when its components fail. There is no heaven or afterlife for broken down computers; that is a fairy story for people afraid of the dark.” Although he was upfront and open about his atheism it was not a major topic for Hawking.
It was more of a topic for Sagan. Sagan was especially interested in critical thinking and the harms that follow from believing things without justification. Not just religion but all sorts of popular pseudoscience. This was the topic of his book The Demon-Haunted World, in which he assembled what he called a “baloney detection kit”. In that book Sagan adapted Russell’s teapot with his own story of a dragon in the garage. Someone tries to convince you that there’s a dragon in the garage but when you go to look at it you don’t see it. So they say it’s an invisible dragon. So you might spread flour on the floor to see its footprints. But the dragon floats in the air. What about an infrared camera to see the invisible fire? But the fire is heatless. Every proposal has some reason for why it will not work. Sagan concludes: “Now what’s the difference between an invisible, incorporeal, floating dragon who spits heatless fire and no dragon at all? If there’s no way to disprove my contention, no conceivable experiment that would count against it, what does it mean to say that my dragon exists? Your inability to invalidate my hypothesis is not at all the same thing as proving it true.”
Sagan was also invited to deliver the prestigious Gifford lectures in 1985 in Glasgow. The lectures were later published as The Varieties of Scientific Experience. The Gifford lectures are annual lectures on the topic of science and religion and this is Sagan’s most comprehensive treatment of the subject. Sagan’s lectures were very respectful but also pulled no punches. While reviewing a number of arguments for the existence of God he said the following on arguments from religious experiences:
“People have religious experiences. No question about it. They have them worldwide, and there are some interesting similarities in the religious experiences that are had worldwide. They are powerful, emotionally extremely convincing, and they often lead to people reforming their lives and doing good works, although the opposite also happens. Now, what about this? Well, I do not mean in any way to object to or deride religious experiences. But the question is, can any such experience provide other than anecdotal evidence of the existence of God or gods?… Large numbers of people can have experiences that can be profound and moving and still not correspond to anything like an exact sense of external reality… Every culture has things of this sort. That doesn’t mean that they all exist; it doesn’t mean that any of them exist.”
On the argument from design he made the following remark, quite similar to Hume’s:
“Why in any case is it necessary for God to intervene in human history, in human affairs, as almost every religion assumes happens? That God or the gods come down and tell humans, ‘No, don’t do that, do this, don’t forget this, don’t pray in this way, don’t worship anybody else, mutilate children as follow.’ Why is there such a long list of things that God tells people to do? Why didn’t God do it right in the first place? You start out the universe, you can do anything. You can see all the future consequences of your present action. You want a certain desired end. Why don’t you arrange it in the beginning? The intervention of God in human affairs speaks of incompetence.”
Although Hawking and Sagan were prominent faces of atheism at the end of the twentieth century neither made atheism a primary focus of their public engagement. This would not be the case for the new public faces of irreligion at the start of the twenty-first century. One of the most significant events in the development of secular thought in recent times was the catastrophic terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 perpetrated by Islamist extremists. The religious motivations for this attack provoked a strong secular response that came to be known as New Atheism. Four members of this movement were known as the “The Four Horsemen”: Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, and Daniel Dennett. With the possible exception of Dennett the atheism of The Four Horsemen was front and center to their public engagement.
Sam Harris began writing The End of Faith shortly after the September 11th attacks. His other major book on the topic of religion was Letter to a Christian Nation. The September 11th attacks were an occasion to point out the violence that religious fundamentalism can provoke and is just one example in a long list of historical cases of such religiously inspired violence and atrocities. Harris made particular note of the complicity of religious moderates in all this. Far from excusing moderates or recommending a conversion from fundamentalism to more moderate forms of religion Harris argued that religious moderates, by taking certain texts and beliefs selectively or metaphorically, grant legitimacy to those texts and beliefs and enable those who take them literally and to extremist ends. Harris also criticized religion generally as fundamentally irrational and lacking in evidence. Science is a much more solid basis for our understanding of reality and even for moral decision making, as he argued in The Moral Landscape.
Biologist Richard Dawkins was already a popular writer on the topic of evolutionary biology prior to the New Atheist movement, having written books like The Selfish Gene, The Extended Phenotype, and The Ancestor’s Tale. As a writer on evolutionary biology his books naturally addressed creationism and intelligent design ideas, especially in books like The Blind Watchmaker and Climbing Mount Improbable. But he really became a major face for New Atheism with the 2006 publication of The God Delusion. The God Delusion was a major bestseller and attracted widespread response and discussion. In it Dawkins explained why, in his view, there is almost certainly no God. He included arguments from his field in evolutionary biology but also discussed religious violence and intolerance.
Christopher Hitchens was a prolific journalist and essayist, a staunch free-speech advocate, and opponent of religion. Hitchens called himself not only an atheist but an “antitheist”. He not only did not believe in God but thought that it would be a horrible thing if God actually did exist. He compared a universe with God to a cosmic North Korea. His major book on the topic and contribution to the New Atheist movement was God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything. Hitchens said that religion was “the main source of hatred in the world”. In the book he criticized Judaism, Christianity, and Islam but also Eastern religions like Buddhism. As with Mencken, to be on the receiving end of Hitchens’s attacks was brutal. Some of his targets were predictable, like Bill Clinton and Henry Kissinger. More surprising was his excoriating criticism of Mother Teresa.
Daniel Dennett was also numbered among the Four Horsemen but of the four he was probably the least like the others. Dennett is one world’s most prominent philosophers in the philosophy of mind. He’s certainly an atheist but it’s not as front and center to his work. In his book-length contribution to the New Atheist movement, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, he even called for world religions to be taught in school. Dennett is perhaps best known for his philosophical work on qualia: individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. In Consciousness Explained he develops a number of arguments to demonstrate how the way our minds work must be quite different from the way it seems to us. Dennett’s philosophy of mind, given its subject, naturally impinges on religious ideas of the soul. In Breaking the Spell Dennett proposed that religion should be thought of as a natural phenomenon and studied by scientists just as any other natural phenomenon.
Dennett and Dawkins have made frequent reference to each other’s work. Dennett has made philosophical use of Dawkins’s concept of memes, as developed in The Selfish Gene and Dawkins has praised Dennett’s 1995 book Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, in particular his metaphor of skyhooks and cranes. Darwin’s Dangerous Idea is perhaps the most interesting and detailed study on the philosophical implications of Darwin’s work. Dennett refers to the concept of natural selection as a kind of “universal acid” that eats through everything it touches. He uses the metaphor of a skyhook for any kind of apparent intelligent design that seems to be suspended from the heavens, but that in fact is held up by a crane or series of cranes, and anchored securely to the ground. The core of Darwin’s dangerous idea, according to Dennett, is the algorithm; an automatic process that requires no intelligent direction. Dennett then shows instances where Darwinian algorithms dissolve apparent skyhooks in biology, mind, meaning, mathematics, and morality.
I remember that New Atheism was in full bloom when I was in my twenties. It also coincided with the rise of social media platforms like Facebook and YouTube, which enabled its diffusion. It seems to have tapered off somewhat since then for whatever reason. All of the Four Horsemen get a mention in this survey because, being quite recent, their influence on the development of secular thought still persists. My guess is that in a similar survey fifty years from now Dennett will be the only one discussed even though he was probably the least prominent of the New Atheists in its heyday. But I’d say his ideas are the most uniquely interesting and instrumentally useful in the service of secular thought.
So what do we make of all this? In going through this brief history I haven’t stopped to challenge any of these thinkers and their ideas. I’ve tried to present their ideas fairly and doing that properly means making it apparent why these ideas have been appealing and persuasive. That’s challenging because I don’t find their ideas personally persuasive. But I do find them interesting and important.
This is admittedly something of an exercise in genealogy, in the style of Nietzsche and Foucault, to show how secular ideas are not absolute but contingent, how they have been dependent on historical events and trends, and how things could have been otherwise. For example, secular thought today is usually aligned with progressive ideals of antiracism, protection of people with disabilities, and the interests of sexual minorities. But before World War II and the Nuremberg Trials the most secular and scientifically-educated people in society were moving in quite a different direction. I think Charles Taylor is correct that secular thought as we have it today is not merely what is left over when we chip away religion. Secular thought is a construct that has been created over time by people and events.
In a certain sense something being a social construct doesn’t really matter. Technology is a construct or a collection of very many constructs. But our devices still work. The scientific principles underlying our technologies are also constructs. And they still work. So does it matter? I think it does. Thomas Kuhn, with his 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions did some excellent work situating and contextualizing scientific developments, showing how they also come about in very circuitous paths with many discarded theories that were once the best theories available. It’s good to know about all that when we think about the future of science and technology. It will likely go in some very unpredicted directions.
Still, with religion and secular thought there are some big either-or questions. Does God exist or not? Was Jesus resurrected or not? At the end of the day between Christians and atheists someone is right and someone is wrong. A genealogy of secular thought doesn’t resolve such questions. But one thing it can do is reveal how certain perspectives can seem more or less compelling because of contingent historical developments. In other words, if certain religious positions seem more problematic and certain secular positions seem stronger than they otherwise would, that’s useful to understand. It helps us to think what is usually unthought. Charles Taylor borrows the term “unthought” from Foucault to refer to all the presuppositions underlying our understanding of religion and secularization that we aren’t even aware that we hold. By bringing the unthought into our conscious thought we should be able to think about things more comprehensively and reflectively.
With this in mind consider two issues that are seemingly problematic for religion: science and religion and the problem of evil.
In Western modernity Judaism and Christianity have been thought to be in conflict with the sciences. And the sciences are so manifestly successful that religion would be at a clear disadvantage. At best, religion could hold to some kind of “God of the gaps” whose domain progressively shrinks as science explains away more and more religious ideas. Natural phenomena like earthquakes and lightning no longer need divine explanations. And our creation myths don’t stand up to geological and fossil evidence. But is this apparent conflict essential or accidental? It’s quite fascinating and often surprising to read premodern Jewish and Christian texts. The authors of the Talmud and the Early Church Fathers were not at all unfamiliar with the internal tensions of the sacred texts or of passages that they could not take literally. They were quite aware of them and wrote extensively about them. Philo of Alexandria (Jewish) and Origen of Alexandria (Christian) are two of the most famous expositors of allegorical interpretation in antiquity. Additionally, in modernity where we make a sharp distinction between the natural and the supernatural, with God operating as something separate from nature, in the Middle Ages educated Christians like Thomas Aquinas understood that distinction to be much less absolute. In their understanding the supernatural always already infuses the natural world, as has been written about by Fergus Kerr (After Aquinas, 2002) and Tyler Roberts (Skeptics and Believers, 2009). Both the premodern comfort with allegorical interpretation and the metaphysical understanding of the natural being infused with the supernatural would make the relationship between science and religion look quite different than the relationship that developed between the two in modernity. David Bentley Hart has even suggested that: “In the ancient or mediaeval worlds, the idea of the evolution of species would not necessarily have posed a very great intellectual challenge for the educated classes, at least not on religious grounds… It would not have been drastically difficult for philosophers or theologians to come to see such evolution as the natural unfolding of the rational principles of creation into forms primordially enfolded within the indwelling rational order of things.” (The Experience God, 62) It was by no means inevitable or necessary that the developments of geology and evolutionary biology would come into conflict with religious beliefs. It just happened to work out that way given the particular intellectual and religious milieux of the time. That’s useful to think about, both for secular and religious people. As Christians we would do well to familiarize ourselves with early thinkers in our tradition to find perspectives that are surprisingly much more unproblematically accommodating to modern science.
The problem of evil is an even more interesting one I think. And if Susan Neiman is correct this is the most salient issue in modernity and for the whole human condition really. How are we to come to terms with God if his creation has so much evil and suffering? The Lisbon Earthquake and the Holocaust are the two major examples of disruptive disasters in modernity. With the problem of evil I actually don’t think there’s ever been any historical period where such disasters would be religiously unproblematic. Disasters of a certain scale and degree always induce religious disruption and crisis. But what’s interesting is that in the case of Judaism especially, and in Christianity by extension, response to this kind of disruption is actually part of the religion. One of the most important events in the Bible is the conquest of Jerusalem and the captivity of the Judeans by the Neo-Babylonian Empire. This dramatically transformed the Judeans as a people. Judaism took another dramatic turn again after the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans, leading to what would become Rabbinic Judaism. And the Holocaust itself induced major reflection and changes in Judaism, as in the work of people like Richard Rubenstein, Emil Fackenheim, Elie Weisel, Irving Greenberg, and Eugene Borowitz. The Hebrew Bible also contains responses and laments to the problems of evil. Most obvious is the Book of Job. Much of the Bible’s Wisdom literature as found in Job, the Psalms, and Ecclesiastes, is testament to the troubled yet creative religious response to suffering. It doesn’t seem like there’s any expectation from God in scripture that we are to be unmoved and untroubled by the evil present in his creation.
Both secular thought and the religions of Judaism and Christianity are part of history and Western heritage. It’s valuable to be familiar with all of it. The history of all these traditions could have taken different paths. But regardless, the traditions as we have them make up who we are and how we think.
I was recently reading Introduction to Christianity, written in 1968 by Joseph Ratzinger, later Pope Benedict XVI. One line from the introduction really stood out to me:
“The world comes from reason, and this reason is a Person.”
I think this may be the most perfect and succinct expression of what I believe. Most of the topics that interest me could be traced back to this sentence. It contains two important ideas:
1. The world is rational.
2. The world’s rationality comes from God.
That the world is rational is consistent with scientific realism, which is the view that the world described by science is real. It’s a view that I think, or at least hope, most people would agree with. Its connection to the second idea – that the world’s rationality comes from God – is not obvious. Many people believe that the world described by science is real without believing in God. Or believe in God and that the world described by science is real without connecting these two ideas. But I think these two ideas are necessarily linked. The reason the world is rational is because its rationality is God’s rationality.
Another thing I like about this statement is that it can be understood in a few ways, all of which I agree with. And the different interpretations have to do with different meanings of “come from” and “reason”, at least in this English translation of Ratzinger’s statement. That the world “comes from” reason we can understand to mean that God creat-ed (past tense) the world and that God is continually creat-ing (present tense) and sustaining the world. By “reason” we can understand “reason” as the power of the mind to think, understand, and form judgments and “reason” as a cause, explanation, or justification. Both work. So we get these four interpretations and their combinations:
“The world comes from reason”
1. At the point in time when the world came into existence it came from reason.
2. The world continues to exist in the way that it does from reason.
“And this reason is a Person”
1. Reason, as such, is a Person.
2. A Person is the reason, or cause, for the world existing.
Before digging further into this let’s look at a longer version of the quote from Ratzinger:
“The God who is logos guarantees the intelligibility of the world, the intelligibility of our existence, the aptitude of reason to know God and the reasonableness of God, even though his understanding infinitely surpasses ours and to us may so often appear to be darkness. The world comes from reason, and this reason is a Person, is Love–this is what our biblical faith tells us about God.”
The intelligibility of the world is fundamentally connected to scientific realism because it’s really what makes science possible. What are some ways in which the world is intelligible scientifically? Here are four:
1. When controlled experiments have predictable and repeatable results.
2. When the results of controlled experiments have predictable and repeatable distributions.
3. When variables in controlled experiments vary in proportion to other variables.
4. When previously unknown laws can be derived from previously known laws and confirmed by experiment.
I include predictable and repeatable distributions because the results of experiments very often are distributions. This can either be because of variations in conditions that we can’t completely account for or because the aspect of nature itself that is being measured actually is a distribution in essence. In the first case the reason for the distribution is a limitation on our knowledge, something epistemological. In the second case the distribution is actually a property in nature itself in its essence or being, something ontological. In either case there is regularity and predictability. Even if the individual data points are not predictable their distributions are. And I think that still counts.
These four kinds of intelligibility are all basic to scientific practice. In an unintelligible world science would not be possible.
I think the novelist Cixin Liu portrayed this well in The Three Body Problem. In that novel aliens are interfering with the results of particle collider experiments to keep humans from making any progress in their scientific knowledge. One scientist describes it to a colleague using an analogy with billiard balls, a classic case of predictable physics:
“Imagine another set of results. The first time, the white ball drove the black ball into the pocket. The second time, the black ball bounced away. The third time, the black ball flew onto the ceiling. The fourth time, the black ball shot around the room like a frightened sparrow, finally taking refuge in your jacket pocket. The fifth time, the black ball flew away at nearly the speed of light, breaking the edge of the pool table, shooting through the wall, and leaving Earth and the Solar System.” (The Three Body Problem, 70)
Of course science would be impossible in that kind of world. And really we wouldn’t even get as far as attempting science because the existence of physical life depends on the regularity of matter, cellular structures, and biochemical reactions. A truly unintelligible world is difficult to imagine because it’s not the kind of world we could live in. It would be a lot like the formlessness and void, the tohu va-bohu (תֹ֙הוּ֙ וָבֹ֔הוּ) in Genesis 1:2, before God imposed order on it.
In science we are in the business of characterizing the world’s regularities. That there are such regularities in the first place we appropriately take for granted. Why and how these regularities are there in the first place is not a scientific question but a philosophical, and specifically metaphysical question. Though we can certainly be interested in that question as scientists as well. It seems like the kind of question that would not be answerable from inside the system. As a comparison, computer programs and video games also have regularities. But these come from their developers. The program has a programmer who is not part of the program. The original regularity and structure of the system comes from the outside. I understand the regularity and structure of the real world to come about in a similar way.
