International law involving armed conflict has been “dead” in public perception since before the first shots were fired on October 7th. A community of humanitarian activists, academics, and NGOs has long presented a version of the law that “doesn’t connect with and doesn’t align with the doctrinal version of the law that we apply in practice,” Professor Brian Cox told a Jewish Policy Center webinar on Feb. 26. Truth may be the well-known first casualty of war, but law precedes it — distorted before conflicts even begin.
Cox, an adjunct professor at Cornell University Law School and a 22-year U.S. Army veteran, served seven years as a judge advocate with combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. His roles included military prosecutor, federal prosecutor, brigade judge advocate, and military magistrate. That background, he said, reveals a stark “divergence” between the law as military practitioners apply it and the version the humanitarian community generates in public discourse. Military lawyers advise commanders and train soldiers — “it’s not really our job to get thoroughly involved with public discourse.” The humanitarian community fills that vacuum.
He pointed to United Nations General Assembly resolutions as a prime example. While the General Assembly offers “absolutely virtuous qualities” as a diplomatic forum, it “cannot create international law” and its resolutions carry “no legal consequence.” Yet those pursuing an anti-Israel agenda exploit resolutions accumulated since the early 1970s to “create the perception as though the United Nations has said this is law and every country now has to follow.”
On the genocide charge, Cox was direct: “The focus always has to be intent. Intent is decisive.” From Raphael Lemkin’s original formulation through the 1948 Genocide Convention to the 1998 Rome Statute, intent has remained the linchpin. “It’s not like there’s a lot of destruction, but we’re not sure about the intent, but it’s still genocide. Intent is decisive.”
Israel’s expressed strategic objective has been consistent throughout: ensure Hamas no longer poses a threat and repatriate all hostages. To establish genocide, one would have to prove the actual intent is to destroy the Palestinian Arab population — not Hamas. Those advancing the allegation, he said, use a methodology “like clockwork”:
He cited a concrete example. When the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) identified an underground Hamas command node beneath a hospital, they “deliberately delayed the fuses of these munitions so that the munitions would penetrate through the ground and explode underneath” rather than destroy the hospital above. “If the intent were to destroy the Palestinian population in whole or in part as such, there would be no need” for such measures.
On disproportionate force, Cox provided the doctrinal standard: “An attack is prohibited if the expected incidental damage is going to be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected.” Key points:
In 22 years of service, he said, “I can’t think of a single scenario where a commander said, I expect incidental damage that’s going to be excessive, and I’m going to launch the attack anyways.” He criticized Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for a “flawed methodology” — visiting attack sites after the fact, finding no visible evidence of military objectives, and concluding disproportionality without access to decision-makers’ intent or intelligence.
The volume of misinformation, he acknowledged, amounts to a “flood” that overwhelms the few voices committed to doctrinal accuracy. Those who understand military doctrine “are too few and far between.” The best approach: “Keep chipping away at it to create an anchor for other folks who are interested in the truth to grab onto.”
Looking ahead, there is no legal obligation to rebuild Gaza before the conflict is resolved — and sound policy argues against it. The administration’s peace plan, including the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF), represents “a generational opportunity to completely change the nature of this conflict that has been dragging out since the late 1940s.” But the international community “is going to have to put their troops where their mouths are” and use armed force against Hamas if necessary. “If that commitment isn’t there,” Cox cautioned, “my assessment is this won’t work. It’s just going to be a piece of paper.”
This summary was created with the help of AI, it may contain errors.