If the world comes from reason then what would it mean for this reason to be a person? Both that the world comes from reason and that this reason is a person are statements of faith. But there are also reasons to believe them that support that faith. That reason is a person has both philosophical and scriptural support.
First on the philosophical support. In a previous episode I looked at the argument from eternal truths, an argument for the existence of God. In Edward Feser’s version of the argument he considers three possible versions of realism: Platonic realism, Aristotelian realism, and Scholastic realism. He describes these three possibilities in this way:
Platonic realism: abstract objects exist in a “third realm” distinct from either the material world or any intellect.
Aristotelian realism: abstract objects exist only in human or other contingently existing intellects.
Scholastic realism: abstract objects exist not only in contingently existing intellects but also in at least one necessarily existing intellect.
These options have some similarity to three options I’ve proposed as possible explanations for the rationality of the world:
1. The rationality of the world is independent of any intelligent beings.
2. The rationality of the world is a conditional property, conditional on there being intelligent beings in the world.
3. The rationality of the world is the rationality of a mind that grounds the world.
I think the idea of the world’s rationality being a conditional property is the most immediately plausible and straightforward, even though I think it is ultimately inadequate. It would be something of the form:
1. IF there are intelligent beings in reality.
2. AND IF any existing intelligent beings obtain some degree of accurate understanding of reality.
3. THEN such intelligent beings will find reality to be intelligible and rational.
I think that happens to be true as far as it goes. But it doesn’t explain or give grounding for the world’s intelligibility, why it is that way in the first place.
Edward Feser establishes scholastic realism, the view that abstract objects exist in at least one necessarily existing intellect, by a process of elimination; eliminating Platonic realism and Aristotelian realism for what he sees as insuperable objections. I won’t go into the insuperable objections to Platonic realism and Aristotelian realism here but just refer those interested to Feser’s text, and move on now to the scriptural foundation for seeing reason as a person.
First, what is the alternative to a personal nature? It would be an impersonal nature. For example, in the times of classical Greece and the Roman Empire the stoics and other educated people understood the world to be governed by logos (λόγος). Heraclitus (535 – 475 BC) said all things come to pass in accordance with the logos (γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ginomenon gar panton kata ton logon). The Stoics had a concept of logos spermatikos (λόγος σπερματικός), understood as the generative principle of the world that creates all things. Very similar to Ratzinger’s statement that the world comes from reason. But an important difference was that the Greeks and Romans did not understand the logos to be personal, but impersonal; law without a lawgiver. What then are we to understand from the following Biblical passage?:
“In the beginning was the Word (Λόγος), and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made.” (John 1:3, KJV)
From this passage alone, in the prologue to John’s gospel, we might still understand the Logos to be an impersonal, generative power. Both share a common principle that it is by the Logos that all things are made. But the Gospel writer then makes clear that this Logos is not impersonal at all and actually became, of all things, a human being:
“And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us.” (John 1:14, KJV)
The Logos was made flesh, the man Jesus of Nazareth. This Incarnation allowed other human beings to see and know God. Up to that point man had seen no form in God, as had been made reiterated to the Israelites in the Torah:
“Take careful heed to yourselves, for you saw no form when the Lord spoke to you at Horeb out of the midst of the fire, lest you act corruptly and make for yourselves a carved image in the form of any figure: the likeness of male or female” (Deuteronomy 4:15-16, NKJV)
John acknowledges that this had been the case. But with the Incarnation of Jesus things change.
“And we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.” (John 1:14, KJV)
“No man hath seen God at any time, the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.” (John 1:18, KJV)
Jesus then could rightfully say:
“He that hath seen me hath seen the Father” (John 14:9, KJV)
Not that they are the same person. That would be a misunderstanding of the Trinity, “confounding the persons”. But in Jesus of Nazareth human beings could see God in the flesh, as a fellow human being and as a person.
As a person God has a mind, a will, self-consciousness, and awareness. What’s more God has all these things in greater and in more perfect measure than we do. We are created in God’s image. So these personal attributes as we find them in ourselves are patterned after their more perfect form in God’s personal attributes.
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) described this well in his Summa Theologiae:
“‘Person’ signifies what is most perfect in all nature—that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence, since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch as His essence contains every perfection, this name ‘person’ is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving them to creatures, we attribute to God… Although the word ‘person’ is not found applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places of Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the most perfectly intelligent being.” (Summa Theologiae 1.29.3)
What’s the upshot of that? Here’s how I think about it. Do we really matter? We certainly matter to each other. But we’re not always fair to each other. And we’re not in control of the world so we’re limited in how much we can actually do for each other. If the world comes from an impersonal source that source is indifferent to us. Whether we live or die, thrive or suffer. But if the world comes from a person we can matter to him. And the witness of scripture is that we do. We matter to God and God is powerful over all other forces. Paul’s message in Romans 8:31-39 is spot on:
“What then shall we say to these things? If God is for us, who can be against us? He who did not spare His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, how shall He not with Him also freely give us all things? Who shall bring a charge against God’s elect? It is God who justifies. Who is he who condemns? It is Christ who died, and furthermore is also risen, who is even at the right hand of God, who also makes intercession for us. Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? As it is written: ‘For Your sake we are killed all day long; We are accounted as sheep for the slaughter.’ Yet in all these things we are more than conquerors through Him who loved us. For I am persuaded that neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present nor things to come, nor height nor depth, nor any other created thing, shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.”
Theology, as the study of God and the things of God, naturally takes the existence of God as a first principle. When studying other theological topics like God’s nature, humanity, and salvation we take God’s existence for granted. And in our own religious development many of us concern ourselves with these other topics before concerning ourselves with the existence of God. Especially in times when belief in God was more universal, people probably worried more about salvation from their sins and how to get right with God, whose existence they took for granted. Still, in systematic theology, where we’re considering the logical relations between ideas it makes sense to start with God’s existence.
Why do people believe in God? I’ve actually asked a lot of people why they believe in God and in most cases the people I’ve talked to don’t believe in God for intellectual reasons. Some have had spiritual experiences that lead them to believe. Some are led to believe because they take seriously the issues of life’s purpose, death, pain, and the need for meaning; what I call existential issues. I think those are good reasons to believe in God. I share those reasons. But I think in my own life intellectual reasons have actually come first, with spiritual and existential reasons coming after. Maybe that’s unusual but that’s just how it’s happened. So that’s what I want to focus on presently; not because intellectual reasons are the most important, but because they’re the most natural for me. And because they lay out the first principles for the rest of systematic theology as a rational structure.
Intellectual reasons for believing in God are expressed most formally as arguments. Arguments here in the technical sense, not in the sense of being ornery and quarrelsome. An argument is a group of statements put together to show that certain statements provide reasons to believe another statement. These different statements are premises and conclusions. An argument is put together to show how certain premises provide reasons to believe a certain conclusion. There are many arguments for the existence of God. By the nature of what an argument is then this means that there are reasons to believe in God. It doesn’t mean that they are automatically good reasons, but there are reasons.
Valid deductive arguments are understood to follow absolutely from their premises. If an argument is deductively valid the conclusion cannot fail to follow from its premises. If the premises are true the conclusion must be true. This means then that a lot of discussion about arguments focuses on the premises. There are definitely deductively valid arguments for the existence of God. But it’s obviously still possible to reject these arguments, not because the conclusions don’t follow from the premises – they do – but because not everyone accepts the premises of the arguments. There’s no argument for the existence of God that seals the deal and convinces everyone. But there are arguments that I find convincing.
The most prominent arguments for the existence of God are:
– The Cosmological Argument
– The Teleological Argument
– The Moral Argument
– The Ontological Argument
I think the cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments are all very good arguments and I find them convincing. I’m not sure about the ontological argument. I think it’s either untenable or absolutely brilliant. But I don’t grasp it well enough to know yet. Regardless, I’m actually not going to talk about any of these arguments any more right now because they aren’t the most compelling for me personally. Instead I want to focus presently on an argument that I personally find the most compelling and interesting:
– The Argument from Eternal Truths
This argument is not as well known and it’s not an easy argument to understand. So I’d like to present it in stages of increasing detail, starting with a short version of just a few sentences and moving toward a longer, more formal version. It was actually the short version that I’ve put the most effort into. For one thing, with the longer, more formal versions I’ve relied on the work of others. And even though I understood their expressions of the argument and found them persuasive I didn’t find them succinct enough to share with people. It can be quite difficult to refine longer arguments into short statements. It necessarily eliminates supporting details and you have to just let that go.
My own version is not an argument in the technical sense but an informal explanation. Here’s the short version:
I think that there are certain ideas that are true in a way that is separate from space, time, and material things. We could suppose that these ideas are products of our minds; and there does seem to be something mental about them. But they would have to be features of a very different kind of mind, a mind that is eternal and that has effects on all the matter in the universe.
That’s the gist, as best as I can think to put it this briefly. That is, informally, an explanation for why I believe in God intellectually. Three key components here to point out:
1. Ideas
2. Mind
3. Eternity
The ideas in question here are things like mathematical truths, logical truths, laws of physics and chemistry; things that are true anywhere and everywhere, all the time. Here’s a slightly longer version of the above statement that adds some of this detail:
I think that there are certain ideas – like in mathematics and logic – that are necessarily true in a way that is separate from space, time, and material things. Such ideas must exist in a way that is very different from material things. We could suppose that these ideas are products of our minds; and there does seem to be something mental about them. But these ideas also seem to have real effects in the material world. All matter in the universe behaves in consistently mathematical ways that don’t depend on our minds. Still, I think we’re right to understand these ideas as mental. They just have to be features of a very different kind of mind, a mind that is eternal and that has effects on all the matter in the universe.
I think I find this kind of explanation compelling because of my background working in chemistry and materials science. I spend a lot of time thinking about matter and the way it behaves, the patterns in the behavior of matter. So I’m especially inclined to think about what governs matter. Versions of the argument from eternal truths that I’ll talk about subsequently focus on different aspects but I think they get at much the same core principles.
The classical statement of the argument from eternal truths comes from Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430) in his book On Free Choice of the Will. In Book II he gives the argument from eternal truths in the form of a dialogue with a character named Evodius. He uses mathematics as an example of eternal truths:
“The intelligible structure [ratio] and truth of number is present to all reasoning beings. Everyone who calculates tries to apprehend it with his own reason and intelligence.” (2.8.20.80)
And he stresses that such truths are eternal, i.e. valid at all times:
“I do not know how long anything I touch with the bodily senses will last, for example when I sense the Earth or the sky or any physical objects in them. But seven and three are ten not only at the moment, but always; it never was and never will be the case that seven and three are not ten. I therefore declared that this incorruptible numerical truth is common to me and to any reasoning being.” (2.8.21.83)
Later he proposes three options:
“Then, in regard to this truth we have long been talking about and in which we recognize so many things: Do you think it is (a) more excellent than our mind is, (b) equal to our minds, or even (c) inferior?” (2.12.34.133)
The option that these truths are inferior to our minds would be the idea that they are wholly products or our creation. This would be a very strong form of social constructionism. Augustine doesn’t accept this option:
“When anyone says that eternal things are more valuable than temporal things, or seven and three are ten, no one says that it ought to be so; he simply knows that it is so. He is not an inspector making corrections but merely a discoverer taking delight.” (2.12.34.134-136)
The second option is that truths are equal to our minds. This is a weaker form of social constructionism and I think is more commonly held. Truths aren’t just arbitrary but they’re still essentially dependent on our minds. Truths are products of our mind’s ways of constructing a mental picture of the world, of our mental “categories”. But Augustine objects to this on account of our mind’s changeability:
“Now if (b) were the case, that this truth is equal to our minds, then it would itself be changeable. For our minds sometimes see more of the truth and sometimes less. And for this reason, they acknowledge themselves to be changeable. The truth, remaining in itself, neither increases when we see more of it nor decreases when we see less, but instead it is intact and uncorrupted, bringing joy with its light to those who turn towards it and punishing with blindness those who turn away from it.” (2.12.34.135-136)
Another way he might have said this is that three and seven would make ten even if no one in the world believed it, or even if there were no people at all. There are certainly arguments to the contrary, some of which will be addressed later, but I think this conforms pretty well to the way most people think about truth.
Another example would be truths of advanced mathematics, which are much more complicated and the question of whether they were true before they were discovered or only became true when they were first expressed. Roger Penrose refers to the example of the Mandelbrot set:
“The particular swirls of the Mandelbrot set… did not attain their existence at the moment that they were first seen on a computer screen or printout. Nor did they come about when the general idea behind the Mandelbrot set was first humanly put forth… Those designs were already ‘in existence’ since the beginning of time, in the potential timeless sense that they would necessarily be revealed precisely in the form that we perceive them today, no matter at what time or in what location some perceiving being might have chosen to examine them.” (Penose, The Road to Reality, 17)
Augustine thought similarly and from this he concluded that the truths must be more excellent than our minds:
“Consequently, if the truth is neither inferior nor equal, it follows that it is superior and more excellent. Now I had promised you, if you recall, that I would show you that there is something more exalted than our mind and reason. Here you have it: the truth itself!” (2.13.35.137)
Augustine then identifies that which is superior to our minds and reason as God. This is the classical formulation of the argument from eternal forms. I think it does a good job of laying out all the essential ideas. Some of the more modern versions that follow I think improve on it and make the argument more formal.
One modern version of the argument is given by Lorraine Juliano Keller in her 2018 paper “The Argument from Intentionality (or Aboutness): Propositions Supernaturalized”. In that paper she gives a few versions of the argument. First she gives this informal expression of the “rough idea”:
“Truth involves representation–something is true only if it represents reality as being a certain way, and reality is that way. But representation is a function of minds. So, truth is mind-dependent. Yet there are truths that transcend the human mind, e.g. eternal truths. So, there must be a supreme mind with the representational capacity to “think” these transcendent truths. Therefore, a supreme mind (viz., God) exists.” (Dougherty, Wallis, Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God: The Plantinga Project, 11)
One important thing to point out here is how Keller juxtaposes two ideas that are in tension and then synthesizes them together. The two ideas are:
1. Truth is a product of mind
2. Truths are independent of our minds
The second idea, that truths are independent of our minds, is one I very much want to endorse. But the first idea, that truth is a product of mind also seems right. As I said in my own explanation, there does seem to be something mental about true ideas. Keller links truth with representation. What does that mean? I think Richard Rorty gave a good explanation of this:
“We need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there. To say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states. To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations. Truth cannot be out there – cannot exist independently of the human mind – because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own – unaided by the describing activities of human beings – cannot.” (Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity)
I don’t agree with Rorty’s statement in its entirety but I think there’s a lot here that he does get right and it supports Keller’s point about truth involving representation. Rorty says that, “Where there are no sentences there is no truth.” Let’s grant that. He also says that, “sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations.” Here’s where I disagree. And I think this difference is key. Recall the two key ideas I picked out in Keller’s statement above:
1. Truth is a product of mind
2. Truths are independent of our minds
Are these two ideas contradictory? No, actually. They’re in tension certainly. And Rorty picks up on that. But note that Rorty points to human languages and human creations. But things change significantly if we do not so restrict ourselves. We can say both that (1) truth is a product of mind but also that (2) truths are independent of our minds, of human minds. We can do that if we also consider other minds, or another mind. The mind of God.
With all that in mind let’s now look at her formal expression of the argument:
1. Propositions represent essentially [Premise]
2. Only agents represent fundamentally [Premise]
3. So propositions depend for their existence on agents. [from 1,2]
4. There are propositions that no finite agent entertains (transcendent propositions).
5. The representation of transcendent propositions is independent of the representation of finite agents. [from 4]
6. So, transcendent propositions cannot depend on finite agents. [from 3,5]
7. Therefore, there’s an infinite agent.
Hopefully this is clear enough in light of all the foregoing. The argument starts with the nature of propositions and the nature of representation. Propositions are representational in nature, like Rorty insisted. And only agents can represent. Nevertheless there are propositions that no humans are representing: talking about or thinking about. So who is thinking these propositions? Rorty denies that such propositions would exist at all. But I’m rejecting that idea. If propositions exist even when no human being is thinking them someone else has to be thinking them. Furthermore these propositions are transcendent and eternal. They can only exist in that way if they are thought by an infinite thinking agent.
I think this is a good argument. There are two main ways to get around it.
1. Deny that propositions represent essentially
2. Deny that there are transcendent propositions, propositions that no finite agent entertains
I’ll address the first denial in the next argument from Edward Feser. Alternatives to this premise include Platonism and Aristotelianism.
The second denial is a very big topic that I won’t go into here in detail. But I’ll touch on it. It’s a debate about universals, a debate going back to at least the Middle Ages in Europe and in other forms before that. The two major positions are realism and nominalism. With the example of mathematics two positions are mathematical realism and mathematical anti-realism, the basic question there being whether mathematical truths are things we discover or create.
I’m a mathematical realist but there are some important clarifications necessary to make this positions sufficiently sophisticated. The issue that complicates things is that there are many different mathematical systems we can work in and they have different rules. For example in Euclidean geometry parallel lines never converge or diverge. But we can change the rules to make different geometries to allow parallel lines to converge (elliptic geometry) or diverge (hyperbolic geometry). That sure makes it seem like we are free to invent mathematics in any way we like. But is that the case? No, I don’t think so. Because in whatever geometry we choose we are still constrained by the conditions of that geometry.
I think Alex Kontorovich put it well when he said: “The questions that are being asked are an invention. The answers are a discovery.” Having said that, I think it’s also important that any questions we ask be well-formed. For example, you can’t just ask the question, “Is it green?” and expect for there to be a right answer without specifying what “it” is. But as you set conditions to your system it shapes its structure for certain right and wrong answers that are not arbitrary.
As another example of this principle, I’m reading an excellent book that just came out this year (2022) by Eugenia Cheng called The Joy of Abstraction. It’s a book about a general theory of mathematical structures called category theory. I highly recommend it. Early in the book she addresses the issue of whether a proposition like “2+2=4” is absolutely true. She gives the example of modular arithmetic in which this may or may not be true. For example in modulus 3 2+2=1. Or another, more practical every-day example, in modulus 12 (like with a clock) 5+9=2 (5 PM plus 9 hours is 2 AM). So, she maintains, mathematics is different in different contexts:
“Mathematical objects behave very differently in different contexts; thus they have no fixed characteristics, just different characteristics in different contexts. The truth is not absolute but is contextual, and so we should always be clear about the context we’re considering… Pedantically one might declare that the ‘truth-in-context’ is then absolute, but I think this amounts to saying that truth is relative to context. Your preferred wording is a matter of choice, but I have made my choice because I think it is important to focus our attention on the context in which we are working, and not regard anything as fixed.” (Cheng, 44)
I have no disagreement with that; other than being called “pedantic”, but that’s OK. I’ll take that allowance that our preferred wording is a matter of choice. And I actually think that for purposes of category theory Cheng’s preference makes sense. But for my present purposes I prefer the other option, that “truth-in-context” is absolute.
That’s all I’ll say for now about realism for universals. It’s a big topic. But those are some of my reasons for thinking the way I do around it. And I think they’re reasonable.
The last version of the argument from eternal truths I want to share is from Edward Feser in his 2017 book Five Proofs of the Existence of God. His third proof he calls the “the Augustinian Proof”, as a nod to Augustine’s exposition of it in On Free Choice of the Will. Feser summarizes it in this way:
“It begins by arguing that universals (redness, humanness, triangularity, etc.), propositions, possibilities, and other abstract objects are in some sense real, but rejects Plato’s conception of such objects as existing in a “third realm” distinct from any mind and distinct from the world of particular things. The only possible ultimate ground of these objects, the argument concludes, is a divine intellect—the mind of God.” (Feser, 13)
It’s the same general set of ideas and structure as we’ve seen in the other versions. In his chapter on this proof he gives a formal version of the argument in 29 statements. I like this argument because it’s very thorough. But it’s also very long so it is harder to follow. But I think having looked at the earlier versions of the argument it will help. Let’s go ahead and go through all 29 statements of Feser’s argument and then comment on certain parts of it.
1. There are three possible accounts of abstract objects such as universals, propositions, numbers and other mathematical objects, and possible worlds: realism, nominalism, and conceptualism.
2. There are decisive arguments in favor of realism.
3. There are insuperable objections against nominalism.
4. There are insuperable objections against conceptualism.
5. So, some version of realism is true.
6. There are three possible versions of realism: Platonic realism, Aristotelian realism, and Scholastic realism.
7. If Platonic realism is true, then abstract objects exist in a “third realm” distinct from either the material world or any intellect.
8. If Aristotelian realism is true, then abstract objects exist only in human or other contingently existing intellects.
9. If Scholastic realism is true, then abstract objects exist not only in contingently existing intellects but also in at least one necessarily existing intellect.
10. There are insuperable objections against the claim that abstract objects exist in a “third realm” distinct from either the material world or any intellect.
11. So, Platonic realism is not true.
12. There are insuperable objections against the claim that abstract objects exist only in human or other contingently existing intellects.
13. So, Aristotelian realism is not true.
14. So, Scholastic realism is true.
15. So, abstract objects exist not only in contingently existing intellects but also in at least one necessarily existing intellect.
16. Abstract objects such as universals, propositions, numbers and other mathematical objects, and possible worlds are all logically related to one another in such a way that they form an interlocking system of ideas.
17. The reasons for concluding that at least some abstract objects exist in a necessarily existing intellect also entail that this interlocking system of ideas must exist in a necessarily existing intellect.
18. So, this interlocking system of ideas exists in at least one necessarily existing intellect.
19. A necessarily existing intellect would be purely actual.
20. There cannot be more than one thing that is purely actual.
21. So, there cannot be more than one necessarily existing intellect.
22. An intellect in which the interlocking system of ideas in question existed would be conceptually omniscient.
23. So, the one necessarily existing intellect is conceptually omniscient.
24. If this one necessarily existing intellect were not also omniscient in the stronger sense that it knows all contingent truths, then it would have unrealized potential and thus not be purely actual.
25. So, it is also omniscient in this stronger sense.
26. What is purely actual must also be omnipotent, fully good, immutable, immaterial, incorporeal, and eternal.
27. So, there is exactly one necessarily existing intellect, which is purely actual, omniscient, omnipotent, fully good, immutable, immaterial, incorporeal, and eternal.
28. But for there to be such a thing is just what it is for God to exist.
29. So, God exists.
See Feser, pages 109 – 110
The first part of the argument concerns the nature of eternal truths, what he calls abstract objects. How to account for them? And he proposes three options: realism, nominalism, and conceptualism. We’ve talked about this before and why I think realism is the best option. Realism is the view that abstract objects “are real, and neither reducible to anything material nor sheer constructs of the human mind”. Nominalism “denies that abstract objects are real”. Conceptualism “allows that they are real but insists that they are wholly constructed by the human mind”. (90)
Feser gives 10 arguments in favor of realism, which I won’t go over here but just list. You can either read about them further in his book or just look them up online. His 10 arguments in favor of realism are:
– The “one over many” argument
– The argument from geometry
– The argument from mathematics in general
– The argument from the nature of propositions
– The argument from science
– The argument from the nature of possible worlds
– The vicious regress problem
– The “words are universals too” problem
– The argument from the objectivity of concepts and knowledge
– The argument from the incoherence of psychologism
Some of these have already been touched on. I’ll just say a little more about the argument from science because I find that one especially interesting personally. Feser says:
“Scientific laws and classifications, being general or universal in their application, necessarily make reference to universals; and science is in the business of discovering objective, mind-independent facts. Hence, to accept the results of science is to accept that there are universals that do not depend for their existence on the human mind. Science also makes use of mathematical formulations, and since (as noted above) mathematics concerns a realm of abstract objects, to accept the results of science thus commits one to accepting that there are such abstract objects.” (92)
I touched on this earlier talking about how eternal truths seem to have real effects in the material world, that all matter in the universe behaves in consistently mathematical ways, that don’t depend on our minds. Eugene Wigner called this “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences”. Though I would call it the remarkable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, because I don’t think it’s unreasonable, rather, divine reason is precisely what is behind it.
After having argued for realism about universals in the next part of the argument Feser touches on the nature of such universals. In what way do these universals exist? He proposes three options: Platonic realism, Aristotelian realism, and Scholastic realism.
Under Platonic realism abstract objects don’t exist in the material world nor in the human mind “but in a ‘third realm’ that is neither material nor mental” (97).
“This is the famous realm of Platonic Forms, entities which exist outside time and space and which the things of our experience merely imperfectly ‘resemble’ or ‘participate’ in.” (97)
In many ways I consider myself a Platonist. Or at least, I think there’s a lot that Platonism gets right. But I don’t go quite all the way with Platonism for various reasons. One of these reasons is that I’ve been persuaded that abstract objects are mental in a way that Platonic Forms are not.
Feser mentions three problems with Platonism. First, the Forms seem to be causally inert. Since one of the reasons for thinking that realism is true in the first place is the remarkable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences this would be a problem, because things that are causally inert can hardly be effective. The second problem is the “Third Man” argument, which I won’t go into but has to do with an infinite regress of meta-forms. The third problem is that it’s not clear with the notion of material objects resembling the Forms that an object is more a genuine instance of itself than an image of it would be, for example a human person a more genuine person than a statue of a human. For more detail on all this just see his book.
Under Aristotelian realism universals do not exist in a “third realm” of Forms but in particular objects. The universals are features that we abstract from concrete individual objects. The universals really do exist but are instantiated in individual objects, rather than in a “third realm” of Forms. Feser describes it this way:
“The universals are abstracted from these [particular objects] extramental things by the mind, rather than being the free creations of the mind. Aristotelian realists emphasize that abstraction is essentially a mental process, so that abstract objects are essentially tied to the mind. Hence, though animality, triangularity, redness, humanness, and so forth do exist in mind-independent reality, they do not exist there as abstract objects, but only as tied to concrete particular individuals. And though animality, triangularity, redness, humanness, and so forth can nevertheless exist as abstract objects, they do not so exist in mind-independent reality. There is no third Platonic alternative way for universals to exist—namely, as both abstract and mind-independent at the same time.” (100)
The problems with Aristotelian realism that Feser points out concern its dependence on the material world. What if the material world didn’t exist at all. This would seem to be an at-least-possible counterfactual. How would Aristotelian realism obtain in that case? How would a material world or human minds come into existence? There wouldn’t seem to be any grounding for that possibility since Aristotelian realism would require something material already present to ground it. Other counterfactuals present problems. There are plenty of things that could have existed but haven’t come into existence. Daniel Dennett has talked about the “Library of Mendel”, a theoretical library containing all possible genomes (Darwin’s Dangerous Idea). There would seem to be an infinite number of potential organisms that have never come into material existence. But if these potential organisms have never actually come into existence there couldn’t be any place for their forms to be physically instantiated in Aristotelian realism. But it doesn’t seem like they are any less logically possible for that fact. Finally, there would seem to be propositions “that would be true whether or not the material world or any human mind existed.” (101) But if the material world didn’t exist there would be no grounding for these propositions in Aristotelian realism. Same for necessary truths of mathematics and logic. So Feser rejects Aristoelian realism.
The remaining option to account for realism is Scholastic realism. Feser describes it this way:
“This brings us, at last, to Scholastic realism, which is essentially Aristotelian in spirit, but gives at least a nod to Platonic realism. Like Aristotelian realism, Scholastic realism affirms that universals exist only either in the things that instantiate them, or in intellects which entertain them. It agrees that there is no Platonic “third realm” independent both of the material world and of all intellects. However, the Scholastic realist agrees with the Platonist that there must be some realm distinct both from the material world and from human and other finite intellects. In particular—and endorsing a thesis famously associated with Saint Augustine—it holds that universals, propositions, mathematical and logical truths, and necessities and possibilities exist in an infinite, eternal, divine intellect. If some form of realism must be true, then, but Platonic realism and Aristotelian realism are in various ways inadequate, then the only remaining version, Scholastic realism, must be correct. And since Scholastic realism entails that there is an infinite divine intellect, then there really must be such an intellect. In other words, God exists.” (102)
The remaining fifteen statements in Feser’s argument follow from Scholastic realism, working out the attributes that this necessarily existing intellect must have. For example, that there can only be one such intellect and that he must be omniscient and omnipotent. I think these three are related in a rather interesting way.
One reason for holding realism to be true in the first place is the observation that matter behaves according to patterns of eternal truths, for example the mathematical forms of the laws of physics. For this to occur it’s not sufficient just that these eternal truths be thought. These thoughts must also have causal power. The mind that thinks these eternal truths must also be causing them to have the effects that they have in the material world. One way of talking about this causality is in terms of actuality and potentiality.
Fair warning: the next couple minutes might be a little hard to follow because it gets into some technical jargon from classical and medieval philosophy. If it’s too much just hold tight for a few minutes.
Actuality and potentiality are ideas from Aristotle that also feature prominently in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Potentiality is any possibility that a thing has. Actuality is what causes a thing’s potentiality to be realized. In Aristotle’s philosophy these concepts equipped him to give an account for change and rebut arguments against the possibility of change by philosophers like Parmendies. Change is “the actualization of a potential” (Feser, 18). Everything in the universe has multiple ways that they can be. At any given moment things are a certain way. But they can be otherwise. They have unrealized potentiality. In order for a thing to change and realize different potentialities something must cause that change. What causes these changes are actualities.
One statement in Feser’s argument is that a necessary being is purely actual. Why must that be? This is important and it connects the related attributes of oneness, omniscience, and omnipotence. A necessary being is one who cannot fail to exist. He has always existed and always will exist. Furthermore, he was never created in the first place. He is the one who creates but is himself uncreated. In the terms just described earlier, he has no potentiality that is actualized by something else. He is not brought into existence by anything else. He is what actualizes the potentialities of everything else. Lacking any potentiality he is pure actuality.
Another statement in Feser’s argument is that there cannot be more than one thing that is purely actual. Why is that? There are a number of reasons. One reason is that the sum of all knowledge consists of an interlocking system of ideas that is indivisible. More on that shortly. Another reason is the following:
“In order for there to be more than one purely actual actualizer, there would have to be some differentiating feature that one such actualizer has that the other lack. But there could be such a differentiating feature only if a purely actual actualizer had some unactualized potential, which being purely actual, it does not have. So, there can be no such differentiating feature, and thus no way for there to be more than one purely actual actualizer.” (36)
So the unity, the oneness of the necessarily existing intellect follows from its pure actuality.
Another statement in Feser’s argument is that what is purely actual must be omnipotent. I think it’s actually pretty straightforward to see that actuality entails power. Actuality is what brings about change; actualizing potentialities. The necessarily existing intellect is purely actual and the only thing that is purely actual. Everything else has potentiality that must be actualized by something else. Eventually this all ties back to the one purely actual necessarily existing intellect. As Feser states:
“To have power entails being able to actualize potentials. Any potential that is actualized is either actualized by the purely actual actualizer or by a series of actualizers which terminates in the purely actual actualizer. So, all power derives from the purely actual actualizer. But to be that from which all power derives is to be omnipotent. So, the purely actual actualizer is omnipotent.” (37)
Finally omniscience. This is closely connected to the fact that there is only one necessarily existing intellect. Recall that it is in the mind of this one necessarily existing intellect that abstract objects such as universals, propositions, numbers and other mathematical objects, and possible worlds reside. Since there is only one necessarily existing intellect it’s not as if “such-and-such possible worlds, necessary truths, universals, and so forth exist in necessarily existing intellect A, and another group of possible worlds, necessary truths, universals, and so forth exist in necessarily existing intellect B.” (104) This wouldn’t really work anyway by virtue of the nature of abstract objects. Abstract objects “are not independent of one another in a way that would allow their ultimate ground to lie in distinct necessarily existing minds. Rather, they form an interlocking system.” (104) It all exists in only one necessarily existing intellect. This one knows all these things, all universals, propositions, numbers and other mathematical objects, and possible worlds. The one necessarily existing intellect knows all these things.
This knowledge is certainly unfathomably vast. Is there anything that it doesn’t include? Is there anything that this one intellect would not know? He knows all universals, propositions, numbers and other mathematical objects, and possible worlds. But what about contingent truths, like the fact that I went to the grocery store at 8 PM this evening? Here too actuality is key. On this Feser states the following:
“It would also have to know all truths, including contingent ones. For if it knew less than all of them, then it would have an unactualized potential–the potential to know the truths that it does not in fact know–and thus fail to be purely actual. So, it must be omniscient in an unqualified sense.” (106)
So we have one intellect who is both omniscient and omnipotent. It’s a long argument and it takes some effort to stick with it, work all the way through it, and really understand each step in the argument. But I think it’s worth it. It’s a good argument and the most detailed of the ones presented here.
People come at arguments with different inclinations to find different premises more or less plausible. I don’t expect that if I find a certain argument persuasive that everyone will find it persuasive, because they may not come to it as open to the premises of the argument as I am. And it’s certainly the case with me and arguments that I don’t find persuasive. An argument that one person finds persuasive I may not find persuasive at all because the premises don’t seem as plausible to me. And if we want to pursue the argument further we have to dig deeper into the premises. And so it goes.
In my case I really do find these arguments from eternal truths quite persuasive. I think it’s natural to suspect arguments for the existence of God to be motivated reasoning. We already believe in God for non-rational reasons so let’s try to come up with some rational explanation to make a case for what we already believe. First thing to say there is that I actually don’t think such rational reconstruction is illegitimate anyway. We believe a lot of correct things first for non-rational reasons and then only work out the rational justification for it after the fact. That’s perfectly fine. But also in my case I actually do just happen to find this to be the most plausible account for the way things are. Not just about God, but about everything, especially in the sciences.
The deeper I look into the nature of things the more I see reality not as mere matter but as intellectually structured. As Joseph Ratzinger put it: “The intellectual structure that being possesses and that we can re-think is the expression of a creative premeditation, to which they owe their existence.” (Introduction to Christianity, 152) When everywhere I look I find more and more rational, intellectual structure, what else can I think? I’m practically compelled and driven to these conclusions.
We’ve gone over a lot here so having passed through all this I’d like to finish by returning to the simplified, shorter expressions of the ideas involved here. I’ll share the summaries of Feser and Keller and then finish with my own.
Feser:
“It begins by arguing that universals (redness, humanness, triangularity, etc.), propositions, possibilities, and other abstract objects are in some sense real, but rejects Plato’s conception of such objects as existing in a “third realm” distinct from any mind and distinct from the world of particular things. The only possible ultimate ground of these objects, the argument concludes, is a divine intellect—the mind of God.” (Feser, 13)
Keller:
“Truth involves representation–something is true only if it represents reality as being a certain way, and reality is that way. But representation is a function of minds. So, truth is mind-dependent. Yet there are truths that transcend the human mind, e.g. eternal truths. So, there must be a supreme mind with the representational capacity to ‘think’ these transcendent truths. Therefore, a supreme mind (viz., God) exists.” (Dougherty, Wallis, Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God: The Plantinga Project, 11)
And mine:
I think that there are certain ideas – like in mathematics and logic – that are necessarily true in a way that is separate from space, time, and material things. Such ideas must exist in a way that is very different from material things. We could suppose that these ideas are products of our minds; and there does seem to be something mental about them. But these ideas also seem to have real effects in the material world. All matter in the universe behaves in consistently mathematical ways that don’t depend on our minds. Still, I think we’re right to understand these ideas as mental. They just have to be features of a very different kind of mind, a mind that is eternal and that has effects on all the matter in the universe.
The history of the world is punctuated with certain transformative events that have fundamentally altered its course. The most significant of such events was the mortal life of Jesus of Nazareth. At the completion of that event, with the Resurrection of Christ, everything changed. The most salient fact of human existence, our finite temporal horizon ending with death, was abolished. Another transformative event took place about one thousand years before that in the wilderness of Sinai, when Moses received the torah (תּוֹרָה) “instruction”, at the hand of the Lord. This too was a foundational event in the history of the world on which the legal, moral, and philosophical developments of the nations have turned in the centuries since. Moses himself witnessed to the people that this would be the case and called their attention to it in his great recitation in Deuteronomy:
“Surely I have taught you statutes and judgments, just as the Lord my God commanded me, that you should act according to them in the land which you go to possess. Therefore be careful to observe them; for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the peoples who will hear all these statutes, and say, ‘Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people.’ For what great nation is there that has God so near to it, as the Lord our God is to us, for whatever reason we may call upon Him? And what great nation is there that has such statutes and righteous judgments as are in all this law which I set before you this day? (Deuteronomy 4:5-8, NKJV)
The statutes and judgments distinguish Israel and make it noteworthy among the nations. “Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people.” Considering how many nations and peoples look to the Bible, to the statutes and judgments that the Lord gave to Israel, it seems to me that this has been dramatically fulfilled in the centuries following Sinai.
I find the torah a joy to read: a rich source of inspiration for the mind and for the practical aspects of life, both theory and wisdom. I recently read a Psalm that seemed like a perfect response to the Lord’s divine instruction.
“O how I love thy law! it is my meditation all the day.
Thou through thy commandments hast made me wiser than mine enemies: for they are ever with me.
I have more understanding than all my teachers: for thy testimonies are my meditation.
I understand more than the ancients, because I keep thy precepts.
I have refrained my feet from every evil way, that I might keep thy word.
I have not departed from thy judgments: for thou hast taught me.
How sweet are thy words unto my taste! yea, sweeter than honey to my mouth!
Through thy precepts I get understanding: therefore I hate every false way.”
(Psalm 119:97-104, KJV)
What kind of person do you want to be? You could do a lot worse than aspire to wisdom and understanding. The Lord was pleased when Solomon asked to be blessed with “an understanding heart to judge” and to “discern between good and evil.” (1 Kings 3:9, NKJV) And the Lord said: “Because you have asked this thing, and have not asked long life for yourself, nor have asked riches for yourself, nor have asked the life of your enemies, but have asked for yourself understanding to discern justice, behold, I have done according to your words; see, I have given you a wise and understanding heart.” (1 Kings 3:11-12, NKJV) These are aspirations of the highest good. No wonder then that law, torah, which gives wisdom and understanding, is sweet to the taste, “sweeter than honey”.
Not all studying we do in life is a delight, even if it’s necessary or useful. Sometimes we have to study subjects that aren’t all that interesting to us and that can be quite a slog. But when you’re studying something that you really find interesting, that is delightful. I really enjoy studying the sciences, which I’m fortunate enough to be able to do in my professional and academic life, as well as for pleasure. And other people have other interests. But I happen think that torah, the instruction, laws and statutes given by God in the Bible has the potential to bring universal delight to everyone, if approached receptively. It can be the kind of thing that you can’t stop thinking about, such that, like the Psalmist, you meditate on it all day.
I believe that this delight for the torah originates in our very natures. I like the way it’s put in the Catholic Catechism:
“Endowed with ‘a spiritual and immortal’ soul, The human person is ‘the only creature on earth that God has willed for its own sake.’ From his conception, he is destined for eternal beatitude. The human person participates in the light and power of the divine Spirit. By his reason, he is capable of understanding the order of things established by the Creator. By free will, he is capable of directing himself toward his true good. He finds his perfection ‘in seeking and loving what is true and good.’ By virtue of his soul and his spiritual powers of intellect and will, man is endowed with freedom, an ‘outstanding manifestation of the divine image.’ By his reason, man recognizes the voice of God which urges him ‘to do what is good and avoid what is evil.’ Everyone is obliged to follow this law, which makes itself heard in conscience and is fulfilled in the love of God and of neighbor. Living a moral life bears witness to the dignity of the person.” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1703-1706)
I think that’s right. Our natural attraction to the good is integral to who we are. That attraction is often clouded by immoral practice but it can be purified and cultivated. As we learn and act according to the good we are developing to become the kinds of creatures that we are meant to be. The understanding and wisdom that comes from meditation on the laws and statutes given by God are the ends to which our reasoning capacities are directed.
The Lord’s torah, instructions, statutes, and judgments include more than ethics but I will focus presently on the ethics given in scripture and tradition. The scriptural foundation for ethics is in the Ten Commandments given by God on Mount Sinai, written on tablets of stone. In what follows I’ll go through the Ten Commandments, out of order, starting with topics like murder and theft, and eventually circling in toward the core source of moral goodness in God. Some of the topics will be auxiliary to the ten commandments themselves, but are also important moral topics in Christian teaching. With many of the auxiliary topics I’ll take my lead from the 1994 Catechism of the Catholic Church, which has an excellent section on Christian moral teaching in its Part Three, “Life in Christ”. That particular text is Catholic but most of the teachings in that section agree with general Christian moral teachings.
Thou shalt kill
Murder is probably the most obvious moral evil. No one wants to be murdered. None of us wants the people we love to be murdered. And pragmatically we can’t have a stable society without prohibiting murder. The theological basis for condemning murder is the divine image in which human beings are created: “For in the image of God He made man.” (Genesis 9:6, NKJV)
Human beings are made in the image of God and, because of that, are intrinsically inviolable. This is more than just a pragmatic matter. Because this inviolability is intrinsic it goes beyond just the interest of social stability. There are many instances in history where social stability was actually the justification for the murder of minority populations. But that kind of justification is absolutely impermissible. Most such justifications would probably be mistaken anyway, but even if murder had, in a perverse way, some kind social benefit it would still be inexcusable. Human beings, all human beings, are intrinsically inviolable.
This commandment also touches on related issues like warfare, suicide, euthanasia, abortion, and bodily integrity.
Suicide, euthanasia, and abortion are all considered forms of murder in Christian moral teaching and are all wrong. The immorality of each relates to the inviolability of human beings and the premise that the person being murdered under suicide, euthanasia, or abortion is a full human person with an inviolable right to life that no one has the right to abrogate. Absolute inviolability means that people do not even have the right to murder themselves, as with suicide. In the case of abortion, although most people agree that a human fetus in its early stages of development is a human being, not everyone agrees that the fetus is a person with an inviolable right to life. The concept “person” here being a moral category.
Are all human beings persons? Yes. That’s what it comes down to. And there can be no other criteria for moral inviolability, i.e. the right to life. Differences in intelligence, strength, physical appearance, ability, stage of development, contribution to society, whatever, don’t make a difference to this right. Similarly people who have been injured, incapacitated, or simply aged, are no less persons with inviolability than anyone else. People are not more or less worthy of life because of their contribution to the Gross Domestic Product. There are no mere “drains on society” who are dispensable.
It is true that there are people who are wholly dependent on others for their survival and who do not “contribute” in tangible ways. But they are no less entitled to life than anyone else. It is perhaps instructive that the first murderer defiantly challenged God with the question, “Am I my brother’s keeper?” (Genesis 4:9) Yes, absolutely. I think the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas got it right when he said that each person is infinitely responsible for everyone else. A similar idea is the line from Fyodor Dostoyevsky that, “We are all responsible for everyone else—but I am more responsible than all the others.”
Thou shalt not steal
Theft is another moral evil that is rather obvious. We value our possessions and we don’t want people to steal from us. We don’t want to live in conditions in which we are constantly worried that we will lose everything we own the minute we leave our homes. We also want to be able to make agreements with people with confidence that people will honor their agreements. These are basic and fairly obvious conditions for a functioning and ordered society.
Along with stealing, the Catholic Catechism also lists the following as morally illicit:
“Speculation in which one contrives to manipulate the price of goods artificially in order to gain an advantage to the detriment of others; corruption in which one influences the judgment of those who must make decisions according to law; appropriation and use for private purposes of the common goods of an enterprise; work poorly done; tax evasion; forgery of checks and invoices; excessive expenses and waste, willfully damaging private or public property” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2409).
A related topic to the ownership of goods is the moral concern for the physical needs of the poor and vulnerable. The poor are not justified in stealing from the wealthy, but neither are the wealthy absolved of responsibility to look after the needs of the poor. This is abundantly clear in torah.
“If there is among you a poor man of your brethren, within any of the gates in your land which the Lord your God is giving you, you shall not harden your heart nor shut your hand from your poor brother, but you shall open your hand wide to him and willingly lend him sufficient for his need, whatever he needs. Beware lest there be a wicked thought in your heart, saying, ‘The seventh year, the year of release, is at hand,’ and your eye be evil against your poor brother and you give him nothing, and he cry out to the Lord against you, and it become sin among you. You shall surely give to him, and your heart should not be grieved when you give to him, because for this thing the Lord your God will bless you in all your works and in all to which you put your hand. For the poor will never cease from the land; therefore I command you, saying, ‘You shall open your hand wide to your brother, to your poor and your needy, in your land.’” (Deuteronomy 15:7-11, NKJV)
This is more than a suggestion. This is an obligation commanded in the Law. When giving these kinds of commands the Lord often reminds Israel of her former enslavement, for example: “You shall neither mistreat a stranger nor oppress him, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.” (Exodus 22:21, NKJV) The Bible has a strong sense of what we might today call social justice. It’s not only a perversion of justice to actively steal from someone but it’s also a perversion of justice to treat someone unreasonably or with excessive harshness, even if it doesn’t technically violate a contract. For example:
“When you lend your brother anything, you shall not go into his house to get his pledge. You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you lend shall bring the pledge out to you. And if the man is poor, you shall not keep his pledge overnight. You shall in any case return the pledge to him again when the sun goes down, that he may sleep in his own garment and bless you; and it shall be righteousness to you before the Lord your God. You shall not oppress a hired servant who is poor and needy, whether one of your brethren or one of the aliens who is in your land within your gates. Each day you shall give him his wages, and not let the sun go down on it, for he is poor and has set his heart on it; lest he cry out against you to the Lord, and it be sin to you.” (Deuteronomy 24:10-15)
When someone is in a position of power they should still respect the person in the position of less power. A person’s home is a personal space, even if you’re lending them money, or even own the home. Even in the case of collateral, where it’s part of a contract, don’t be unreasonable. Don’t deprive a person of their means to live in comfort and dignity. Continuing:
“You shall not pervert justice due the stranger or the fatherless, nor take a widow’s garment as a pledge. But you shall remember that you were a slave in Egypt, and the Lord your God redeemed you from there; therefore I command you to do this thing.” (Deuteronomy 24:17-18)
Interesting that it calls this a perversion of justice. But what if everyone had agreed to the arrangement beforehand? Isn’t everyone getting exactly what was agreed to? Isn’t that just? The Lord’s notion here of justice would seem to be more than “giving everyone their due”. This kind of justice calls on the wealthier to be more generous. Continuing:
“When you reap your harvest in your field, and forget a sheaf in the field, you shall not go back to get it; it shall be for the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow, that the Lord your God may bless you in all the work of your hands. When you beat your olive trees, you shall not go over the boughs again; it shall be for the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow. When you gather the grapes of your vineyard, you shall not glean it afterward; it shall be for the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow. And you shall remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt; therefore I command you to do this thing.” (Deuteronomy 24:19-22, NKJV)
This is really interesting. It’s your field. Don’t all the sheaves, olives, and grapes rightfully belong to you? Actually, no. It’s a fascinating concept of justice at work here.
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor
Lying takes many forms. Bearing false witness against a person has to be one of the worst forms. Slander, libel, defamation – these are ugly and inexcusable actions. We ought not underestimate how important our reputations are to us. Unfortunately we cannot expect that we will always have the reputations we deserve. In fact we’ve been warned about the opposite, that disciples of Christ will have all manner of evil spoken against them falsely (Matthew 5:11). That will happen. But wo to the person who perpetrates these kinds of falsehoods. Bearing false witness can cause financial damage but I think the social damage is even worse.
To love God is to love the truth. Jesus said, “I am the way, the truth, and the life” (John 14:6) and Psalmist said, “Your law is truth” (Psalm 119:142). The Catechism says: “Man tends by nature toward the truth. He is obliged to honor and bear witness to it: ‘It is in accordance with their dignity that all men, because they are persons . . . are both impelled by their nature and bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth. They are also bound to adhere to the truth once they come to know it and direct their whole lives in accordance with the demands of truth.” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2467) Why again, when studying torah, this delight, “O how love I thy law! it is my meditation all the day”? Because it’s in our nature. We are impelled toward truth, we are bound, morally, to seek and adhere to truth.
Truth isn’t merely propositional but also morally inflected. Aristotle said, “To say that that which is, is not, and that which is not, is, is a falsehood; therefore, to say that which is, is, and that which is not, is not, is true” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1011b26). Yes, for sure. But it’s also a moral principle. To say that that which is, is not, and that which is not, is, is wrong. It’s an offense against reality and against justice.
Thou shalt not commit adultery
Sex is either something we think too much about or not enough about. I’m reminded of Alain de Botton’s playful book title How to Think More About Sex. The title is playful because by “think” he doesn’t mean mere sexual fantasy but rather critical thinking. What part does sexuality play in the overall scheme of things?
The Catechism states: “Chastity means the successful integration of sexuality within the person and thus the inner unity of man in his bodily and spiritual being. Sexuality, in which man’s belonging to the bodily and biological world is expressed, becomes personal and truly human when it is integrated into the relationship of one person to another, in the complete and lifelong mutual gift of a man and a woman. The virtue of chastity therefore involves the integrity of the person and the integrality of the gift.” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2337)
Something interesting to observe in this statement is that chastity and sexuality are not opposites. Rather chastity is sexuality directed toward its proper ends. What kind of beings are we? We are certainly members of the bodily and biological world. We are mortal. And we only persist as a species through sexual reproduction. Sexuality is the way in which belonging to the bodily and biological world is expressed. In a certain sense all of ethics concerns the successful integration of the multiple aspects of our being toward those ends for which we are created. And that’s what chastity is for sexuality.
An important concept pertaining to chastity is “integrity”. The primary definition of “integrity” is general moral uprightness. But another definition of particular relevance here is of a state of being whole and undivided, having all parts integrated into a coherent unity. The Catechism states: “The chaste person maintains the integrity of the powers of life and love placed in him. This integrity ensures the unity of the person; it is opposed to any behavior that would impair it. It tolerates neither a double life nor duplicity in speech.” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2338) This is an interesting concept that can certainly apply to other aspects of personhood in addition to sexuality. Continuing on: “Chastity includes an apprenticeship in self-mastery which is a training in human freedom. The alternative is clear: either man governs his passions and finds peace, or he lets himself be dominated by them and becomes unhappy.” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2339)
Underlying all of this is the sanctity of marriage. Jesus said: “Have you not read that He who made them at the beginning ‘made them male and female,’ and said, ‘For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh’? So then, they are no longer two but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined together, let not man separate.” (Matthew 19:4-6) This union is a very serious matter. And hence the gravity of adultery. The union is designed by God for the unitive and procreative purpose.
Marriage of male and female persons is what sexuality is for and is normative for it. Violations of chastity include adultery, rape, fornication, prostitution, lust, pornography, masturbation, and homosexuality.
Rape especially is an extremely serious offense. It is not only a perversion of the divinely ordained purposes of sexuality but is also violent. It is also a uniquely horrific act of violence because it is sexual, and thus much more horrific even than a regular assault. Sexual assault is a more accutely personal and existential attack. And our appropriately intense and visceral response to it indicates how deeply sexuality is situated at the core of our being and identity.
Thou shalt not covet
The forbidding of covetousness is interesting because it pertains to thoughts rather than physical actions. Our moral character and virtue is defined by our mental actions. A succinct expression of this outlook is the proverb: “For as he thinks in his heart, so is he.” (Proverbs 23:7, NKJV)
For example, the commandment says, “thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife” (Exodus 20:17, KJV). This goes beyond but also extends from the commandment against adultery. To be sure, it is wrong to commit adultery. But it is also wrong to desire another man’s wife. Chastity is not only physical but is also mental. A clear example of this is Jesus’s teaching:
“You have heard that it was said to those of old, ‘You shall not commit adultery.’ But I say to you that whoever looks at a woman to lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. If your right eye causes you to sin, pluck it out and cast it from you; for it is more profitable for you that one of your members perish, than for your whole body to be cast into hell. And if your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off and cast it from you; for it is more profitable for you that one of your members perish, than for your whole body to be cast into hell.” (Matthew 5:27-30, NKJV)
The most extreme example of an offense of this kind is pornography where a person is actively seeking and leering at people lustfully. This is extremely destructive to a person’s soul. Modern communications enables us to access an unlimited number of images on a scale previously unimaginable. The commandment and teaching of Jesus condemns leering and lusting after even just one person as a very serious sin.
This kind of statute relating to mental actions is in tension with more modern moral ideas like the “harm principle” as promoted by the philosopher John Stuart Mill, where actions are only immoral if they cause harm to others. We find anything beyond this invasive. What goes on inside my head is no one else’s business. But the Lord’s torah is much more extensive than this and goes deeper into the state of one’s soul.
Beyond sexuality we are also commanded to cultivate our thoughts in all our relations to others. “You shall not covet your neighbor’s house… nor his ox, nor his donkey, nor anything that is your neighbor’s.” (Exodus 20:17, NKJV) Today we might say that we must not covet our neighbor’s job, our neighbor’s car, our neighbor’s investment portfolio, our neighbor’s social prestige, etc. Thinking like that is not a proper way to live. And if you think about it, it’s certainly a way to be miserable. There’s wisdom in the idea that comparison is the thief of joy. It’s no way to live with yourself or with others in fellowship.
Honour thy father and thy mother
The family plays a central part in God’s creation, starting with husband and wife, father and mother. God has joined husband and wife together (Matthew 19:4-6) and commanded them to “Be fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 1:28, NKJV). Father and mother are the divinely appointed leaders and teachers of their children.
The Catechism states: “In creating man and woman, God instituted the human family and endowed it with its fundamental constitution. Its members are persons equal in dignity. For the common good of its members and of society, the family necessarily has manifold responsibilities, rights, and duties.” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2203)
The philosopher Roger Scruton distinguished between the kinds of rights and responsibilities created by agreement, as with a contract, and the kinds of rights and responsibilities that we have for reasons beyond anything we chose; what he calls “sacred obligations” (Scruton, On Human Nature, 113-117). Family responsibilities, rights, and duties are of this second type. Children do not choose to be born, nor to be born to the parents they’re born to. Nevertheless they have responsibilities of filial piety. And parents do not choose the character and personality of their children. We take then as they come. Another philosopher, Michael Sandel, has called this “openness to the unbidden” (Sandel, The Case Against Perfection). Parents are obligated to care for them and teach them, regardless of the unique and unforeseen challenges that come with each individual child. As Scruton puts it: “The field of obligation is wider than the field of choice. We are bound by ties that we never chose, and our world contains values and challenges that intrude from beyond the comfortable arena of our agreements.” (Scruton, 116) Nowhere is this more relevant than in family responsibilities.
What do parents owe to their children? The Catechism states that parents must respect their children as human persons, educate their children, create a home “where tenderness, forgiveness, respect, fidelity, and disinterested service are the rule”, teach them “self-denial, sound judgment, and self-mastery”, initiate them into “solidarity and communal responsibilities”, teach them to “avoid the compromising and degrading influences which threaten human societies”, and teach them the gospel of Jesus Christ (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2221-2226).
What do we owe to our parents? When we are children we owe them obedience and respect. The Catechism states, “Obedience toward parents ceases with the emancipation of the children; not so respect, which is always owed to them.” As adults we must, as much as we are able, “give them material and moral support in old age and in times of illness, loneliness, or distress.”
Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy
Labor is part of the human condition, something illustrated in Genesis with God’s words to Adam:
“Cursed is the ground for your sake;
In toil you shall eat of it
All the days of your life.
Both thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you,
And you shall eat the herb of the field.
In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread
Till you return to the ground,
For out of it you were taken;
For dust you are,
And to dust you shall return.”
(Genesis 3:17-19, NKJV)
Nevertheless, we are ordained to more than endless toil. God has ordained that we should have periodic and regular rest. Rest is not just for a privileged elite. Everyone must have rest from labor on the Sabbath:
“In it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy manservant, nor thy maidservant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates.” (Exodus 20:10)
This includes laborers, service workers, migrants; everyone. This reprieve even extends to the animals that labor for us. As important as it is to rest from our own labors on the Sabbath it is just as important, maybe even more important to enable others to rest. As stated in the Catechism:
“Those Christians who have leisure should be mindful of their brethren who have the same needs and the same rights, yet cannot rest from work because of poverty and misery… Sanctifying Sundays and holy days requires a common effort. Every Christian should avoid making unnecessary demands on others that would hinder them from observing the Lord’s Day.”
This is a Sabbath perspective that ought to affect the way we view ourselves and others generally. Who am I beyond my labor and career? Who are other people to me beyond the benefit that I can get from them in the goods and services they provide me?
Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain
One of the important concepts in the Law given by God through Moses is that of holiness. Certain things are marked out as qadosh, radically separate and other from the ordinary. God is loving but his holiness also requires singular reverence. But his holiness doesn’t diminish his love and goodness. These attributes all cohere together as one in a way unique to God. An apt illustration of this is C.S Lewis’s description of Aslan, a type for Christ, in The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe:
“‘Aslan is a lion- the Lion, the great Lion.’ ‘Ooh’ said Susan. ‘I’d thought he was a man. Is he-quite safe? I shall feel rather nervous about meeting a lion’…’Safe?’ said Mr Beaver …’Who said anything about safe? ‘Course he isn’t safe. But he’s good.’”
I think the most powerful example of this principle in scripture comes in the episode after the people of Israel had fallen into idolatry and worshiped before the golden calf, an unimaginably grave offense before God. The Lord told Moses that he could not stay with them but would instead send an angel, a messenger, in his place.
“Then the Lord said to Moses, ‘Depart and go up from here, you and the people whom you have brought out of the land of Egypt, to the land of which I swore to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, saying, ‘To your descendants I will give it.’ And I will send My Angel before you… for I will not go up in your midst, lest I consume you on the way, for you are a stiff-necked people.’” (Exodus 33:1-3)
The Lord is good but he is not safe. That’s why he was hesitant to journey with the people. He knew that his holiness was hazardous to the people in their wickedness. Still he did go up with them. And he did not desire that they be distant from him. Rather he instituted laws and statutes for them to be holy like him.
“Now therefore, if you will indeed obey My voice and keep My covenant, then you shall be a special treasure to Me above all people; for all the earth is Mine. And you shall be to Me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation.” (Exodus 19:6)
We should keep these things in mind when we speak of God and approach God with the proper reverence.
The Catechism states: “Respect for his name is an expression of the respect owed to the mystery of God himself and to the whole sacred reality it evokes. the sense of the sacred is part of the virtue of religion” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2144).
I am the LORD thy God
We end now with the first commandment. I wanted to save this one for last because I think of this as the foundation for all of ethics. What is it that gives the laws and statutes their authority? “I am the LORD thy God” (Exodus 20:2). What follows that statement is absolutely authoritative, coming directly from the source of truth, goodness, beauty, and all that is. Nachmanides (1194 – 1270), also known as Ramban, said in his commentary on this verse:
“He said, I am the Eternal, thus teaching and commanding them that they should know and believe that the Eternal exists and that He is G-d to them. That is to say, there exists an Eternal Being through Whom everything has come into existence by His will and power, and He is G-d to them, who are obligated to worship Him.” (Ramban on Exodus 20:2)
The Lord also says, “Thou shalt have no other gods before me.” (Exodus 20:3) Which we can interpret either as having other gods in priority over the Lord or even simply in the presence of the Lord, even if in equal position. I think one possible way to summarize the whole of the Hebrew Scripture would be as Israel’s continual temptation with idolatry.
The Catechism states: “Idolatry consists in divinizing what is not God. Man commits idolatry whenever he honors and reveres a creature in place of God, whether this be gods or demons (for example, satanism), power, pleasure, race, ancestors, the state, money, etc.” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2113).
This first commandment is foundational. It addresses the matter of where goodness itself comes from in the first place and it also precludes the possibility that there could be any other source. What else could be the source for goodness and ethical principles? Power? Pleasure? The state? Economic output? There are ethical systems with each of these as a philosophical or ideological foundation. And each has a compelling case that is, to a limited extent, intellectually satisfying. But I don’t think that any of them is ultimately intellectually satisfying, nor ultimately emotionally or spiritually satisfying.
What should we expect and hope to receive from the law? In the end we want answers to the question, “how should I live?” Does it ultimately matter how I live? If it does matter how I live, why does it matter? On what basis? I think these questions are naturally related to the question of what kind of beings we are. What are we and why do we exist? What do we exist for? It all goes back to this first commandment: I am the LORD thy God. How we should act and what we should do ties back to our origin in God.
Human beings are the tzelem elohim, the image of God. So to understand what kind of beings we are and how we can fulfill our nature we should look to God. What attributes are constitutive of our divine nature? Holiness, justice, loving-kindness, mercy, faithfulness, honor. We are also embodied, spiritual, mental, mortal, dependent, sexual, emotional, social, familial, and rational. All of these attributes have moral implications that are addressed in God’s laws and statutes. Our fulfillment requires spiritual practice, reverence for God, filial piety, responsibilities to family members, sexual discipline, concern for the physical needs of others, respect for the physical body and for life, and discipline of the mind. God’s laws and statutes set forth the foundational ethical principles for how to fulfill our nature as human beings and as image bearers of God’s nature.
With this episode I’d like to get into some more systematic theology. In a previous episode I went over the nature of God as it has been formulated in the theological and philosophical tradition of classical theism. The topic of this episode, the Trinity, is also about the nature of God but more especially about the uniquely Christian understanding of the nature of God as the triune God, God as Trinity: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
The doctrine of the Trinity is very important in Christianity. But people who are not Trinitarians, even non-Trinitarians who believe in the Bible and in Jesus, might wonder, what’s the reason for believing in the Trinity? How did Christians come to understand things in this way? And why has this understanding persisted in Christian history? Is the idea of the Trinity motivated from Biblical texts or was it something that came out of Greek philosophy or Greek culture in early Christianity? Or even more basic, what is the doctrine of the Trinity, really? I think these are good questions and quite common questions. So it’s a topic worth looking at.
I’ll go through this topic in seven sections: (1) a definition of the Trinity, (2) some misinterpretations of the Trinity, (3) the scriptural motivation for the doctrine of the Trinity, (4) some of the cultural and philosophical background, (5) some useful theological terms, (6) some history of the development of the doctrine, and (7) the significance of the doctrine of the Trinity to the whole Christian faith.
Definition
One definition of the Trinity I think is quite good is one with the following seven parts.
The Father is God.
The Son is God.
The Holy Spirit is God.
The Father is not the Son.
The Son is not the Holy Spirit.
The Holy Spirit is not the Father.
There is only one God.
I picked up this definition from Phillip Cary in his Teaching Company course The History of Christian Theology. And he adapted this from Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430). This definition is quite straightforward, I think. And we’ll see later how there are scriptural motivations for each of these statements. Each of the statements, taken individually, isn’t hard to understand. It’s trying to understand how they can all fit together that gets challenging. And that’s where a lot of the additional terms and concepts come in; like substance, persons, generation, and procession. But the most basic content of the definition, which all these other concepts are based on, consists of these very basic ideas. God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Each of them is God. They are not the same person. And there is only one God.
Misinterpretations
That’s what the Trinity is. It’s also good to understand what the Trinity is not. There are two major misunderstandings of the Trinity, that make the mistake of either confounding the persons or dividing the essence. These two misinterpretations are modalism and tritheism.
Modalism is the view that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are all the same person. That each is merely a mode that God can take on. One proponent of this view in history was a man named Sabellius in the third century A.D. So this idea is also sometimes called Sabellianism. I think this is a pretty common misunderstanding of the Trinity, for both non-Trinitarians and even many Trinitarians. It’s easy to see where this comes from. If there’s only one God and the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are God, then just say they’re all the same person. But this is quite clearly scripturally untenable, as we’ll see in the next section. We shouldn’t try to imagine that Jesus prayed to himself or spoke of himself in the third-person as if he were his own Father.
Tritheism is the view that there are three Gods: the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It’s also easy enough to see where this comes from. If the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are God, then just say there are three Gods. But this is also quite clearly scripturally untenable. Monotheism is one of the most emphatic teachings of both the Old and New Testaments. Granted, the Ancient Israelites were not very good at following this and were almost irrepressible relapsing polytheists. But the prophets of the Lord were uncompromising and zealous monotheists, continually reproving the people and calling them to repent and to forsake polytheism. While there are other divine beings like angels in the Bible, they are subordinate to the one creator God. There’s no room for three such capital G Gods in the scriptures.
Scriptural Motivation
More than any other source, more than tradition, reason, or culture, the most important and authoritative source of doctrine in Christianity is in scripture. The doctrine of the Trinity is not explicitly taught in the Bible. But the doctrine is scripturally motivated. If we ask, “what is it that motivates Christians to formulate the doctrine of the Trinity?” we can find those motivations in scripture. It doesn’t come from nowhere.
There are two main groups of scriptures that motivate the doctrine of the Trinity. First, scriptures that affirm that there is only one God. And second, scriptures that affirm that Jesus is God. Other kinds of scriptures include those that affirm that the Father is God, that the Holy Spirit of God, and that they are not all the same person.
The most significant of the monotheistic passages is the Shema in Deuteronomy 6:4.
“Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one!”
This is a kind of first article of faith for the religion of Israel. It’s the one Jesus called the first and greatest commandment (Matthew 22:38). The first of the Ten Commandments are similar.
“I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. You shall have no other gods before Me.” (Exodus 20:2-3)
Among the Old Testament prophets Second Isaiah is especially emphatic in his monotheism:
Isaiah 43:12
“You are My witnesses,” says the Lord,
“And My servant whom I have chosen,
That you may know and believe Me,
And understand that I am He.
Before Me there was no God formed,
Nor shall there be after Me.”
Isaiah 44:6
“Thus says the Lord, the King of Israel,
And his Redeemer, the Lord of hosts:
‘I am the First and I am the Last;
Besides Me there is no God.’”
That’s the monotheistic foundation. One God, the Lord God of Israel. As we come to the New Testament we find passages of scriptures that indicate that this same God is actually three persons. After his Resurrection, at the moment of his Ascension, Jesus commissioned his apostles in Matthew 28:19.
“Go therefore and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit”
Interesting that it’s the name, singular, ὄνομα (onoma), of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, rather than the names. This baptismal formula calls for baptism in the name of the three persons of the Trinity. We see elsewhere that the three persons are invoked in blessing, as with Paul in 2 Corinthians 13:14.
The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit be with you all. Amen.
In the scriptures Jesus doesn’t ever say explicitly, “I am God”. Some conclude from this is that the early Christians actually didn’t believe that he was God and that this idea developed later. I don’t think that theory works, but that’s another topic. Even without that kind of direct statement there are many reasons to conclude from the scriptures that Jesus is God.
The Gospel of John opens placing Christ at the Creation of all things in the prologue of John 1:1-5.
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made through Him, and without Him nothing was made that was made. In Him was life, and the life was the light of men. And the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it.
Paul also taught of an exalted origin when he quoted what appears to have been a very, very early Christian hymn about Jesus, in Philippians 2:5-11.
Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus, who, being in the form of God, did not consider it robbery to be equal with God, but made Himself of no reputation, taking the form of a bondservant, and coming in the likeness of men. And being found in appearance as a man, He humbled Himself and became obedient to the point of death, even the death of the cross. Therefore God also has highly exalted Him and given Him the name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those in heaven, and of those on earth, and of those under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.
That’s quite exalted language. The name which is abovery name. Jesus Christ is Lord. Lord is the word traditionally substituted for the name of God, YHWH. “Jesus is Lord” is probably the earliest Christian confession. Essentially another version of “YHWH is Lord”.
Paul has similarly exalted language for Jesus when he says in Colossians 2:9.
For in Him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily.
In the Gospel of John Jesus makes a number of conspicuous “I am” statements, basically invoking the name of God as revealed to Moses in Exodus 3:14, “I AM THAT I AM”. For example in John 8:58.
Jesus said to them, “Most assuredly, I say to you, before Abraham was, I AM.”
And Jesus’ disciple Thomas actually calls him God in John 20:27-28.
Then He said to Thomas, “Reach your finger here, and look at My hands; and reach your hand here, and put it into My side. Do not be unbelieving, but believing.” And Thomas answered and said to Him, “My Lord and my God!”
In John Jesus also teaches about his oneness with the Father. In John 10:30.
“I and My Father are one.”
And in John John 14:9-11.
He who has seen Me has seen the Father; so how can you say, ‘Show us the Father’? Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me? The words that I speak to you I do not speak on My own authority; but the Father who dwells in Me does the works. Believe Me that I am in the Father and the Father in Me, or else believe Me for the sake of the works themselves.
This unity notwithstanding, it is clear from multiple instances in the scriptures that the Father and the Son are not the same person. For example at Jesus’ baptism in Matthew 3:16-17.
When He had been baptized, Jesus came up immediately from the water; and behold, the heavens were opened to Him, and He saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove and alighting upon Him. And suddenly a voice came from heaven, saying, “This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.”
The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are all spoken of distinctly here. Jesus is also always praying to the Father, with no indication that he is in any way praying to himself. Even in their intimate unity there is distinction, as shown wonderfully in John 17:20-23.
“I do not pray for these alone, but also for those who will believe in Me through their word; that they all may be one, as You, Father, are in Me, and I in You; that they also may be one in Us, that the world may believe that You sent Me. And the glory which You gave Me I have given them, that they may be one just as We are one: I in them, and You in Me; that they may be made perfect in one, and that the world may know that You have sent Me, and have loved them as You have loved Me.”
These and other scriptures indicate that: there is only one God, that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are God, and that they are not all the same person.
Cultural and Philosophical Background
Christianity developed in a highly Hellenized, Greek-speaking environment. Even important Jewish leaders of early Christianity, like Paul of Tarsus, spoke and wrote in Greek and were immersed in Greek culture. The Jewish scripture for many outside of Judea was the Septuagint, a Greek translation of the Hebrew scriptures. An important Jewish theologian and philosopher of the time period, Philo of Alexandria (20 B.C. – 50 A.D.) wrote all his works in Greek and he was well-versed in Platonic philosophy.
There is a line of thought that Greek culture and philosophy was the real source of many Christian theological developments, rather than scripture. One prominent proponent of this view was Adolf Von Harnack (1851 – 1930). I happen to think this position is overstated and agree with Robert Louis Wilken that “the time has come to bid a fond farewell to the ideas of Adolf von Harnack” and that rather than positing the Hellenization of Christianity “a more apt expression would be the Christianization of Hellenism” (The Spirit of Early Christian Thought, xvi). Greek culture and philosophy are sometimes thought to have invaded and supplanted the original Hebrew foundation. But this world was already immersed in Greek influence, even the Jewish part of it. Certainly Jews and Christians drew from the ideas available to them in the surrounding culture, but in a way that was subordinate to and in the service of scripture. Robert Louis Wilkin made this observation of the writings of the Early Church Fathers:
“To be sure, many of the best minds in the early church were philosophically astute and moved comfortably within the intellectual tradition of the ancient world… But if one picks up a treatise of Origen or Basil of Caesarea and compares it with the writings of the philosopher Alcinous or the neo-Platonist Plotinus, it is apparent at once that something else is at work. For one thing… they turn always to the Bible as the source of their ideas. No matter how rigorous or abstruse their thinking–for example, in dealing with a complex and subtle topic like the distinctive identity of each person of the Trinity–Christian thinkers always began with specific Biblical texts. I have found that it is not possible to read the church fathers without the Bible open before me. The words of the Scriptures crowd the pages of their books and essays, and their arguments often turn on specific terms or phrases from the Bible. But one can detect something else in their writings, at once closer to experience yet more elusive. On page after page the reader senses that what they believe is anchored in regular, indeed habitual, participation in the church’s worship, and what they teach is confirmed by how they pray.”
This has also been my experience in reading the Early Church Fathers.
Something interesting that we get from Greeks are philosophical ideas that are quite amenable to monotheism, converging on a similar idea that we get through revelation in the Old Testament. Greek pagans, among the regular folk, were polytheists. But the more educated, intellectual, and philosophical Greek pagans tended to trace everything back to some single ultimate source. For Plato (c. 428 – c. 348 BC) this was The Good, for Aristotle (384 – 322 BC) this was the Unmoved Mover, for Plotinus (c. 204 – 270 AD) this was The One. Both reason and revelation pointed to the reality of a single first principle or God over all things. Early Church Fathers well-versed in both scripture and philosophy, like Justin Martyr (100 – 165), Origen of Alexandria (185 – 253), and Clement of Alexandria (150 – 215), could find both sources quite harmonious. Both reason and revelation were important sources in support of the foundational idea of the doctrine of the Trinity: that there is only one God.
Terms
It’s possible to define the Trinity in very simple terms, like the seven listed earlier. Those simple terms are sufficient for many purposes. They certainly were for the earliest Christians. Still, as Christians have thought more deeply about the Trinity they have found it helpful to expand their vocabulary to cover more sophisticated concepts and to distinguish them from heretical views. Before people had these terms available to them they might ask questions about the Trinity like “one what?” and “three whos?” What kinds of things are we talking about here? There weren’t terms available to tag these sorts of concepts to get a hold of them. There aren’t terms in scripture to use for these sorts of philosophical questions. But they are interesting questions. They’re terms that we can use if we want to take things to the “next level”. Let’s look at five such terms.
Substance, Homoousion, Essence
This is a term for the “one what?” question. The Greek term οὐσία (ousia) is essence or substance. The Council of Nicea used this term to describe what it is in their essence as God, that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share. They are the same in essence, ὁμοούσιον (homoousion), one ousia.
Persons, Hypostases
Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) is a term for the “three whos?” question. This is an especially good example of a term that was appropriated and repurposed to make a fine distinction that wasn’t conceptualized previously. (It’s quite interesting how language can extend our thinking in this way). Hypostasis had meant something very similar to ousia. But it was later made distinct to refer to that in the Trinity which should not be confounded, the persons of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Using the terms ousia and hypostasis the Trinity can be described as three hypostases, one ousia; three persons, one essence.
Perichoresis
Perichoresis (περιχώρησις) is a term to used to refer to the relations between the three persons of the Trinity. It means “going around” and when used to describe the Trinity it refers to their particular interrelation or interpenetration. As used historically in the writings of theologians like Maximus Confessor (c. 580 – 662), Gregory of Nazianzus (329–389), and John of Damascus (c. 675 – 749) it conveys a sense of motion, dynamism, even a kind of eternal dance between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This idea has special currency for the mystical side of Christianity, in pursuit of direct, experiential, and personal relationship with the Triune God.
Eternal Generation, Eternal Begetting
The Nicene Creed states that Christ is “begotten, not made”, γεννηθέντα, οὐ ποιηθέντα (gennethenta, ou poiethenta). The point being that the Son is not a creature, not created by the Father. But he is begotten, or put another way, generated by the Father. Is this a distinction without a difference? No. Unlike any created being, the Son exists necessarily and eternally, just like the Father. Each has life in himself. “For as the Father has life in Himself, so He has granted the Son to have life in Himself”. (John 5:26) There’s a relation of begetter and begotten. But this is something more akin to a logical process than a process in time.
A geometrical analogy of generation that comes to mind is the relation of the center point of a circle to all the points on its circumference. By definition all points on a circle are equidistant from the center of the circle. In a sense the center point generates all the points on the circle. But which part comes first? Well neither really comes first. The relation doesn’t even come to be in any kind of temporal process. There’s a relation there but it’s just there, without needing to have ever started, much less one part before another.
One philosophy contemporary with the Council of Nicea, Neoplatonism, certainly provided intellectual tools to come up with this kind of idea. In the metaphysics of Plotinus (204 – 270) all things are understood to derive from a single great source, an absolute One. The first level of emanation from this One is the Divine Mind. The One eternally generates the Divine Mind in a way very similar to the way Christian theologians understood the Father to generate the Son.
Procession
In the Nicene Creed it is said that the Holy Spirit “proceeds from the Father”, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον (to ek tou Patros ekporeuomenon). Catholics and Protestants also say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son. Filioque in Latin. One example from scripture for this idea is John 14:23,
But the Helper, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in My name, He will teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all things that I said to you.
History
A key historical moment for the development of the doctrine of the Trinity was the Council of Nicea in 325. The Council was a response to the teachings of Arius (265 – 336). Arius taught that the Son, Jesus Christ, was a creature, a creation of the Father, the first and greatest of God’s created beings, but still a created being. The key idea of this doctrine was that “there was a time when he was not”.
Arius’ teachings were very influential, not just among clergy and theologians but even among regular folks. Gregory of Nyssa (335 – 395) described the controversy in this way:
“The whole city is full of it, the squares, the marketplaces, the crossroads, the alleyways; rag dealers, money-changers, food-sellers, they are all busy arguing. If you ask someone to give you change, he philosophizes about the Begotten and the Unbegotten; if you inquire about the price of a loaf, you are told by way of reply that the Father is greater and the Son inferior; if you ask, “Is my bath ready?” the attendant answers that the Son was made out of nothing.” (“On the Deity of the Son” PG xlvi, 557b)
Πάντα γὰρ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τῶν τοιούτων πεπλήρωται͵ οἱ στενωποὶ͵ αἱ ἀγοραὶ͵ αἱ πλατεῖαι͵ τὰ ἄμφοδα· οἱ τῶν ἱματίων κάπηλοι͵ οἱ ταῖς τραπέζαις ἐφεστη κότες͵ οἱ τὰ ἐδώδιμα ἡμῖν ἀπεμπολοῦντες. Ἐὰν περὶ τῶν ὀβολῶν ἐρωτήσῃς͵ ὁ δέ σοι περὶ γεννητοῦ καὶ ἀγεννήτου ἐφιλοσόφησε· κἂν περὶ τιμήματος ἄρτου πύθοιο͵ Μείζων ὁ Πατὴρ͵ ἀποκρίνεται͵ καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς ὑποχείριος. Εἰ δὲ͵ Τὸ λουτρὸν ἐπιτήδειόν ἐστιν͵ εἴποις͵ ὁ δὲ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τὸν Υἱὸν εἶναι διωρίσατο. Οὐκ οἶδα τί χρὴ τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο ὀνομάσαι͵ φρενῖτιν ἢ μανίαν͵ ἤ τι τοιοῦτον κακὸν ἐπιδήμιον͵ ὃ τῶν λογι σμῶν τὴν παραφορὰν ἐξεργάζεται.
So the Church had to ask, what do we say about this? Is this right? The First Council of Nicea (325) and the Nicene Creed were the result. The Nicene Creed was later adjusted further in the First Council of Constantinople (381) to the version in use today. In response to Arius the Nicene Creed affirmed that Jesus Christ is:
“Begotten of the Father; Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father”
The key being that Jesus is God. That was the line drawn.
There were also some very significant theologians and texts written following the council that have been important in the history of Christian theology, especially theology of the Trinity. Some theologians of special note are
Athanasius of Alexandria (296 – 373)
Basil the Great (330 – 379)
Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335 – c. 395)
Gregory of Nazianzus (329–389)
Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430)
Hilary of Poitiers (310 – 367)
Arianism continued to be a prominent view, sometimes supported by the Roman Empire. And many of the Barbarian kingdoms in the West were Arians. These theologians worked diligently to teach the orthodox view against Arianism.
One of the most significant texts of this period was Augustine of Hippo’s On the Trinity (De Trinitate). It’s not only an impressive theological defense and explanation of the Trinity but it also ends up being a fascinating work on the philosophy of the mind and personal identity. This was because Augustine pursued the idea that human beings, being created in the image of God, must be created in the image of the Trinity and therefore bear features of the Trinity in themselves and in their minds.
Significance
In his Intercessory Prayer in John 17:3 Jesus said to the Father:
And this is eternal life, that they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent.
Knowing God is foundational to Christian life. This means knowing both the Father and his son Jesus Christ. And also the Holy Spirit, who testifies of both. This brings home the importance of Jesus Christ to Christian faith.
This is what makes Christianity unique. There are other monotheistic religions and even monotheistic philosophies. But the unique and special revelation of Christianity is the one we find in Jesus Christ.
Entropy is rather intimidating. It’s important to the sciences of physics and chemistry but it’s also highly abstract. There are, no doubt, more than a couple of students who graduate with college degrees in the physical sciences or in engineering who don’t have much of an understanding of what it is or what to do with it. We know it’s there and that it’s a thing but we’re glad not to have to think about it any more after we’ve crammed for that final exam in thermodynamics. I think one reason for that is because entropy isn’t something that we often use. And using things is how we come to understand them, or at least get used to them.
Ludwig Wittgenstein argued in his later philosophy that the way we learn words is not with definitions or representations but by using them, over and over again. We start to learn “language games” as we play them, whether as babies or as graduate students. I was telling my daughters the other day that we never really learn all the words in a language. There are lots of words we’ll never learn and that, if we happen to hear them, mean nothing to us. To use a metaphor from Wittgenstein again, when we hear these words they’re like wheels that turn without anything else turning with them. I think entropy is sometimes like this. We know it’s a thing but nothing else turns with it. I want to plug it into the mechanism. I think we can understand entropy better by using it to solve physical problems, to see how it interacts (and “turns”) with things like heat, temperature, pressure, and chemical reactions. My theory is that using entropy in this way will help us get used to it and be more comfortable with it. So that maybe it’s a little less intimidating. That’s the object of this episode.
I’ll proceed in three parts.
1. Define what entropy is
2. Apply it to problems using steam
3. Apply it to problems with chemical reactions
What is Entropy?
I’ll start with a technical definition that might be a little jarring but I promise I’ll explain it.
Entropy is a measure of the number of accessible microstates in a system that are macroscopically indistinguishable. The equation for it is:
S = k ln W
Here S is entropy, k is the Boltzmann constant, and W is the number of accessible microstates in a system that are macroscopically indistinguishable.
Most people, if they’ve heard of entropy at all, haven’t heard it described in this way, which is understandable because it’s not especially intuitive. Entropy is often described informally as “disorder”. Like how your bedroom will get progressively messier if you don’t actively keep it clean. That’s probably fine as an analogy but it is only an analogy. I prefer to dispense with the idea of disorder altogether as it relates to entropy. I think it’s generally more confusing than helpful.
But the technical, quantifiable definition of entropy is a measure of the number of accessible microstates in a system that are macroscopically indistinguishable.
S = k ln W
Entropy S has units of energy divided by temperature, I’ll use units of J/K. The Boltzmann constant k is the constant 1.38 x 10-23 J/K. The Boltzmann constant has the same units as entropy so those will cancel, leaving W as just a number with no dimensions.
W is the number of accessible microstates in a system that are macroscopically indistinguishable. So we need to talk about macrostates and microstates. An example of a macrostate is the temperature and pressure of a system. The macrostate is something we can measure with our instruments: temperature with a thermometer and pressure with a pressure gauge. But at the microscopic or molecular level the system is composed of trillions of molecules and it’s the motion of these molecules that produce what we see as temperature and pressure at a macroscopic level. The thermal energy of the system is distributed between its trillions of molecules and every possible, particular distribution of thermal energy between each of these molecules is an individual microstate. The number of ways that thermal energy of a system can be distributed among its molecules is an unfathomably huge number. But the vast majority of them make absolutely no difference at a macroscopic level. The vast majority of the different possible microstates correspond to the same macrostate and are macroscopically indistinguishable.
To dig a little further into what this looks like at the molecular level, the motion of a molecule can take the form of translation, rotation, and vibration. Actually, in monatomic molecules it only takes the form of translation, which is just its movement from one position to another. Polyatomic molecules can also undergo rotation and vibration, with the number of vibrational patterns increasing as the number of atoms increases and shape of the molecule becomes more complicated. All these possibilities for all the molecules in a system are potential microstates. And there’s a huge number of them. Huge, but also finite. A fundamental postulate of quantum mechanics is that energy is quantized. Energy levels are not continuous but actually come in discrete levels. So there is a finite number of accessible microstates, even if it’s a very huge finite number.
For a system like a piston we can set its entropy by setting its energy (U), volume (V), and number of atoms (N); its U-V-N conditions. If we know these conditions we can predict what the entropy of the system is going to be. The reason for this is that these conditions set the number of accessible microstates. The reason that the number of accessible microstates would correlate with the number of atoms and with energy should be clear enough. Obviously having more atoms in a system will make it possible for that system to be in more states. The molecules these atoms make up can undergo translation, rotation, and vibration and more energy makes more of that motion happen. The effect of volume is a little less obvious but it has to do with the amount of energy separating each energy level. When a set number of molecules expand into a larger volume the energy difference between the energy levels decreases. So there are more energy levels accessible for the same amount of energy. So the number of accessible microstates increases.
The entropies for many different substances have been calculated at various temperatures and pressures. There’s especially an abundance of data for steam, which has had the most practical need for such data in industry. Let’s look at some examples with water at standard pressure and temperature conditions. The entropy of
Solid Water (Ice): 41 J/mol-K
Liquid Water: 69.95 J/mol-K
Gas Water (Steam): 188.84 J/mol-K
One mole of water is 18 grams. So how many microstates does 18 grams of water have in each of these cases?
First, solid water (ice):
S = k ln W
41 J/K = 1.38 x 10-23 J/K * ln W
Divide 41 J/K by 1.38 x 10-23 J/K and the units cancel
ln W = 2.97 x 1024
That’s already a big number but we’re not done yet.
Raise e (about 2.718) to the power of both sides
W = 10^(1.29 x 10^24) microstates
W = 101,290,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 microstates
That is an insanely huge number.
Using the same method, the value for liquid water is:
W = 10^(2.2 x 10^24) microstates
W = 102,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 microstates
And the value for steam is:
W = 10^(5.94 x 10^24) microstates
W = 105,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 microstates
In each case the increased thermal energy makes additional microstates accessible. The fact that these are all really big numbers makes it a little difficult to see that, since these are differences in exponents, each number is astronomically larger than the previous one. Liquid water has 10^(9.1 x 10^23) times as many accessible microstates as ice. And steam has 10^(3.74 x 10^24) times as many accessible microstates as liquid water.
With these numbers in hand let’s stop a moment to think about the connection between entropy and probability. Let’s say we set the U-V-N conditions for a system of water such that it would be in the gas phase. So we have a container of steam. We saw that 18 grams of steam has 10^(5.94 x 10^24) microstates. The overwhelming majority of these microstates are macroscopically indistinguishable. In most of the microstates the distribution of the velocities of the molecules is Gaussian; they’re not all at identical velocity but they are distributed around a mean along each spatial axis. That being said, there are possible microstates with different distributions. For example, there are 10^(1.29 x 10^24) microstates in which that amount of water would be solid ice. That’s a lot! And they’re still accessible. There’s plenty of energy there to access them. And a single microstate for ice is just as probable as a single microstate for steam. But there are 10^(4.65 x 10^24) times as many microstates for steam than there are for ice. It’s not that any one microstate for steam is more probable than any one microstate for ice. It’s just that there are a lot, lot more microstates for steam. The percentage of microstates that take the form of steam is not 99% or 99.99%. It’s much, much closer than that to 100%. Under the U-V-N conditions that make those steam microstates accessible they will absolutely dominate at equilibrium.
What if we start away from equilibrium? Say we start our container with half ice and half steam by mass. But with the same U-V-N conditions for steam. So it has the same amount of energy. What will happen? The initial conditions won’t last. The ice will melt and boil until the system just flips among the vast number of microstates for steam. If the energy of the system remains constant it will never return to ice. Why? It’s not actually absolutely impossible in principle. But it’s just unimaginably improbable.
That’s what’s going on at the molecular level. Macroscopically entropy is a few levels removed from tangible, measured properties. What we see macroscopically are relations between heat flow, temperature, pressure, and volume. But we can calculate the change in entropy between states using various equations expressed in terms of these macroscopic properties that we can measure with our instruments.
For example, we can calculate the change in entropy of an ideal gas using the following equation:
Here s is entropy, cp is heat capacity at constant pressure, T is temperature, R is the ideal gas constant, and P is pressure. We can see from this equation that, all other things being equal, entropy increases with temperature and decreases with pressure. And this matches what we saw earlier. Recall that if the volume of a system of gas increases with a set quantity of material the energy difference between the energy levels decreases and there are more energy levels accessible for the same amount of energy. Under these circumstances pressure would decrease so entropy would decrease with pressure.
For solids and liquids we can assume that they are incompressible and leave off the pressure terms. So the change in entropy for a solid or liquid is given by the equation:
Let’s do an example with liquid water. What’s the change in entropy, and the increase in the number of accessible microstates, that comes from increasing the temperature of liquid water one degree Celsius? Let’s say we’re increasing 1 mole (18 grams) of water from 25 to 26 degrees Celsius. At this temperature the heat capacity of water is 75.3 J/mol-K.
Now that we have the increase in entropy we can find the increase in the number of microstates using the equation
Setting this equal to 0.252 J/mol-K
The increase is not as high as it was with phase changes, but it’s still a very big change.
We’ll wrap up the definition section here but conclude with some general intuitions we can gather from these equations and calculations:
1. All other things being equal, entropy increases with temperature.
2. All other things being equal, entropy decreases with pressure.
3. Entropy increases with phase changes from solid to liquid to gas.
Keeping these intuitions in mind will help as we move to applications with steam
Applications with Steam
The first two examples in this section are thermodynamic cycles. All thermodynamic cycles have 4 processes.
1. Compression
2. Heat addition
3. Expansion
4. Heat rejection
These processes circle back on each other so that the cycle can be repeated. Think, for example, of pistons in a car engine. Each cycle of the piston is going through each of these processes over and over again, several times per second.
There are many kinds of thermodynamic cycles. The idealized cycle is the Carnot cycle, which gives the upper limit on the efficiency of conversion from heat to work. Otto cycles and diesel cycles are the cyles used in gasoline and diesel engines. Our steam examples will be from the Rankine cycle. In a Rankine cycle the 4 processes take the following form:
1. Isentropic compression
2. Isobaric heat addition
3. Isentropic expansion
4. Isobaric heat rejection
An isobaric process is one that occurs at constant pressure. An adiabatic process is one that occurs at constant entropy.
An example of a Rankine cycle is a steam turbine or steam engine. Liquid water passes through a boiler, the steam passes through a turbine, expanding and turning the turbine, The fluid passes through a condenser, and then is pumped back to the boiler, where the cycle repeats. In such problems the fact that entropy is the same before and after expansion through the turbine reduces the number of unknown variables in our equations.
Let’s look at an example problem. Superheated steam at 6 MPa at 600 degrees Celsius expands through a turbine at a rate of 2 kg/s and drops in pressure to 10 kPa. What’s the power output from the turbine?
We can take advantage of the fact that the entropy of the fluid is the same before and after expansion. We just have to look up the entropy of superheated steam in a steam table. The entropy of steam at 6 MPa at 600 degrees Celsius is:
The entropy of the fluid before and after expansion is the same but some of it condenses. This isn’t good for the turbines but it happens nonetheless. Ideally, most of the fluid is still vapor so the ratio of the mass that is saturated vapor to the total fluid mass is called “quality”. The entropies of saturated liquid, sf, and of evaporation, sfg, are very different. So we can use algebra to calculate the quality, x2, of the fluid. The total entropy of the expanded fluid is given by the equation:
s2 we already know because the entropy of the fluid exiting the turbine is the same as that of the fluid entering the turbine. And we can look up the other values in steam tables.
Solving for quality we find that
Now that we know the quality we can find the work output from the turbine. The equation for the work output of the turbine is:
h1 and h2 and enthalpies before and after expansion. If you’re not familiar with enthalpy don’t worry about it (we’re getting into enough for now). It roughly corresponds to the substance’s energy. We can look up the enthalpy of the superheated steam in a steam table.
For the fluid leaving the turbine we need to calculate the enthalpy using the quality, since it’s part liquid, part vapor. We need the enthalpy of saturated liquid, hf, and of evaporation, hfg. The total enthalpy of the fluid leaving the turbine is given by the formula
From the steam tables
So
And now we can plug this in to get the work output of the turbine.
So here’s an example where we used the value of entropy to calculate other observable quantities in a physical system. Since the entropy was the same before and after expansion we could use that fact to calculate the quality of the fluid leaving the turbine, use quality to calculate the enthalpy of the fluid, and use the enthalpy to calculate the work output of the turbine.
A second example. Superheated steam at 2 MPa and 400 degrees Celsius expands through a turbine to 10 kPa. What’s the maximum possible efficiency from the cycle? Efficiency is work output divided by heat input. We have to input work as well to compress the fluid with the pump so that will subtract from the work output from the turbine. Let’s calculate the work used by the pump first. Pump work is:
Where v is the specific volume of water, 0.001 m3/kg. Plugging in our pressures in kPa:
So there’s our pump work input.
The enthalpy of saturated liquid is:
Plus the pump work input is:
Now we need heat input. The enthalpy of superheated steam at 2 MPa and 400 degrees Celsius is:
So the heat input required is:
The entropy before and after expansion through the turbine is the entropy of superheated steam at 2 MPa and 400 degrees Celsius is:
As in the last example, we can use this to calculate the quality of the steam with the equation:
Looking up these values in a steam table:
Plugging these in we get:
And
Now we can calculate the enthalpy of the expanded fluid.
And the work output of the turbine.
So we have the work input of the pump, the heat input of the boiler, and the work output of the turbine. The maximum possible efficiency is:
So efficiency is 32.32%.
Again, we used entropy to get quality, quality to get enthalpy, enthalpy to get work, and work to get efficiency. In this example we didn’t even need the mass flux of the system. Everything was on a per kilogram basis. But that was sufficient to calculate efficiency.
One last example with steam. The second law of thermodynamics has various forms. One form is that the entropy of the universe can never decrease. It is certainly not the case that entropy can never decrease at all. Entropy decreases all the time within certain systems. In fact, all the remaining examples in this episode will be cases in which entropy decreases within certain systems. But the total entropy of the universe cannot decrease. Any decrease in entropy must have a corresponding increase in entropy somewhere else. It’s easier to see this in terms of an entropy balance.
The entropy change in a system can be negative but the balance of the change in system entropy, entropy in, entropy out, and entropy of the surroundings will never be negative. We can look at the change of entropy of the universe as a function of the entropy change of a system and the entropy change of the system’s surroundings.
So let’s look at an example. Take 2 kg of superheated steam at 400 degrees Celsius and 600 kPa and condense it by pulling heat out of the system. The surroundings have a constant temperature of 25 degrees Celsius. From steam tables the entropy of the superheated steam and saturated steam are:
With these values we can calculate the change in entropy inside the system using the following equation;
The entropy decreases inside the system. Nothing wrong with this. Entropy can definitely decrease locally. But what happens in the surroundings? We condensed the steam by pulling heat out of the system and into the surroundings. So there is positive heat flow, Q, out into the surroundings. We can find the change in entropy in the surroundings using the equation:
We know the surroundings have a constant temperature, so we know T. We just need the heat flow Q. We can calculate the heat flow into the surroundings by calculating the heat flow out of the system using the equation
So we need the enthalpies of the superheated steam and saturated steam.
And plugging these in
Q = mΔh=(2)3270.2-670.6=5199 J
Now that we have Q we can find the change in entropy in the surroundings:
The entropy of the surroundings increases. And the total entropy change of the universe is:
So even though entropy decreases in the system the total entropy change in the universe is positive.
I like these examples with steam because they’re very readily calculable. The thermodynamics of steam engines have been extensively studied for over 200 years, with scientists and engineers gathering empirical data. So we have abundant data on entropy values for steam in steam tables. I actually think just flipping through steam tables and looking at the patterns is a good way to get a grasp on the way entropy works. Maybe it’s not something you’d do for light reading on the beach but if you’re ever unable to fall asleep you might give it a try.
With these examples we’ve looked at entropy for a single substance, water, at different temperatures, pressures, and phases, and observed the differences of the value of entropy at these different states.
To review some general observations:
1. All other things being equal, entropy increases with temperature.
2. All other things being equal, entropy decreases with pressure.
3. Entropy increases with phase changes from solid to liquid to gas.
In the next section we’ll look at entropies for changing substances in chemical reactions.
Applications with Chemical Reactions
The most important equation for the thermodynamics of chemical reactions is the Gibbs Free Energy equation:
ΔG=ΔH-TΔS
Where H, T, S are enthalpy, temperature, and entropy. ΔG is the change in Gibbs free energy. Gibbs free energy is a thermodynamic potential. It is minimized when a system reaches chemical equilibrium. For a reaction to be spontaneous the value for ΔG has to be negative, meaning that during the reaction the Gibbs free energy is decreasing and moving closer to equilibrium.
We can see from the Gibbs free energy equation
ΔG=ΔH-TΔS
That the value of the change in Gibbs free energy is influenced by both enthalpy and entropy. The change in enthalpy tells us whether a reaction is exothermic (negative ΔH) or endothermic (positive ΔH). Exothermic reactions release heat while endothermic reactions absorb heat. This has to do with the total change in the chemical bond energies in all the reactants against all the products. In exothermic reactions the energy released from breaking chemical bonds is greater than the energy used to form new chemical bonds. This extra energy is converted to heat. We can see from the Gibbs free energy equation that exothermic reactions are more thermodynamically favored. Nevertheless, entropy can override enthalpy.
The minus sign in front of the TS term tells us that an increase in entropy where ΔS is positive will be more thermodynamically favored. This makes sense with what we know about entropy from the second law of thermodynamics and from statistical mechanics. The effect is proportional to temperature. At low temperatures entropy won’t have much influence and enthalpy will dominate. But at higher temperatures entropy will start to dominate and override enthalpic effects. This makes it possible for endothermic reactions to proceed spontaneously. If the increase in entropy for a chemical reaction is large enough and the temperature is high enough endothermic reactions can proceed spontaneously, even though the energy required to form the chemical bonds of the products is more than the energy released from the chemical bonds in the reactants.
Let’s look at an example. The chemical reaction for the production of water from oxygen and hydrogen is:
We can look up the enthalpies and entropies of the reactants and products in chemical reference literature. What we need are the standard enthalpies of formation and the standard molar entropies of each of the components.
The standard enthalpies of formation of oxygen and hydrogen are both 0 kJ/mol. By definition, all elements in their standard states have a standard enthalpy of formation of zero. The standard enthalpy of formation for water is -241.83 kJ/mol. The total change in enthalpy for this reaction is
It’s negative which means that the reaction is exothermic and enthalpically favored.
The standard molar entropies for hydrogen, oxygen, and water are, respectively, 130.59 J/mol-K, 205.03 J/mol-K, and 188.84 J/mol-K. The total change in entropy for this reaction is
It’s negative so entropy decreases in this reaction, which means the reaction is entropically disfavored. So enthalpy and entropy oppose each other in this reaction. Which will dominate depends on temperature? At 25 degrees Celsius (298 K) the change in Gibbs free energy is
The reaction is thermodynamically favored. Even though entropy is reduced in this reaction, at this temperature that effect is overwhelmed by the favorable reduction in enthalpy as chemical bond energy of the reactants is released as thermal energy.
Where’s the tradeoff point where entropy overtakes enthalpy? This is a question commonly addressed in polymer chemistry with what’s called the ceiling temperature. Polymers are macromolecules in which smaller molecular constituents called monomers are consolidated into larger molecules. We can see intuitively that this kind of molecular consolidation constitutes a reduction in entropy. It corresponds with the rough analogy of greater order from “disorder” as disparate parts are assembled into a more organized totality. And that analogy isn’t bad. So in polymer production it’s important to run polymerization reactions at temperatures where exothermic, enthalpy effects dominate. The upper end of this temperature range is the ceiling temperature.
The ceiling temperature is easily calculable from the Gibbs free energy equation for polymerization
Set ΔGp to zero.
And solve for Tc
At this temperature enthalpic and entropic effects are balanced. Below this temperature polymerization can proceed spontaneously. Above this temperature depolymerization can proceed spontaneously.
Here’s an example using polyethylene. The enthalpies and entropies of polymerization for polyethylene are
Using our equation for the ceiling temperature we find
So for a polyethylene polymerization reaction you want to run the reaction below 610 degrees Celsius so that the exothermic, enthalpic benefit overcomes your decrease in entropy.
Conclusion
A friend and I used to get together on weekends to take turns playing the piano, sight reading music. We were both pretty good at it and could play songs reasonably well on a first pass, even though we’d never played or seen the music before. One time when someone was watching us she asked, “How do you do that?” My friend had a good explanation I think. He explained it as familiarity with the patterns of music and the piano. When you spend years playing songs and practicing scales you just come to know how things work. Another friend of mine said something similar about watching chess games. He could easily memorize entire games of chess because he knew the kinds of moves that players would tend to make. John Von Neumann once said: “In mathematics you don’t understand things. You just get used to them.” I would change that slightly to say that you understand things by getting used to them. Also true for thermodynamics. Entropy is a complex property and one that’s not easy to understand. But I think it’s easiest to get a grasp on it by using it.
“Could anything truly exist in such a fashion that it could never be either perceived or thought of, even if only in principle? How would such a reality be distinct from absolute nothingness?”
This is a question posed by David Bentley Hart in his recent book You Are Gods: On Nature and Supernature. I think it’s an interesting question and it touches on some of the most foundational issues in philosophy.
I’ll call that which could never be either perceived or thought of the “intelligible remainder”. It’s that which is left unperceived and unknown in all our perception and knowledge of things because it is intrinsically imperceptible, unknowable, and unintelligible to intelligent beings. To frame this idea it’s helpful to refer to the philosophy of John Locke and Immanuel Kant. The concepts of subject and object are important to both. Philosophically, a subject is a being who has a unique consciousness and unique personal experiences. An object is something that the subject observes, perceives, or relates to in some way. Both Locke and Kant concerned themselves with how thinking subjects relate to the objects of their experience, and in particular the limitations, or unintelligible remainder, of the subject’s grasp of the object.
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding John Locke introduced what he called the primary and secondary qualities of things. As an example, for a light wave or a sound wave one primary quality would be its wavelength. Those are things that are in the objects themselves, independent of our perceptions of them. A secondary quality, by contrast, would be like the color of light or the pitch of a sound. These secondary qualities are not in the objects themselves but are products of our modes of perception. Secondary qualities are our own quirky human ways of perceiving things.
Immanuel Kant had some similar ideas. Instead of primary and secondary qualities, in his Critique of Pure Reason he used the terms noumena and phenomena. The noumenon is the thing-in-itself, the object as it really is, independent of our perception. The phenomenon is what we perceive of it. Kant stressed that we cannot know the noumena, the things themselves as they really are. We can only know the phenomena. Our knowledge of the world outside our heads is necessarily filtered or mediated.
Sometimes you might hear this in the form of the claim that we never actually see things themselves. What’s really happening is our brains are responding to a series of physical processes and biochemical reactions, as photons impinge on our retina and induce phototransduction in photoreceptor cells, resulting in a cascade of signals carried via the optic nerve to the visual cortex, and so on. In effect we are several layers of mediation removed from the world outside our heads. And a lot is left out in the process of translation.
What I call the unintelligible remainder is a feature of this kind of philosophy in which there is a gulf between things in themselves and our perceptions of them. There’s always something inaccessible to us. A remainder that is inaccessible or unintelligible. To put it in the form of a conceptual equation.
Things In Themselves – Our Perceptions of the Them = The Unintelligible Remainder
The unintelligible remainder is what’s left over; the aspect of things that remains inaccessible and unintelligible to us. What would that unintelligible remainder be? Well, it’s impossible to say because it’s intrinsically inaccessible and unintelligible to us. But then there’s another question. Why should we think that there is such an intelligible remainder? Why should we think that any such remainder exists if it’s something we can never really know anything about?
Let’s break such remainders down into two different types:
1. Things that we don’t know about but could know about
2. Things that we don’t know about and never could know about
How different are these? Maybe the difference is slight. Or maybe it’s huge, even ontological.
We can reason inductively that there are a lot of things that we don’t know about but that we could know about because in the past there have been things that we didn’t know about at one point but later came to know about.
For example, even though we’ve always been able to see light and color we weren’t always aware of the quantifiable spectrum of wavelengths, and that it extended into wavelengths that we can’t see with our eyes, like with infrared and ultraviolet wavelengths. But we can quantify and detect those wavelengths now. The fields of optics and quantum mechanics have further increased our understanding of light.
We can reason that we will continue to come to know about more things that we don’t currently know about. For example, we’ll certainly continue to learn more about the nature of light. Such things are obviously knowable and intelligible because we have come to know about them.
But we can’t reason inductively in the same way about things that we could never know about. Trivially, we’ve never come to know about something that is unknowable. Obviously. Why should we think that such unknowable things exist as an unintelligible remainder?
I think the reasoning about these two kinds of remainders is quite different so I want to dwell on this difference for a bit.
In the case of things that we don’t know about but could know about, we can reason that such things exist through inductive reasoning. We know this is how things have worked in the past. There have been aspects of things that we didn’t know about before that we’ve come to know about later. For any particular thing we can’t conclude deductively that there’s nothing left about it that we don’t know. But we kind of expect that there’s more there because that’s how it’s always been before.
But this kind of inductive reasoning doesn’t work for things that we don’t know about and never could know about. Why is that? Because we’ve never come to know about something that we could never know about. So it’s completely different.
But we kind of want to say still that things exist that we could never know about. Or that there are aspects of things that we could never know about. Why is that? Part of it may be a spill-over effect of our inductive reasoning about things that we didn’t know about but later came to know about. It seems like if there’s all this unknown stuff there should be stuff that we could never know about. And maybe there is a lot of stuff that we never will know about. But that’s different from stuff that we never could know about. Maybe another reason is humility, recognition of our own finitude and limited capacities. Humility is certainly admirable. But I’m not sure it’s enough to make that kind of positive claim. The only way I can see that we could really conclude that there do exist such unknowables would be some kind of indirect argument of impossibility, similar to the halting problem or Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. I don’t know of any such argument of impossibility for unintelligible remainders but it’s an intriguing possibility.
What about the alternative possibility that there is no unintelligible remainder? That everything that exists is intrinsically intelligible and could be perceived and thought of? Are there reasons to think that could be the case?
We can call the foregoing picture with Locke and Kant one of the “Cartesian subject”, which owes its name to the philosopher Rene Descartes. The basic model is of me here “inside” my head as a thinking subject, receiving sense data from objects “outside” in the world. So there’s this stark division between subject and object. This model of the Cartesian subject is quite powerful and intuitive. And it fits with the idea that there is an unintelligible remainder to the objects in the outside world, albeit inconclusively as previously discussed. But there are alternatives. I’ll talk about two: the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and the classical philosophy of Logos.
Martin Heidegger was working out of the field of phenomenology, which is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness. But his primary focus was ontology, the philosophy of being. His work was an effort to explain the meaning of being, what it means for a thing to be. In Being and Time he first approached this question through the being of human beings, what he called “Dasein”, a German neologism for “there being”. He discarded the concept of the Cartesian subject, a subject separated from the world of objects, with its split between subject and object. Instead, for Heidegger we are “being in the world”.
The philosophy of Being and Time and Heidegger’s later philosophy is extremely vast so I’m only sticking to a few key points related to my topic. One way he describes being is as disclosure, as things being revealed. Many of his circumlocutions have the effect of keeping the active role away from any kind of Cartesian subject. Instead of us as subjects perceiving objects there is disclosure and being revealing things. Another interesting concept of his is the “clearing”, like a clearing in the woods. In the dense forest it is dark and obscure but in the clearing there is space to see things. I am like a clearing in the woods, a site of disclosure and revealing, where things are revealed around me. It’s a very unusual way of speaking but these circumlocutions have the aim of directing our thinking away from the subject-object split.
Another important Heideggerian idea is that the disclosure of being to us comes in terms of our projects and interests. Things like tools are disclosed to us in the first place as tools rather than as atomic facts that we then deduce to be tools in a secondary way. Heidegger’s example is a hammer. In the Kantian view we’d receive raw sense data, percepts, that our minds would use “categories”, sort of like mental modules, to process into concepts. We’d see the raw sense data first and then our minds would process that it is a hammer. But Heidegger rejects that idea. For Heidegger we’re not isolated in our own minds looking out at the world, receiving raw sense impressions. We’re already in the world. We’re already in the workshop, smelling the sawdust, engaged in the activity of building something. The hammer is a tool for hammering as part of our project. We may not even “see” it when we’re using it if we’re really in the zone. It’s just part of a seamless flow of activity. This is a very different way of thinking.
One of the fascinating things about this is that it has very tangible implications in the field of artificial intelligence. If you think about the different approaches I’ve described here you can imagine that it will make a really big difference whether you approach AI in a Lockean, Kantian way versus a Heideggerian way. And I think this is actually one of the best ways to approach Heidegger’s thought. One of the major players in 20th century artificial intelligence was the Heideggerian philosopher Hubert Dreyfus. Here’s his account:
“In 1963 I was invited by the RAND Corporation to evaluate the pioneering work of Alan Newell and Herbert Simon in a new field called Cognitive Simulation (CS). Newell and Simon claimed that both digital computers and the human mind could be understood as physical symbol systems, using strings of bits or streams of neuron pulses as symbols representing the external world. Intelligence, they claimed, merely required making the appropriate inferences from these internal representations… As I studied the RAND papers and memos, I found to my surprise that, far from replacing philosophy, the pioneers in CS had learned a lot, directly and indirectly from the philosophers. They had taken over Hobbes’ claim that reasoning was calculating, Descartes’ mental representations, Leibniz’s idea of a ‘universal characteristic’ – a set of primitives in which all knowledge could be expressed, – Kant’s claim that concepts were rules, Frege’s formalization of such rules, and Russell’s postulation of logical atoms as the building blocks of reality. In short, without realizing it, AI researchers were hard at work turning rationalist philosophy into a research program.”
“…I began to suspect that the critical insights formulated in existentialist armchairs, especially Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s, were bad news for those working in AI laboratories – that, by combining rationalism, representationalism, conceptualism, formalism, and logical atomism into a research program, AI researchers had condemned their enterprise to reenact a failure.”
“…To say a hammer has the function of being for hammering leaves out the defining relation of hammers to nails and other equipment, to the point of building things, and to the skills required when actually using the hammer – all of which reveal the way of being of the hammer which Heidegger called readiness-to-hand.”
“…It seemed to me, however, that the deep problem wasn’t storing millions of facts; it was knowing which facts were relevant in any given situation. One version of this relevance problem was called ‘the frame problem.’ If the computer is running a representation of the current state of the world and something in the world changes, how does the program determine which of its represented facts can be assumed to have stayed the same, and which would have to be updated?”
I think that’s quite fascinating and one of the best examples I’m aware of where we can see that the opaque writing of a Continental philosopher is not just meaningless gibberish or gratuitous navel gazing without any actual implications. If we ever end up creating artificial intelligence with true self-consciousness – and I think we will – I suspect that one of these approaches will work and the other will not. And in the process that will tell us a lot about the generalized nature of self-consciousness as such, including the nature of our own self-consciousness. It may also tell us about the nature of being itself, what it means for things to be.
How does this relate to the question of the unintelligible remainder? I don’t think Heideggerian ontology addresses that as much as the approach I’ll be talking about next but I think there are some interesting things here to think about. What I see with Heidegger isn’t as much the elimination of a remainder as much as the presence of certain indispensables. And these are indispensables that in other frameworks seem less real or fundamental to the being of things; in other words, quite dispensable. We might think that what a hammer “really” is is a meaningless collocation of atoms. But in Heidegger’s ontology this is not how the being of the hammer is revealed to us. Far from it. That may not seem like a big deal. Why should the way we see things be so important or say anything about the way things really are? But here I’d go back to AI. For a self-conscious AI certain things are going to be indispensable for it to make its way around in the world. AI without the indispensables won’t work. And I’d say that’s because it won’t approach the world correctly. A self-conscious AI will have to see the world in terms of projects, activities, and interests, populated with things in terms of these interests. Those are the indispensables that make up the reality of our world. So in a reverse sort of way it may be that the Lockean-Kantian approach does have a remainder that the Heiderggerian approach is able to account for.
The second alternative to the Cartesian subject I’d like to talk about is the classical philosophy of Logos. I talked about this in some detail in a previous episode, “Logos: The Intellectual Structure of Being”. Logos has its roots in Greek philosophy but has since been most developed in Christian philosophy. The two philosopher-theologians I’ll refer to here are Joseph Ratzinger and David Bentley Hart.
Joseph Ratzinger, later Pope Benedict XVI, gave an excellent overview of Logos in his book Introduction to Christianity, in which he calls Logos the “intellectual structure of being”. He says, “All being is a product of thought and, indeed, in its innermost structure is itself thought.” What implication does this have for the way we perceive and understand things? Ratzinger says: “There is also expressed the perception that even matter is not simply non-sense that eludes understanding, that it too bears in itself truth and comprehensibility that makes intellectual comprehension possible.” That’s the key. With the Logos all of reality is intellectual or, in other words, thought. There can be no unintelligible remainder to things when all of reality is itself thought in its innermost structure.
The process of perceiving the world in this view is not one of processing mere matter with our mental faculties. It’s a process that is parallel to the structure of reality itself. As Ratzinger says: “All our thinking is, indeed, only a rethinking of what in reality has already been thought out beforehand.” As we conceive of the world through thought we are retracing the thought that comprises its essence. “The intellectual structure that being possesses and that we can re-think is the expression of a creative pre-meditation, to which they owe their existence.”
Does this kind of intellectual structure to all of reality entail the existence of God? Ultimately it may. But I think there are a couple other ways to think about it. Consider three possibilities:
1. The rationality of reality is a conditional property, conditional on there being intelligent beings in reality.
2. The rationality of reality is independent of any intelligent beings.
3. The rationality of reality is the rationality of a mind that grounds reality.
Only the third requires God.
In the first option the rationality of reality is a conditional feature, a feature that reality would have if certain conditions were met, even if they are not otherwise actualized. Something of the form:
1. IF there are intelligent beings in reality.
2. AND IF any existing intelligent beings obtain some degree of accurate understanding of reality.
3. THEN such intelligent beings will find reality to be intelligible and rational.
This is probably the option that seems most immediately plausible and straightforward.
The second option moves away from a subjective understanding of rationality to an objective understanding. We can think of this just as consistency. For intelligent beings instrumental rationality is consistency between actions and intentions. But apart from intelligent beings we could think of consistency between states of affairs. At a most basic level, noncontradiction. For some state of affairs, S, it won’t be the case that both S and not-S.
Ratzinger calls this kind of objective consistency “objective mind”. There is at least an “as-if” quality to the intelligibility of reality. It is structured “as if” rationally constructed. I think it’s possible to work within that framework. But ultimately I follow Ratzinger in his view that “objective mind is the product of subjective mind and can only exist at all as the declension of it, that, in other words, being-thought (as we find it present in the structure of the world) is not possible without thinking.”
Let’s turn now to David Bentley Hart and his discussion of this in his book You Are Gods. He says:
“We are accustomed, here in modernity’s evening twilight, to conceive of our knowledge of the world principally as a regime of representation, according to which sensory intuitions are transformed into symbolic images by some kind of neurological and perceptual metabolism, and then subjected to whatever formal conceptual determinations our transcendental apperception and apparatus of perception might permit.”
This is a restatement of the fundamental problem at hand. As a thinking subject, I’m stuck inside my head, separated from the world out there, receiving and processing raw sense data, and trying to come up with a picture of the objects out in the world as best I can. But that picture is always incomplete and eludes intelligibility. As Hart says:
“Being in itself possesses an occult adversity or resistance to being known. All that we experience in experiencing the world, then, is an obscure, logically inexplicable, but unremitting correspondence between mind and world, one whose ontological basis is not a presumed primordial identity between them, but rather something like a pre-established harmony or purely fortuitous synchrony—or inexplicably coherent illusion.”
Some opaque language here but I’ll explain. What Hart calls the “occult adversity or resistance to being known” is what I’m calling the unintelligible remainder. As I sit isolated inside my head looking out into the world putting a picture of it together, the picture that I see has order and regularity. But why? Ratzinger says it’s because the world is intrinsically rational. If that were not the case the order and regularity would be remarkable indeed. This is what Hart means when he says it would be “purely fortuitous synchrony–or inexplicably coherent illusion.” But Hart rejects that idea and, like Ratzinger, sees reality as intrinsically rational. Like Ratzinger he understands our perception and knowledge of things to be a process that is parallel to the structure of reality itself.
“Mind and world must belong to one another from the first, as flowing from and continuously participating in a single source.”
“Being and knowing must, then, coincide in some principle of form.”
Being and knowing are fundamentally linked in such a way that ontology, the philosophy of being, and epistemology, the philosophy of knowledge, “coincide as a single event of manifestation, of Being’s disclosure, which is to say also, of the full existence of what is made manifest.” There are some interesting similarities here with Heidegger in Hart’s idea of the “disclosure” of Being. In Hart’s view, being and knowing are ultimately one and the same. He’s very skeptical of the idea that the way things “really” are is something intrinsically unintelligible that we could never access or perceive.
“Under the regime of representation, the intelligible is a veil drawn before the abyss of the unintelligible, and the unintelligible is more real than the intelligible.”
This is the view he is going to criticize. That the unintelligible is more real than the intelligible.
“But what would it really mean to say that something exists that is, of its nature, alien to intelligibility? Can Being and knowing be wholly severed from one another without creating an intolerable contradiction? Could anything truly exist in such a fashion that it could never be either perceived or thought of, even if only in principle?”
“In principle” is a modifier that should not be overused but I think it’s appropriate here. The issue is not whether something currently is or can be perceived and thought of by finite human beings. As I said before, there’s been a lot of stuff that we haven’t been able to perceive or know about in the past that we’ve since gained the ability to perceive or know about by extending the reach of our innate capacities. Our innate capacities are the same as those of our ancestors 10,000 years ago. The things that are, in fact, perceivable and knowable to us were, in principle, perceivable and knowable to them. By analogy, there are things that are, in principle, perceivable and knowable to us that are not currently perceivable and knowable to us, in fact. With that in mind, Hart is asking if, with this most expansive possible understanding of the perceptive and intellectual capacities of intelligent beings, could anything exist that eludes them? That would be the unintelligible reminder. And he asks:
“How would such a reality be distinct from absolute nothingness?”
I’ll bring up again my distinction between things that we don’t know about but could know about and things that we don’t know about and never could know about. Certainly the first of these is distinct from absolute nothingness. We can reasonably conclude by inductive reasoning that lots of things exist that we don’t know about. But we cannot conclude with that same kind of inductive logic that there are things that exist that we never could know about. We might want to say that there are such unknowables out of humility. Or maybe we can reason toward their existence through some kind of argument of impossibility. But Hart thinks that: “The more rational assumption is… that in fact mind and world must belong to one another from the first, as flowing from and continuously participating in a single source.”
“It certainly seems reasonable to assume that Being must also be manifestation, that real subsistence must also be real disclosure, that to exist is to be perceptible, conceivable, knowable, and that to exist fully is to be manifest to consciousness.”
Why is that the more rational assumption? Hart doesn’t really explain that but I don’t disagree. Everything we do know about the world indicates that it is rationally structured and we have no knowledge of anything that isn’t. That’s not an absolutely conclusive reason but I think it’s a compelling reason to think that everything that exists is rationally structured, perceivable, and intelligible.
“So long as any absolute qualitative disproportion remains between Being and knowing, then, Being cannot become manifest, and so is not. Being must be intelligible, or even intelligibility itself. The perfectly unintelligible is a logical and ontological contradiction.”
There are some interesting ideas here that I think could use some further development. If the perfectly unintelligible, what I’ve been calling the unintelligible remainder, really is a logical and ontological contradiction that would be a compelling refutation of the existence of the unintelligible remainder. It looks like that argument for such logical and ontological contradiction would involve a demonstration of the necessary connection between being and manifestation, or being and disclosure as Heidegger put it. That what it means for something to be is a process of unconcealment and disclosure.
So going back to the opening question. “Could anything truly exist in such a fashion that it could never be either perceived or thought of, even if only in principle?” Is there an ineliminable, unintelligible remainder to all our knowledge and perception? I don’t think there is. I suspect that a great deal falls into the class of things that we don’t know about. Probably the vast majority of the things that make up reality. Nevertheless, I think they are all things that we don’t know about but could know about because all of reality is rationally structured and mind and world, thought and being, flow in parallel from the same source.
From the publisher's feed